in v0.12 https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/pull/7081 (by @luke-jr) was merged adding `-bytespersigop` (with default of 20).

this is preventing simple bare multisig transactions from being accepted into mempool when the size is < 400 bytes.  
eg; https://gist.github.com/rubensayshi/ac4f617207f7a50559e85d61c05800be

from 1-of-7 and onwards they are accepted because the ratio of bytes:sigops is high enough.  
also having 2 or more inputs will work because it again tips the ratio of bytes:sigops over.

the reason mainly being that `GetLegacySigOpCount` calls `GetSigOpCount` with `fAccurate=false`.

It looks like changing `GetLegacySigOpCount` to use `fAccurate=true` would cause side effects in the few other places (`ConnectBlock`, `CheckBlock`, `CreateNewBlock`) and simply adding `fAccurate` as arg to `GetLegacySigOpCount` would affect the value stored in `CTxMemPoolEntry.sigOpCount` which in turn affects a bunch of other things.

const CCoins *coins = view.AccessCoins(txin.prevout.hash);
            if (coins->IsCoinBase()) {
                fSpendsCoinbase = true;
                break;
            }
        }
        CTxMemPoolEntry entry(tx, nFees, GetTime(), dPriority, chainActive.Height(), pool.HasNoInputsOf(tx), inChainInputValue, fSpendsCoinbase, nSigOpsCost, lp);
        unsigned int nSize = entry.GetTxSize();
        
        
        
        
        
        if ((nSigOpsCost > MAX_STANDARD_TX_SIGOPS_COST) || (nBytesPerSigOp && nSigOpsCost > nSize * WITNESS_SCALE_FACTOR / nBytesPerSigOp))
            return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_NONSTANDARD, "bad-txns-too-many-sigops", false,
                strprintf("%d", nSigOpsCost));
        CAmount mempoolRejectFee = pool.GetMinFee(GetArg("-maxmempool", DEFAULT_MAX_MEMPOOL_SIZE) * 1000000).GetFee(nSize);
        if (mempoolRejectFee > 0 && nModifiedFees < mempoolRejectFee) {
            return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "mempool min fee not met", false, strprintf("%d < %d", nFees, mempoolRejectFee));
        } else if (GetBoolArg("-relaypriority", DEFAULT_RELAYPRIORITY) && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize) && !AllowFree(entry.GetPriority(chainActive.Height() + 1))) {
            
            return state.DoS(0, false, REJECT_INSUFFICIENTFEE, "insufficient priority");
        }
        
        
        
        if (fLimitFree && nModifiedFees < ::minRelayTxFee.GetFee(nSize))
        {
            static CCriticalSection csFreeLimiter;
            static double dFreeCount;