["[Event happened on 2024-01-01 The user is reading a book]\n<User> <CHAPTER>\nBOOK V. I. She ceased, and was about to pass on in her discourse to the exposition\nof other matters, when I break in and say: 'Excellent is thine\nexhortation, and such as well beseemeth thy high authority; but I am\neven now experiencing one of the many difficulties which, as thou saidst\nbut now, beset the question of providence. I want to know whether thou\ndeemest that there is any such thing as chance at all, and, if so, what\nit is.' Then she made answer: 'I am anxious to fulfil my promise completely, and\nopen to thee a way of return to thy native land. As for these matters,\nthough very useful to know, they are yet a little removed from the path\nof our design, and I fear lest digressions should fatigue thee, and thou\nshouldst find thyself unequal to completing the direct journey to our\ngoal.' 'Have no fear for that,' said I. 'It is rest to me to learn, where\nlearning brings delight so exquisite, especially when thy argument has\nbeen built up on all sides with undoubted conviction, and no place is\nleft for uncertainty in what follows.' She made answer: 'I will accede to thy request;' and forthwith she thus\nbegan: 'If chance be defined as a result produced by random movement\nwithout any link of causal connection, I roundly affirm that there is no\nsuch thing as chance at all, and consider the word to be altogether\nwithout meaning, except as a symbol of the thing designated. What place\ncan be left for random action, when God constraineth all things to\norder? For \"ex nihilo nihil\" is sound doctrine which none of the\nancients gainsaid, although they used it of material substance, not of\nthe efficient principle; this they laid down as a kind of basis for all\ntheir reasonings concerning nature. Now, if a thing arise without\ncauses, it will appear to have arisen from nothing. But if this cannot\nbe, neither is it possible for there to be chance in accordance with the\ndefinition just given.' 'Well,' said I, 'is there, then, nothing which can properly be called\nchance or accident, or is there something to which these names are\nappropriate, though its nature is dark to the vulgar?' 'Our good Aristotle,' says she, 'has defined it concisely in his\n\"Physics,\" and closely in accordance with the truth.' 'How, pray?' said I. 'Thus,' says she: 'Whenever something is done for the sake of a\nparticular end, and for certain reasons some other result than that\ndesigned ensues, this is called chance; for instance, if a man is\ndigging the earth for tillage, and finds a mass of buried gold. Now,\nsuch a find is regarded as accidental; yet it is not \"ex nihilo,\" for it\nhas its proper causes, the unforeseen and unexpected concurrence of\nwhich has brought the chance about. For had not the cultivator been\ndigging, had not the man who hid the money buried it in that precise\nspot, the gold would not have been found. These, then, are the reasons\nwhy the find is a chance one, in that it results from causes which met\ntogether and concurred, not from any intention on the part of the\ndiscoverer. Since neither he who buried the gold nor he who worked in\nthe field _intended_ that the money should be found, but, as I said, it\n_happened_ by coincidence that one dug where the other buried the\ntreasure. We may, then, define chance as being an unexpected result\nflowing from a concurrence of causes where the several factors had some\ndefinite end. But the meeting and concurrence of these causes arises\nfrom that inevitable chain of order which, flowing from the\nfountain-head of Providence, disposes all things in their due time and\nplace.' SONG I. CHANCE. In the rugged Persian highlands,\n      Where the masters of the bow\n    Skill to feign a flight, and, fleeing,\n      Hurl their darts and pierce the foe;\n    There the Tigris and Euphrates\n      At one source[O] their waters blend,\n    Soon to draw apart, and plainward\n      Each its separate way to wend. When once more their waters mingle\n      In a channel deep and wide,\n    All the flotsam comes together\n      That is borne upon the tide:\n    Ships, and trunks of trees, uprooted\n      In the torrent's wild career,\n    Meet, as 'mid the swirling waters\n      Chance their random way may steer. Yet the shelving of the channel\n      And the flowing water's force\n    Guides each movement, and determines\n      Every floating fragment's course. Thus, where'er the drift of hazard\n      Seems most unrestrained to flow,\n    Chance herself is reined and bitted,\n      And the curb of law doth know. FOOTNOTES:\n\n[O] This is not, of course, literally true, though the Tigris and\nEuphrates rise in the same mountain district. II. 'I am following needfully,' said I, 'and I agree that it is as thou\nsayest. But in this series of linked causes is there any freedom left to\nour will, or does the chain of fate bind also the very motions of our\nsouls?' 