National Liberation Front (Algeria)

# National Liberation Front (Algeria)

## Abstract

The National Liberation Front (Arabic: جبهة التحرير الوطني, romanized: Jabhatu l-Taḥrīri l-Waṭanī; French: Front de libération nationale) commonly known by its French acronym FLN, is a nationalist political party in Algeria. It was the principal nationalist movement during the Algerian War and the sole legal and ruling political party of the Algerian state until other parties were legalised in 1989.

The FLN was established in 1954 following a split in the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties from members of the Special Organisation paramilitary; its armed wing, the National Liberation Army, participated in the Algerian War from 1954 to 1962. After the Évian Accords of 1962, the party purged internal dissent and ruled Algeria as a one-party state. After the 1988 October Riots and the Algerian Civil War (1991–2002) against Islamist groups, the FLN was reelected to power in the 2002 Algerian legislative election, and has generally remained in power until 2007, when it started forming coalitions with other parties.

## History

### Colonial era

The background of the FLN can be traced back to the growing anti-colonialism and Algerian nationalist sentiments since the outbreak of WWII. The repression against the Algerian Muslim population intensified as Abdelhamid Ben Badis got placed under house arrest and Marshal Pétain 's government banned the Algerian Communist Party and Algerian People's Party. As the war turned gradually more in favor of the Western Allies, given the US's global engagement and its ideological campaign against colonialism, the core sentiment amongst the Algerian nationalists was to use the victory in Europe to promote the independence of the country, which is reflected by the issuing of the Manifesto of the Algerian People by Ferhat Abbas. As this objective failed to materialize, a new party Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTDL) founded by the just-released Messali Hadj started to gain momentum and took the lead in the nationalist movement.

However, the Algerian Assembly's double electoral college system stipulated an equal number of 60 representation between the French settlers and the Muslim community while the Muslim community was significantly larger than the settlers. The underrepresentation combined with the unfair election in 1948 limited the MTDL's ability to gain further political power. Consequently, the Algerian nationalists veered to a more military approach as noted in their participation in the Special Organisation (Algeria), which is a paramilitary component of the MTLD and included the important figures in Algerian politics such Ahmed Ben Bella, Hocine Aït Ahmed, and Mohammed Boudiaf.

Later in 1951, the capture of Ahmed Ben Bella and the subsequent dismantling of the Special Organisation temporarily subdued the nationalist movement but sparkled the desire inside the Special Organisation militants to form a new organization – Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action (CRUA). It initially had a five-man leadership consisting of Mostefa Ben Boulaïd, Larbi Ben M'hidi, Rabah Bitat, Mohamed Boudiaf and Mourad Didouche. They were joined by Krim Belkacem in August, and Hocine Aït Ahmed, Ahmed Ben Bella and Mohamed Khider later in the summer.

The FLN was established on 10 October 1954. It succeeded the CRUA which had been formed earlier in the year because the CRUA failed to provide unity within the MTLD Party. On 1 November 1954, the FLN launched the Algerian War after publishing the Declaration of 1 November 1954 written by journalist Mohamed Aïchaoui. Didouche was killed on 18 January 1955, whilst both Ben Boulaïd and Bitat were captured by the French. Abane Ramdane was recruited to take control of the FLN's Algiers campaign, and went on to become one of its most effective leaders. By 1956, nearly all the nationalist organizations in Algeria had joined the FLN, which had established itself as the main nationalist group through both co-opting and coercing smaller organizations; the most important group that remained outside the FLN was Messali Hadj 's Algerian National Movement (MNA). At this time the FLN reorganized into something like a provisional government, consisting of a five-man executive and legislative body, and was organized territorially into six wilayas, following the Ottoman -era administrative boundaries.

The FLN's armed wing during the war was called the National Liberation Army (ALN). It was divided into guerrilla units fighting France and the MNA in Algeria (and wrestling with Messali's followers over control of the expatriate community, in the " Café Wars " in France), and another, stronger component more resembling a traditional army. These units were based in neighbouring Arab countries (notably in Oujda in Morocco, and Tunisia), and although they infiltrated forces and ran weapons and supplies across the border, they generally saw less action than the rural guerrilla forces. These units were later to emerge under the leadership of army commander Colonel Houari Boumediene as a powerful opposition to the political cadres of the FLN's exile government, the GPRA, and they eventually came to dominate Algerian politics.

#### FLN violence

The Algerian war resulted in between 300,000 and 400,000 deaths. The FLN is considered responsible for over 16,000 civilians killed and over 13,000 disappeared between 1954 and 1962. After the ceasefire of 19 March 1962, the FLN is thought to have massacred thousands of harkis, Muslim Algerians who had served in the French army and whom the French, contrary to promises given, had denied a "repatriation" to France. An example of an FLN massacre is the Philippeville massacre.

### Independence and one-party state

The war for independence continued until March 1962, when the French government finally signed the Évian Accords, a ceasefire agreement with the FLN. In July of the same year, the Algerian people approved the cease-fire agreement with France in a referendum, supporting economic and social cooperation between the two countries as well. Full independence followed, and the FLN seized control of the country. Political opposition in the form of the MNA and Communist organizations was outlawed, and Algeria was constituted as a one-party state. The FLN became its only legal and ruling party.

Immediately after independence, the party experienced a severe internal power struggle. Political leaders coalesced into two large camps: a Political Bureau formed by the radical Ahmed Ben Bella, who was assisted by the border army, faced off against the political leadership in the former exile government; Boumédiène's army quickly put down resistance and installed Ben Bella as president. The single most powerful political constituency remained the former ALN, which had returned largely unscathed from exile and was now organized as the country's armed forces; added to this were regionally powerful guerrilla irregulars and others who jockeyed for influence in the party. In building his one-party regime, Ben Bella purged remaining dissidents (such as Ferhat Abbas), but also quickly ran into opposition from Boumédiène as he tried to assert himself independently from the army.

In 1965, the tension between Boumédiène and Ben Bella culminated in a coup d'état, after Ben Bella had tried to sack one of the Colonel's closest collaborators, Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika (who was elected President of Algeria in 1999). A statist- socialist and anticolonial nationalist, Boumédiène ruled through decree and "revolutionary legitimacy", marginalizing the FLN in favor of his personal decision-making and the military establishment, even while retaining the one-party system. Boumédiène held tight control over party leadership until his death in 1978, at which time the party reorganized again under the leadership of the military's next candidate, Col. Chadli Bendjedid. The military remained well-represented on the FLN Central Committee and is widely thought to have been the real power-broker in the country. During the 1980s the FLN toned down the socialist content of its programme, enacting some free-market reforms and purging Boumédiène stalwarts.

