text:
The Fractious Path

Pakistan's Democratic Transition

RAZA RUMI

HarperCollins _Publishers_ India
Dedicated to
Sabeen Mahmud
Contents

_Preface_

IDEMOCRATIC TRANSITION

_Introduction_

1. Pakistan's Ruling Coalition Must Not Splinter

2. Suicide Democrats

3. To Undo the Vicious Past

4. Should We Bid Farewell to Democracy in Pakistan?

5. How Instability Is Garnered

6. Democratic Governance Is the Only Option

7. Pakistan's Democracy Remains Fragile

8. Consensus Is Vital for Democracy

9. Governance Crises Cannot be Tackled by Old Formula of Changing Faces

10. Will the Court Punish Officials Who Violated their Oath?

11. Time for Complete Justice

12. Challenges of Political Transition

13. A Risky Transition?

II SECURITY, CONFLICT & EXTREMISM

_Introduction_

1. On Benazir's Death

2. Suicide Bombing – The Narratives of Terror

3. Confronting Militancy

4. What Is the Threat? What Is the Way Out?

5. Salmaan Taseer's Assassination and State Failures

6. Address Radicalization Before It's Too Late

7. Karachi Continues to Bleed

8. Myth and Reality of Extremism

9. The Killing of Shias Is a Rude Wake-up Call for the State and Society

10. Fighting the Existential Battle

11. Polio, Extremism and a Failing State

12. Reassessing Pakistan's Security Paradigm

13. Different Strands of Violence

14. Balochistan – Pushed to the Wall

15. It's Time to Engage with Baloch Nationalists

III GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS & REFORM

_Introduction_

1. Civil Service Reform for Improving State Capacity

2. Poverty and Inequality – The Brewing Storm

3. Pakistani Reform – The Task Ahead

4. Pakistan's Crumbling Institutions

5. Innovations for Public Accountability

6. A Reform Agenda to Address Challenges

7. 18th Amendment – More Questions than Answers

8. Devolution – Unpacking the Higher Education Commission Debate

9. Devolution of Powers – The Challenges Ahead

10. Towards a Decentralized Pakistan

11. The Debate on New Provinces in Pakistan

12. Tackling the Local Governance Crisis

13. Civil Service Is No Longer an AlluringJob for the Youth

14. Dealing with the Devastating Floods

IV FOREIGN POLICY

_Introduction_

1. Policy Shifts Not War

2. Who Will Win the Game?

3. 1971 – The Forgotten Silence

4. Say No to War

5. Irrational Discourse on Raymond Davis

6. Saving a Rocky Relationship

7 Pakistan – Fixing the Civil-Military Imbalance

8. No More Escape Routes

9. Time to Move On

V MEDIA

_Introduction_

1. Pakistan's Media Opinion – The Column Industry

2. Beyond Censorship

3. Media Should Not Turn into a Holy Cow

4. Media Freedoms and Judicial Accountability

5. Through the Looking Glass

6. Responsibility Must Anchor Freedom

_Epilogue_

_Notes_

_Acknowledgements_

_About the Book_

_About the Author_

_Copyright_
Preface

This book is a collection of commentaries that appeared in the Pakistani weekly _The News on Sunday_ during the years 2008-2013. I had been writing in the media since 2005, but it was only in late 2008 that I turned to journalism full-time. During this time, I was Features and News Editor at the weekly _The Friday Times_ , and a columnist for _The News_ and _Express Tribune_ among others. In 2013, I started to host a television current affairs show as well. Sadly, that came to an end in April 2014 when I left the country after escaping an assassination attempt that killed my colleague.

I am aware that there are multiple challenges to publishing an anthology of news commentaries. First, they have lost their immediate relevance. Second, unlike an integrated narrative, the reader's attention is called to focus on disparate topics. Yet, in the case of Pakistan's most recent transition to a democracy, I saw true value in collecting an on-the-ground report of the times, both for immediacy and accuracy. Contrary to the global perceptions of Pakistan being a 'failed', 'failing', 'martial', 'warrior' or 'terrorist' state, these commentaries testify to the diversity and intense struggle of its politicians and civil society to re-orient the country's present and its future.

Since its inception, Pakistan has oscillated between authoritarian and democratic spells. The civil-military bureaucracy has directly governed the country for more than three decades and the brief periods of democratic rule were turbulent, with civilians enjoying limited powers, given the overarching powers of the unelected institutions.

The years 2008-2013 were a departure from the earlier trends. While the control of the military over key policy areas was intact, Pakistan did inch forward towards a democratic culture, with unprecedented media freedoms, an assertive judiciary and a reformist parliament. The country's geographical location and the war on terror in its neighbourhood impeded the path towards political stability as the quest for 'security' remained the prime concern of the state.

Prior to the democratic transition of 2008, Pakistan underwent a series of traumatic events. In March 2007, General Musharraf fired the chief justice that triggered a lawyers' movement, soon joined by the civil society and the media. The supreme court restored the top judge and a new phase of confrontation between the executive and the judiciary started which led to the second martial law or emergency by the General in November 2007. Musharraf had reached an understanding with Benazir Bhutto, the leader of Pakistan People's Party, who ended her decade-long exile and returned to Pakistan in October of the same year. Most significantly, Musharraf was engaged in backchannel negotiations with India towards a realistic settlement on the Kashmir issue. The domestic instability in Pakistan weakened Musharraf; it is said that his Chief of Intelligence General Kayani was not averse to Musharraf's ouster.

In a tragic development Benazir Bhutto was killed in December 2007, ostensibly by Islamic extremists. The elections were postponed for a month and were held in February 2008 in a climate of uncertainty and national mourning.

The elections resulted in the victory of Pakistan People's Party and it formed a coalition government with other political parties. Initially, Nawaz Sharif's party was also a part of the coalition, but that was a short-lived alliance. The allies split over the issue of restoring the chief justice who had been suspended for the second time by Musharraf.

For the next five years, the civilian forces in the parliament and the presidency under Asif Ali Zardari, widower of Bhutto, struggled with the military-dominated state to assert their power. The net result of this continuous power struggle was an increased civilian space in Pakistan. It increased provincial autonomy, thereby addressing the historically problematic issue of federalism.

Pakistan's love–hate relationship with the United States worsened during this period. The year 2011 was perhaps the worst in a decade-old partnership between the two countries. India-Pakistan relations hit a new low with Pakistan-based jihadists attacking Mumbai in November 2011, and it took a few years for the two states to resume diplomatic engagement.

Yet, within Pakistan, an emerging middle-class voice was beginning to express its discontent. This was best articulated through the powerful electronic media and the rise of cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan's party. By 2013, Khan had begun to challenge the established players and his party made considerable gains in 2013.

The issue of Pakistan's identity remains unresolved. Over the decades, it has turned into a hybrid theocracy. This is not a simple outcome of the country's creation in the name of religion, but a conscious choice of its mostly secular rulers to exploit religion for both nation building and power maximization. With the opening of some democratic space, there were intense debates about the direction Pakistan should take. Some of these public battles resulted in violence – the most notable case was Punjab Governor, Salmaan Taseer, being gunned down for his call to amend the blasphemy law. Similarly, a Christian minister, Shahbaz Bhatti, was also killed by the Taliban for the same reason. These incidents only further served to highlight the fact that leaders like Taseer and Bhatti represent the views of a sizeable number of people, many of them devout Muslims, who resent intolerance and religious violence.

This period also saw the rise of the Pakistani Taliban and sectarian militias that target minority sects such as Shias, Ahmadis and non-Muslims. The military cleared out several areas that fell to the Taliban, but it was not ready until 2014 for an all-out operation against the militants' havens in the country. In part, this was due to the historical relationship between the security establishment and the jihad groups for strategic space in Afghanistan and keeping 'Indian hegemony' under check. But the price of these policies was paid by more than 50,000 Pakistanis who were killed across the country. The fragmentation of militias and some of them turning rogue resulted in increased attacks on the Pakistani state itself. The military suffered losses as the militias attacked soldiers and installations across the country. Since 2014, Pakistan has been struggling to change its course vis-à-vis the militias as the cost of its policy of inaction proved to be too high.

Despite their failures and charges of corruption, the major parties collaborated on key governance reforms, avoided playing the game of the military – unlike the decade of the 1990s – and vowed to let the 'system' function according to constitutional parameters. This increased assertion of civilian authority was one of the reasons why the 2013 elections were held on time and the government completed its full term. Consequently, a peaceful transfer of power from one democratic government to another took place. This, by itself, is no mean achievement in the history of Pakistan.

I hope that students of Pakistan and South Asia, and lay readers will find this collection useful. Any mistakes and errors of analysis are solely mine.

I

* * *

DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
Introduction

Pakistan's political trajectory is a tale of instability and repeated interruptions of its weak democratic process. Its powerful military directly ruled for over three decades, with brief periods of feeble civilian government rule. The year 2008 was a watershed: the military transferred power to an elected government after nearly a decade-long military rule.

Prior to the National Assembly elections scheduled for 2008, former Prime Ministers Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto returned to Pakistan from exile. In December 2007, during the election campaign, Bhutto was assassinated near the military headquarters in Rawalpindi, a city adjacent to the federal capital, Islamabad. The assassination spurred discontentment in the province of Sindh against the military and Pakistani nationalism. In these circumstances, the elections of February 2008, in large measure, served to quell the growing unease. Pakistan People's Party emerged as the largest party in the legislature and formed a coalition government first with Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. President Pervez Musharraf, facing prospects of impeachment, resigned from office in August 2008. This restored the civilian dispensation in Pakistan, although the military continued to exert influence over the foreign and the security policies of the country.

Since the return of parliamentary democracy, Pakistan has witnessed the expansion of civilian space and increased efforts by the Parliament to restore governance structures. But the efforts towards consolidating democratic gains were hampered by chronic instability and political crises fuelled by an activist judiciary, an assertive media and a reactive military. These three unelected, non-representative institutions kept the civilian political leadership under tight scrutiny. Squabbling between the various political parties also led to indirect military intervention to restore stability in the system. This was evident from the 'Kayani moment', where the army chief stopped opposition leader Nawaz Sharif's Long March as it was headed to Islamabad, asking for the restoration of the judiciary's relevance and power. The judiciary, under the leadership of Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, went into overdrive. It nullified laws, intervened in the day-to-day affairs of the executive branch, threatened to quash a constitutional amendment passed by the parliament through a rare consensus, and disqualified a prime minister for following the constitution and refusing to write a letter indicting the sitting president of the republic.

The military, which faced severe criticism during 2007-2008, also began to reassert itself from 2009. Military high command and civilian leadership were at loggerheads on numerous occasions. Starting from the government's attempt to exercise operational and financial control over the military's intelligence service, Inter-Services Intelligence or ISI, this battle culminated in the 'Memogate' scandal. In 2009, the military pressured the government for not objecting to what the military called 'intrusive' terms of the 'Kerry-Lugar bill', which promised a United States annual aid of $1.5 billion to the civilian government. Next, in 2010, the military again undercut the government by expressing 'concerns' over the alleged corruption of the political leadership.

The following year, 2011, saw the military facing severe public and internal backlash for recurring crises including a deteriorating relationship with the US, including the Raymond Davis fiasco (where a contractor with the Central Intelligence Agency, who was attached to the Lahore Consulate, killed three men). Tensions with the US escalated with the US forces conducting a unilateral raid into Pakistani territory and killing Osama bin Laden; this was followed by a top USA military officer declaring the Haqqani network a 'veritable arm of the ISI', and close on its heels, the 'Salala attack'. The civilian government, instead of capitalizing on these opportunities, defended the military and faced flak for it. In return, the military leadership collaborated with a 'suspicious' businessman, Mansoor Ejaz, and a hyperactive media, and accused the government of treason. A 'memo', ostensibly by Pakistan's ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, to Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USA, was presented as evidence. The opposition led by Nawaz Sharif filed a writ in the supreme court for a judicial investigation into the case. Army Chief General Kayani, and ISI head Lt General Shuja Pasha, submitted statements against the civilian leadership for their involvement in the memo scandal that hit the national sovereignty and armed forces of the country.

These developments severely undermined the country's fragile democracy once again, and talk of a Bangladeshi model, limited military intervention and a coup d'état re-entered the national conversation.
1.

Pakistan's Ruling Coalition Must Not Splinter

There has been much ado about the fact that now the ruling coalition could split in response to the great betrayals perpetrated by Asif Ali Zardari. In classic machismo-laden bravado, the honorific narratives have been urging Nawaz Sharif and his party to take the bold step and stick to their 'principled' stand. What is interesting about these exhortations is the brazen rendering of political discourse in black-and-white terms.

Many a former ambassador, the recent cohort to jump into the fray of political activism, has found a great post-retirement vocation. Once the plush tenures are over and all that could be extracted from the holy state cow has been extracted, now is the time to speak the truth and condemn military dictatorships. Convenient and most opportune! This low-risk strategy is paying its dividends: a great whitewashing of all that they were a party to, and all that they let happen in front of their red-taped offices. The ex-servicemen whose record is even more dismal are more vociferous in their advocacy for a democratic Pakistan.

Therefore, the confused citizens with a shred of historical sense are simply bewildered. General Chishti, the key player in toppling Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's government and the unleashing of eleven years of medieval darkness, is heard talking about resistance to army rule. Ironically, the realization took three decades of inflicting lasting damage and creating fissures within the body politic. Another retired Army Chief, General Beg, is also at the forefront. His vitriol, which cannot camouflage the years when he actively sabotaged the democratic process, admitted before the supreme court that he had 'advised' a bench not to restore Junejo's government and disbursed astronomical sums of money raised through another shady character heading a dubious financial institution to undermine the civilian government of the time.

And let us not forget Air Marshal Asghar Khan, who urged General Zia to hang Bhutto at Kohala Bridge and that army intervention was legitimate in national interest. His well-meaning son, the bright Omar Asghar Khan (may his soul rest in peace), joined Musharraf and heralded the dawn of a new era with the last army takeover. Inconvenient: mea culpa?

Since Pakistan's inception, the politicians, not the best for sure, were portrayed as the evil characters. The first decade of democracy 1947-58 witnessed seven prime ministers with an overarching establishment fiddling and rocking the boat each time. So politicos earned a bad name and were ousted in 1958 for nearly twelve years. We know well what happened during 1972-77 that eventually ended in the 1977 coup, led from the front by General Chishti, who depicted Bhutto as the worst thing to have happened to Pakistan. In the process, half the country was lost and its institutions sabotaged even before they could take root.

The most recent decade of democratic rule between 1988-99 was yet again marked by similar games of power, betrayal and military interference culminating in martial rule that is still refusing to go away. Among others, the key lesson of this decade was the willingness of the political elites to play the game, the rules for which were set by other power centres. They were hostage to their own limitations and the instruments of the state represented by opportunities for corruption as well as witch-hunting organizations that ostensibly oversaw accountability of the political elites.

Prior to the mobilization of the middle classes and the new components of an expanded bourgeoisie, something unique had taken place through the Charter of Democracy. This document was a Herculean achievement by the major political players, if we were to exclude the Tonga parties; a document that is still alive and from which no party has backed out.

This is momentous, a coalition, that too of former adversaries, will not be an easy process to manage. It will stumble, falter and swirl; and it should. Political maturity is neither gained through pompous declarations nor pious accords. It is the experience of governance and the ability for conflict-resolution and problem-solving that makes coalitions work. The Indian case is the closest to our context. In the last two decades, the Indian political class has learnt the art of managing coalitions and even now this is far from a smooth ride.

The current hysteria against the villainous nature of Zardari and his real and imagined misdeeds is nothing but a desperate call for the old order – of the 1950s, 1970s and 1990s – to return in full force. Like the polarized polity of Bangladesh, where the army had to intervene in January 2007 to 'save' the country from chaos.

The old order has beneficiaries: political underlings who can switch and become pegs in the power game; retired bureaucrats who can pledge loyalty for favours; journalists who can broker power and profit from it, and so on. This time it is difficult: whom to demolish as a 'security-risk' and whom to term as a born-again Jinnah? And, above all, a vigilante media and a highly-charged civil society led by lawyers cannot be appeased or tricked into these little games.

One can detect some measure of frustration, almost a panic, as to why Nawaz Sharif has not condemned Zardari and called him a 'chor'. And why has Zardari not lashed out against the Sharifs for their inflexibility on the judges' issue? It is a separate matter that the way a 100-day reign of this government has been judged is not even remotely akin to assessments of Musharraf's eight years.

Yes, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz has signed off on the increase in the total number of judges to twenty-nine. Yes, it is reluctantly ready to accept judges that were appointed under Musharraf's Provisional Constitutional Order. This is pragmatism of governance as opposed to the fiery materials for political rhetoric and high posturing. We simply cannot allow the ruling parties to part ways and demonstrate to a future authoritarian figure that politicians are incapable of governance because they 'fight amongst each other'.

Political sagacity and vision require that lumberdar-behaviour, Mullahist puritanism and sloganeering must give way to a calibrated means of dispute resolution. In case the constitutional package is the only way out for the Pakistan People's Party, then coalition partners and advocacy groups must focus on that. I have yet to read a single informed critique of the package that is inherently transformational and holds the potential to undo the misgovernance of the past. Instead, the voices that want the coalition to break away reject the package with the one-liner that it is meant to side-track the judges' issue. Was this impasse and tribal behaviour worth eight years of democratic struggle, the death of Benazir Bhutto and sacrifices of people who died in the lawyers' movement? The answer, plainly, is in the negative.

Mian Nawaz Sharif is a changed man. His steadfast commitment to the renewal of the truncated democratic process has been exemplary. Zardari has already tasted the bitter pills of politics, jail, media trials and miscarriage of justice. Who would know better than them that their split will only benefit their tormentors? And if they don't know that, then God save us all.

The coalition must not splinter. In fact, the challenges require shared governance and collective experience for many years to come. Those advocating Sharif's exit are serving no one's cause. The coalition has to stay. Let us not revive the beleaguered forces that are currently on the retreat.

_July 2008_
2.

Suicide Democrats

I am appalled by the recent events that have yet again stirred instability and uncertainty into Pakistani politics. Those of us who voted in last year's elections expected that the political leaders and Pakistan's political elites would learn a lesson from our unfortunate history.

We also expected the lawyers' movement, headed by men of extraordinary calibre, to display sagacity and vision and contribute to the consolidation of a democratic culture. However, what we witnessed was a complete rejection of the 18 February 2008 polls by the leading lights of the movement, and a few other naïve political actors. When the electorate voted in large numbers and returned the two mainstream political parties to the parliament, the lawyers, instead of accepting that they were wrong to boycott elections, insisted on their narrow and bourgeois interpretation of the term 'rule of law'.

Sadly, law, rights and constitutionalism are personalized through the idolization of the deposed chief justice, as if Pakistan were still a medieval kingdom where the bad King (Musharraf) had to be overthrown, and the good Qazi (Justice Iftikhar) had to be 'restored' and vested with all moral, political, executive, military and judicial powers.

The right-wing media has further whipped this game up and brought the popular and well-meaning Sharif in direct confrontation with the federal government on this single issue. President Zardari, who we all hoped had learnt his lessons from endless court trials, jail and exile, would act with vision and leadership, disappointed all. Similarly, the supreme court led by Justice Dogar might have gone an extra mile to prove its neutrality. Alas, how wrong we were!

It is amazing that the long marches, threats of violence and agitation, and questionable imposition of the governor's rule in the largest province of the country are taking place at a time when the Taliban are capturing one district after another. The media and civil society, instead of bringing down the creaky edifice of democracy, should be pressurizing political leaders to act with maturity and not wrangle among themselves.

Given the hysteria of the last few days, since the disqualification of the Sharif brothers, the media is portraying the situation as one with no solution. Enemies of democracy, the traditional forces that have always sabotaged civilian rule, are smiling at this imbroglio. There is no paucity of solutions: there are legal and constitutional means whereby the legislature can amend the constitution on the eligibility of politicians to contest elections and hold offices. A review petition can always be filed that could look at the questions of law pertaining to this matter. Similarly, the promulgation of another National Reconciliation Ordinance is not beyond the realms of possibility. Politics is about bargains and adjustments to strengthen the representative system, rather than bringing it down at every inconvenient juncture.

The Pakistan People's Party must take the initiative to avoid further fissures in the tenuous federation called Pakistan. The current posturing and gung-ho behaviour of the Pakistan People's Party's Punjab leaders need to be arrested by the central leadership. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and, in particular, its Quaid, Mian Nawaz Sharif, should also rise above the rhetoric of the nineties and display flexibility that is essential to a functional democracy. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz has little support in the three smaller provinces of Pakistan and its current rhetoric and thundering against President Zardari, who represents the smaller federating units, is not a good omen. A group of political activists torched the memorial of Benazir Bhutto in Rawalpindi, and there have been strong reactions to this across the country, especially in Sindh. Why blame the bomb blasts at funerals and mosques when such is the prevalent culture of protest?

If the deposed chief justice has to be restored, the matter must be brought before the parliament and solved through constitutional means. One cannot play the politics of constitutionalism and find solutions through executive orders. If Mr Sharif will lead an agitation with the lawyers who are now placed on the other side of the democratic divide, he will not only engineer the fall of the central government and the Pakistan People's Party, but will also sign the deed of death for the future of democratic politics in Pakistan.

Over fifty deposed judges have taken fresh oaths under the policy of the sitting government. When the incumbent judiciary is trampled and defamed, the detractors forget that it includes all those judges who resisted Musharraf's Emergency. Once an individual is restored to the top slot, will it become legitimate overnight or will the incumbent judges be fired for being part of the 'naqli' judiciary?

The civic activism since 2007 is a harbinger of change in Pakistan. The lawyers' movement is de-legitimizing democracy and political parties (including the largest and perhaps the only national party). One may ask whose purpose is being served here. Is it not similar to what the leaders of the Taliban and other extremist groups maintain about democracy by calling it 'kufr'?

The establishment and its proxies must not win this game. At present, it looks like both the mainstream political parties and their obstinate leaders are bound to create a situation similar to 1958, 1977 and 1999. However, this time the cost of unrest and confrontation will be detrimental to our future. The vicious cycle, emanating from our inability to handle political squabbles, will this time give way to erosion of democratic space won today with sacrifices, toils and struggles.

_March 2009_
3.

To Undo the Vicious Past

That Pakistan's endemic political instability is caused by its inherent power imbalances is well-known. The continued spells of authoritarian rule have also retarded the growth of political parties and other necessary institutions essential for democratic governance. We are a country trapped in our history and our self-fulfilling conspiracies and intrigues that are also rooted in the various phases of the colonial era. Our geo-political situation, celebrated by a rentier state, has not helped us either. From the fifties we have been in close partnership with global powers that are viewed as the ultimate saviours of a dysfunctional polity.

