etaduktaṃ bhavati yadi mohāt pareṇāpramāṇam eva pramāṇam iti kṛtvā saṃgṛhītaṃ kathaṃ tenāpramāṇena parasya samyagjñānotpādanaṃ śakyate kartuṃ samyagjñānaphalatvāt pramāṇasya / nahi mohāt khaḍga iti kṛtvā gṛhītena yenakenacicchedakena paraśchettuṃ śakyata iti na samāno dṛṣṭāntaḥ //
This means: if through delusion the opponent has accepted what is not a means of knowledge as if it were a means of knowledge, how can correct knowledge be produced in another by that non-means of knowledge, since a means of knowledge [by definition] has correct knowledge as its result? For if something is taken up as a sword through delusion, one cannot cut another with just any cutting instrument - thus the example is not analogous.