["[Event happened on 2024-01-01 The user is reading a book]\n<User> 1. Some princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed their\nsubjects; others have kept their subject towns distracted by factions;\nothers have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid\nthemselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the beginning\nof their governments; some have built fortresses; some have overthrown\nand destroyed them. And although one cannot give a final judgment on all\nof these things unless one possesses the particulars of those states\nin which a decision has to be made, nevertheless I will speak as\ncomprehensively as the matter of itself will admit. 2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects; rather\nwhen he has found them disarmed he has always armed them, because, by\narming them, those arms become yours, those men who were distrusted\nbecome faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so, and your\nsubjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects cannot be\narmed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the others can be\nhandled more freely, and this difference in their treatment, which they\nquite understand, makes the former your dependents, and the latter,\nconsidering it to be necessary that those who have the most danger and\nservice should have the most reward, excuse you. But when you disarm\nthem, you at once offend them by showing that you distrust them, either\nfor cowardice or for want of loyalty, and either of these opinions\nbreeds hatred against you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it\nfollows that you turn to mercenaries, which are of the character already\nshown; even if they should be good they would not be sufficient to\ndefend you against powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore,\nas I have said, a new prince in a new principality has always\ndistributed arms. Histories are full of examples. But when a prince\nacquires a new state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then\nit is necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have\nbeen his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and\nopportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters should\nbe managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state shall be\nyour own soldiers who in your old state were living near you. 3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were accustomed\nto say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions and Pisa by\nfortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in some of their\ntributary towns so as to keep possession of them the more easily. This may have been well enough in those times when Italy was in a way\nbalanced, but I do not believe that it can be accepted as a precept\nfor to-day, because I do not believe that factions can ever be of use;\nrather it is certain that when the enemy comes upon you in divided\ncities you are quickly lost, because the weakest party will always\nassist the outside forces and the other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I believe, by the above reasons, fostered the\nGuelph and Ghibelline factions in their tributary cities; and although\nthey never allowed them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these\ndisputes amongst them, so that the citizens, distracted by their\ndifferences, should not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not\nafterwards turn out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one\nparty at once took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue,\ntherefore, weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be\npermitted in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the\nmore easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if\nwar comes this policy proves fallacious. 4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the\ndifficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore\nfortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who\nhas a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one, causes\nenemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he may have\nthe opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount higher, as by a\nladder which his enemies have raised. For this reason many consider that\na wise prince, when he has the opportunity, ought with craft to foster\nsome animosity against himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown\nmay rise higher. 5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and assistance\nin those men who in the beginning of their rule were distrusted than\namong those who in the beginning were trusted. Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince\nof Siena, ruled his state more by those who had been distrusted than by\nothers. But on this question one cannot speak generally, for it varies\nso much with the individual; I will only say this, that those men who\nat the commencement of a princedom have been hostile, if they are of\na description to need assistance to support themselves, can always be\ngained over with the greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to\nserve the prince with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very\nnecessary for them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had\nformed of them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from\nthem than from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect\nhis affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a\nprince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state, that he\nmust well consider the reasons which induced those to favour him who\ndid so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him, but only\ndiscontent with their government, then he will only keep them friendly\nwith great trouble and difficulty, for it will be impossible to satisfy\nthem. And weighing well the reasons for this in those examples which\ncan be taken from ancient and modern affairs, we shall find that it is\neasier for the prince to make friends of those men who were contented\nunder the former government, and are therefore his enemies, than of\nthose who, being discontented with it, were favourable to him and\nencouraged him to seize it. 6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their states\nmore securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle and bit\nto those who might design to work against them, and as a place of refuge\nfrom a first attack. I praise this system because it has been made use\nof formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli in our times\nhas been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di Castello so that he\nmight keep that state; Guido Ubaldo, Duke of Urbino, on returning to\nhis dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare Borgia, razed to the\nfoundations all the fortresses in that province, and considered that\nwithout them it would be more difficult to lose it; the Bentivogli\nreturning to Bologna came to a similar decision. Fortresses, therefore,\nare useful or not according to circumstances; if they do you good in one\nway they injure you in another. And this question can be reasoned thus:\nthe prince who has more to fear from the people than from foreigners\nought to build fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners\nthan from the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan,\nbuilt by Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the\nhouse of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this reason\nthe best possible fortress is--not to be hated by the people, because,\nalthough you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not save you if the\npeople hate you, for there will never be wanting foreigners to assist\na people who have taken arms against you. It has not been seen in our\ntimes that such fortresses have been of use to any prince, unless to the\nCountess of Forli,(*) when the Count Girolamo, her consort, was killed;\nfor by that means she was able to withstand the popular attack and wait\nfor assistance from Milan, and thus recover her state; and the posture\nof affairs was such at that time that the foreigners could not assist\nthe people. But fortresses were of little value to her afterwards when\nCesare Borgia attacked her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied\nwith foreigners. Therefore, it would have been safer for her, both then\nand before, not to have been hated by the people than to have had the\nfortresses. All these things considered then, I shall praise him\nwho builds fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame\nwhoever, trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people. (*) Catherine Sforza, a daughter of Galeazzo Sforza and\n     Lucrezia Landriani, born 1463, died 1509. It was to the\n     Countess of Forli that Machiavelli was sent as envoy on 1499.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-01, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-03 The user is reading a book]\n<User> A letter from Fortunati to the countess announces the\n     appointment: \"I have been with the signori,\" wrote\n     Fortunati, \"to learn whom they would send and when. They\n     tell me that Nicolo Machiavelli, a learned young Florentine\n     noble, secretary to my Lords of the Ten, is to leave with me\n     at once.\" Cf. \"Catherine Sforza,\" by Count Pasolini,\n     translated by P. Sylvester, 1898. Nothing makes a prince so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting\na fine example. We have in our time Ferdinand of Aragon, the present\nKing of Spain. He can almost be called a new prince, because he has\nrisen, by fame and glory, from being an insignificant king to be the\nforemost king in Christendom; and if you will consider his deeds\nyou will find them all great and some of them extraordinary. In the\nbeginning of his reign he attacked Granada, and this enterprise was the\nfoundation of his dominions. He did this quietly at first and without\nany fear of hindrance, for he held the minds of the barons of Castile\noccupied in thinking of the war and not anticipating any innovations;\nthus they did not perceive that by these means he was acquiring power\nand authority over them. He was able with the money of the Church and\nof the people to sustain his armies, and by that long war to lay the\nfoundation for the military skill which has since distinguished him. Further, always using religion as a plea, so as to undertake greater\nschemes, he devoted himself with pious cruelty to driving out and\nclearing his kingdom of the Moors; nor could there be a more admirable\nexample, nor one more rare. Under this same cloak he assailed Africa,\nhe came down on Italy, he has finally attacked France; and thus