W2B-015 Political future-2.txt
It takes two to consent

Things have moved quickly since the joint declaration: it has acted as the catalyst for the IRA ceasefire and prompted the 'framework document', to be presented soon by the two governments, which can chart the way to new, stable political structures on the island. When London and Dublin agreed last December "to remove the cause of the conflict, to overcome the legacy of history and to heal the divisions which have resulted", they made a commitment to go to the heart of the problem.

The test of the practical merits of the declaration and of the governments'commitment will, however, be in their application to, and implication in, the political process, as reflected in the framework document. This is particularly true for nationalists, whose defining experience of Northern Ireland has been of exclusion, domination by unionism and all the inequalities that stemmed from majoritarian rule.

The most certain political fact is this: nationalists in the north will never again accept a position where they are second-class citizens in their own land. Whatever their differences, there is a common resolve that never again will they accept the status of a subordinate and abused minority, formerly assigned to us by the combined weight of the British government and the unionist majority.

That is why the focus of the declaration is, quite properly, the island as a whole. Yet there are still legitimate nationalist concerns, which centre on the so-called 'unionist veto'. They are tied up with the issue of 'consent' - that is, acceptance that there will be no change in the status of Northern Ireland without the consent of a majority of its people.

In essence, the concern boils down to this: for as long as the Northern Ireland framework exists, given its unionist bias and inbuilt, tribal weighting in the unionists'favour, how can nationalists expect equality and dignity?

While the declaration lays stress on equal rights and 'parity of esteem', we need to know what these concepts will mean in practice. Is mere lip-service to be paid to the ideals and aspirations of nationalists, where the practical impact, as well as inertia, of the British administration weight in one direction only - that of the maintenance of the union?

Similarly, is the aspiration to unity to be treated as irrelevant, unless and until the day the majority has actually voted it into reality? Or is it to be given real, operational expression and opportunity as a legitimate and worthy aspiration, as of now? If the people of Northern Ireland are not to be persuaded into Irish unity, they must also not be subject to hidden barriers and loaded preferences, bolstering up the unionist position and loading the dice between the two aspirations.

There may no longer be a 'unionist veto' in the extreme sense which allowed unionist domination to go unchecked and unexamined for more than 50 years. There are, however, more subtle variants still around.

There is the notion that the rights of nationalists must meet an unwritten test of unionist consent and approval. There is the notion that, notwithstanding the tribal make-up of Northern Ireland, the empowerment of nationalists would somehow be an infringement of the rights of unionists. There is the notion that the union is somehow the only 'real' dimension in Northern Ireland and that anything to do with nationalist aspirations is, in the last analysis an 'add-on'.

If the unionist veto means the strong political influence of a coherent community of 900,000 people, then that of course is accepted. To deny it would be as futile as any other flight from reality.

But he other notions should be dispelled and 'veto' and 'consent' precisely defined. We need to be assured that there is no veto over the policy of the two governments, and that neither is precluded from adopting or pursuing a policy in relation to the north of which unionists disapprove. Both governments enjoy a wider mandate and are entitled to consult the general good or set wider objectives, on this as on any other issue. They should put beyond doubt that their approach to Northern Ireland is based on a recognition that it is sui generis and that the needs of nationalists cannot be met or mediated through the inbuilt unionist majority.

People should also recognise that nationalist consent is directed at the specific question of a change in the status of Northern Ireland. It should not be taken to imply a nationalist consent to a chain of logic that, because Northern Ireland is at present under United Kingdom jurisdiction, their consent must apply to everything that flows from that. There is a world of political difference between agreeing there will be no change of status without consent, and saying we consent to the present status. If that distinction is eluded, there will be no real dialogue with nationalism.

Acceptance of consent is not a blank cheque for some unionist programme for Northern Ireland. We must all remember - especially the British government and the unionist parties - that the coin of consent has two sides, and the more clearly that is reflected in any new arrangements the more durable and stable they will be. Because Irish history, if it teaches us anything, teaches us that consent is the essential ingredient of stability.