### Multi-party era

It was not until 1988 that massive demonstrations and riots jolted the country towards major political reform. The riots led to the constitution being amended to allow a multi-party system. The first multi-party elections were the 1990 local elections, which saw the FLN heavily defeated by the Islamist Islamic Salvation Front (ISF), which won control of over half the local councils; the FLN received just over a quarter of the vote, retaining control of a similar number of councils. The first round of the parliamentary elections the following year saw the ISF win 188 of the 231 seats, whilst the FLN won only 16, placing third behind the Socialist Forces Front. However, shortly afterwards, due to fears of the ISF forming an Islamic state, a military coup d'état cancelled the election process and forced president Bendjedid to resign, sparking the Algerian Civil War.

Algeria was under direct military rule for several years, during which the party remained in opposition to the government during the first part of the war, notably in 1995 signing the Sant'Egidio Platform, which was highly critical of the military establishment. After internal power struggles and a leadership change, it returned to supporting the presidency. After formal democracy was restored, the FLN initially failed to regain its prominent position; in the 1997 parliamentary elections it emerged as the third-largest party, receiving 14% of the vote and winning 69 of the 231 seats. However, it won a landslide victory in the 2002 elections, winning 199 of the 389 seats.

The party nominated Ali Benflis as its candidate for the 2004 presidential elections. He finished as runner-up to the incumbent Abdelaziz Bouteflika, but received only 6.4% of the vote. In 2005 FLN formed the Presidential Alliance with the National Rally for Democracy (RND) and the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP).

The 2007 parliamentary elections saw the FLN reduced to 163 seats, although the FLN's Abdelaziz Belkhadem remained Prime Minister. Bouteflika was the party's candidate in the 2009 presidential elections, which he won with 90% of the vote.

In 2012, MSP left the Presidential Alliance and joined the Green Algeria Alliance. Despite that, the FLN remained the largest party following the 2012 parliamentary elections, winning 208 of the 462 seats. Bouteflika was re-elected on the FLN ticket in the 2014 presidential elections with 82% of the vote. The elderly and ailing Bouteflika is widely seen as a mere frontman for what has often described as a "shadowy" group of generals and intelligence officers known to the Algerians collectively as le pouvoir (“the power”) and whose individual members are called décideurs with The Economist writing in 2012 "The most powerful man in the land may be Mohamed Mediène, known as Toufiq who has headed military intelligence for two decades". General Mohamed Mediène, the chief of military intelligence from 1990 to 2015 was known to be a leading décideur within le pouvior and for his secrecy with The Economist reporting on 21 September 2013: "Despite his leading role in defeating Islamic militants in a brutal civil war between 1991 and 2000, and his less public role as kingmaker in the pouvoir, General Mediene’s face remains unknown; it is said that anyone who has seen it expires soon after." On 13 September 2015, it was announced that Mediène was retiring and President Bouteflika had appointed General Athmane Tartag to succeed him. Mediène's dismissal was viewed as the culmination of a long "behind-the-scenes power struggle" with Bouteflika, leaving the latter fully in charge and giving him more power to determine his own successor.

In the 2017 parliamentary elections, FLN won 164 of the 462 seats, thus losing 44 seats; however, thanks to the good performance of the RND (which won 100 seats), the Presidential Alliance was able to maintain a parliamentary majority and continue to rule the country.

#### Relationship with Jewish Algerians

Jews in Algeria were given French citizenship during the colonial era starting in 1870, while Muslims were denied citizenship by the French. The Jews in Algeria were seen as a go-between for French-Muslim relations; however, the lack of citizenship on behalf of the Muslims created tension between the two groups. During the Algerian War, Jews felt as if they were being forced to choose sides; they were either Algerian and fighting with the FLN for independence, or they were French and fighting with the French to keep Algeria as a colony. At the start of the Algerian War, the FLN offered Jews the opportunity to join their efforts, and in return Jews would be given Algerian citizenship when Algeria won independence. Most of the Jews in Algeria sided with the French Government, much to the dismay of the FLN and their supporters. During the course of the war, Jews in Algeria began to feel as if the FLN was targeting Jews and not just the French people living in Algeria. This led to increased tensions between Jews and Muslims in the area. After the war, Algerian citizenship was only extended to Muslims whose fathers and grandfathers were Muslim at the time the FLN won independence from the French Government and those who participated directly or indirectly in the national liberation movement. Algerian Jews were no longer considered Algerian, but they still retained French citizenship. With their French citizenship, the majority of Jews in Algeria decided to emigrate to France, with a small number of Jews deciding to emigrate to Israel and an even smaller number of Jews deciding to stay in Algeria under the rule of the FLN. Between 1961 and 1962, 130,000 out of Algeria's 140,000 Jews left for France, while around 10,000 immigrated to Israel.

## Ideology

The FLN's ideology was primarily Algerian nationalist, understood as a movement within a wider Arab nationalism and also a pan-Arab solidarity. It essentially drew its political self-legitimization from three sources: Nationalism, and the revolutionary war against France; Socialism, loosely interpreted as a popular anti-exploitation creed; Islam, defined as the main foundation for the national consciousness, and a crucial factor in solidifying the Algerian identity as separate from that of French Algerians or pied-noirs.

As the name implies, it viewed itself as a "front" composed of different social sectors and ideological trends, even if the concept of a monolithic Algerian polity gradually submerged this vision. A separate party ideology was not well developed at the time of independence, except insofar as it focused on the liberation of Algeria. This latter aspect led to the denial of or refusal to deal with the separate Berber identity held by Algerian Berbers who made up about 20% of Algeria, something which caused fierce opposition and led to the splintering of the movement immediately after independence, as Hocine Aït Ahmed set up the Berberist and pro-democracy Socialist Forces Front (FFS) in Tizi Ouzou and began a rebellion in Kabylia which was defeated by the government in 1965.

### Anti-colonialism and Islamism

Anti-Colonialism is widely considered as the core value in Algerian official discourse during its entire contemporary political and social history, especially during the formation of the FLN and later during the Islamist movement. The Muslim population had been discriminated against at a constitutional level, as illustrated by the fact that French settlers formed up to 80% of the membership in three departmental councils in 1875; and at a local level, the metropolitan model composed of a major and municipal council only granted voting right to 5% of the adult male Muslim population until 1919, when the number increase to 25%. Therefore, its nationalist outlook was also closely interwoven with anti-Colonialism and anti-imperialism, something which would remain a lasting characteristic of Algerian foreign policy.