In 1971, we lost half the country. While the seeds of discord in East Pakistan had been sown by West Pakistan's ruling elites, our vengeful neighbour took full advantage and supported the Bangladeshi liberation movement. By all accounts, this was a tragedy that could have been avoided had the national security-obsessed state, dominated by West Pakistani vested interests, seen the writing on the wall and fixed the issues of federalism that still haunt us.

The current mess in Pakistan is no different from the historic cycles of instability. It is true that the growth of a middle class, relatively independent judiciary and a media that is trying to unshackle itself are clear and positive trends. However, the way Pakistan is governed, with its resources distributed and its state priorities rolled out in the name of nationalism, remains the same. This is the disconnect that has now been exacerbated to the extent that, once again, an existentialist dilemma has become common parlance.

This is not to suggest that anyone, God forbid, is working to disintegrate Pakistan. Nor do the regional and international players want such a catastrophic outcome. However, the long-standing issues confronting Pakistani state and society have become untenable and if not addressed will explode bringing us all down. Some say the process has already begun.

The first looming question is whether we will work towards civilian supremacy or not. It appears that while there is loud rhetoric about democratic process, elections and Constitutionalism, the major elements of the state are not geared to exercise power in an accountable manner. If on one hand, the political parties are dynastic entities supported by clans, tribes and feudal configurations, the unelected organs of the state are no less driven by similar imperatives. It may be easy to say that politicians are corrupt and atrocious managers of the state, but this view is located in a selective reading of Pakistan's history where politicians have been at the receiving end of the security establishment. Take, for instance, the past decade where failed devolution reform has been accepted as a fait accompli without ascertaining that it was the military in charge of the country, and oversaw the reversal of reforms and general instability in the country due to the set of policies it pursued.

First, the economic mismanagement and the resultant economic meltdown inherited by the present government was in large measure a result of Musharraf's economic managers who are all now absolved of their role and not even questioned by those who are, all of a sudden, hungry for accountability. The reason is simple: no one can take on the uniformed strongmen, whether in or out of power. This is a clear lesson. General Yahya Khan and his cohorts split the country into two parts, but they were never summoned to courts or even tried. Even the Hamood-ur-Rehman Commission report was not made public until decades later.

Second, the thorny issues related to imbalanced federalism have turned into sources of continued instability. From 1947-1971, the populous wing – East Pakistan, now Bangladesh – was never given the democratic rights of a majority province. In fact, there was a constant effort to make it equal to the smaller West Pakistan either through the problematic construct of 'parity' or through the creation of a One Unit. The distribution of resources, wars with India and policy-setting almost always remained the domain of unelected institutions who were dominated or, shall we say, controlled by the West Pakistani elites. The results are all too well-known. We lost our majority province.

Today Balochistan is wrapped in an insurgency. Pakistani flags have been burnt in many schools and the singing of the national anthem has been abandoned. Key Baloch tribal leaders, who are a part of the problem, are all set to reject the federation. The Balochistan package, rightly called the first step, aims to address this problem. But what has been the response to the package? The media gurus want to sell news that reject the package because it was initiated by a government that is not acceptable to its traditional detractors.

North Western Frontier Province and Federally Administered Territories Administration are in the grip of a war that we got involved in due to the circumstances, geography and the ill-fated policies of our security establishment to nurture strategic assets and find imaginary depths in Afghanistan. Add to this the concerted campaign to dislodge the co-chairperson of the ruling party whose Sindhi leadership has been brutally killed twice over. There is a perception in Sindh that its prime ministers, and now the president, are always unfairly treated. Thus, the Sindh card raises its head. This card has been trashed by many a commentator by using the testimonies of Sindhi politicians with no mass support or representatives of Sindhi nationalist groups who are equally weak in their public support. If and when the incumbent is thrown out or resigns, the political dynamics will change. It was only two years ago when a Sindhi and federal leader were shot dead in broad daylight in the heartland of the Punjab.

The third threat to contemporary Pakistan relates to the rise of Islamism and its impact on the society, foreign policy and political process. The non-state actors, it appears, have grown bigger and mightier over the past decades. Such is their nuisance value. The danger is that these are not groups that are clustered or regional anymore. These groups are found across the country with astounding weaponry and ammunition. From the sleepy towns of southern Punjab to the highly dense urban jungle known as Karachi, these groups operate in a policy framework that allows for pernicious curricula to be taught with impunity and there is an utter lack of state capacity to track their funding lines.

At a much deeper level, the mass disenchantment with the status quo and sham governance has aided the growth of Islamism. It is an alternative ideology and in the short term provides a livelihood to otherwise destitute families. Take the case of Ajmal Kasab or the young Taliban recruits whose stories are now being documented and which confirm this phenomena.

Last but not the least is the issue of economic and employment opportunities that are stymied due to political instability and the chorus that accompanies it. This is a vicious cycle – political instability has clear-cut economic repercussions and vice versa. Given that Pakistan's demographics are fast changing, an explosion of sorts within the next two decades is evident and this is a worrisome trend. We already have young men and women who see no hope in the country and with this situation continuing, the results will be disastrous. Recent surveys of youth are disturbing to say the least. The generation that will steer Pakistan into the immediate future is extremely upset and disillusioned. And who can blame them when the ruling classes – elected and unelected – continue to scramble for state power and pelf.

Our education system has collapsed, employment is growing at a snail's pace, and insecurity and the lack of certainty of Pakistan's future does not instil any confidence in our younger citizens.

With these four clear threats, it is almost certain that if policy shifts are not effected or deliberated, we will fast move towards a scenario where our domestic turmoil and internal factors will result in social and political upheavals that will undo Pakistan given the fact that state capacity has dwindled over time thanks to the rotting colonial institutions of governance. Many post-colonial countries are undoing the legacy but we stick to it as faithful followers. The elites who bargained for Pakistan and benefited from it only know one version of reality. However, Pakistan is changing and there seems to be no acknowledgement of this reality.

In these circumstances, we the citizens have to pressurize our governing elites to ensure these vicious cycles of the past are undone. A civilian Pakistan functions as a peaceful country with a fair share of resources invested in the welfare of the people. Without this, there is no way out. We may already be too late.

_January 2010_
4.

Should We Bid Farewell to Democracy in Pakistan?

Many decades ago, President Iskander Mirza had rather contemptuously stated that democracy does not suit the genius of Pakistani people. Immediately after these words of wisdom were uttered, direct military rule not only exiled Mirza, but also became a norm rather than an aberration. For the last six decades or so we have not been able to overcome this political reality. The unelected institutions of the state are not willing to give up the power they inherited from the might of the colonial state. At best, they are willing to share power to a degree that they deem fit.

It is now clear that within a few months Pakistan is due for another political upheaval. Barely two years following the elections, the political elite are back in business: bickering and wrangling, oblivious to their historical role in strengthening the fragile democratic process. The unelected institutions have traditionally been contemptuous of democracy and their conduct in the last two years has not been surprising. The losers at the hands of the military rule – the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan People's Party – ought to have learnt their lesson: no matter how adverse the political climate, the political forces should stay united for a common cause.

Instead, the brief interlude of political cooperation led to mistrust and misgivings among the political players. First, the restoration of judges and a partisan interpretation to the issue of independence of the judiciary created a rift between the two parties. Second, the imposition of an ill-advised governor's rule led to the widening of the gulf. This was followed by the long march that led to the restoration of the deposed judges. In the process, the co-chairperson of the Pakistan People's Party was condemned as a leader who reneged on his promises and repeatedly betrayed the trust of Mian Nawaz Sharif, who was painted by a prejudiced media as an innocent victim.

These differences had become so intractable that the Kerry-Lugar Bill controversy, led by sections of the media, juxtaposed the two parties as rivals. The secret meetings of top leaders of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the army were reported in the press, leading to a mild condemnation by Mian Nawaz Sharif who obviously knew that this was a replay of the nineties. And now, when the supreme court struck down the National Reconciliation Ordinance and the fall of Mr Zardari seems imminent, the antagonism between the parties is at an all-time high, thus giving credence to the fact that non-political players are adept at dividing the political class.

The situation today is quite peculiar. The three provincial assemblies have passed unanimous resolutions in favour of the President while the Punjab Assembly with a Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz majority has ostensibly refused to do so. It is a dangerous signal on many counts. Once again, Punjab versus the smaller provinces perception has gained currency and through these fissures the future of the democratic system seems unclear. The country is abuzz with rumours that a 'wrapping up' of the system is on the cards or the real power wielders in Rawalpindi are contemplating the 'Bangladesh model'. President Zardari is crying himself hoarse that the enemies of democracy are out to get him. The media's hostility to the elected governments and overplay of the clichéd phrase, 'lack of governance in the country' is further deepening the crisis.

Such systemic shocks to a nascent democratic process are harmful for the society and endanger our cohesion as a fractured and factionalized society. We have already witnessed the long-term consequences of non-democratic governance. The first and second martial laws split the country asunder. The Zia regime destroyed Pakistan as a society, created the drugs – Kalashnikov culture and nurtured militancy as a state policy that we are trying to undo with much bloodletting. Everyone knows how Musharraf's regime ended and the way it led to the alienation of Balochistan, the insurgencies in the northwest and the tribal areas and the colossal economic meltdown due to unrepresentative policies.

In spite of these clear lessons, the wizards of our political scene are quite content with the prospect of another intervention by the khakis. The irony is that Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, who boasts himself as the architect of the 1973 Constitution, is not shy of stating that the supreme court shall invite the army to implement its judgments. One wonders how Mian Nawaz Sharif is silent in view of this considering that he and his party suffered at the hands of General Musharraf. There are eminent writers in the press who quote or refer to what the military establishment is thinking or has decided to do. They write with authority but their views are never contradicted by the military's public relations wing. How can journalists and lawyers have access to what the military is thinking, and if someone's speculation could tarnish the image of the armed forces, then this becomes a serious matter? At least on record, the current army leadership has supported the transition to military rule.

It is still not too late that Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, Pakistan People's Party and the regional parties confab to decide the way forward. The issue is not about saving an individual in office. However, if a president has been elected by the electoral college with a majority through a constitutional process then this becomes an issue of the legitimacy of the institutions. Political parties have to become the guardians of representative institutions and not work towards undermining them.

The naïve argument being advanced these days holds that if the president is declared ineligible by the court or is pressurized to resign, there is no threat to the system. Well, the simple truth is that technical knock-outs have been all too common in our history. Military rulers since the fifties have held purges of politicians and corruption has been the most common of pretexts to oust elected representatives. Tomorrow, if another elected ruler is thrown out of office on 'technical' grounds, this would belittle the essence of democracy and the spirit of our constitution whereby sovereignty has been delegated to elected representatives.

It should, therefore, be understood that if constitutional means are not used to oust the president then the system will soon head towards a collapse. It may not happen immediately, but the instability arising out of the current mess will lead to another crash where a direct or indirect military rule will become a reality once again. One is sure that our political parties do not want that. Nevertheless, they will have to make an effort to rescue the system and not be mere bystanders to the current scenario.

There is no other way Pakistan can be governed. We have had chief martial law administrators, field marshals and chief executives and none of them delivered on their trumpeted promises of eliminating corruption or strengthening national interest. Instead, we have become a weaker and more vulnerable society. Pakistan is a federation and it has to be ruled through a political system that provides space for all – the excluded, marginalized and its myriad ethnic nationalities.

Why is the presidency always reserved for Iskander Mirzas, Ghulam Ishaq Khans and the khakis? This will have to change and the biggest problem with the incumbent is that he is not a politico nurtured by the establishment. All the arguments claiming that the prerequisites for democracy are missing in Pakistan become illogical when one looks at our bigger neighbour where the gradualism of democracy has led to social and political transformations. India's marginalized sections, such as the Dalits, are now in mainstream politics and the democratic system gives a voice to the diverse communities within the country.

If the political elites want to save the system and their present and future role in governance, they will have to become active participants of the game. Three things would need to be done immediately:

  * Firstly, an agreement on the constitutional amendments that have been delayed
  * Secondly, recourse to the charter of democracy whereby they will agree that unelected institutions will not be allowed to derail the democratic system
  * Finally, a clear-cut strategy to save the current democratic system at all costs rising above party lines.

It is a tall order given the short-sightedness and feudal character of our political class, but they will have to make a beginning somewhere. Otherwise, we should bid farewell to democracy and accept that Iskander Mirza was right: we are not fit to be a democracy.

_January 2010_
5.

How Instability Is Garnered

We continue to bemoan the failure of democratic norms to take root in our governance culture. True that the repeated extra-constitutional interventions and direct or indirect military rule have rendered democratic governance a distant and seemingly unattainable goal. In addition, the emergence of non-state actors, sometimes more powerful than the state itself has also led to formidable and multiple centres of power. In such a milieu, achieving the sustainability of a democratic process is a Herculean task. Whilst the intentions of our unelected state institutions and their overt and covert non-state partners are clear, the behaviour of the political elites is confounding.

Not unlike the past, the divisiveness of Pakistan's political elites has entered into a decisive phase. Fissures are apparent in the post-2008 political accord that led to the unanimous election of Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani. The first cleavage, now a recurrent pattern, has emerged in Sindh, where the coalition partners – the Pakistan People's Party and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement – are pitted against each other for political control of urban Sindh. The latest skirmish is rooted in the evolving arrangements for the local governments, which is a mad scramble for control of the third tier of government. However, there is an ethnic dimension to it as well. Karachi remains besieged by sectarian, provincial, and linguistic ghosts that apparently are alive and kicking.

The second disruption in the political compact that led to a transition towards representative rule is unfolding in the shape of a brewing discord between the ruling Pakistan People's Party and the opposition Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz rules the Punjab and thereby has a stake in the system and power matrix, but it is also striving to maintain its 'opposition' status. This is why a dual strategy is evident where a few firebrand leaders of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz take a hard line against the federal government and President Asif Ali Zardari. Although the party claims it does not want to rock the system, it considers 'options' that lead to a mid-term election or even the premature exit of the president from the office in the wake of the supreme court rulings on the National Reconciliation Ordinance.

The third and perhaps more important factor relates to the rag-tag parties that boycotted the election in 2008, but are now keen to wreck the system to get into power or share it with other contenders that may include non-political forces. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf led by cricket-superstar-turned-philanthropist, Imran Khan, and the mercurial, Jamaat-e-Islami, top this list. Their views on the Taliban threat and proclivity to make peace with the miscreants are well-known and add significant weight to their calls to undo the 'system'. The recent shifts in the stance of Western powers, especially the US, towards the Afghani Taliban groups, is being touted by these forces as an interim victory of their long held worldview.

Exactly how is instability garnered in Pakistan is a million-dollar question. Is it a systemic fault-line, a handiwork of the shadow state composed of unaccountable and mighty intelligence agencies and/or the influence of regional and global powers such as the US? Political scientists, analysts and conspiracy theorists have all sorts of reasoning for the continued cycles of instability and crash of democracy and Constitutionalism. Whatever may be the driving factor, it is clear that the overall impact of this state of affairs has been debilitating for the economy, society and security of Pakistan.

At present, we are mired in the grip of serious economic and fiscal crises. The growth rate at 2 per cent or so has been an all-time low and public discourse hardly features it. Inflation has also been unmanageable and seemingly uncontrollable due to the oil price fluctuations, energy costs and other factors. This situation is bound to have a serious impact on the immediate future of Pakistan. The energy and water crises require long-term policy-making and stability in political process and economic management. The federal and provincial governments are strained for resources and moving towards a state of perpetual indebtedness. A shrinking economy also limits the chances for revenue mobilization and the security scenario rules out increase in foreign investment.

If we were to analyse the Karachi violence, target killings and political mayhem in this context, then the short-sightedness of the political forces and their bickering becomes a matter of immense concern. Similarly, the incessant wrangling between the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz also has a perverse effect on the way markets and economic managements work. Already, the federal and provincial governments of Punjab and Sindh appear to be on a constant election trail. However, the sad reality is that both Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz are only dwindling their chances for an electoral success in the next round. The falling popularity of the Pakistan People's Party due to incumbency and economic strain and the by-election results in the Hazara region of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, suggest that their strategies have been nothing short of political suicide.

This leads us to the recent victorious and smug posturing by Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf Chief, Imran Khan. His contention that even the US has bowed to his desire for dialogue with the Taliban is neither correct nor a great piece of news for Pakistan. The US, as always, has its selfish national interests in view while deciding on foreign policy matters. Its invasion of Afghanistan was wrong and its hasty exit strategy is equally questionable. After a decade of failure in arresting the problems there, the US public opinion has turned against the war. This is hardly a victory for the Taliban. Let us not forget that in the previous Taliban regime the US corporations were supporting the barbaric regime and expanding their business. There is incontrovertible evidence that confirms this.

Nonetheless, the effects of Taliban rule next door will be damaging for Pakistan. The proponents of strategic depth, India bashers and Pakhtun card users, may feel elated, but the Pakistani Taliban are hardly going to give up their power-capture agenda. Pakistan has never been under US occupation despite the fact that US imperial interests have completely defined Pakistan's governance choices, national policies and state's conduct for decades. The Pakistani Taliban represents the embedded instruments of extremism nurtured by the state over time. The jihad factories, the militant madrassas and, above all, the nihilistic and anarchic view of Pakistani Taliban are hardly going to evaporate. Should we be asking them to accept a slice of power as advised by Tehreek-e-Insaf and Jamaat-e-Islami? The answer is plain. No. Only electoral process, and that too an impartial one, can establish that. Until such a prospect arises, the offers of political reconciliation and tacit offers of power to those who do not represent the people are undermining our nascent democracy in letter and spirit.

This is why, although the rejectionist point of view by Tehreek-e-Insaf and Jamaat-e-Islami is not a means of their return to the parliament, it can unfortunately bring about a major crisis in Pakistan. Any effort to pack up the present assemblies will be naïve and dangerous at this stage. We have done this too many times in the 1990s. However, this time the state itself is a victim of this anarchy. In a political vacuum – a much coveted state for the militants – the non-state actors beyond the confines of constitutional and electoral bounds are likely to step in or at least struggle harder to gain control of power. Their ultimate design is the access to the nuclear programme that is a source of the Pakistani state's strength as well as its biggest handicap. It is therefore not difficult to understand who wants the present coalition of anti-extremist political parties – the Pakistan People's Party and Awami National Party out of power and to what end.

In addition to our economic meltdown, we are also going to witness a partial reversal of war against extremism that the naïve politicians and media mujahideen, and to use Ayaz Amir's coinage, 'laptop warriors', have been calling for. There is no doubt that sectarianism, religious fundamentalism, militancy and bigoted calls for Sharia imposition are our own problems. If the opinion leaders wish to gloss over this reality then they are doing a huge disservice to our country and even to their role. The future historian will remember these men and women in the unkindest of manners.

In this situation, a wide section of public opinion, including former judges, lawyers and civil society activists have raised concerns about using the Islamic provisions of the 1973 Constitution, especially those inserted by the Islamo-Fascist dictator General Zia-ul-Haq to oust the incumbent president. The constitutional way is clear: impeachment is the only way to dethrone the president. The route suggested by the maverick lawyers and litigants of dubious antecedents before the supreme court is fraught with danger and strangely, not through sheer coincidence, echoes what the Jamaat-e-Islami and Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf want us to do with the Taliban and their allies: abject surrender. Pakistan was not created to be a theocracy or a haven for religious Fascism and Jinnah's statements are on record. Its people, ethos and political mainstream remain secular and moderate.

In 1958, a band of opportunists invoked the army's help to sort out the mess. The result was the break-up of Pakistan at the hands of General Ayub's successor, Yahya Khan whose ally was the Jamaat-e-Islami and a regime that was ably assisted by Mr Roedad Khan as Information Secretary. In 1977, Asghar Khan and other politicians lacking legitimacy, the dross of our history, made a similar Faustian mistake. Their laments, books and shenanigans are insignificant now as we were doomed with a decade of retrogression and socio-political destruction due to the personalized anti-Bhutto stance of a handful of politicians. In 1999, after the sabotage of three civilian governments, a wide array of politicos and civil society luminaries welcomed General Musharraf. The situation that we are in cannot be attributed to the person of General Musharraf alone. All the collaborators and abettors are equally guilty of bringing us to such a pass.

In 2010, the interventionist chorus of opportunists and losers among the political elites and select individuals from the media, who are convinced that General Headquarters will intervene with boots and tanks, regurgitates the same old recipes for our survival. We have only grown weaker and weaker with each decade of authoritarian, unaccountable rule. This is a lesson that the politicians need to learn – otherwise the proverbial camel is always willing to peep into the tattered and fractured tent.

It is time that the political elite sat down to resolve their power-sharing issues for the next two years and resolve that they will not aid or abet any extra-constitutional calamity. In addition to a political accord, they will have to agree on a bi-partisan basis on the two key issues: economy and war against extremism. Any shift of focus at this critical juncture will lend credibility to the propaganda by anti-democratic forces that our politicians are meant to be in jail, exile or inspiration for national monuments.

_February 2010_
6.

Democratic Governance Is the Only Option

Given the average shelf life of any civilian government, it is almost miraculous that the incumbent government has survived and there are signs that its removal is not imminent. The longevity of civilian order has less to do with the inherent strengths of its style of governance or delivery of public goods that it had promised in its manifesto. The survival of this government is an outcome of the lack of options for the establishment as well as its international allies, notably the Western powers. Leaving the conspiracy theories and the excessive over-reliance of the analysts on the American factor, we can safely argue that the military establishment of Pakistan, along with its intelligence agencies has found itself in a unique situation since the assumption of the presidency by Asif Ali Zardari.

The truth is that the Pakistan People's Party, an anathema to the civil-military bureaucracy, has assumed the most important and powerful offices that a civilian government can aspire for. Two years ago, when Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani was elected, it was unimaginable that the Pakistan People's Party would assume the highest executive office of the state. However, through deft, and according to some, wily moves of Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistan People's Party attained political power in a manner that smacks the traditional power-play staged and enacted by the military establishment. This power-play is essentially devoid of the trappings of high-sounding morality, is opportunistic and works on the principle of maximization of political gains regardless of their consequences for the federation. Interestingly, Zardari's amoral political cards have also been successful due to the fact that the political elites of smaller provinces have forged strong alliances with his political objectives. This is why the Pakistani establishment has been in a dilemma since the fateful day he took oath by none other than Justice Dogar. While an independent and belligerent supreme court ousted the oath-giver, the top beneficiary remains ensconced on the Islamabad hill.

The approach of Pakistan's new power-centre, i.e., the electronic media, towards President Zardari and the Pakistan People's Party government underwent three distinct phases during the last few years. In the first instance, the media was sympathetic to Zardari and the Pakistan People's Party in the aftermath of Benazir Bhutto's tragic murder, not too far away from the General Headquarters. Yousaf Raza Gilani's consensual election was hailed by the media as a victory of post-military order and the exit of the former military dictator was only a matter of time in early 2008.

