AFAICT, as of commit a0a422c,  we have 2 different logics to evict outbound peers : lagging-chain (`ConsiderEviction`) and (`CheckForStaleTipAndEvictPeers`). The former to sanitize out lazy/buggy peers who have never sent us a valid header and are always staying behind our tip, the latter triggered in case of stale tip due to block variance to seek a better chain by rotating our outbound peers if we already reach an outbound limit (`EvictExtraOutboundPeers`).

Block-relay-only peers were introduced by #15719. Contrary to outbound full-relay peers who provided us at least a useful header, they're not protected by lagging-chain eviction.

We actually have a comment inside `ProcessHeadersMessage` indicating the contrary behavior. We should either document cleanly that block-relay-only aren't protected or effectively extend the scope of protection to them.

Hinted during #19724 review, see https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/19724#discussion_r475144532
break;
            }
            
            
            if (!via_compact_block && !node_state->m_is_inbound && !node_state->m_is_manual_connection) {
                Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
                return true;
            }
            break;
        }
    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_HEADER:
    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_CHECKPOINT:
    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_INVALID_PREV:
        Misbehaving(nodeid, 100, message);
        return true;
    
    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_MISSING_PREV:
        
        Misbehaving(nodeid, 10, message);
        return true;
    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_RECENT_CONSENSUS_CHANGE:
    case BlockValidationResult::BLOCK_TIME_FUTURE:
        break;
    }
    if (message != "") {
        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "peer=%d: %s\n", nodeid, message);
    }
    return false;
}
bool PeerManager::MaybePunishNodeForTx(NodeId nodeid, const TxValidationState& state, const std::string& message)