syād etat na vayaṃ pratyakṣato jñātvaivaṃ brūmaḥ tathā kālāntare 'pyabhūd iti, kiṃ tarhi anumānāt / yatpramāṇaṃ yajjātīyārthagrāhi dṛṣṭaṃ tat kālāntare 'pi tathaivābhūt pramāṇatvād iti, tatrāha na cānumānataḥ siddhir iti /
"[One might say:] We do not make this statement [about the past] based on direct perception, saying 'thus it was also in another time,' but rather from inference – [namely that] whatever means of cognition is seen to grasp objects of a certain kind must have done so also in another time, because it is a means of cognition." To this [we] reply: "Nor can [it] be established through inference."