abhyāsād iti cet, evaṃ tarhi yadyabhyāsabalād vijātīyākāravyavacchedena sajātīyasādhāraṇamasaṅkīrṇaṃ sārūpyamavasīyate bhrāntikāraṇābhāvāt kaḥ prāmāṇye pradveṣo yena tadanubhūtau bhrāntikāraṇavirahe 'pi nādhyavasīyata iti syāt
If [you say] "it comes from repetition," then if through repetition one can cognize unconfused similarity common to [objects of] the same kind by excluding heterogeneous forms due to absence of causes of error, what hostility is there to [intrinsic] validity that one would deny its cognition even in the absence of causes of error?