["[Event happened on 2024-01-01 The user is reading a book]\n<User> What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual\nover himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of\nhuman life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society? Each will receive its proper share, if each has that which more\nparticularly concerns it. To individuality should belong the part of\nlife in which it is chiefly the individual that is interested; to\nsociety, the part which chiefly interests society. Though society is not founded on a contract, and though no good purpose\nis answered by inventing a contract in order to deduce social\nobligations from it, every one who receives the protection of society\nowes a return for the benefit, and the fact of living in society renders\nit indispensable that each should be bound to observe a certain line of\nconduct towards the rest. This conduct consists, first, in not injuring\nthe interests of one another; or rather certain interests which, either\nby express legal provision or by tacit understanding, ought to be\nconsidered as rights; and secondly, in each person's bearing his share\n(to be fixed on some equitable principle) of the labours and sacrifices\nincurred for defending the society or its members from injury and\nmolestation. These conditions society is justified in enforcing, at all\ncosts to those who endeavour to withhold fulfilment. Nor is this all\nthat society may do. The acts of an individual may be hurtful to others,\nor wanting in due consideration for their welfare, without going the\nlength of violating any of their constituted rights. The offender may\nthen be justly punished by opinion though not by law. As soon as any\npart of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of\nothers, society has jurisdiction over it, and the question whether the\ngeneral welfare will or will not be promoted by interfering with it,\nbecomes open to discussion. But there is no room for entertaining any\nsuch question when a person's conduct affects the interests of no\npersons besides himself, or needs not affect them unless they like (all\nthe persons concerned being of full age, and the ordinary amount of\nunderstanding). In all such cases there should be perfect freedom, legal\nand social, to do the action and stand the consequences. It would be a great misunderstanding of this doctrine, to suppose that\nit is one of selfish indifference, which pretends that human beings have\nno business with each other's conduct in life, and that they should not\nconcern themselves about the well-doing or well-being of one another,\nunless their own interest is involved. Instead of any diminution, there\nis need of a great increase of disinterested exertion to promote the\ngood of others. But disinterested benevolence can find other instruments\nto persuade people to their good, than whips and scourges, either of the\nliteral or the metaphorical sort. I am the last person to undervalue the\nself-regarding virtues; they are only second in importance, if even\nsecond, to the social. It is equally the business of education to\ncultivate both. But even education works by conviction and persuasion as\nwell as by compulsion, and it is by the former only that, when the\nperiod of education is past, the self-regarding virtues should be\ninculcated. Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the\nbetter from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid\nthe latter. They should be for ever stimulating each other to increased\nexercise of their higher faculties, and increased direction of their\nfeelings and aims towards wise instead of foolish, elevating instead of\ndegrading, objects and contemplations. But neither one person, nor any\nnumber of persons, is warranted in saying to another human creature of\nripe years, that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit what\nhe chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own\nwell-being: the interest which any other person, except in cases of\nstrong personal attachment, can have in it, is trifling, compared with\nthat which he himself has; the interest which society has in him\nindividually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional, and\naltogether indirect: while, with respect to his own feelings and\ncircumstances, the most ordinary man or woman has means of knowledge\nimmeasurably surpassing those that can be possessed by any one else. The\ninterference of society to overrule his judgment and purposes in what\nonly regards himself, must be grounded on general presumptions; which\nmay be altogether wrong, and even if right, are as likely as not to be\nmisapplied to individual cases, by persons no better acquainted with the\ncircumstances of such cases than those are who look at them merely from\nwithout. In this department, therefore, of human affairs, Individuality\nhas its proper field of action. In the conduct of human beings towards\none another, it is necessary that general rules should for the most part\nbe observed, in order that people may know what they have to expect; but\nin each person's own concerns, his individual spontaneity is entitled to\nfree exercise. Considerations to aid his judgment, exhortations to\nstrengthen his will, may be offered to him, even obtruded on him, by\nothers; but he himself is the final judge. All errors which he is likely\nto commit against advice and warning, are far outweighed by the evil of\nallowing others to constrain him to what they deem his good. I do not mean that the feelings with which a person is regarded by\nothers, ought not to be in any way affected by his self-regarding\nqualities or deficiencies. This is neither possible nor desirable. If he\nis eminent in any of the qualities which conduce to his own good, he is,\nso far, a proper object of admiration. He is so much the nearer to the\nideal perfection of human nature. If he is grossly deficient in those\nqualities, a sentiment the opposite of admiration will follow. There is\na degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though the\nphrase is not unobjectionable) lowness