https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/d72758c3f6c34cd835f5de3efc230964f3b1ea56/src/torcontrol.cpp#L539

If a user is running Tor proxy outside localhost (perhaps on other host inside LAN or in containerised environment) , the automatic creation of onion services ends up creating an onion service listening to hardcored 127.0.0.1 address on the Tor proxy's host instead of the private address of the bitcoind – effectively running an empty onion service listening the Tor proxy's localhost.
{
    if (fAddressesInitialized) {
        DumpAddresses();
        fAddressesInitialized = false;
    }
    
    LOCK(cs_vNodes);
    for (CNode* pnode : vNodes)
        pnode->CloseSocketDisconnect();
    for (ListenSocket& hListenSocket : vhListenSocket)
        if (hListenSocket.socket != INVALID_SOCKET)
            if (!CloseSocket(hListenSocket.socket))
                LogPrintf("CloseSocket(hListenSocket) failed with error %s\n", NetworkErrorString(WSAGetLastError()));
    
    for (CNode* pnode : vNodes) {
        DeleteNode(pnode);
    }
    for (CNode* pnode : vNodesDisconnected) {
        DeleteNode(pnode);
    }
    vNodes.clear();
    vNodesDisconnected.clear();
    vhListenSocket.clear();
    semOutbound.reset();
    semAddnode.reset();
}
void CConnman::DeleteNode(CNode* pnode)