The second phase related to the breakdown of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and Pakistan People's Party accord over the restoration of the judges when sections of the Pakistani media strongly criticized the Pakistan People's Party for its betrayal of the national cause. More importantly, this betrayal was viewed as a blow to constitutionalism. In reality, however, rule of law is nothing more than the survival of bourgeois dominance, which is guaranteed by an independent judiciary that ensures the sustenance of corporate interests, private property rights and the livelihoods of the corporate lawyers. Not surprisingly, the leaders of the lawyers' movement were also the top corporate lawyers. It is a separate matter that in the last two years, many of these legal eagles have shifted their political position and realized that the primacy of the democratic process is central to the emergence and safeguarding of constitutionalism in Pakistan.

The third phase of the media offensive against the elected government commenced with the disclosure of the Kerry-Lugar Bill in 2009, when almost all the variants of media opinion took a hard-line jingoistic, inward-looking and conventional line on Pakistan's national security apparatus. The bill was seen as a blow to the military establishment whereby an unscrupulous government headed by a 'corrupt' individual had sold national interest for a few billion dollars. The reality is that not only was the Kerry-Lugar Bill passed by the US legislature, but it is operational now and it can be rightfully seen as a small beginning of a new partnership between the US and Pakistan's civilian government. This shift in Pak-US strategic relationship has been by and large ignored by the mainstream commentary on Pakistani politics.

Three decades of military rule under Ayub, Zia and Musharraf respectively indicated that the US aid was tied to strategic objectives in the South Asian region, where a rentier state worked almost in isolation from its citizenry to advance the imperial interests. However, this time, a new relationship has been forged where the people of Pakistan, through their legitimately elected national and provincial governments, have been recognized as vital to the planning and operation of the US foreign policy in this troubled region of the globe. It would be premature to say how this partnership will play out in the short to medium-term, but it is absolutely clear that the incumbent federal and provincial governments, especially the North Western Frontier Province civilian government Awami National Party led coalition, have shifted the way the Pakistani state engages with the sole superpower.

The current, i.e., third phase of the media-government relations is continuing in its confrontational form, where deadlines are issued like decrees by media gurus that relate to not just the fall of the government, but also to individuals at the helm of power for their sins of omission and commission. There is obviously a problem with the Pakistan People's Party's media management that suffers from the larger incompetence, which the post-Bhutto Pakistan People's Party governments are known for. In fact, long spells of military rule have not enabled the political parties to flourish as policy think-tanks and strategic entities. Instead, most political parties in Pakistan react to the whims and moods of the military establishment, adjust their positions accordingly in pursuit of power and find ways of accommodation with the all-powerful military intelligence agencies.

The obvious fallout of the media-government war has been a virtual blackout of what the civilian governments have achieved despite their obvious lack of capacity, the legacy of a long military rule and the unfavourable global economic conditions. First and foremost, the Pakistan People's Party and its coalition partners have displayed an unwavering and unflinching position towards the menace of sectarian extremism, which ironically is a creation of the powerful and unelected institutions of the state. In fact, there is no other political party in Pakistan that can be dubbed as truly anti-extremism as the current ruling coalition. This unequivocal position has also led to successful deployment of the Pakistani military in the troubled regions of northwestern Pakistan, the continued elimination of high-value terrorists and restoration of civilian writ in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. In 2008, there were at least six districts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where the provincial government did not have administrative control. In 2010, the situation has radically altered despite the huge challenges of poverty, injustice and resentment against the US drone attacks. Perhaps this policy has also been one of the key factors in undermining the image and credibility of the civilian government, for there are multiple centres of power and influence that are pitted against this ideological worldview. Such dissenting voices range from the extreme left to the extreme right and most importantly, the Urdu press and its counterpart voices in the mainstream national electronic media. However, the commitment of the government thus far remains unwavering.

Secondly, when the new government took office in February 2008, Pakistan's economic situation was extremely precarious. Its foreign reserves were at an all-time low, stagflation had set in and due to the fluctuation in oil prices, and an uncertain and almost near-crash situation confronted the new policy-makers. It is evident that through creative and not-so-creative engineering aimed towards macro-economic stabilization, the federal government pulled the country out of this particular economic abyss. This scribe argued against the International Monetary Fund package in 2008. However, subsequent events have proved that the economic managers perhaps had no choice at that particular juncture.

Thirdly, the political reforms aimed towards the inclusion of marginalized areas of Pakistan have also been a major step forward. In particular, the Gilgit-Baltistan reform package and the induction of a provincial government there have gone largely unnoticed. Similarly, the Balochistan package has been a critical demonstration of the government's policy to end political conflict and assuage separatist tendencies that have now become a reality among the beleaguered Baloch communities and its leadership. It has been argued that the package is not enough or that its implementation is slow, but there are a few people in Pakistan who would deny that this was a much-needed step towards the federal-integrationist agenda of the civilian government.

Fourthly, the concerted effort towards providing a viable, reliable and transparent social safety-net mechanism has also been a major development in the last twenty months. The Benazir Income Support Programme, through its peculiar design and speedy implementation, has targeted the poor, especially the women. Independent evaluations have suggested that at least 60 per cent of the assistance is reaching the intended beneficiaries. There are leakages, wastage and politicization, but the numbers are not unimpressive at all.

Lastly, the consensus achieved on the National Finance Commission Award was a landmark in recent times. The four federating units and the various political parties agreed on the thorny issue of resource allocation and proved that democratic governance entails bargain, compromise and accommodation. The all-powerful military government could not achieve that for nearly a decade and the earlier confrontational politics did not allow this to happen. This has been a major development that was trumpeted for a short while before the non-issues and agenda-laden media reporting came back with a vengeance in the wake of the National Reconciliation Ordinance judgement.

The less savoury aspects of the civilian government relate to the manner in which it has dealt with the issue of the judiciary, especially when it was forced to restore the judges after a street agitation. Furthermore, its handling of Punjab and the imposition of governor's rule was uncalled for and led to systemic instability, the legacy of which is still haunting us. More seriously, the government has not been able to muster a competent and clean team around the office of the president and this is one of the key reasons that the president's moral legitimacy has remained under attack and is now subject to judicial review.

The allegations of corruption in the past and present have prejudiced the public perception. Moreover, the energy crisis and inflation have also eroded the popular support to the government as reflected by the limited opinion polls that have been conducted largely by external agencies. It is also not clear what the development strategy of the current government is, given the huge challenges of stagflation. The economic management of civilian governments is always a tricky affair as they need to balance their populist agenda with the grim realities of budget rationalization. This is why the cuts on development expenditure announced will not go down well and the results from development investments in any case take four to five years to germinate. The appointment of a banker as the lead economic advisor has also been a major stumbling-block to advancing the economic interests of the poor, which happen to be the popular base of democratic dispensations. Such a betrayal of people's aspirations rarely goes down well in the public arena and electoral contests. Therefore, it is quite certain that the Pakistan People's Party government will not be able to retain its strength in the next election unless, of course, we witness a miraculous economic recovery and expansion of employment opportunities in the country. However, the biggest threat to economic recovery and developmental outcomes is the continued political instability that has gripped popular imagination, thanks to the media industry.

It is, therefore, essential that improvements are made to three key elements of governance: firstly, to the debilitating competition between political elites out to undo each other by finding a suitable compromise; secondly, to the thorny federal-provincial relations where the Punjab province once again appears to be pitted against the smaller units of the federation; and thirdly, to the environment within which the political forces of Pakistan operate so that the constitutional order is preserved despite all its pitfalls, gaps and contradictions. This is a key lesson that they have to learn from their hated neighbour: political stability and certainty of the democratic process is a non-negotiable requirement for Pakistan's progress.

All in all, the national policy frameworks have witnessed shifts that require the continuation of civilian order. It is not necessary that the ruling party should continue in office to carry forward these policy shifts after the completion of its tenure in 2013. Any legitimate and accountable democratic government would need to deepen, modify and improve these policies, and further the agenda of responsible governance and social justice.

_February 2010_
7.

Pakistan's Democracy Remains Fragile

If the parliament and judiciary wish to continue exercising their new found powers, they have no option but to act strictly within the framework of the Pakistani Constitution.

Pakistan is a surreal country. Only here do we have long, protracted struggles for democracy and only here are we almost always ready to scuttle it. Perhaps, Iskander Mirza was not too off the mark while making the assessment that democracy does not suit the genius of our people. Furthermore, it does not suit the genius of the elites, in particular the unelected institutions of the state.

There is now a clear and present danger that the judicial review of the 18th Amendment will lead to a potential clash between the key organs of the state: the legislature and the judiciary. Pundits have also predicted that if such a situation arises, then a logjam will benefit the third force – Pakistan's well-organized army which is readily available to undertake crisis management. Perhaps such fears are slightly exaggerated and misplaced. However, the reality is that Pakistani history teaches us some interesting, though unsavoury lessons.

**Curse of History:** The Constitution of 1956 was drafted almost after a decade of the new country's formation as the elites were not interested in changing the colonial structure of the state and its institutions. After much negotiation and a bit of arm-twisting, parity between the eastern and the western wings was achieved and the basic law was finalized. However, the 1956 constitution could not be implemented, let alone enforced, as new elections were a risk for the national security establishment that had taken charge of the country in 1958. The second moment arrived in 1970 when a political consensus arrived through election with divisive results, once again nullified by the unelected institutions and the west Pakistani elites. The results were tragic. 1977 was a third moment when the Bhutto administration and Pakistan National Alliance movement agreed on a workable package for the future course of politics in the country. Even before this accord could reach the public domain, an Islamo-Fascist General commandeered the reins of power and thwarted the political consensus. There is a clear lesson here: a political consensus – wide-ranging, legitimate and inclusive – is a threat to the post-colonial state and the inherent contradictions of the Pakistani polity come into play the instant such compacts are arrived at.

**18th Amendment:** No constitutional amendment, and that too in a fractured and bruised country like Pakistan, can be perfect. Yet the erstwhile enemies, the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, along with a host of regional players such as the Awami National Party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam, deliberated for several months and agreed upon a consensus formula. The allegations that such deliberations took place within in-camera sessions, thus, were not representative is simple hogwash. Across the globe, this is how political parties operate and not all divisive proceedings are made public as the legitimacy of such a process can easily be questioned. This is especially true in Pakistan, where unelected, unrepresentative institutions are far more powerful than the operators of a fragile democracy. Public views were invited through national advertisements and all sorts of proposals were considered by the Raza Rabbani-led constitutional reform committee. The outcomes of such deliberations were speedily ratified by the two houses of parliament, which represent the entire spectrum of the Pakistani federation and any attempt to undo this development would be tantamount to nullifying the popular will.

What then is the problem with the 18th Amendment? First of all, it substantially alters the structure of the post-colonial state by undermining the centre and its overgrown powers and functions through the abolition of the Concurrent List. Second, it restores the original democratic ideal of Jinnah – a parliamentary framework, albeit it makes little headway on the 'secular' portion of the Pakistan project. Third, it radically alters the way judges have been appointed in this country – through a club of networks, affiliations, blood and marriage ties and above all, connections with the all-powerful executive. A commission with a majority of judges aims to distribute and dilute the discretionary part of the appointment process. Fourth, the fundamental rights of basic education and freedom of information opens up immense possibilities for the concept of citizenship. As has been noted by many political scientists and writers such as Partha Chatterjee, the post-colonial state maintains the fragile relationship of the poor with the notion of citizenship. Basic entitlements are not considered as rights, thereby excluding the poor from full citizenship rights. Education and information are two such powerful entitlements. Last, as could be expected, the return of the powers to appoint army chiefs has gone to the head of the elected executive, i.e., the prime minister and the indirectly elected president has been relegated to the status of a figurehead.

**The Imminent Clash Theory:** Within hours of the enactment of the amendment, a storm erupted within sections of the media and a section of the lawyers' community about the alleged distortion of the 'basic structure' of the constitution. The 'basic structure' theory has emanated from our maligned neighbour, India, where the courts struck down amendments enacted during Indira Gandhi's regime by labelling them as contrary to the basic structure of the constitution. First of all, this borrowed imposition from a country which the Pakistani establishment loves to hate is disingenuous because our courts have ruled different things at different times, thereby denying a consensus on the basic structure theory with respect to Pakistan. The most vocal opponent of the 18th Amendment happens to be none other than the framer of the 1973 Constitution, Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, who has been making accusations left, right and centre about how the constitutional amendment is undermining the original principles of the 1973 Constitution.

Before we come to the technicalities of Mr Peerzada's position, it should be remembered that only a few months ago Mr Peerzada, admittedly the finest of legal brains in Pakistan and an avowedly secular politician of yore, was arguing in favour of the Islamic provisions in the constitution while indirectly attacking the immunity enjoyed by the president under Article 248. Perhaps Mr Peerzada has also changed over the decades, finding Article 2A, which makes the semi-theocratic Objectives Resolution an operative part of the constitution, to be a legitimate expression of popular will. Article 2A was inserted by the brutal military dictator General Zia who not only abrogated the 1973 Constitution and violated its basic features through the 8th Amendment, but also hanged Mr Peerzada's celebrated benefactor, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. The politics of Mr Peerzada's position is, therefore, deeply disturbing.

Even on technical grounds, a five-member judgment of the supreme court (Pakistan Lawyers' Forum vs Government of Pakistan, Pakistan Legal Decisions [PLD] 2005 Supreme Court [719]) held that 'this court does not have the jurisdiction to strike down provisions of the constitution on substantive grounds'. Similarly, there are several other references which confirm the view that the supreme court does not enjoy the power to strike down a constitutional amendment. Justice Ajmal Mian's remarks in a judgment in Abdul Mujeeb Peerzada's case, PLD 1990 Kar.9 are most instructive: 'The superior courts of this country have consistently acknowledged that while there may be a basic structure to the constitution, and while there may also be limitations on the power of parliament to make amendments to such a basic structure, such limitations are to be exercised and enforced not by the judiciary, but by the body politic, i.e., the people of Pakistan.'

On the face of it, therefore, the issue is settled. Why is there such a hullabaloo that there is an imminent clash of institutions? The reasons are not legal or constitutional, but they pertain to the redistribution of power that has taken place since April 2009.

**Power Shifts:** The major shift that took place in 2009 was the restoration of the deposed judges through a street agitation and political movement which had its own logic and a unique legal basis. There is no question that the military junta had illegally and shamefully deposed the judges in 2007. However, it was the same power group that facilitated the undoing of this wrong, by bypassing the parliament and the elected executive, which was either unwilling to restore the judges or unsure about the legal modalities for achieving that.

A populist movement, highlighted by a new media industry and backed by Punjab's street power, drafted a new script for the power dynamics in Pakistan. The traditionally powerful executive was now redistributed between the superior judiciary, which ironically began acting through the now well-known chain-of-command process. Since then, judges have acted in a manner whereby they clearly follow their top leadership and by doing so, set a new precedent in Pakistan's juridical history. Similarly, the repressed media, always a target of the powerful executive, especially the military dictators, has gained and tasted a new assertiveness. Even though there is little media accountability (especially that of the electronic media – a relatively young industry), the contours of its hold over public policy and outreach within the power circles is immense. With this new power alignment, Pakistan is a changed polity as the traditional troika has been undone, perhaps for good. As long as the civilian dispensation lasts in power, the army, the elected executive and the presidency will have to share their power with the judiciary and the media.

What is wrong with such realignment, one may ask. It is after all a historic undoing of the murky power politics of the past. The key issue with this new alignment is that it subsumes the 'elected' into the coterie of the 'unelected' power players. Within the five, i.e., military, judiciary, parliament, media and civilian executive, power centres now, at best two are direct expressions of the popular will. The other three will always dominate any policy or fundamental decision through sheer majority. Elections, therefore, is just one mode of power acquisition, for so many alternative channels have emerged in Pakistan. So what do we make of this transitional nature of power and governance in Pakistan?

**The Fate of the 18th Amendment:** In this melting-pot, known as the Pakistani power cradle, anything and everything is possible. It may well be the case that the courts reaffirm that constitutional amendments are the preserve of the parliament and do not satisfy their activist partners, i.e., the lawyers. Otherwise the courts may actually strike down clauses of the 18th Amendment which the lawyers feel compromise the independence of the judiciary. The latter course of action would push Pakistan into another phase of deep instability and institutional chaos as the parliament may react to such a judicial verdict, given that a consensus was recently forged by these erstwhile political enemies. Such a reaction would be most damaging to the country in a situation where a failing economy, the rise of militant Islamism and insurgencies in Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas administration and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa haunt the formal institutions of the state. Therefore, the parliament and judiciary will have to show maximum restraint and foresight. What are the chances for such an ideal scenario?

The chances for such an accommodating pact are slim, as both institutions will consider the consequent developments as an infringement or undermining of their newly-acquired powers. Let us not forget that the parliament has gained powers after nearly three decades and the judiciary has been able to assert itself in the power matrix after a full sixty years. Both the organs of the state, therefore, have newly found their 'space' in the Pakistani mainstream and are not going to give that up willingly or easily.

One simple lesson of history should be clear, as has been indicated at the start of this essay. The institutional clash or a logjam scenario will favour the only well-organized institution of the state, which is armed in both the conventional and the nuclear sense, and is now in ascendance on the regional and the global scene. If the parliament and judiciary want to continue exercising their new found powers, they have no option but to act strictly within the framework of the Pakistani Constitution. Having said that, one often forgets which constitution we are talking about: the 1973 version, one that existed in the year 1999, or what was finalized in 2002. Or is it the April 2010 version? Perhaps in this confusion lies the endemic political instability of Pakistan. The country is still searching for a governance framework and an identity for itself.

_March 2010_
8.

Consensus Is Vital for Democracy

The federal government seems to have escaped many a crisis in recent months. There is a pattern to this madness. The systemic fault lines of Pakistan's political system manifest themselves time and again. Whether it is the long-standing civil-military distrust or the fissures within the political elites, this is not a new story. In recent years, a new power centre, i.e., the higher judiciary has entered the equation thereby creating a new dynamic in terms of power imbalances between various actors. This development has its roots in the events of 2007-2009 when the so-called lawyers' movement mobilized urban middle classes and led to what some analysts have termed as the 'law model'.

Faisal Siddiqui, an active member of the lawyers' movement has cited this historic quote by Justice Jawwad S. Khawaja in his piece (01 January 2012, _The Dawn_ ): 'The past three years in the history of Pakistan have been momentous, and can be accorded the same historical significance as the events of 1947 and those of 1971. It is in this backdrop that these petitions have been heard and decided.'

Furthermore, it has been highlighted how the courts with their newly growing 'judicio-political' power articulated the 'law model' – negotiating democratic transitions through courts and the law – in direct opposition to the 'force model' conceived by Musharraf and his associates in the junta. The tensions resulted in the emergence of a 'consent' model typified by the National Reconciliation Ordinance and how it allowed for a negotiated democratic transition.

Indeed, this is a new development in Pakistan. The understanding of this law model is rather limited and perhaps rudimentary given that this model is still evolving. Nevertheless, a few conceptual problems can be detected. It is a well-established principle that democratic development requires an elite consensus of sorts.

The very process of democratization, as has been noted in various democratic countries entails negotiation, bargain and compromise. Therefore, the consent model is what has driven many countries towards democracy. Several Southeast Asian countries like Indonesia have implemented this model and proceeded with strengthening of civilian institutions.

Needless to say, the political elites and civil society play a major role in effecting this consensus. By signing the charter of democracy, most political parties in Pakistan did agree on a common framework. However, in actual terms the realization of a Charter of Democracy has been stunted. Even though much of it has been implemented in terms of constitutional reform, the interplay between the parliament, judiciary and the military has been problematic to say the least.

First of all, the military re-ascended for various reasons. There are domestic lobbies, especially within the largest province of the country, which trust the armed forces compared to the 'corrupt' politicians. The military is engaged in a protracted war against extremists and also as an ally of NATO in the 'war on terror'. Under such circumstances, it is difficult to reset the parameters of power relations. The political elites have remained disunited in terms of tackling this issue even when they displayed rare consensus in devolving powers from the centre to the provinces.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, the judiciary now treats itself as a representative of people's will due to the support it garnered during the lawyers' movement. Judges have made remarks to this effect, to the extent of one supreme court judge claiming that the court was only answerable to the people. This kind of representative politics is misleading. After all, what would be the mechanism of public accountability when the judges cannot be held accountable other than by their peers – through the mechanism of the Supreme Judicial Council – which has remained inactive for most of Pakistan's history?

The growth of the middle class is another factor, which emboldens this new consciousness among the judges and lawyers. Various estimates suggest the middle class or 'extended middle class' could be between 30 and 60 million people. One study by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics even suggests that the size of this extended middle class may be the largest in the region, even larger than in India. This class is driven by motives other than the pure patronage that the traditional electoral process guarantees to the rural and semi-rural areas.

However, analysts such as Ayesha Siddiqa are not too optimistic about the middle class as an agent of change. In her view, Pakistan is a '''praetorian state and society'', which means that it is mired in or inclined towards illegal and excessive authority and violence'. Perhaps this explains why the unelected institutions such as the judiciary and the military branch of the executive are likely to remain dominant. The 'law model' is inherently problematic. Without the participation of people and electoral accountability, the exercise of power by the unelected can only reinforce the historical trends of a state that remain divorced from the citizen leading to a rapid loss of legitimacy of the elected power.

The middle class is also an avid consumer of Pakistan's noisy media, especially its twenty-four-hour news channels. Entertainment has now been redefined as politician-bashing and advancing the old argument that 'democracy' is a failure and it does not deliver except to enrich the politicians. Ironically, a large number of the young supporters of Imran Khan-led Tehreek-e-Insaf believe in this dictum. On one hand, they are keen to vote and bring Tehreek-e-Insaf to power through the ballot box, and on the other, they want to discredit political class and bring the whole 'system' down which in populist discourse is deemed as 'corrupt'.

Since Pakistan's dismemberment in 1971, national security has been an obsession with the state. The education system and popular discourse have changed and notions of nationalism and patriotism have been defined in terms of militarism, nuclear prowess and xenophobia against India; this paranoia has now grown to the extent that almost the entire world is somehow plotting against Pakistan and it needs to 'defend' itself. The rise of a new right wing nationalism, therefore, is aided by these historical factors. However, the last ten years of Pakistan's involvement in the war on terror and inability of its political elites to arrive at an alternative narrative has given rise to an extraordinary consensus and consequently the 'force model' as termed by Siddiqui has perhaps entered into a new phase of reinvention.

This new 'force model' prefers individual judges over the Constitution; it permeates on a daily basis through a variety of talk shows which, barring a few exceptions, regurgitate what Zia-ul-Haq's tailor-made textbooks and legal system have set as the destiny of Pakistan. This 'destiny' encapsulates expansionary nationalism (strategic depth in Afghanistan), a righteous society (purged of non-Muslims and dissenters) and a primitive, emotional sense of honour (through nuclear might as a 'deterrent').

