MIN_CHANGE is a privacy leak, since it is an easily observable wallet behaviour. Any output almost equal, but minimally larger than MIN_CHANGE is highly likely the change output of a tx.

Also, MIN_CHANGE is quite high, considering the value of bitcoin.

An easy fix for the second issue would be to just lower the value, but maybe some randomization can be done to also fix the first issue?
CoinEligibilityFilter(int conf_mine, int conf_theirs, uint64_t max_ancestors, uint64_t max_descendants) : conf_mine(conf_mine), conf_theirs(conf_theirs), max_ancestors(max_ancestors), max_descendants(max_descendants) {}
    CoinEligibilityFilter(int conf_mine, int conf_theirs, uint64_t max_ancestors, uint64_t max_descendants, bool include_partial) : conf_mine(conf_mine), conf_theirs(conf_theirs), max_ancestors(max_ancestors), max_descendants(max_descendants), m_include_partial_groups(include_partial) {}
};
struct OutputGroup
{
    
    std::vector<COutput> m_outputs;
    /** Whether the UTXOs were sent by the wallet to itself. This is relevant because we may want at
     * least a certain number of confirmations on UTXOs received from outside wallets while trusting
     * our own UTXOs more. */
    bool m_from_me{true};
    
    CAmount m_value{0};
    
    int m_depth{999};
    /** The aggregated count of unconfirmed ancestors of all UTXOs in this