W2A-015 Devolution-0.txt
Why Devolution?

Paul R. Maguire
The story of how devolution came to Northern Ireland in 1920 and how it operated during the period 1920-72 has been told many times. It remains relevant and instructive. For our purposes, two essential points from it may be repeated here. First, devolution to Northern Ireland arose out of a historical fluke. Neither unionists nor nationalists in Ireland wanted it; on the contrary, they wanted to avoid it. Unionist concern was to resist 'home rule' for Ireland as a whole and particularly to prevent the province falling within the jurisdiction of a Dublin home-rule parliament. Nationalists wanted home rule for the island but for them any talk of the partition of Ireland and separate institutions in the North was anathema. Wanting to grant home rule to Ireland but being driven by unionist pressure to exclude the North-East of the island from it, the British government legislated for devolution to both North and South, each area with its separate institutions. As Buckland has said of the legislation: 'The Act was basically a device adopted by the British government and Parliament anxious to get rid of the Irish Question and yet obliged to redeem pledges to Ulster unionists'. The proposed institutions only took root in Northern Ireland, Southern Ireland soon becoming a Dominion and later a Republic.
Second, the operation of devolution in Northern Ireland ended in failure. At the worst of times, the unionist majority in the province governed in its own interest and to the detriment of the minority. At the best of times, the devolved institutions lacked the political consensus across the historical community divide to sustain them. For over fifty years, allegations of discrimination and bias against, and repression of, the minority were widespread, and many of these allegations were justified. When a civil rights movement to redress minority grievances led on to inter-communal violence, this resulted in the deployment of the British Army, in aid of the civil power, in 1969. The slumbering national government was woken up. By 1972 London's need to control security in the province meant that it had to ask the government of Northern Ireland to agree to powers in this sphere, which legally were vested in the devolved authority, being returned to the centre. When the devolved authority refused to accept this and resigned, the British government, exercising its undoubted legal right, prorogued the Parliament of Northern Ireland and ended devolution. Direct rule of Northern Ireland by Westminster began. Devolution for Northern Ireland at this point looked dead and buried, and few would have thought that after 1972 there would be any sustained interest in it. Expectations pointed away from devolution. Unionists would surely find nothing more acceptable than rule from Westminster? Similarly, one might have expected nationalists to prefer London to Belfast rule: surely the latter would be the last thing they would want? And to the British government, the responsible power internationally accountable for the calamitous situation in Northern Ireland, the idea of entrusting power again to provincial politicians cannot, it might have been thought, have had much appeal. Yet the focus of political debate about the future government of Northern Ireland since then has not substantially centred on forms of government from the centre. Instead, much of the time, it has been directed to the restoration of devolution. Time after time the body has been exhumed and attempts made to breathe life into it. Why? What are the arguments being deployed to support a return to devolution? In this chapter, after considering the demand for devolution, it is proposed to identify and consider these arguments. The purpose is not to pass judgement on the future viability of devolution; rather, it is to seek to explain why it is desired. Understanding the latter may, it is hoped, provide a foundation for conclusions concerning the former.

The demand for devolution since 1972

The stance of three main groups needs to be considered in the assessment of the demand for devolution: the British government; the Irish government; and the political parties in Northern Ireland.

As far as the first is concerned, it is clear that a policy of redevolving power to institutions in Northern Ireland has held sway. That this is so is evident from a series of papers published on the future government of Northern Ireland in 1972, 1973, 1974, 1979, 1980 and 1982. Moreover, the Anglo-Irish Agreement signed in 1985 records the British government's support for devolution in Northern Ireland on a basis which would secure widespread acceptance throughout the community. At the time of writing (mid-1991), the Secretary of State has obtained the agreement of relevant other parties to the establishment of formal talks whose aim, inter alia, is to arrive at a situation in which devolved power could again be transferred to regional institutions.

As regards the Irish government, it is probably correct to say that its approach has varied from time to time. Three periods are worth distinguishing: 1972-9, 1979-85, and 1985 to the present time. In the first of these, Irish governments of all political shades supported a policy which had two limbs to it: first, the establishment of a partnership or power-sharing devolved system in Northern Ireland in which the traditional minority would have a full part to play; and second, the creation of an appropriate institutional recognition of what that that time was referred to as 'the Irish dimension'. Consequent to this broad policy, both Irish government and opposition were in support of the power-sharing and Sunningdale package put together in 1973, with devolved power actually being transferred at the beginning of 1974. When the package came apart in mid-1974, Irish government policy was directed to re-establishing a similar arrangement and this remained the case until the election of Charles Haughey as Fianna F&/ail leader and Taoiseach in 1979. From then until 1985 interest in Northern devolution waned. The emphasis was placed instead on Anglo-Irish intergovernmental structures, a process begun by Haughey and continued by Garret FitzGerald when he was Taoiseach. While this approach faltered because of the Falklands war, and while for a period the field was occupied by the New Ireland Forum which had nothing to say about this idea of devolution to Northern Ireland - its conclusions supporting a series of more or less nationalist options - by 1985 the intergovernmental strategy was back on course, leading in November to the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Though initially rejected by Fianna F&/ail, which were then in opposition, the Agreement has represented Irish Government policy since, despite the return of Fianna F&/ail to power in 1987. In its terms, the Agreement commits the Irish government to support devolution for Northern Ireland, albeit devolution within the context established by the Agreement itself. The strength of that commitment, however, is open to debate. At the time of writing, a gap is proposed in the meetings of the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Conference to enable talks between relevant parties to proceed with the aim mentioned earlier.