Sadly, despite the growing middle class, their so-called modernity and socio-economic mobility many Pakistanis are wedded to these constructs. It is indeed true that no society or group can be a static entity and there are several signs of change evident in Pakistan, especially in terms of women's empowerment and integration into the highly competitive globalized world. Even so, the extent of commitment to the democratic system by the urban classes remains an unknown.

In recent weeks, power play in Islamabad has shown that an overt military coup is perhaps not possible due to the emerging systemic dynamics. A coup cannot be sustained in the presence of a powerful judiciary and media, which has its own stakes in the power-arrangements. Democratic transition, truncated and compromised as it might be, continues to be underway. With the new general election it might enter into another phase where the contests and fault lines become sharper and move towards a resolution of sorts.

In the short term, adhering to constitutional provisions will be vital. Any morality-led reinterpretation of the supreme law will open doors for future misuse. Whether it is the jurisdictions of the parliament and judiciary, the immunity granted to the president or the sanctity of basic rights, under no circumstance should the elites trample the arduous consensus reached after nearly thirty-five years in the form of the 18th and 19th Amendments to the Constitution.

Regardless of what the stakeholders may have planned, Pakistan needs political stability and a serious focus on policy. The year 2011 was disastrous for economic policy as the government moved from one crisis to another and paid scant attention to the issues that affected millions.

The results are evident: doomsday pundits are predicting an economic meltdown once again and energy shortages have paralysed sections of the industry and enraged the citizens. Perhaps it is time for the reinterpretation and enforcement of a 'consensus model' whereby the elected and the unelected, the guardians, populists and the adjudicators agree on the constitutional rules of the game. Neither the parliament nor the judiciary should abuse the constitutional provisions for their narrow interests. If the trend continues, such bitterly played power struggles will lead to 'grievous consequences' of another kind.

_January 2012_
9.

Governance Crises Cannot be Tackled by Old Formula of Changing Faces

Commenting on the meltdown of the economy, a reputed economics analyst stated how the 'deplorable state of governance' was responsible for the 'mismanagement of public goods'. Luckily, he also explained how elections placed accountability for such a situation on the shoulders of the incumbents. A common misunderstanding that plagues public discourse relates to how 'governance' is viewed as the job of an elected government as though the state and the government are interchangeable entities. It is important to note that the government of Pakistan – post-colonial, encroached upon and shredded by its non-elected offspring – remains forever subordinate to non-elected institution's permanent interests.

The most glaring manifestation of this reality came about when the federal government in the memo-case (concerning the alleged treasonous act of authoring a memo addressed to the US against Pakistan's security establishment) submitted before the supreme court that it had no control over the operations of the military and its premier spy agency – the Inter Services Intelligence. This has been mentioned before in other judicial proceedings but not in so many words. Although it was common knowledge, the government's admission makes it abundantly clear that 'constitutional governance' is a mere pipedream in the land of the pure. Without finger-pointing at any one institution, this has been the case for decades and is not going to change overnight.

A new state within the state may have emerged. During the hearing of the same case, an honourable judge of the supreme court remarked in his obiter dicta that the judiciary was not answerable to anyone but the 'people'. This statement defies logic as judges are not elected by the people; they are servants of the state, paid for by the taxpayers who are represented by the parliament. These developments have prompted a beleaguered government and its prime minister to enunciate the supremacy of the parliament and that 'states within states' cannot be tolerated.

Leaving aside the turbulent decade of the 1970s, the evolution of an autonomous power centre within the state apparatus in the form of the intelligence agencies is a well-recognized fact. A martial state since the 1950s has been a player in the global power games of the region, and the reorientation of state priorities was almost inevitable. The 2008 elections were, therefore, a transitional moment and during these transitions from military to civilian rule, shared power is not rigorously exercised by the elected officials. The addition of another power-centre, i.e., the judiciary, is a recent development and is in its nascent stages. The question remains as to whether this judiciary can effectively arrest the dominance of the military-intelligence complex.

Pakistan's changed demographics and the existence of an urban middle class (estimated between 30-60 million) also complicates the future of democracy. Urban Pakistan is not an avid supporter of constitutional democracy; its formulae for 'change' (judges in 2007 and Imran Khan in 2011) border on authoritarian models of a messiah fixing all the problems. Luckily, this segment of the population has little appetite for direct military rule, but it yearns for a civilian strongman to exercise power. Yet, its influence and outreach is tremendous. It is the recruiting ground for the civil-military bureaucrats and of late the major supplier of human resources to the growing media oligarchies. Electronic media also thrives because of its urban middle class consumers. Hence, the media campaign in recent times against the democratic process articulates and reinforces impatience with civilian rule in favour of a deliverer.

Furthermore, these developments are taking place in a country where the majority of the population views the US and the West as 'enemies' of Pakistan and back the emotional appeals to safeguard a militaristic conception of sovereignty and honour. Thus, the capture of political discourse by Islamist groups is a sad reminder that perhaps we are living in a new Pakistan. A country where the old configurations and alignment of political forces are becoming somewhat irrelevant.

It is also an established fact that the civilian government has blundered on several counts and its promotion of incompetent people to deal with the various issues of economy has been far from satisfactory. Nevertheless, its real watchdog is the parliament and ultimately the electoral process. Elections are not too far away and can be as early as next year. However, it remains to be seen if there is a 'change' effected through court orders or military diktat before the term of the assemblies ends in due course. Such is the perilous nature of a three to four-year-old democratic process that the media oligarchs and their employees are citing prescriptions of a 'coup' and a technocratic government, as 'viable' and 'legitimate'. Dissent to this narrative is equivalent to sedition. Journalists and commentators who are on the margins of the mainstream discourse are either facing threats or being silenced.

The plain reality is that the unelected institutions – the military and the judiciary – backed by the media appear to be impatient with the civilian government. The judiciary may survive just because constitutional deviance appears to be unfeasible. However, the damage to the credibility of the electoral process has already been done.

The enduring problem with Pakistan's governance is that regardless of the government in power, the 'state' remains disconnected and disengaged with its citizens. The argument on misgovernance by a coalition government is untenable when unelected institutions of the state are unaccountable and unwilling to accept the authority of public representatives. This is why we are trapped in yet another cycle of political instability.

The latest statements by the army chief and the chief justice are heartening. A military coup has been ruled out from the available options. However, improved 'governance' will not result from implementing the game plan – of dismissing the elected government before its term is up. This fallacy, propagated by an unregulated media and an establishment under tremendous international pressure, to install improved 'governance' without structural reform is illusory. Any non-democratic stint will further damage the federation. Pakistan is too plural, diverse and factionalized to do without democracy.

Strange that we have not learnt anything from the 1971 tragedy when Pakistan was dismembered and a national humiliation was suffered. Forty years later, the script has changed little. A civilian head of the state is an alleged 'traitor'; 'national security' equals nationalism and loyalty to the country, and the Baloch leaders are saying that they will be happy to be ousted from Pakistan.

Where does the political class stand in this morass? Frankly, their role has not been befitting of responsible, transitional actors. They have tried to undermine each other, squabbled over non-issues and despite the rhetoric, have not touched the core area: civil-military imbalance.

The victory of the politicians in drafting and approving the 18th Amendment is laudable considering that this has been achieved despite all of them, almost without exception, having played their own bargaining game with the security establishment. After all, the military establishment presented itself before the parliament at least notionally. The 'Memogate' petition was filed by a 'civilian' leader, and the current president and prime minister cannot escape some level of responsibility in building a consensus around structural reform. Perhaps consolidating power was the key goal which, as it turns out, is no substitute for performance in the limited sphere of 'civilian' action.

It is fervently hoped that an unconstitutional regime change will be avoided. The odds are against this, but then this is not the Pakistan of the 1990s. The country has moved on and so have the power-players. Old formulae are proving to be difficult remedies for a festering governance crisis.

_February 2012_
10.

Will the Court Punish Officials Who Violated their Oath?

Evidently, the state of Pakistan is rotten when its former chief of the army staff, who does not stop touting himself as a true patriot, prima facie, violated the constitutional oath he undertook. It is not just Mirza Aslam Beg whose nefarious involvement in politics has been the subject of discussion in the courts and TV channels, but countless others in Pakistan who have been getting away with similar transgressions.

After the death of General Zia-ul-Haq in 1988, military rule only changed its clothes. It survived and flourished for a decade until the emperor (holder of army chief's office) threw off his civilian façade and took over in 1999 through a proper coup d'état citing the same old excuse of saving the country. The history of 1988-1999 is yet to be written for it has remained hostage to the obfuscations of a political class created by the army itself and its loyalist intellectuals who rule the media are to be found in Pakistan's moribund academia as well.

The recent political glasnost in Pakistan – thanks to the lawyers' mobilization and the refusal of two major political parties to repeat their mistakes – is a new chapter in our history. Whether this is an illusion or a temporary triumph remains to be seen. The supreme court has, after a criminal delay of sixteen years, taken up the Asghar Khan petition. The 'free' and independent supreme court did not take up this pending case until there was sufficient public pressure in recent months. The judges have been remarking that they are representing 'people's will' and perhaps this is why they are now establishing that they are truly independent and not taking their cues from their erstwhile senior partner, the military-intelligence complex. This is a welcome development and, if taken to its logical conclusion, might reset the way power dynamics have been structured in Pakistan.

After the 1988 elections, it was clear that the junta, despite losing its greatest Machiavellian leader, Zia, was in no mood to transfer power to a civilian government. The story of Benazir Bhutto's first ill-fated government (1988-1990) has been well documented by her advisor Iqbal Akhund in his book entitled, _Trial and Error: The Advent and Eclipse of Benazir Bhutto_ (Oxford University Press, Pakistan, 2000). The book, among other things, reveals the severe limits of Bhutto's powers and outlines how she had little control over core governance areas such as security and economic policies.

During this time, there were two serious attempts to oust her: first, through a vote of no-confidence where rogue intelligence officials doled out money to engineer the outcomes. The name of one Osama bin Laden was also cited as a likely financier for this effort. Bhutto's government also indulged in horse-trading, as was the norm at the time. In a hard-hitting interview given to the monthly _Herald_ in the year 2000, Bhutto recounts the years in these words:

'... December 1988, within a week of my forming the government, Brigadier Imtiaz, working at the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Internal, began contacting political parties to overthrow my government. My political adviser at the time, General Babar, moved to have him replaced. The army refused initially, though later, Brigadier Imtiaz was removed from the ISI Internal, not from the army itself... We collected proof, in 1989, of ISI elements visiting Members of National Assembly for a no-confidence move. We made audio tapes. The head of the Military Intelligence entered my office and saw the photograph of the man who had been approaching my Members of National Assembly. He panicked, took the photograph and the tape and then sent me a report saying the man in question was deranged. In 1990, when the ISI launched a similar effort, we made a videotape called Operation Jackal. A serving army officer, Brigadier Imtiaz, technically not in the ISI but substantively still there, was taped saying: 'The army does not want her, the president does not want her, the Americans don't want her.' He was seeking the support of parliamentarians to oust the government. I gave that tape, substantive proof of treason, to General Beg. He filibustered.'

The second attempt was through a failed coup. The storyline was simple. Bhutto, as a people's representative, could not be trusted and she was a security risk for the deep state which wanted the continuation of jihad even after the demise of the Soviet Union. The priorities of the civilian governments would come into conflict with this sooner than later. It is not surprising that Pakistan's most progressive scheme, budgetary constraints notwithstanding, of hiring and fielding village-level lady health workers was initiated during these turbulent twenty months of Bhutto's reign. This programme has continued ever since and its beneficial impact has been noted globally.

However, after her 1990 ouster, Bhutto had to be kept away from power. So the military chief General Aslam Beg, as details have re-emerged, played a direct and proactive role in ensuring that her right wing opponents (not too averse to the jihad paradigm) were returned to power.

Apparently, Rs 14 crores were distributed by the ISI Chief Lt General Asad Durrani to opposition politicians. This is a small amount as more details trickle in and some estimate that the total quantum of funds used for political engineering may have been Rs 1.4 billion. Major General (Retd) Naseerullah Babar, the Interior Minister in the Pakistan People's Party's second government, collected the record and Air Marshal (Retd) Asghar Khan initiated this case.

The key man, arm-twisted, was Younis Habib, a banker who has now confessed that he was asked to raise Rs 350 million by the former president Ghulam Ishaq Khan and the army chief before the 1990 general elections. Out of the Rs 345 million 'raised', Rs 140 million was paid through General Aslam Beg.

The constitution in Pakistan is clear. It was even as unambiguous when General Beg was at the helm of affairs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The oath of members of armed forces as enshrined in the Constitution's Third Schedule reads as under:

'I... do solemnly swear that I will bear true faith and allegiance to Pakistan and uphold the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which embodies the will of the people, that I will not engage myself in any political activities whatsoever and that I will honestly and faithfully serve Pakistan in the Pakistan Army (or Navy or Air Force) as required by and under the law.'

How many times was this oath violated? First, General Beg is on record as having sent a message to the supreme court in 1988 not to restore Prime Minister Junejo's government. The message was sent through none other than the longest-serving Chairman of the Senate, Wasim Sajjad who 'advised' the court. Later, a contempt petition against the ex-chief of army staff was brought before the court, but the supreme court was reluctant to proceed against Beg. It was widely believed, although with no hard evidence, that the General Headquarters had saved its former military chief.

Not content with this victory, Gen. Beg and his team indulged in pure politics and that too with an ideological bravado. Khaled Ahmed wrote recently, 'Aslam Beg was essentially an adventurer and a soldier of fortune shaped by Pakistan's revisionist doctrine of defence who could not win against India playing according to rules of professionalism.' Thus, the affinity with local and global jihadis was behind the sabotaging of the democratic process in Pakistan.

This diarchy of governance continues. The de facto powers to govern and make the important decisions still reside within a small coterie of unelected generals, bureaucrats, big businesses and a handful of pliant politicians. Now that the supreme court is asserting its space within the Pakistani state structure, it is welcome to do so provided it establishes civilian ascendancy. The de jure arrangements are clear. A parliament, the repository of people's will and its elected cabinet has the legitimate right to govern and take executive decisions. Any other formulation will only perpetuate a dysfunctional governance.

Pakistan's assertive supreme court faces the most challenging choices today. By opening up the Asghar Khan case, it has enhanced the possibilities for correcting our course. However, its justice must be 'complete' as enshrined in the constitution. At the very least, the army officials who violated their oath and politicians who squandered public funds must be brought to justice. Anything less than this would disappoint all of us who are hoping that the judges will not let history repeat itself.

Bhutto's haunting words: 'Rogue elements incessantly violating their oath and plunging the nation into crises,' make even more sense nowadays after the agencies' tricks such as the memo affair have backfired. The paralysis of governance for months ultimately affected the ordinary citizen whose priorities such as security, employment and basic services are yet to be fully addressed by the dysfunctional state.

_November 2012_
11.

Time for Complete Justice

Dr Tahirul Qadri, who has kept Pakistani pundits busy for the past three months, faced a major blow when a three-member supreme court bench dismissed his petition (which stated that the chief election commissioner and four members of the Election Commission of Pakistan were not appointed in accordance with Articles 213 and 218 of the Constitution).

The court decreed that the petition failed to point out any violations of fundamental rights in either the petition itself or in the arguments of the petitioner. Therefore, as per 184 (3) of the Constitution, none of Qadri's fundamental rights were infringed upon. Throughout the hearing of this case, certain fault-lines were traversed by both the parties. The court reminded Qadri that he was a dual national and his loyalties were split. Qadri in his retort reminded the chief justice of his past allegiance to General Musharraf during the days before March 2007 when Musharraf was resisted by the judges.

The supreme court observed that dual nationals were allowed to vote in Pakistani elections. However, the court added that because of his dual nationality, Dr Qadri could not contest elections under Article 63(1) of the Constitution. Qadri's dual nationality was, however, constantly brought under question during the proceedings.

In another case that made headlines during 2011 and 2012, the court gave extraordinary attention to US citizen Mansoor Ijaz's testimony and also entertained a petition filed by a Canadian citizen on the alleged violation of Pakistan's national security by the civilian government through its ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani.

A commission was formed to investigate the charges in the so-called 'Memogate'. The findings of the Memo Commission sadly relied mostly on the testimony of Mansoor Ijaz, who was exempted from appearing personally and could not be considered a reliable and honest witness. The formation of a commission, instead of registering a police case, led to the exemption of Mansoor Ijaz's presence before the court. It should be noted that the judicial commission allowed Mansoor Ijaz's testimony to be delivered via video conferencing, but denied Haqqani the same facility.

Recently, the court has asked Haqqani to appear before the bench. The earlier findings of the commission and the irresponsible opinion generated in the media have already portrayed Haqqani as a 'traitor' in many minds. Sadly, in Pakistan there is little or no check against libel and anyone can be declared an infidel or a traitor.

After Taseer's fate, who was also labelled a blasphemer by irresponsible sections of the media, why would Haqqani feel secure in returning to Pakistan? In his recent letter, he has questioned whether any of the myriad threats made against him have been investigated. He claims that even the US authorities have had to investigate some of the threats. For good reason, Haqqani has also mentioned that the security arrangements for political leaders such as Bashir Bilour, Taseer and Shahbaz Bhatti were most inadequate even though they were in positions of authority. The writ of the Pakistani state is weak and everyone knows that.

Pakistan is a polity where private militias have become stronger than the state apparatus. Jihadists, hyper-nationalists or indoctrinated personnel find it easy to kill whoever they believe to be violating any religious or patriotic 'norm', especially when media trials and verdicts have all declared Haqqani to be complicit in the alleged memo against the 'national interest', i.e., an alleged coup attempt imagined by the memo writer.

How can we forget that political leaders such as Imran Khan and Sheikh Rasheed have already stated on live television that Haqqani is a traitor? Often the TV anchors have not challenged these narratives and instead let the hype continue for higher ratings. In fact, media persons need to realize just how their reporting or presentation of events can incite violence. Haqqani has also pointed out that his observations on the findings of the commission remain unaddressed and perhaps the judicial commission or the court should take them up.

Given that Haqqani's security concerns have merit in them, it would be wise to allow him to appear via video link given the advances in technology. More importantly, what is left in the case? Haqqani is no longer the ambassador. The Pakistan People's Party government has almost completed its tenure and people are going to vote for a new government soon. Above all, the example of the Swiss case is clear to all and sundry.

A long, drawn out proceeding by the Pakistani state – prosecutors, judges and the media – did not lead to any relevant or conclusive decision. The Swiss authorities have reiterated what so many of us were saying from the very start. The president of Pakistan under the constitution enjoys immunity against criminal proceedings. Respecting international conventions in this regard, the Swiss authorities have only restated the obvious.

The question is why the writing of the letter to the Swiss authorities became such a huge legal issue. In fact, it remained a source of political instability, did not allow the elected government to focus on policy-making and governance and even gobbled up a prime minister.

Haqqani's case undeniably has huge political overtones. The opposition leader was the petitioner, the military establishment and former ISI chief were parties to the whole farce and at the end of the day, the memo was unsigned and 'filed' by Admiral Mullen. Something that may be considered by the honourable supreme court as well.

Sections of the media who are baying for the blood of Haqqani might rethink their focus as well. He is of little significance to the current Pakistani political landscape. Neither can Haqqani be used as a political lever against the Pakistan People's Party government nor is he a threat to the media or the judiciary. Perhaps Mr Haqqani's estranged friends in Islamabad and Rawalpindi are way too annoyed. Who knows?

In any case, given the challenges that the Pakistani state and society face, this issue should not even appear on the priority list. Charging Haqqani with contempt of court and/or treason will be counterproductive as well. What will be achieved through an extradition? The country has learnt its bitter lessons.

If Dr Qadri, a major religious scholar and the face of Pakistan's moderate Islam, is controversial for his loyalty as a dual national, then Mansoor Ijaz as a US citizen or the Canadian gentlemen concerned about Pakistan's national security must not be given a high place on the national pedestals. It is time for 'complete justice' as the constitution promises to the citizens of Pakistan.

_February 2013_
12.

Challenges of Political Transition

Pakistan's next general elections, due in a few months, will be the first where civilian forces are in charge of the transition from one elected government to another. Throughout its history, Pakistan's military and civil bureaucracy have been the arbiters of political transitions.

With the elections nearing, the political leadership of Pakistan faces many questions about not only the interim government that will oversee the polls, but also the rules of the game for those contesting elections.

While Pakistan's noisy and multifarious media is highlighting various election issues, on most occasions the intent behind the programming is to sensationalize matters. It is critical to inform the public about these issues and build sufficient pressure on institutions to take steps wherever necessary to ensure free, fair and transparent elections.

There are six main challenges before the political parties, especially those leading the coalition government and the opposition. The sooner these are dealt with, the more likely the coming elections will make history.

**Caretaker Governments:** The current National Assembly term ends on March 16, yet the election schedule and the interim government have not been decided. Both are the focus of much speculation, political point-scoring and conspiracy theories. It is vital for the major political parties to agree on the caretaker prime minister and chief ministers.

Instead of bickering over individuals, the government and the opposition should tilt the balance of power in favour of political forces rather than leaving such decisions to unelected institutions. If the ruling Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz fail to agree on a caretaker government, the election commission of Pakistan will have to decide on their behalf. In any case, we need to develop healthy parliamentary traditions and a culture of bipartisan consensus on matters of national interest.

Given that there are political forces outside parliament, the government and the opposition need to consult parties like the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf which boycotted the 2008 elections. That consultation must be initiated immediately and concluded as soon as possible. If the politicians could agree on the 18th Amendment and other vital political compacts, then this should not be a difficult endeavour.

**Compliance with the Election Commission's Scrutiny Process:** It would be counterproductive for the political parties to indulge in a confrontational game with the Election Commission of Pakistan. In fact, after the conclusion of a democratic tenure and public concerns over the quality of politicians who enter the legislatures, the political parties would be doing themselves a big favour by undertaking a clean-up process within their ranks.

Nominating candidates with dubious credentials hardly helps the image of the political parties and the future of democracy. Exaggerated or not, the perception that most parliamentarians don't pay taxes or that they are loan defaulters needs to be addressed by the parties themselves. Sections of the media may be de-legitimizing the politicians, but the political parties must address these concerns instead of trying to sweep them under the carpet. This may be the best time to put in place internal screening mechanisms where the electoral strength of a candidate may be tested against his or her eligibility as per the Election Commission of Pakistan's (ECP) rules. The third challenge pertains to intra-party mechanisms for adherence to the electoral code of conduct.

The parliamentarians have now amended the electoral code of conduct and formally accepted most of what the ECP had suggested. The code is ambitious, for it asks the political parties to avoid displaying weapons, regulate campaign expenditure, streamline the process of advertising through hoardings and billboards and above all, set out an overall framework for peaceful elections. The code is well conceived; however, the real challenge is its enforcement.