or depravation of taste, which,\nthough it cannot justify doing harm to the person who manifests it,\nrenders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in\nextreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite\nqualities in due strength without entertaining these feelings. Though\ndoing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge\nhim, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and\nsince this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to\navoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any\nother disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be\nwell, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than\nthe common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person\ncould honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without\nbeing considered unmannerly or presuming. We have a right, also, in\nvarious ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to\nthe oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are\nnot bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it\n(though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the\nsociety most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty,\nto caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation\nlikely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We\nmay give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except\nthose which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may\nsuffer very severe penalties at the hands of others, for faults which\ndirectly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so\nfar as they are the natural, and, as it were, the spontaneous\nconsequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely\ninflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows\nrashness, obstinacy, self-conceit--who cannot live within moderate\nmeans--who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences--who pursues\nanimal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect--must\nexpect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share\nof their favourable sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain,\nunless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social\nrelations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which\nis not affected by his demerits towards himself. What I contend for is, that the inconveniences which are strictly\ninseparable from the unfavourable judgment of others, are the only ones\nto which a person should ever be subjected for that portion of his\nconduct and character which concerns his own good, but which does not\naffect the interests of others in their relations with him. Acts\ninjurious to others require a totally different treatment.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-01, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-03 The user is reading a book]\n<User> Encroachment\non their rights; infliction on them of any loss or damage not justified\nby his own rights; falsehood or duplicity in dealing with them; unfair\nor ungenerous use of advantages over them; even selfish abstinence from\ndefending them against injury--these are fit objects of moral\nreprobation, and, in grave cases, of moral retribution and punishment. And not only these acts, but the dispositions which lead to them, are\nproperly immoral, and fit subjects of disapprobation which may rise to\nabhorrence. Cruelty of disposition; malice and ill-nature; that most\nanti-social and odious of all passions, envy; dissimulation and\ninsincerity; irascibility on insufficient cause, and resentment\ndisproportioned to the provocation; the love of domineering over others;\nthe desire to engross more than one's share of advantages (the [Greek:\npleonexia] of the Greeks); the pride which derives gratification from\nthe abasement of others; the egotism which thinks self and its concerns\nmore important than everything else, and decides all doubtful questions\nin its own favour;--these are moral vices, and constitute a bad and\nodious moral character: unlike the self-regarding faults previously\nmentioned, which are not properly immoralities, and to whatever pitch\nthey may be carried, do not constitute wickedness. They may be proofs of\nany amount of folly, or want of personal dignity and self-respect; but\nthey are only a subject of moral reprobation when they involve a breach\nof duty to others, for whose sake the individual is bound to have care\nfor himself. What are called duties to ourselves are not socially\nobligatory, unless circumstances render them at the same time duties to\nothers. The term duty to oneself, when it means anything more than\nprudence, means self-respect or self-development; and for none of these\nis any one accountable to his fellow-creatures, because for none of them\nis it for the good of mankind that he be held accountable to them. The distinction between the loss of consideration which a person may\nrightly incur by defect of prudence or of personal dignity, and the\nreprobation which is due to him for an offence against the rights of\nothers, is not a merely nominal distinction. It makes a vast difference\nboth in our feelings and in our conduct towards him, whether he\ndispleases us in things in which we think we have a right to control\nhim, or in things in which we know that we have not. If he displeases\nus, we may express our distaste, and we may stand aloof from a person as\nwell as from a thing that displeases us; but we shall not therefore feel\ncalled on to make his life uncomfortable. We shall reflect that he\nalready bears, or will bear, the whole penalty of his error; if he\nspoils his life by mismanagement, we shall not, for that reason, desire\nto spoil it still further: instead of wishing to punish him, we shall\nrather endeavour to alleviate his punishment, by showing him how he may\navoid or cure the evils his conduct tends to bring upon him. He may be\nto us an object of pity, perhaps of dislike, but not of anger or\nresentment; we shall not treat him like an enemy of society: the worst\nwe shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself,\nif