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Suicide Research Paper
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1. Definition
The term suicide was mentioned for the first time in medieval times in 1177 (van Hooff 1990) according to the Latin sui cidium (self-killing) and sui caedere (to kill himself/herself). Now, this term is used in the international scientific literature. It avoids judgment, as do terms like 'self murder' and 'voluntary death.'
In the realm of the term suicide, there are other terms that have to be defined. Suicide ideas include: thinking about death either of one's own or someone else's or death in general; the wish to die; suicide ideas in a more narrow sense. It is not easy to define the term suicide attempt. The definition most commonly accepted is the following: 'An act with nonfatal outcome, in which an individual deliberately indicates a nonhabitual behavior that, without the intervention of others, will cause self-harm, or deliberately ingests a substance in excess of the prescribed or generally recognized therapeutic dosage, and which is aimed at realizing changes which the subject desired via the actual or expected physical consequences' (WHO 1989, Platt et al. 1992). This definition includes an active intention for self-harm but not necessarily self-killing. Suicide and suicide attempt are also considered as suicidal behavior.
2. Importance Of Suicide
Suicide belongs to the 10 most frequent causes of death among adults in industrialized European and North American countries. In these countries, suicide is considered the second most frequent cause of death among adolescents and young adults (15–35 years). Suicide in young male adults has increased constantly during the last 20 years. Table 1 shows the frequencies of causes of death worldwide (WHO 1990) disregarding the most frequent causes of death such as cardiovascular diseases, stroke, cancer, infectious diseases, and malnutrition. These figures have to be taken cum grano salis because of a dearth of or inaccurate statistics on death in developing countries. As shown in Table 1, only fatal car accidents had a similar frequency of death as compared with suicide rates. War activities, crime, or even AIDS at the beginning of the 1990s had a considerably lower death rate.
3. Epidemiology
The most recent available suicide rates from all over the world are depicted in Fig. 1. This shows that a high variability of suicide rates exists across cultures and countries. Looking at the rank order of the frequency of suicide rates, a relatively stable pattern can be described—at least for European countries. There exist a North–South down gradient and a East–West down gradient of suicide rates: eastern and northern countries have higher suicide rates than western and southern countries. Hereby, sociological factors seem to play an important role in terms of secularization and industrialization with the collapse of the family group as a consequence as well as climate factors, which cannot be disentangled sufficiently.
There exist distinct sex differences with a preponderance of males in suicide and preponderance of females in suicide attempt. This distribution is stable across all countries and cultures. Only China reports a prevalance of suicide among women in selected areas.
The highest rate of suicide is found in people of older age and that of suicide attempt in younger people. Suicidal behavior has been found very rarely in children but, without doubt, there is clinical evidence that children from 4 years of age have suicide ideas and make a suicide attempt or kill themselves. However, suicide occurring in children before prepuberty is very rare. Furthermore, it has to be taken into consideration, that until prepuberty (8–10 years) children normally do not experience death as something irreversible (Pfeffer 1986). Cultural differences exist in terms of using different suicide methods. Socalled weak suicide methods (ingestion of drugs, wrist cutting) and hard suicide methods (shooting, hanging, jumping, drowning, etc.) will be distinguished. Weak suicide methods prevail in suicide attempts, hard methods in successful suicide. In general, females more often prefer weak methods than males. The most frequent method for suicide in females and males in North America is shooting, in Europe hanging.
Suicide rates in several European countries such as Germany, England and Wales, France, Hungary, and the Nordic countries show an astonishing stability over decades and even a century. The same holds true for counties such as Saxonia, Brandenburg, and Thuringia, where suicide rates have been stable over a century. Figure 2 depicts suicide rates over one century in Germany (Deutsches Reich and Federal Republic of Germany) (Wedler 1992). Such stability can be traced also (in other countries) back to the nineteenth century such as in Prussia, France, and the Nordic countries. On the other hand, there have been dramatic changes in suicide rates as during the nineteenth century, where secularization, industrialization, and individualization have taken place in western and northern European societies. During World War I and II further dramatic changes occurred not only affecting both males and females but also countries which have not been involved in these wars, such as Switzerland. Finally, the last changes have occurred after the fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe between 1985 and 1995 with a dramatic decrease in suicide rates by up to 40 percent (Diekstra 1996).
4. Differing And Common Aspects Between Suicide And Suicide Attempts
There are considerable differences between suicide attempters and suicide victims (Stengel 1964). The group of suicide victims is rather small in comparison with the group of suicide attempters. The sociodemographic characteristics are quite different: suicide victims are older and predominantly male, suicide attempters are younger age and predominantly female. The tendency of a transition from the group of suicide attempters to the group of suicide victims is rather small with a 10 percent chance. Whereas the life of the victim is terminated by suicide, a nonfatal suicide attempt becomes a very important event in the life of this person, often with a change in the further life trajectory.
Nevertheless, there are also some common aspects between these two groups: the probability of suicide is higher, the more often suicide attempts happen. Despite the fact that more males are committing suicide and more females make a suicide attempt, there is a considerable overlap between both groups. The same holds true for age distribution: a considerable proportion of young males and females commit suicide, while older males and females make suicide attempts. Most of the risk factors are equally valid for both suicide victims and suicide attempters (see below).
5. Risk Factors For Suicide And Suicide Attempts
Risk factors for suicide and suicide attempts are as follows: increased age; marital status like being separated, divorced, widowed; single; unemployment; gender and economical status (suicide occurs more often in males, suicide attempts occur more often in females and the lowest social class). The most important risk factors for suicide and suicide attempts, however, are a previous suicide attempt and a psychiatric disorder (Kreitman 1977).
Psychiatric hospitals bear a great risk of losing a patient to suicide. It has been estimated that 15 percent of depressed patients, 15 percent of patients with a drug or alcohol addiction, and 10 percent of patients with schizophrenia, who have been treated in a psychiatric hospital, finally die by committing suicide. Patients with anxiety disorders or personality disorders also have a considerable risk of committing suicide. From an epidemiological point of view, subjects with a depression or an addiction have a 15fold to 60-fold higher risk of committing suicide as compared with the general population (Bronisch 1999).
There are differences between urban and rural areas with respect to suicide rates. The highest suicide rates are seen in urban areas, whereas the lower rates are seen in rural areas. An exception are the states of the former USSR, where a preponderance of suicide rates in rural areas is found.
Climate seems also to play an important role in the distribution of suicide rates. The highest suicide rates are found during late spring and summer time. This distribution can be found across the northern as well as the southern hemispheres. Countries in southern parts of Europe show a lower suicide rate than countries in the northern parts of Europe.
Religious affiliation also plays in important role in the frequency of suicides. Especially in those countries with a predominance of Catholics, suicide rates are lower, whereas in countries with a predominance of Protestants, suicide rates are higher. However, if the degree of urbanization and the distribution of social classes are taken into consideration, the differences between catholic and protestant countries are fading (Kreitman 1977).
6. Origins Of Suicidal Behavior
6.1 Suicide As A Basic Human Existential Problem
Ever since the written history of mankind, suicide has been considered a basic human existential phenomenon that has been reflected in many philosophical and religious contributions as well as in all kinds of arts. The attitude towards suicide did not only depend on the Zeitgeist of the respective historical period, but also on the individual stance of different philosophical schools such as of Stoa and Epikur in antiquity and different religions such as Christianity and Buddhism. The sociological theories are a consequence of the enlightment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. During the second half of the nineteenth century, psychological theories developed upon the influence of psychological thinking and emerging psychoanalysis. During the second half of the twentieth century, biological theories were finally stimulated by the natural sciences focusing on the brain.
Suicide requires self-reflecting properties of an individual, i.e., an individual who can differentiate between an observing and experiencing ego. Suicide does not exist in animals. Even nonhuman primates do not show suicidal behavior, neither in natural settings nor in preservations. However, suicide has been found in Neolithic societies.
6.2 Sociological Aspects
6.2.1 Durkheim´s theory. Sociological theories are influenced by the theory of Durkheim (1897) based upon the evaluation of suicide statistics of western European countries (France and Prussia) during the second half of the nineteenth century. Durkheim proposed four different types of suicide depending on the degree of successful adaptation of the individual to different types of societies. A prerequisite to adaptation of the individual to society is that individualization is neither too weak nor too strong. If the individualization is too strong, the individual will be isolated from society and the danger of an egoistic suicide increases. If the individualization is too weak, the danger of an altruistic suicide increases.
On the other hand, a prerequisite to the equilibrium between the individual and society is that social norms are neither too strong nor too unspecific. Norms that are too strong facilitate fatalistic suicide such as an expiatory death. Norms that are too unspecific favor anomic suicide. With the help of the existing suicide statistics, Durkheim tried to verify three of the four types (he did not discuss the fatalistic suicide). He tried to prove that Protestant countries have a higher suicide rate than Catholic countries, since Protestantism allows the individual a higher degree of freedom than does Catholicism: it is called egoistic suicide. He explained the increase in suicide rates during political crises (Dreyfuss affair in France) in terms of an egoistic suicide. During times of flourishing economic growth, implying a derestriction of social norms, suicide rates should lead to an anomic suicide, whereas during times of war, stronger norms lead to a stronger coherence of society resulting in a decrease in suicide rates.
