text:
WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOC. OF N. Y., INC. v.VILLAGE OF STRATTON
240 F. 3d 553, reversed and remanded.
Syllabus [Syllabus] [PDF]
Opinion, Stevens [Stevens Opinion] [PDF]
Concurrence, Breyer [Breyer Concurrence] [PDF]
Concurrence, Scalia [Scalia Concurrence] [PDF]
Dissent, Rehnquist J. [Rehnquist J. Dissent] [PDF]
WATCHTOWER BIBLE & TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., et al. v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON et al.
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
No. 00–1737. Argued February 26, 2002—Decided June 17, 2002
Respondent Village of Stratton (Village) promulgated an ordinance that, inter alia, prohibits "canvassers" from "going in and upon" private residential property to promote any "cause" without first obtaining a permit from the mayor's office by completing and signing a registration form. Petitioners, a society and a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought this action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations, although it did require the Village to accept narrowing constructions of several provisions. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Among its rulings, that court held that the ordinance was content neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny; rejected petitioners' argument that the ordinance is overbroad because it impairs the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that was recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334; concluded that the Village's interests in protecting its residents from fraud and undue annoyance and its desire to prevent criminals from posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents were sufficient bases on which to justify the regulation; and distinguished this Court's earlier cases protecting the Jehovah's Witnesses ministry.
Held: The ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. Pp. 9–18.
(a) For over 50 years, this Court has invalidated on First Amendment grounds restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering by Jehovah's Witnesses. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105. Although those cases do not directly control the question at issue, they yield several themes that guide the Court. Among other things, those cases emphasize that the hand distribution of religious tracts is ages old and has the same claim as more orthodox practices to the guarantees of freedom of religion, speech, and press, e.g., id., at 109; discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas, e.g., Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147, 164, but recognize the legitimate interests a town may have in some form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation of money is involved, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306, or the prevention of burglary is a legitimate concern, Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 144; make clear that there must be a balance between such interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights; e.g., ibid.; and demonstrate that the Jehovah's Witnesses have not struggled for their rights alone, but for those many who are poorly financed and rely extensively upon this method of communication, see, e.g., id., at 144–146, including nonreligious groups and individuals, see, e.g., Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516, 539–540. Pp. 9–13.
(b) The Court need not resolve the parties' dispute as to what standard of review to use here because the breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Sixth Circuit erred in upholding it. There is no doubt that the interests the ordinance assertedly serves—the prevention of fraud and crime and the protection of residents' privacy—are important and that the Village may seek to safeguard them through some form of regulation of solicitation activity. However, the amount of speech covered by the ordinance raises serious concerns. Had its provisions been construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Village's interest in protecting its residents' privacy and preventing fraud. Yet, the Village's administration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that it applies to a significant number of noncommercial "canvassers" promoting a wide variety of "causes." The pernicious effect of the permit requirement is illustrated by, e.g., the requirement that a canvasser be identified in a permit application filed in the mayor's office and made available for public inspection, which necessarily results in a surrender of the anonymity this Court has protected. Also central to the Court's conclusion that the ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not tailored to the Village's stated interests. Even if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The Village's argument that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves the two additional interests of protecting residents' privacy and the prevention of crime is unpersuasive. As to the former, an unchallenged ordinance section authorizing residents to post "No Solicitation" signs, coupled with their unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for unwilling listeners. As to the latter, it seems unlikely that the lack of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance, and, in any event, there is no evidence in the record of a special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation. Pp. 13–18.
Stevens, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, JJ., joined. Breyer, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which Souter and Ginsburg, JJ., joined. Scalia, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Thomas, J., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed a dissenting opinion .
WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC., et al., PETITIONERS v. VILLAGE OF STRATTON et al.
on writ of certiorari to the united states court of appeals for the sixth circuit
[June 17, 2002]
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court.
Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regulation not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills.
Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovah's Witnesses throughout the United States and publishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do accept donations.
Petitioners brought this action against the Village and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of several sections of Ordinance No. 1998–5 regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation on private property in the Village. Petitioners' complaint alleged that the ordinance violated several constitutional rights, including the free exercise of religion, free speech, and the freedom of the press. App. 10a–44a. The District Court conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the administration of the ordinance and its effect on petitioners was introduced.
Section 116.01 prohibits "canvassers" and others from "going in and upon" private residential property for the purpose of promoting any "cause" without first having obtained a permit pursuant to §116.03.1 That section provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause, must obtain a "Solicitation Permit" from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant fills out a fairly detailed "Solicitor's Registration Form."2 The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises that he listed on the registration form, but he must carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested to do so by a police officer or by a resident.3 The ordinance sets forth grounds for the denial or revocation of a permit,4 but the record before us does not show that any application has been denied or that any permit has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply for a permit.
A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not challenge establishes a procedure by which a resident may prohibit solicitation even by holders of permits. If the resident files a "No Solicitation Registration Form" with the mayor, and also posts a "No Solicitation" sign on his property, no uninvited canvassers may enter his property, unless they are specifically authorized to do so in the "No Solicitation Registration Form" itself.5 Only 32 of the Village's 278 residents filed such forms. Each of the forms in the record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions;6 on one form, a resident checked 17 exceptions, thereby excluding only "Jehovah's Witnesses" and "Political Candidates" from the list of invited canvassers. Although Jehovah's Witnesses do not consider themselves to be "solicitors" because they make no charge for their literature or their teaching, leaders of the church testified at trial that they would honor "no solicitation" signs in the Village. They also explained at trial that they did not apply for a permit because they derive their authority to preach from Scripture.7 "For us to seek a permit from a municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult to God." App. 321a.
Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance was the product of the mayor's hostility to their ministry, but the District Court credited the mayor's testimony that it had been designed to protect the privacy rights of the Village residents, specifically to protect them "from 'flim flam' con artists who prey on small town populations." 61 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the court concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to the activities of petitioners as well as to "business or political canvassers," id., at 737, 738.
The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations that did not infringe on petitioners' First Amendment rights. The court did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing constructions of three provisions. First, the court viewed the requirement in §116.03(b)(5) that the applicant must list the specific address of each residence to be visited as potentially invalid, but cured by the Village's agreement to attach to the form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737. Second, it held that petitioners could comply with §116.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as "the Jehovah's Witness ministry." Id., at 738. And third, it held that §116.05, which limited canvassing to the hours before 5 p.m., was invalid on its face and should be replaced with a provision referring to "reasonable hours of the day." Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the ordinance constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners and dismissed the case.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 240 F. 3d 553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was "content neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny." Id., at 560. It rejected petitioners' reliance on the discussion of laws affecting both the free exercise of religion and free speech in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990),8 because that "language was dicta and therefore not binding." 240 F. 3d, at 561. It also rejected petitioners' argument that the ordinance is overbroad because it impairs the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that we recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995), reasoning that "the very act of going door-to-door requires the canvassers to reveal a portion of their identities." 240 F. 3d, at 563. The Court of Appeals concluded that the interests promoted by the Village—"protecting its residents from fraud and undue annoyance"—as well as the harm that it seeks to prevent—"criminals posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents"—though "by no means overwhelming," were sufficient to justify the regulation. Id., at 565–566. The court distinguished earlier cases protecting the Jehovah's Witnesses ministry because those cases either involved a flat prohibition on the dissemination of ideas, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943), or an ordinance that left the issuance of a permit to the discretion of a municipal officer, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 302 (1940).
In dissent, Judge Gilman expressed the opinion that by subjecting noncommercial solicitation to the permit requirements, the ordinance significantly restricted a substantial quantity of speech unrelated to the Village's interest in eliminating fraud and unwanted annoyance. In his view, the Village "failed to demonstrate either the reality of the harm or the efficacy of the restriction." 240 F. 3d, at 572.
We granted certiorari to decide the following question: "Does a municipal ordinance that requires one to obtain a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or dis-course?" 534 U. S. 971 (2001); Pet. for Cert. i.9
For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering.10 It is more than historical accident that most of these cases involved First Amendment challenges brought by Jehovah's Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is mandated by their religion. As we noted in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 108 (1943), the Jehovah's Witnesses "claim to follow the example of Paul, teaching 'publicly, and from house to house.' Acts 20:20. They take literally the mandate of the Scriptures, 'Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.' Mark 16:15. In doing so they believe that they are obeying a commandment of God." Moreover, because they lack significant financial resources, the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously diminished by regulations that burden their efforts to canvass door-to-door.