Islamism pertained its dominance in Algerian politics because of the specific social contexts during different periods. The humiliating failure of the Mokrani Revolt in 1871 facilitated the pro-Islamism sentiment in the society as people generally regarded Islam as the long-lasting and never-fading symbolic opposition towards the French rule; also the Italian invasion of Libya in 1911 provoked sympathy in the Muslim community and strengthened the Islamic cultural identity and these two events together consolidated the Islamism-Colonialism opposition rhetoric.

The politicization of the Islamism started with the noticeable wave of Islamic discourse led by religious scholars such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838–97), Mohammed Abduh (1849–1905) and Rashid Rida (1865–1935) that focused on resisting the foreign economic control and establishing an Islamic country based on the sharia, which were the core values of the Algerian Ulama. The movement absolutely rejected atheism and was not overtly secularist, contrary to widespread perception in the West, and Islamism was perhaps the most important mobilizing ideology during the Algerian War. Still, after independence, the party would in practice assume a strongly modernist interpretation of Islam, supported the social transformation of Algerian society, the emancipation of women, etc., and worked only through secular institutions.

Before Col. Chadli Bendjedid came into power in 1971, the Islamic movement had been rather successfully monitored and subdued by the government during the previous 20 years, but the Iranian Revolution rekindled the movement and posed a greater threat to the state. Since the Algerian independence, Religion had been relegated to the role of legitimizing factor for the party-regime, especially under the presidency of Col. Houari Boumédiènne (1965–78), but even then Islam was considered the state religion and a crucial part of Algerian identity, as Boumédiènne himself took pride in his Quranic training. His predecessor Ahmed Ben Bella (1962–65) was more committed to the Islamic component of the regime, although always viewed as more of an Arab nationalist than an Islamic activist (and he remains far removed from what is today referred to as Algeria's Islamists). During the mid- to late-1980s, Bendjedid reintroduced religiously conservative legislation in an attempt to appease growing Islamist opposition. During and after the Algerian Civil War, the party's position has remained that of claiming Algerian Islam as a main influence, while simultaneously arguing that this must be expressed as a progressive and modern faith, even if the party generally keeps in line with the conservative social mores of Algeria's population. It has strongly condemned the radical- fundamentalist religious teachings of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and other Islamist groups, even while supporting the inclusion of non-violent Islamist parties in the political system and working with them.

### Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism

Arab nationalism and Pan-Arabism are considered core principles of the FLN and Algerian nationalism. Arab themes were glorified as the foundation of Algerian nationalism that would fit into Pan-Arabism. Albert Camus argued that Algerian nationalism was closely tied to Nasserism and Pan-Arabism in an essay titled 'Algeria 1958'. A prominent member of the Algerian independence movement, Abdel-Hamid ibn Badis (1889–1940), emphasized the Arab and Muslim character of Algeria through his Association of Algerian Muslim Ulema, and famously coined the often-cited phrase: "Islam is our religion, Algeria is our homeland, Arabic is our language", while his fellow 'alim Ahmad Tawfiq al-Madani (1889–1983) wrote extensive historical writings in Arabic celebrating the Muslim and Arab ancestors of Algeria.

During the Algerian war of independence, the FLN emerged as the main socialist group after uniting with several smaller independence groups, and was strongly committed to Pan-Arabism. A major supporter of the Algerian independence movement was Gamal Abdel Nasser, whose mixture of Arab nationalism and revolution appealed to the Arabs in North Africa. He provided financial, diplomatic and military support to the FLN, and based the Algerian provisional government in Cairo. This played a major role in France's decision to wage war against him during the 1956 Suez Crisis. Once Algeria gained independence in 1962, Arab nationalist leader Ahmed Ben Bella was elected president after winning elections with 99.6 per cent of the votes. He composed the Algerian constitution in October 1963, which asserted that Islam was the state religion, Arabic was the sole national and official language of the state, Algeria was an integral part of the Arab world, and that Arabization was the first priority of the country to reverse French colonization.

Ben Bella was succeeded by Houari Boumédiène in 1965, who also pursued Arab socialist and Pan-Arabist policies. He drafted a new Algerian constitution in 1976 which declared "the unity of the Arab people is written in the community of the destinies of these people. When there will be the conditions for a unity based on the liberation of the popular masses, Algeria will engage itself in the promotion of the formulas of union, integration or fusion that may fully respond to the legitimate and deep aspirations of the Arab people". Like Ben Bella, Boumédiène imposed Arab socialism as the state ideology and declared Islam the state religion. He was more assertive than Ben Bella in carrying out Arabization, especially between 1970 and 1977. The year 1971 was declared the "year of Arabization". Chadli Bendjedid had talks with Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 1988 about forming an Algeria-Libya Arab union. Instead the Arab Maghreb Union was formed in 1989.

### Socialism

A historical reference of socialist values is the implementation of the Warnier Law of 1873, which allowed the selling of community land at an individual base toppled the economic power of the Algerian indigenous elites; the elimination of class structure undertoned the later FLN populism and socialist agendas. Such egalitarianism, which implies a liberation struggle, reflects the FLN's militant socialism during Ben Bella's period, who considered the struggle was to invent a new society to release the peasantry's potential.

This ideological construct of the FLN is controversial and disputed but can be analyzed through lenses of different socio-economic contexts. Given the global background of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cold War, Algeria was considered the entry point into the Third World in this ideological conflict; the FLN's ideologies under Ben Bella and Boumédiène were largely shaped by the fundamental needs of the country such as radical economic reforms, getting international aids and recognition, along with the domestic Islamic pressure.

Facing the grave economic consequences of the Algerian War of Independence that included the destruction of 8,000 villages and millions of acres of land, a centralized authority, in this case, the FLN, was forced to act and redress the problem through a Leninist and corporatist framework. In response, Ben Bella also experimented the socialist autogestion among the Muslim workers who entered industrial and agricultural businesses that featured profit-sharing and equity. Ben Bella and his supporters in the FLN believed in the harmony between religion and socialism and it was in their political interest to renew the FLN party by leading a popular revolution to integrate Islam and socialism.