6.2.2 General Sociological Trends. During the nineteenth century, only parts of Durkheim s theories could be confirmed such as the differences between Catholic and Protestant countries in western Europe and the decrease of suicide rates during both world wars. Generally speaking, Durkheim s data and statistical data from the twentieth centuries could demonstrate an increase in suicide in Europe during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries depending on the development of industrialization, secularization, and individualization of the respective countries, i.e., the more pronounced these developments were the more frequent suicide and suicide attempts occurred (Retterstol 1992). However, through the fall of the Iron Curtain in Eastern Europe between 1985 and 1995, the theory of anomic suicide has been opposed. Also, a remarkably stable sex difference with male preponderance in suicide and female preponderance in suicide attempts has been shown in nearly all cultures and societies. Another quite remarkable trend of the last decades has been the increase in suicide rate of 15–35-year-old adolescents and young adults. In most western societies, this development has been correlated with an increasing rate of depression and addiction potential. An increasing urbanization, loss of social structures and familial bonds, as well as changes in sex roles may play an important role in this development (Klerman 1987).
6.3 Psychological Aspects
Psychological models include psychodynamic, attachment, and cognitive-behavioral theories that are only partially substantiated by empirical research. The main theories are concerning aggression directed inward instead of outward, the loss of a symbiotic relationship, and a severe personal insult resulting in severe loss of self-esteem. Finally, classical conditioning, operant conditioning, and model learning are, in terms of the behavioral point of view, also of great importance.
6.3.1 Aggression Directed Against The Ego. Freud (1917) conceptualized one of the first psychological theories about the development of suicidal behavior in 'mourning and melancholia.' To him, the psychodynamics of suicidal behavior and depression were indistinguishable, i.e., suicidal behavior and depression were seen as a turn of aggression against the ego and an ambivalent attitude towards other people. Aggression directed against other people will be followed by loss of a desperately needed person. Turn of the aggression against the ego is expressed by feelings of guilt, self-devaluation, and finally self-killing.
6.3.2 Distorted Cognitive Schemes. Beck (1967) also emphasized a strong connection between suicidal behavior and depression. The depressive sees himself, the world, and the future (so called cognitive triade) negatively because of their distorted cognitive schemes. Catastrophization, minimizing, maximizing, and overgeneralization belong to typically distorted cognitive schemes. As a consequence of such a cognitive triade, helpnessless, hopelessness, and powerlessness result. In this case, the only solution for an individual may be to end their miserable life by committing suicide.
6.3.3 Narcissistic Crisis. Henseler (1974 1984) formulated the first narcissistic theory of suicidal behavior. Individuals with narcissistic personality traits are people who can be hurt easily by significant others through criticism or lack of special attention. They are lacking a stable self-esteem and their self-perception is distorted: they oscillate between overestimation and underestimation of their own abilities. This is not restricted to one's own character but also extends onto a corresponding distorted view of other people. Insults through criticism or lack of special attention lead to aggressive outbursts that can be directed either towards others or their own character in terms of a suicide or suicide attempt.
6.3.4 Appeal To Human Bonding. Attachment of the newborn to the mother is a characteristic common to all mammals. In all mammals, the newborn is very dependent and the reproductivity rate at least in the nonhuman and human primates is rather small. Therefore, the strong attachment is a life-preserving measure of the evolution to protect the dependent newborn until it is grown up. The emotional bonding in primates is very intense, a separation of the mother will be experienced as very painful (Bowlby 1977a, 1977b).
As has been known from many empirical studies, most suicides and suicide attempts are consequences of imminent separation, separation, or divorce of males and females. The intention to die is ambivalent in most suicide attempts, i.e., besides a true tendency to end life in nearly all suicide attempts there are tendencies to survive. That can be seen easily in the choice of suicide methods, which often are not so dangerous, i.e., ingestion of small amounts of pills, or in the arrangement of suicide attempt that leaves a rescue open, i.e., by attempting suicide in the presence of a significant other.
The painfully expected or experienced separation from a significant other and the appeal of the significant others not to be left behind both seem to play an important role in the meaning of a suicide attempt (Bronisch 1995).
6.3.5 Classical And Operant Conditioning. Basic principles of behavioral theory and therapy can be described using the Stimulus Organism Reaction Kontingency Consequence Scheme (SORKC scheme) of Kanfer (Schmidtke 1988) (see Fig. 3). The SORKC scheme tries to describe each behavior in a broader context of conditions, which can be placed linearly in a chain or circle. The constituents of the SORKC scheme for suicidal behavior are the following:
(a) life events and social situations as Stimuli variables (S), which may trigger suicidal behavior;
(b) behavioral repertoire based upon organic conditions of the individual such as psychiatric disorders and the personality (e.g., cognitive styles and stances) as Organism variable (O), which may predispose to suicidal behavior;
(c) suicidal behavior as a reaction (R) to the S and O variables;
(d) Kontingency (K), i.e., the reinforcement conditions, which support or suppress suicidal behavior; and behavior according to a regular or irregular order of the consequences;
(e) Consequences (C) in the sense of negative reinforcement (e.g., death) or positive reinforcement (attention of the environment) of suicidal behavior.
The process hereby is rather circular, i.e., consequences can again influence further suicidal behavior. This might be possible by changing the individual (O variable) and the surroundings (S variable).
6.3.6 Model Learning. Imitation of suicidal behavior is a new area in suicide research. The observation that suicidal behavior is running in certain families, cultures, and countries could be explained by genetic transmission, psychological conflicts, or by model learning. In regard to model learning, three hypotheses have been proposed: the imitation hypothesis, the contagion hypothesis, and the suggestion hypothesis. All three hypotheses have in common that suicidal behavior of a model will be imitated, whereby predisposition of the individual (so-called 'presuicidal personality'), lack of social support in coping with life crises and enduring social burden are the contributing factors. Furthermore, a high degree of social suggestibility of predisposed individuals plays an important role.
During the 1980s and 1990s the influence of different media, such as books, newspapers, journals, television, and movies, on increasing suicide rates can be demonstrated (Phillips and Lesyna 1995). Suicide victims have resembled the person portrayed by the respective media: there have been similarities between this person and the suicide victim in terms of age, gender, motives for the suicide, and the methods used for suicide. The increase of suicide rate was in temporal relationship to the reported suicide cases and was not compensated by a decrease in later time, i.e., these suicides were committed earlier than planned. Also very impressive are studies that demonstrate a decrease in suicide rates not only by changing the information towards being more informative and being less sensational, but also by reducing information about suicide (Phillips and Lesyna 1995). One example is a study of railway suicides reported in newspapers, which could be reduced by cooperation with local newspapers in reducing and confining to nonsensational reports on this matter (Sonneck et al. 1994).
In a broader sense, traditions in different cultures and countries concerning either permissive or restrictive attitudes towards suicide can also be regarded as a form of model learning. These attitudes may be transferred over generations such as in Hungary where an extremely high suicide rate can be observed throughout an entire century.
6.4 Biological Aspects
During the nineteenth century, Esquirol (1838) was the first to observe that suicidal behavior ran in families and, therefore, postulated that suicidal behavior was a kind of mental illness. Family, twin, and adoption studies gave hints about suicidal behavior having a genetic component.
There is a familial burden due to suicide and suicide attempts (of suicide victims or suicide attempters as compared with subjects without suicide or suicide attempts). Separation of nature (heritage) and nurture (rearing) is not possible within family studies, but is within twin and adoption studies. In twin studies, identical (identical genes) and fraternal twins (half of the genes are nonidentical as in sisters and brothers) are compared with regards to suicide or suicide attempts. The respective studies demonstrate a significantly higher frequency of suicide and suicide attempts in identical as compared with fraternal twins (Roy et al. 1991). In adoption studies, identical twins have been compared with each other, whereby one twin has been raised with his biological parents, while the other twin has been adopted right away after birth. Significantly fewer twins raised by their biological parents developed suicidal behavior or committed suicide than twins who had been adopted following birth. Furthermore, within biological families, a significantly higher rate of suicides or suicide attempts was shown than within adoptive families of the respective identical twin. All these studies also demonstrate that suicidal behavior has to be seen apart from a specific psychiatric diagnosis, especially apart from a depressive illness. On the other hand, the distinctive feature that might be inherited may not be suicidal behavior as such but rather personality traits such as lack of impulse control or aggressiveness (Wender et al. 1986). Postmortem studies of suicide victims and in vivo studies (investigation of cerebrospinal fluid and the platelets in the blood of suicidal persons concerning molecular genetic, biochemical and physiological parameters) support the so-called serotonin hypotheses of suicidal behavior: impulsiveness, aggression directed inwards or outwards, and violent suicidal behavior are correlated with a dysfunction of the serotonergic transmitter system in the human brain (Mann 1998).