his\nachievements and designs have always been great, and have kept the minds\nof his people in suspense and admiration and occupied with the issue of\nthem. And his actions have arisen in such a way, one out of the other,\nthat men have never been given time to work steadily against him. Again, it much assists a prince to set unusual examples in internal\naffairs, similar to those which are related of Messer Bernabo da Milano,\nwho, when he had the opportunity, by any one in civil life doing some\nextraordinary thing, either good or bad, would take some method of\nrewarding or punishing him, which would be much spoken about. And a\nprince ought, above all things, always endeavour in every action to gain\nfor himself the reputation of being a great and remarkable man. A prince is also respected when he is either a true friend or a\ndownright enemy, that is to say, when, without any reservation, he\ndeclares himself in favour of one party against the other; which course\nwill always be more advantageous than standing neutral; because if two\nof your powerful neighbours come to blows, they are of such a character\nthat, if one of them conquers, you have either to fear him or not. In either case it will always be more advantageous for you to declare\nyourself and to make war strenuously; because, in the first case, if\nyou do not declare yourself, you will invariably fall a prey to\nthe conqueror, to the pleasure and satisfaction of him who has been\nconquered, and you will have no reasons to offer, nor anything to\nprotect or to shelter you. Because he who conquers does not want\ndoubtful friends who will not aid him in the time of trial; and he who\nloses will not harbour you because you did not willingly, sword in hand,\ncourt his fate. Antiochus went into Greece, being sent for by the Aetolians to drive\nout the Romans. He sent envoys to the Achaeans, who were friends of\nthe Romans, exhorting them to remain neutral; and on the other hand the\nRomans urged them to take up arms. This question came to be discussed in\nthe council of the Achaeans, where the legate of Antiochus urged them to\nstand neutral. To this the Roman legate answered: \"As for that which has\nbeen said, that it is better and more advantageous for your state not\nto interfere in our war, nothing can be more erroneous; because by\nnot interfering you will be left, without favour or consideration, the\nguerdon of the conqueror.\" Thus it will always happen that he who is not\nyour friend will demand your neutrality, whilst he who is your friend\nwill entreat you to declare yourself with arms. And irresolute princes,\nto avoid present dangers, generally follow the neutral path, and are\ngenerally ruined. But when a prince declares himself gallantly in favour\nof one side, if the party with whom he allies himself conquers, although\nthe victor may be powerful and may have him at his mercy, yet he is\nindebted to him, and there is established a bond of amity; and men are\nnever so shameless as to become a monument of ingratitude by oppressing\nyou. Victories after all are never so complete that the victor must not\nshow some regard, especially to justice. But if he with whom you ally\nyourself loses, you may be sheltered by him, and whilst he is able he\nmay aid you, and you become companions on a fortune that may rise again. In the second case, when those who fight are of such a character that\nyou have no anxiety as to who may conquer, so much the more is it\ngreater prudence to be allied, because you assist at the destruction\nof one by the aid of another who, if he had been wise, would have saved\nhim; and conquering, as it is impossible that he should not do with your\nassistance, he remains at your discretion. And here it is to be noted\nthat a prince ought to take care never to make an alliance with one\nmore powerful than himself for the purposes of attacking others, unless\nnecessity compels him, as is said above; because if he conquers you are\nat his discretion, and princes ought to avoid as much as possible being\nat the discretion of any one. The Venetians joined with France against\nthe Duke of Milan, and this alliance, which caused their ruin, could\nhave been avoided. But when it cannot be avoided, as happened to the\nFlorentines when the Pope and Spain sent armies to attack Lombardy, then\nin such a case, for the above reasons, the prince ought to favour one of\nthe parties. Never let any Government imagine that it can choose perfectly safe\ncourses; rather let it expect to have to take very doubtful ones,\nbecause it is found in ordinary affairs that one never seeks to avoid\none trouble without running into another; but prudence consists in\nknowing how to distinguish the character of troubles, and for choice to\ntake the lesser evil. A prince ought also to show himself a patron of ability, and to honour\nthe proficient in every art. At the same time he should encourage his\ncitizens to practise their callings peaceably, both in commerce and\nagriculture, and in every other following, so that the one should not be\ndeterred from improving his possessions for fear lest they be taken away\nfrom him or another from opening up trade for fear of taxes; but the\nprince ought to offer rewards to whoever wishes to do these things and\ndesigns in any way to honour his city or state. Further, he ought to entertain the people with festivals and spectacles\nat convenient seasons of the year; and as every city is divided into\nguilds or into societies,(*) he ought to hold such bodies in esteem, and\nassociate with them sometimes, and show himself an example of courtesy\nand liberality; nevertheless, always maintaining the majesty of his\nrank, for this he must never consent to abate in anything. (*) \"Guilds or societies,\" \"in arti o in tribu.