we do not interfere benevolently by showing interest or concern for\nhim. It is far otherwise if he has infringed the rules necessary for the\nprotection of his fellow-creatures, individually or collectively. The\nevil consequences of his acts do not then fall on himself, but on\nothers; and society, as the protector of all its members, must retaliate\non him; must inflict pain on him for the express purpose of punishment,\nand must take care that it be sufficiently severe. In the one case, he\nis an offender at our bar, and we are called on not only to sit in\njudgment on him, but, in one shape or another, to execute our own\nsentence: in the other case, it is not our part to inflict any suffering\non him, except what may incidentally follow from our using the same\nliberty in the regulation of our own affairs, which we allow to him in\nhis. The distinction here pointed out between the part of a person's life\nwhich concerns only himself, and that which concerns others, many\npersons will refuse to admit. How (it may be asked) can any part of the\nconduct of a member of society be a matter of indifference to the other\nmembers? No person is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a\nperson to do anything seriously or permanently hurtful to himself,\nwithout mischief reaching at least to his near connections, and often\nfar beyond them. If he injures his property, he does harm to those who\ndirectly or indirectly derived support from it, and usually diminishes,\nby a greater or less amount, the general resources of the community. If\nhe deteriorates his bodily or mental faculties, he not only brings evil\nupon all who depended on him for any portion of their happiness, but\ndisqualifies himself for rendering the services which he owes to his\nfellow-creatures generally; perhaps becomes a burthen on their affection\nor benevolence; and if such conduct were very frequent, hardly any\noffence that is committed would detract more from the general sum of\ngood. Finally, if by his vices or follies a person does no direct harm\nto others, he is nevertheless (it may be said) injurious by his example;\nand ought to be compelled to control himself, for the sake of those whom\nthe sight or knowledge of his conduct might corrupt or mislead. And even (it will be added) if the consequences of misconduct could be\nconfined to the vicious or thoughtless individual, ought society to\nabandon to their own guidance those who are manifestly unfit for it? If\nprotection against themselves is confessedly due to children and persons\nunder age, is not society equally bound to afford it to persons of\nmature years who are equally incapable of self-government? If gambling,\nor drunkenness, or incontinence, or idleness, or uncleanliness, are as\ninjurious to happiness, and as great a hindrance to improvement, as many\nor most of the acts prohibited by law, why (it may be asked) should not\nlaw, so far as is consistent with practicability and social convenience,\nendeavour to repress these also? And as a supplement to the unavoidable\nimperfections of law, ought not opinion at least to organise a powerful\npolice against these vices, and visit rigidly with social penalties\nthose who are known to practise them? There is no question here (it may\nbe said) about restricting individuality, or impeding the trial of new\nand original experiments in living. The only things it is sought to\nprevent are things which have been tried and condemned from the\nbeginning of the world until now; things which experience has shown not\nto be useful or suitable to any person's individuality. There must be\nsome length of time and amount of experience, after which a moral or\nprudential truth may be regarded as established: and it is merely\ndesired to prevent generation after generation from falling over the\nsame precipice which has been fatal to their predecessors. I fully admit that the mischief which a person does to himself, may\nseriously affect, both through their sympathies and their interests,\nthose nearly connected with him, and in a minor degree, society at\nlarge. When, by conduct of this sort, a person is led to violate a\ndistinct and assignable obligation to any other person or persons, the\ncase is taken out of the self-regarding class, and becomes amenable to\nmoral disapprobation in the proper sense of the term. If, for example,\na man, through intemperance or extravagance, becomes unable to pay his\ndebts, or, having undertaken the moral responsibility of a family,\nbecomes from the same cause incapable of supporting or educating them,\nhe is deservedly reprobated, and might be justly punished; but it is for\nthe breach of duty to his family or creditors, not for the extravagance. If the resources which ought to have been devoted to them, had been\ndiverted from them for the most prudent investment, the moral\nculpability would have been the same. George Barnwell murdered his uncle\nto get money for his mistress, but if he had done it to set himself up\nin business, he would equally have been hanged. Again, in the frequent\ncase of a man who causes grief to his family by addiction to bad habits,\nhe deserves reproach for his unkindness or ingratitude; but so he may\nfor cultivating habits not in themselves vicious, if they are painful to\nthose with whom he passes his life, or who from personal ties are\ndependent on him for their comfort. Whoever fails in the consideration\ngenerally due to the interests and feelings of others, not being\ncompelled by some more imperative duty, or justified by allowable\nself-preference, is a subject of moral disapprobation for that failure,\nbut not for the cause of it, nor for the errors, merely personal to\nhimself, which may have remotely led to it.