<instructions>Your goal is to analyze the following comment and estimate how highly it will be upvoted by the Hacker News community.</instructions><comment><author>bdamm</author><text>My employer produces low-power devices with hardware cryptography built into them. Without the crypto hardware, almost all crypto (including ECC) is too slow for practical use. It&amp;#x27;s all well and good to have &amp;quot;crypto agility&amp;quot; but that ends when it comes to depending on silicon. So if we&amp;#x27;re making our 20 year plan for, say, the next generation hardware platform that we&amp;#x27;re going to invest many millions of dollars and thousands of engineer hours to build, then which PQC algorithms will we select to be built into our platform? It&amp;#x27;s very unclear at this point.&lt;p&gt;Certainly we can be flexible in key and cert sizes, but also I happen to live in a world where a 1200 byte MTU actually matters a great deal, so it&amp;#x27;s easier to just push the requirement for dealing with enormous certificates down the road for the day when we actually have enormous certificates. Future-proofing isn&amp;#x27;t an issue yet because legacy devices will &lt;i&gt;never&lt;/i&gt; be able to do PQC.&lt;p&gt;The premise is not broken at all, for us.</text><parent_chain><item><author>Perseids</author><text>The whole premise of the article is broken:&lt;p&gt;1. Every respectable cryptographic protocol designer would hedge their bets by combining a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithm with a classical one, preferable elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), such that you first have to break ECC in order to attack the post-quantum cryptography. ECC is great in that it is both fast, secure, its signatures, ciphertexts and keys are small. Every post-quantum algorithm fails in at least one of the categories, but as ECC excels everywhere, the overhead is basically bound by a factor of two.&lt;p&gt;2. Our focus can&amp;#x27;t be on choosing one PQC algorithm now (and keep it forever), as it is a very young field comparably (as the article agrees). Instead, we need to built up &lt;i&gt;algorithm agility&lt;/i&gt; in our protocols and software, as we are probably going to change PQC algorithms at least once, when the cryptographic community has gained experience in PQC design&amp;#x2F;cryptanalysis and we switch to the second wave PQC algorithms. In practice that means: Never assume keys, ciphertext, signatures are small. Investigate whether it is possible for keys to have &lt;i&gt;state&lt;/i&gt; (see Lamport signature). And the only way to show these properties about protocols and software &lt;i&gt;is to try out some PQC algorithms now&lt;/i&gt;. (Why the urgency? Because software and protocol turnaround time is bonkers in commercial applications. Heck, parts of the payment industry still use single DES in 2019...)&lt;p&gt;Given that the NSA knows both of this, the question is whether the author was clueless or the NSA spokesperson is malicious.</text></item></parent_chain></comment><story><title>Don’t Rush Quantum-Proof Encryption, Warns NSA Research Director</title><url>https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2019/11/dont-rush-quantum-proof-encryption-warns-nsa-research-director/161217/</url></story>
<instructions>Your goal is to analyze the following comment and estimate how highly it will be upvoted by the Hacker News community.</instructions><comment><author>tialaramex</author><text>1. Yes, &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;www.imperialviolet.org&amp;#x2F;2019&amp;#x2F;10&amp;#x2F;30&amp;#x2F;pqsivssl.html&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;www.imperialviolet.org&amp;#x2F;2019&amp;#x2F;10&amp;#x2F;30&amp;#x2F;pqsivssl.html&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;blog.cloudflare.com&amp;#x2F;the-tls-post-quantum-experiment&amp;#x2F;&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;blog.cloudflare.com&amp;#x2F;the-tls-post-quantum-experiment&amp;#x2F;&lt;/a&gt; describe actual experiments Google ran using randomly selected Chrome canary users against Cloudflare and indeed their test algorithms CECPQ2 and CECPQ2b are both hybrids built using ECC plus a post-quantum algorithm.&lt;p&gt;2. However at this present time there is a strong constituency (e.g. see morelisp&amp;#x27;s comment in this sub-thread) which is happy to blame cryptographic agility for problems it arguably had little or no part in, so you can expect them to fight this while of course not committing to any particular post-quantum crypto because they also hate being wrong and invariably if you pick one now you&amp;#x27;ll be wrong.</text><parent_chain><item><author>Perseids</author><text>The whole premise of the article is broken:&lt;p&gt;1. Every respectable cryptographic protocol designer would hedge their bets by combining a post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithm with a classical one, preferable elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), such that you first have to break ECC in order to attack the post-quantum cryptography. ECC is great in that it is both fast, secure, its signatures, ciphertexts and keys are small. Every post-quantum algorithm fails in at least one of the categories, but as ECC excels everywhere, the overhead is basically bound by a factor of two.&lt;p&gt;2. Our focus can&amp;#x27;t be on choosing one PQC algorithm now (and keep it forever), as it is a very young field comparably (as the article agrees). Instead, we need to built up &lt;i&gt;algorithm agility&lt;/i&gt; in our protocols and software, as we are probably going to change PQC algorithms at least once, when the cryptographic community has gained experience in PQC design&amp;#x2F;cryptanalysis and we switch to the second wave PQC algorithms. In practice that means: Never assume keys, ciphertext, signatures are small. Investigate whether it is possible for keys to have &lt;i&gt;state&lt;/i&gt; (see Lamport signature). And the only way to show these properties about protocols and software &lt;i&gt;is to try out some PQC algorithms now&lt;/i&gt;. (Why the urgency? Because software and protocol turnaround time is bonkers in commercial applications. Heck, parts of the payment industry still use single DES in 2019...)&lt;p&gt;Given that the NSA knows both of this, the question is whether the author was clueless or the NSA spokesperson is malicious.</text></item></parent_chain></comment><story><title>Don’t Rush Quantum-Proof Encryption, Warns NSA Research Director</title><url>https://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2019/11/dont-rush-quantum-proof-encryption-warns-nsa-research-director/161217/</url></story>