\" \"Arti\" were\n     craft or trade guilds, cf. Florio: \"Arte . . . a whole\n     company of any trade in any city or corporation town.\" The\n     guilds of Florence are most admirably described by Mr\n     Edgcumbe Staley in his work on the subject (Methuen, 1906). Institutions of a somewhat similar character, called\n     \"artel,\" exist in Russia to-day, cf. Sir Mackenzie Wallace's\n     \"Russia,\" ed. 1905: \"The sons . . . were always during the\n     working season members of an artel. In some of the larger\n     towns there are artels of a much more complex kind--\n     permanent associations, possessing large capital, and\n     pecuniarily responsible for the acts of the individual\n     members.\" The word \"artel,\" despite its apparent similarity,\n     has, Mr Aylmer Maude assures me, no connection with \"ars\" or\n     \"arte.\" Its root is that of the verb \"rotisya,\" to bind\n     oneself by an oath; and it is generally admitted to be only\n     another form of \"rota,\" which now signifies a \"regimental\n     company.\" In both words the underlying idea is that of a\n     body of men united by an oath.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-03, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-06 The user is reading a book]\n<User> \"Tribu\" were possibly gentile\n     groups, united by common descent, and included individuals\n     connected by marriage. Perhaps our words \"sects\" or \"clans\"\n     would be most appropriate. The choice of servants is of no little importance to a prince, and they\nare good or not according to the discrimination of the prince. And the\nfirst opinion which one forms of a prince, and of his understanding, is\nby observing the men he has around him; and when they are capable and\nfaithful he may always be considered wise, because he has known how\nto recognize the capable and to keep them faithful. But when they are\notherwise one cannot form a good opinion of him, for the prime error\nwhich he made was in choosing them. There were none who knew Messer Antonio da Venafro as the servant of\nPandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, who would not consider Pandolfo to\nbe a very clever man in having Venafro for his servant. Because there\nare three classes of intellects: one which comprehends by itself;\nanother which appreciates what others comprehended; and a third which\nneither comprehends by itself nor by the showing of others; the first is\nthe most excellent, the second is good, the third is useless. Therefore,\nit follows necessarily that, if Pandolfo was not in the first rank, he\nwas in the second, for whenever one has judgment to know good and\nbad when it is said and done, although he himself may not have the\ninitiative, yet he can recognize the good and the bad in his servant,\nand the one he can praise and the other correct; thus the servant cannot\nhope to deceive him, and is kept honest. But to enable a prince to form an opinion of his servant there is one\ntest which never fails; when you see the servant thinking more of his\nown interests than of yours, and seeking inwardly his own profit in\neverything, such a man will never make a good servant, nor will you ever\nbe able to trust him; because he who has the state of another in his\nhands ought never to think of himself, but always of his prince, and\nnever pay any attention to matters in which the prince is not concerned. On the other hand, to keep his servant honest the prince ought to study\nhim, honouring him, enriching him, doing him kindnesses, sharing with\nhim the honours and cares; and at the same time let him see that he\ncannot stand alone, so that many honours may not make him desire more,\nmany riches make him wish for more, and that many cares may make him\ndread chances. When, therefore, servants, and princes towards servants,\nare thus disposed, they can trust each other, but when it is otherwise,\nthe end will always be disastrous for either one or the other. I do not wish to leave out an important branch of this subject, for it\nis a danger from which princes are with difficulty preserved, unless\nthey are very careful and discriminating. It is that of flatterers, of\nwhom courts are full, because men are so self-complacent in their own\naffairs, and in a way so deceived in them, that they are preserved with\ndifficulty from this pest, and if they wish to defend themselves they\nrun the danger of falling into contempt. Because there is no other way\nof guarding oneself from flatterers except letting men understand that\nto tell you the truth does not offend you; but when every one may tell\nyou the truth, respect for you abates. Therefore a wise prince ought to hold a third course by choosing the\nwise men in his state, and giving to them only the liberty of speaking\nthe truth to him, and then only of those things of which he inquires,\nand of none others; but he ought to question them upon everything, and\nlisten to their opinions, and afterwards form his own conclusions. With these councillors, separately and