'There is freedom,' said she; 'nor, indeed, can any creature be\nrational, unless he be endowed with free will. For that which hath the\nnatural use of reason has the faculty of discriminative judgment, and of\nitself distinguishes what is to be shunned or desired. Now, everyone\nseeks what he judges desirable, and avoids what he thinks should be\nshunned. Wherefore, beings endowed with reason possess also the faculty\nof free choice and refusal. But I suppose this faculty not equal alike\nin all. The higher Divine essences possess a clear-sighted judgment, an\nuncorrupt will, and an effective power of accomplishing their wishes. Human souls must needs be comparatively free while they abide in the\ncontemplation of the Divine mind, less free when they pass into bodily\nform, and still less, again, when they are enwrapped in earthly members. But when they are given over to vices, and fall from the possession of\ntheir proper reason, then indeed their condition is utter slavery. For\nwhen they let their gaze fall from the light of highest truth to the\nlower world where darkness reigns, soon ignorance blinds their vision;\nthey are disturbed by baneful affections, by yielding and assenting to\nwhich they help to promote the slavery in which they are involved, and\nare in a manner led captive by reason of their very liberty. Yet He who\nseeth all things from eternity beholdeth these things with the eyes of\nHis providence, and assigneth to each what is predestined for it by its\nmerits:\n\n     '\"All things surveying, all things overhearing.'\" SONG II. THE TRUE SUN. Homer with mellifluous tongue\n    Phoebus' glorious light hath sung,\n      Hymning high his praise;\n      Yet _his_ feeble rays\n    Ocean's hollows may not brighten,\n    Nor earth's central gloom enlighten. But the might of Him, who skilled\n    This great universe to build,\n      Is not thus confined;\n      Not earth's solid rind,\n    Nor night's blackest canopy,\n    Baffle His all-seeing eye. All that is, hath been, shall be,\n    In one glance's compass, He\n      Limitless descries;\n      And, save His, no eyes\n    All the world survey--no, none! _Him_, then, truly name the Sun. III. Then said I: 'But now I am once more perplexed by a problem yet more\ndifficult.' 'And what is that?' said she; 'yet, in truth, I can guess what it is\nthat troubles you.' 'It seems,' said I, 'too much of a paradox and a contradiction that God\nshould know all things, and yet there should be free will. For if God\nforesees everything, and can in no wise be deceived, that which\nprovidence foresees to be about to happen must necessarily come to pass. Wherefore, if from eternity He foreknows not only what men will do, but\nalso their designs and purposes, there can be no freedom of the will,\nseeing that nothing can be done, nor can any sort of purpose be\nentertained, save such as a Divine providence, incapable of being\ndeceived, has perceived beforehand. For if the issues can be turned\naside to some other end than that foreseen by providence, there will not\nthen be any sure foreknowledge of the future, but uncertain conjecture\ninstead, and to think this of God I deem impiety. 'Moreover, I do not approve the reasoning by which some think to solve\nthis puzzle.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-01, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-03 The user is reading a book]\n<User> For they say that it is not because God has foreseen the\ncoming of an event that _therefore_ it is sure to come to pass, but,\nconversely, because something is about to come to pass, it cannot be\nhidden from Divine providence; and accordingly the necessity passes to\nthe opposite side, and it is not that what is foreseen must necessarily\ncome to pass, but that what is about to come to pass must necessarily be\nforeseen. But this is just as if the matter in debate were, which is\ncause and which effect--whether foreknowledge of the future cause of the\nnecessity, or the necessity of the future of the foreknowledge. But we\nneed not be at the pains of demonstrating that, whatsoever be the order\nof the causal sequence, the occurrence of things foreseen is necessary,\neven though the foreknowledge of future events does not in itself\nimpose upon them the necessity of their occurrence. For example, if a\nman be seated, the supposition of his being seated is necessarily true;\nand, conversely, if the supposition of his being seated is true, because\nhe is really seated, he must necessarily be sitting. So, in either case,\nthere is some necessity involved--in this latter case, the necessity of\nthe fact; in the former, of the truth of the statement. But in both\ncases the sitter is not therefore seated because the opinion is true,\nbut rather the opinion is true because antecedently he was sitting as a\nmatter of fact. Thus, though the cause of the truth of the opinion comes\nfrom the other side,[P] yet there is a necessity on both sides alike. We\ncan obviously reason similarly in the case of providence and the future. Even if future events are foreseen because they are about to happen, and\ndo not come to pass because they are foreseen, still, all the same,\nthere is a necessity, both that they should be foreseen by God as about\nto come to pass, and that when they are foreseen they should happen, and\nthis is sufficient for the destruction of free will. However, it is\npreposterous to speak of the occurrence of events in time as the cause\nof eternal foreknowledge. And yet if we believe that God foresees future\nevents because they are about to come to pass, what is it but to think\nthat the occurrence of events is the cause of His supreme providence? Further, just as when I _know_ that anything is, that thing\n_necessarily_ is, so when I know that anything will be, it will\n_necessarily_ be. It follows, then, that things foreknown come to pass\ninevitably. 