7. Prevention
Prevention can be divided into primary, secondary, and tertiary prevention. With regard to primary prevention the main focus implies a reduction of tendencies within the society that support suicidal tendencies. A verdict of suicidal behavior by means of social ostracizing or punishment has not been successful in reducing suicide rates in medieval and modern times (Minois 1995). However, primary prevention also concerns the prevention of suicidal behavior by ameliorating life conditions in general and socioeconomical conditions in particular as well as effective treatment of psychiatric disorders. It also refers to a support of tolerance for individual life styles. Furthermore, the restricted approach to frequently used methods, such as guns for shooting, can be helpful. Primary prevention implies also an amelioration of power of resistance against suicidal tendencies in the individual. Education of lay people and professionals in detecting and treating suicidal persons could be the most effective strategies. Secondary and tertiary prevention provided by fellow citizens (e.g., Samaritans) or medical or psychological professional personnel mean prevention of relapses in suicidal behavior or rehabilitation of patients with suicidal behavior. Empirical studies proving the effect of the above mentioned preventive strategies are still lacking. There is now an emerging trend to develop national suicide prevention programs in several western and northern European countries (Silverman and Maris 1995).
8. Therapy
Therapy has to be divided into crisis intervention, with actual psychiatric-psychotherapeutic intervention, into pharmacotherapy and psychotherapy. Crisis intervention primarily means prevention of an imminent danger of suicide. Crisis intervention should provide care and protection to the individual, i.e., protection of life, since suicide attempts often require medical care such as admission to an internal intensive care unit for detoxification or a surgical intervention. Crisis intervention also includes immediate evaluation of still existing suicidal tendencies of the patient in order to make decisions for further preventive measures: admission to a closed psychiatric ward for relapse prevention or crisis intervention on an inpatient or outpatient basis. Crisis intervention also includes acute psychotherapy and pharmacotherapy of the patient. The most important determinant of the psychotherapy is hereby the development of a supportive relationship between the suicidal person and the therapist. The greater the time lapse between the suicide attempt and help offered, the more often suicidal people are inclined to disregard this help. A supportive relationship means that the therapist is accepting the patient's 'cry for help' and is making a commitment trying to understand the patient, however, is not willing to accept the patient's decision to end their life as a form of reasonable problem solving. They clarify the triggering situation that has led to the suicide attempt. Together with the patient, the therapist tries to develop other strategies to resolve seemingly insoluble conflicts in the patient's life. Also, an important determinant of a successful intervention is the involvement of significant others of the patient as well as the social environment in general. The acute pharmacological intervention means primarily sedation of the patient in order to keep him or her from further suicidal behavior.
Psychotherapy means treatment of psychopathological states such as depression, dysfunctional behaviors like impulsiveness, or pathological personality traits such as low self-esteem (Bronisch 1999). It includes the classical types of psychotherapy, i.e., psychodynamic approaches and cognitive-behavioral approaches. So far, empirical studies could only demonstrate efficacy for some groups of patients, such as patients with Borderline Personality Disorders by cognitive-behavioral therapies (Linehan 1997).
Pharmacotherapy of suicidal behavior primarily is focused on the underlying psychiatric illness of the patient such as schizophrenia (antipsychotics), depressive disorders (antidepressants), anxiety disorders (anxiolytics), and addiction (drugs against withdrawal symptoms). However, during the 1990s drugs specifically targeting the typical characteristics of suicide attempters such as impulsiveness and aggressiveness seem to have been successful in reducing suicide and suicide attempts: lithium (Ahrens 1997) and selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (Montgomery 1997).
Suicide and suicide attempt are a behavior confined to human beings. They are rooted fundamentally in the human existence and have as a prerequisite self-reflecting properties of the individual, i.e., conscious acting with the consequence or the attempt to extinguish the own existence.
The attempts to describe suicide and suicide attempt based on a single cause in only one dimension has been tried by Esquirol (1838) in biology, Durkheim (1897) in sociology, or Freud (1917) in psychology and seems to be inappropriate. Suicide and suicide attempt are multidetermined acts (Roy 2000). However, the weighting of different aspects of suicide and suicide attempt seems to be rather difficult to explain, so that in the following, only a synopsis of the empirical findings will be given.
Suicide is lacking in animals and even in nonhuman primates. However, it has already been found in Neolithic societies as well as later on in the old Greek and Latin societies. Precise empirical data about suicide in different countries and cultures has been lacking up to the nineteenth century so that a description of the development of suicide from the antiquity via the medieval to modern times is impossible. However, there is a considerable increase of suicides in societies with a high degree of secularization, industrialization, and individualization starting in the middle of the nineteenth century. For individual countries, there is often a stability of suicide rates on a high or low level depending at least in Europe on the degree of industrialization, religious affiliation and climate: northern countries with a high degree of industrialization, Protestant religious affiliation and rather few sunny days have considerably higher suicide rates than southern countries with a low degree of industrialization, Catholic religious affiliation, and many sunny days have lower suicide rates. The differences could best be explained by human bonding as a protective factor, whereas climate could influence biological rhythms, hence, triggering suicidal behavior.
In regard to sex differences and suicidal behavior, very stable differences exist between males and females with a male preponderance in suicide and female preponderance in suicide attempts. The reasons for these sex differences, which seem to be stable across countries, cultures, and times, have not been well investigated and need further empirical research. There is no doubt that psychological motives play not only an important role as triggers for suicidal behavior but also are important determinants for the development of suicidal behavior. The most important motive for suicidal behavior is certainly the impending loss of a human relationship, even if the wish to die outweighs the wish to survive in the suicidal act, i.e., in the seriousness of the suicide attempt. Besides that, the turning of aggressive tendencies towards the own character and narcissistic vulnerability are personality traits predisposing to suicidal behavior. From the cognitive-behavioral point of view, classical conditioning, operant conditioning, and model learning are basic learning principles, which also can be transferred to behaviors such as suicide and suicide attempt. This way, model learning is not only important for perpetuating suicidal behavior in families and peer groups but also in societies with traditional high (Hungary) suicide rates (so called imitation hypothesis).
In certain families, a genetic burden of suicidal behavior could be confirmed by twin and adoption studies. This genetic burden is often connected to psychiatric illnesses such as depressive disorder, addiction, anxiety disorder, schizophrenia, and personality disorder. Biological studies (postmortem brain and peripheral biochemical studies) could demonstrate a dysfunction of the serotonergic system in suicide victims and suicide attempters, which in psychopathological terms is correlated to a loss of impulse control, aggressiveness, affective instability, and violent suicide attempt.
As empirical studies could confirm, suicidal behavior is not a 'normal' behavior, but is rooted in psychological and biological abnormalities of the respondent with the corollary of prevention and therapy. However, empirical data about successful prevention of suicidal behavior is still lacking and successful therapeutic interventions only exist for subgroups of suicide attempters such as depressives with a successful treatment with lithium and serotonin reuptake inhibitors as well as cognitive behavioral therapy for patients with a borderline personality disorder. Life as a precious good, desperation, and suffering of the respondents as well as suffering of the relatives should bring the focus on suicide more into the scientific scope of view as other life threatening illnesses already have been for a long time.
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brittany.kauffman@du.edu
Brittany Kauffman is a Senior Director, overseeing IAALS' programmatic objectives and strategy with expertise in civil justice reform at the state and federal levels.
Kauffman has worked with state and federal courts, rules committees, civil justice task forces, and bar organizations around the country, serving as a facilitator, expert liaison, and consultant on civil justice reform efforts. She provides legal and empirical research and analysis to assist in the development of recommendations, as well as support for implementation—all toward the goal of making our civil justice system accessible, efficient, and relevant to the people whom it serves. Examples include Kauffman's work with the Conference of Chief Justice's Civil Justice Improvements Committee, which developed a set of 13 recommendations for transforming civil justice in our state courts, and the American College of Trial Lawyer's Task Force on Discovery and Civil Justice.
Kauffman joined IAALS in the spring of 2012 after having practiced with Arnold & Porter, LLP, where she worked in appellate, environmental, natural resources, and Indian law. She was honored in 2009 as a nominee for the Colorado Lawyers Committee Individual of the Year Award for her pro bono efforts. Prior to her work at Arnold & Porter, she served as a law clerk for the Honorable Judge Paul J. Kelly, Jr., of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Kauffman received her JD from the University of Colorado School of Law, where she was a member of Order of the Coif and a Breitenstein Scholar. Kauffman obtained her undergraduate degree from Colorado College, where she graduated cum laude with a BA in Chemistry and a minor in Environmental Studies and was a Boettcher Scholar.
Member and Expert Advisor, 7th Circuit Council on eDiscovery and Digital Information (formerly 7th Circuit Electronic Discovery Pilot Program Committee)
Co-Chair of the State Court Initiatives Project Team
Member, Updated Principles Project Team
Member, Faculty of Federal Advocates
Member, Colorado Bar Association
Member, Colorado Women's Bar Association
Recent Speaking Engagements
Panelist, National Association for Court Management, Mind the Gap: The Power of Active Engagement, July 2018: "Redefining Case Management for the 21st Century"
Speaker and Moderator, CCJ/COSCA Southern Regional Civil Justice Reform Summit, May 2018
Panelist, University of Akron School of Law & Akron Law Review, A Day of Disovery: New Trends and Issues in Federal Civil Discovery, April 2018: "Initial Disclosures: The Past, Present, and Future of Discovery"
Speaker and Moderator, CCJ/COSCA New England/Mid-Atlantic Regional Civil Justice Reform Summit, April 2018
Speaker, Missouri Commission on Civil Justice Reform Meeting, February 2018
Coauthor, Civil Justice Playbook: To Change the Discovery Culture, Take it One Case at a Time, Corporate Counsel Business Journal (March 2, 2018).