The attitudes of the political parties in Northern Ireland can broadly be seen by reference to manifestos or position papers at times of inter-party negotiation or discussion, that is, in 1972-3, 1975-6, 1980, and 1982-6. Inevitably there have, over time, been some changes in the composition of the 'constitutional' political spectrum but, notwithstanding these, it is possible to distinguish four main groups: the Democratic Unionists (DUP); the Official Unionists (OUP); the Alliance Party; and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP).

The position of the DUP after the breakdown of devolved government in 1972 was that 'Northern Ireland should cease to have any separate legislature or executive of its own, but be fully integrated with the rest of the United Kingdom'." But by 1975 this position had altered. Since then, either as part of a unionist coalition or in its own right, the DUP has consistently and vigorously argued for devolution.

In contrast, while the OUP strongly supported redevolution in 1972 and, as part of a unionist coalition, in 1975, after this it became ambivalent, some of the leading spokesmen adhering to a policy of devolution, some advocating only a very weak form of devolution, and others, led by Enoch Powell, calling for integration. Since 1986 OUP support for devolution has been intermittent, though an OUP representative, Jack Allen, appears to have been in favour of it at the Duisburg talks, an informal gathering of representatives from Northern Ireland's political parties held in Germany in 1989, and, more recently, the party has indicated its willingness to participate in the Secretary of State's proposed discussions, referred to earlier.

The Alliance Party has consistently adhered to a policy of redevolution, as is clear from its submissions to the Darlington Conference held in September 1972 (which three out of seven local parties invited by the Secretary of State attended), its participation in the power-sharing executive in 1974, its manifesto for the Convention election in 1975, its participation in the Convention in 1975-6, its submission to the Atkins inter-party talks in 1980, and its involvement in the 1982-6 Assembly. After 1986 it also published its proposals for the future, which centred on devolution.

Finally, the SDLP position has progressed on lines not dissimilar to those along which the Irish government's thinking has progressed. While the language used in 1972 was that of the creation of an interim system of government for Northern Ireland in which there would be an Assembly and Executive drawn from it, under the joint responsibility of the British and Irish governments, the party was actively involved in the power-sharing Executive in 1974 and was a supporter of the Sunningdale package. In 1975 its manifesto for the Convention election proposed the establishment of 'a powerful and representative Northern Ireland Assembly' and an administration in which both sections of the community could participate to the full. It also sought recognition of both Irish and British dimensions. After initial hesitation, the party did take part in the Atkins conference, but only on condition that there be discussions with the Secretary of State to deal with arrangements for an Irish dimension to any agreed partnership form of devolution. In 1982 the SDLP decided to contest the election to the proposed Assembly but not to take any seats, if elected. This was because it considered unworkable the rolling devolution proposal legislated for in the Northern Ireland Act 1982, and, in any event, as far as the party was concerned the plan lacked a sufficient Irish dimension. Instead of going to the Assembly the SDLP became involved in the proceedings of the New Ireland Forum, which sat for the first time on 30 May 1983 and reported on 2 May 1984. As would be expected, the SDLP supported the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Since 1985 there has been interest in the SDLP in devolution within the framework of the Agreement or a suitable Anglo-Irish agreement to supersede it. The SDLP has agreed to enter the formal inter-party talks noted earlier.

Overall, it may be concluded that the concept of devolution has played a significant part in the thinking of all the groups concerned at some time, if not throughout the period under review. What, of course, has been lacking has been agreement both on the ways in which minority rights are to be safeguarded in the internal operation of devolution and on the relationships between the devolved institutions and the two governments involved.

The arguments for devolution

In discussing the arguments addressed in favour of devolution, reliance has been placed mainly, but not exclusively, on the stances adopted by the relevant parties: not exclusively, because it is necessary at times to seek to interpret party postures. This is so because very often what parties state is the form of devolution they desire, and only in passing do they state their reasons for preferring a devolutionary model in the first place. Why this is so is itself interesting. The assumption must be that either the parties themselves have not addressed, head-on at any rate, the question why there should be devolution, or they regard candour in this respect, for reasons perhaps related to negotiation, as unnecessary or even counter-productive. Whatever the reason, the result is that in what follows lines of argument may be exposed which are implicit rather than explicit in their thinking.
