<instructions>Your goal is to analyze the following comment and estimate how highly it will be upvoted by the Hacker News community.</instructions><comment><author>godelski</author><text>I think your point is very important. Forbidding e2e encryption only enables &lt;i&gt;mass&lt;/i&gt; surveillance. It does not affect traditional investigative work. There are other existing tools for the job.&lt;p&gt;Anyone remember the FBI and Apple case a few years back? How quickly the FBI hacked the phone after Apple wouldn&amp;#x27;t cave? Other tools exist to do targeted surveillance and targeted attacks. Only authoritarians want &lt;i&gt;mass&lt;/i&gt; surveillance.</text><parent_chain><item><author>kyboren</author><text>Some crimes can also be aided by whispered in-person conversation.  Should we require all in-person conversation to be shouted near a government office?&lt;p&gt;The societal default used to be that substantially all conversations were inaccessible to the government except through testimony.  Encryption does nothing to change the availability of information through testimony.&lt;p&gt;Previously, remote conspirators could collaborate through the post, and their conversations could only be accessed with a warrant specifically targeting those communicators.  End-to-end encryption does little to change the availability of information in a targeted investigation; it just means it&amp;#x27;s a little more difficult to access the information than entering a phone number into XKeyscore.  Investigators can install malware on the device, or microphones and video cameras in the suspect&amp;#x27;s home to hear or see what is being communicated.&lt;p&gt;Forbidding end-to-end encryption, in combination with our mass surveillance apparatus, changes the societal default to be that substantially all conversations are trivially and automatically accessible to the government.</text></item><item><author>IfOnlyYouKnew</author><text>I&amp;#x27;m not entirely sure how those four examples are supposedly invalidated by giving them a clever nickname.&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#x27;ll take the privacy side in most any discussion of privacy-vs-security, but categorically denying the possibility that some crimes could be aided by encryption seems a step to far.&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#x27;s also bad PR strategy: anybody not already on your side will be put off by your apparent lack of reasoning skills.&lt;p&gt;Instead, acknowledge the possibility and show them &lt;i&gt;why&lt;/i&gt; you consider the benefits outweighing the risks.</text></item><item><author>Kinnard</author><text>The Second Great CryptoWar: &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;reason.com&amp;#x2F;2013&amp;#x2F;03&amp;#x2F;12&amp;#x2F;the-second-great-crypto-war&amp;#x2F;&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;reason.com&amp;#x2F;2013&amp;#x2F;03&amp;#x2F;12&amp;#x2F;the-second-great-crypto-war&amp;#x2F;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;quot;The proponents of this process use fear tactics to win support, what the four cypherpunks dub &amp;quot;The Four Horsemen of the Info-pocalypse: child pornography, terrorism, money laundering, and the War on Some Drugs.&amp;quot; In other words, laws passed to go after child pornographers, terrorists, money launderers, and drug dealers end up chipping away at everyone&amp;#x27;s privacy. The classic example is the PATRIOT Act, passed to prevent terrorism but soon used to expand wiretapping and National Security Letter powers in other contexts.&amp;quot;</text></item><item><author>saagarjha</author><text>&amp;gt; We are writing to request that Facebook does not proceed with its plan to implement end-to-end encryption across its messaging services without ensuring that there is no reduction to user safety.&lt;p&gt;Oh, so you’re asking for more end-to-end encryption?&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; While the letter acknowledges that Facebook, which owns Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and Instagram, captures 99% of child exploitation and terrorism-related content through its own systems, it also notes that &amp;quot;mere numbers cannot capture the significance of the harm to children.&amp;quot;&lt;p&gt;This is such a lazy argument :&amp;#x2F;</text></item></parent_chain></comment><story><title>Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption</title><url>https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/bill-barr-facebook-letter-halt-encryption</url></story>