'Lastly, to think of a thing as being in any way other than what it is,\nis not only not knowledge, but it is false opinion widely different from\nthe truth of knowledge. Consequently, if anything is about to be, and\nyet its occurrence is not certain and necessary, how can anyone foreknow\nthat it will occur? For just as knowledge itself is free from all\nadmixture of falsity, so any conception drawn from knowledge cannot be\nother than as it is conceived. For this, indeed, is the cause why\nknowledge is free from falsehood, because of necessity each thing must\ncorrespond exactly with the knowledge which grasps its nature. In what\nway, then, are we to suppose that God foreknows these uncertainties as\nabout to come to pass? For if He thinks of events which possibly may not\nhappen at all as inevitably destined to come to pass, He is deceived;\nand this it is not only impious to believe, but even so much as to\nexpress in words. If, on the other hand, He sees them in the future as\nthey are in such a sense as to know that they may equally come to pass\nor not, what sort of foreknowledge is this which comprehends nothing\ncertain nor fixed? What better is this than the absurd vaticination of\nTeiresias? '\"Whate'er I say\n    Shall either come to pass--or not.\" In that case, too, in what would Divine providence surpass human opinion\nif it holds for uncertain things the occurrence of which is uncertain,\neven as men do? But if at that perfectly sure Fountain-head of all\nthings no shadow of uncertainty can possibly be found, then the\noccurrence of those things which He has surely foreknown as coming is\ncertain. Wherefore there can be no freedom in human actions and designs;\nbut the Divine mind, which foresees all things without possibility of\nmistake, ties and binds them down to one only issue. But this admission\nonce made, what an upset of human affairs manifestly ensues! Vainly are\nrewards and punishments proposed for the good and bad, since no free and\nvoluntary motion of the will has deserved either one or the other; nay,\nthe punishment of the wicked and the reward of the righteous, which is\nnow esteemed the perfection of justice, will seem the most flagrant\ninjustice, since men are determined either way not by their own proper\nvolition, but by the necessity of what must surely be. And therefore\nneither virtue nor vice is anything, but rather good and ill desert are\nconfounded together without distinction. Moreover, seeing that the whole\ncourse of events is deduced from providence, and nothing is left free to\nhuman design, it comes to pass that our vices also are referred to the\nAuthor of all good--a thought than which none more abominable can\npossibly be conceived. Again, no ground is left for hope or prayer,\nsince how can we hope for blessings, or pray for mercy, when every\nobject of desire depends upon the links of an unalterable chain of\ncausation? Gone, then, is the one means of intercourse between God and\nman--the communion of hope and prayer--if it be true that we ever earn\nthe inestimable recompense of the Divine favour at the price of a due\nhumility; for this is the one way whereby men seem able to hold\ncommunion with God, and are joined to that unapproachable light by the\nvery act of supplication, even before they obtain their petitions. Then,\nsince these things can scarcely be believed to have any efficacy, if the\nnecessity of future events be admitted, what means will there be whereby\nwe may be brought near and cleave to Him who is the supreme Head of all? Wherefore it needs must be that the human race, even as thou didst\nerstwhile declare in song, parted and dissevered from its Source, should\nfall to ruin.' FOOTNOTES:\n\n[P] _I.e._, the necessity of the truth of the statement from the fact. SONG III. TRUTH'S PARADOXES. Why does a strange discordance break\n      The ordered scheme's fair harmony? Hath God decreed 'twixt truth and truth\n      There may such lasting warfare be,\n    That truths, each severally plain,\n    We strive to reconcile in vain? Or is the discord not in truth,\n      Since truth is self consistent ever? But, close in fleshly wrappings held,\n      The blinded mind of man can never\n    Discern--so faint her taper shines--\n    The subtle chain that all combines? Ah! then why burns man's restless mind\n      Truth's hidden portals to unclose? Knows he already what he seeks? Why toil to seek it, if he knows? Yet, haply if he knoweth not,\n    Why blindly seek he knows not what? [Q]\n\n\n    Who for a good he knows not sighs? Who can an unknown end pursue? How find? How e'en when haply found\n      Hail that strange form he never knew? Or is it that man's inmost soul\n    Once knew each part and knew the whole? Now, though by fleshly vapours dimmed,\n      Not all forgot her visions past;\n    For while the several parts are lost,\n      To the one whole she cleaveth fast;\n    Whence he who yearns the truth to find\n    Is neither sound of sight nor blind. For neither does he know in full,\n      Nor is he reft of