A code of conduct cannot be implemented without the full ownership by the political parties and effective sensitization measures within the party ranks whereby all candidates are made to adhere to it, and all violations are considered breaches of party discipline. Evidence of the parties' willingness to undertake the required measures seems lacking thus far.

**Shunning Extremism:** Perhaps the most disturbing political feature of our times is the kowtowing to militant outfits by political parties for electoral gains. Most notably, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz has entered into local, unwritten agreements with the Ahle Sunnat wal Jamaat. Such an alliance may favour the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz in the short-term, but would have a high cost to Pakistani society overall.

In a democracy, all shades of political actors coexist with each other. However, when violence as a justified means to uphold a particular ideology or worldview is legitimized, the brutalization of society cannot be arrested. By giving leeway to militant organizations, political parties are setting dangerous precedents. This may lead to a long term undermining of constitutional democracy as radical groups do not recognize the Pakistani state or its Constitution. There is no alternative to building public pressure on the political parties on this issue and ensuring that the ECP checks such practices.

**Access to Polling Booths:** My recent interactions with the political parties have underlined one key concern: the number of polling booths is too few to cater to a country of 200 million people. For instance, in Balochistan the dispersed polling booths are an immediate hurdle to maximizing electoral participation. Similarly, to increase women's participation, the number of polling booths will have to be increased.

The lack of a polling booth proximate to the voter necessitates the transportation of voters to the place of polling. This leads to a situation where richer candidates gain an edge over those who cannot afford such major investments. There are thousands of government buildings available across Pakistan which can be used as polling booths and there is no reason why adequate planning cannot cater to the additional demand. The ECP has already promised Pakistanis 25,000 new polling booths, taking the number to 90,000 booths in total.

**Women's Participation:** The reasons for the low level of participation by women in Pakistan are well-known. There are certain areas of the country where women are discouraged from voting. We cannot afford to let half of the electorate face hurdles to participate in such an important exercise. The ECP must take to task political parties and candidates working with conservative forces aimed at denying women their right to vote.

**Media Responsibility:** There are worrying aspects of the media's attitude to the electoral process. First, corporate and commercial interests override the imperatives of sound editorial practices and ethics of journalism. In recent months, two controversial characters – businessman Malik Riaz and religious leader Tahir-ul-Qadri – have been receiving inordinate media coverage. Paid content is evident and media responsibility at best is non-existent.

These are dangerous trends, for electoral campaigns may be unnecessarily influenced by money, thereby putting into question the 'fairness' of the exercise. The two regulators – the Election Commission of Pakistan and the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority – must devise an elaborate framework to balance the corporate concerns of media houses with the requirements for electoral transparency.

At several points since 1988, the superior judiciary – toeing the line of the military establishment – has interfered in the electoral process. For instance, in 1988 it declared General Zia-ul-Haq's dismissal of the Junejo government illegal, but did not restore the government and decreed that fresh elections should take place. In the same year, the rule that ID cards must be presented at polling stations disenfranchised millions of Pakistanis and worked against the Pakistan People's Party. Through the 1990s and even under General Musharraf, court decisions were a major hurdle to the conduct of fair elections. In 2013, we hope that the supreme court will veer away from the past trends and support a free and fair election. The court would be best advised to strengthen Pakistan's fractured and endangered democracy. An independent judiciary can only function in a constitutional democracy.

The influence of the military and intelligence agencies is a different subject altogether and the fact that civilians have been choking the space for that interference is a major step forward. It would be in the interest of the military to allow a legitimate election to take place given that it finds itself threatened by terrorists inside the country and regional powers outside the country. Its battle for survival can only succeed when it has the support of elected representatives of the people of Pakistan. The recent statement from the military that the security establishment favours on-time elections is a welcome move. We hope that the bitter experiences of the 1990s will not be repeated by rogue elements from within its fold.

_March 2013_
13.

A Risky Transition?

Only a democratic dispensation that enjoys the people's mandate will be able to handle the disastrous energy crisis, the spill-over of NATO's exit from Afghanistan and the security and foreign policies of the country.

Pakistan's first rule-based democratic transition is underway. The last time a civilian government oversaw the election process was in 1977 when charges of rigging led to a popular movement, ouster of the civilian government and ultimately a coup. Otherwise, it has been a military or quasi-military regime managing the process of elections.

Three institutions are managing this process:

  * The Election Commission of Pakistan
  * The judiciary
  * The interim governments at the centre and the provinces.

The role of the president is minimal other than managing his own party affairs, and the military seems to be in the background and largely focusing on the security issues. This is a situation which ought to be celebrated as we have the basic preconditions in place.

However, state incapacity and ideological biases overshadow the ongoing transition. In the past few weeks, the Returning Officers – senior district judicial officers – have been scrutinizing the candidates in the most ad hoc manner. In their zeal to abide by the constitutional clauses inserted by General Zia's regime, which place a premium on the faith of the candidate and his/her loyalty to an undefined 'ideology of Pakistan', a circus was witnessed.

An unprofessional line of questioning adopted by the Returning Officers marred the initial electoral proceedings. The ECP perhaps did not issue the right standard guidelines and, therefore, left the subordinate judges to exercise their will and the results were not too pleasing. Women were asked how they would manage their children if they became legislators and others were asked to recite Quranic verses with the right intonations and accent! Ideological shifts of the past three decades were at work here.

Despite the much-hyped scrutiny, the issue of corruption – tax evasion, bank defaults, etc. – were thereby bypassed. And a newspaper, _The Express Tribune_ , commented as follows: 'Not being able to recite Quranic verses became grounds for disqualification but financial impropriety is apparently considered more kosher.' The ECP ought to have trained the returning officers and installed some capacity for financial screening.

Judicial populism continued as the chief justice of Pakistan, while addressing the returning officers, stated: 'I may emphasize that you are not performing functions in individual capacity, but as representatives of the institution of judiciary. Discharging your functions, as District Returning Officers, Returning Officers and Assistant Returning Officers, you represent all of us, the institution of judiciary as a whole. A single mistake, if committed by any of you, it is likely to bring (a) bad name for the institution of judiciary, which is respected and has earned the trust and confidence of the nation.' The mistakes sadly were many and are being rectified by the appellate tribunals where the aggrieved candidates are getting relief.

A lawyers' convention held a few days ago highlighted the view of the bar. Asma Jahangir, for instance, stated that courts 'should not meddle in the Election Commission of Pakistan's affairs... and the Chief Justice of Pakistan by addressing the Returning Officers wanted to influence the election process.' ( _The Express Tribune_ , 07 April 2013). Other lawyer leaders such as Abid Saqi also opined that judicial officers were not trained before their appointment as Returning Officers and they had 'no right to humiliate the candidates by asking personal questions'.

Overall, Pakistan's media, despite the primary audience's (the urbanizing middle class) anathema for elected officials and politicians, did take the Returning Officers to task. Eventually, the president issued a statement and the ECP also reined in the over-zealous Returning Officers from exercising injudicious control over the ideological fitness of the candidates.

The most challenging issue, which haunts the forthcoming transition, is that of security and the growing power of non-state actors who have decreed a de facto 'eligibility' of political parties that can contest and succeed in the coming elections. To date, dozens of attacks have taken place on the Pakistan People's Party, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Awami National Party's candidates.

The leadership of these parties is under threat and it is unclear how far public campaigns and canvassing would be possible for these parties. In part, there is the obvious question regarding the lack of focus by the outgoing federal and provincial governments on law enforcement. But that is just one side of this complex issue. The larger issue relates to the overall security framework within which the Pakistani state operates. Using and letting non-state actors grow as strategic assets is a policy that bedevils our future; this calls for resetting the civil-military imbalance. The latter goal is a long-term one and only democratic transitions and incremental increase of the civilian sphere will allow for this to happen.

The net result of the security factor is that parties such as the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal are more favoured by Pakistan's most powerful non-state actors. The controversial caretaker interior minister has talked of threats to Imran Khan and Mian Nawaz Sharif as well. Therefore, the caretaker administrations find themselves handling a worn out security apparatus to ensure that violence is minimized in the country.

Notwithstanding these larger dynamics at work, the political parties are gearing up for the electoral contest. Very soon the tickets for candidates will be announced and a very tight campaign of thirty days or less will lead us to the next parliament.

The pundits are placing the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz at the front of the electoral race with the Pakistan People's Party and other parties trailing behind. The Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf is expected to emerge as a sizeable parliamentary group and the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement as the other two groups are likely to join the next coalition. The Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz is in alliance with the Baloch and Sindhi nationalists, and in the past few weeks it has worked rather hard to overcome its Punjab-centric identity. While in Sindh it may not make any inroad, in Balochistan its alliance with the Balochistan National Party (Mengal) will yield some dividends for the future federal and provincial governments.

The key battlegrounds are south Punjab and Sindh where the Pakistan People's Party's fate will be decided. If it retains its seats, then it will be in a position to challenge Nawaz Sharif's expected sweep in central Punjab. The new factor in these elections is a party-based contest in Federally Administered Territories Administration where once again chances for the Pakistan People's Party and the Awami National Party are limited due to the security climate. The Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal is likely to make some gains. The most fragmented results may be seen in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa where the terrorism and chaos of the last five years will impact the outcomes.

The elections are not the end of this process. The next government – most likely a weak coalition of competing interests and ideologies – has the most onerous agenda at hand: dealing with a disastrous energy crisis, the spill-over of NATO's exit from Afghanistan and reclaiming the security and foreign policy. Only a democratic dispensation that enjoys the people's mandate will deliver on these objectives.

This is why a transition that is free of interference, rigging and unwarranted interference by unelected institutions of the state is paramount at this difficult moment in Pakistan's existence.

_March 2013_

II

* * *

SECURITY, CONFLICT & EXTREMISM
Introduction

In Pakistan, conflict has had its roots in the state's internal and external policies. The years of civil war and internal strife in Afghanistan, for instance, has contributed to the spread of extremism in Pakistan which looks at its troubled neighbour through the prism of an enduring rivalry with India. The internal security situation has also deteriorated following the US invasion of Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks. Insurgencies in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and Balochistan intensified. Militancy spread across the country, while political violence and growing Talibanization in Karachi, the financial capital, meant that conflict became more complex.

Terrorism and insurgencies sapped the state's capacity to restore some form of order. An estimated thirteen militant groups were actively fighting the state under the banner of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. In addition, twelve sectarian militias with close linkages to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and the larger network of militancy continued to launch terror attacks on Pakistani Shias, Ahmadis and non-Muslims. Jihad groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Taiba continued to support insurgency in the Indian-administered state of Jammu and Kashmir. Between the years 2002 and 2014, terrorism claimed the lives of 19,886 civilians. A total of 6015 security personnel were killed by militants and Pakistan lost four generals in its battle against terrorism. The leading political parties, including Pakistan People's Party, Awami National Party and Muttahida Qaumi Movement were targeted for criticizing Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and other terrorist networks over these years.
1.

On Benazir's Death

I was in the dargah compound of Ajmer when our phones started buzzing with friends and relatives wanting to share grief on the loss of a woman who was both loved and hated, but never ignored. This was the typical winter dusk and we were returning from a soulful traditional dua-i-roshnayee (pre-sunset prayer) where candles are lit in remembrance of the much revered Khawaja. Amidst frantic phone calls from grieving friends, the shock was cushioned in the mystical atmosphere as one reaffirmed that God's will was above everything. But the aching sense of loss for Pakistan haunted us despite the calming effect of Ajmer.

It was this strong faith in God and in her mission that brought Benazir Bhutto back to Pakistan; there were heinous elements that wanted to physically eliminate her. Benazir was a lover of the mystics and had visited Ajmer thrice as we found out from the deeply-shocked residents of this small medieval town. Coming from Sindh, the land of the Sufis and poets, Bhutto was a devotee of Khawaja Ghareeb Nawaz. Like a true Bhutto, she was not afraid of death as the believers consider it to be ordained by God in the first place. But the truth is that she is no more and this is hard to reconcile with.

One cannot miss the symbolism of the location where Bhutto was killed. The place, Liaquat Bagh, is named after Pakistan's first prime minister who was also shot there. The reasons for his death are still not known other than the simple imperative that in Pakistan, legitimate politicians need to be eliminated. This tragic place in Rawalpindi is also not far from the place where Benazir's father was hanged in 1979, whose legacy refuses to go away.

At least in Benazir's case, the battle lines were clear. A patently violent brand of political Islam masking itself as anti-imperial and aided by powerful elements within the Pakistani establishment is hell-bent on destroying Pakistan's political and social fabric. Contrary to what many believe, this embedded dysfunction is above all a threat to Pakistan and its burgeoning population. The region and the world come next. In India, the comparisons between Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir have been unavoidable as the two countries have suffered from the endemic violence, dynastic politics and a symbiotic relationship defined by cyclical political turbulence.

Today's subcontinent has all but forgotten the tolerant and inclusive Islam that was practised by the Sufis and which in large measure shapes the belief system of a vast majority of Muslims and non-Muslims alike. This is what the militancy and its official backers have now set out to achieve, but they forget that centuries of tradition of peace and inclusion can be dented but cannot be reversed.

Bhutto's mass appeal remained a formidable challenge to the Pakistani establishment and it failed to undo the legacy of people-centred politics for three decades. The Bhutto brand of politics came about without the manipulations of the bureaucratic steel-frame that shaped Pakistani politics, often in tandem with foreign interests. Benazir's return in October showed that her popular support was intact despite the corruption charges, trials – real and media-led – and continued impression of incompetence and opportunism in a culture of misogyny and violence against women. Her worst opponents could not deny her dazzling articulation and grasp of global politics. And now, like her father, she also demonstrated an uncanny sense of history, of seizing the moment and dying for the cause of political process in the militarized Pakistan.

This fearlessness of death is a Sufi trait as death is just another phase in our journeys and struggles. The inclusive and multicultural legacy of the Sufis is endangered by the rise of militant Islam and politics of elimination. Benazir Bhutto had drawn on this legacy and in her death we are reminded of the urgency to revisit and build on that legacy.

_January 2008_
2.

Suicide Bombing – The Narratives of Terror

An overwhelming majority of Pakistan's population finds itself hostage to narratives of _terror_ that are either alien to its ethos or are constructed by its home-grown theologians and opinion-makers. This is not to say that the issue of suicide bombings is easy to define and understand. They are essentially complex and located in decades of Pakistan's evolution into a society that is difficult to label: Islamic in name, struggling to be democratic and proclaiming to be a republic which it is not; well, not yet.

If we take the viewpoint of liberals, it is our war as much as a war for others. If we were to hear the West, it is about countering terror and preserving world peace; if we listen to Pakistan's right it is someone else's battle fought on 'the land of the pure' lest we forget.

Where does this leave the confused, battered citizen who now has to strive for personal security among other daily struggles for existence? There are no clear answers and if one were to probe further, the questions are as murky as their geneses.

However, one thing is clear: to identify the recurrent suicide bombings in the name of theological, tribal and imperial grievances is at best a half-truth. The genesis is far more complex and it cannot be a response to the war on terror, they are the terror against which war is being waged. At the core of this phenomena, if one were to be rather blunt, lies an exclusive, bigoted ideology of a few men of holy intentions orchestrating a script written by others.

The Deoband School has in no uncertain terms rejected the Islamic pretensions of acts against the civilians – especially the ones of the suicidal variety. _Haram_ is forbidden and that's that. The Pakistani madressahs, drawing their inspiration from the Deobandi view of the world, need to hear this clearly. The Holy Book, traditions of the Prophet (pbuh) and later jurisprudence down to the Al-Azhar debates today allow no room for the pusillanimity of the invisible men (or women) buying their way to heaven through self-immolation.

What is happening then? Among the various postulates, the economic argument is the strongest. Pakistan's tribal areas, bypassed by modernity and economic progress are the poorest areas of the country. Other than lack, or shall we say virtual non-existence, of infrastructure and employment opportunities, ordinary citizens (for the sake of argument only) live in a society bound by the tribal code and an administrative system reminiscent of medievalism. Human life and dignity are subsumed into tribal honour and political Islam exploits all these fault lines to its maximum advantage.

In these rural ghettos, it is not difficult to sell the temporal and the spiritual package to families who are aggrieved by the ongoing war in their courtyards often sneaking into their schools, madressahs, marriage processions and day-to-day life.

This leads to the question of financing the militancy. Quite obviously, the figure of one million per family, anecdotal as it is, requires extensive cash transfers and an efficient system of exchange that either escapes scrutiny or is embedded. Either of the scenarios is worrying and merits a dispassionate analysis and not an emotional call for ending the foreign war.

Who are these clerics and networks that motivate young minds to accept death? What sort of indoctrination takes place and where? The situation is mystified by anecdotes on all sides again depending on the line you adopt and who your source happens to be. The western media would have us believe that it is the simplistic jihad for bin Laden-ism; the North Western Frontier Province versions suggest a resurgent Pakhtun nationalism; the mainstream right talks of the larger role of the west in the Islamic world. What exists is an utter state of confusion and uncertainty most conducive to such anti-people moments of history.

The tally is scary. During 2007, over 1500 Pakistanis were killed and thousands injured and maimed. In the first quarter of 2008, nearly 400 have died in acts of terrorism most notably suicide bombings. In 2006, the suicide attacks were six in number. A year later, over sixty attacks took place and the graph continues to rise. Thanks to a liberated media, you can see in real time heads, limbs, security guards being rammed into and all the gore that would put surrealism to shame.

And what does it say about the claims of our Islamic identity? That no mosque, Imambargah or even a funeral prayer is safe. Busy markets could turn into graveyards and peaceful rallies are venues for mass murders!

The discourse surrounding these acts is even more worrying. TV channels show speakers arguing for Shariat imposition in the northwestern areas to avoid such attacks, and respectable politicians, columnists and experts are found stressing that this is all a reaction to our faulty policies. If these reprehensible policies were changed or reversed, would the jihad factories change the production line? Perhaps for a short while, but then where would the holy warriors go?

Not long ago, these warriors were fighting by the side of today's villains. In the words of Samir Amin, 'Political Islam is not anti-imperialist, even if its militants think otherwise!' It is an invaluable ally for imperialism and the latter knows it. This is why a range of opinion polls show that a vast majority of people are against suicide bombings. Over time, people have smelled the rot masked as bravery.

The ugly truth is that any justification, even if remotely rational, amounts to legitimizing the heinous anti-people acts. Why should innocent citizens on the street be targeted in such a brutal manner? No excuse or explanation will do as all such narratives lead to making barbarity the norm. Decapitations in Swat, the blood of Benazir Bhutto and what not. How could an anti-imperial struggle end up imitating the imperial tactic of wreaking havoc and then accepting collateral damage?

The sooner we realize this, the better it is. What needs to be condemned has to be condemned, not condoned. Extremism is spreading within the body politic and it needs to be countered through all means, from dialogue, development and if needed, force. The root cause is poverty and lack of opportunity leading to alienation that is easily exploitable. This alienation is not tribal or religious, but economic and class-oriented; it is not linked with the NATO's occupation of Afghanistan.

It's about time we faced these prickly little truths before blaming the world and the gods.

_April 2008_
3.

Confronting Militancy

It is time that the vocabulary introduced by the global imperial projects is changed in Pakistan. The infamous and rotten coinage – war on terror – needs to be trashed. It was constructed by an imbecile global leader whose vision defies basic standards of human intelligence. And, in our case, the 'frontline-state status' is a passé title as well. The war has now entered Pakistani consciousness, has consumed thousands and continues to destabilize the country to a point where its citizenry is insecure and bereft of hope. We have to now protect Pakistanis and Pakistan first. Everything else is secondary.

The gravity of the situation is, however, not shared by many. The rugged militants are artfully backed by the 'urban Taliban', a term that has emanated from Sindhi intelligentsia. There are political parties and their leaders who downplay the threat to Pakistan, and a few journalists and TV anchors brazenly eulogize the Taliban bravery and, believe it or not, 'sound' governance. Even some on the residual Left term this extremism as an anti-imperial struggle. We are being reminded that the destruction of private property and daylight murders of innocent civilians are nothing but a 'reaction' to our policies and Western diktat. Ironically, a key religious party, Jamat- e-Islami, now marching across the country against the West, was ruling two of the war-zoned provinces for nothing less than five years supported the Army operations and legitimized a military ruler who was considered as the most allied-ally of the West.

Aren't the people of the smaller provinces justified in taking issue with the urban Taliban for their silence, when minority provinces are shoddily treated by the establishment even to the extent of being 'cleansed' in their homeland with their leaders brutally murdered? A legitimate question by all accounts. Is the blowing up of girls' schools, burning of CD shops and attacking tourist resorts also a reaction to Pakistani policies? Not quite.

Thus, the urban Taliban also allude that non-Muslim forces such as India are the motivators of the suicide bombers. The argument that a Muslim cannot kill other Muslims is fallacious and not supported by history or the way the so-called Islamic societies have functioned. After, all the Northern Alliance wallahs and the Pakistani Shias are Muslims too. Islamic history is replete with incidents that belie this mythical nonsense responsible for local insurgency. This mindset is further popularized by the jingoistic 'strategic' analysts who continue to blame the outsiders for our own follies and blunders.

The liberal prescription is equally messed up by throwing its weight behind army action and surgical strikes. This menace is not going to go away, let alone be successfully tackled through war. In the short term, reclaiming territory maybe imperative, but even this effort has been stymied by conflicting signals and un-sequenced actions. This is why the Awami National Party's leadership is now a hostage to a complex set of actors and processes. Thus, the policy to protect Pakistanis from violence has to be holistic and not merely war-mongering.

To make matters worse, the identification of this government's anti-terror mantra with Musharraf has amplified the perception that it is just another stooge of the dwindling imperial power. To be fair to the Pakistan People's Party, its stance has always been clear: it is opposed to extremism and the hijacking of Islam by self-styled jihad-warriors. In any case, the urban Taliban have managed to strengthen this perception of the capitulation of the Pakistan People's Party at the hands of Amreeka.

However, the incumbent government, notwithstanding a burdensome legacy, has been unable to demonstrate that it has the will or the capacity to handle the situation. The ordinary people, a bulk of whom viewed the Pakistan People's Party as 'their' party, are distraught due to galloping inflation and insecurity. The overwhelming sense of dejection and hopelessness arises from the way local investigation has progressed on late Benazir Bhutto's case. Admittedly, for good reasons, the onus of the investigation has been shifted to the slow and inefficient United Nations. This only strengthens the public impression that protection of Pakistanis is no longer possible by the local law enforcement agencies. Why has this been the slowest and most invisible of investigations, especially when the ruling party is the Pakistan People's Party?

