You are provided with the abstract of a scientific paper and the abstracts of the papers it references. Your task is to write a Related Work section for the main paper. This section should concisely summarize and integrate the key points from the cited abstracts, reflecting how they relate to the main paper's contributions and context. In your summary, use numerical citation markers like [1], [2], etc., to refer to the corresponding papers.

Main Abstract:
The unprecedented success of deep neural networks in various applications have made these networks a prime target for adversarial exploitation. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark technique for detecting backdoor attacks (aka Trojan attacks) on deep convolutional neural networks (CNNs). We introduce the concept of Universal Litmus Patterns (ULPs), which enable one to reveal backdoor attacks by feeding these universal patterns to the network and analyzing the output (i.e., classifying as clean' or corrupted'). This detection is fast because it requires only a few forward passes through a CNN. We demonstrate the effectiveness of ULPs for detecting backdoor attacks on thousands of networks trained on three benchmark datasets, namely the German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark (GTSRB), MNIST, and CIFAR10.

Cited Abstract(s):
[1]: Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks. Numerous efforts have focused on defenses that either try to patch holes' in trained models or try to make it difficult or costly to compute adversarial examples exploiting these holes. In our work, we explore a counter-intuitive approach of constructing "adversarial trapdoors. Unlike prior works that try to patch or disguise vulnerable points in the manifold, we intentionally inject trapdoors,' artificial weaknesses in the manifold that attract optimized perturbation into certain pre-embedded local optima. As a result, the adversarial generation functions naturally gravitate towards our trapdoors, producing adversarial examples that the model owner can recognize through a known neuron activation signature. In this paper, we introduce trapdoors and describe an implementation of trapdoors using similar strategies to backdoor Trojan attacks. We show that by proactively injecting trapdoors into the models (and extracting their neuron activation signature), we can detect adversarial examples generated by the state of the art attacks (Projected Gradient Descent, Optimization based CW, and Elastic Net) with high detection success rate and negligible impact on normal inputs. These results also generalize across multiple classification domains (image recognition, face recognition and traffic sign recognition). We explore different properties of trapdoors, and discuss potential countermeasures (adaptive attacks) and mitigations.

[2]: Recent trojan attacks on deep neural network (DNN) models are one insidious variant of data poisoning attacks. Trojan attacks exploit an effective backdoor created in a DNN model by leveraging the difficulty in interpretability of the learned model to misclassify any inputs signed with the attacker's chosen trojan trigger input. Trojan attacks are easy to craft; survive even in adverse conditions such as different viewpoints, and lighting conditions on images; and threaten real world applications such as autonomous vehicles and robotics. The trojan trigger is a secret guarded and exploited by the attacker. Therefore, detecting such trojaned inputs is a challenge, especially at run-time when models are in active operation. We focus on vision systems and build the STRong Intentional Perturbation (STRIP) based run-time trojan attack detection system. We intentionally perturb the incoming input, for instance by superimposing various image patterns, and observe the randomness of the predicted classes for the perturbed inputs for a given model---malicious or benign---under deployment. A low entropy in the predicted classes violates the input-dependence property of a benign model and implies the presence of a malicious input---a characteristic of a trojaned input. The high efficacy of our method is validated through case studies on two popular and contrasting datasets: MNIST and CIFAR10. We achieve an overall false acceptance rate (FAR) of less than 1 , given a preset false rejection rate (FRR) of 1 , for four different tested trojan trigger types---three triggers are identified in previous attack works and one dedicated trigger is crafted by us to demonstrate the trigger-size insensitivity of the STRIP detection approach. In particular, on the dataset of natural images in CIFAR10, we have empirically achieved the desired result of 0 for both FRR and FAR.

[3]: Deep neural networks (DNNs) provide excellent performance across a wide range of classification tasks, but their training requires high computational resources and is often outsourced to third parties. Recent work has shown that outsourced training introduces the risk that a malicious trainer will return a backdoored DNN that behaves normally on most inputs but causes targeted misclassifications or degrades the accuracy of the network when a trigger known only to the attacker is present. In this paper, we provide the first effective defenses against backdoor attacks on DNNs. We implement three backdoor attacks from prior work and use them to investigate two promising defenses, pruning and fine-tuning. We show that neither, by itself, is sufficient to defend against sophisticated attackers. We then evaluate fine-pruning, a combination of pruning and fine-tuning, and show that it successfully weakens or even eliminates the backdoors, i.e., in some cases reducing the attack success rate to 0 with only a (0.4 ) drop in accuracy for clean (non-triggering) inputs. Our work provides the first step toward defenses against backdoor attacks in deep neural networks.
Evading Backdoor Attacks: [3] assume existence of clean trusted test data and studied pruning and fine-tuning as two possible strategies for defending against backdoor attacks. Pruning refers to eliminating neurons that are dormant in the DNN when presented with clean data. The authors then show that it is possible to evade pruning defenses by designing pruning-aware' attacks. Finally, they show that a combination of fine-tuning on a small set of clean data together with pruning leads to a more reliable defense that withstands pruning-aware' attacks. While the presented approach in [3] is promising, it comes at the cost of a reduced accuracy of the trained model on clean data. [2] identifies the attack at test time by perturbing or superimposing input images. [1] defends by proactively injecting trapdoors into the models. Such methods, however, do not necessarily detect the existence of backdoor attacks.