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-03, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-05 The user is reading a book]\n<User> In like manner, when a\nperson disables himself, by conduct purely self-regarding, from the\nperformance of some definite duty incumbent on him to the public, he is\nguilty of a social offence. No person ought to be punished simply for\nbeing drunk; but a soldier or a policeman should be punished for being\ndrunk on duty. Whenever, in short, there is a definite damage, or a\ndefinite risk of damage, either to an individual or to the public, the\ncase is taken out of the province of liberty, and placed in that of\nmorality or law. But with regard to the merely contingent, or, as it may be called,\nconstructive injury which a person causes to society, by conduct which\nneither violates any specific duty to the public, nor occasions\nperceptible hurt to any assignable individual except himself; the\ninconvenience is one which society can afford to bear, for the sake of\nthe greater good of human freedom. If grown persons are to be punished\nfor not taking proper care of themselves, I would rather it were for\ntheir own sake, than under pretence of preventing them from impairing\ntheir capacity of rendering to society benefits which society does not\npretend it has a right to exact. But I cannot consent to argue the\npoint as if society had no means of bringing its weaker members up to\nits ordinary standard of rational conduct, except waiting till they do\nsomething irrational, and then punishing them, legally or morally, for\nit. Society has had absolute power over them during all the early\nportion of their existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and\nnonage in which to try whether it could make them capable of rational\nconduct in life. The existing generation is master both of the training\nand the entire circumstances of the generation to come; it cannot indeed\nmake them perfectly wise and good, because it is itself so lamentably\ndeficient in goodness and wisdom; and its best efforts are not always,\nin individual cases, its most successful ones; but it is perfectly well\nable to make the rising generation, as a whole, as good as, and a little\nbetter than, itself. If society lets any considerable number of its\nmembers grow up mere children, incapable of being acted on by rational\nconsideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame for the\nconsequences. Armed not only with all the powers of education, but with\nthe ascendency which the authority of a received opinion always\nexercises over the minds who are least fitted to judge for themselves;\nand aided by the _natural_ penalties which cannot be prevented from\nfalling on those who incur the distaste or the contempt of those who\nknow them; let not society pretend that it needs, besides all this, the\npower to issue commands and enforce obedience in the personal concerns\nof individuals, in which, on all principles of justice and policy, the\ndecision ought to rest with those who are to abide the consequences. Nor\nis there anything which tends more to discredit and frustrate the better\nmeans of influencing conduct, than a resort to the worse. If there be\namong those whom it is attempted to coerce into prudence or temperance,\nany of the material of which vigorous and independent characters are\nmade, they will infallibly rebel against the yoke. No such person will\never feel that others have a right to control him in his concerns, such\nas they have to prevent him from injuring them in theirs; and it easily\ncomes to be considered a mark of spirit and courage to fly in the face\nof such usurped authority, and do with ostentation the exact opposite of\nwhat it enjoins; as in the fashion of grossness which succeeded, in the\ntime of Charles II., to the fanatical moral intolerance of the Puritans. With respect to what is said of the necessity of protecting society\nfrom the bad example set to others by the vicious or the\nself-indulgent; it is true that bad example may have a pernicious\neffect, especially the example of doing wrong to others with impunity to\nthe wrong-doer. But we are now speaking of conduct which, while it does\nno wrong to others, is supposed to do great harm to the agent himself:\nand I do not see how those who believe this, can think otherwise than\nthat the example, on the whole, must be more salutary than hurtful,\nsince, if it displays the misconduct, it displays also the painful or\ndegrading consequences which, if the conduct is justly censured, must be\nsupposed to be in all or most cases attendant on it. But the strongest of all the arguments against the interference of the\npublic with purely personal conduct, is that when it does interfere, the\nodds are that it interferes wrongly, and in the wrong place. On\nquestions of social morality, of duty to others, the opinion of the\npublic, that is, of an overruling majority, though often wrong, is\nlikely to be still oftener right; because on such questions they are\nonly required to judge of their own interests; of the manner in which\nsome mode of conduct, if allowed to be practised, would affect\nthemselves. But the opinion of a similar majority, imposed as a law on\nthe minority, on questions of self-regarding conduct, is quite as\nlikely to be wrong as right; for in these cases public opinion means, at\nthe best, some people's opinion of what is good or bad for other people;\nwhile very often it does not even mean that; the public, with the most\nperfect indifference, passing over the pleasure or convenience of those\nwhose conduct they censure, and considering only their own preference. There are many who consider as an injury to themselves any conduct which\nthey have a distaste for, and resent it as an outrage to their feelings;\nas a religious bigot, when charged with disregarding the religious\nfeelings of others, has been known to retort that they disregard his\nfeelings, by persisting in their abominable worship or creed. But there\nis no parity between the feeling of a person for his own opinion, and\nthe feeling of another who is offended at his holding it; no more than\nbetween the desire of a thief to take a purse, and the desire of the\nright owner to keep it. And a person's taste is as much his own peculiar\nconcern as his opinion or his purse. It is easy for any one to imagine\nan ideal public, which leaves the freedom and choice of