Questions have also been raised as to how a truck loaded with a phenomenal quantity of explosives freely roams on barricaded Islamabad streets, is allegedly prepared for action in Islamabad, and remains unnoticed until it explodes. And reckless media theory suggesting that this was a slick James Bond-type operation against the US intelligence operatives merely dilute the colossal tragedy for the poor security personnel, the drivers and the passers-by, not to mention the trauma suffered by the general public. There is not a single country where freedom of the media allows for trashing a country's national security issues the way it is done here. The closeted extremists, thus, insult intelligence and humanity both in equal measure.

Our poor disaster-preparedness and emergency handling have also come into the glare of the public eye. How come not a single soul questioned the Marriott hotel magnate about inadequate fire-fighting measures in a top-notch establishment? Instead, many media reports were extolling the kind-hearted individual acts of charity of the hotel owners overlooking the sheer negligence that often accompanies profit-greed.

The bomb blasts in Lahore and elsewhere have also demonstrated that there are virtually no civil defence mechanisms in place. The government-managed civil defence departments are, historically, under-funded, untrained and miles away from being minimally functional. Despite the escalation of violence and the slow creeping of war into our cities and towns, there has been little effort on this front. This is the time when the public has to be prepared, motivated and taken along in the efforts to counter forces of violence.

However, nothing can be more urgent than the reclaiming of policy-making from the unelected power-elites by the civilian-elected decision makers. This is why the parliament's in-camera session has been such an important milestone despite the sensationalism caused by urban zealots and noises by political nobodies. Pakistan's troubled history teaches us this single lesson: there is no alternative to civilian ascendancy over national security. This will not be achieved overnight, but has to be earned overtime.

Five issues therefore become paramount:

  * The articulation of a refined policy and a home-grown agenda with bi-partisan consensus (the troublemakers can compose their cacophonous tunes but Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz is vital to this agreement)
  * A clear demonstration of the government's writ by expediting and completing a local inquiry into Benazir's assassination
  * Developing a strategy to confront the media zealots and urban Taliban who are cleaving public opinion through a discounted ideological framework
  * Bolstering the civil defence systems to ensure that the public is a proactive partner
  * An immediate attention to issues of social protection so that the citizens are shielded from the vagaries of economic exploitation.

There is a war, whether ours or not, on our doorstep. It is time to face the tide and confront it.

_October 2008_
4.

What Is the Threat? What Is the Way Out?

Not unlike good old Nero, who carried on with his self-involved pursuits while Rome burnt, our enlightened brigade from the Urdu and the English medium worlds have been quite busy with their hobbyhorses. With thousands of homes churning out a suicide bomber per minute, the national discourse, or the flimsy excuse for it, has been truly remarkable. First came the minus one formula, backed by the 'be-ghairat' Kerry-Lugar Bill and now the centre of the universe has shifted to the National Reconciliation Ordinance.

If one were to analyse the mountains of verbosity and poisonous write-ups in the print and electronic media, the storyline is as simple as follows: one fine day, Late Benazir Bhutto and her 'corrupt' husband sitting thousands of miles away from Pakistan issued the National Reconciliation Ordinance to 'protect' their wealth. As if these political leaders in exile in the wilderness had the legislative and executive authority to issue an ordinance.

We cannot debate the ordinance at this stage since the matter is now __ sub judice. However, even a child on a Pakistani street knows that a uniformed president and his khaki associates issued this ordinance and participated in the 'reconciliation' dialogue between the Late Benazir Bhutto and the military establishment. Today, the sententious media campaigns do not mention even one of these inconvenient truths. The issue at one level is quite basic: a legitimate political leader with a mass following was framed by the establishment twice over, then given a 'reconciliation' package and now, after her death, the perks have been withdrawn by the very same establishment.

This brings us to the larger question of the fundamental power imbalance that persists in Pakistan, i.e., between the unelected and elected institutions of the state. This time, thanks to a robust civil society movement, the judiciary, hitherto a subordinate partner of the executive, the beneficiary of a redistribution of power that has taken place since 2007, has gained powers from the street and has become a player of significance. Nevertheless, this still does not augur well for a democratic future. Democracy continues to be an elusive dream despite all the rhetoric and hyped-up yearnings of our masses.

The unelected executive comprising the military, the civilian bureaucracy and a powerful judiciary has now been joined by a fourth unelected partner – the media. Leading media persons on a daily basis quote 'insiders' and 'sources' and issue reports that are not contradicted by the 'powerful' elements of the civil-military establishment. At best, the servants of the state remain unaccountable and, at worst, regurgitate the old script in vogue since the 1950s: that the politicians are incompetent, corrupt and security risks. The guardians of Pakistan ideology, therefore, have the moral right to get rid of them when they want. The list of those whose corruption cases were pardoned under Musharraf's effort of 'reconciliation' amply proves that, out of several thousands, only a handful, in comparative terms, are politicians. The rest are all minions and top or underdogs of the unelected executive.

The army expenditure is still not audited and the drain on the budget cannot be questioned. If you talk of peace with India and an amicable settlement of the Kashmir dispute, you are bound to be labelled a traitor.

In a similar fashion, while the subordinate judiciary is accountable to the superior judiciary, the mechanisms of holding the superior judiciary accountable such as the supreme judicial council are ineffectual. Since the vindictive reference of General Musharraf against the incumbent chief justice, the issue of questioning judges has become intensely political.

The mala fide reference that was filed by General Musharraf was thrown out by the court through a short order issued on 20 July 2007 and the chief justice was restored. Ideally, after March 2009, as a matter of national priority and transparency, a detailed judgment should have been issued to set the parameters of the operations of the supreme judicial council. No institution within the constitutional scheme can, however, dare ask that question.

The recent judgment whereby the supreme court sent several judges home who were appointed by General Musharraf under the emergency was another peculiar instance. The decision was bold and historic in many ways; however, one of the aggrieved parties was the bench itself. This case opened up several legal issues which the constitutionalists will ponder over for years to come, not to mention the fact that the key culprits – General Musharraf, Shaukat Aziz and their legal eagles – have been let off despite the fact that they violated the constitution and incarcerated honourable judges.

In these times, when the country is burning and militancy is at its peak, the priorities of the unelected institutions are curiously different. Peshawar has been reduced to ruins, Lahore is hostage to fear, Islamabad is barricaded and every corner is unsafe, and guess what the loose alliance of civil-military-judicial-media establishment are concerned about? The focus is on President Zardari to keep him under immense pressure and even oust him when feasible

To the credit of the political class, despite its relative lack of experience and short-sightedness, it stands together. Well, at least for now. Pakistan's most popular leader, after the forced removal of Benazir Bhutto from the scene, stands firmly behind the democratic process and the regional political players are also not willing to play ball with the unelected state actors.

Who is the threat? The non-state actors – trained and armed jihadists by the military – firmly entrenched in the country and its cultural ethos, are enemies of this legitimate political class. In fact, the non-state militias want physical elimination of the godless political class, and they have started the process from the northwest. Take the case of hundreds of Awami National Party workers and leaders who have been killed during the last two years. Or, the Maliks and other tribesmen who have been completely eliminated from Federally Administered Tribal Areas?

All such power-revolutions in South Asia or the Indus Valley have historically commenced from the Western frontiers. Sadly, insiders within Pakistan are abetting the current wave of medievalism and international power play. The non-state actors are defiant and waiting for a political vacuum. Their key financiers have been from the Middle East and the rhetorical Ummah, but our spin doctors are keen to prove that this is the handiwork of an Israel-USA-India nexus.

So what is the way out, a rational mind would reflect? There is no option for the political parties but to get organized and weed out their internal morass. They need to be accountable to their constituents and immediately undertake measures to counter the torrent of disinformation and de-legitimization. They must be clear on their objective: civilian ascendancy. Democracy is not an overnight fix and the electoral and representative political frameworks must not be compromised on any pretext.

Firstly, the Charter of Democracy is a far-reaching framework that ought to be fully implemented and also widened in its ambit and ownership. All political parties must be brought within its fold. The provisions on army, judiciary and executive need to be operationalized at once. Of course, this requires a speedy passage of a constitutional bill that will undo the distortions inserted by the army and legitimized by the superior judiciary of yore.

Secondly, the parliament must also debate on media regulations. Its recent deliberations were helpful with respect to the coverage of terrorism. It must now refine and improve the media regulation and laws, and include a self-regulation mechanism that must be owned and managed by the media houses and journalists' associations.

Thirdly, the credibility of a civilian government in these times rests on the delivery of rights, entitlements and services. This includes security as a paramount state obligation. A restructuring of the civil service and security services is something that the federal and provincial governments must do.

Our given political and security mess denotes that the economy will refuse to grow at a rate required to match the population explosion and employment expectations. Therefore, a robust, effective social protection regime is essential. Benazir Income Support Programme is a step in the right direction. It needs to be made a lot more credible.

Finally, this is also the time for massive political mobilization as an antidote to the tyranny of the few. Political cadres are dying out after the unions and workers' groups have been eliminated. The political parties need to counter the growing Talibanization and extremism by getting down to the grassroots and reinforcing the conviction that an inclusive, democratic Pakistan is the only way out for the survival of our fractured federation. Gilgit-Baltistan reform and Balochistan package were great starters and now the centre has to initiate a series of such legal, administrative and financial packages for the northwestern and other marginalized regions to establish that the civilian governments are responsive to the diversity of a federation and only they can keep such arrangements intact and workable.

The erroneous illusion of Pakistan's civil society being a natural ally of democratic process is something to be questioned. Experience from authoritarian jurisdictions such as Indonesia, Thailand and Malaysia, amongst others, demonstrates that they prefer developmental civilian authoritarianism. In Pakistan, the clamouring for a strong man, a neo-Khomeini and a deliverer is an ever-present danger and the 1999 coup and its allies within the civil society are the recent history of our country.

Pakistan's survival is now dependent on its internal political situation. Contrary to the conspiracy theories, no foreign power wants a country with nuclear weapons and lashkars of jihadis and its state dismantled. By fuelling systemic instability, our unelected institutions are yet again creating uncertainty and hindering economic progress. It's about time we recognized this reality and moved on.

_December 2009_
5.

Salmaan Taseer's Assassination and State Failures

The brutal assassination of the governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, by a staff member of Punjab's supposedly professional 'elite force' has virtually exposed every fault line of contemporary Pakistan. That a constitutional figurehead of a province with no executive authority or legislative power could be murdered simply for dissenting with the extremist worldview, is shocking to say the least. However, the tragedy has compounded further, much like the dark denouement of a Greek tragedy. The well-organized, ruthless and all-powerful extremist forces have jumped into the fray and challenged the actuality of a cold-blooded murder. Clerics of all shades and varieties have tried to condone this act of barbarity and reactionary lawyers have promised to defend 'Ghazi' Mumtaz Qadri – a self-confessed killer – free of cost. Above all, public opinion has never been so shamelessly manipulated in Pakistan as it is being done today by sections of the electronic media who have gone out of their way to dilute the immensity of this event and short of condoning it, have attempted to justify the motives of the criminal Qadri and his followers (which, alas, are in the millions across Jinnah's Pakistan).

**Identity Mess:** Much has been said about Pakistan's warped identity and it is a cliché to say that it is a tottering society in search of an identity. It should be clear to all and sundry by now that large numbers of its residents, thanks to state-led indoctrination and a poisonous educational system, have espoused the right-wing interpretation of Pakistan as a theocratic state and that too a particular variant of Sunni Islam. This dangerously imagined polity excludes a large number of Muslims who belong to different schools of thought within the plural and complex range of Islamic faith. The minorities in Pakistan have suffered throughout their history and their near invisibility and insecurity is now a given fact of life.

Taseer struggled to raise a voice from his public office to challenge the hegemony of Islamicistic discourse, which makes this ready-to-implode 'fortress of Islam' a repository for a faith-based nuclear bomb with thousands of armed militants ready to die in jihad and with irrationality driving all forms of decision-making – from foreign policy and economy to municipal issues such as the regulation of loud speakers in neighbourhoods. In effect, Jinnah's Pakistan is long dead and Zia's Pakistan lives on in its full glory.

**State Failure – No Longer a Myth:** We have always rejected the various pronouncements of state failure, labelling them conspiracies to destabilize Pakistan. Leading western think-tanks, experts and some Pakistani analysts have tried alerting us in the past. However, in the illusory fortress of Islam, such realistic prognoses have found little resonance. An extremist mindset has infiltrated state agencies from the sensitive to the less sensitive, and the governments of the day along with their large, compromised and unwieldy bureaucracies can do nothing in the face of this ideological onslaught. The policeman who killed Taseer had been removed from sensitive duties. He crawled back into the system and manipulated his posting as Taseer's personal guard. These are the parables of our times: the protectors are turning into killers and the defenders are turning into attackers. A day later, when Pakistan's 'last man standing' (Taseer's description of himself posted on Twitter) was brought back from the dehumanized precincts of Islamabad to Lahore, all state-employee Mullahs refused to offer his _namaz-e-janaaza_ (funeral prayer). The mighty federal government and the besieged provincial government took no action against these recalcitrant bigots who were not satisfied with the twenty-nine wounds that killed an enlightened man within a few seconds. Worst of all, the ruling party, i.e., the Pakistan People's Party appears to be in a state of ideological chaos as it has termed the murder 'a political assassination', whereas it is a simple case of extremism at its ugliest. Senior ministers of the Pakistan People's Party are on the defensive, claiming to be better Muslims than the mullahs and swearing blind to kill all blasphemers. Taseer's murder has churned out a new tragedy by the hour.

**Progressive Political Space?:** In the last two years, Salmaan Taseer had emerged as a pillar of enlightenment and rationality in Pakistan's opportunistic and dismal political discourse. He had consistently taken positions against Talibanization, growth of militancy in the Punjab, blasphemy laws, minority and women's rights. He expressed his views without fear and displayed no signs of regret even when his party distanced itself from his unadulterated, principled stance on such issues. This progressive political space, which had already shrunk after the death of Benazir Bhutto and the ancillary rise of the Taliban, is now receding at an alarming pace. The myth of the Deobandi sect being the only variant of militant Islam has also been exposed, as the otherwise peaceful Barelvis have openly expressed their penchant for violence over the issue of blasphemy. Unless the political forces join hands to counter this new wave of Islamism, Pakistan will drift towards a stage where Al Qaeda and its local hosts will find public support in reshaping the old Pakistan into a new radical, totalitarian country.

**Political Instability and Further Chaos?:** Whilst the extremists are busy pursuing multiple agendas of harassment and violence, and deepening their discourse, the so-called moderate political parties are engaging unwittingly in a crazy death dance. The Muttahida Qaumi Movement, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazal are all scrambling for power and patronage. Either they are oblivious to the mammoth challenges in front of them or their short-term goals have beclouded their political understanding of a Pakistan which is changing quite rapidly. This new Pakistan hosts nearly 105 million inhabitants under the age of twenty-six with inappropriate skills, little or no education and a shrinking economy that only provides black market options as the means of subsistence and survival. The black market, or what the experts would euphemize as 'the informal economy', among other things, comprises of smugglers, criminal gangs, militant groups and the urban mafia, further adding to the chaos in the country.

The irrational political parties want the Pakistan People's Party government to refrain from raising taxes, increasing fuel prices and balancing its books as it wants the government to fail in the short term. Such a lack of vision and sagacity is truly alarming and perhaps the day is not too far when the extremist ideological narratives will be the only option for Pakistanis to cherish. It is a separate matter that such ideological upheavals seldom lead to 'solutions' in the long term. However, we seem to be doomed to follow a trajectory that history has time and again shown as a natural outcome of oppression, economic exploitation and arbitrary modes of governance.

Taseer's murder, therefore, is not an isolated incident. It fits into the macabre game plan of Pakistan's move towards extremism where the liberal or the moderate is a fictional character: this curious species has to either espouse a grand exclusivist narrative or be silenced!

**The Curse of Geo-Politics:** 2011 may actually be the last chance for Pakistan and its ruling classes to make existential choices. In June 2011, the exit plan by the US/NATO might be finalized in consultation with Pakistan's security establishment. The current features of this plan include power-sharing arrangements with the 'good' Taliban. In the short term, that may be an elusive victory for Pakistan's strategists. However, in the long term, it means that the Talibanization of Pakistan would be unstoppable, creating more fissures within the state policy. The Taliban rulers in Kabul would not be content with a limited area of operations as they would seek a power space in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the fortification of ideological emirates in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. How would any strategy to counter extremism be effective in such a scenario? Several analysts are of the view that the pursuit of such policies at home and abroad may worsen Pakistan's current predicament in the medium term. Similarly, the refusal to engage with India exacerbates the irrational worldview that drives an extremist mindset. It is in 2011 that we need to determine where we would like to go: towards a more rational future or remain embroiled in a state of perpetual fight with history and the plural values of our society.

We have reached a point where if the 'silent majority' – a phrase which has become questionable in the context of mainstream support for the murder – does not take a united stand against the forces that are out to impose a neo-Fascist ideology on the denizens of the country, then Pakistan as envisioned by Jinnah will permanently cease to exist. The political forces and the military establishment have one final chance to stop Pakistan from slipping into the abyss of a totalitarian system which idealizes barbarity, promotes further intolerance and alarms the world by managing a lunatic society with nuclear weapons. It's about time we all woke up.

_January 2011_
6.

Address Radicalization Before It's Too Late

As Pakistan enters into another year fraught with fresh challenges and old dilemmas, it is quite clear that its ruling elites – civil and military – are unwilling to learn from history. The crisis of governance in the country has spiralled out of control. We are speeding towards grave internal conflict, the possibility of which has been bolstered by debilitating economic woes in the wake of highly inflationary trends. Most importantly, the dilemma of reconciling our national security interest with a possible long-term economic agenda is growing more problematic by the day.

Radicalistan? Pakistan's radicalization is now a threat to its society and region. Whilst General Zia-ul-Haq will be remembered for institutionalizing extremism, most Pakistani governments, including democratic and quasi-democratic regimes have in the past, surrendered to the Islamist fringe. From Liaquat Ali Khan's acquiescence to the terribly vague and confusing Objectives Resolution to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's unpardonable act of declaring Ahmedis as non-Muslims through a constitutional amendment, Pakistan's long-term interest has always been sacrificed at the altar of short-term expediency and political survival. However, the Pakistan of today is not a case of a majority beholden to a virulent minority; it is split from within and fraying at the edges.

Extremism has become embedded in our social fabric? We are a country in transition. The old is cracking up and the new remains undefined and directionless. Over 65 per cent of Pakistan's exploding population is under the age of twenty-six and the coming generations will set the future course of the country. However, the portents are disheartening. Nearly 60 per cent of the youth surveyed in a countrywide poll (organized by the British Council Pakistan) has little faith in democracy. Therefore, the glorification of the former governor of Punjab, Salmaan Taseer Shaheed's murderer is not an isolated matter. It reflects a combination of societal changes in the broader context of religio-political transformation.

At least three factors have greatly contributed to these phenomena:

  * The education system and its overtly pro-jihad bias (whether in madrassas or in state-run schools) has led to the construction of a particular mindset that shuns reason in favour of a theological or a hyper-nationalistic discourse
  * The institutionalization of mullahs and mosques with hefty state patronage backed by the zakat distribution systems ensure that public discourse is dictated by and aligned with national security imperatives
  * The sheer neglect of a social change agenda and absolute disregard for issues of social justice and a citizen voice means that there is an ever-increasing citizenship crisis. A large number of Pakistanis either enjoy partial citizenship rights (Balochistan, many parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and even Karachi for that matter) or none at all (Federally Administered Territories Areas, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, to name a few)

**Statelessness:** Above all, Pakistan has also become a polity without a state. We have a colonial version of the police force – brutal and extractive – and over the last decade, it has been under severe attack by militants and organized terrorist groups. The courts are dysfunctional and corrupt at the lower levels. Even worse, they are becoming increasingly conservative in their approach to legal discourse. Be it the issue of whether Pakistan is to be secular or not, how much land reform is 'halaal', issues of women's rights or more recently, the fate of terrorists, we have subordinate courts which are simply not delivering justice. At the same time, the traditional systems of justice have either broken down (in Federally Administered Territories Administration or elsewhere) or become instruments of the powerful at the local level and, more importantly, turned incompatible with the requirements of the twenty-first century.

For the past decade, the worst crisis to hit Pakistan has been the annihilation of the local state. The abolition of the district magistrate to enforce state writ was meant to give way to local democracy (never mind its patrimonial nature). However, the reversal of the local government system after eight years of experimentation and the inability of political parties at the centre and the provinces to create new local governance frameworks has increased the disappearance of state writ. The situation is chaotic: the existing law is no longer being implemented and the 'new' draft laws are stuck in a political quagmire in Punjab and Sindh – the two most populous provinces of the country.

**No Change-agenda:** Such has been the extent of the endemic crisis that no political party or even its nemesis – the military-technocratic cabal – has a coherent agenda for social change. Take the manifestos of the mainstream political parties in Pakistan: they read like neo-liberal recipes with cosmetic, or worse, populist rhetoric. Oppositions rarely work towards finding a solution and the ruling parties are completely beholden to International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for maintaining a simple cash flow.

This is why Pakistan's elites and a paralyzed civil service have entrusted the task of policy-making and solutions to a handful of international development organizations. The policy solutions, neither home-grown nor widely debated, remain closed-door exercises and inherently non-participatory.

**Blame It on Geo-politics:** Many in Pakistan blame the western strategic interests and our frontline status in the war on terror as the key reasons for our failures. However, this is only a partial story. The truth is that Pakistan's elites have used the frontline status as instruments to gain leverage for financial flows while keeping their rapacious plundering intact or to retain 'foreign' support for prolonging regimes that are unpopular and praetorian in nature. However, there is a growing realization in the civil-military circles that the game has slipped out of their ambit and gone into the lawless minefield known as Pakistan. How else could one describe attacks on presidents, the General Headquarters, police and paramilitary installations, not to mention rampant terror attacks on civilians? State ineffectiveness has meant that the inherent powers and functions of the state have perhaps moved too far into the 'non-state' domain. It is clear that Pakistan's security establishment is no longer in control of the proliferating militant organizations and mafias.

**Economic Decline:** Our economic woes today are the direct result of a larger and deeper governance malaise. What could be more unfortunate than the fact that Pakistan, located in a global high-growth zone (China and India are growing at 10 and 9 per cent respectively), is struggling to maintain a 3 per cent growth rate? In terms of social indicators, we are not far from sharing these with the world's poorest regions where high infant mortality rates and incidence of polio are considered indicators of public health. This is not to claim that India and China have achieved improved resource distribution (India's poverty is a huge challenge), but they are rapidly lifting people out of poverty and moving forward. On the other hand, we are still groping for the next tranche of an International Monetary Fund loan to buy oil for consumption and other key import items or simply to stay afloat.

This is once again related to the way we have defined ourselves in relation to the world. We are eager to get Kashmir liberated, but happy to blame the US, India and others for the insurgency in Balochistan. Our trade with India is negligible compared to its true potential and there is an absolute lack of consensus on vital issues such as a functional tax system. A substantive portion of the country's defence expenditure remains beyond public view and ill-conceived and patronage-based development programmes cater to the contractors' mafia who are now entrenched among civil-military elites.