Although our past cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, most of which were decided shortly before and during World War II, do not directly control the question we confront today, they provide both a historical and analytical backdrop for consideration of petitioners' First Amendment claim that the breadth of the Village's ordinance offends the First Amendment.11 Those cases involved petty offenses that raised constitutional questions of the most serious magnitude—questions that implicated the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the press. From these decisions, several themes emerge that guide our consideration of the ordinance at issue here.
First, the cases emphasize the value of the speech involved. For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court noted that "hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism—as old as the history of printing presses. It has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years… . This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion. It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press." 319 U. S., at 109.
In addition, the cases discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas. In Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939), the petitioner was a Jehovah's Witness who had been convicted of canvassing without a permit based on evidence that she had gone from house to house offering to leave books or booklets. Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that "pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of the people. On this method of communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees." Id., at 164 (emphasis added).
Despite the emphasis on the important role that door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering has played in our constitutional tradition of free and open discussion, these early cases also recognized the interests a town may have in some form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation of money is involved. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940), the Court held that an ordinance requiring Jehovah's Witnesses to obtain a license before soliciting door to door was invalid because the issuance of the license depended on the exercise of discretion by a city official. Our opinion recognized that "a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent." Id., at 306. Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court recognized crime prevention as a legitimate interest served by these ordinances and noted that "burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the premises in order that they may return later." 319 U. S., at 144. Despite recognition of these interests as legitimate, our precedent is clear that there must be a balance between these interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights. We "must 'be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation' and must 'weigh the circumstances and … appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.' " Ibid. (quoting Schneider, 308 U. S., at 161).
Finally, the cases demonstrate that efforts of the Jehovah's Witnesses to resist speech regulation have not been a struggle for their rights alone. In Martin, after cataloging the many groups that rely extensively upon this method of communication, the Court summarized that "[d]oor to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people." 319 U. S., at 144–146.
That the Jehovah's Witnesses are not the only "little people" who face the risk of silencing by regulations like the Village's is exemplified by our cases involving nonreligious speech. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U. S. 620 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U. S. 516 (1945). In Thomas, the issue was whether a labor leader could be required to obtain a permit before delivering a speech to prospective union members. After reviewing the Jehovah's Witnesses cases discussed above, the Court observed:
"As a matter of principle a requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly… .
. . . . .
"If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order. So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction. If one who solicits support for the cause of labor may be required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause. We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment." Id., at 539–540.
Although these World War II-era cases provide guidance for our consideration of the question presented, they do not answer one preliminary issue that the parties adamantly dispute. That is, what standard of review ought we use in assessing the constitutionality of this ordinance. We find it unnecessary, however, to resolve that dispute because the breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding it.
The Village argues that three interests are served by its ordinance: the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of residents' privacy. We have no difficulty concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are important interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicitation activity. We must also look, however, to the amount of speech covered by the ordinance and whether there is an appropriate balance between the affected speech and the governmental interests that the ordinance purports to serve.
The text of the Village's ordinance prohibits "canvassers" from going on private property for the purpose of explaining or promoting any "cause," unless they receive a permit and the residents visited have not opted for a "no solicitation" sign. Had this provision been construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Village's interest in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing fraud. Yet, even though the Village has explained that the ordinance was adopted to serve those interests, it has never contended that it should be so narrowly interpreted. To the contrary, the Village's administration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that the provisions apply to a significant number of noncommercial "canvassers" promoting a wide variety of "causes." Indeed, on the "No Solicitation Forms" provided to the residents, the canvassers include "Camp Fire Girls," "Jehovah's Witnesses," "Political Candidates," "Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season," and "Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church." The ordinance unquestionably applies, not only to religious causes, but to political activity as well. It would seem to extend to "residents casually soliciting the votes of neighbors,"12 or ringing doorbells to enlist support for employing a more efficient garbage collector.
The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises constitutional concerns. It is offensive—not only to the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society—thatin the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so. Even if the issuance of permits by the mayor's office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition. Three obvious examples illustrate the pernicious effect of such a permit requirement.
First, as our cases involving distribution of unsigned handbills demonstrate,13 there are a significant number of persons who support causes anonymously.14 "The decision to favor anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible." McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S., at 341–342. The requirement that a canvasser must be identified in a permit application filed in the mayor's office and available for public inspection necessarily results in a surrender of that anonymity. Although it is true, as the Court of Appeals suggested, see 240 F. 3d, at 563, that persons who are known to the resident reveal their allegiance to a group or cause when they present themselves at the front door to advocate an issue or to deliver a handbill, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the ordinance does not implicateanonymity interests. The Sixth Circuit's reasoning is undermined by our decision in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U. S. 182 (1999). The badge requirement that we invalidated in Buckley applied to petition circulators seeking signatures in face-to-face interactions. The fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our consideration of the circulators' interest in maintaining their anonymity. In the Village, strangers to the resident certainly maintain their anonymity, and the ordinance may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes. Such preclusion may well be justified in some situations—for example, by the special state interest in protecting the integrity of a ballot-initiative process, see ibid., or by the interest in preventing fraudulent commercial transactions. The Village ordinance, however, sweeps more broadly, covering unpopular causes unrelated to commercial transactions or to any special interest in protecting the electoral process.
Second, requiring a permit as a prior condition on the exercise of the right to speak imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views. As our World War II-era cases dramatically demonstrate, there are a significant number of persons whose religious scruples will prevent them from applying for such a license. There are no doubt other patriotic citizens, who have such firm convictions about their constitutional right to engage in uninhibited debate in the context of door-to-door advocacy, that they would prefer silence to speech licensed by a petty official.
Third, there is a significant amount of spontaneous speech that is effectively banned by the ordinance. A person who made a decision on a holiday or a weekend to take an active part in a political campaign could not begin to pass out handbills until after he or she obtained the required permit. Even a spontaneous decision to go across the street and urge a neighbor to vote against the mayor could not lawfully be implemented without first obtaining the mayor's permission. In this respect, the regulation is analogous to the circulation licensing tax the Court invalidated in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233 (1936). In Grosjean, while discussing the history of the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment, the Court stated that " '[t]he evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.' " Id., at 249–250 (quoting 2 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed. 1927)); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
The breadth and unprecedented nature of this regulation does not alone render the ordinance invalid. Also central to our conclusion that the ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not tailored to the Village's stated interests. Even if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The Village, however, argues that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves the two additional interests of protecting the privacy of the resident and the prevention of crime.
With respect to the former, it seems clear that §107 of the ordinance, which provides for the posting of "No Solicitation" signs and which is not challenged in this case, coupled with the resident's unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling listener. Schaumburg, 444 U. S., at 639 ("[T]he provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting [no solicitation] signs … suggest[s] the availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to protect privacy"). The annoyance caused by an uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or not the visitor is armed with a permit.
With respect to the latter, it seems unlikely that the absence of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance. They might, for example, ask for directions or permission to use the telephone, or pose as surveyers or census takers. See n. 1, supra. Or they might register under a false name with impunity because the ordinance contains no provision for verifying an applicant's identity or organizational credentials. Moreover, the Village did not assert an interest in crime prevention below, and there is an absence of any evidence of a special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation in the record before us.
The rhetoric used in the World War II-era opinions that repeatedly saved petitioners' coreligionists from petty prosecutions reflected the Court's evaluation of the First Amendment freedoms that areimplicated in this case. The value judgment that then motivateda united democratic people fightingto defend those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is unchanged. It motivates our decision today.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
1 Section 116.01 provides: "The practice of going in and upon private property and/or the private residence of Village residents in the Village by canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise or services, not having been invited to do so by the owners or occupants of such private property or residences, and not having first obtained a permit pursuant to Section 116.03 of this Chapter, for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services, is hereby declared to be a nuisance and is prohibited." App. to Brief for Respondents 2a. The Village has interpreted the term "canvassers" to include Jehovah's Witnesses and the term "cause" to include their ministry. The ordinance does not appear to require a permit for a surveyor since such an individual would not be entering private property "for the purpose of advertising, promoting, selling and/or explaining any product, service, organization or cause, or for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, merchandise or services." Thus, contrary to the assumption of the dissent in its heavy reliance on the example from Dartmouth, post, at 2, 7, 9, the Village's ordinance would have done nothing to prevent that tragic crime.