individuals in\nall uncertain matters undisturbed, and only requires them to abstain\nfrom modes of conduct which universal experience has condemned. But\nwhere has there been seen a public which set any such limit to its\ncensorship? or when does the public trouble itself about universal\nexperience? In its interferences with personal conduct it is seldom\nthinking of anything but the enormity of acting or feeling differently\nfrom itself; and this standard of judgment, thinly disguised, is held up\nto mankind as the dictate of religion and philosophy, by nine-tenths of\nall moralists and speculative writers. These teach that things are right\nbecause they are right; because we feel them to be so. They tell us to\nsearch in our own minds and hearts for laws of conduct binding on\nourselves and on all others. What can the poor public do but apply these\ninstructions, and make their own personal feelings of good and evil, if\nthey are tolerably unanimous in them, obligatory on all the world? The evil here pointed out is not one which exists only in theory; and it\nmay perhaps be expected that I should specify the instances in which the\npublic of this age and country improperly invests its own preferences\nwith the character of moral laws. I am not writing an essay on the\naberrations of existing moral feeling. That is too weighty a subject to\nbe discussed parenthetically, and by way of illustration. Yet examples\nare necessary, to show that the principle I maintain is of serious and\npractical moment, and that I am not endeavouring to erect a barrier\nagainst imaginary evils. And it is not difficult to show, by abundant\ninstances, that to extend the bounds of what may be called moral police,\nuntil it encroaches on the most unquestionably legitimate liberty of the\nindividual, is one of the most universal of all human propensities. As a first instance, consider the antipathies which men cherish on no\nbetter grounds than that persons whose religious opinions are different\nfrom theirs, do not practise their religious observances, especially\ntheir religious abstinences. To cite a rather trivial example, nothing\nin the creed or practice of Christians does more to envenom the hatred\nof Mahomedans against them, than the fact of their eating pork. There\nare few acts which Christians and Europeans regard with more unaffected\ndisgust, than Mussulmans regard this particular mode of satisfying\nhunger. It is, in the first place, an offence against their religion;\nbut this circumstance by no means explains either the degree or the kind\nof their repugnance; for wine also is forbidden by their religion, and\nto partake of it is by all Mussulmans accounted wrong, but not\ndisgusting.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-05, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-06 The user is reading a book]\n<User> Their aversion to the flesh of the \"unclean beast\" is, on\nthe contrary, of that peculiar character, resembling an instinctive\nantipathy, which the idea of uncleanness, when once it thoroughly sinks\ninto the feelings, seems always to excite even in those whose personal\nhabits are anything but scrupulously cleanly, and of which the sentiment\nof religious impurity, so intense in the Hindoos, is a remarkable\nexample. Suppose now that in a people, of whom the majority were\nMussulmans, that majority should insist upon not permitting pork to be\neaten within the limits of the country. This would be nothing new in\nMahomedan countries. [14] Would it be a legitimate exercise of the moral\nauthority of public opinion? and if not, why not? The practice is really\nrevolting to such a public. They also sincerely think that it is\nforbidden and abhorred by the Deity. Neither could the prohibition be\ncensured as religious persecution. It might be religious in its origin,\nbut it would not be persecution for religion, since nobody's religion\nmakes it a duty to eat pork. The only tenable ground of condemnation\nwould be, that with the personal tastes and self-regarding concerns of\nindividuals the public has no business to interfere. To come somewhat nearer home: the majority of Spaniards consider it a\ngross impiety, offensive in the highest degree to the Supreme Being, to\nworship him in any other manner than the Roman Catholic; and no other\npublic worship is lawful on Spanish soil. The people of all Southern\nEurope look upon a married clergy as not only irreligious, but unchaste,\nindecent, gross, disgusting. What do Protestants think of these\nperfectly sincere feelings, and of the attempt to enforce them against\nnon-Catholics? Yet, if mankind are justified in interfering with each\nother's liberty in things which do not concern the interests of others,\non what principle is it possible consistently to exclude these cases? or\nwho can blame people for desiring to suppress what they regard as a\nscandal in the sight of God and man? No stronger case can be shown for\nprohibiting anything which is regarded as a personal immorality, than\nis made out for suppressing these practices in the eyes of those who\nregard them as impieties; and unless we are willing to adopt the logic\nof persecutors, and to say that we may persecute others because we are\nright, and that they must not persecute us because they are wrong, we\nmust beware of admitting a principle of which we should resent as a\ngross injustice the application to ourselves. The preceding instances may be objected to, although unreasonably, as\ndrawn from contingencies impossible among us: opinion, in this country,\nnot being likely to enforce abstinence from meats, or to interfere with\npeople for worshipping, and for either marrying or not marrying,\naccording to their creed or inclination. The next example, however,\nshall be taken from an interference with liberty which we have by no\nmeans passed all danger of. Wherever the Puritans have been sufficiently\npowerful, as in New England, and in Great Britain at the time of the\nCommonwealth, they have endeavoured, with considerable success, to put\ndown all public, and nearly all private, amusements: especially