For the 0.22 release we'll want to start hardcoding Torv3 addresses instead of (or in addition to) Torv2.

The biggest challenge here is not how to hardcode them, although that will require a few minor script and code changes, but how to collect them. The release process is to get the addresses from DNS seeders, however these currently don't support the `addrv2` message nor Torv3 addresses in the first place. Nor do they really have a need to.
uint64_t naMostConnections;
    unsigned int nMostConnections = 0;
    int64_t nMostConnectionsTime = 0;
    std::map<uint64_t, std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> > mapNetGroupNodes;
    for (const NodeEvictionCandidate &node : vEvictionCandidates) {
        std::vector<NodeEvictionCandidate> &group = mapNetGroupNodes[node.nKeyedNetGroup];
        group.push_back(node);
        const int64_t grouptime = group[0].nTimeConnected;
        if (group.size() > nMostConnections || (group.size() == nMostConnections && grouptime > nMostConnectionsTime)) {
            nMostConnections = group.size();
            nMostConnectionsTime = grouptime;
            naMostConnections = node.nKeyedNetGroup;
        }
    }
    
    vEvictionCandidates = std::move(mapNetGroupNodes[naMostConnections]);
    
    return vEvictionCandidates.front().id;
}
/** Try to find a connection to evict when the node is full.
 *  Extreme care must be taken to avoid opening the node to attacker
 *   triggered network partitioning.
 *  The strategy used here is to protect a small number of peers
 *   for each of several distinct characteristics which are difficult
 *   to forge.  In order to partition a node the attacker must be
 *   simultaneously better at all of them than honest peers.
 */
bool CConnman::AttemptToEvictConnection()