Author, Initial Disclosures: The Past, Present, and Future of Discovery, 51 Akron L. Rev. 783 (2018).
Coauthor, Civil Justice Reformers Aim to Modernize State Courts: Leaders call for states to implement 13 recommendations, Metropolitan Corporate Counsel (July 7, 2017).
Author, Change the Culture, Change the System: A Top 10, Court Manager, NACM, Spring 2016.
Coauthor, Rule Reform, Case Management, and Culture Change: Making the Case for Real and Lasting Reform, Kansas Journal of Law and Public Policy, 2015.
JD, University of Colorado School of Law, Order of the Coif
BA, Chemistry, Environmental Studies Minor, Colorado College, cum laude
Transforming Our Civil Justice System for the 21st Century: The Road to Civil Justice Reform
Preventing Whack-a-Mole Management of Consumer Debt Cases
Initial Discovery Protocols
Efficiency in Motion
US Justice Needs Project Benefits From Collaboration with Our Partners
Holding Jury Trials in the Pandemic Like Building an Airplane While You're Flying It
Federal Courts Continue to Tackle the Challenges of Reopening and Restarting Jury Trials amidst Pandemic
New Pew Report Highlights Trends in Debt Collections and Critical Need for Reform

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Here are five things Warren Buffett said in his latest letter to shareholders that contain valuable investing lessons for all of us.
Widely followed billionaire investor Warren Buffett recently released his latest letter to Berkshire Hathaway's (NYSE:BRK-A) (NYSE:BRK-B) shareholders, and as usual, it was full of useful investing information. Since Buffett is one of the most often-quoted people in the world, here are five new Buffett-isms we can add to the list, and what they mean to you as an investor.
1. "Widespread fear is your friend as an investor, because it serves up bargain purchases."
Here's something you may not know. Successful long-term investors love stock market corrections, and even crashes. When everyone else is selling, it creates great opportunities for investors with the foresight to see past the short-term volatility.
Here's an example from Buffett's own past. In 2008 while the financial world was in free-fall, Buffett invested $5 billion of Berkshire Hathaway's capital in Goldman Sachs (NYSE:GS), for which he received 10%-yielding preferred stock as well as warrants to buy common shares at a strike price of $115. He still holds shares of Goldman that resulted from the deal, which are currently worth about $250 each.
The point is that when most of the financial world is in a panic, the ability to keep a cool head and think from a long-term perspective can allow you to make tremendous profits over time.
2. "Personal fear is your enemy."
According to a study by Dalbar, the stock market generated an annualized average total return of 8.19% over the 20-year period from 1996-2015, but the average equity fund investor averaged just 2.11%. Why?
The reason for this massive underperformance is simple. It's common knowledge that the central idea of investing is to buy low and sell high, but too many people do the exact opposite. When stocks keep going up and up, and they see how much money everyone else is making, that's when many people decide to buy. And, when the market is crashing, panic sets in and people sell to limit their losses. In other words, in practice, investors have an unfortunate tendency to buy high and sell low. Don't let your own emotions lead to poor investment decisions.
3. "What is smart at one price is stupid at another."
Buffett used this quote in his letter in reference to share repurchases, and how they make great financial sense when shares are trading at a discount to their intrinsic value, but are a silly use of capital when shares are expensive.
However, this quote applies to any investment. No matter how great a company's business is, and how much money it could make, there is a price above which it becomes a bad investment. While methods of analyzing stocks vary from person to person, the lesson to be learned is to thoroughly evaluate the stocks you buy, and if the price isn't reasonable, walk away -- no matter how much you want to own the stock.
4. "We have made no commitment that Berkshire will hold any of its marketable securities forever."
One of the most famous Warren Buffett quotes among long-term investors is "our favorite holding period is forever." Unfortunately, many people misinterpret this quote to mean that Berkshire will hold the stocks in its portfolio forever.
In this year's letter to shareholders, Buffett wanted to clarify what he meant.
What Buffett means is that Berkshire buys stocks with the intention of holding them forever, if the original thesis for buying them continues to apply. If his original reasons for buying a stock no longer apply, Buffett is perfectly willing to sell. As an example, Buffett made a rather large investment in Freddie Mac stock in the 1990s. However, he noticed that management was slowly starting to take on more and more risk to boost earnings, and Buffett wasn't comfortable with the path the company was taking. So, he sold Berkshire's position in 2000 -- about eight years before the financial crisis proved his instincts right.
5. "When trillions of dollars are managed by Wall Streeters charging high fees, it will usually be the managers who reap outsized profits, not the clients."
This one isn't hard to interpret. High investment fees are your enemy. Buffett used the example of hedge funds, which generally charge such exorbitant management fees that investors are lucky to make any money at all.
However, even if you don't invest in hedge funds, this logic also applies to actively managed mutual funds. Don't get me wrong, it's completely worth paying a reasonable management fee for a fund with a strong track record of performance. However, many funds haven't done any better than the S&P 500, but charge high expense ratios (I consider high to be anything over 1%).
To illustrate why this is such a big deal to Buffett, consider this example. If you had invested $10,000 in a low-cost S&P 500 index fund 35 years ago, your investment would be worth about $240,000 today. If you had invested the same amount in a fund that did just as well as the S&P 500, but charged a 1% expense ratio, your investment would have grown to $173,800. Still impressive, but that "small" 1% fee would have robbed more than $66,000 of your gains. Think about this next time you're comparing funds to invest in.


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How was 2022 for Girls Get Strong Cycling?
It's hard to believe that it has been 2 and a half years since Girls Get Strong Cycling was born. For those that don't know we started in 2020 during lock down. It was merely my lockdown project to keep me sane from the quarantine here in Spain where we could not leave the house and also to settle the resentment I had for the closure of my gym I owned.
I quickly noticed how so many women had taken up cycling during the pandemic even though there were no groups to cycle with. They took to the roads themselves to find some salvation from the pandemic. It was great to help support women to becoming stronger cyclists and find structure, focus and support through our online cycle coaching.
Roll onto 2021 and we started our first cycling camps in September. More than ever women were excited not only to travel but to cycle alongside other women.
2022 has been a great year with 10 camps, 2 of which were for private clubs. It's been wonderful to meet so many women over different ages from different countries all with a passion for cycling. They all are so keen to commit to their time on the bike and make the most of the time cycling on the roads of Mallorca and also absorbing the great advice that our guides and coaches have to offer them. We search far and wide to find a great team to ensure that everyone does actually go home stronger and more confident cyclists. During our camps I really admire to see all the women putting themselves out there and creating a supportive group of women who they have just met. Supporting one another through the highs and lows throughout the week.
On the other side of GGSC we have our online cycle coaching where it has been amazing to introduce Rachel from the UK at the beginning of the year as our cycling coach. Rachel has a huge depth of knowledge of cycling many disciplines and always willing to put herself out there, not only as a coach, but as an athlete. We are lucky to have her to help other women follow the training from an expert. Then in spring we welcomed Charlotte from Canada, who is our cycling and triathlon coach. She has the been there and done it knowledge that only someone with her level of experience can offer along with her extensive coaching experience. It's wonderful to have an all female coaching team that can communicate to women as women.
This year I must have literally met with 100's of women over zoom to learn about their cycling journeys. There is such a diverse mix of motivations and goals in which women want to achieve and also barriers that have been put up against them. From this knowledge I hope that GGSC can break down these barrier to help more women achieve more on the bike and more in life.
So what does 2023 have in store for GGSC? I often get asked how I plan to grow GGSC, the obvious answer would be more camps more locations. But honestly I don't think that we would be able to deliver the same quality and personal experiences at a larger scale, plus I think my stress levels might hit the roof. For 2023, we want to ensure that we work with amazing people that share our values and a personalised approach, so we can carry on delivering an amazing experience for new comers to our camps and returning women that we now feel are part of the family. As for our coaching we are already rolling out our new 12 month packages in order for our coaches to fulfil a year long journey with the women they train.
The one thing I am so humbled with is how so many women enjoy the benefits of cycling and also committed to becoming better cyclists and having a better life for themselves and their families. Thank you to everyone that has been part of GGSC in 2022 and we look forward to sharing more bright and passionate miles on the bike with amazing women in 2023.


White House press secretary Robert Gibbs on Thursday backed off the March 18 deadline for a House vote on a health care bill that he had set last week and repeated this week.
But Gibbs also did not directly answer questions about whether President Obama will delay, by a day or two, his trip to southeast Asia. He is scheduled to leave on the 18th for the week-long trip.
"Our hope is to get this done as soon as possible. If it takes a couple extra days after a year, it takes a couple of extra days," Gibbs said, when asked about the 18th.
The March 18th deadline had been rejected by numerous House Democrats over the last few days.
When asked about delaying the trip, Gibbs did not answer but indicated that news might be forthcoming.