music,\ndancing, public games, or other assemblages for purposes of diversion,\nand the theatre. There are still in this country large bodies of\npersons by whose notions of morality and religion these recreations are\ncondemned; and those persons belonging chiefly to the middle class, who\nare the ascendant power in the present social and political condition of\nthe kingdom, it is by no means impossible that persons of these\nsentiments may at some time or other command a majority in Parliament. How will the remaining portion of the community like to have the\namusements that shall be permitted to them regulated by the religious\nand moral sentiments of the stricter Calvinists and Methodists? Would\nthey not, with considerable peremptoriness, desire these intrusively\npious members of society to mind their own business? This is precisely\nwhat should be said to every government and every public, who have the\npretension that no person shall enjoy any pleasure which they think\nwrong. But if the principle of the pretension be admitted, no one can\nreasonably object to its being acted on in the sense of the majority, or\nother preponderating power in the country; and all persons must be ready\nto conform to the idea of a Christian commonwealth, as understood by the\nearly settlers in New England, if a religious profession similar to\ntheirs should ever succeed in regaining its lost ground, as religions\nsupposed to be declining have so often been known to do. To imagine another contingency, perhaps more likely to be realised than\nthe one last mentioned. There is confessedly a strong tendency in the\nmodern world towards a democratic constitution of society, accompanied\nor not by popular political institutions. It is affirmed that in the\ncountry where this tendency is most completely realised--where both\nsociety and the government are most democratic--the United States--the\nfeeling of the majority, to whom any appearance of a more showy or\ncostly style of living than they can hope to rival is disagreeable,\noperates as a tolerably effectual sumptuary law, and that in many parts\nof the Union it is really difficult for a person possessing a very large\nincome, to find any mode of spending it, which will not incur popular\ndisapprobation. Though such statements as these are doubtless much\nexaggerated as a representation of existing facts, the state of things\nthey describe is not only a conceivable and possible, but a probable\nresult of democratic feeling, combined with the notion that the public\nhas a right to a veto on the manner in which individuals shall spend\ntheir incomes. We have only further to suppose a considerable diffusion\nof Socialist opinions, and it may become infamous in the eyes of the\nmajority to possess more property than some very small amount, or any\nincome not earned by manual labour. Opinions similar in principle to\nthese, already prevail widely among the artisan class, and weigh\noppressively on those who are amenable to the opinion chiefly of that\nclass, namely, its own members. It is known that the bad workmen who\nform the majority of the operatives in many branches of industry, are\ndecidedly of opinion that bad workmen ought to receive the same wages as\ngood, and that no one ought to be allowed, through piecework or\notherwise, to earn by superior skill or industry more than others can\nwithout it. And they employ a moral police, which occasionally becomes a\nphysical one, to deter skilful workmen from receiving, and employers\nfrom giving, a larger remuneration for a more useful service. If the\npublic have any jurisdiction over private concerns, I cannot see that\nthese people are in fault, or that any individual's particular public\ncan be blamed for asserting the same authority over his individual\nconduct, which the general public asserts over people in general. But, without dwelling upon supposititious cases, there are, in our own\nday, gross usurpations upon the liberty of private life actually\npractised, and still greater ones threatened with some expectation of\nsuccess, and opinions proposed which assert an unlimited right in the\npublic not only to prohibit by law everything which it thinks wrong, but\nin order to get at what it thinks wrong, to prohibit any number of\nthings which it admits to be innocent. Under the name of preventing intemperance, the people of one English\ncolony, and of nearly half the United States, have been interdicted by\nlaw from making any use whatever of fermented drinks, except for medical\npurposes: for prohibition of their sale is in fact, as it is intended to\nbe, prohibition of their use. And though the impracticability of\nexecuting the law has caused its repeal in several of the States which\nhad adopted it, including the one from which it derives its name, an\nattempt has notwithstanding been commenced, and is prosecuted with\nconsiderable zeal by many of the professed philanthropists, to agitate\nfor a similar law in this country. The association, or \"Alliance\" as it\nterms itself, which has been formed for this purpose, has acquired some\nnotoriety through the publicity given to a correspondence between its\nSecretary and one of the very few English public men who hold that a\npolitician's opinions ought to be founded on principles. Lord Stanley's\nshare in this correspondence is calculated to strengthen the hopes\nalready built on him, by those who know how rare such qualities as are\nmanifested in some of his public appearances, unhappily are among those\nwho figure in political life. The organ of the Alliance, who would\n\"deeply deplore the recognition of any principle which could be wrested\nto justify bigotry and persecution,\" undertakes to point out the \"broad\nand impassable barrier\" which divides such principles from those of the\nassociation. \"All matters relating to thought, opinion, conscience,\nappear to me,\" he says, \"to be without the sphere of legislation; all\npertaining to social act, habit, relation, subject only to a\ndiscretionary power vested in the State itself, and not in the\nindividual, to be within it.