Despite being challenged by the Algerian Ulema and other domestic conservatives who criticized Ben Bella on the shallowness of his intentionally Islamism-leaning policies, the FLN kept its Marxist–Leninist organization principles that featured a secular institutional dominance over religion. The later FLN's ideological change towards anti-socialism and anti-communism can be illustrated by Kaid Ahmed's opposition towards Boumédiène's leftist agenda, which featured the radical agrarian revolution that hurt rich landowners who defended themselves on the religious ground and fueled the Islamic movement, which gradually took over the national sentiment later in the century. Starting in 1971 and ending in 1992, the government under Chadli Bendjedid was authoritative but collegial, less rigid on ideologies but more moderate on domestic and international issues, while Bendjedid and his advisers believed in socialism.

### Communism

The organization initially committed itself to socialism, but understood this along the lines of Arab socialism, and opposed orthodox Marxism. The existence of different classes in Algerian society was generally rejected, even if several of the party's top ideologues were influenced to varying degrees by Marxist analysis.

Borrowed Marxist terminology was instead commonly reinterpreted by party radicals in terms of the conflict with France, e.g. casting the colonizer in the role of economic exploiter-oppressor as well as national enemy, while the label of " bourgeoisie " was applied to uncooperative or pro-French elites. The FLN absorbed some communist activists into its ranks during the War of Independence for pragmatic reasons but refused to allow them to organize separately from the FLN after the war. The FLN then quickly moved to dissolve the pro-Moscow Algerian Communist Party (PCA). However, since independent Algeria was set up as a one-party system under the FLN soon thereafter, many communist intellectuals were later co-opted into the regime at various stages. The cooperation occurred during the early Ben Bella and late Boumédiènne years when the Socialist Vanguard Party (PAGS), established in 1966, cooperated and tactically consulted with the FLN and recognized the FLN as the sole legitimate party in the country.

### Contemporary developments

During all periods of Algerian post-colonial history, except for a few years between 1990 and 1996, the FLN has been a pillar of the political system and has primarily been viewed as a "pro-system" party. Its role as Algeria's liberators has remained the absolute cornerstone of the party's self-perception, and the defining feature of its otherwise somewhat fluid ideology. The FLN was close to former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was made honorary chairman. It mixes its traditional populist interpretations of Algeria's nationalist- revolutionary and Islamic heritage with a pro-system conservatism, and support for gradual pro-market reform qualified by statist reflexes. Since the breakdown of the one-party system and its detachment from the state structure in ca. 1988–1990, the FLN has been in favor of multi-party democracy, whereas it upheld itself as the only organization representing the Algerian people before this period.

The FLN was admitted into Socialist International (SI) as a consultative member at the SI's spring congress on 4–5 February 2013. It was expelled from the Socialist International during the 2019 protests in Algeria.

## Electoral history


LGBT rights in Cuba

# LGBT rights in Cuba

## Abstract

Lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) rights in Cuba have significantly varied throughout modern history. Cuba is now considered generally progressive, with vast improvements in the 21st century for such rights. Following the 2022 Cuban Family Code referendum, there is legal recognition of the right to marriage, unions between people of the same sex, same-sex adoption and non-commercial surrogacy as part of one of the most progressive Family Codes in Latin America. Until the 1990s, the LGBT community was marginalized on the basis of heteronormativity, traditional gender roles, politics and strict criteria for moralism. It was not until the 21st century that the attitudes and acceptance towards LGBT people changed to be more tolerant.

In 2018, the National Assembly of People's Power voted to legalize same-sex marriage, with a constitutional referendum to be held in February 2019; it was later removed from the draft constitution. In May 2019, the government announced that the Union of Jurists of Cuba was working on the new Family Code, which would address same-sex marriage. On 7 September 2021, the government announced that the new Family Code would be brought to the National Assembly for approval, and then be put to popular vote to legalize same-sex marriage if approved in the referendum. The referendum was approved in April 2022 and took place in September 2022, with the referendum passing. Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity is illegal in Cuba.

Historically, public antipathy towards LGBT people was high. This had eased since the 1990s. Educational campaigns on LGBT issues are currently implemented by the National Center for Sex Education (locally known as "CENESEX"), headed by Mariela Castro, daughter of former president and First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba, Raúl Castro. Pride parades in Havana are held every May, to coincide with the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia, with attendance having grown every year. In 2022, Cuba became the first Latin American country to mark LGBT History Month.

## History

### Pre-revolution Cuba

Pre-revolutionary Cuba was a place of intolerance toward the LGBT community. Due to the emphasis on traditional heteronormativity, there were few enclaves where the queer community could congregate together in a common space. The job market was uneven at the time and the "Afro-Hispanic culture was very patriarchal and emphasized a compulsory toxic and heterosexual society, especially in rural areas." Most of the community migrated toward Havana in search of jobs and sexual liberation. Moreover, rural communities would often alienate their LGBT community or family members deeming them the "village queer" or the "village idiot." Due to the uneven job market, Havana around the 1950s allowed for closeted occupational life and the underground job sector continued to grow aside from tourism like drug distribution, gambling, and prostitution. This job sector curtailed homosexual desire into the "Havana Underworld, which was run by the Cuban homosexual bourgeoisie." Homosexuality was a component of the thriving industry of prostitution in Cuba, with many gay men drawn into prostitution largely for visitors and servicemen from the United States. Homosexuality also was linked to gambling and crime. Therefore, while the LGBT community did not have official visibility, they had success in the job market for US tourists who were looking for homoerotic experiences. There were few LGBT-friendly bars in Cuban cities, such as the St. Michel, the Intermezzo Bar, the Dirty Dick, and El Gato Tuerto in Havana. However, despite the vibrancy of the Underworld and the breadth of its influence, Cuba still had laws that oppressed homosexuality and targeted gay men for harassment. Socially, gay men were considered outcasts. Families were often heard calling their family members "locas" meaning queens, "maricones" meaning faggots or "tortilleras" meaning dykes. The homosexual culture was purely recognized as an economic strategy where the Underworld fostered a sense of reliance on homoerotic desires by US tourists and other niche interests that the community took part in.

iscrete lesbian or gay male identities in the modern sense - identities that are based on self-definition and involve emotional as well as physical aspects of same-sex relations - were rare. Erotic loyalty (and, in the case of women, subservience) to the opposite sex was assumed to be normal even by homosexuals. Hence, for many Cubans of this era, homosexuality was a mere addendum to customary marital roles. Among others, it was just a profitable commodification of sexual fantasy. For the vast majority, homosexuality made life a shameful and guilt-ridden experience.