Price Reduced! This home has options and is now priced accordingly! This home's space is unique for the area. Updates include newer windows, kitchen and bathrooms. Lovely finishes throughout that maintain the character of the home. Great Location in East Wash Park between Bonnie Brae and Old South Gaylord and 1/2 mile from the park.


We hope you've had a great 2015 in life and at the game table. May the plundering of your dungeons in 2016 yield you much loot and level you up fast (or at least once every three months)!
Thanks to everyone who has followed our hurdles and progress on Pinterest (over 20,000), via our Newsletter (3000+), and on Facebook (350+). Your liking and words of encouragement have helped keep us going.
In 2016, we will keep pinning, posting, and working on the RPG Bard alpha until it is finally in your hands.
In this newsletter, we've got info on the last issue we're dealing with for alpha release, a preloaded content update, and (much more exciting) a preview of the RPG book creation process as it currently stands.
We are down to one issue: font line heights. While this might not seem like a big issue, what it currently means is you cannot change a font family (such as Ariel to Helvetica) or change a font size (such as from 12pt to 16pt) without getting radically different spacing between the online version and the PDF export version.
We have spent nearly a month with various work arounds and trying to "crack the code" to figuring out an elegant solution to this problem. The current work around is: the user can't change font families or sizes and, on our end, we have to set alternate line-height rules for each different font at each different size and each different line height. Obviously not a long-term solution for anyone.
We now have over 1000 monster stat-blocks from the Pathfinder Roleplaying Game Reference Document (PRD) and over 600 fonts already implemented. There's also a limited set of page backgrounds that are implemented by selection of a book "theme" (such as "ice" to get the blue and white background) for the book interior, which you can also use for your book covers instead of your own background artwork.
The following demonstrates the 5 minute process of creating an account, logging in, setting up a book, creating a cover, creating a page with content blocks, previewing the book online, exporting the PDF, and previewing the PDF in Adobe Reader. This leaves out the population of the content blocks, which would take some additional time, but most of that content would just be a copy/past from your text editing software or a quick typing job, such as changing the "Header 1" text of a heading to the actual heading text.
Create your account, then check your email for your password.
Click "Books" (see above) and then "New Book" to create your new book. Set your system and theme design defaults to get your basic book styling.
Click "Create" under "Book Cover" (see above). Then set your basic cover layout, fill in the text fields, add any images you want, save, and continue scrolling down to see your cover preview.
Click "Add" under "Book Pages". Use the bottom-left 3 icons to insert a elements (both page templates and smaller elements such as an "aside" or "read aloud" box), stat blocks, and images. Then paste in or update your text content as desired.
Click "Preview" to view your complete book online.
Click "Export" to save your book out as a PDF file, which can then be opened in Adobe Reader or any other PDF viewer.
In our next newsletter, we will provide screens of all the content areas that support the book creation processed through automation (such as layout and formatting), libraries of reusable content (fonts, images, stat blocks, and visual elements), legal and support information (including feedback and feature request forms), and user account management.
Once again, Happy New Year and good gaming!


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BROADNAX v. STATE
Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.
Donald BROADNAX v. STATE of Alabama.
CR-04-2141.
Decided: June 29, 2007
Daniel Gary Hamm, Montgomery, for appellant. Troy King, atty. gen., and Richard D. Anderson, J. Clayton Crenshaw, and Jeremy W. McIntire, asst. attys. gen., for appellee.
Donald Broadnax appeals the circuit court's denial of his Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition for postconviction relief, in which he attacked his capital-murder convictions and his sentence of death.
In 1997, Broadnax was convicted of four counts of capital murder in connection with the murders of his wife, Hector Jan Stamps Broadnax, and her four-year-old grandson, DeAngelo Stamps. The murders were made capital (1) because two or more persons were murdered pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct, see § 13A-5-40(a)(10), Ala.Code 1975; (2) because Broadnax had been convicted of another murder in the 20-year period preceding the present murders, see § 13A-5-40(a)(13), Ala.Code 1975; and (3) because the murders were committed during the course of a kidnapping, see § 13A-5-40(a)(1), Ala.Code 1975. The murder of DeAngelo Stamps was also made capital because he was under 14 years of age at the time of his death, see § 13A-5-40(a)(15), Ala.Code 1975. The jury unanimously recommended that Broadnax be sentenced to death, and the trial court accepted the jury's recommendation and sentenced Broadnax to death. Broadnax's convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal, Broadnax v. State, 825 So.2d 134 (Ala.Crim.App.2000), aff'd, 825 So.2d 233 (Ala.2001), and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari review, Broadnax v. Alabama, 536 U.S. 964, 122 S.Ct. 2675, 153 L.Ed.2d 847 (2002). This Court issued a certificate of judgment on January 16, 2002.
Broadnax, through counsel Timothy J. Golden, filed his Rule 32 petition on June 25, 2003, raising several claims, including numerous allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. On September 24, 2003, the State filed a motion seeking to have the court order Broadnax to amend those allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in his petition that the State believed were insufficiently pleaded under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b), Ala.R.Crim.P.; a motion to summarily dismiss those claims in Broadnax's petition that the State believed were subject to the procedural bars in Rule 32.2, Ala.R.Crim.P.; a motion to summarily dismiss those claims in his petition that the State believed presented no material issue of fact or law; and an answer to the remaining claims in Broadnax's petition. On September 26, 2003, the circuit court granted the State's three motions; it summarily dismissed several of the claims in Broadnax's petition, and it ordered Broadnax to amend several of his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel within 30 days to comply with the pleading requirements in Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b), specifically informing Broadnax that the failure to comply with the pleading requirements would result in summary dismissal of those allegations.
After obtaining several extensions, Broadnax filed an amendment to his petition on January 16, 2004. On February 19, 2004, the circuit court set an evidentiary hearing on the petition and the amendment for April 2, 2004. On March 8, 2004, and March 10, 2004, respectively, the State filed a motion to summarily dismiss those allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in Broadnax's petition and amendment that the State believed were insufficiently pleaded under Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b); a motion to dismiss those claims in Broadnax's petition and amendment that the State believed presented no material issue of fact or law; a motion to dismiss those claims in Broadnax's petition and amendment that the State believed were subject to the procedural bars in Rule 32.2; and an amended answer to the remaining claims in Broadnax's petition and amendment. On March 23, 2004, the circuit court granted the State's three motions, summarily dismissing several of Broadnax's claims.
On April 2, 2004, at what was originally scheduled as an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Broadnax's request for a continuance and reset the evidentiary hearing on the remaining claims in Broadnax's petition and amendment for August 25, 2004. On August 11, 2004, the circuit court granted Broadnax's request for a second continuance and reset the hearing for January 21, 2005. The case-action summary reflects that on January 6, 2005, the circuit court again reset the hearing for March 11, 2005. Although the reason for this third continuance does not specifically appear in the record, also on January 6, 2005, the circuit court appointed new counsel, Mari Morrison, to represent Broadnax on his Rule 32 petition, thus indicating the appointment of new counsel prompted the continuance. On February 4, 2005, Golden moved to withdraw, and the circuit court granted the motion on February 8, 2005. Morrison then moved for a continuance of the hearing, which the circuit court granted; the hearing was reset for April 28, 2005. On April 7, 2005, Broadnax filed another motion for a continuance, which the circuit court granted on April 8, 2005; the hearing was reset for May 23, 2005.
On April 8, 2005, Broadnax filed a motion for leave to file a second amendment to his petition; a motion for funds; and a motion for discovery. On April 15, 2005, the State filed oppositions to all Broadnax's motions, and the circuit court held a hearing on the motions the same day, after which it denied the motions. The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Broadnax's petition and the amendment on May 23, 2005. On June 14, 2005, the circuit court issued an order denying the petition and the amendment.1
Broadnax raises several issues on appeal. However, because of our disposition of this case, we need address only one issue. Broadnax contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion for leave to file a second amendment to his petition. We agree.
