tathāparau prayogau yo 'nāptapraṇītavākyajanitaḥ pratyayo{ya}śca deśakālanarāvasthābhedādau visaṃvādarahitaḥ sa pramāṇam, yathā"ptavākyajanitaḥ, pratyayaḥ tathācāyaṃ codanāvākyajanitaḥ pratyaya iti svabhāvahetuḥ /
There are two other logical arguments: [First,] that cognition which is not produced by statements of an unreliable person and [second, that cognition] which remains free from contradiction despite variations in place, time, human conditions, etc., is a valid means of knowledge, just like cognition produced by statements of a reliable person; and this cognition produced by Vedic injunctive statements is of the same nature - thus [this constitutes] a reason based on essential nature.