collectively, he ought to carry\nhimself in such a way that each of them should know that, the more\nfreely he shall speak, the more he shall be preferred; outside of\nthese, he should listen to no one, pursue the thing resolved on, and be\nsteadfast in his resolutions. He who does otherwise is either overthrown\nby flatterers, or is so often changed by varying opinions that he falls\ninto contempt. I wish on this subject to adduce a modern example. Fra Luca, the man of\naffairs to Maximilian,(*) the present emperor, speaking of his majesty,\nsaid: He consulted with no one, yet never got his own way in anything. This arose because of his following a practice the opposite to the\nabove; for the emperor is a secretive man--he does not communicate his\ndesigns to any one, nor does he receive opinions on them. But as in\ncarrying them into effect they become revealed and known, they are\nat once obstructed by those men whom he has around him, and he, being\npliant, is diverted from them. Hence it follows that those things he\ndoes one day he undoes the next, and no one ever understands what he\nwishes or intends to do, and no one can rely on his resolutions. (*) Maximilian I, born in 1459, died 1519, Emperor of the\n     Holy Roman Empire. He married, first, Mary, daughter of\n     Charles the Bold; after her death, Bianca Sforza; and thus\n     became involved in Italian politics. A prince, therefore, ought always to take counsel, but only when he\nwishes and not when others wish; he ought rather to discourage every one\nfrom offering advice unless he asks it; but, however, he ought to be\na constant inquirer, and afterwards a patient listener concerning the\nthings of which he inquired; also, on learning that any one, on any\nconsideration, has not told him the truth, he should let his anger be\nfelt. And if there are some who think that a prince who conveys an impression\nof his wisdom is not so through his own ability, but through the good\nadvisers that he has around him, beyond doubt they are deceived, because\nthis is an axiom which never fails: that a prince who is not wise\nhimself will never take good advice, unless by chance he has yielded his\naffairs entirely to one person who happens to be a very prudent man. In\nthis case indeed he may be well governed, but it would not be for long,\nbecause such a governor would in a short time take away his state from\nhim. But if a prince who is not inexperienced should take counsel from more\nthan one he will never get united counsels, nor will he know how to\nunite them. Each of the counsellors will think of his own interests, and\nthe prince will not know how to control them or to see through them. And\nthey are not to be found otherwise, because men will always prove untrue\nto you unless they are kept honest by constraint. Therefore it must be\ninferred that good counsels, whencesoever they come, are born of\nthe wisdom of the prince, and not the wisdom of the prince from good\ncounsels. The previous suggestions, carefully observed, will enable a new prince\nto appear well established, and render him at once more secure and fixed\nin the state than if he had been long seated there. For the actions of\na new prince are more narrowly observed than those of an hereditary\none, and when they are seen to be able they gain more men and bind\nfar tighter than ancient blood; because men are attracted more by the\npresent than by the past, and when they find the present good they enjoy\nit and seek no further; they will also make the utmost defence of a\nprince if he fails them not in other things. Thus it will be a double\nglory for him to have established a new principality, and adorned and\nstrengthened it with good laws, good arms, good allies, and with a good\nexample; so will it be a double disgrace to him who, born a prince,\nshall lose his state by want of wisdom. And if those seigniors are considered who have lost their states in\nItaly in our times, such as the King of Naples, the Duke of Milan,\nand others, there will be found in them, firstly, one common defect in\nregard to arms from the causes which have been discussed at length; in\nthe next place, some one of them will be seen, either to have had the\npeople hostile, or if he has had the people friendly, he has not known\nhow to secure the nobles. In the absence of these defects states that\nhave power enough to keep an army in the field cannot be lost. Philip of Macedon, not the father of Alexander the Great, but he who\nwas conquered by Titus Quintius, had not much territory compared to\nthe greatness of the Romans and of Greece who attacked him, yet being a\nwarlike man who knew how to attract the people and secure the nobles, he\nsustained the war against his enemies for many years, and if in the\nend he lost the dominion of some cities, nevertheless he retained the\nkingdom.