### Post-revolution Cuba

Following the emergence of Fidel Castro ’s régime in 1959, the visibility of the LGBT community only worsened. The revolutionary leaders were typically white middle-class men who were raised under the traditional sexual ideology. Furthermore, the Marxist–Leninist framework that the regime utilized prioritized a change in production and class relations, with an emphasis on family and sexuality. In addition, the government emphasized the youth as the future of the Revolution which was a fundamental aim of the 1960s. Education was used to promote "moralism" along with a sense of total commitment to the Revolution. In the same breath, anti-Revolutionary tactics were criticized and penalized, therefore listening to American music, wearing mini skirts, and men with long hair were all forms of anti-Revolutionary tactics along with homosexuality. Accordingly, the Revolution defined a qualified citizen as one who promotes a productive labor force and homosexuality along with prostitution were deemed nonproductive and related to American decadence. Furthermore, oftentimes, men who had sex with other men were caught in bar raids to crackdown on commercial sex and drugs in the 1960s. Consequently, the Committees for Defense of the Revolution began to report homosexual people in the 1960s to authorities in response to a possible US invasion. It was plain to see that homosexual individuals in Cuba were painted as anti-Revolutionary threats to the regime.

In 1965, the Ministry of Health stated that homosexuality was learned and therefore they began to implement preventative measures for children to learn of typical and traditional heterosexual normalities. "Effeminate" boys were taught to play sports, self-defense and military exercise. In addition, if men were deemed too feminine, they would be subject to expulsion from mass organizations such as the Young Communist League. There was even a sign held up on University of Havana's campus saying "no homosexual represents the Revolution, which is a matter of men, fists and not feathers, of courage and not trembling, of certainty and not intrigue, of creative valor and not of sweet surprises." Fidel Castro also stated in 1966 that "no homosexual could ever embody the conditions and requirements of conduct that would enable us to consider him a true revolutionary, a true communist militant." Overall, the homophobia that was established in the 1960s and persisted until the 2000s was a result of a combination of traditional heterosexual masculinity combined with socialist morality that identified certain sexual behaviors as non-productive. The Revolutionary Offensive was also a campaign that sought to nationalize private business in 1968, and was also a part of a greater scheme to promote morality within the political and economic campaign, which allowed Cuba to create its path as a socialist state.

#### Homophobia and labor camps during the 1960s

With the profit motive eradicated by the revolution, the superficial tolerance of LGBT persons by the strongly homophobic Cuban society quickly evaporated. Emigration to Miami began immediately, including lesbians and gay men who had worked for United States firms or had done domestic work for the native bourgeoisie. LGBT people who already had lived largely abroad moved away permanently.

he homophobia and heterosexism that already existed... became more systematized and institutionalized. Gender and sexuality explicitly entered political discourse even as vaguely worded laws increasingly targeted gender-transgressive men who were believed to be homosexual... whereas lesbianism remained unnamed and invisible. Between 1959 and 1980 male homosexuals suffered a range of consequences from limited career options to detention in street sweeps to incarceration in labor camps.... Long hair, tight pants, colorful shirts, so-called effeminate mannerisms, "inappropriate clothing," and "extravagant hairstyles" were seen as visible markers of male homosexuality. Such visible markers not only facilitated enforcement of homosexual repression; more broadly, visibility and gender transgressions themselves constituted a central part of the problem identified by the revolution. Even during the severest period of enforcement, Marvin Leiner reminds us, private homosexual expression was never the main target. Rather, "... the major concern, as it had always been, was with the public display of homosexuality."

Many of the progressive LGBT persons who remained in Cuba became involved in counter-revolutionary activities, independently or through encouragement of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and were jailed. The 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, commando attacks from Florida bases, and internal CIA-sponsored subversion created in Cuba an increased concern over national security. Realistic fears gave rise to paranoia, and anyone who was "different" fell under suspicion. Homosexual bars and La Rampa cruising areas were perceived as centers of counter-revolutionary activities and they began to be systematically treated as such. The gay community was seen as a threat to the military order.

Cuba's new ally, the Soviet Union, had hostile policies towards gays and lesbians, seeing homosexuality as a product of the decadent capitalist society prevailing in Cuba in the 1950s. Fidel Castro made insulting comments about homosexuality. Castro's admiring description of rural life in Cuba ("in the country, there are no homosexuals") reflected the idea of homosexuality as bourgeois decadence, and he denounced "maricones" as "agents of imperialism". Castro explained his reasoning in a 1965 interview:

e would never come to believe that a homosexual could embody the conditions and requirements of conduct that would enable us to consider him a true Revolutionary, a true Communist militant. A deviation of that nature clashes with the concept we have of what a militant Communist must be.

According to Ian Lumsden, traditional Spanish machismo and the Catholic Church have disdained effeminate and sexually passive males for centuries. The homophobia exposed during the revolution was a mere continuation of the well-established culture of machismo and the rigid gender roles of pre-revolutionary Cuba. Barbara Weinstein, professor of Latin American history at New York University and co-editor of the Hispanic American Historical Review, said that gay people were defined as deviant and decadent but not weak or sick. She also claimed that the way that the Cuban revolution came to power gave it a stronger sense of masculinity than other revolutions. The guerrilla experience pervaded the political structure and the guerrilla army itself became the nucleus of a new society.

Cuban gay writer Reinaldo Arenas wrote, "he decade of the sixties... was precisely when all the new laws against homosexuals came into being, when the persecution started and concentration camps were opened, when the sexual act became taboo while the 'new man' was being proclaimed and masculinity was being exalted."

In 1965, the countrywide Military Units to Aid Production (Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción; UMAP) program, located in the Camagüey Province, was set up as an alternative form of military service for members of pacifist religious groups, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, hippies, conscientious objectors, and gay men. It was believed that the work, together with the strict regimes operating within the UMAP camps, would "rehabilitate" the participants. The camps became notorious both inside and outside Cuba. Although the camps ended up targeting gay men more than most, "there is no evidence that were created with homosexuals exclusively in mind." There is a debate whether or not these camps were labor or concentration camps. That being said, these camps were notorious for holding prisoners for up to three years without a charge.

