https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/d72758c3f6c34cd835f5de3efc230964f3b1ea56/src/torcontrol.cpp#L539

If a user is running Tor proxy outside localhost (perhaps on other host inside LAN or in containerised environment) , the automatic creation of onion services ends up creating an onion service listening to hardcored 127.0.0.1 address on the Tor proxy's host instead of the private address of the bitcoind – effectively running an empty onion service listening the Tor proxy's localhost.
{
    
    
    
    
    const int64_t nOneWeek = 7*24*60*60;
    std::vector<CAddress> vSeedsOut;
    vSeedsOut.reserve(vSeedsIn.size());
    FastRandomContext rng;
    for (const auto& seed_in : vSeedsIn) {
        struct in6_addr ip;
        memcpy(&ip, seed_in.addr, sizeof(ip));
        CAddress addr(CService(ip, seed_in.port), GetDesirableServiceFlags(NODE_NONE));
        addr.nTime = GetTime() - rng.randrange(nOneWeek) - nOneWeek;
        vSeedsOut.push_back(addr);
    }
    return vSeedsOut;
}
CAddress GetLocalAddress(const CNetAddr *paddrPeer, ServiceFlags nLocalServices)