<instructions>Your goal is to analyze the following comment and estimate how highly it will be upvoted by the Hacker News community.</instructions><comment><author>Animats</author><text>* Should we require all in-person conversation to be shouted near a government office?*&lt;p&gt;&amp;quot;Why isn&amp;#x27;t your desk in front of the telescreen?&amp;quot; - &lt;i&gt;1984&lt;/i&gt;&lt;p&gt;The day will come when not having an Amazon Echo or Google Speaker will be considered probably cause for a search.</text><parent_chain><item><author>kyboren</author><text>Some crimes can also be aided by whispered in-person conversation.  Should we require all in-person conversation to be shouted near a government office?&lt;p&gt;The societal default used to be that substantially all conversations were inaccessible to the government except through testimony.  Encryption does nothing to change the availability of information through testimony.&lt;p&gt;Previously, remote conspirators could collaborate through the post, and their conversations could only be accessed with a warrant specifically targeting those communicators.  End-to-end encryption does little to change the availability of information in a targeted investigation; it just means it&amp;#x27;s a little more difficult to access the information than entering a phone number into XKeyscore.  Investigators can install malware on the device, or microphones and video cameras in the suspect&amp;#x27;s home to hear or see what is being communicated.&lt;p&gt;Forbidding end-to-end encryption, in combination with our mass surveillance apparatus, changes the societal default to be that substantially all conversations are trivially and automatically accessible to the government.</text></item><item><author>IfOnlyYouKnew</author><text>I&amp;#x27;m not entirely sure how those four examples are supposedly invalidated by giving them a clever nickname.&lt;p&gt;I&amp;#x27;ll take the privacy side in most any discussion of privacy-vs-security, but categorically denying the possibility that some crimes could be aided by encryption seems a step to far.&lt;p&gt;It&amp;#x27;s also bad PR strategy: anybody not already on your side will be put off by your apparent lack of reasoning skills.&lt;p&gt;Instead, acknowledge the possibility and show them &lt;i&gt;why&lt;/i&gt; you consider the benefits outweighing the risks.</text></item><item><author>Kinnard</author><text>The Second Great CryptoWar: &lt;a href=&quot;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;reason.com&amp;#x2F;2013&amp;#x2F;03&amp;#x2F;12&amp;#x2F;the-second-great-crypto-war&amp;#x2F;&quot; rel=&quot;nofollow&quot;&gt;https:&amp;#x2F;&amp;#x2F;reason.com&amp;#x2F;2013&amp;#x2F;03&amp;#x2F;12&amp;#x2F;the-second-great-crypto-war&amp;#x2F;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; &amp;quot;The proponents of this process use fear tactics to win support, what the four cypherpunks dub &amp;quot;The Four Horsemen of the Info-pocalypse: child pornography, terrorism, money laundering, and the War on Some Drugs.&amp;quot; In other words, laws passed to go after child pornographers, terrorists, money launderers, and drug dealers end up chipping away at everyone&amp;#x27;s privacy. The classic example is the PATRIOT Act, passed to prevent terrorism but soon used to expand wiretapping and National Security Letter powers in other contexts.&amp;quot;</text></item><item><author>saagarjha</author><text>&amp;gt; We are writing to request that Facebook does not proceed with its plan to implement end-to-end encryption across its messaging services without ensuring that there is no reduction to user safety.&lt;p&gt;Oh, so you’re asking for more end-to-end encryption?&lt;p&gt;&amp;gt; While the letter acknowledges that Facebook, which owns Facebook Messenger, WhatsApp, and Instagram, captures 99% of child exploitation and terrorism-related content through its own systems, it also notes that &amp;quot;mere numbers cannot capture the significance of the harm to children.&amp;quot;&lt;p&gt;This is such a lazy argument :&amp;#x2F;</text></item></parent_chain></comment><story><title>Attorney General will ask Zuckerberg to halt plans for end-to-end encryption</title><url>https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ryanmac/bill-barr-facebook-letter-halt-encryption</url></story>