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-06, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-08 The user is reading a book]\n<User> Therefore, do not let our princes accuse fortune for the loss of their\nprincipalities after so many years' possession, but rather their own\nsloth, because in quiet times they never thought there could be a change\n(it is a common defect in man not to make any provision in the calm\nagainst the tempest), and when afterwards the bad times came they\nthought of flight and not of defending themselves, and they hoped that\nthe people, disgusted with the insolence of the conquerors, would recall\nthem. This course, when others fail, may be good, but it is very bad to\nhave neglected all other expedients for that, since you would never\nwish to fall because you trusted to be able to find someone later on to\nrestore you. This again either does not happen, or, if it does, it will\nnot be for your security, because that deliverance is of no avail which\ndoes not depend upon yourself; those only are reliable, certain, and\ndurable that depend on yourself and your valour. It is not unknown to me how many men have had, and still have, the\nopinion that the affairs of the world are in such wise governed by\nfortune and by God that men with their wisdom cannot direct them and\nthat no one can even help them; and because of this they would have us\nbelieve that it is not necessary to labour much in affairs, but to let\nchance govern them. This opinion has been more credited in our times\nbecause of the great changes in affairs which have been seen, and\nmay still be seen, every day, beyond all human conjecture. Sometimes\npondering over this, I am in some degree inclined to their opinion. Nevertheless, not to extinguish our free will, I hold it to be true that\nFortune is the arbiter of one-half of our actions,(*) but that she still\nleaves us to direct the other half, or perhaps a little less. (*) Frederick the Great was accustomed to say: \"The older\n     one gets the more convinced one becomes that his Majesty\n     King Chance does three-quarters of the business of this\n     miserable universe.\" Sorel's \"Eastern Question.\" I compare her to one of those raging rivers, which when in flood\noverflows the plains, sweeping away trees and buildings, bearing away\nthe soil from place to place; everything flies before it, all yield to\nits violence, without being able in any way to withstand it; and yet,\nthough its nature be such, it does not follow therefore that men, when\nthe weather becomes fair, shall not make provision, both with defences\nand barriers, in such a manner that, rising again, the waters may\npass away by canal, and their force be neither so unrestrained nor so\ndangerous. So it happens with fortune, who shows her power where valour\nhas not prepared to resist her, and thither she turns her forces where\nshe knows that barriers and defences have not been raised to constrain\nher. And if you will consider Italy, which is the seat of these changes, and\nwhich has given to them their impulse, you will see it to be an open\ncountry without barriers and without any defence. For if it had been\ndefended by proper valour, as are Germany, Spain, and France, either\nthis invasion would not have made the great changes it has made or it\nwould not have come at all. And this I consider enough to say concerning\nresistance to fortune in general. But confining myself more to the particular, I say that a prince may be\nseen happy to-day and ruined to-morrow without having shown any change\nof disposition or character. This, I believe, arises firstly from causes\nthat have already been discussed at length, namely, that the prince who\nrelies entirely on fortune is lost when it changes. I believe also that\nhe will be successful who directs his actions according to the spirit of\nthe times, and that he whose actions do not accord with the times will\nnot be successful. Because men are seen, in affairs that lead to the end\nwhich every man has before him, namely, glory and riches, to get there\nby various methods; one with caution, another with haste; one by force,\nanother by skill; one by patience, another by its opposite; and each one\nsucceeds in reaching the goal by a different method. One can also see of\ntwo cautious men the one attain his end, the other fail; and similarly,\ntwo men by different observances are equally successful, the one being\ncautious, the other impetuous; all this arises from nothing else than\nwhether or not they conform in their methods to the spirit of the times. This follows from what I have said, that two men working differently\nbring about the same effect, and of two working similarly, one attains\nhis object and the other does not. Changes in estate also issue from this, for if, to one who governs\nhimself with caution and patience, times and affairs converge in such a\nway that his administration is successful, his fortune is made; but if\ntimes and affairs change, he is ruined if he does not change his course\nof action. But a man is not often found sufficiently circumspect to know\nhow to accommodate himself to the change, both because he cannot deviate\nfrom what nature inclines him to do, and also because, having always\nprospered by acting in one way, he cannot be persuaded that it is well\nto leave it; and, therefore, the cautious man, when it is time to turn\nadventurous, does not know how to do it, hence he is ruined; but had he\nchanged his conduct with the times fortune would not have changed. Pope Julius the Second went to work impetuously in all his affairs, and\nfound the times and circumstances conform so well to that line of action\nthat he always met with success. Consider his first enterprise against\nBologna, Messer Giovanni Bentivogli being still alive. The Venetians\nwere not agreeable to it, nor was the King of Spain, and he had the\nenterprise still under discussion with the King of France; nevertheless\nhe personally entered