2 Section 116.03 provides: "(a) No canvasser, solicitor, peddler, hawker, itinerant merchant or transient vendor of merchandise or services who is described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter and who intends to go in or upon private property or a private residence in the Village for any of the purposes described in Section 116.01, shall go in or upon such private property or residence without first registering in the office of the Mayor and obtaining a Solicitation Permit. "(b) The registration required by subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a Solicitor's Registration Form, at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The Form shall be completed by the Registrant and it shall then contain the following information: "(1) The name and home address of the Registrant and Registrant's residence for five years next preceding the date of registration; "(2) A brief description of the nature and purpose of the business, promotion, solicitation, organization, cause, and/or the goods or services offered; "(3) The name and address of the employer or affiliated organization, with credentials from the employer or organization showing the exact relationship and authority of the Applicant; "(4) The length of time for which the privilege to canvass or solicit is desired; "(5) The specific address of each private residence at which the Registrant intends to engage in the conduct described in Section 116.01 of this Chapter, and, "(6) Such other information concerning the Registrant and its business or purpose as may be reasonably necessary to accurately describe the nature of the privilege desired." Brief for Respondents 3a–4a.
3 Section 116.04 provides: "Each Registrant who complies with Section 116.03(b) shall be furnished a Solicitation Permit. The permit shall indicate that the applicant has registered as required by Section 116.03 of this Chapter. No permittee shall go in or upon any premises not listed on the Registrant's Solicitor's Registration Form. "Each person shall at all times, while exercising the privilege in the Village incident to such permit, carry upon his person his permit and the same shall be exhibited by such person whenever he is requested to do so by any police officer or by any person who is solicited." Id., at 4a.
4 Section 116.06 provides: "Permits described in Section 116.04 of this Chapter may be denied or revoked by the Mayor for any one or more of the following reasons: "(a) Incomplete information provided by the Registrant in the Solicitor's Registration Form. "(b) Fraud or misrepresentation contained in the Solicitor's Registration Form. "(c) Fraud, misrepresentation or false statements made in the course of conducting the activity. "(d) Violation of any of the provisions of this chapter or of other Codified Ordinances or of any State or Federal Law. "(e) Conducting canvassing, soliciting or business in such a manner as to constitute a trespass upon private property. "(f) The permittee ceases to possess the qualifications required in this chapter for the original registration." Id., at 5a.
5 Section 116.07 provides, in part: "(a) Notwithstanding the provisions of any other Section of this Chapter 116, any person, firm or corporation who is the owner or lawful occupant of private property within the territorial limits of the Village of Stratton, Ohio, may prohibit the practice of going in or upon the private property and/or the private residence of such owner or occupant, by uninvited canvassers, solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors, by registering its property in accordance with Subdivision (b) of this Section and by posting upon each such registered property a sign which reads 'No Solicitation' in a location which is reasonably visible to persons who intend to enter upon such property."(b) The registration authorized by Subsection (a) hereof shall be made by filing a 'No Solicitation Registration Form', at the office of the Mayor, on a form furnished for such purpose. The form shall be completed by the property owner or occupant and it shall then contain the following information: … ." Id., at 6a.
6 The suggested exceptions listed on the form are: 1. Scouting Organizations 2. Camp Fire Girls 3. Children's Sports Organizations 4. Children's Solicitation for Supporting School Activities 5. Volunteer Fire Dept. 6. Jehovah's Witnesses 7. Political Candidates 8. Beauty Products Sales People 9. Watkins Sales 10. Christmas Carolers 11. Parcel Delivery 12. Little League 13. Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season 14. Police 15. Campaigners 16. Newspaper Carriers 17. Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church 18. Food Salesmen 19. Salespersons. App. 229a. Apparently the ordinance would prohibit each of these 19 categories from canvassing unless expressly exempted.
7 Specifically, from the Book of "Matthew chapter 28, verses 19 and 20, which we take as our commission to preach. … So Jesus, by example, instituted a house-to-house search for people so as to preach the good news to them. And that's the activity that Jehovah's Witnesses engage in, even as Christ's apostles did after his resurrection to heaven." Id., at 313a–314a.
8 "The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S., at 304–307 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U. S. 573 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510 (1925), to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school)." 494 U. S., at 881 (footnote omitted).
9 In their briefs and at oral argument, the parties debated a factual issue embedded in the question presented, namely, whether the permit contains the speaker's name. We need not resolve this factual dispute in order to answer whether the ordinance's registration requirement abridges so much protected speech that it is invalid on its face.
10 Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U. S. 413 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940); Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U. S. 147 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444 (1938).
11 The question presented is similar to one raised, but not decided in Hynes. The ordinance that we held invalid in that case on vagueness grounds required advance notice to the police before "casually soliciting the votes of neighbors." 425 U. S., at 620, n. 4.
12 Hynes, 425 U. S., at 620, n. 4.
13 Talley v. California, 362 U. S. 60 (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U. S. 334 (1995).
14 Although the Jehovah's Witnesses do not themselves object to a loss of anonymity, they bring this facial challenge in part on the basis of overbreadth. We may, therefore, consider the impact of this ordinance on the free speech rights of individuals who are deterred from speaking because the registration provision would require them to forgo their right to speak anonymously. See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U. S. 601, 612 (1973).
Justice Breyer, with whom Justice Souter and Justice Ginsburg join, concurring.
While joining the Court's opinion, I write separately to note that the dissent's "crime prevention" justification for this ordinance is not a strong one. Cf. post, at 6–10 (Rehnquist, C. J.). For one thing, there is no indication that the legislative body that passed the ordinance considered this justification. Stratton did not rely on the rationale in the courts below, see 61 F. Supp. 2d 734, 736 (SD Ohio 1999) (opinion of the District Court describing the ordinance as "constructed to protect the Village residents from 'flim flam' con artists"); 240 F. 3d 553, 565 (CA6 2001) (opinion of the Court of Appeals describing interests as "protecting [the Village's] residents from fraud and undue annoyance"), and its general references to "deter[ing] crime" in its brief to this Court cannot fairly be construed to include anything other than the fraud it discusses specifically. Brief for Respondents 14–18.
In the intermediate scrutiny context, the Court ordinarily does not supply reasons the legislative body has not given. Cf. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U. S. 803, 816 (2000) ("When the Government restricts speech, the Government bears the burden of proving the constitutionality of its actions" (emphasis added)). That does not mean, as The Chief Justice suggests, that only a government with a "battery of constitutional lawyers," post, at 1, could satisfy this burden. It does mean that we expect a government to give its real reasons for passing an ordinance. Legislators, in even the smallest town, are perfectly able to do so—sometimes better on their own than with too many lawyers, e.g., a "battery," trying to offer their advice. I can only conclude that if the village of Stratton thought preventing burglaries and violent crimes was an important justification for this ordinance, it would have said so.
But it is not just that. It is also intuitively implausible to think that Stratton's ordinance serves any governmental interest in preventing such crimes. As the Court notes, several categories of potential criminals will remain entirely untouched by the ordinance. Ante, at 17, 2, n. 1. And as to those who might be affected by it, "[w]e have never accepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden," Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 392 (2000). Even less readily should we accept such implausible conjecture offered not by the party itself but only by an amicus, see Brief for Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 5–6.
Because Stratton did not rely on the crime prevention justification, because Stratton has not now "present[ed] more than anecdote and supposition," Playboy Entertainment Group, supra, at 822, and because the relationship between the interest and the ordinance is doubtful, I am unwilling to assume that these conjectured benefits outweigh the cost of abridging the speech covered by the ordinance.
Justice Scalia, with whom Justice Thomas joins, concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment, for many but not all of the reasons set forth in the opinion for the Court. I do not agree, for example, that one of the causes of the invalidity of Stratton's ordinance is that some people have a religious objection to applying for a permit, and others (posited by the Court) "have such firm convictions about their constitutional right to engage in uninhibited debate in the context of door-to-door advocacy, that they would prefer silence to speech licensed by a petty official." Ante, at 16.
