W2B-015 Political future-1.txt
Driving down the Upper Springfield Road, Belfast's latest peacewall dominates the landscape, hovering over the people of Springmartin and Springfield Parade. It is a monument to past and resent fears, a continuing reality a year after the ceasefire. Perhaps, when all the other Belfast walls come down this last Great Wall of Belfast should remain.
The wall reflects another reality of west Belfast - that the suffering inflicted and endured over decades cannot be demolished quickly. To have expected otherwise misunderstands the pain which burden so many, a pain that is acknowledged (if at all) only spasmodically by those who caused it. Last month's 'VJ' commemorations confirm how long the healing process can be - our pain will take much time and thought to ease.

The ceasefire, despite its year of traumas and turbulence, is firmly anchored among the people of west Belfast. They value it and support those who manage and maintain it - when it appears that it may unravel, a communal restraint appears, pulling it out of crisis. Falls Road republicans, having evolved policy and practice over the years, appear committed to 'a long peace'. Those who disagreed with the timing of the ceasefire of the leadership's method of its achievement enjoy little or no sympathy for the argument (as they see it) that a return to war will bring more advantage. Shankill Road loyalists - whose political evolution requires more analysis - appear as the advance guard for new thinking within the wider unionist community. The US Administration affirms its commitment to the process by the expected visit of President Clinton in early December. The two governments prepare to re-focus their political strategy with the September Summit of which much is expected and much required. In short a potent cocktail of factors sustains the peace far greater than the totality of forces that may threaten it.

Yet a sense of crisis exists. A political process so carefully crafted over the last decade urgently requires the impetus of governments. London's strategy appears at best confused and at worst bloody minded. Issues that can be resolved - repatriation, release of prisoners, repeal of oppressive laws - are delayed or denied. For nationalists and others in west Belfast, these issues are essential tests of British good faith or bad faith. Broader issues (such as weapons and negotiations) compound doubts about British strategy, doubts that must be laid to rest at the September Summit by confirming the timing of inclusive negotiations and, perhaps, a structure for parallel discussions on all relevant issues.

As we exit the season of marches and protests, for many in west Belfast recent police actions confirm the centrality of the policing debate, which so far, has been somewhat sterile. The Police Authority, marginal in influence and minimalist in intention, clashes with the RUC establishment, who cling to policies and a culture inappropriate to new policing needs. The Acting-Deputy Chief Constable, Ronnie Flanagan, perhaps more aware of the need for change, conducts a review in a political vacuum. Sinn F&/ein's demand - 'Disband the RUC' - is a slogan and not a policy and offers few creative insights. The debate nonetheless has been energised by Seamus Mallon's occasional forays and it is anticipated that the SDLP policy document, possibly published later this year, will enliven and enrich the debate further. However, without constitutional and institutional agreement and fundamental cultural change within the police and an agreed means of resolving conflict issues, the policing issues will run and run.

The many warm phrases about tackling economic and social disadvantage in west Belfast must be translated into the hard facts of eroding disadvantage. On the Falls and the Shankill this task remains substantially unaddressed. The compelling political success of President Clinton's US Investment Conference and the innovative strategy behind the European Peace and Reconciliation package, is the essential preamble to creating employment opportunities. This is understood and accepted 'on the ground' in west Belfast.

However, the continuing indifference of most government agencies to redressing years of neglect and discrimination and the absence of any systematic strategy by the IDB for inward investment is alarming. This issue will be one of the touchstones of government intentions towards west Belfast in the second year of the ceasefire.
It was Martin McGuinness who most narrowly misjudged nationalist political culture with his recent comment that in future negotiations, nationalists would have nothing to give because "they had nothing to give". In terms of jobs, justice and equality, there is validity in is assertion. But nationalists have much to give - we know that it is a long twilight struggle that brings change; that the political agenda has been enormously enriched by nationalist creative thought and that national confidence and international respect characterise our perspective. This is only part of what we have to give and what we have to give can be seen on the Garvaghy Road; by our building of inclusive politics; by our first articulating the equality and validity of unionist and nationalist traditions. This is a growing reality in west Belfast - that unreconstructed dogmas and demands of the past need to be redefined in a more relevant and accommodating way and that nationalists are well placed and informed to do so.
An Italian once wrote: "There is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct or more uncertain in its success than to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things". And the late US Senator Robert Kennedy added "Yet this is the task of this generation and the road is strewn with many dangers." The past year of ceasefire confirms the truth of this. But everyday, everywhere, there are people who do not shirk the task of introducing new order of things. In West Belfast, as much as anywhere.