upon the expedition with his accustomed boldness\nand energy, a move which made Spain and the Venetians stand irresolute\nand passive, the latter from fear, the former from desire to recover\nthe kingdom of Naples; on the other hand, he drew after him the King of\nFrance, because that king, having observed the movement, and desiring\nto make the Pope his friend so as to humble the Venetians, found it\nimpossible to refuse him. Therefore Julius with his impetuous action\naccomplished what no other pontiff with simple human wisdom could have\ndone; for if he had waited in Rome until he could get away, with his\nplans arranged and everything fixed, as any other pontiff would have\ndone, he would never have succeeded. Because the King of France would\nhave made a thousand excuses, and the others would have raised a\nthousand fears. I will leave his other actions alone, as they were all alike, and they\nall succeeded, for the shortness of his life did not let him experience\nthe contrary; but if circumstances had arisen which required him to go\ncautiously, his ruin would have followed, because he would never have\ndeviated from those ways to which nature inclined him. I conclude, therefore that, fortune being changeful and mankind\nsteadfast in their ways, so long as the two are in agreement men are\nsuccessful, but unsuccessful when they fall out. For my part I consider\nthat it is better to be adventurous than cautious, because fortune is\na woman, and if you wish to keep her under it is necessary to beat and\nill-use her; and it is seen that she allows herself to be mastered by\nthe adventurous rather than by those who go to work more coldly. She is,\ntherefore, always, woman-like, a lover of young men, because they are\nless cautious, more violent, and with more audacity command her. Having carefully considered the subject of the above discourses, and\nwondering within myself whether the present times were propitious to\na new prince, and whether there were elements that would give an\nopportunity to a wise and virtuous one to introduce a new order of\nthings which would do honour to him and good to the people of this\ncountry, it appears to me that so many things concur to favour a new\nprince that I never knew a time more fit than the present. And if, as I said, it was necessary that the people of Israel should be\ncaptive so as to make manifest the ability of Moses; that the Persians\nshould be oppressed by the Medes so as to discover the greatness of the\nsoul of Cyrus; and that the Athenians should be dispersed to illustrate\nthe capabilities of Theseus: then at the present time, in order to\ndiscover the virtue of an Italian spirit, it was necessary that Italy\nshould be reduced to the extremity that she is now in, that she should\nbe more enslaved than the Hebrews, more oppressed than the Persians,\nmore scattered than the Athenians; without head, without order, beaten,\ndespoiled, torn, overrun; and to have endured every kind of desolation.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-08, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-10 The user is reading a book]\n<User> Although lately some spark may have been shown by one, which made us\nthink he was ordained by God for our redemption, nevertheless it was\nafterwards seen, in the height of his career, that fortune rejected him;\nso that Italy, left as without life, waits for him who shall yet heal\nher wounds and put an end to the ravaging and plundering of Lombardy,\nto the swindling and taxing of the kingdom and of Tuscany, and cleanse\nthose sores that for long have festered. It is seen how she entreats God\nto send someone who shall deliver her from these wrongs and barbarous\ninsolencies. It is seen also that she is ready and willing to follow a\nbanner if only someone will raise it. Nor is there to be seen at present one in whom she can place more hope\nthan in your illustrious house,(*) with its valour and fortune, favoured\nby God and by the Church of which it is now the chief, and which could\nbe made the head of this redemption. This will not be difficult if you\nwill recall to yourself the actions and lives of the men I have named. And although they were great and wonderful men, yet they were men, and\neach one of them had no more opportunity than the present offers, for\ntheir enterprises were neither more just nor easier than this, nor was\nGod more their friend than He is yours. (*) Giuliano de Medici. He had just been created a cardinal\n     by Leo X. In 1523 Giuliano was elected Pope, and took the\n     title of Clement VII. With us there is great justice, because that war is just which is\nnecessary, and arms are hallowed when there is no other hope but in\nthem. Here there is the greatest willingness, and where the willingness\nis great the difficulties cannot be great if you will only follow those\nmen to whom I have directed your attention. Further than this, how\nextraordinarily the ways of God have been manifested beyond example:\nthe sea is divided, a cloud has led the way, the rock has poured\nforth water, it has rained manna, everything has contributed to\nyour greatness; you ought to do the rest. God is not willing to do\neverything, and thus take away our free will and that share of glory\nwhich belongs to us. And it is not to be wondered at if none of the above-named Italians\nhave been able to accomplish all that is expected from your