If a licensing requirement is otherwise lawful, it is in my view not invalidated by the fact that some people will choose, for religious reasons, to forgo speech rather than observe it. That would convert an invalid free-exercise claim, see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), into a valid free-speech claim—and a more destructive one at that. Whereas the free-exercise claim, if acknowledged, would merely exempt Jehovah's Witnesses from the licensing requirement, the free-speech claim exempts everybody, thanks to Jehovah's Witnesses.
As for the Court's fairy-tale category of "patriotic citizens," ante, at 16, who would rather be silenced than licensed in a manner that the Constitution (but for their "patriotic" objection) would permit: If our free-speech jurisprudence is to be determined by the predicted behavior of such crackpots, we are in a sorry state indeed.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting.
Stratton is a village of 278 people located along the Ohio River where the borders of Ohio, West Virginia, and Pennsylvania converge. It is strung out along a multilane highway connecting it with the cities of East Liverpool to the north and Steubenville and Weirton, West Virginia, to the south. One may doubt how much legal help a village of this size has available in drafting an ordinance such as the present one, but even if it had availed itself of a battery of constitutional lawyers, they would have been of little use in the town's effort. For the Court today ignores the cases on which those lawyers would have relied, and comes up with newly fashioned doctrine. This doctrine contravenes well-established precedent, renders local governments largely impotent to address the very real safety threat that canvassers pose, and may actually result in less of the door-to-door communication that it seeks to protect.
More than half a century ago we recognized that canvassers, "whether selling pots or distributing leaflets, may lessen the peaceful enjoyment of a home," and that "burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the premises in order that they may return later." Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141, 144 (1943). These problems continue to be associated with door-to-door canvassing, as are even graver ones.
A recent double murder in Hanover, New Hampshire, a town of approximately 7,500 that would appear tranquil to most Americans but would probably seem like a bustling town of Dartmouth College students to Stratton residents, illustrates these dangers. Two teenagers murdered a married couple of Dartmouth College professors, Half and Susanne Zantop, in the Zantop's home. Investigators have concluded, based on the confession of one of the teenagers, that the teenagers went door-to-door intent on stealing access numbers to bank debit cards and then killing their owners. See Dartmouth Professors Called Random Targets, Washington Post, Feb. 20, 2002, p. A2. Their modus operandi was to tell residents that they were conducting an environmental survey for school. They canvassed a few homes where no one answered. At another, the resident did not allow them in to conduct the "survey." They were allowed into the Zantop home. After conducting the phony environmental survey, they stabbed the Zantops to death. See ibid.
In order to reduce these very grave risks associated with canvassing, the 278 " 'little people,' " ante, at 12, of Stratton, who, unlike petitioners, do not have a team of attorneys at their ready disposal, see Jehovah's Witnesses MayMake High Court History Again, Legal Times, Feb. 25, 2002, p. 1 (noting that petitioners have a team of 12 lawyers in their New York headquarters), enacted the ordinance at issue here. The residents did not prohibit door-to-door communication, they simply required that canvassers obtain a permit before going door-to-door. And the village does not have the discretion to reject an applicant who completes the application.
The town had little reason to suspect that the negligible burden of having to obtain a permit runs afoul of the First Amendment. For over 60 years, we have categorically stated that a permit requirement for door-to-door canvassers, which gives no discretion to the issuing authority, is constitutional. The District Court and Court of Appeals, relying on our cases, upheld the ordinance. The Court today, however, abruptly changes course and invalidates the ordinance.
The Court speaks of the "historical and analytical backdrop for consideration of petitioners' First Amendment claim," ante, at 9. But this "backdrop" is one of longstanding and unwavering approval of a permit requirement like Stratton's. Our early decisions in this area expressly sanction a law that merely requires a canvasser to register. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 306 (1940), we stated that "[w]ithout doubt a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent." In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 116 (1943), we contrasted the license tax struck down in that case with "merely a registration ordinance calling for an identification of the solicitors so as to give the authorities some basis for investigating strangers coming into the community." And Martin, supra, at 148, states that a "city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the previously expressed will of the occupant and, in addition, can by identification devices control the abuse of the privilege by criminals posing as canvassers."
It is telling that Justices Douglas and Black, perhaps the two Justices in this Court's history most identified with an expansive view of the First Amendment, authored, respectively, Murdock and Martin. Their belief in the constitutionality of the permit requirement that the Court strikes down today demonstrates just how far the Court's present jurisprudence has strayed from the core concerns of the First Amendment.
We reaffirmed our view that a discretionless permit requirement is constitutional in Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U. S. 610 (1976). Hynes, though striking down a registration ordinance on vagueness grounds, noted that "the Court has consistently recognized a municipality's power to protect its citizens from crime and undue annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing. A narrowly drawn ordinance, that does not vest in municipal officials the undefined power to determine what messages residents will hear, may serve these important interests without running afoul of the First Amendment." Id., at 616–617.
The Stratton ordinance suffers from none of the defects deemed fatal in these earlier decisions. The ordinance does not prohibit door-to-door canvassing; it merely requires that canvassers fill out a form and receive a permit. Cf. Martin, supra. The mayor does not exercise any discretion in deciding who receives a permit; approval of the permit is automatic upon proper completion of the form. Cf. Cantwell, supra. And petitioners do not contend in this Court that the ordinance is vague. Cf. Hynes, supra.
Just as troubling as the Court's ignoring over 60 years of precedent is the difficulty of discerning from the Court's opinion what exactly it is about the Stratton ordinance that renders it unconstitutional. It is not clear what test the Court is applying, or under which part of that indeterminate test the ordinance fails. See ante, at 13 (finding it "unnecessary … to resolve" what standard of review applies to the ordinance). We are instead told that the "breadth of speech affected" and "the nature of the regulation" render the permit requirement unconstitutional. Ante, at 13. Under a straightforward application of the applicable First Amendment framework, however, the ordinance easily passes muster.
There is no support in our case law for applying anything more stringent than intermediate scrutiny to the ordinance. The ordinance is content neutral and does not bar anyone from going door-to-door in Stratton. It merely regulates the manner in which one must canvass: A canvasser must first obtain a permit. It is, or perhaps I should say was, settled that the "government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions 'are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.' " Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U. S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non&nbhyph;Violence, 468 U. S. 288, 293 (1984)). Earlier this Term, the Court reaffirmed that this test applies to content-neutral time, place, or manner restrictions on speech in public forums. See Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U. S. 316 (2002).
The Court suggests that Stratton's regulation of speech warrants greater scrutiny. Ante, at 13. But it would be puzzling if regulations of speech taking place on another citizen's private property warranted greater scrutiny than regulations of speech taking place in public forums. Common sense and our precedent say just the opposite. In Hynes, the Court explained: " 'Of all the methods of spreading unpopular ideas, [house-to-house canvassing] seems the least entitled to extensive protection. The possibilities of persuasion are slight compared with the certainties of annoyance. Great as is the value of exposing citizens to novel views, home is one place where a man ought to be able to shut himself up in his own ideas if he desires.' " 425 U. S., at 619 (quoting Z. Chafee, Free Speech in the United States 406 (1954)). In Ward, the Court held that intermediate scrutiny was appropriate "even in a public forum," 491 U. S., at 791 (emphasis added), appropriately recognizing that speech enjoys greater protection in a public forum that has been opened to all citizens, see ibid. Indeed, we have held that the mere proximity of private residential property to a public forum permits more extensive regulation of speech taking place at the public forum than would otherwise be allowed. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U. S. 474, 483–484 (1988). Surely then, intermediate scrutiny applies to a content-neutral regulation of speech that occurs not just near, but at, another citizen's private residence.
The Stratton regulation is aimed at three significant governmental interests: the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, and the protection of privacy.1 The Court concedes that "in light of our precedent, … these are important interests that [Stratton] may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicitation activity." Ante, at 13. Although initially recognizing the important interest in preventing crime, the Court later indicates that the "absence of any evidence of a special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation in the record before us" lessens this interest. Ante, at 17–18. But the village is entitled to rely on our assertion in Martin that door-to-door canvassing poses a risk of crime, see Erie v. Pap's A. M., 529 U. S. 277, 297 (2000) (citing Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U. S. 41 (1986)), and the experience of other jurisdictions with crime stemming from door-to-door canvassing, see 529 U. S., at 297; Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S. 377, 393, n. 6 (2000).