knowledge quite;\n    But, holding still to what is left,\n      He gropes in the uncertain light,\n    And by the part that still survives\n    To win back all he bravely strives. FOOTNOTES:\n\n[Q] Compare Plato, 'Meno,' 80; Jowett, vol. ii., pp. 39, 40. IV. Then said she: 'This debate about providence is an old one, and is\nvigorously discussed by Cicero in his \"Divination\"; thou also hast long\nand earnestly pondered the problem, yet no one has had diligence and\nperseverance enough to find a solution. And the reason of this obscurity\nis that the movement of human reasoning cannot cope with the simplicity\nof the Divine foreknowledge; for if a conception of its nature could in\nany wise be framed, no shadow of uncertainty would remain. With a view\nof making this at last clear and plain, I will begin by considering the\narguments by which thou art swayed.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-03, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-05 The user is reading a book]\n<User> First, I inquire into the reasons\nwhy thou art dissatisfied with the solution proposed, which is to the\neffect that, seeing the fact of foreknowledge is not thought the cause\nof the necessity of future events, foreknowledge is not to be deemed any\nhindrance to the freedom of the will. Now, surely the sole ground on\nwhich thou arguest the necessity of the future is that things which are\nforeknown cannot fail to come to pass. But if, as thou wert ready to\nacknowledge just now, the fact of foreknowledge imposes no necessity on\nthings future, what reason is there for supposing the results of\nvoluntary action constrained to a fixed issue? Suppose, for the sake of\nargument, and to see what follows, we assume that there is no\nforeknowledge. Are willed actions, then, tied down to any necessity in\n_this_ case?' 'Certainly not.' 'Let us assume foreknowledge again, but without its involving any actual\nnecessity; the freedom of the will, I imagine, will remain in complete\nintegrity. But thou wilt say that, even although the foreknowledge is\nnot the necessity of the future event's occurrence, yet it is a sign\nthat it will necessarily happen. Granted; but in this case it is plain\nthat, even if there had been no foreknowledge, the issues would have\nbeen inevitably certain. For a sign only indicates something which is,\ndoes not bring to pass that of which it is the sign. We require to show\nbeforehand that all things, without exception, happen of necessity in\norder that a preconception may be a sign of this necessity. Otherwise,\nif there is no such universal necessity, neither can any preconception\nbe a sign of a necessity which exists not. Manifestly, too, a proof\nestablished on firm grounds of reason must be drawn not from signs and\nloose general arguments, but from suitable and necessary causes. But how\ncan it be that things foreseen should ever fail to come to pass? Why,\nthis is to suppose us to believe that the events which providence\nforesees to be coming were not about to happen, instead of our supposing\nthat, although they should come to pass, yet there was no necessity\ninvolved in their own nature compelling their occurrence. Take an\nillustration that will help to convey my meaning. There are many things\nwhich we see taking place before our eyes--the movements of charioteers,\nfor instance, in guiding and turning their cars, and so on. Now, is any\none of these movements compelled by any necessity?' 'No; certainly not. There would be no efficacy in skill if all motions\ntook place perforce.' 'Then, things which in taking place are free from any necessity as to\ntheir being in the present must also, before they take place, be about\nto happen without necessity. Wherefore there are things which will come\nto pass, the occurrence of which is perfectly free from necessity. At\nall events, I imagine that no one will deny that things now taking place\nwere about to come to pass before they were actually happening. Such\nthings, however much foreknown, are in their occurrence _free_. For even\nas knowledge of things present imports no necessity into things that are\ntaking place, so foreknowledge of the future imports none into things\nthat are about to come. But this, thou wilt say, is the very point in\ndispute--whether any foreknowing is possible of things whose occurrence\nis not necessary. For here there seems to thee a contradiction, and, if\nthey are foreseen, their necessity follows; whereas if there is no\nnecessity, they can by no means be foreknown; and thou thinkest that\nnothing can be grasped as known unless it is certain, but if things\nwhose occurrence is uncertain are foreknown as certain, this is the very\nmist of opinion, not the truth of knowledge. For to think of things\notherwise than as they are, thou believest to be incompatible with the\nsoundness of knowledge. 