**Bleak Future for Many:** However, the real challenge, as noted above, remains the lack of faith of Pakistan's youth in the country and perhaps for good reason. Employment levels are static or falling and Pakistan needs a 7 to 8 per cent growth rate to cater to the requirements of the increased workforce. Vocational training programmes managed by the federal and provincial governments are farcical (there is still a course for repairing black-and-white television sets) and, therefore, the younger population finds it hard to see much hope for its future. This factor alone will prove to be the defining one for Pakistan. The country will need to make the right choices sooner rather than later: whether it wants to retain the status quo on a set of policies geared towards national security obsessions or move to a set of more rational choices which include trading with India, focusing on expenditure reductions (especially in defence) and giving up on socially expensive projects of raising proxies for controlling the neighbourhood.

The chances of course-correction are slimmer than ever. The political elites are battling for their very survival in the face of an increased threat from the extremists and the timetable of NATO's withdrawal from Afghanistan has provided Pakistan's security establishment with an immediate prospect of regaining its eroded strategic depth in Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the cost of these choices is far too great for the country to bear anymore. Obsessive hatred towards India and the inclination for a Talibanic solution means that extremism will deepen and irredeemably damage Pakistani society.

**Short-term Is Explosive:** In the short-term, this self-created mess is getting worse. Recent indications that another unnatural Islamist alliance is emerging out of anti-blasphemy mobilization are noteworthy. Rarely have the Deobandis and Barelvis joined hands to fight the moderates in the political spectrum. Even rarer is the case of high profile support from lawyers, sections of the media, police (note the conduct of Rawalpindi police while dealing with Salmaan Taseer's murderer) and subordinate judges (more sentences under blasphemy law have been awarded in recent weeks). The ruling moderate parties are on the defensive, fearful of a 1977-type Nizam-e-Mustafa movement and the opportunity that it provided to the military to capture power. The current convergence of Islamist parties and groups spells doom as a potential Taliban government in Kabul would like to do business with a resurrected Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal in Pakistan, while the ineffectual moderate parties will lose the elections due to high inflation, the persistent energy crisis and associated unrest. Leading economists of the country are gradually agreeing on a bleak scenario for the immediate term.

It is, therefore, vital for the political parties with high stakes in the system to arrest this situation before it gets any further out of hand. Similarly, Pakistan's security establishment must also review its current policies which may fan further militancy and extremism given what repeated military interventions have done to civilian institutions. There remains no alternative to taking bold and radical policy steps. Some of them are within the purview of quasi-democrats, such as installing the local government system (a sequel to the 18th Amendment), public campaigns against extremism and reforms in education. Above all, there is a dire need to find a consensus on economic reforms. Matters such as Afghanistan and India policies can at least be debated by the national and provincial assemblies and the media platform. After all, both the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz want to trade with India. Silence or opportunism would not do the country any good when it is on the brink of imploding. The political parties also control the police force and other law enforcement agencies where reforms can be introduced.

We cannot be oblivious to the fact that Pakistan's quasi-democracy might be the nation's last hope before a tide of part-real and part-manufactured extremism engulfs the country. However, this is an epiphany that our myopic political class needs to undergo before it is too late.

_January 2011_
7.

Karachi Continues to Bleed

Karachi's mayhem in the past few days has exposed, once again, the primary issue of the megapolis – a weak, encroached-upon state. The city has grown in numbers and is now home to millions of Pakistanis of all varieties. Its cosmopolitanism and centrality to Pakistan's economy means that Pakistan cannot remain unaffected if its largest city is not functioning well.

July has been a bloody month. However, this is not the first time that the city has been subjected to ethnic-bloodbaths. A week ago, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement walked out of the federal and provincial governments and this was a signal to all and sundry that the tenuous and uneasy peace between the various power-brokers in Karachi would be affected or, at worst, torn asunder.

This is precisely what happened. A strike followed the decision and over a hundred people were killed in various low-income settlements comprising mohajirs (migrants), Pakhtuns and others. Public transport came to a standstill and innocent citizens were targeted by death squads of major political parties which mobilize people around ethnic and linguistic identities. The underlying class-divides among major ethnic groups is also an issue to be explored. The biggest city, alas, is also the most under-researched region of Pakistan.

When the events of early July settled, the tense truce between the Muttahida Quami Movement and the government was shaken when the firebrand Sindhi nationalist representative of the Pakistan People's Party, Zulfiqar Mirza, lashed out against Altaf Hussain, the leader of the Muttahida Quami Movement, living in exile far away from the turbulence of Karachi. Calling Mr Hussain a bigger criminal than the leaders of the Muttahida Quami Movement's breakaway faction, Mirza also made some sweeping, ill-informed remarks against the mohajirs who had arrived in Karachi after Partition.

The media re-emerged as a major influence in shaping the public opinion in Karachi and elsewhere. The statement of Mirza, which has now been officially denounced by Pakistan People's Party (along with an apology by him), was repeated ad nauseam to indicate how the Pakistan People's Party had initiated an 'ethnic conflict'. The ethnic conflict has been there for decades and even during the Pakistan People's Party-Muttahida Qaumi Movement alliance, the phenomenon of target killing persisted. More people died in Karachi due to target killings than incidents of terrorism in the city.

**A Dying Patient:** The state institutions in Karachi are weak and ineffectual. Successive federal and provincial governments, due to their short-term goal of holding power, have allowed the governance crises to deepen. Instead of reform and institution-building, the political parties have entered into alliances with the mafia in Karachi for short-term peace. But the results have been disastrous. The bureaucracy is divided along ethnic lines with each party and its loyalists in positions of power. The police force, recruited on political lines and not merit, is weak, unprofessional and untrained to handle the challenges of governance and the worsening law and order.

**Whither Local Governance:** During the Musharraf years, Karachi's local governance arrangements had improved. To give credit to an unrepresentative military regime, the local government system showed some positive results in terms of service delivery and the citizen-state relations. The Muttahida Quami Movement ruled the municipalities of Karachi under the new local governance framework that led to a noticeable improvement in the infrastructure. In the larger political context, Musharraf viewed the Muttahida Quami Movement and Karachi as his constituency of sorts. Therefore, additional financing for Karachi's development was injected into the central and provincial budgets. However, major reform such as the finalization of the Karachi master plan, introduction of mass transit and improvement in security apparatus were not delivered largely due to the federal government's desire to control the city. The posting of rangers in Karachi is mind-boggling, given that the border security force is ill-trained to manage urban law and order. The recent killing of a young man in a public park by the rangers demonstrates this mismatch.

**Mafia vs Mafia:** Such is the governance culture since the emergence of Muttahida Quami Movement that ethnic mobilization and armed wings of political parties are informally accepted modes for transacting power and citizen interest. In recent years, the Pashtun immigration into Karachi has added a new powerful player in Karachi. The Awami National Party, therefore, is a stakeholder in Karachi's politics beyond its domains in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and perhaps parts of Balochistan. Since 2008, reports suggest that a third power-group in the form of the Lyari Aman Committee has emerged with a militant wing. Therefore, Karachi has also witnessed the fragmentation of Muttahida Quami Movement's traditional 'control' and sole-representative status in the city. The three power groups, i.e., the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Awami National Party's militant cadres and the Lyari Aman Committee now operate in Karachi as the 'real' state, i.e., as the revenue-raising authority: consequently influencing policy and development.

It is also an established fact that many of Karachi's businesses – of all varieties – pay 'rent' to these mafias for their protection and 'security' as the state seems to have lost or willingly 'subcontracted' that function to private actors. There are Pathan areas, and then there are mohajir areas and other settlements which, through a complex network of middlemen, touts and strongmen pay money also known as 'bhatta'. Therefore, the political economy of Karachi's violence is far more complicated than is painted or discussed.

**Back to the Colonial Era:** The response of the federal government, to return to the 1861 Police Act as a means to improve Karachi's situation, is unfortunate and untimely. First of all, the Police Order needs certain prerequisites to be in place, such as the revival of the district magistrates, which may not be feasible given the potential for conflict with the judiciary on separation of powers. Secondly, urban policing was never a strong point of the 1861 law as it was largely designed to exercise colonial control over a widely dispersed rural population. In any case, restoration of an old law will only lead to further chaos and confusion. In addition, the inevitable court battles will erode whatever little impact it may have in the short term. The government will have to think of more contemporary solutions, including community policing.

**And a Commissioner, Once Again:** Along with the revival of the old police system, the institution of the commissioner has also been revived. The commissioner has no executive powers, especially with regard to law and order as it is an office meant for administration and coordination of landed property. The larger aim is to revert to the old districts that existed in the pre-2001 administrative landscape. The revival of districts and the local government system of 1979 is seen as an attempt to dilute the city-level control and subdivide it as per the demands of non-mohajir communities living in Karachi. The Muttahida Quami Movement bitterly opposes this move and it will prove to be a contentious issue.

**Is the Muttahida Quami Movement Isolated?:** With the unofficial alliance of all non-mohajir representatives and Muttahida Quami Movement's breakaway factions operating under the guise of Sunni Tehreek, there is greater likelihood of street battles erupting and getting out of control. It is true that the Pakistan People's Party controls the federal agencies such as the rangers and the Frontier Constabulary, but further escalation of violence and tension will have an adverse impact on democratic and consensual decision-making. Zulfiqar Mirza's bravado and Pakistan People's Party's risk-taking is, therefore, a game of chance that may work or simply backfire with unfortunate consequences. Given the current configuration, Muttahida Quami Movement is rightly worried about being side-lined and denied of its due share in power arrangement. But then it cannot totally absolve itself of the blame as it has always been a major actor in Karachi's politics and governance. Karachi's economy cannot function without the inclusion of other communities given the interdependence of economic and social forces. The transport business is largely operated by the Pathans, so they simply cannot be isolated from the power matrix and decision-making. As the second largest community, they also have a right to claim their share.

As always, Karachi needs democratization of power, robust accountability mechanisms and strengthening of the state as the mediating agent between diverse interests and lobbies. There can be no other alternative to a responsive local government, a municipal police and effective law-enforcement agencies. The notions of cosmetic and brutal 'clean-up' operations are recipes for failure because they cannot change the underlying imbalances in the state and society. The democratic option is clear. The major political parties will have to agree on a common agenda for reform and negotiate it. In the absence of such a political compact, the dwindling federal state will intervene to 'fix' things or the jihadis united under the broad umbrella of an Al Qaeda worldview may emerge as the winners.

An army intervention has never achieved systemic changes. Karachi is no exception. Similarly, the reported hideouts of the jihadis in Karachi can flourish only under a situation of permanent chaos. Karachi is Pakistan's only port city; it is also the NATO supply line route and the financial nerve centre. Above all, it belongs to its resilient, inventive citizens who want peace, security and opportunities. Ending violence in Karachi and creating equitable opportunities should, therefore, become a top priority for political parties. Otherwise, they are doomed to fail us once again.

_August 2011_
8.

Myth and Reality of Extremism

A recent attempt to understand militancy, _Poverty and Support for Militant Politics: Evidence from Pakistan_ by Graeme Blair, C. Christine Fair, Neil Malhotra and Jacob N. Shapiro, 2011, provides fresh insights into the phenomenon or myth of popular support for militant extremism in Pakistan. Using a sample of urban and rural population and employing inventive techniques, this research is an important document if only Pakistan's policy-makers would pay attention to the little evidence that is generated with respect to militancy. It is a sad state of affairs that our national policy institutes and 'think-tanks' are yet to undertake such studies even when the state and its agencies have been brutally attacked and over 35,000 Pakistanis have died due to terrorism during the last decade. By no means does this survey provide a definitive account of what is happening in the country. However, in the absence of any other study, its findings are most useful to debate how extremism is taking root in the society.

The survey firstly measured public attitudes towards four important militant groups: Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, Kashmiri groups (Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, among others) and sectarian groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the study concludes that the survey participants 'were generally negatively inclined toward all four militant organizations' and reinforced what many analysts have often said: 'Pakistanis do not have a taste for militancy.' However, participants differentiated between the groups. They were more inclined to believe that Kashmiri-linked groups provided public welfare like health services, etc., and were much more likely to say that they were fighting for a good cause. Secondly, Pakistanis living in violent parts of the country (e.g. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), abhor these groups probably because they pay a higher price for their actions.

Most significantly, the third finding of the study was that poor Pakistanis resented these groups almost twice as much as middle-class Pakistanis. In fact, the authors concluded that middle-class Pakistanis were 'mildly positive' toward militants. A reasonable explanation for this finding was that militant groups are more likely to strike in bazaars and mosques – places that the poor frequent – and the attacks pose more of an economic threat to the poor, whose losses are proportionately greater than those of the more affluent sections of society.

The final conclusion relates to the condemnation of militant organizations by poor urban residents. The negative relationship between poverty and support for militancy is three times stronger in urban Pakistan than in the country as a whole. This finding reinforces the idea that aversion to militants is driven by the greater exposure to their attacks which are concentrated in urban areas. The study, therefore, busts the myth that support for militancy is related to individuals' socio-economic status, especially poverty, and calls for 'substantial revision' of the international aid policy (especially from the United States) which predicates itself on poverty as the key driver of the support for extremism.

This study could not have come at a more opportune time. In the past few years, Pakistan has witnessed an exceptionally high level of tolerance for extremism among the middle class, which staffs Urdu media and provides intellectual direction to public opinion. Urdu newspapers glorify militant groups as the agents of local and global 'jihad' and are steeped in the jihadist discourse that emanated from Pakistan's concerted alliance with the US in the 1980s to nurture the Mujahideen and later efforts to seek 'strategic depth' in Afghanistan and 'fix' India via proactive jihadism. Little has changed in the past three decades except the fact that a grander version of Urdu press now exists in the shape of electronic media. The latter, barring a few exceptions, has also overtly and covertly supported soft-Islamism as a natural policy option for an Islamic Republic endowed with nuclear weapons.

However, this worldview did not come into being in a few years. Pakistan's history and its issues of identity have haunted the state right from its inception. From the 1949 Objectives Resolution to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Islamization efforts, most notably getting the parliament to declare one sect as 'non-Muslim' in 1974, Islamism has been a strong narrative, though with little electoral basis or mass appeal. However, Zia-ul-Haq used the well-organized Jamaat-e-Islami and powerful mullahs from other Islamist groups to engineer 'intellectual' support for a long dictatorship in the name of Islam. His rule also supported sectarian organizations, especially those propagating a Saudi-Wahabi version of Islam with ample financing from the Middle East that continues to date.

By the late 1980s, 'defeat' of India and 'control' over Afghanistan were seen as legitimate goals of Pakistan's jihad industry. During the 1980s, the education system also reflected these goals: there is credible evidence now cited in various papers and books which demonstrate how the central ministry of education was tasked to indoctrinate young minds in public schools and train a crop of jihadis through a specially financed and protected madrassa network outside the formal schooling system. Three generations have been fed with this ideological diet and, therefore, an eager audience for Islamist discourses exists in Pakistan.

The civil-military bureaucracy recruits its officers from the Pakistani middle class (whichever way one defines it). A large number of fresh entrants to the 'system', therefore, come with an education that is conducive to the continuation of militarism and jihadism in pursuit of Pakistan's destiny as a nuclear Islamic fortress beset by foreign conspiracies. The so-called 'non-state' actors or sections of civil society which provide justification to military ascendancy, reinforce this 'mindset'. In particular, the unilateral and narrow interpretation of jihad thus becomes a 'truth' in itself, thereby allowing the justifications or even support for militant groups for the attainment of Pakistan's global 'importance'. Whilst we are seriously short of empirical evidence of civil servants' attitudes, the retired officers who write and speak in the public domain testify to this unfortunate trend.

For instance, former chiefs of the ISI openly argue how important the militant groups are for Pakistan's strategic leverage and ability to bargain with the United States and the west. The retired ambassadors, save a few exceptions, regurgitate the unimaginative India policy and indirectly, sometimes more directly, justify how militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba are important to our policy goals. A new crop of TV anchors, reporters and producers, also educated in Pakistani schools and colleges, allow for this space to grow; the handful of naysayers or 'independent' thinkers are either not given space or drowned in the shrillness of apologia for terrorism.

Another cultivated opinion on the Pashtuns' affinity for militant groups has been busted by the survey mentioned above. There is very little support among Pakhtuns for the militias. For years, the mainstream media and rogue analysts were citing the US presence in Afghanistan and the emergence of Pashtun nationalism as the reasons for the romantic anti-US struggle through militant groups operating under the banner of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. It was only when terrorism spread beyond Khyber Pakhtunkhwa that Punjab and Balochistan came into the media spotlight. The seminaries operating in the Punjab have grown in size, strength, resources and outreach.

A recent report entitled _Madrassahs Fanning Radicalism_ was reportedly forwarded by the Punjab home department to the Punjab inspector general of police and other senior police officers, including divisional commissioners, urging regulation of mainstream madrassas 'to ensure protection of civil society from radicalization and sectarian polarization'. ('Intelligence report: Punjab seminaries fanning radicalism identified.' The seminaries named in the report include Madarassa Usman-o-Ali in Bahawalpur, Al-Noor Markaz Muridkey Goraya in Sialkot, Madrassa Darul Uloom Khatijatul Qubra Lil Banat in Multan, among others).

Therefore, the rise of extremism is no longer a localized issue. The obvious inability of the Punjab government to take on the militant organizations also reflects how the state may be becoming weaker in confronting these outfits. Most certainly, the support for militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is, therefore, not the root cause for the rise of radical seminaries. The deep involvement of the state and its policy of allowing extremist ideologies to flourish and accept Gulf funding may be the actual issues of concern. Any counter-terrorism strategy ignoring these vital links is likely to fail.

The only way Pakistan can begin to alter the discourse on militancy, jihad and the rising tide of Islamism is through a consensus among the stakeholders of the democratic system. Despite several initiatives, such a consensus is lacking. A common agreement among the civilian stakeholders will be essential to move towards a strategy to address militancy. The major opposition party and a formidable representative of the Punjab needs to take a clear position and should not play the politics of expediency by suggesting that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and its agenda is tolerable and that the Punjab province should be left alone. Thus far, Imran Khan has been apologetic about the Taliban and has indulged in populist anti-USA rhetoric. Khan would be well-advised to read and imbibe the major findings of the survey cited above.

Finally, the international community, especially the United States, should revise its agenda for Pakistan's 'development', which currently is a strategic extension of the war on terror. Poverty reduction ought to be the overarching goal, but more needs to be done with the education system, madrassa reform and media regulation. Pakistan needs to undertake more research and update its sources of data on militancy for effective policy-making and for providing the right direction to international aid. Otherwise, we may end up once again on our past trajectory of getting too much aid with little or no results.

_August 2011_
9.

The Killing of Shias Is a Rude Wake-up Call for the State and Society

'The joke is that those who raise the slogan of Islam in the loudest voices have nothing to do with the philosophy of this religion... Apart from imperialism, no mention is ever made of Islam's great humanism, nor is it considered necessary to speak about the open-heartedness of Arab seers, Iranian poets and Indian Sufis. There is no interest in the philosophy of Ali and Hussain. Islam is being presented as a violent religion and a violent way of life.' (Qurratulain Hyder, Aag Ka Darya, 1957)

On 16 August 2012, passenger buses heading towards Gilgit-Baltistan via the Mansehra-Naran-Jalkhad route were stopped by killers dressed in military uniforms who undertook a witch-hunt of Shia Muslims by putting them through a theological test. Later, the terrorists killed twenty-one Shias and three Sunnis who tried to protect the former. This was the second such incident on the highway: in February 2012, ninteen Shias were murdered in broad daylight. Only this year, there have been dozens of attacks on the Shia population in Pakistan and hundreds have been killed.

More recently, Gilgit-Baltistan and Balochistan have emerged as the hot spots for Shia hatred and killings. These are zones where governance is at its weakest and new havens are being established for Sunni militant organizations that can launder the Taliban and Al Qaeda agendas to destabilize the country and 'cleanse' it of non-Wahabi-Salafi influence.

The expansion of sectarian hatred has emerged as a major threat to peace and harmony in Pakistan. The denominational differences in Islam are not new. They have been there since the new faith spread from the seventh century onwards. Sects of Islam have always reinforced the pluralism of this faith and its ability to absorb myriad cultural nuances. From the spartan interpretations of the faith in the Arabian Peninsula to the eclectic central Asian and Persian cultures, the core principles of Islam – equality, redistributive justice and focus on spirituality – have attracted a variety of groups and communities.

In South Asia, Islam arrived through the Sufis who were multicultural by birth and attitude. Sufis had their sectarian origins, but they placed emphasis on the inherent cultural diversity of the subcontinent; instead of being exclusivistic, they attempted to be as inclusive as possible. Most Sufi orders established in medieval India respected local traditions, folklore, languages and age-old belief systems. This is how the peculiar framework of a tolerant, secular local society emerged in South Asia. As court-based Ulema gained power and influence, there were communitarian and sectarian tensions that accompanied the emergence of an organized clergy.

The Shia and Sunni clerics opposed each other but kept the debates intellectual and theological. Manazara (a theological debate) was a popular instrument in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. It would shock many Pakistanis to know that even Ahmadis (also termed pejoratively Qadianis) held manazaras with Sunni clerics and no one branded each other as infidel or called for 'cleansing'.

The contemporary notion of violence and hatred is a political phenomenon, a manufactured majoritarian religious identity developed by the state. This is why there was an official dilemma, a schism, manifested at the time of the funeral prayers for Jinnah, the country's founder. The latter had converted to the Shia faith but, as a leader of the Sunnis, his funeral had to subscribe to the majority norm. The civil-military bureaucracy – devoid of a political and progressive vision for the post-colonial state – allied with the clerics and capitulated at every stage. In the 1960s, the funeral of Jinnah's sister, also a democrat, Fatima Jinnah, underwent a similar trajectory. Khaled Ahmed has quoted Ayub Khan's diaries in his seminal work on sectarianism. The lines from Ayub Khan are tragicomic as well as indicative of how early we had started to pander to the exclusion of Shia identity in the public arena. Here is our 'progressive' dictator recording the account of Fatima Jinnah's funeral:

'11 July 1967: Major General Rafi, my military secretary, returned from Karachi. He had gone there to represent me at Miss Jinnah's funeral. He said that sensible people were happy that the government had given her so much recognition, but generally the people behaved very badly. There was an initial _namaz-e janaza_ at her residence in Mohatta Palace in accordance, presumably, with Shia rites. Then there was to be _namaz-e janaza_ for the public in the Polo Ground. There an argument developed whether this should be led by a Shia or a Sunni. Eventually, Badayuni was put forward to lead the prayer. As soon as he uttered the first sentence the crowd broke in the rear. Thereupon he and the rest ran leaving the coffin high and dry. It was with some difficulty that the coffin was put on a vehicle and taken to the compound of the Quaid's mazar where she was to be buried. There a large crowd had gathered and demanded to converge on the place of burial. This obviously could not be allowed for lack of space. Thereupon, the students and the goonda elements started pelting stones on the police. They had to resort to lathi charge and tear gas attack. The compound of the mazar was apparently littered with stones. Look at the irresponsibility of the people. Even a place like this could not be free of vandalism.'

