yadyāropitasya tāttvikasya ca rūpasya vibhāgaṃ na jānīyāt tadā bhrānto bhavet, yāvatā vikalpāviṣayamāropitātmanā eva niścinvan bāhyaṃ ca vastu nirvikalpakajñānagocaraṃ pṛthag eva tāttvikaṃ tāttvikātmanā paśyan kathaṃ viparyasto nāma /
[He] would be mistaken only if [He] did not know the distinction between the imposed form and the real form; however, since [He] determines the object of conceptual cognition as merely imposed while seeing the external object—which is the scope of non-conceptual cognition—as something quite separate and real in its real nature, how could [He] be called mistaken?