illustrious\nhouse; and if in so many revolutions in Italy, and in so many campaigns,\nit has always appeared as if military virtue were exhausted, this has\nhappened because the old order of things was not good, and none of us\nhave known how to find a new one. And nothing honours a man more than to\nestablish new laws and new ordinances when he himself was newly risen. Such things when they are well founded and dignified will make him\nrevered and admired, and in Italy there are not wanting opportunities to\nbring such into use in every form. Here there is great valour in the limbs whilst it fails in the head. Look attentively at the duels and the hand-to-hand combats, how superior\nthe Italians are in strength, dexterity, and subtlety. But when it comes\nto armies they do not bear comparison, and this springs entirely from\nthe insufficiency of the leaders, since those who are capable are not\nobedient, and each one seems to himself to know, there having never been\nany one so distinguished above the rest, either by valour or fortune,\nthat others would yield to him. Hence it is that for so long a time,\nand during so much fighting in the past twenty years, whenever there\nhas been an army wholly Italian, it has always given a poor account of\nitself; the first witness to this is Il Taro, afterwards Allesandria,\nCapua, Genoa, Vaila, Bologna, Mestri. (*)\n\n     (*) The battles of Il Taro, 1495; Alessandria, 1499; Capua,\n     1501; Genoa, 1507; Vaila, 1509; Bologna, 1511; Mestri, 1513. If, therefore, your illustrious house wishes to follow these remarkable\nmen who have redeemed their country, it is necessary before all things,\nas a true foundation for every enterprise, to be provided with your\nown forces, because there can be no more faithful, truer, or better\nsoldiers. And although singly they are good, altogether they will\nbe much better when they find themselves commanded by their prince,\nhonoured by him, and maintained at his expense. Therefore it is\nnecessary to be prepared with such arms, so that you can be defended\nagainst foreigners by Italian valour. And although Swiss and Spanish infantry may be considered very\nformidable, nevertheless there is a defect in both, by reason of which\na third order would not only be able to oppose them, but might be relied\nupon to overthrow them. For the Spaniards cannot resist cavalry, and the\nSwitzers are afraid of infantry whenever they encounter them in close\ncombat. Owing to this, as has been and may again be seen, the Spaniards\nare unable to resist French cavalry, and the Switzers are overthrown by\nSpanish infantry. And although a complete proof of this latter cannot\nbe shown, nevertheless there was some evidence of it at the battle of\nRavenna, when the Spanish infantry were confronted by German battalions,\nwho follow the same tactics as the Swiss; when the Spaniards, by agility\nof body and with the aid of their shields, got in under the pikes of the\nGermans and stood out of danger, able to attack, while the Germans stood\nhelpless, and, if the cavalry had not dashed up, all would have been\nover with them. It is possible, therefore, knowing the defects of both\nthese infantries, to invent a new one, which will resist cavalry and not\nbe afraid of infantry; this need not create a new order of arms, but\na variation upon the old. And these are the kind of improvements which\nconfer reputation and power upon a new prince. This opportunity, therefore, ought not to be allowed to pass for letting\nItaly at last see her liberator appear. Nor can one express the love\nwith which he would be received in all those provinces which have\nsuffered so much from these foreign scourings, with what thirst for\nrevenge, with what stubborn faith, with what devotion, with what tears. What door would be closed to him? Who would refuse obedience to him? What envy would hinder him? What Italian would refuse him homage? To all\nof us this barbarous dominion stinks. Let, therefore, your illustrious\nhouse take up this charge with that courage and hope with which all\njust enterprises are undertaken, so that under its standard our native\ncountry may be ennobled, and under its auspices may be verified that\nsaying of Petrarch:\n\n     Virtu contro al Furore\n     Prendera l'arme, e fia il combatter corto:\n     Che l'antico valore\n     Negli italici cuor non e ancor morto. Virtue against fury shall advance the fight,\n     And it i' th' combat soon shall put to flight:\n     For the old Roman valour is not dead,\n     Nor in th' Italians' brests extinguished. Edward Dacre, 1640.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-10, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far."]
[{"question": "Summarize the content of the book I read from 2024-01-01 to 2024-01-10", "answer": "Machiavelli, The Prince, Lorenzo de Medici, Cesare Borgia, Ferdinand of Spain, Venice, Aragon, Castille, Granada, expelling the Moors, Italy, fortresses, factionalism, armed forces, loyalty, reputation, military campaigns, festivals and spectacles, private counselors, good ministers, flatterers, advice, neutrality, unification of Italy, barbarians, luck, Fortune, ancient pride, Petrarch, conqueror, disarm subjects, arm subjects, defensive policies, obstacles, enmity, support of the people, talent rewards, confiscation, dignity, wise council, ministers' obedience, loss of dominions, storms, redeemer, heroic pride, Italian hearts"}]