https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/d72758c3f6c34cd835f5de3efc230964f3b1ea56/src/torcontrol.cpp#L539

If a user is running Tor proxy outside localhost (perhaps on other host inside LAN or in containerised environment) , the automatic creation of onion services ends up creating an onion service listening to hardcored 127.0.0.1 address on the Tor proxy's host instead of the private address of the bitcoind – effectively running an empty onion service listening the Tor proxy's localhost.
if (node.peerman) UnregisterValidationInterface(node.peerman.get());
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    if (node.connman) {
        node.connman->StopThreads();
        LOCK2(::cs_main, ::g_cs_orphans);
        node.connman->StopNodes();
    }
    StopTorControl();
    
    
    if (node.scheduler) node.scheduler->stop();
    if (g_load_block.joinable()) g_load_block.join();
    threadGroup.interrupt_all();
    threadGroup.join_all();
    
    
    node.peerman.reset();
    node.connman.reset();
    node.banman.reset();
    if (node.mempool && node.mempool->IsLoaded() && node.args->GetArg("-persistmempool", DEFAULT_PERSIST_MEMPOOL)) {
        DumpMempool(*node.mempool);