### FEATURE REQUEST

Currently, when a bitcoin node is set up with a connection to both TOR and normal IPv4/6 internet, the 8 outbound-only connection slots, almost always get filled with nodes connecting over IP.
Adding a config option, which would try to ballance these connections based on what kind of network they go through, would be benefficial in many ways:

1. It would add edges between bitcoin network on TOR and normal internet, reducing delays, and the risks associated with an attacker isolating a part of TOR-bitcoin-network from the rest of the world
(Or an ISP/government man-in-the-middling all the normal IP connections)

2. It would help hide/annonymise normal user's transactions from his/her ISP, by mixing them with TOR-outbound ones

3. It would reduce the stress on normal general purpose TOR exit nodes, as users would more likely/reliably connect to TOR-IPv4/6 bitcoin nodes instead of exiting into normal internet first, and then connecting to default IPv4/6-only bitcoin nodes

I understand it is possible to create such bridges already, by forcing connections to TOR-only nodes, or by just running a node with lots of inbound slots, but I think the proposed option, would greatly increase the number of such relays, and remove the need for user to maintain a TOR-node whitelist, by handing this work off to normal bitcoind connection finding algorithm.

This could be implemented as a minimum number of connections for each network, or just a simple evening boolean switch. (Which could be enabled by default for bitcoind installs with TOR connectivity)

In the future, if bitcoin was to support a new network type (for example cjdns/I2P/GNUnet), this option would help establish a presence on the new network faster

bitcoind: 0.15
const std::vector<CService>& binds,
    const std::vector<NetWhitebindPermissions>& whiteBinds,
    const std::vector<CService>& onion_binds)
{
    bool fBound = false;
    for (const auto& addrBind : binds) {
        fBound |= Bind(addrBind, (BF_EXPLICIT | BF_REPORT_ERROR), NetPermissionFlags::PF_NONE);
    }
    for (const auto& addrBind : whiteBinds) {
        fBound |= Bind(addrBind.m_service, (BF_EXPLICIT | BF_REPORT_ERROR), addrBind.m_flags);
    }
    if (binds.empty() && whiteBinds.empty()) {
        struct in_addr inaddr_any;
        inaddr_any.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_ANY);
        struct in6_addr inaddr6_any = IN6ADDR_ANY_INIT;
        fBound |= Bind(CService(inaddr6_any, GetListenPort()), BF_NONE, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NONE);
        fBound |= Bind(CService(inaddr_any, GetListenPort()), !fBound ? BF_REPORT_ERROR : BF_NONE, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NONE);
    }
    for (const auto& addr_bind : onion_binds) {
        fBound |= Bind(addr_bind, BF_EXPLICIT | BF_DONT_ADVERTISE, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NONE);
    }
    return fBound;
}
bool CConnman::Start(CScheduler& scheduler, const Options& connOptions)
{
    Init(connOptions);
    if (fListen && !InitBinds(connOptions.vBinds, connOptions.vWhiteBinds, connOptions.onion_binds)) {
        if (clientInterface) {
            clientInterface->ThreadSafeMessageBox(