\"\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-06, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-08 The user is reading a book]\n<User> No mention is made of a third class,\ndifferent from either of these, viz. acts and habits which are not\nsocial, but individual; although it is to this class, surely, that the\nact of drinking fermented liquors belongs. Selling fermented liquors,\nhowever, is trading, and trading is a social act. But the infringement\ncomplained of is not on the liberty of the seller, but on that of the\nbuyer and consumer; since the State might just as well forbid him to\ndrink wine, as purposely make it impossible for him to obtain it. The\nSecretary, however, says, \"I claim, as a citizen, a right to legislate\nwhenever my social rights are invaded by the social act of another.\" And\nnow for the definition of these \"social rights.\" \"If anything invades my\nsocial rights, certainly the traffic in strong drink does. It destroys\nmy primary right of security, by constantly creating and stimulating\nsocial disorder. It invades my right of equality, by deriving a profit\nfrom the creation of a misery, I am taxed to support. It impedes my\nright to free moral and intellectual development, by surrounding my path\nwith dangers, and by weakening and demoralising society, from which I\nhave a right to claim mutual aid and intercourse.\" A theory of \"social\nrights,\" the like of which probably never before found its way into\ndistinct language--being nothing short of this--that it is the absolute\nsocial right of every individual, that every other individual shall act\nin every respect exactly as he ought; that whosoever fails thereof in\nthe smallest particular, violates my social right, and entitles me to\ndemand from the legislature the removal of the grievance. So monstrous a\nprinciple is far more dangerous than any single interference with\nliberty; there is no violation of liberty which it would not justify;\nit acknowledges no right to any freedom whatever, except perhaps to that\nof holding opinions in secret, without ever disclosing them: for the\nmoment an opinion which I consider noxious, passes any one's lips, it\ninvades all the \"social rights\" attributed to me by the Alliance. The\ndoctrine ascribes to all mankind a vested interest in each other's\nmoral, intellectual, and even physical perfection, to be defined by each\nclaimant according to his own standard. Another important example of illegitimate interference with the rightful\nliberty of the individual, not simply threatened, but long since carried\ninto triumphant effect, is Sabbatarian legislation. Without doubt,\nabstinence on one day in the week, so far as the exigencies of life\npermit, from the usual daily occupation, though in no respect\nreligiously binding on any except Jews, is a highly beneficial custom. And inasmuch as this custom cannot be observed without a general consent\nto that effect among the industrious classes, therefore, in so far as\nsome persons by working may impose the same necessity on others, it may\nbe allowable and right that the law should guarantee to each, the\nobservance by others of the custom, by suspending the greater operations\nof industry on a particular day. But this justification, grounded on the\ndirect interest which others have in each individual's observance of\nthe practice, does not apply to the self-chosen occupations in which a\nperson may think fit to employ his leisure; nor does it hold good, in\nthe smallest degree, for legal restrictions on amusements. It is true\nthat the amusement of some is the day's work of others; but the\npleasure, not to say the useful recreation, of many, is worth the labour\nof a few, provided the occupation is freely chosen, and can be freely\nresigned. The operatives are perfectly right in thinking that if all\nworked on Sunday, seven days' work would have to be given for six days'\nwages: but so long as the great mass of employments are suspended, the\nsmall number who for the enjoyment of others must still work, obtain a\nproportional increase of earnings; and they are not obliged to follow\nthose occupations, if they prefer leisure to emolument. If a further\nremedy is sought, it might be found in the establishment by custom of a\nholiday on some other day of the week for those particular classes of\npersons. The only ground, therefore, on which restrictions on Sunday\namusements can be defended, must be that they are religiously wrong; a\nmotive of legislation which never can be too earnestly protested\nagainst. \"Deorum injuriae Diis curae.\" It remains to be proved that\nsociety or any of its officers holds a commission from on high to\navenge any supposed offence to Omnipotence, which is not also a wrong to\nour fellow-creatures. The notion that it is one man's duty that another\nshould be religious, was the foundation of all the religious\npersecutions ever perpetrated, and if admitted, would fully justify\nthem. Though the feeling which breaks out in the repeated attempts to\nstop railway travelling on Sunday, in the resistance to the opening of\nMuseums, and the like, has not the cruelty of the old persecutors, the\nstate of mind indicated by it is fundamentally the same. It is a\ndetermination not to tolerate others in doing what is permitted by their\nreligion, because it is not permitted by the persecutor's religion. It\nis a belief that God not only abominates the act of the misbeliever, but\nwill not hold us guiltless if we leave him unmolested. I cannot refrain from adding to these examples of the little account\ncommonly made of human liberty, the language of downright persecution\nwhich breaks out from the press of this country, whenever it feels\ncalled on to notice the remarkable phenomenon of Mormonism. Much might\nbe said on the unexpected and instructive fact, that an alleged new\nrevelation, and a religion founded on it, the product of palpable\nimposture, not even supported by the _prestige_ of extraordinary\nqualities in its founder, is believed by hundreds of thousands, and has\nbeen made the foundation of a society, in the age of