A homosexual man who worked in a UMAP camp described the conditions there as follows, "ork is hard because it's nearly always in the sun. We work 11 hours a day (cutting marble in a quarry) from seven in the morning to seven at night, with one hour's lunch break." In 1968, the camps closed. Castro said, "They weren't units of internment or punishment.... However, after a visit I discovered the distortion in some places, of the original idea, because you can't deny that there were prejudices against homosexuals. I personally started a review of this matter. Those units only lasted three years."

Many gay artists and intellectuals like Reinaldo Arenas were attracted to the socialist promise of an egalitarian society, which would pave the way for cultural and sexual freedom and social justice. Gay writers largely wrote the popular journal Lunes de Revolución. Its radical ideas seemed to enjoy the favor of the Cuban Government. But a couple of years after Castro's rise to power, this journal was closed down amidst a wave of media censorship. Its gay writers were publicly disgraced, refused publication, and dismissed from their jobs. Some were reassigned to work as janitors and labourers.

This period was dramatically documented in the 1980s documentary Improper Conduct, by Reinaldo Arenas in his 1992 autobiography, Before Night Falls, as well as in his fiction, most notably The Color of Summer and Farewell to the Sea.

#### Negative attitudes during most of the 1970s

Homophobia in Cuba persisted in the 1970s, with more tolerant attitudes beginning to appear in the mid-1970s.

After a discussion of homosexuality at the Cuban Educational and Cultural Congress in April 1971, homosexuality was declared to be a deviation incompatible with the revolution. Homosexuality was considered sufficient grounds for discriminatory measures to be adopted against the gay community, and homophobia was institutionalized. Gay and lesbian artists, teachers, and actors lost their jobs. Gays and lesbians were expelled from the Communist Party. Students were expelled from university. Gays were prohibited from having contact with children and young people. Gays were not allowed to represent their country.

A more tolerant policy slowly began to emerge in 1975.

In 1975, the People's Supreme Court found in favor of a group of marginalised gay artists who were claiming compensation and reinstatement in their place of work. The court's ruling was the initial change in official attitudes towards gays and lesbians. In the same year, a new Ministry of Culture was formed under the leadership of Armando Hart Dávalos, resulting in a more liberal cultural policy. In addition, a commission was established to investigate homosexuality, leading to the decriminalization of private, adult, non-commercial and consensual same-sex relationships in 1979.

#### Gradual liberalization during the 1980s

Cuban gays took the opportunity to leave Cuba during the 1980 Mariel boatlift. From the early stages of the massive exodus, the Government described homosexuals as part of the "scum" that needed to be discarded so the socialist society could be purified. Some homosexuals were given the ultimatum of either imprisonment (or extended terms for those already imprisoned) or leaving the country, although Fidel Castro publicly denied that anyone was being forced to leave.

In 1981, the Ministry of Culture stated in a publication entitled "In Defence of Love" that homosexuality was a variant of human sexuality. The ministry argued that homophobic bigotry was an unacceptable attitude inherited by the revolution and that all sanctions against gays should be opposed.

In 1986, the National Commission on Sex Education publicly opined that homosexuality was a sexual orientation and that homophobia should be countered by education. Gay author Ian Lumsden has claimed that since 1986 there is "little evidence to support the contention that the persecution of homosexuals remains a matter of state policy".

In 1988, the Government repealed the Public Ostentation Law of 1938 (Spanish: Ley de ostentación pública de 1938) and the police received orders not to harass LGBT people. In a 1988 interview with Galician television, Castro criticized the rigid attitudes that had prevailed towards homosexuality.

Toward the end of the 1980s, literature with gay subject matter began to re-emerge.

#### More rapid liberalization since 1990

In a 1993 interview with a former Nicaraguan government official, Tomás Borge, Fidel Castro declared that he opposed policies against LGBT people as he considered homosexuality to be a natural tendency that should be respected. The same year, a series of sex education workshops were run throughout the country carrying the message that homophobia was a prejudice. That same year, the Government lifted its ban on allowing LGBT persons from serving openly in the military. Since 1993, lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender persons may serve openly in the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces.

In 1994, the feature film Strawberry and Chocolate, produced by the government-run Cinema of Cuba and Tomás Gutiérrez Alea, featured a gay main character. The film criticized the country's narrow, doctrinaire ways of thinking in the 1970s and discussed anti-gay prejudice and the unjust treatment suffered by gays. The film provoked a great deal of comment and discussion among the public.

In 1995, Cuban drag queens led the annual May Day procession, joined by two gay delegations from the United States. In the same year, Fidel Castro recanted his previous anti-LGBT sentiment, saying: "I am absolutely opposed to all forms of oppression, contempt, scorn, or discrimination with regard to homosexuals".

According to a Human Rights Watch report, "the government... heightened harassment of homosexuals, raiding several nightclubs known to have gay clientele and allegedly beating and detaining dozens of patrons." Spanish filmmaker Pedro Almodóvar was reported to be among several hundred people detained in a raid on Havana's most popular gay discothèque, El Periquiton. According to a United States government report, Cuban customers of the club were fined and warned of imprisonment if they did not stop publicly displaying their homosexuality. The foreigners who were detained were released after a check of their documents. Many of the Cuban gay and lesbian clientele were reportedly beaten by police. This crackdown extended to other known gay meeting places throughout the capital, such as Mi Cayito, a beach east of Havana, where gays were arrested, fined, or threatened with imprisonment.

After this crackdown, Cuban gays and lesbians began keeping a lower profile amid intermittent sweeps of gay and lesbian meeting places. Castro's apparent criticism of Tomás Gutiérrez Alea and his last film Guantanamera during a speech in February 1998 seemed to cast a further chill over Cuba's gay community. Still, a number of clandestine gay clubs continued to operate sporadically in private homes.

In December 2000, half of all the Latin American films shown at the Havana Film Festival had gay themes. Gay and lesbian film festivals are now run in a number of Cuban cities, and in October 2005, a Sexual Diversity Cinema Week was held in Pinar del Río.

Yet, in 2001, the police operated a campaign against gay and trans people, and prevented them from meeting in the street, fined them and closed down meeting places.

In 2004, the soap opera El jardín de los helechos (Garden of Ferns) included a lesbian couple as part of its plot. That same year, however, the BBC reported that "Cuban police have once again launched a campaign against homosexuals, specifically directed at travestis (transvestites) whom they are arresting if they are dressed in women's clothing."