As noted, on September 26, 2003, the circuit court granted the State's motion requesting that Broadnax amend his petition to satisfy the pleading requirements in Rule 32.3 and Rule 32.6(b) and ordered Broadnax to file an amendment. After several extensions, Broadnax filed an amendment to his petition on January 16, 2004. On April 8, 2005, Broadnax filed a motion to again amend his petition. In the motion, counsel Morrison alleged that she had "had the opportunity to interview Mr. Broadnax in March 2005, on several occasions and has discovered relevant mitigating factors that have not been included within the Rule 32 petition and have such an extent [sic] of probative value that the prejudice resulted [sic] in a different sentence had the jury and trial court known." (C. 782.) Morrison did not identify in the motion what specific mitigating evidence she had discovered that had not been included in the petition and the first amendment, nor did she include with her motion an actual amendment to the petition setting forth the mitigating evidence she had discovered. However, at the hearing on the motion on April 15, 2005, Morrison argued that she had learned from her interviews with Broadnax that he had been sexually abused between the ages of 12 and 14, which, she said, resulted in a drop in his grades and a change in his behavior at that time. Although not specifically stated by counsel, these additional allegations would have been relevant to, and supportive of, Broadnax's claim that his trial counsel were ineffective for not adequately investigating and presenting mitigation evidence, one of the claims not previously disposed of by the circuit court. Counsel stated at the hearing that she had had more time to meet with Broadnax than had his previous counsel and that she perhaps had developed a better rapport with Broadnax and Broadnax, therefore, had disclosed this information to her. In addition, Morrison stated that Broadnax's trial counsel had not put on a single witness during the guilt phase of the trial but that she had learned through her investigation that, at the time of the crime, Broadnax had an injury to his hand that, she believed, might have made it impossible for him to have beaten the victims as severely as the testimony at trial indicated they had been beaten. As the State noted at the hearing, this allegation that trial counsel was ineffective for not discovering and presenting this evidence was a new claim that had not been raised in Broadnax's original petition or in his first amendment. In opposition to the motion to amend, the State argued that an amendment at that time-38 days before the date of the hearing on the petition, when the petition had been pending in the circuit court for almost two years as a result of Broadnax's numerous requests for continuances and when Broadnax had already had an opportunity to amend his petition once-would unduly prejudice the State and unduly delay the proceedings. The circuit court denied Broadnax's motion to amend his petition for a second time, stating: "We're going to get to the bottom of this. He's been represented by counsel all along. And, you know, it's time to draw this matter to a conclusion." (R.Supp. 20.)
In Ex parte Rhone, 900 So.2d 455 (Ala.2004), the Alabama Supreme Court set forth the principles governing amendments to Rule 32 petitions:
"This Court's statements concerning the amendment of Rule 32 petitions are supported by the plain language of Rule 32.7, Ala.R.Crim.P. Subsection (b) of that rule unambiguously grants discretion to the trial court, providing that '[a]mendments to pleadings may be permitted at any stage of the proceedings prior to the entry of judgment.' (Emphasis added [in Ex parte Rhone ].) Guiding the exercise of that discretion is the mandate of subsection (d) that '[l]eave to amend shall be freely granted.' (Emphasis added [in Ex parte Rhone ].) However, because the trial court has discretion to refuse an amendment to a Rule 32 petition, we must consider the nature of the factors that would provide a proper basis for such a refusal.
"In Ex parte Allen, [825 So.2d 271 (Ala.2002),] this Court cited Talley v. State, 802 So.2d 1106, 1107 (Ala.Crim.App.2001), in support of our statement of the principles relevant to the amendment of Rule 32 petitions. In Talley, the Court of Criminal Appeals stated:
" ' " '[A]mendments should be freely allowed and ․ trial judges must be given discretion to allow or refuse amendments․ The trial judge should allow a proposed amendment if it is necessary for a full determination on the merits and if it does not unduly prejudice the opposing party or unduly delay the trial.' Record Data International, Inc. v. Nichols, 381 So.2d 1, 5 (Ala.1979) (citations omitted). 'The grant or denial of leave to amend is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge․' Walker v. Traughber, 351 So.2d 917(Ala.Civ.App.1977)."
" 'Cochran v. State, 548 So.2d 1062, 1075 (Ala.Crim.App.1989).'
"802 So.2d at 1107-08 (emphasis added [in Ex parte Rhone ] ). The statements in Talley are consistent with this Court's prior decisions, as well as with Rule 32.7. Thus, it is clear that only grounds such as actual prejudice or undue delay will support a trial court's refusal to allow, or to consider, an amendment to a Rule 32 petition."
900 So.2d at 457-58. The Court then concluded that "[t]he right to amend is limited by the trial court's discretion to refuse an amendment based upon factors such as undue delay or undue prejudice to the opposing party. That limitation is ․ sufficient to protect the rights of the parties, while allowing the trial court sufficient control over the management of its docket." 900 So.2d at 459.
In Ex parte Jenkins, 972 So.2d 159 (Ala.2005), the Alabama Supreme Court further explained its holding in Ex parte Rhone:
"This Court recently examined the principles applicable to the amendment of Rule 32 petitions in Ex parte Rhone, 900 So.2d 455 (Ala.2004). In Rhone, the petitioner moved to amend his Rule 32 petition 16 days after the trial court had received the original petition. In denying the petition, the trial court addressed only the claims in the original petition. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial, holding that the trial court had not exceeded its discretion in failing to address the claims in the amendment to Rhone's petition because 'Rhone failed to meet his initial burden of showing diligence in filing the amendment or that the facts underlying the amendment were unknown to him before filing his original petition.' Rhone v. State, 900 So.2d 443, 448 (Ala.Crim.App.2004). This Court granted certiorari review to consider Rhone's contention that the Court of Criminal Appeals' decision conflicted with the well-established principle stated by this Court in Ex parte Allen, 825 So.2d 271, 273 (Ala.2002), that although '[l]eave to amend a Rule 32 petition is within the discretion of the trial court, ․ it should be freely granted.'
"In considering the nature of the factors that would provide a proper basis upon which a trial court could exercise the discretion to disallow an amendment to a Rule 32 petition, this Court stated in Ex parte Rhone that 'it is clear that only grounds such as actual prejudice or undue delay will support a trial court's refusal to allow, or to consider, an amendment to a Rule 32 petition.' 900 So.2d at 458. We concluded in Rhone that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in imposing upon a Rule 32 petitioner an 'initial burden' to show diligence in filing the amendment or that the facts underlying that amendment were unknown when the original petition was filed. We stated: 'Such a burden is clearly inconsistent with the mandate of this Court, as expressed in both its decisions and in Rule 32, that leave to amend should be freely granted.' 900 So.2d at 458-59.
"This Court also responded in Ex parte Rhone to the Court of Criminal Appeals' statement that the only alternative to its holding in Rhone v. State would be ' "to allow a petitioner the unfettered right to amend his Rule 32 petition." ' 900 So.2d at 459. We responded:
" 'That statement, however, is not correct. The right to amend is limited by the trial court's discretion to refuse an amendment based upon factors such as undue delay or undue prejudice to the opposing party. That limitation is, in this Court's opinion, sufficient to protect the rights of the parties, while allowing the trial court sufficient control over the management of its docket.'
"As we held in Ex parte Rhone, however, a petitioner does not have the unfettered right to file endless amendments to a Rule 32 petition. The right to amend is limited by the trial court's discretion to refuse to allow an amendment if the trial court finds that the petitioner has unduly delayed filing the amendment or that an amendment unduly prejudices the State. Such an exercise of the trial court's discretion would certainly be appropriate, for example, if, on the eve of an evidentiary hearing, a Rule 32 petitioner filed an amendment that included new claims of which the State had no prior notice and as to which it was not prepared to defend.
"We emphasize that the concepts of 'undue delay' and 'undue prejudice' as discussed in this opinion and in Ex parte Rhone apply to the trial court's management of its docket and to the petitioner's attention to his or her case. Those concepts cannot be applied to restrict the petitioner's right to file an amendment clearly provided for in Rule 32.7 simply because it states a new claim that was not included in the original petition."
972 So.2d at 163-64.
Subsequently, in Ex parte Woods, 957 So.2d 533 (Ala.2006), the Supreme Court applied its holding in Ex parte Rhone. In Ex parte Woods, the petitioner filed a Rule 32 petition in July 2002, and an amendment to the petition in November 2002. After a status conference in December 2002, the circuit court ordered both parties to submit proposed orders by the end of January 2003. However, instead of following the circuit court's request and submitting a proposed order, the petitioner submitted a second amended petition. The State objected, and the circuit court struck the second amended petition. Six months later, in July 2003, the circuit court summarily dismissed Woods's petition. This Court held that the circuit court had not erred in striking the second amended petition, Woods v. State, 957 So.2d 492 (Ala.Crim.App.2004), but the Alabama Supreme Court reversed our judgment, holding that "[t]he facts of this case do not establish that the circuit court's consideration of Woods's second amended petition would give rise to actual prejudice or cause undue delay." Ex parte Woods, 957 So.2d at 536-37.
This Court has also addressed and applied the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Rhone in Wilson v. State, 911 So.2d 40 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), and in Smith v. State, 961 So.2d 916 (Ala.Crim.App.2006). In Wilson, the petitioner filed his Rule 32 petition in December 2001, and an amendment in March 2002. Four days after the amendment was filed, the State filed a motion to dismiss the petition, attaching an affidavit from trial counsel. In July 2002, the petitioner filed a second amendment, responding to the State's motion to dismiss and trial counsel's affidavit. Four days later, the circuit court held a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss and took the issue under advisement. In August 2002, the petitioner filed three more amendments; the fourth and fifth amendments included further responses to trial counsel's affidavit. In October 2002, the circuit court issued an order summarily denying the petition without an evidentiary hearing and refusing to accept any of the petitioner's amendments. This Court held that the circuit court erred in refusing to accept the first, second, fourth, and fifth amendments.2 With respect to the first amendment, this Court noted that it had been filed before the State had even responded, as had been the case in Ex parte Rhone, and, thus, accepting the amendment would have caused no undue delay or undue prejudice. With respect to the remaining amendments, this Court held that the amendments were the only avenue for the petitioner to respond to trial counsel's affidavit, given that the circuit court had not held an evidentiary hearing, and that acceptance of the amendments, all filed within eight months of the original petition and two months before the circuit court's summary denial of the petition, would not have unduly delayed the proceedings.