The double murder in Hanover described above is but one tragic example of the crime threat posed by door-to-door canvassing. Other recent examples include a man soliciting gardening jobs door-to-door who tied up and robbed elderly residents, see Van Derbken, 98-Year-Old Latest Victim in Series of Home Invasions, San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 13, 2000, p. A18, a door-to-door vacuum cleaner salesman who raped a woman, see Employers Liable for Rape by Salesman, Texas Lawyer, Jan. 11, 1999, p. 2, and a man going door-to-door purportedly on behalf of a church group who committed multiple sexual assaults, see Ingersoll, Sex Crime Suspect Traveled with Church Group, Wis. State Journal, Feb. 19, 2000, p. 1B. The Constitution does not require that Stratton first endure its own crime wave before it takes measures to prevent crime.
What is more, the Court soon forgets both the privacy and crime interests. It finds the ordinance too broad because it applies to a "significant number of non-commercial 'canvassers.' " Ante, at 14. But noncommercial canvassers, for example, those purporting to conduct environmental surveys for school, see supra, at 2, can violate no trespassing signs and engage in burglaries and violent crimes just as easily as commercial canvassers can. See Martin, 319 U. S., at 144 (canvassers, "whether selling pots or distributing leaflets, may lessen the peaceful enjoyment of a home" and "sp[y] out" homes for burglaries (emphasis added)). Stratton's ordinance is thus narrowly tailored. It applies to everyone who poses the risks associated with door-to-door canvassing, i.e., it applies to everyone who canvasses door-to-door. The Court takes what should be a virtue of the ordinance—that it is content neutral, cf. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U. S. 484, 501 (1996) ("[O]ur commercial speech cases have recognized the dangers that attend governmental attempts to single out certain messages for suppression")—and turns it into a vice.
The next question is whether the ordinance serves the important interests of protecting privacy and preventing fraud and crime. With respect to the interest in protecting privacy, the Court concludes that "[t]he annoyance caused by an uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or not the visitor is armed with a permit." Ante, at 17. True, but that misses the key point: the permit requirement results in fewer uninvited knocks. Those who have complied with the permit requirement are less likely to visit residences with no trespassing signs, as it is much easier for the authorities to track them down.
The Court also fails to grasp how the permit requirement serves Stratton's interest in preventing crime.2 We have approved of permit requirements for those engaging in protected First Amendment activity because of a common-sense recognition that their existence both deters and helps detect wrongdoing. See, e.g., Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U. S. 316 (2002) (upholding a permit requirement aimed, in part, at preventing unlawful uses of a park and assuring financial accountability for damage caused by the event). And while some people, intent on committing burglaries or violent crimes, are not likely to be deterred by the prospect of a misdemeanor for violating the permit ordinance, the ordinance's effectiveness does not depend on criminals registering.
The ordinance prevents and detects serious crime by making it a crime not to register. Take the Hanover double murder discussed earlier. The murderers did not achieve their objective until they visited their fifth home over a period of seven months. If Hanover had a permit requirement, the teens may have been stopped before they achieved their objective. One of the residents they visited may have informed the police that there were two canvassers who lacked a permit. Such neighborly vigilance, though perhaps foreign to those residing in modern day cities, is not uncommon in small towns. Or the police on their own may have discovered that two canvassers were violating the ordinance. Apprehension for violating the permit requirement may well have frustrated the teenagers' objectives; it certainly would have assisted in solving the murders had the teenagers gone ahead with their plan.3
Of course, the Stratton ordinance does not guarantee that no canvasser will ever commit a burglary or violent crime. The Court seems to think this dooms the ordinance, erecting an insurmountable hurdle that a law must provide a fool-proof method of preventing crime. In order to survive intermediate scrutiny, however, a law need not solve the crime problem, it need only further the interest in preventing crime. Some deterrence of serious criminal activity is more than enough to survive intermediate scrutiny.
The final requirement of intermediate scrutiny is that a regulation leave open ample alternatives for expression. Undoubtedly, ample alternatives exist here. Most obviously, canvassers are free to go door-to-door after filling out the permit application. And those without permits may communicate on public sidewalks, on street corners, through the mail, or through the telephone.
Intermediate scrutiny analysis thus confirms what our cases have long said: A discretionless permit requirement for canvassers does not violate the First Amendment. Today, the Court elevates its concern with what is, at most, a negligible burden on door-to-door communication above this established proposition. Ironically, however, today's decision may result in less of the door-to-door communication that the Court extols. As the Court recognizes, any homeowner may place a "No Solicitation" sign on his or her property, and it is a crime to violate that sign. Ante, at 17. In light of today's decision depriving Stratton residents of the degree of accountability and safety that the permit requirement provides, more and more residents may decide to place these signs in their yards and cut off door-to-door communication altogether.
1 Of course, fraud itself may be a crime. I assume, as does the majority, that the interest in preventing "crime" refers to a separate interest in preventing burglaries and violent crimes.
2 It is sufficient that the ordinance serves the important interest of protecting residents' privacy. A law need only serve a governmental interest. Because the Court's treatment of Stratton's interest in preventing crime gives short shrift to Stratton's attempt to deal with a very serious problem, I address that issue as well.
3 Indeed, an increased focus on apprehending criminals for "petty" offenses, such as not paying subway fares, is credited with the dramatic reduction in violent crimes in New York City during the last decade. See, e.g., M. Gladwell, The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference (2000). If this works in New York City, surely it can work in a small village like Stratton.
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"These figures are slightly better-than-expected, but they still highlight worrying trends in the UK labour market. Unemployment is up, the level of inactivity has increased further, and the number of people working part-time because they could not find a full-time job has reached a record high. Additionally, public sector earnings, excluding bonuses, continue to rise at a much faster rate than the private sector – an unacceptable and unaffordable trend.
"Since the tough deficit-cutting programme that is likely to be announced in the Budget will probably result in job losses in the public sector, the overall level of unemployment is set to increase further. On the basis of these figures, we reiterate our forecast that unemployment is likely to reach 2.65 million before the middle of 2011.


Walker & Dunlop, Inc. (NYSE: WD) (the "Company") announced today it structured a $15,000,000 refinance loan with Freddie Mac for The Harvey, an early 1920s vintage, midrise multifamily building in Los Angeles, California.
This rent-controlled property qualified as 100 percent "affordable" by Freddie Mac's metrics, which provides costeffective rents for moderate- and low-income tenants in this high cost area. As a result, Walker & Dunlop could provide aggressive financing in the form of overall loan proceeds and a lower rate. The loan was structured as a seven-year, adjustable-rate mortgage with two years of interest-only payments, followed by a 30-year amortization schedule. In the first year of ownership, the client made interior renovations and exterior restorations, which enabled the loan to recapitalize over 90 percent of the owner's basis in the property. Last month, the mayor of Los Angeles publicly recognized the property's sponsors for their proactive and thorough renovations to another one of their rent-controlled assets in nearby Echo Park.
Located just west of the 101 freeway, along East Hollywood's Santa Monica Boulevard, The Harvey fills a gap in the area's housing market by offering an affordable living option for local service and entertainment industry workers, in an area that is saturated with luxury living options. Just a short walk to Paramount Studios, this 57,664 square-foot building consists of four stories with street accessible retail shops on the first floor and 178 apartment units on the additional three levels.


More Los Angeles and Southern California business leaders today are turning to outsourcing in an attempt to make sure that business tasks are performed in the most efficient and cost-effective way possible. Outsourcing can provide a number of concrete business benefits, such as helping companies conserve capital, control costs, improve efficiency, lower overhead and, perhaps most importantly, stay focused on their core competencies.
Of course, there is a cost involved in outsourcing. Before diving in, smart owners and executives will take the time to carefully analyze the costs and benefits of outsourcing in order to make sure that they will receive the most value from any outsourcing engagement they might be considering.
The most important thing any company should do to ensure value from an outsourcing relationship is identify the areas of the business where the outsourcing firm will focus and the specific objectives it will strive to meet. This will help ensure that the business and the outsourcing firm are on the same page in terms of each other's expectations with regard to the outsourcing engagement, as well as ease any concerns the owner might have about maintaining control over the engagement or the time and cost that will be invested into it.