Carlos Sanchez, the male representative of the International Lesbian, Gay, Trans and Intersex Association for the Latin America and Caribbean Region, visited Cuba in 2004. While there, he asked about the status of lesbians and gays in the country and asked the Cuban Government why it had abstained from the vote on the " Brazilian Resolution ", a 2003 proposal to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights that would symbolically recognize the "occurrence of violations of human rights in the world against persons on the grounds of their sexual orientation." The Government argued that the resolution could be used to further attack and isolate Arab countries, consistent with "North American aggression against Afghanistan and Iraq". Sanchez also asked about the possibility of creating an LGBT organization in Cuba. The Government said that the formation of the organization would distract attention from national security in light of constant threats from the United States. After meeting with some Cuban LGBT people, Sanchez reported the following observations:

- "Neither institutional nor penal repression exists against lesbians and homosexuals."

- "There are no legal sanctions against LGBT people."

- "People are afraid of meeting and organizing themselves. It is mainly based on their experience in previous years, but one can assume that this feeling will disappear in the future if lesbians and gays start to work and keep working and eventually get support from the government. (The National Center for Sexual Education is offering this support)."

- "'Transformismo' (drag performance) is well accepted by the majority of the Cuban population."

- "There is indeed a change in the way people view homosexuality, but this does not mean the end of discrimination and homophobia. The population is just more tolerant of lesbians and homosexuals."

- "Lesbians and gays do not consider fighting for the right to marriage, because that institution in Cuba does not have the same value that it has in other countries. Unmarried and married people enjoy equal rights."

In 2006, the state-run Cuban television began running a serial soap opera titled La Otra Cara De La Luna (The Other Face of the Moon) in which a married man "discovers himself" through a sexual relationship with a male friend.

In 2012, Adela Hernández became the first known transgender person to hold public office in Cuba, winning election as a delegate to the City Council of Caibarien in the central province of Villa Clara.

#### Fidel Castro admits responsibility

In his autobiography My Life, Fidel Castro criticized the machismo culture of Cuba and urged for the acceptance of homosexuality. He made several speeches to the public regarding discrimination against homosexuals.

In a 2010 interview with Mexican newspaper La Jornada, Castro called the persecution of homosexuals while he was in power "a great injustice, great injustice!" Taking responsibility for the persecution, he said, "If anyone is responsible, it's me.... We had so many and such terrible problems, problems of life or death. In those moments, I was not able to deal with that matter. I found myself immersed, principally, in the Crisis of October, in the war, in policy questions." Castro personally said that the negative treatment of gays in Cuba arose out of the country's pre-revolutionary attitudes toward homosexuality.

#### Reversals 2019–present

In May 2019, the state-run National Center for Sex Education, or Cenesex, abruptly canceled its 12th annual march against homophobia (pride parade). CENESEX, led by Mariela Castro, said only that "international and regional tensions" meant the parade had to be cancelled. According to the Miami Herald, this abrupt change was also motivated by increasing resistance to LGBT protections by Christian groups in Cuba, with the government hoping to avoid violent confrontations with more conservative elements. LGBT Activists condemned the cancellation and organised their own demonstration, largely through social media. Cenesex told activists not to attend the event, with some reporting receiving calls from state security. The march went on, but after setting out the marchers came up against a large number of police and state security forces. At least three were arrested with the rest ordered to disperse.

In August 2019, Leandro Rodríguez García, director of the Cuban Foundation for LGBTI Rights, was pulled from the departure lounge at the José Martí International Airport while awaiting a flight to Miami, Florida. Officials told him he was not allowed to leave Cuba and prevented him from boarding, despite him having obtained a US visa. In December, Journalist Maykel González Vivero, director and one of the founders of Tremenda Nota, the Spanish media partner for the Washington Blade, was prohibited from traveling outside the country by the Cuban Interior Ministry. Nelson Julio Álvarez Mairata, an LGBTI YouTuber who had recently worked as a reporter for Tremenda Nota, was similarly prohibited from travel outside of Cuba. A series of hacks in 2019 targeted LGBTI reporters social media pages, with posts referencing their sexual orientation in a negative way and the release of private photos, often having sexual content.

In 2020, the state-run Cuban Institute of Radio and Television censored out the kiss scene between the lead male character and another boy in the 2018 U.S. film Love, Simon. Activists criticized the decision and began to organize a " kiss-in " protest of the censorship. The government, shortly before the kiss-in, published an apology for the "mistake" of editing out the gay kiss and organizers cancelled the protest.

### Machismo and homophobia

Where machismo and patriarchy are often conflated, it is important to note their difference. Patriarchy is a structure that allows for male superiority and male dominance but is generic whereas machismo has cultural implications that combines Latin American and Caribbean colonial history. Machismo is specific to Latin American culture. As a result of this culture, female sexuality was "mystified" and misunderstood, allowing many lesbians to escape prejudice where gay men could not.

#### LGBT and capitalist association

Prior to the revolution, Havana was a popular tourist location. Homosexual men "received greater employment opportunities in the tourist sector, as they were often used to satisfy the prostitution needs of US military personnel and tourists."

## Legality of same-sex sexual activity

Private, non-commercial sexual relations between same-sex consenting adults 16 and over have been legal in Cuba since 1979.

The Social Defence Code, which characterized "homosexual practices" as a "social threat" and imposed preventive measures to combat it, was repealed in 1979 by the Penal Code of Cuba. This Code did not criminalize homosexuality per se. However, Article 359(1) criminalized those who made "public display of their homosexual condition" or bothered or solicited others with "homosexual requests". The crime of "public display of homosexual condition" was repealed in 1987 and the crime of bothering or soliciting with "homosexual requests" was amended in 1997 to refer only to "sexual" requests.

### Prostitution

Prostitution in Cuba has always been legal but has gone through periods of restriction and regulation over the years. Because of this, sex tourism in Cuba blossomed in the post-colonial era, giving way to a different type of chosen family. However, prostitution in Cuba began a period of significant decline in 1998 and was no longer widespread or openly seen in Cuban tourist hotspots by 2007. In 2015, Anthropological Quarterly reported that through sex work, many gay Cuban men are able to gain autonomy and sex tourists sometimes ultimately support them and their families. The dynamic between sex workers and clients reportedly evolves into a gay kinship that expands to the Cuban family. This unique relationship is important to understand the connection between finances, gay Cuban men, and sex tourists.

## Recognition of same-sex relationships

The Cuban Constitution does not ban same-sex marriage. Until 2019, Article 36 contained language defining marriage as between a man and a woman. This was repealed in a February 2019 referendum. The current Constitution states that "marriage is a social and legal institution.... It is based on free will and equality of rights, obligations and legal capacity of the spouses."

