tathā hi ekasmād vastunaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣayor abhede 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe katham anayoḥ parasparaṃ svabhāvavivekaḥ siddhyet, ekasmād abhede tayor abhedaprasaṅgād ekavastusvabhāvavat / sāmānyaviśeṣayoś ca parasparaṃ svabhāvaviveke 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe tābhyām abhinnam ekaṃ vastu na siddhyet tābhyām abhinnatvāt tasyāpyekatvenābhimatasya
For if the non-difference of universal and particular from one entity is accepted, how could there be distinction in nature between these two, since [if there is] non-difference from one [thing], there would necessarily be non-difference between them, like the nature of a single entity? And when distinction in nature between universal and particular is accepted, a single entity non-different from these two could not be established, because what is intended as one would be non-different from these two.