It doesn't even specify which "invalid syscall".
```
$ src/bitcoind -sandbox=log-and-abort
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Bitcoin Core version v22.99.0-b223c3c21e89 (release build)
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Assuming ancestors of block 00000000000000000008a89e854d57e5667df88f1cdef6fde2fbca1de5b639ad have valid signatures.
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Setting nMinimumChainWork=00000000000000000000000000000000000000001fa4663bbbe19f82de910280
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Experimental syscall sandbox enabled (-sandbox=log-and-abort): bitcoind will terminate if an unexpected (not allowlisted) syscall is invoked.
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Using the 'sse4(1way),sse41(4way),avx2(8way)' SHA256 implementation
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Default data directory /…/.bitcoin
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Using data directory /…/.bitcoin
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Config file: /…/.bitcoin/bitcoin.conf (not found, skipping)
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Command-line arg: sandbox="log-and-abort"
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Using at most 125 automatic connections (1024 file descriptors available)
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Using 16 MiB out of 32/2 requested for signature cache, able to store 524288 elements
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Using 16 MiB out of 32/2 requested for script execution cache, able to store 524288 elements
2022-02-17T13:45:57Z Script verification uses 1 additional threads
Bad system call (core dumped)
```
Nothing in `dmesg` either.
{
        allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_clock_nanosleep); 
        allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_nanosleep);       
    }
    void AllowUmask()
    {
        allowed_syscalls.insert(__NR_umask); 
    }
    
    
    
    
    std::vector<sock_filter> BuildFilter(SyscallSandboxAction default_action)
    {
        std::vector<sock_filter> bpf_policy;
        
        bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)));
        
        bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64, 1, 0));
        bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS));
        
        bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_LD + BPF_W + BPF_ABS, offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)));
        for (const uint32_t allowed_syscall : allowed_syscalls) {
            
            bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP + BPF_JEQ + BPF_K, allowed_syscall, 0, 1));
            bpf_policy.push_back(BPF_STMT(BPF_RET + BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW));
        }
        switch (default_action) {
        case SyscallSandboxAction::KILL_PROCESS: