kiṃ ca yadi jñānāntareṇānubhavo 'ṅgīkriyate tadā tatrāpi jñānāntare smṛtirutpadyata eva jñānajñānaṃ mamotpannam iti tasyāpyapareṇānubhavo vaktavyaḥ nahyananubhūte smṛtir yuktā tataścemā jñānamālāḥ ko 'nanyakarmā janayatīti vaktavyam
Moreover, if the apprehension is accepted [to be apprehended] by another cognition, then with regard to that other cognition also, a memory would certainly arise [in the form] "I have had a cognition of [that] cognition," so that another apprehension would have to be posited for that [cognition] too; for memory is not possible without [prior] experience; therefore it must be explained who, having no other function, produces these series of cognitions.