newspapers,\nrailways, and the electric telegraph. What here concerns us is, that\nthis religion, like other and better religions, has its martyrs; that\nits prophet and founder was, for his teaching, put to death by a mob;\nthat others of its adherents lost their lives by the same lawless\nviolence; that they were forcibly expelled, in a body, from the country\nin which they first grew up; while, now that they have been chased into\na solitary recess in the midst of a desert, many in this country openly\ndeclare that it would be right (only that it is not convenient) to send\nan expedition against them, and compel them by force to conform to the\nopinions of other people. The article of the Mormonite doctrine which is\nthe chief provocative to the antipathy which thus breaks through the\nordinary restraints of religious tolerance, is its sanction of polygamy;\nwhich, though permitted to Mahomedans, and Hindoos, and Chinese, seems\nto excite unquenchable animosity when practised by persons who speak\nEnglish, and profess to be a kind of Christians. No one has a deeper\ndisapprobation than I have of this Mormon institution; both for other\nreasons, and because, far from being in any way countenanced by the\nprinciple of liberty, it is a direct infraction of that principle, being\na mere riveting of the chains of one half of the community, and an\nemancipation of the other from reciprocity of obligation towards them. Still, it must be remembered that this relation is as much voluntary on\nthe part of the women concerned in it, and who may be deemed the\nsufferers by it, as is the case with any other form of the marriage\ninstitution; and however surprising this fact may appear, it has its\nexplanation in the common ideas and customs of the world, which teaching\nwomen to think marriage the one thing needful, make it intelligible that\nmany a woman should prefer being one of several wives, to not being a\nwife at all. Other countries are not asked to recognise such unions, or\nrelease any portion of their inhabitants from their own laws on the\nscore of Mormonite opinions. But when the dissentients have conceded to\nthe hostile sentiments of others, far more than could justly be\ndemanded; when they have left the countries to which their doctrines\nwere unacceptable, and established themselves in a remote corner of the\nearth, which they have been the first to render habitable to human\nbeings; it is difficult to see on what principles but those of tyranny\nthey can be prevented from living there under what laws they please,\nprovided they commit no aggression on other nations, and allow perfect\nfreedom of departure to those who are dissatisfied with their ways. A\nrecent writer, in some respects of considerable merit, proposes (to use\nhis own words), not a crusade, but a _civilizade_, against this\npolygamous community, to put an end to what seems to him a retrograde\nstep in civilisation. It also appears so to me, but I am not aware that\nany community has a right to force another to be civilised.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-08, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far.", "[Event happened on 2024-01-10 The user is reading a book]\n<User> So long as\nthe sufferers by the bad law do not invoke assistance from other\ncommunities, I cannot admit that persons entirely unconnected with them\nought to step in and require that a condition of things with which all\nwho are directly interested appear to be satisfied, should be put an end\nto because it is a scandal to persons some thousands of miles distant,\nwho have no part or concern in it. Let them send missionaries, if they\nplease, to preach against it; and let them, by any fair means (of which\nsilencing the teachers is not one), oppose the progress of similar\ndoctrines among their own people. If civilisation has got the better of\nbarbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to\nprofess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under,\nshould revive and conquer civilisation. A civilisation that can thus\nsuccumb to its vanquished enemy, must first have become so degenerate,\nthat neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has\nthe capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be\nso, the sooner such a civilisation receives notice to quit, the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated\n(like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians. FOOTNOTE:\n\n[14] The case of the Bombay Parsees is a curious instance in point. When\nthis industrious and enterprising tribe, the descendants of the Persian\nfire-worshippers, flying from their native country before the Caliphs,\narrived in Western India, they were admitted to toleration by the Hindoo\nsovereigns, on condition of not eating beef. When those regions\nafterwards fell under the dominion of Mahomedan conquerors, the Parsees\nobtained from them a continuance of indulgence, on condition of\nrefraining from pork. What was at first obedience to authority became a\nsecond nature, and the Parsees to this day abstain both from beef and\npork. Though not required by their religion, the double abstinence has\nhad time to grow into a custom of their tribe; and custom, in the East,\nis a religion.\n\n<System> Please remember what the user reads on 2024-01-10, save the details within the book, and retain a summary of the book the user has read so far."]
[{"question": "Summarize the content of the book I read from 2024-01-01 to 2024-01-10", "answer": "Mill, individual liberty, society's authority, Lockean contract, mutual contract, rights, community obligation, public scrutiny, criticism, coercion, self-regarding virtues, natural penalty, harmful self-regarding action, public damage, drunk man example, policeman on duty, basic human liberties, responsibility of society, development of members, children, immoral citizens, selling vs consuming, regulation, workers, Sundays off, religious ideal, Mormon tradition, polygamy, contract, personal will, interference, rational reasoning, public opinion, private opinions, punishment, protection, benefits"}]