1. Define the engagement — Defining the exact parameters of the engagement up front will help ensure that there are no surprises later, for either your business or the outsourced services provider. This includes setting high-level strategic objectives and identifying specific tasks the services provider will perform in order to meet them, as well as the approximate timeline for completion of these tasks and accomplishment of the business objectives.
2. Determine the underlying cause(s) of the problems — This is usually the first thing the services provider will do when it starts the engagement. This step typically involves in-depth interviews and high-level discussions with your executives, managers and any other staff deemed necessary to drill down deep and get to the root cause(s) of the challenges your business is facing.
3. Develop solutions — Once it has a good understanding of why your business is facing specific problems, the services provider can begin to map out the appropriate solutions. This should be done working in close conjunction with you and other key executives and with your buy-in and cooperation; otherwise, implementing the solutions will be difficult, if not impossible.
4. Deploy the solutions — Once developed, solutions must be executed. This is where the so-called "rubber meets the road." A great solution poorly executed will do little if anything to help solve the underlying causes of the problems identified in step 2. The solutions should include tactical initiatives that will be undertaken by the services provider that are designed to help solve these specific problems.
5. Document the solutions — By carefully documenting all the steps and tactics detailed in the solutions, you and the services provider together are creating a road map that will provide direction for the outsourcing engagement every step of the way. This document can then be consulted throughout the engagement in order to help keep everyone focused and moving in the same direction.
6. Debrief — A debrief of the services provider's findings, recommendations and accomplishments should not necessarily be put off until the engagement is complete. Rather, milestones should be built into the solution document, with the services provider debriefing you and your team at these key points so you are kept aware of progress that's being made along the way.
Defining the parameters of the working relationship between your business and the outsourced services provider is another key to ensuring value from an outsourcing engagement. For example, will the services provider be fully integrated into your company? How will communication and knowledge transfer take place between the services provider and you, your executives, and your staff? And perhaps most importantly, what specifically will a successful outcome of the engagement look like?
Finally, you should take steps up front to try to ensure the best possible match between the outsourced services provider and your company. Try to determine whether the services provider will be able to work well within a collaborative environment and if the provider will be a good fit personality-wise with you and the rest of your team. Also, will the services provider be able to draw on a broad base of collective knowledge and expertise beyond him or herself — or in other words, is there a deep bench of support? This will enable the provider to bring proven processes, tools and industry best practices to bear to help solve your company's specific problems and challenges.
Following a systematic approach can help justify the cost of hiring an outsourced services provider and ensure that your company obtains maximum value from the engagement. This includes following the 6 D's of the engagement process, as well as carefully defining the parameters of the working relationship and trying to ensure a good match between the services provider and your company up front — before the engagement begins.


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Germany minister: religious circumcision legal in Berlin
Sung Un Kim
September 5, 2012 02:54:10 pm
[JURIST] A German state official clarified [press release, in German] Wednesday that circumcision [JURIST news archive] for religious reasons is legal in Berlin. State justice minister Thomas Heilmann [official profile, in German] stated that circumcision would be legal if (1) parents consent to such procedure in writing after they were informed of the associated risks; (2) parents are able to present the religious reason and need for such procedure; and (3) the procedure is performed according to the acknowledged medical standard. The announcement came after a Jewish hospital in Berlin asked the justice minister to clarify the legality surrounding the circumcision procedure. The inquiry was in response to the June ruling by the Cologne state court [official website, in German] that circumcising young boys based on religious traditions is prohibited [JURIST report] even if the parents consent to the procedure. It addressed the issue of whether to criminalize the circumcision of Muslim and Jewish children and reasoned that a child's right to physical integrity is above the freedom of religion and parents' rights.
In July, responding to the controversial decision by the Cologne state court, the German government announced [JURIST report] that it will act swiftly to lift criminal sanctions imposed on circumcision. Spokesperson for Chancellor Angela Merkel [official website, in German], Steffen Seibert, said that without adequate protections for the practice of circumcision, Jewish and Muslim communities would not be able to live in Germany because the practice is so fundamental to the groups.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Google Featured in "The Internship" Trailer
Published Feb 14, 2013 at 2:16 PM | Updated at 6:59 PM PST on Feb 14, 2013
The trailer for a new movie, about two salesman competing for an internship at Google has been released and features the Googleplex.
The trailer shows scenes from Google including a self-driving car, a Rubik's cube competition and both Vince Vaughn and Owen Wilson playing two 40-something unemployed salesman trying to fit in with twenty-something colleagues, according to VentureBeat.
We wrote about the film last September, when both stars showed up at the Googleplex to film scenes. However, the majority of the flick was filmed at the Georgia Institute of Technology in Atlanta. However, Google's co-founder Sergey Brin is supposedly helping market the film.
Vaughn originally penned the script because to him Google was a cross between "The Wizard of Oz" and "Willie Wonka and the Chocolate Factory."
"Such a different place to work at than what is considered a traditional work environment, with the nap pods and the access to food, and of course the intramural sports on campus and massages and all that kind of stuff," he told Bloomberg.
The trailer shows that the film could be promising, but past Vaughn films have not been successes. So let's hope for a "Swingers" type of humor rather than his unfunny "The Dilemma." We think how funny the film is may be equal to how much Google decides to help with marketing it.


In June 2014, David Cameron emphasised the important role that British values can play in education. Further, how well a school promotes such values is an aspect of Ofsted's inspection framework. British values are promoted in so much of what we do, not least during our Religious Education, school assemblies, and Social and Emotional Aspects of Learning (SEAL). Our school values are integral to our Vision and Mission Statements.
As a school, we value and celebrate the diverse heritages of everybody at St Monica's . Alongside this, we value and celebrate being part of Britain. This means that we celebrate traditions of our faith and customs in the course of the year such as Harvest Festival during the Autumn term. We also celebrate and remember national events, a recent example being the Centenary of the Great War.
Historically: Learning about historical timelines such as the Tudors and the Victorian Era. As part of our ongoing commitment to a broad, enriched and balanced curriculum, Time Travel will be a whole-school topic which will take place every two years. The main focus will be British history. During the topic, children will learn about an aspect of life and how this has developed and changed over time.
Children, parents and staff have many opportunities for their voices to be heard at St Monica's. Democracy is central to how we operate. An obvious example is our School Council as well as our School Prefects. The election of the School Council and School Prefect members reflect our British electoral system and demonstrates democracy in action.
Candidates make speeches, pupils consider characteristics important for an elected representative and pupils vote. Made up of two representatives from each class, the School Council meets regularly to discuss issues raised by different classes. The Council is actively involved in recruitment and in providing teachers with feedback, such as providing a review of themed weeks and is able to genuinely effect change within the school.
St Monica's is a community which is greatly culturally diverse and we are proud to promote and celebrate our different backgrounds. Mutual respect is at the heart of our Mission Statement. Our pupils know and understand that it is expected and imperative that respect is shown to everyone, whatever differences we may have, and to everything. Our children learn that their behaviour choices have an effect on their own rights and those of others. All members of the school community should treat each other with respect.
through the teachings of Jesus Christ inspired by Christian values, SEAL and other lessons where we might develop awareness and appreciation of other cultures "that every person is unique and created in the image of God"


In my previous post on Spike's disease I have mentioned how unfortunately a cure for this terrible disease has not yet been discovered. Then again in time it has been proven that you can manage Spike's in your dog with a gluten free diet. Today I'd like to tell you a bit more about gluten free wheat free foods that you may want to introduce in your dog's diet if he/she is affected by Spike's, and how effective gluten free food for dogs is in the management of Spike's symptoms.
Please don't quote me when it comes to domestic science applied to food and how it's formed – or when it comes to science, for all that matters!!
My understanding, however, is that gluten is a protein contained in many grain foods. Many allergy sufferers have been found to be intolerant to gluten – most commonly known are celiac disease sufferers.
But gluten is found in wheat, as well as rye and barley. For this reason, all gluten free food is also wheat free, whereas the same cannot be said about wheat free food, as food free of wheat may still contain rye or barley, which carry the protein of gluten.
Let me take you back to the history of Spike's and how it was discovered. The first symptoms were registered in Germany back in 1994 by a Mrs Plunge, who started publishing her findings on what appeared to be abnormal liver function in affected Borders. That is the reason why initially efforts were concentrated on possible liver disease, and which eventually pushed Mrs Plunge to try to find a solution in implementing dietary changes.