'Now, the cause of the mistake is this--that men think that all\nknowledge is cognized purely by the nature and efficacy of the thing\nknown. Whereas the case is the very reverse: all that is known is\ngrasped not conformably to its own efficacy, but rather conformably to\nthe faculty of the knower. An example will make this clear: the\nroundness of a body is recognised in one way by sight, in another by\ntouch. Sight looks upon it from a distance as a whole by a simultaneous\nreflection of rays; touch grasps the roundness piecemeal, by contact and\nattachment to the surface, and by actual movement round the periphery\nitself. Man himself, likewise, is viewed in one way by Sense, in another\nby Imagination, in another way, again, by Thought, in another by pure\nIntelligence. Sense judges figure clothed in material substance,\nImagination figure alone without matter. Thought transcends this again,\nand by its contemplation of universals considers the type itself which\nis contained in the individual. The eye of Intelligence is yet more\nexalted; for overpassing the sphere of the universal, it will behold\nabsolute form itself by the pure force of the mind's vision. Wherein the\nmain point to be considered is this: the higher faculty of comprehension\nembraces the lower, while the lower cannot rise to the higher. For Sense\nhas no efficacy beyond matter, nor can Imagination behold universal\nideas, nor Thought embrace pure form; but Intelligence, looking down, as\nit were, from its higher standpoint in its intuition of form,\ndiscriminates also the several elements which underlie it; but it\ncomprehends them in the same way as it comprehends that form itself,\nwhich could be cognized by no other than itself. For it cognizes the\nuniversal of Thought, the figure of Imagination, and the matter of\nSense, without employing Thought, Imagination, or Sense, but surveying\nall things, so to speak, under the aspect of pure form by a single flash\nof intuition. Thought also, in considering the universal, embraces\nimages and sense-impressions without resorting to Imagination or Sense. For it is Thought which has thus defined the universal from its\nconceptual point of view: \"Man is a two-legged animal endowed with\nreason.\" This is indeed a universal notion, yet no one is ignorant that\nthe _thing_ is imaginable and presentable to Sense, because Thought\nconsiders it not by Imagination or Sense, but by means of rational\nconception. Imagination, too, though its faculty of viewing and forming\nrepresentations is founded upon the senses, nevertheless surveys\nsense-impressions without calling in Sense, not in the way of\nSense-perception, but of Imagination. See'st thou, then, how all things\nin cognizing use rather their own faculty than the faculty of the things\nwhich they cognize? Nor is this strange; for since every judgment is the\nact of the judge, it is necessary that each should accomplish its task\nby its own, not by another's power.' SONG IV. A PSYCHOLOGICAL FALLACY. [R]\n\n\n    From the Porch's murky depths\n      Comes a doctrine sage,\n    That doth liken living mind\n      To a written page;\n    Since all knowledge comes through\n      Sense,\n    Graven by Experience. 'As,' say they, 'the pen its marks\n      Curiously doth trace\n    On the smooth unsullied white\n      Of the paper's face,\n    So do outer things impress\n    Images on consciousness.' But if verily the mind\n      Thus all passive lies;\n    If no living power within\n      Its own force supplies;\n    If it but reflect again,\n    Like a glass, things false and vain--\n\n\n    Whence the wondrous faculty\n      That perceives and knows,\n    That in one fair ordered scheme\n      Doth the world dispose;\n    Grasps each whole that Sense presents,\n    Or breaks into elements? So divides and recombines,\n      And in changeful wise\n    Now to low descends, and now\n      To the height doth rise;\n    Last in inward swift review\n    Strictly sifts the false and true? Of these ample potencies\n      Fitter cause, I ween,\n    Were Mind's self than marks impressed\n      By the outer scene. Yet the body through the sense\n    Stirs the soul's intelligence. When light flashes on the eye,\n      Or sound strikes the ear,\n    Mind aroused to due response\n      Makes the message clear;\n    And the dumb external signs\n    With the hidden forms combines. FOOTNOTES:\n\n[R] A criticism of the doctrine of the mind as a blank sheet of paper on\nwhich experience writes, as held by the Stoics in anticipation of Locke. See Zeller, 'Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics,' Reichel's translation,\np. 76.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-05, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-06 The user is reading a book]\n<User> V.\n\n\n'Now, although in the case of bodies endowed with sentiency the\nqualities of external objects affect the sense-organs, and the activity\nof mind is preceded by a bodily affection which calls forth the mind's\naction upon itself, and stimulates the forms till that moment lying\ninactive within, yet, I say, if in these bodies endowed with sentiency\nthe mind is not inscribed by mere passive affection, but of its own\nefficacy discriminates the impressions furnished to the body, how much\nmore do intelligences free from all bodily affections employ in their\ndiscrimination their own mental activities instead of conforming to\nexternal objects? So on these principles various modes of cognition\nbelong to distinct and different substances. For to creatures void of\nmotive power--shell-fish and other such creatures which cling to rocks\nand grow there--belongs Sense alone, void of all other modes of gaining\nknowledge; to beasts