https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/d72758c3f6c34cd835f5de3efc230964f3b1ea56/src/torcontrol.cpp#L539

If a user is running Tor proxy outside localhost (perhaps on other host inside LAN or in containerised environment) , the automatic creation of onion services ends up creating an onion service listening to hardcored 127.0.0.1 address on the Tor proxy's host instead of the private address of the bitcoind – effectively running an empty onion service listening the Tor proxy's localhost.
{
    assert(conn_type != ConnectionType::INBOUND);
    
    
    
    if (interruptNet) {
        return;
    }
    if (!fNetworkActive) {
        return;
    }
    if (!pszDest) {
        bool banned_or_discouraged = m_banman && (m_banman->IsDiscouraged(addrConnect) || m_banman->IsBanned(addrConnect));
        if (IsLocal(addrConnect) || FindNode(static_cast<CNetAddr>(addrConnect)) || banned_or_discouraged || FindNode(addrConnect.ToStringIPPort())) {
            return;
        }
    } else if (FindNode(std::string(pszDest)))
        return;
    CNode* pnode = ConnectNode(addrConnect, pszDest, fCountFailure, conn_type);
    if (!pnode)
        return;
    if (grantOutbound)
        grantOutbound->MoveTo(pnode->grantOutbound);
    m_msgproc->InitializeNode(pnode);
    {
        LOCK(cs_vNodes);
        vNodes.push_back(pnode);
    }
}
void CConnman::ThreadMessageHandler()