Bitcoin Core currently only support to using RDRAND / RDSEED instruction on x86 architecture when requiring to generate a ultra high quality random numbers. For example, a private key.
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/random.h
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/src/random.cpp

ARM later added two new similar instructions as well, RNDR (similar to RDRAND) / RNDRRS (similar to RDSEED).
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0601/2022-12/AArch64-Registers/RNDR--Random-Number
https://developer.arm.com/documentation/ddi0601/2022-12/AArch64-Registers/RNDRRS--Reseeded-Random-Number

OpenSSL also had a similar feature request on last year. (Implemented)
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/15627
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15361
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/blob/master/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_cpu_arm64.c

I hope this feature is also available on Bitcoin Core as Bitcoin Core also can using on ARM machine (E.g. A Mac computer using Apple silicon, Raspberry Pi...).
Mutex m_mutex;
    /* The RNG state consists of 256 bits of entropy, taken from the output of
     * one operation's SHA512 output, and fed as input to the next one.
     * Carrying 256 bits of entropy should be sufficient to guarantee
     * unpredictability as long as any entropy source was ever unpredictable
     * to an attacker. To protect against situations where an attacker might
     * observe the RNG's state, fresh entropy is always mixed when
     * GetStrongRandBytes is called.
     */
    unsigned char m_state[32] GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = {0};
    uint64_t m_counter GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = 0;
    bool m_strongly_seeded GUARDED_BY(m_mutex) = false;
    Mutex m_events_mutex;
    CSHA256 m_events_hasher GUARDED_BY(m_events_mutex);
public:
    RNGState() noexcept
    {
        InitHardwareRand();
    }
    ~RNGState() = default;