endowed with movement, in whom some capacity of\nseeking and shunning seems to have arisen, Imagination also. Thought\npertains only to the human race, as Intelligence to Divinity alone;\nhence it follows that that form of knowledge exceeds the rest which of\nits own nature cognizes not only its proper object, but the objects of\nthe other forms of knowledge also. But what if Sense and Imagination\nwere to gainsay Thought, and declare that universal which Thought deems\nitself to behold to be nothing? For the object of Sense and Imagination\ncannot be universal; so that either the judgment of Reason is true and\nthere is no sense-object, or, since they know full well that many\nobjects are presented to Sense and Imagination, the conception of\nReason, which looks on that which is perceived by Sense and particular\nas if it were a something \"universal,\" is empty of content. Suppose,\nfurther, that Reason maintains in reply that it does indeed contemplate\nthe object of both Sense and Imagination under the form of\nuniversality, while Sense and Imagination cannot aspire to the\nknowledge of the universal, since their cognizance cannot go beyond\nbodily figures, and that in the cognition of reality we ought rather to\ntrust the stronger and more perfect faculty of judgment. In a dispute of\nthis sort, should not we, in whom is planted the faculty of reasoning as\nwell as of imagining and perceiving, espouse the cause of Reason? 'In like manner is it that human reason thinks that Divine Intelligence\ncannot see the future except after the fashion in which its own\nknowledge is obtained. For thy contention is, if events do not appear to\ninvolve certain and necessary issues, they cannot be foreseen as\ncertainly about to come to pass. There is, then, no foreknowledge of\nsuch events; or, if we can ever bring ourselves to believe that there\nis, there can be nothing which does not happen of necessity. If,\nhowever, we could have some part in the judgment of the Divine mind,\neven as we participate in Reason, we should think it perfectly just that\nhuman Reason should submit itself to the Divine mind, no less than we\njudged that Imagination and Sense ought to yield to Reason. Wherefore\nlet us soar, if we can, to the heights of that Supreme Intelligence; for\nthere Reason will see what in itself it cannot look upon; and that is in\nwhat way things whose occurrence is not certain may yet be seen in a\nsure and definite foreknowledge; and that this foreknowledge is not\nconjecture, but rather knowledge in its supreme simplicity, free of all\nlimits and restrictions.' SONG V. THE UPWARD LOOK. In what divers shapes and fashions do the creatures great and small\n    Over wide earth's teeming surface skim, or scud, or walk, or crawl! Some with elongated body sweep the ground, and, as they move,\n    Trail perforce with writhing belly in the dust a sinuous groove;\n    Some, on light wing upward soaring, swiftly do the winds divide,\n    And through heaven's ample spaces in free motion smoothly glide;\n    These earth's solid surface pressing, with firm paces onward rove,\n    Ranging through the verdant meadows, crouching in the woodland grove. Great and wondrous is their variance! Yet in all the head low-bent\n    Dulls the soul and blunts the senses, though their forms be different. Man alone, erect, aspiring, lifts his forehead to the skies,\n    And in upright posture steadfast seems earth's baseness to despise. If with earth not all besotted, to this parable give ear,\n    Thou whose gaze is fixed on heaven, who thy face on high dost rear:\n    Lift thy soul, too, heavenward; haply lest it stain its heavenly worth,\n    And thine eyes alone look upward, while thy mind cleaves to the earth! VI. 'Since, then, as we lately proved, everything that is known is cognized\nnot in accordance with its own nature, but in accordance with the nature\nof the faculty that comprehends it, let us now contemplate, as far as\nlawful, the character of the Divine essence, that we may be able to\nunderstand also the nature of its knowledge. 'God is eternal; in this judgment all rational beings agree. Let us,\nthen, consider what eternity is. For this word carries with it a\nrevelation alike of the Divine nature and of the Divine knowledge. Now,\neternity is the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single\nmoment. What this is becomes more clear and manifest from a comparison\nwith things temporal. For whatever lives in time is a present proceeding\nfrom the past to the future, and there is nothing set in time which can\nembrace the whole space of its life together. To-morrow's state it\ngrasps not yet, while it has already lost yesterday's; nay, even in the\nlife of to-day ye live no longer than one brief transitory moment. Whatever, therefore, is subject to the condition of time, although, as\nAristotle deemed of the world, it never have either beginning or end,\nand its life be stretched to the whole extent of time's infinity, it yet\nis not such as rightly to be thought eternal. For it does not include\nand embrace the whole space of infinite life at once, but has no present\nhold on things to come, not yet accomplished. Accordingly, that which\nincludes and possesses the whole fulness of unending life at once, from\nwhich nothing future