tasmācchaktasya śakyakāraṇādityeṣonaikāntaḥ / asatkāryavāde ca kāraṇābhāvasya yujyamānatvāt kāraṇabhāvādityayamapyanaikāntikaḥ / yadvā pūrvaṃ sataḥ kāryatvāsambhavasya pratipāditatvāt asatkāryavāda eva copādānagrahaṇādiniyamasya yujyamānatvāt upādānagrahaṇād ityāder hetucatuṣṭayasya viruddhatā sādhyaviparyayasādhanāt //
Therefore, the reasoning that "because what is capable [produces] what it is capable of [producing]" is inconclusive. And since in the theory of asatkāryavāda [the doctrine of non-existent effect] it is possible for things to be causes, the argument "because [the effect] is of the nature of the cause" is also inconclusive. Alternatively, since it has been previously established that what exists cannot be an effect, and since the rule regarding "the securing of material causes" etc. is explicable only under the theory of asatkāryavāda, the four reasons beginning with "the securing of material causes" are contradictory because they prove the opposite of what is to be proved.