In Smith, the petitioner filed his Rule 32 petition in June 2002, and the State responded. In September 2002, the petitioner filed his first amended petition, and attached an affidavit from Dr. Michael S. Maher in support of his allegation that his trial counsel were ineffective for not presenting evidence of his mental-health problems. The State again responded. The circuit court then set December 31, 2002, as the deadline for filing amendments. Over the next three years, the evidentiary hearing on the petition was continued several times, at both the State's and the petitioner's requests, and discovery was exchanged between the parties. On July 12, 2005, 13 days before the evidentiary hearing was scheduled to take place on July 25, 2005, the State filed an objection to some of the petitioner's witnesses, arguing that only one expert witness had been identified in the petition, Dr. Maher, and that during Dr. Maher's deposition, Dr. Maher had stated that the petitioner suffered from additional mental-health problems that Dr. Maher had not previously identified in his affidavit, which had been attached to the first amended petition. The State moved that no expert not specifically listed in the petition be allowed to testify at the evidentiary hearing and that Dr. Maher be allowed to testify only to that diagnosis that had been referred to in the affidavit. On July 18, 2005, only seven days before the evidentiary hearing, the petitioner filed a response to the State's objection, as well as a motion to amend his petition, and a second amended petition setting forth additional factual allegations to support his claim that his trial counsel were ineffective for not presenting evidence of his mental-health problems and naming the additional expert witnesses who had been disclosed during the discovery process. The circuit court granted the State's motion to limit Dr. Maher's testimony to that information contained in his affidavit and to preclude the additional expert witnesses from testifying and denied the motion to amend.
On appeal, this Court held that the circuit court erred in denying the petitioner's motion to amend:
"Based on the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Alabama Supreme Court caselaw quoted above, the circuit court erred when it set a deadline for amendments and stated that it would allow further amendments 'only upon showing of good cause with evidentiary basis.' Instead, the circuit court could have properly denied an amendment only upon a finding of undue delay or undue prejudice. When it struck the Second Amended Petition, the circuit court did not cite either of these reasons.
"In his Second Amended Petition, the appellant did not raise new claims of which the State did not have prior notice and as to which it was not or could not have been prepared to defend. In fact, he amended only one paragraph-paragraph 105-in his Second Amended Petition. In that paragraph, he fleshed out with more specificity his previous claim regarding his alleged mental health problems and the experts who would testify about such problems. The State argues that it did not have the specific information about which the experts intended to testify until shortly before the evidentiary hearing. However, the record shows that the State knew about the appellant's experts and their conclusions almost one year before the appellant filed his Second Amended Petition. Also, it had the opportunity to depose the experts and learn more specific information about their opinions almost one year before the appellant filed his Second Amended Petition, and it specifically chose not to do so. In fact, the State waited until July 8, 2005, and then deposed only Maher. Further, even before the appellant attempted to file a Second Amended Petition, as evidenced by its 'Memorandum Brief Concerning Issues to Be Considered by the Court at the Rule 32 Evidentiary Hearing,' the State was fully aware of his claims regarding his mental health condition․
" '․'
"․ Finally, the State retained its own mental health expert to evaluate the appellant and to rebut the appellant's evidence regarding his mental health. Therefore, consideration of the Second Amended Petition, which simply expanded on a claim that had been included in both the original petition and the First Amended Petition, would not have caused undue prejudice to the State.
"Also, consideration of the Second Amended Petition would not have adversely affected the circuit court's control over the management of its docket. The record does not indicate that the appellant neglected his case. Rather, it establishes that, despite several continuances, the parties continued to conduct and exchange discovery. The State argues that it would not have had time to respond to the Second Amended Petition before the evidentiary hearing and that another continuance might have been required. However, the only substantive changes were in paragraph 105 of his Second Amended Petition. As is set forth above, the State was already aware of the additional information that was included in the Second Amended Petition. Therefore, it could have easily filed a response to the Second Amended Petition, and there would not have been any reason for any further delay of the evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, consideration of the Second Amended Petition would not have caused undue delay."
Smith, 961 So.2d at 927-28.
Based on the cases cited above and the particular circumstances of this case, we have no choice but to conclude that the circuit court erred in denying Broadnax's motion for leave to file a second amended petition. Like the circuit court in Smith, the circuit court in this case did not cite undue prejudice or undue delay as reasons for denying Broadnax's motion for leave to amend. Nevertheless, the State argued to the circuit court, and continues to argue on appeal, that granting the motion to amend would have caused undue prejudice to the State and would have unduly delayed the proceedings.3 For the reasons stated below, we cannot agree with the State's arguments.
The State argues that allowing an amendment after a partial judgment had been entered summarily dismissing several of Broadnax's claims would have had the effect of vacating the circuit court's dismissal of those claims and beginning the proceedings "anew," resulting in "another round of time-consuming litigation." (State's brief at p. 78.) Thus, the State concludes, it "would have been forced to answer and defend claims that had previously been dismissed," which, it says, would have resulted in prejudice. (State's brief at p. 78.) In addition, the State argues, the Rule 32 proceedings had been continued several times at Broadnax's request and because, it argues, allowing an amendment would have effectively restarted the Rule 32 proceedings, the proceedings would have been unduly delayed even further and would have denied the State its "right to a timely disposition of Rule 32 proceedings." (State's brief at p. 79.)
Rule 32.7(b) provides that "[a]mendments to pleadings may be permitted at any stage of the proceedings prior to entry of judgment." (Emphasis added.) When a partial judgment is entered on a Rule 32 petition, as is often the case in a Rule 32 petition challenging a death sentence, those claims that had previously been disposed of by the circuit court cannot be amended; such an amendment would clearly be after entry of judgment and in violation of Rule 32.7(b). See, e.g., Hodges v. State, [Ms. CR-04-1226, March 23, 2007] --- So.2d ---- (Ala.Crim.App.2007). Thus, contrary to the State's contention, allowing an amendment after the entry of a partial judgment on a Rule 32 petition does not have the effect of vacating the previously entered judgment. In this case, Broadnax could not have amended any of the claims that had previously been dismissed by the circuit court, and allowing him to amend those claims that had not been dismissed or to add new claims would not have vacated the circuit court's previous orders dismissing several of his claims, nor would it have begun the proceedings "anew" as argued by the State. Thus, the State would not have been forced to respond to those claims that had previously been dismissed but would have been required to respond only to the new and/or expanded claims. Although having to respond to an amendment, in any circumstance, would certainly cause some marginal prejudice to the State, we cannot say that merely having to respond to an amendment, alone, constitutes undue prejudice to the State. If that were the case, then no amendment would be permitted, and Ex parte Rhone, Ex parte Woods, Wilson, and Smith all would have been decided differently.
In addition, although counsel Morrison indicated at the hearing on the motion to amend that she intended to raise a new claim in the amendment, a new claim does not automatically result in undue prejudice to the State. In Ex parte Jenkins, the Supreme Court specifically noted that a circuit court would be well within its discretion to refuse to accept an amendment asserting a new claim if that amendment was filed "on the eve of an evidentiary hearing," but the Court nevertheless pointed out that the concepts of undue prejudice and undue delay "cannot be applied to restrict the petitioner's right to file an amendment clearly provided for in Rule 32.7 simply because it states a new claim that was not included in the original petition." 972 So.2d at 164. Here, the motion to amend was filed 45 days before the scheduled evidentiary hearing; 45 days is not on the "eve" of the evidentiary hearing. Thus, we cannot say that requiring the State to respond to the new claim would have caused the State undue prejudice.
Likewise, we cannot say that allowing Broadnax to amend his petition would have unduly delayed the proceedings. As noted, Broadnax's motion for leave to amend was filed 45 days before the scheduled evidentiary hearing. Rule 32.7(a) provides that, unless otherwise authorized by the court, the State has 30 days to respond to a petition. Although Broadnax did not file an actual amendment with his motion and the hearing on the motion was not held until 38 days before the evidentiary hearing, we have no reason to believe that Broadnax could not have filed the amendment within time to allow the State 30 days before the evidentiary hearing to respond to the amendment. In other words, nothing in the record indicates that allowing the amendment would have further delayed the evidentiary hearing.
Moreover, although Broadnax's petition had, at the time he filed his motion to amend, been pending in the circuit court for almost two years, mostly as a result of continuances requested by Broadnax himself, Broadnax's original Rule 32 counsel, Golden, had withdrawn from the case and new counsel, Morrison, had been appointed only three months earlier, in January 2005. At the hearing on the motion to amend, Morrison indicated that the amendment was based on her investigation and interviews with Broadnax since her appointment and would include one new claim and an expansion of a claim that had been raised in the original petition. We do not agree with the State that "[i]t is irrelevant that Broadnax's original Rule 32 counsel withdrew from the case and new counsel was appointed." (State's brief at p. 79.) We agree that Broadnax was represented by able counsel throughout the Rule 32 proceedings. However, Morrison was not appointed to represent Broadnax until January 2005, only four months before the evidentiary hearing, and nothing in the record indicates that the substitution of counsel was an intentional delay tactic. Broadnax did not fire his counsel; counsel moved to withdraw, and this was the only substitution of counsel throughout the proceedings. In his motion to withdraw, Golden stated that he was experiencing severe financial hardship and that he would be unable to continue representing Broadnax, a situation not unusual in the representation of indigent death-row inmates. We note that it was also Golden's financial hardship that prompted his request for a second continuance, which was unopposed by the State, and which led to the evidentiary hearing being continued from August 25, 2004, to January 21, 2005. It appears from the record that Golden discussed the situation with both the State and the circuit court before withdrawing and that he was involved in finding Morrison upon his withdrawal. Thus, we cannot say that the substitution of counsel was in any way a delay tactic.