is absent, from which nothing past has escaped,\nthis is rightly called eternal; this must of necessity be ever present\nto itself in full self-possession, and hold the infinity of movable time\nin an abiding present. Wherefore they deem not rightly who imagine that\non Plato's principles the created world is made co-eternal with the\nCreator, because they are told that he believed the world to have had\nno beginning in time,[S] and to be destined never to come to an end. For\nit is one thing for existence to be endlessly prolonged, which was what\nPlato ascribed to the world, another for the whole of an endless life to\nbe embraced in the present, which is manifestly a property peculiar to\nthe Divine mind. Nor need God appear earlier in mere duration of time to\ncreated things, but only prior in the unique simplicity of His nature. For the infinite progression of things in time copies this immediate\nexistence in the present of the changeless life, and when it cannot\nsucceed in equalling it, declines from movelessness into motion, and\nfalls away from the simplicity of a perpetual present to the infinite\nduration of the future and the past; and since it cannot possess the\nwhole fulness of its life together, for the very reason that in a manner\nit never ceases to be, it seems, up to a certain point, to rival that\nwhich it cannot complete and express by attaching itself indifferently\nto any present moment of time, however swift and brief; and since this\nbears some resemblance to that ever-abiding present, it bestows on\neverything to which it is assigned the semblance of existence. But since\nit cannot abide, it hurries along the infinite path of time, and the\nresult has been that it continues by ceaseless movement the life the\ncompleteness of which it could not embrace while it stood still. So, if\nwe are minded to give things their right names, we shall follow Plato in\nsaying that God indeed is eternal, but the world everlasting. 'Since, then, every mode of judgment comprehends its objects conformably\nto its own nature, and since God abides for ever in an eternal present,\nHis knowledge, also transcending all movement of time, dwells in the\nsimplicity of its own changeless present, and, embracing the whole\ninfinite sweep of the past and of the future, contemplates all that\nfalls within its simple cognition as if it were now taking place. And\ntherefore, if thou wilt carefully consider that immediate presentment\nwhereby it discriminates all things, thou wilt more rightly deem it not\nforeknowledge as of something future, but knowledge of a moment that\nnever passes. For this cause the name chosen to describe it is not\nprevision, but providence, because, since utterly removed in nature from\nthings mean and trivial, its outlook embraces all things as from some\nlofty height.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-06, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-09 The user is reading a book]\n<User> Why, then, dost thou insist that the things which are\nsurveyed by the Divine eye are involved in necessity, whereas clearly\nmen impose no necessity on things which they see? Does the act of vision\nadd any necessity to the things which thou seest before thy eyes?' 'Assuredly not.' 'And yet, if we may without unfitness compare God's present and man's,\njust as ye see certain things in this your temporary present, so does He\nsee all things in His eternal present. Wherefore this Divine\nanticipation changes not the natures and properties of things, and it\nbeholds things present before it, just as they will hereafter come to\npass in time. Nor does it confound things in its judgment, but in the\none mental view distinguishes alike what will come necessarily and what\nwithout necessity. For even as ye, when at one and the same time ye see\na man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the sky, distinguish\nbetween the two, though one glance embraces both, and judge the former\nvoluntary, the latter necessary action: so also the Divine vision in its\nuniversal range of view does in no wise confuse the characters of the\nthings which are present to its regard, though future in respect of\ntime. Whence it follows that when it perceives that something will come\ninto existence, and yet is perfectly aware that this is unbound by any\nnecessity, its apprehension is not opinion, but rather knowledge based\non truth. And if to this thou sayest that what God sees to be about to\ncome to pass cannot fail to come to pass, and that what cannot fail to\ncome to pass happens of necessity, and wilt tie me down to this word\nnecessity, I will acknowledge that thou affirmest a most solid truth,\nbut one which scarcely anyone can approach to who has not made the\nDivine his special study. For my answer would be that the same future\nevent is necessary from the standpoint of Divine knowledge, but when\nconsidered in its own nature it seems absolutely free and unfettered. So, then, there are two necessities--one simple, as that men are\nnecessarily mortal; the other conditioned, as that, if you know that\nsomeone is walking, he must necessarily be walking. For that which is\nknown cannot indeed be otherwise than as it is known to be, and yet this\nfact by no means carries with it that other simple necessity. For