I discovered a race condition in sendrawtransaction. For details: see my comment in https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/commit/1d46fe3327f6645fd79b442cd72ef422418c1a50.

If you send a raw transaction which has already been broadcasted, then you don't know whether you'll receive an RPC_TRANSACTION_ALREADY_IN_CHAIN exception, since you don't know whether a new block has just been received, which includes the transaction. There are use cases where such RPC_TRANSACTION_ALREADY_IN_CHAIN occurrences do not indicate an error; however, since this type of occurrence is very rare, developers are not likely to be aware of the possibility, and silence the exception. As a result, applications can potentially experience hard-to-diagnose, very rare errors.

I think the core of the problem is that sendrawtransaction tries to combine two use cases:
A: publish a transaction on the Bitcoin network
B: re-transmit an already known transaction to peers
RPC_TRANSACTION_ALREADY_IN_CHAIN might make sense for B, but for A (which is, IMHO, the primary use case) it is confusing.

{
    return RPCHelpMan{"createpsbt",
                "\nCreates a transaction in the Partially Signed Transaction format.\n"
                "Implements the Creator role.\n",
                {
                    {"inputs", RPCArg::Type::ARR, RPCArg::Optional::NO, "The json objects",
                        {
                            {"", RPCArg::Type::OBJ, RPCArg::Optional::OMITTED, "",
                                {
                                    {"txid", RPCArg::Type::STR_HEX, RPCArg::Optional::NO, "The transaction id"},
                                    {"vout", RPCArg::Type::NUM, RPCArg::Optional::NO, "The output number"},
                                    {"sequence", RPCArg::Type::NUM,  "depends on the value of the 'replaceable' and 'locktime' arguments", "The sequence number"},
                                },
                                },