https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/d72758c3f6c34cd835f5de3efc230964f3b1ea56/src/torcontrol.cpp#L539

If a user is running Tor proxy outside localhost (perhaps on other host inside LAN or in containerised environment) , the automatic creation of onion services ends up creating an onion service listening to hardcored 127.0.0.1 address on the Tor proxy's host instead of the private address of the bitcoind – effectively running an empty onion service listening the Tor proxy's localhost.
{
    
    unsigned int nRemaining = CMessageHeader::HEADER_SIZE - nHdrPos;
    unsigned int nCopy = std::min(nRemaining, nBytes);
    memcpy(&hdrbuf[nHdrPos], pch, nCopy);
    nHdrPos += nCopy;
    
    if (nHdrPos < CMessageHeader::HEADER_SIZE)
        return nCopy;
    
    try {
        hdrbuf >> hdr;
    }
    catch (const std::exception&) {
        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "HEADER ERROR - UNABLE TO DESERIALIZE, peer=%d\n", m_node_id);
        return -1;
    }
    
    if (memcmp(hdr.pchMessageStart, m_chain_params.MessageStart(), CMessageHeader::MESSAGE_START_SIZE) != 0) {
        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "HEADER ERROR - MESSAGESTART (%s, %u bytes), received %s, peer=%d\n", hdr.GetCommand(), hdr.nMessageSize, HexStr(hdr.pchMessageStart), m_node_id);
        return -1;
    }