https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/d72758c3f6c34cd835f5de3efc230964f3b1ea56/src/torcontrol.cpp#L539

If a user is running Tor proxy outside localhost (perhaps on other host inside LAN or in containerised environment) , the automatic creation of onion services ends up creating an onion service listening to hardcored 127.0.0.1 address on the Tor proxy's host instead of the private address of the bitcoind – effectively running an empty onion service listening the Tor proxy's localhost.
}
struct NodeEvictionCandidate
{
    NodeId id;
    int64_t nTimeConnected;
    int64_t nMinPingUsecTime;
    int64_t nLastBlockTime;
    int64_t nLastTXTime;
    bool fRelevantServices;
    bool fRelayTxes;
    bool fBloomFilter;
    CAddress addr;
    uint64_t nKeyedNetGroup;
    bool prefer_evict;
    bool m_is_local;
};
static bool ReverseCompareNodeMinPingTime(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b)
{
    return a.nMinPingUsecTime > b.nMinPingUsecTime;
}
static bool ReverseCompareNodeTimeConnected(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b)
{
    return a.nTimeConnected > b.nTimeConnected;
}
static bool CompareLocalHostTimeConnected(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b)
{
    if (a.m_is_local != b.m_is_local) return b.m_is_local;
    return a.nTimeConnected > b.nTimeConnected;
}
static bool CompareNetGroupKeyed(const NodeEvictionCandidate &a, const NodeEvictionCandidate &b) {