Furthermore, we cannot say that Morrison's two requests for continuances after her appointment or her three-month delay in filing the motion for leave to amend were in any way unreasonable. Morrison clearly needed time to familiarize herself with the case and to investigate after her appointment in January 2005, and three months is not an unreasonable amount of time to prepare in a capital case. Indeed, it took the State three months to respond to Broadnax's petition. Although there was an almost-two-year delay between the filing of Broadnax's original petition and counsel Morrison's motion to file a second amended petition, under the circumstances in this case, we cannot say this was the result of negligence or intentional delay.
It is important to note that this is not a case where the petitioner had already filed multiple amendments and was attempting to file yet another amendment. Although Broadnax had filed one previous amendment, the petitioners in Ex parte Woods and Smith had likewise filed previous amendments. In addition, as noted above, this is not a case where the amendment was filed on the eve of the evidentiary hearing-it was filed 45 days before the hearing-nor is this a case where the amendment contained a multitude of new claims of which the State was never given notice-counsel here indicated that only one new claim would be raised in the amendment. Finally, as noted above, this is not a case where the petitioner fired his counsel shortly before the evidentiary hearing and the substitution of counsel was an obvious and intentional delay tactic. Rather, the substitution of counsel was at the request of counsel himself as the result of financial hardship.
Based on the circumstances in this case and the caselaw cited herein, we hold that the circuit court erred in denying Broadnax's motion for leave to amend his petition, and we must reverse the circuit court's judgment on that ground. In doing so, we also note that the circuit court erred in denying some of Broadnax's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel on the ground that this Court's finding of no plain error on direct appeal regarding the underlying substantive issue precluded a finding of prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In Ex parte Taylor, [Ms. 1040186, September 30, 2005] ---So.2d ----, ---- (Ala.2005), the Alabama Supreme Court held that "[a]lthough it may be the rare case in which the application of the plain-error test and the prejudice prong of the Strickland test will result in different outcomes, a determination on direct appeal that there has been no plain error does not automatically foreclose a determination of the existence of the prejudice required under Strickland to sustain a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel." We recognize that the circuit court's order in this case was issued before the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Taylor was released; thus, we cannot fault the circuit court for applying a standard this Court had followed for many years. See, e.g., Hunt v. State, 940 So.2d 1041 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), and the cases cited therein. However, on remand, we instruct the circuit court to reconsider those allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel in light of the Supreme Court's opinion in Ex parte Taylor.
Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed and this cause remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
I reluctantly concur with the main opinion's reversal of the circuit court's denial of Broadnax's Rule 32, Ala.R.Crim.P., petition, challenging his convictions for capital murder and his sentence of death, based on the holding of the Alabama Supreme Court in Ex parte Rhone, 900 So.2d 455 (Ala.2004), and subsequent decisions applying that holding. However, I write to urge the Supreme Court to revisit its holding in Ex parte Rhone, and, further, to amend Rule 32.7 so as to give some finality to a Rule 32 petitioner's pleadings.
This Court is bound by decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court, see § 12-3-16, Ala.Code 1975, and "is without authority to overrule the decisions of [that] court." Jones v. City of Huntsville, 288 Ala. 242, 244, 259 So.2d 288, 290 (1972). Thus, we have no choice; we must reverse the circuit court's order denying Broadnax's Rule 32 petition and remand this case for that court to allow Broadnax to amend his Rule 32 petition yet again to add new allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and for the court to enter a new order addressing those allegations.
In my opinion, the Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Rhone has expanded the scope of Rule 32.7(b) far beyond the plain language of that rule. Rule 32.7(b) provides: "Amendments to pleadings may be permitted at any stage of the proceedings prior to the entry of judgment." (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the plain language of Rule 32.7(b) creates no absolute right to amend a petition, only a conditional right, left to the sound discretion of the circuit court.
I believe that allowing a petitioner the unfettered right to amend his Rule 32 petition-without first requiring any showing of diligence or a showing that the underlying facts were unknown to the petitioner before the Rule 32 petition was filed-opens a Pandora's box. Such a decision will, in my opinion, lead to a flood of frivolous amendments to Rule 32 petitions, the consequence of which will be unnecessary delays in the resolution of meritorious claims, as well as the creation of yet more problems for an already overburdened and understaffed judicial system. There must be a point at which the claims presented to a court are sufficiently settled so as to allow a court to render a decision with some degree of finality.4 Although I acknowledge newly appointed counsel's right to investigate the previously filed claims and the right to amend in the event counsel finds an additional ground for relief, counsel failed even to advise the court of the proposed additional grounds at the time she filed the motion to amend. Nor did she file a copy of the amended Rule 32 petition with her motion. Although counsel did specify her claims during the hearing on her motion to amend, the hearing did not occur until 38 days before the scheduled evidentiary hearing, barely enough time to allow the State the requisite 30 days to file its response to the amendment, much less to fully prepare to address these new claims at an evidentiary hearing. The end result of allowing an eleventh-hour amendment would be yet another continuance and further delay in litigating the petitioner's claims.
Nevertheless, based on Ex parte Rhone, the circuit court erred in denying of Broadnax's request to amend his Rule 32 petition, thus mandating reversal of the circuit court's judgment. Because I believe that Ex parte Rhone unnecessarily expands the scope of Rule 32.7(b), I would urge the Supreme Court to revisit that decision at its earliest convenience. I further urge the Supreme Court to consider amending Rule 32.7(b) to establish specific guidelines and time periods governing amendments to Rule 32 petitions.
1. We note that on July 15, 2005, 31 days after the circuit court denied his petition, Broadnax filed a motion to reconsider the circuit court's denial. On July 26, 2005, the circuit court initially set the motion for a hearing on August 8, 2005. That same day, Broadnax filed his notice of appeal. On August 1, 2005, the State filed an objection to the circuit court's setting the motion to reconsider for a hearing. On August 5, 2005, the circuit court denied Broadnax's motion to reconsider without a hearing, and it denied the State's objection to the circuit court's setting the motion for a hearing, apparently on the ground that it was moot. In Rule 32 proceedings, a circuit court retains jurisdiction for only 30 days after its judgment is entered. See Loggins v. State, 910 So.2d 146 (Ala.Crim.App.2005). Therefore, Broadnax's motion to reconsider was untimely and all subsequent orders by the circuit court directed to the motion are void for lack of jurisdiction.
2. This Court held that any error in refusing to accept the third amendment was harmless because the petitioner was due no relief on the claim raised in that amendment.
3. The State's brief in this case was filed before the decisions in Ex parte Woods and Smith were issued, and we cannot know what the State's position would be in this case in light of those opinions. However, we note that the State conceded error in Ex parte Woods, a case we believe presented a much closer question than is presented here.
4. For this reason, Rule 32.7(b) should be amended to set out the circumstances under which a Rule 32 petition may be amended, as well as to establish a specific time period beyond which an amendment to a Rule 32 petition will not be entertained. Such an amendment to Rule 32 would clarify the Supreme Court's intent and be instructive to all parties involved in Rule 32 proceedings.
SHAW, Judge.
BASCHAB, P.J., and McMILLAN and WELCH, JJ., concur. WISE, J., concurs specially.


This is Cader's first year in school here. He is our youngest student this year. His father, Mr. Abalo, is also blind and attended the Village of Light when he was young. Cader's mother left their family when Cader was very young. Please pray for her salvation and reconciliation. His father is very loving and attentive, but struggles to take care of them both. They are very poor.
Pray that Cader continues to learn French. It is difficult for him to communicate with others because he speaks a different tribal language than most of the other students (Kabiye). However, he has been learning French very well for how young he is.
It has been a joy to see the transformation of Cader since he started out here. Cader was withdrawn, shy, and very sad when he first came. It was difficult for him to adjust to life away from his father. It was not uncommon to find little Cader crying. However, now it is hard to find Cader without a smile on his face. He loves to sing. You can usually hear his voice over all the other voices during chapel. He loves school, his friends, and to play games.
Pray that Cader understands and accepts the Gospel as soon as possible.


"In the year of 2230, Mining and Research vessel Tartarus (MRS TARTARUS 220478) activates the security protocol near Neptune without any sign. The only chance for crew to survive is to reach the Bridge and restart all systems one by one before the ship crashes into Neptune. We are playing as Cooper(miner of the ship) who has no education or training about electronics or pilotage; to overcome this, vessels engineer - Andrews- is helping us as much as he can. Though it's not as easy as it sounds..."