the\nformer necessity is not imposed by the thing's own proper nature, but by\nthe addition of a condition. No necessity compels one who is voluntarily\nwalking to go forward, although it is necessary for him to go forward at\nthe moment of walking. In the same way, then, if Providence sees\nanything as present, that must necessarily be, though it is bound by no\nnecessity of nature. Now, God views as present those coming events which\nhappen of free will. These, accordingly, from the standpoint of the\nDivine vision are made necessary conditionally on the Divine\ncognizance; viewed, however, in themselves, they desist not from the\nabsolute freedom naturally theirs. Accordingly, without doubt, all\nthings will come to pass which God foreknows as about to happen, but of\nthese certain proceed of free will; and though these happen, yet by the\nfact of their existence they do not lose their proper nature, in virtue\nof which before they happened it was really possible that they might not\nhave come to pass. 'What difference, then, does the denial of necessity make, since,\nthrough their being conditioned by Divine knowledge, they come to pass\nas if they were in all respects under the compulsion of necessity? This\ndifference, surely, which we saw in the case of the instances I formerly\ntook, the sun's rising and the man's walking; which at the moment of\ntheir occurrence could not but be taking place, and yet one of them\nbefore it took place was necessarily obliged to be, while the other was\nnot so at all. So likewise the things which to God are present without\ndoubt exist, but some of them come from the necessity of things, others\nfrom the power of the agent. Quite rightly, then, have we said that\nthese things are necessary if viewed from the standpoint of the Divine\nknowledge; but if they are considered in themselves, they are free from\nthe bonds of necessity, even as everything which is accessible to sense,\nregarded from the standpoint of Thought, is universal, but viewed in its\nown nature particular. \"But,\" thou wilt say, \"if it is in my power to\nchange my purpose, I shall make void providence, since I shall perchance\nchange something which comes within its foreknowledge.\" My answer is:\nThou canst indeed turn aside thy purpose; but since the truth of\nprovidence is ever at hand to see that thou canst, and whether thou\ndost, and whither thou turnest thyself, thou canst not avoid the Divine\nforeknowledge, even as thou canst not escape the sight of a present\nspectator, although of thy free will thou turn thyself to various\nactions. Wilt thou, then, say: \"Shall the Divine knowledge be changed at\nmy discretion, so that, when I will this or that, providence changes its\nknowledge correspondingly?\" 'Surely not.' 'True, for the Divine vision anticipates all that is coming, and\ntransforms and reduces it to the form of its own present knowledge, and\nvaries not, as thou deemest, in its foreknowledge, alternating to this\nor that, but in a single flash it forestalls and includes thy mutations\nwithout altering. And this ever-present comprehension and survey of all\nthings God has received, not from the issue of future events, but from\nthe simplicity of His own nature. Hereby also is resolved the objection\nwhich a little while ago gave thee offence--that our doings in the\nfuture were spoken of as if supplying the cause of God's knowledge. For\nthis faculty of knowledge, embracing all things in its immediate\ncognizance, has itself fixed the bounds of all things, yet itself owes\nnothing to what comes after. 'And all this being so, the freedom of man's will stands unshaken, and\nlaws are not unrighteous, since their rewards and punishments are held\nforth to wills unbound by any necessity. God, who foreknoweth all\nthings, still looks down from above, and the ever-present eternity of\nHis vision concurs with the future character of all our acts, and\ndispenseth to the good rewards, to the bad punishments. Our hopes and\nprayers also are not fixed on God in vain, and when they are rightly\ndirected cannot fail of effect. Therefore, withstand vice, practise\nvirtue, lift up your souls to right hopes, offer humble prayers to\nHeaven. Great is the necessity of righteousness laid upon you if ye will\nnot hide it from yourselves, seeing that all your actions are done\nbefore the eyes of a Judge who seeth all things.' FOOTNOTES:\n\n[S] Plato expressly states the opposite in the 'Timaeus' (28B), though\npossibly there the account of the beginning of the world in time is to\nbe understood figuratively, not literally. See Jowett, vol. iii., pp. 448, 449 (3rd edit.). </CHAPTER>\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-09, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far."]
[{"question": "Summarize the content of the book I read from 2024-01-01 to 2024-01-09", "answer": "Boethius, Philosophy, chance, free will, Providence, mind of God, God's foreknowledge, virtue, true happiness, vice, error, prayer, temporal creatures, eternity, rational nature, judgment, ability to choose, God's omniscience, order, hidden causes, communication with God, pursuit of virtue, God's act of knowing, past and present, future events, efficacy of prayer, Creator, striving for virtue, God's judgment, mystery of eternity"}]