A major public campaign by LGBT groups began in late 2017 to amend the Constitution to allow same-sex marriage. In July 2018, the National Assembly approved a new draft constitution which recognized same-sex marriage in Article 68. Amidst pressure from evangelical churches who opposed same-sex marriage—even though President Miguel Díaz-Canel expressed his support for same-sex marriage that September —the National Assembly withdrew the language on 18 December 2018. As a result of removing the article, same-sex marriage is neither prohibited nor regulated by the new Cuban Constitution. Had the article remained in the draft, it would have needed to go to a referendum in February 2019. Nevertheless, media outlets spoke of a "revolution within a revolution" or of a "rainbow revolution", and pointed out how quickly the political and societal landscape for LGBT rights has changed.

The National Assembly and Mariela Castro have stated that same-sex marriage will be legalized through a Family Code amendment instead. In March 2019, the Government began popular consultations to look into legalizing same-sex marriage in the Family Code. A referendum on the proposed new Family Code, which would include same-sex marriage, civil unions, adoption by same-sex couples and altruistic surrogacy, was held in September 2022, and passed. The new family law was signed by Cuban president Miguel Díaz-Canel on 26 September 2022, and came into effect the following day, after being published on the Official Gazette.

## Discrimination protections

Employment discrimination on account of sexual orientation is prohibited by law. The Labor Code (Código de Trabajo) does not cover gender identity, and LGBT discrimination in other sectors of society – such as education, housing and public accommodations – is not addressed by the law. Mariela Castro, director of the National Center for Sex Education, had also sought to ban employment discrimination on the basis of gender identity, HIV status and disability, but this was rejected.

In July 2018, a same-sex couple, Brian Canelles and Arián Abreu, were kicked out of a Havana bar after taking a selfie of themselves kissing. A worker at the bar asked them to leave, saying: "The bar isn't interested in the gay public. We don't want that reputation." The case was widely criticized. Merely two days after the incident, Cuba's official gazette published a decree outlining that any private business found to discriminate against clients based on their gender or sexual orientation can be fined 1,000 Cuban pesos (around 860 euros /1,000 U.S. dollars) and shut down.

The Cuban Constitution, amended in 2019, prohibits all discrimination on the basis of gender, gender identity and sexual orientation, among others. Article 42 reads as follows:

All people are equal before the law, receive the same protection and treatment from the authorities, and enjoy the same rights, liberties, and opportunities, without any discrimination for reasons of sex, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, age, ethnic origin, skin color, religious belief, disability, national or territorial origin, or any other personal condition or circumstance that implies a distinction injurious to human dignity.

## Gender identity and expression

Since June 2008, qualifying Cubans have been able to have free sex reassignment surgeries under Resolución 126 ("Resolution 126"). Opinion polling suggested the move was unpopular among the Cuban public.

As many scholars suggest, the Cuban Government treats trans rights and sex reassignment surgeries as a health issue. Cuba operates under the idea that healthcare is a right to all, allowing trans people access to public health care.

In 1979, the Ministry of Public Health (MIN-SAP) established the Multidisciplinary Commission for Attention to Transsexuals to provide both specialized health care and social services. Mariela Castro Espín describes it: "specialists in the care of transsexual persons, and … adopted internationally approved diagnostic and therapeutic procedures, which were incorporated as services offered free of charge by the, along with courses to train sex therapists."

### Resolutions and law amendments

#### Resolution 126

The resolution permitting sex reassignment surgeries consisted of 11 articles that outlined the ways in which the Cuban Government aimed to improve their treatment of the trans community. Article 5 explicitly states, that the state should provide comprehensive health care to "all transsexual citizens" and it is also relevant to note that "one of the articles contains a glossary that defines various terms associated with health care for transsexual and transgender persons."

#### Law on the Registry of Civil Status

Previously, it was required that a person's gender on official documents reflect their sexual organs but CENESEX pushed for a modification of this law. In 2013, this allowed trans people to modify their official gender without reassignment surgery.

## Blood donation

Individuals seeking to donate blood must be in good health, have a regular pulse and must not have had a viral infection (catarrh or pharyngitis) within the past seven days. Men who have sex with men are not explicitly banned from donating.

## Social conditions

### Freedom of association

According to the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association and other sources, one of Cuba's only gay and lesbian civil rights organizations, the Cuban Association of Gays and Lesbians (Asociación Cubana de Gays y Lesbianas), was formed in 1994 by eighteen people but was effectively shut down and its members arrested in 1997.

Since 2008, the National Center of Sex Education has sponsored some LGBT festivals and pride events.

In 2013, a week of drag shows, colorful marches, and social and cultural events in Havana culminated with celebrations of the International Day Against Homophobia. Events have been held every year since.

### Nosotros también amamos

In 2015, the project Nosotros también amamos ("We love too") which advocates for the legalization of same-sex marriage, was funded by the human rights organizations Corriente Martiana ("Martian Current"), Fundación Cubana por los Derechos LGBTI ("Cuban Foundation for LGBTI Rights") and the gay project SHUI TUIX.

In June 2016, Babel, a socio-cultural Cuban LGBT project, declared, "all people are equal in dignity and rights beyond what differentiates us as race, skin color, sex, national origin, political, religious, ideological or sexual preferences, amongst other things"

## Works

### Films

- Lizette Vila's documentary films, Y hembra es el alma mía (1992) and Sexualidad: un derecho a la vida (2004), profile the lives of Cuban male-to-female transsexuals and travestis.

- Mauvaise Conduite or Improper Conduct is a 1984 documentary film directed by Néstor Almendros and Orlando Jiménez Leal about the UMAP labor camps.

- Before Night Falls (2000), directed by Julian Schnabel, is based on the autobiography of Reinaldo Arenas by the same name.

- Fresa y Chocolate, (Strawberry and Chocolate, 1993) directed by Tomás Gutiérrez Alea and Juan Carlos Tabío, focuses on a conflicted relationship between a committed Marxist student and a flamboyantly gay artist. It was the first Cuban film to be nominated for the Academy Award for Best International Feature Film.

### Books

- Furia del Discurso Humano ("The Fury of Human Discourse") is a novel by Miguel Correa Mujica, the celebrated author of Al Norte del Infierno, that addresses the topic of persecution of homosexuals in Cuba.