When however in 1999 it was registered that Borders with a normal liver function also started displaying seizures but did not suffer from epilepsy, the search for affected subjects was extended to the rest of Europe and eventually to the States too. The exercise of compiling a database of as many Borders as possible all displaying the same symptoms wanted to meet the need to cross-match their habits and their traits to see if there was any common denominator that would make reason of their unwell being.
I do not want to bore you excessively with the details of how the research progressed, other than to say in the meantime our Dutch border Spike was identified as exhibiting more sever episodes of epileptic-like fits and cramps, which escalated to 2-3 episodes a week in 2001. At the same time Utrecht University in Holland established once and for all that these symptoms were not signs of epilepsy, and recognised a new disease in its own right, Canine Epileptoid Cramping Syndrome (CECS) or more commonly known by most of us as Spike's.
I expect the common denominator further forums discovered, and specialised vet centres alike, with the broadening of social media and internet communication in the last 15 years, is that when you applied a certain gluten and/or wheat free diet to your Border, seizures and confusional cramping state in dogs decreased in frequency.
Unfortunately in dogs the same 'trial and error' principle applies as in humans. How many times we go to the doctor's with some unusual complaint, and we are prescribed some tablet and asked to make another appointment a few days later to see if it has worked? With Spike's it has been the same since it was classed as a disease in its own right.
And unfortunately to date a curative formula for Spike's has not yet been discovered. But what owners of Borders, or other dogs affected by Spike's, have had to learn is to adapt their hound's diet in an effort to reduce cramping episodes.
beef, eggs and fish, if again episodes keep re-occurring after the above foods have already been eliminated.
As you can see, most of these foods are to be removed from your dog's diet only if he/she still has adverse reactions. The main indicator is however the removal of gluten based foods, as this is the one category of food where, when removed, most owners of affected dogs have noticed an improvement in their hounds.
By contrast, it has been proven that the best and most advisable type of diet for dogs suffering with Spike's is row meat. Initially you can start feeding your dog all sorts of row meats, including beef. If however you see that your dog still gets episodes in the same frequency and violence, you can try removing beef from his or her diet – this should trigger a neat decrease in number and intensity of cramping.
What has been advised, however, if you decide to switch to row meat regime for your dog, is to ensure that no stomach or neck are fed to them, as often these parts retain grain elements that may have been eaten by the animal you are feeding to your hound. Even minuscule amounts of grain or gluten based foods are deemed to be the cause of an increase in seizures.
Please be aware, and I can't stress this enough, that the above advice is not the 'be all end all' solution to improving, let alone curing, CECS episodes in your dog. If still in doubt, the best practice I suggest is to consult your vet to discuss potential risk factors in changes of your dog's dietary habits and requirements.
And that is the difficulty about CECS. There are still so many open questions about the disease!! For a start, at times vets still struggle to identify and separate its symptoms from the ones of epilepsy. But even when the disease is diagnosed in your dog, it is difficult in veterinary science to advise one course of action against another.
As ever, in implementing changes to your dog's diet, you want to ensure that your dog does not end up missing out on intake of vital nutritional values, such as calcium.
At times, and when your dog's health noticeably improves after you have started eliminating the above categories of food, your vet might still want to prescribe tablets to overcome a possible unbalance in your dog's newly adopted diet.
In any one case, whatever decision or 'trial and error' method you adopt with your dog, go with caution – I am sure the last thing you want to do is put your fur child's health in jeopardy, and as they say, better safe than sorrow!!!
Yes, I know the feeling. You would have just come back from work, after stopping at the local shop for a bit of food shopping. You are now to come back home, take the dog for a walk, put dinner together for the family whilst doing a few more chores in the house (the famous or infamous multi-tasking regime so many people are stuck into!) and of course, don't forget to prepare your dog's meals!!
The reality is that your dog's health does come at a price. As I have mentioned at different points on this website, your dog is your fur child. In the same way as you would be prepared to spend money, time and effort for your human child, so you are to be prepared to do the same with your dog.
If however you are really desperate and cannot make the time to put your dog's meals together, you can try one of the many gluten free foods available on the market. Amazon has a healthy range of gluten and grain free food for dogs, But for once I feel the need to deviate from my usual supplier Amazon, to the benefit of Zooplus. Please click on the below image to find out the many opportunities offered on Zooplus website.
As mentioned in my previous post on Spike's Disease, of all the ailments our Indy has had to endure so far, Spike's is not one of them. Yet, I have regularly used Zooplus not only as a regular supplier of food for Indy, but also in the past when we had guinea pigs, for their supplies and for their outdoor run. And we have always found Zooplus most competitive in prices as well as in quality of service. I shall talk more extensively at another time about Zooplus as an alternative in fulfilling your dog's and your needs as a dog owner.
For now, however, I would like to draw your attention to the raw meat dog diet program that Zooplus has recently launched.
This is an extract I took from Zooplus current banner on their website home page. As you can see, what Zooplus has to offer is the perfect solution for you to be able to provide ideal meals for your dog affected by Spike's, as you find there a combination of raw meat meals or raw meat mixed with vegetables.
The advantage of getting supplies of raw meat meals for your dog from Zooplus is multiple. Not only food is sold in convenient bulk packs at an extremely competitive price, and with free delivery for orders over £29. But given the perishable nature of the food, packs are delivered frozen and can be stored frozen, guaranteeing freshness of the meat and other ingredients you feed your dog for up to 12 months.
I believe Zooplus is a winning option, which will guarantee a healthier diet in controlling your dog's Spike's symptoms whilst making your life as a dog owner much easier!!
My previous post of Spike's Disease has received much attention online, as well as on social media. So many of you left comments, which opened my eyes as to how many more Borders unfortunately are affected by such nasty disease worldwide.
Many of you asked for advice on the benefit of a gluten free and raw meat controlled diet for affected dogs. I am hoping, with the above suggestions, to be able to help from the little I have learnt myself.
Please continue to leave comments and messages below. It is through sharing individual experiences, I believe, that we can all learn from each other in an effort to improve our dogs' quality of life.
This is not something I have ever heard of before, but it sounds terrible for any dog owner to have to go through, and even worse for the poor wee dog.
Does this condition affect borders more than other types of dogs? I don't know anyone with this breed and I would be interested to know if there are certain breeds more prone to this sort of thing?
Hi Craig. Spike's has become 'the illness of Borders' as it was discovered and first officially recognised in Borders. However more recent studies have found the same seizure-like symptoms in other dogs. Regardless of the breed, my understanding is that the disease can be managed – but unfortunately not cured – through a diet regime.
If you are interested in purchasing a Border, please do so through a reputable breeder so that you can find out if there is history of Spike's in his/her parents' families. It becomes a bit more difficult if you are interested in adopting a Border. But, rest reassured that not all Borders have Spike's!!
Thanks Giulia for sharing your interest.
I never thought that raw meat would be advisable for dogs. Honestly, I am newbie pet owner and I want my dog to be fit and in good shape. I usually feed my dog rice and left over foods which are still suitable.
Maybe I need to try your recommendation and see the results.
Thanks for passing by, my friend! First of all, my understanding is that feeding your hound human food is not good – too many fats and salt which your dog's body cannot process and which can be really damaging to his/her liver. Also be advised that the recommendations I suggest are specifically for dogs suffering from Spike's Disease. My understanding is that, unless there are specific medical requirements, a more varied diet for your dog is more suited as including all nutritions. My suggestions exclude a lot of food categories, only due to the fact that dogs with Spike's have an adverse reaction to those categories.
Hi Giulia, this is great information. A friend of mine from Thailand was allergic to gluten and she was always on the lookout for gluten-free products. I wasn't fully aware of this Spike's disease in Border Terriers so you have provided some really good information and also solutions. It's pretty scary to think they could have seizures or epileptic fits so it's good to know about this in advance. Is there no way to really check if your dog has this?
I suspect, Craig, vets can surely run a set of test to exclude epilepsy or other conditions, which leaves Spike's as only alternative explanation. I'm not sure the dietary suggestions would work for humans – certainly not raw meat. But excluding grains can work as much as with dogs. Like in human medicine, with this type of disease it's very much a case of trial and error before finding the right dietary equilibrium!
