https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/d72758c3f6c34cd835f5de3efc230964f3b1ea56/src/torcontrol.cpp#L539

If a user is running Tor proxy outside localhost (perhaps on other host inside LAN or in containerised environment) , the automatic creation of onion services ends up creating an onion service listening to hardcored 127.0.0.1 address on the Tor proxy's host instead of the private address of the bitcoind – effectively running an empty onion service listening the Tor proxy's localhost.
CloseSocket(hSocket);
        return;
    }
    if (!IsSelectableSocket(hSocket))
    {
        LogPrintf("connection from %s dropped: non-selectable socket\n", addr.ToString());
        CloseSocket(hSocket);
        return;
    }
    
    
    SetSocketNoDelay(hSocket);
    
    bool banned = m_banman && m_banman->IsBanned(addr);
    if (!NetPermissions::HasFlag(permissionFlags, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NOBAN) && banned)
    {
        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "connection from %s dropped (banned)\n", addr.ToString());
        CloseSocket(hSocket);
        return;
    }
    
    bool discouraged = m_banman && m_banman->IsDiscouraged(addr);
    if (!NetPermissions::HasFlag(permissionFlags, NetPermissionFlags::PF_NOBAN) && nInbound + 1 >= nMaxInbound && discouraged)
    {
        LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "connection from %s dropped (discouraged)\n", addr.ToString());
        CloseSocket(hSocket);
        return;
    }
    if (nInbound >= nMaxInbound)
    {