yadi hi yugapad anante vastuni pratibhāsamāne heyopādeyavastunaḥ pratibhāsavirodhaḥ syāt avirodhe cānyaiḥ pratibhāsamānasya tasya heyopādeyavastunaḥ tattvapracyutiḥ syāt, pracyutattvasyāpi vibhāgenāvabhāsam eva vā na syāt, viraktāvabhāsanasyāpi yadi paricchedakaḥ śuddhalaukiko vimarśapratyayaḥ pṛṣṭhabhāvī notpadyate tadaitat sarvaṃ syād vaktum
[This objection would only be valid] if, when infinite objects appear simultaneously, there were either: a contradiction in the appearance of things to be abandoned and acquired, or if there were no contradiction with other appearing things but the things to be abandoned and acquired lost their essential nature, or if even their lost nature did not appear distinctly, or if even when appearing distinctly, no subsequent pure worldly discriminating cognition arose – [only] then could all this be said.