It's really hard to find suitable foods for our fury friends that are suffering this disease. A friend of mine also suffers as a celiac and lives on a gluten free diet. I like your suggestion of feeding a dog some raw meat and your solution to correct if the dog shows aggression signals.
Would it be advisable to include mashed up vegetables with the proportion of red meat with their meals?
Absolutely Jeff. In fact I believe Zooplus sells meal menus of raw meat and vegetables and fruit, which I believe are cut in small pieces and par boiled. Their philosophy in putting these menus together is that it mirrors a diet a wild dog would have stuck to. Again, follow the link to Zooplus on my actual post to find out the wide selection of menus available there.
Gluten allergy or celiac disease are very nasty illnesses, I guess in human as much as in dogs. I wish your friend well on their gluten free diet.
Awww bless. It's a good thing he was diagnosed so early, so you can put in place a care plan with your vet to manage his condition as best as possible.
I feel Zooplus have a wider choice of gluten free, but even row diet products, which you may end up having to use if eliminating gluten from your little one does not reduce his seizures.
And by all means, do let us know how you guys progress with your Border's Spike's.
Rachel, I'm ever so sorry to hear your baby is going through this, and you too with her 🙁 It's a good thing that your vet took you down the route of a gluten free diet to start off with. Do you know why? I mean, did he explain what he's thinking it may be? If you have read my articles on Cecs, also called Spike's Disease, you will find that for many years vets thought it may be linked to a neurological disorder, whereas the latest theories think it may be nothing more than gluten intolerance. Either way, it is horrible to have to see your little one go through the horrendous seizures.


According to the documents filed with the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Hard Rock International's $275 million project will start with approximately 54,000 square feet of casino space and 200 guest rooms. The new Atlantic City casino would be built in phases and includes a an expansion plan that would add another 650 hotel rooms plus additional gaming space. The Boardwalk casino would also bring other features when fully developed, including several restaurants, bars, spa and beach cabanas and Hard Rock's traditional rock-and-roll museum.
Hard Rock International is the first company to file an application to build one of the two small scale resort & casinos allowed under the new state law. Previously, the law required a minimum of 500 rooms for casino construction. Under the new law, smaller casinos could now have as few as 200 room.
Hard Rock International, which is owned by the Florida-based Seminole Indian tribe, also operates Seminole Hard Rock Hotels & Casino Tampa and Seminole Hard Rock Hotels & Casino Hollywood, in Florida, as well as hotel-casinos in Biloxi and Las Vegas.


Marking the 30th anniversary of the discovery of high temperature superconductors, particularly the cuprates, this Plenary presentation by David Larbalestier at the 2016 Applied Superconductivity Conference reviews the past and predicts the future.
2016 marks the 30th anniversary of the discovery of high temperature superconductivity in the cuprates so it is natural to ask how they are doing. In fact the LTS conductors, Nb-Ti and Nb3Sn have more widespread application than ever and their market has not in any way been negatively harmed by HTS. At first this was because HTS was seen as the vehicle for an entirely separate industry in electro-technology operating at ~77 K or more recently in the 30-40 K range. Almost all elements of the electric utility network have been demonstrated with HTS (and a few with LTS too) but an application-pull market of the type that MRI, NMR, and accelerators provide for LTS has not developed. One reason is that HTS conductor costs are still several times those of LTS in any application where either could serve. Only this year can we expect HTS magnets, always so far the dominant application of any superconductor, in domains where LTS cannot compete. A second drawback for use of HTS is the strong architectural limitations imposed on conductors by the suppressed superfluid densities of HTS grain boundaries. Fabrication routes for HTS conductors are thus complex and emphasize strong shape texture (Coated conductors and Bi-2223) or require complex heat treatments to develop growth-induced texture as in round wire Bi-2212. With the expected delivery of an LTS/HTS (REBCO coated Conductor) hybrid magnet generating 32 T for users of the National High Magnetic Field Laboratory in mid-2016, perhaps a new application field will emerge. However, the huge costs of all HTS conductors (in the $100-200,000 per liter range) mean that we must exploit lower cost materials that could also offer the twisted, round-wire, multifilament architecture of Nb-Ti and Nb3Sn. Here MgB2 and K-doped BaFe2As2 conductors both offer promise for use in the 4-30 K range, especially if fundamental science improvements to Hc2 of MgB2 and to the connectivity of polycrystalline (K,Ba)Fe2As2 can be made. For the even more adventurous we should note that the highest Tc superconductor (203 K) is now a modified metallic hydrogen based on solidifying H2S under about 150 GPa. And finally we return to the RE-123 compounds can new processing routes generate conductors capable of mimicking round wires (e.g. the Cable on Round Core concept CORC) at high enough Jc and low enough costs to provide an all-purpose Nb-Ti conductor capable of generating fields of a few tesla at 65-77K? These are some of the challenges addressed in this talk.


text:
What is the Angel Shot? The drink order used to signal for help at a bar
Meredith Clark
August 10, 2022, 7:52 PM ·3 min read
The Angel Shot is currently trending across TikTok, but not because of some new cocktail craze. It isn't even a drink at all. The Angel Shot is being used as a signal for help to alert bartenders of an unsafe situation.
The secret drink order, known as the "Angel Shot," has recently become a viral trend on TikTok as people raise awareness towards the potentially life-saving codeword. The hashtag #angelshot has more than 143m views on the app, with bartenders and content creators reenacting scenes in which ordering an Angel Shot could help staff intercede an unsafe encounter.
Ben Smith, who has worked as a bartender for 19 years, first brought attention to the Angel Shot back in 2021 when he made a TikTok about the secret drink order and received more than 2.8m likes. After he acted out a potential situation where a customer ordered an angel shot, Smith explained the three different ways to order the drink and what each of them mean.
Depending on what type of Angel Shot a patron orders, bartenders and restaurants employees will know what to do. The first way to order the shot is neat or straight up, which means that a guest needs an escort to their car. An angel shot on the rocks or on ice indicates that they need help calling an Uber, Lyft, or taxi. And the third order, with lime or a twist, lets the staff know that they should call the police.
Following the viral trend, some users pointed out how restaurants and bars have been placing signage on how to order an Angel Shot in their restrooms. One TikToker shared a picture of a poster that was hung in a Hooters bathroom, informing customers on how to order an Angel Shot in case of an unsafe situation.
But with any social media trend, many bartenders and advocates for the Angel Shot are now worried that publicising the secret drink order will defeat its purpose of being discreet. Michelle Charlotte, a bartender and content creator with more than three million followers, uses her platform to share her own personal stories with bartending. While no one has ever ordered an Angel Shot from her, she hopes its widespread awareness will ruin its secrecy.
"I feel like the whole point of an Angel Shot is to ask the bartender for help discreetly," she said in a TikTok video posted this week. "We've been publicising it so much, making it so well known, that if somebody asks me for one, the person next to them that they're asking help from is going to know what it is."
@elongatedmusk
#pov you ask for angel shot but the bartender doesn't know what that is #foryoupage
♬ оригинальный звук - volcogot - volcogot
@claud_cirillo98
#pov : You ask for An Angel Shot (ib: @avi.akbar) #fyp #foryou #foryoupage #angelshot #fypシ
"But then again if somebody asks me for an Angel Shot, I am now involved," she added. "It doesn't matter if the person they're asking for help from knows what it is, because I have no problem telling someone to get lost or kicking anybody out of the bar that's harassing somebody else."
"I was at the bar and the bartender asked me if I needed an angel shot," one person commented. "I never knew what this was until then. I am so thankful for her!!"
An estimated 81 per cent of women and 43 per cent of men in the US reported experiencing some form of sexual harassment or assault in their lifetime, according to the National Sexual Violence Resource Center. In the UK, a similar safety initiative known as "Ask For Angela" allows people who feel unsafe or threatened in bars or clubs to seek help by approaching staff and asking them for "Angela".
Michael Haight is accused of killing his wife and 5 kids in a brutal Utah familicide. Police reports suggest he had a troubling pattern of aggression toward children.
2 former George Santos campaign workers describe a 'sloppy' workplace and a boss with a short fuse


I was searching for a Property and found this listing (MLS® #C4225931). Please send me more information regarding #505 38 9 St Ne, Calgary, Alberta, T2E 7X9. Thank you!
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