While the Pakistani leadership was steering towards the creation of a Sunni identity for the state, the real putsch came in the 1970s with the formal alliance that Bhutto made with the Arab world and its proxies, i.e., the religious right. Thereafter, General Zia grew close to the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia. There was an amalgam of factors that influenced this move: petrodollars, migration of Pakistani workers, vague notions of an Ummah (dominated by Saudi and Pakistani muscle) and later, the clear-cut alignment with US strategic interests in Southwest Asia.

Saudi money started to shape a new Pakistan: an influential madrassa-mosque network which followed the 'Ahl-e-Hadith' interpretation of Islam closely tied in with the puritanical Wahabbi stream of Islam defined by the House of Saud to control the Arabian Peninsula and deny the Shia populations their voice and status in most of the Gulf belt. The introduction of mandatory Zakat collection and the promotion of Deobandi groups for jihadi purposes became state policies. Countering the evil Soviet Union was a collective project for Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with US money and short-sighted objectives for the region. Today, the US cries foul at Islamic jihad, conveniently forgetting that decades of investment by it has created the 'demand' for jihad.

This is why known clerics and 'scholars' such as Dr Israr Ahmad received state patronage. Their Shia-hating views were well-known and state-run television gave them ample space, and the vernacular press articulated their version of Islam spreading hatred across all strata of society. Pakistan's civil-military bureaucracy prayed on Fridays under the leadership of Dr Israr, who married away his daughter during Muharram (the month of mourning) to undermine the Shia religious-cultural practices. It is another matter that Pakistan's inherent pluralism, which is centuries old, continues to resist this top-down project of the state.

But this 'Sunnification' project is now an existential danger for Pakistan. Despite the limitations of PEW polls (a research centre based in Pakistan), their new survey shows that nearly half of the Pakistanis do not consider Shias as 'true Muslims'. Prolific atrocity literature and the Internet are the new bastions of religious extremism. On YouTube alone, thousands of videos can be found, labelling Shias as infidels and rationalizing militancy.

The top-down sectarian hatred for Shias has been institutionalized through the formation and rise of anti-Shia militant organizations such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, or its 'sanitized' version Ahl-e-Sunnat-wal-Jamaat, all of whom have played havoc with the social fabric of the country, especially in the Punjab province. Reports suggest that they are in league with the anti-state Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Others have seen this as an ominous sign of the Al Qaeda operating within Pakistan. Thus, the state and society of Pakistan are under severe threat.

As Ayaz Amir put it plainly:

'North Waziristan extremism has ideological sympathizers, sleeper cells and a support network, a mosque support network, running from one end of Pakistan to the other. And it is thriving in an atmosphere of radicalization marked by such incidents as the killing of Shias in Quetta, the murder of Shias in Kohistan... When the next bunch of Shias is murdered we read it as a newspaper item and shrug our shoulders and carry on as usual. And the call to prayers is sounded and it makes not the slightest difference to our collective conduct.'

Across the spectrum, Pakistan's sane voices are calling for urgent attention from the state. However, the politicians are scared of the power of Sunni extremists, as well as of their historical links with the intelligence agencies. The law enforcement agencies as a subset of the larger society are not free of radicalization either. The police recruitment and training methods are antiquated and do not have adequate focus on human rights' protection. Prosecutors are in short supply and too insecure to take a stance. What's worse, some say that the judges, who have also been cowed down by the might of these agencies, espouse the majoritarian (Sunni) Islamic identity. And the armed forces, never shy of advocacy on the USA Kerry-Lugar-Berman Bill, have nothing to say about the murder of their fellow citizens whose security is their professional duty. We are faced with an onslaught of silence, inaction and policy paralysis.

Pakistan has to protect its Muslims and non-Muslims alike. It has a constitution which needs to be upheld by all institutions of the state. Most importantly three areas of reform are critical:

  * First, beefing up and re-educating the law enforcement agencies towards giving protection to witnesses, prosecutors and judges who handle sectarian cases
  * Second, urgent measures to check the growth of the hate industry, which should be unacceptable in a plural country like Pakistan. For this purpose, publications need to be screened and the seminaries' curricula have to be regulated
  * Lastly, a comprehensive policy review by the military and civilian authorities to recognize that, far from being the assets, the Sunni extremist organizations are now sources of social instability and can accelerate state collapse. Surely this is not what the ruling elites want unless they are on a suicidal path

_August 2012_
10.

Fighting the Existential Battle

The renewed attacks by the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan across the country indicate the exasperation of this anti-state network trying to re-assert its strength in the face of the Pakistani army's operations as well as the drone strikes by the US which have now turned into whipping boys for most political parties.

The illegal drone strikes have targeted Al Qaeda leadership as well as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan stalwarts, leading to the dispersal of the militants' leaders and the relocation of Al Qaeda, reportedly to several urban centres of Pakistan.

The 'popular' Imran Khan led his march to Waziristan (without being able to set foot in the tribal agency) and created a kind of media consensus that Pakistan needed to pull out of 'America's war' and make peace with the Taliban or, more fantastically, enable the threatened tribals to take on the Taliban themselves.

This fanciful and simplistic narrative omitted a vital segment of reality: the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan is pitted not just against the United States' 'imperial designs' but it also considers the state of Pakistan as its enemy. These Kharijites of the twenty-first century use religious appeal to justify and rationalize extremely violent and barbaric acts, and consider the existence of pluralism within the fold of Islam as an anathema. They consider women's education to be un-Islamic and consider a constitutional democracy as an infidel imposition on the faithful.

Unlike other insurgent groups in Pakistan, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan wants to demolish the state of Pakistan and its constitutional basis in line with Al Qaeda ideology. Readers doubtful of this polemic should refer to Al Zawahiri's famous treatise called _The Morning and the Lamp_ , freely available on the Internet. If they are further interested, they could refer to any bookshop where such materials are widely available. This is how we have allowed anti-state doctrines to penetrate our public life.

The most brazen act of targeting a fourteen-year-old girl, Malala Yousafzai, immediately after Khan's march came as a game-changer. The 'public opinion' shaped by Taliban apologists received their biggest jolt, the biggest after Benazir Bhutto's assassination in 2007. Even the conservative and religious sections of Pakistani society could not help condemn this barbarity and for a day or two, it appeared as if there was a major consensus emerging in the country that put home-grown terrorist networks such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan before the imagined enemies such as India or the United States.

However, this consensus was breached by the usual suspects such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, which termed the Taliban as their brothers, obfuscating the real issue of a girl child not being allowed to go to school. The Jamaat-e-Islami also went ahead and, on various social media platforms, released pictures of Malala and her father meeting the late Richard Holbrooke, thereby suggesting that Malala's family were CIA agents and therefore 'legitimate targets' of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. This came as a shocking reminder to the country on the lack of clarity and deliberate confusion spread by the apologists for brutal groups such as the Taliban.

The second source of public confusion came through none other than once-a-westernized-liberal-cricketer Imran Khan who – while condemning the attack on Malala – refused to name the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan as the perpetrator and created a spurious link between the ongoing drone strikes and the attack on Malala.

Imran Khan's shocking positions may well be cynical political ploys to gain power in the coming years by positioning the issue of the Taliban in a traditional 'strategic depth' framework that views the Taliban as a pro-Pakistan asset which is capable of establishing a Pakistan-friendly government in Kabul.

The third source of confusion and evident cowardice came from the ruling parties and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, who shed many a tear on Malala's plight, but refused to name the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan out of fear as well as political expediency, given that nobody wants to cede any ground to the Taliban-savvy Imran Khan.

The chairperson of the Pakistan People's Party, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, was brave enough to name the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and also reminded everyone that this mindset was responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. He, however, gave this statement from a position of comfort and relative insularity, sitting in London and not being directly responsible for Pakistan's governance.

The same could be said of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement's exiled leader, Altaf Hussain, who perhaps gave the boldest statement in the case of Malala Yousafzai, the butchery of Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, and the unprecedented rise of extremism and its widespread acceptance, even among the educated segments of Pakistan. Nevertheless, it needs to be recognized that Altaf bhai's statement was aired in Karachi amidst thousands of people and the Muttahida Quami Movement has emerged as a bulwark of resistance against bigotry and extremism.

The Muttahida Qaumi Movement realizes that its support base, i.e., the middle classes, women and upwardly-mobile social classes, will not accept Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan's vision for Pakistan. This is why Altaf Hussain has been repeatedly citing Mr Jinnah's 11 August speech. The clearest denunciation of the attack on Malala came in these words:

'Malala Yousafzai is the symbol of knowledge which the Taliban want to suppress. The cowardly attack on Malala and her classmates was the attack on Islam, the teachings of the Holy Prophet (pbuh), and the humanity.'

More importantly, Mr Hussain asked the Pakistanis if they wanted Pakistan to survive and progress, or if they would allow it to be wiped out from the map of the world. To save the country, he added, the entire nation would have to rise against these heartless killers. 'We have to decide if we want a Pakistan of Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah or we want a Pakistan of the Taliban. You are either with the Taliban or you are against them. There is no third option.'

Altaf Hussain, in his address last week, also challenged the religious scholars who were reticent when condemning the Taliban's dastardly acts. As he rightly pointed out, the lines were clearly drawn in today's Pakistan. Referring to the slain governor of the Punjab, Salmaan Taseer, Mr Hussain reminded the people that no cleric was ready to lead his funeral prayers. When the killer Mumtaz Qadri was presented in court, a group of lawyers had showered flower petals on him. For the first time, a politician questioned the chief justice's silence and inaction against his 'constituency' – the lawyers – who celebrated Qadri's ghastly act.

The truth is that the Pakistani state remains hostage to its own ideological confusion, grown out of its policy of adopting extremism as a hedge against India. While this paradigm is currently being shifted by affecting a thaw with the traditional enemy, Pakistani society itself is now a victim of the misplaced emphasis on using proxies to wage a low-intensity, yet lethal battle against India.

The above-mentioned ideological confusion is further compounded by the state's incapacity to tackle extremism and guerrilla groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan and its affiliates across the country. A critical factor impacting the fight against terrorism is the inability of the Pakistani state to reform its police force. Built into a ninteenth-century framework, the police is understaffed, undertrained and lacks a coherent approach to counter terrorism.

A recent study by the Asia Society entitled _Stabilizing Pakistan through Police Reform_ argues that the agility of criminal networks and terrorist organizations has rendered the Pakistani police force incapable of fulfilling its functions. This report also highlights how the insufficient and outmoded equipment, lack of merit in recruitment and overall resource constraint is a crisis for the Pakistani state.

In a similar fashion, archaic and low-capacity prosecution services across the country are unable to submit well-prepared cases for the courts, which adjudicate on instances of terrorism. This is why nearly 95 per cent of terrorists are acquitted from Pakistani courts. Insecure judges are unwilling to risk their lives as they face powerful groups operating with impunity, and often with the tacit support of elements within the intelligence apparatus.

The Lal Masjid case was a national epitome of this syndrome, where a children's library, illegally occupied, was turned into a terrorist nursery and despite a military operation overseen by General Musharraf, the media organizations delegitimized the effort and its results. Reportedly, elements within the intelligence community were undermining the operation.

Today, the supreme court of Pakistan, the executive authorities and the country's well-known tycoon, Malik Riaz, have all joined hands to rehabilitate the Lal Masjid, and have gone to the extent of providing land and shelter to the violent activists of the Lal Masjid. When a state capitulates in such a manner, Malalas of Pakistan will continue to remain vulnerable to terrorist attacks.

A three-pronged approach is desperately needed:

  * To unite on the issue on terrorism and identify the common enemy. The recent division on the North Waziristan operation is dangerous and shows how all parties treat anti-Americanism as an electoral goldmine
  * The capacity of civilian institutions to fight terror remains an unattended issue. More investments are required on an emergency basis
  * The Pakistan military will have to reassess its 'threat perception'. What is the real, existential cause for concern – the imagined enemy, or a real, functional terror network in the shape of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan? Let's hope that General Kayani's speech on 14 August and the recent Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) statement on Malala are indicators of a shifting policy.

_November 2012_
11.

Polio, Extremism and a Failing State

The death of nine anti-polio workers has come as a new low in the life of the Pakistani nation. Almost as if the country had lost its bearings, and its society could not even determine its priorities. The polio virus is a real threat to the future of Pakistani children and adults. While it has been eliminated in neighbouring countries such as India and Bangladesh, Pakistan has witnessed the resurgence of the virus as well as a disturbing trend of refusal by parents to vaccinate their children. There are a complex set of factors at play. The extremists have unleashed a campaign which considers the polio vaccine a part of the 'western' agenda to harm the Muslims of Pakistan. Last year's CIA-sponsored fake vaccination campaigns to hunt bin Laden did not help this cause either. Polio vaccination was made controversial in the process. However, all of this is not an excuse to deny Pakistani children their right to a safe and healthy future.

The United Nations is now worried about the security of its staff and the growing threats to their workers and volunteers who are undertaking door-to-door campaigns to achieve 100 per cent vaccination coverage for children. The World Health Organization, as reported in the media, may be winding up its work in the country. This is a moment of reckoning for the Pakistani authorities – its civilian government and the army leadership – which have to ensure that this country does not become hostage to the terror perpetrated by extremists who have a warped view of the world.

The brutal killing of five people in Karachi and more in Peshawar and Nowshehra is a sad reminder of our crippled law enforcement machinery. The police remains governed by a confusing legal and administrative framework. Whatever reform was initiated during Musharraf's rule has been undone by the civilian governments in the provinces, keen to use the police as an instrument of personal and political aggrandizement. The prosecution services are in shambles and no worthwhile investment has been made into them despite the massive threat of terrorism and worsening law and order across the country.

How can the courts decide on terrorism cases if investigation and prosecution of criminal cases are unreliable and incomplete? Having said that, the courts, especially at the district level, have not demonstrated much efficiency in arbitrating terrorism cases. Sometimes they are afraid, and sometimes the cases do not have enough credible evidence for a sentence to be pronounced.

To its credit, the prime minister's cell on polio has been working tirelessly to coordinate subnational agencies involved in the process of managing services. This high-level body has received immense support from the United Nations in the past. The government has involved the media, the clerics and a variety of stakeholders in the process. Even so, when it comes to security in the provinces and districts, the challenges impede progress.

The aid workers and anti-polio teams at the local level remain vulnerable and this casts a dark shadow over the future of the immunization campaign. Pakistan, along with Afghanistan and Nigeria, remains a high threat country. Considering the statutory vaccinations necessary for international travel, there are reports that Pakistanis' travel abroad may become restricted in the months to come. What would this mean for a country that has sent millions abroad to work to support their families at home?

Countless pundits and analysts are always ready to boast of Pakistan's viability and strength as opposed to Afghanistan, which is a stateless country. It is time they took a real hard look at the situation and changed this view. In our quest to 'control' Afghanistan and 'contain' Indian influence, we have crippled our own society and left millions of children vulnerable to a deadly virus.

While the Pakistani government and its civil society have deplored the killing of anti-polio workers, sadly many people in the country continue to rationalize the heinous crimes being committed by the terrorists. Each time there is a transgression against civilians, a tirade of anti-USA emotion is spun by sections of print and electronic media. This culture has also engulfed social media which is becoming a new citadel for jihad promotion. After the recent spate of killings, the social media was abuzz with all sorts of rumours. Those who are soft on the Taliban and their affiliates endlessly cursed Dr Shakil Afridi – the alleged collaborator of the CIA – and the United States for causing the deaths of volunteers. Those who oppose the government and its allies say that it is the Pakistan People's Party, Muttahida Quami Movement and Awami National Party who are responsible for these ugly terror attacks. Several others cite the components of the vaccine as the cause for public mistrust and reaction by the extremists. There have been TV anchors who have even conducted such shows on air, not realizing the consequences of their appetite for transient ratings with the advertisers.

For instance, a right wing paper published from Karachi has been publishing reports with screaming headlines that monkey cells are used to prepare polio vaccines. According to this newspaper, in 2006, Mr Mohammed Nabi filed a petition in the Peshawar high court asking for a ban on polio vaccines because it contained female hormones. The paper also regurgitates half-truths and feeds anti-polio vaccine hysteria even when innocent lives of brave, underpaid and dedicated workers are lost due to this mindset.

Our national security doctrines are now recipes for further chaos and mayhem in the country. We have pandered to the extremists for too long and therefore cannot expect to gain short-term political capital or execute projects of regional adventurism in Afghanistan and India. In the bargain, the Pakistanis have lost. Our state firmly occupied by elites with tunnel-vision has forsaken human security and the need for an educated, healthy and employable citizenry. It has put the interest of a few institutions and agencies above everything else in the republic. Consequently, we are a country of 200 million now without a clear future. Unlike other regional countries, our middle classes are increasingly despondent and uncertain about the future. Despite the xenophobia inculcated by the education system, mosques and the media, a Pakistani youth would happily leave the country. Such is the irony of the national security-obsessed paradigm of governance.

Tackling the polio crisis in the short- to medium-term is a major challenge for the state. No matter which party rules Islamabad or the provincial capitals, they have to deliver on this front. The politicians and the civil-military bureaucracy cannot afford to let the country slip into the hands of the out-of-control non-state actors that they helped create.

The anti-polio campaign, therefore, becomes a symbol of the larger struggle for reclaiming Pakistan from the forces of bigotry. Those who are in denial about the link between extremism, polio and a failing state should read all the decrees issued by the militant groups. According to the Taliban, vaccinations are a Western plot to sterilize Muslim populations. Worse, we have also heard about fatwas issued by some clerics that those crippled by polio have a natural 'martyr' status. When faced with this narrative, there is no option but to think of some immediate and long-term measures. In particular, there can be no viable immunization campaign without the inclusion of women workers and volunteers while also arriving at a consensus in the society that our children need to be protected.

Sadly, I will have to agree with Dr Omar Ali, a blogger, who wrote a chilling post on the deaths of anti-polio workers (Brown Pundits, 20 December 2012) and concluded with these lines:

'It's worth noting that this is clearly not the work of one demented madman or even a few demented mad men. It's a movement. And they have "freedom of movement" across the length and breadth of Pakistan. And they are getting much sympathy from fellow anti-imperialists and anti-globalization activists who are providing them with new and better justifications via the Internet. Ironically, another feature of globalization.'

This is the time to stand up and reject those who want to cripple our younger generations. The insidious violence-justifying mindset along with the poliovirus needs to be fought by all segments of the Pakistani society.

_December 2012_
12.

Reassessing Pakistan's Security Paradigm

The Pakistan army has reportedly revised its security assessment and is now placing more emphasis on 'internal threats' rather than the external enemies which had informed its strategy as well as operations in the past.

This is a welcome development. The details of the new doctrine are unclear, but there have been three indications in the recent past:

  * The tacit support to the civilian government's thaw with India and undertaking the unimaginable – trade with India
  * The chief of the army staff, General Kayani, while speaking at an official ceremony on 14 August, cited the threat of extremism and reiterated the moderate ethos of Islam
  * The battle against militants in the northwest of the country continues without any major policy reversal

There are two issues with the internal shifts, if any, in the way the military is proceeding with its strategic rethink. First of all, due to its structure and institutional culture, it is not an open and engaging entity. Decisions are centralized and are taken by a coterie of top commanders. Secondly, it is learning to readjust its power and influence within the context of a changing Pakistan.

After five years of civilian rule, the emergence of new power centres (judiciary and media) has eroded its exclusive monopoly on power. For instance, launching a coup, although not impossible, is now a far more complicated endeavour. In this fluid political environment, the army has yet to find a comfortable equilibrium with the political forces and the parliament. It might have been more useful had the army tried to engage with the national security committee of the parliament, thereby giving its rethink more depth, public input and long-term legitimacy.

Let's not forget that the ideological propaganda of Al Qaeda and its affiliates has penetrated various sections of Pakistani society. Whilst the Pakistani population does not want a Taliban-type regime that bans women's education, a vast majority of the population considers the US an enemy of Islam and the Muslims. More often than not, the 'West' – as a vague construct – is also employed in this xenophobic and violent ideology of resistance. This narrative has gained ground in the country whether we like it or not.

Unfortunately, the elements of the state, especially the military, have added to this paranoia by firstly, allowing the torchbearers of this ideology to live safely in the country for over a decade and secondly, to operate from within the country. In this lax environment, the Al Qaeda and its junior partner, the Taliban, have made some local alliances and established more bases beyond the rugged mountains of the north. Media reports again inform us that sectarian groups are also in alliance with the Salafi Islamists and many places in mainland Pakistan, such as Karachi, south Punjab, etc., are the new havens.

Therefore, the military may have changed its doctrine, but the internal efforts cannot be accomplished by this alone. Its past record of internal reform and restructuring is not very encouraging; the reforms led by the military machine have been transient at best. Without political praxis, a strategic reassessment will be only partially successful or entirely fruitless. Furthermore, the media, which perpetuates an extremist and xenophobic mindset would need to change its direction. This can only happen with a better regulatory environment – not the kind of gagging that takes place under the garb of 'regulation', but a sincere effort by the owners and editors to insist on filters and fact verification. They should avoid unnamed sources or presentation of 'opinion' as facts which is a plague that has infected our collective consciousness and media personnel are not immune to this societal attitude.

However, the assumption here is that there is a move towards a reassessment of the way our soldiers and their commanders look at security and threat. Recent events have been chilling.

The cold-blooded attack on a Peshawar air base on 15 December, assassination of Bashir Bilour on 22 December in Peshawar, the execution of twenty-two Levies on 29 December in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the subsequent murders of dozens of Shia pilgrims in Balochistan, have shaken the state as well as the population of Pakistan. However, the response of General Kayani was intriguing. In an official statement, the enemy was called 'amorphous' at the Pakistan Naval Academy.

The truth is that our strategic assets are not behaving very asset-like. Hakimullah Mehsud, his leader Mullah Umar and their spiritual master, i.e., the Al Qaeda chief, Ayman al Zawahiri and other groups such as Hizb-ul-Tahrir are promoters of anti-Americanism. Al Qaeda Inc. in Pakistan holds the Pakistan army as just targets of attacks due to its alliance with the United States.

Why cannot the military leadership see that coalitions such as the Defence of Pakistan Council are part of this larger security problem? Why does it have to pander to such outfits in the manner of the 1980s when the rest of the world and the country have moved on?

While we look askance at the way the military is dealing with the internal threats, we cannot exonerate the civilian leadership of its abdication of responsibility to take charge of the counter-extremism efforts. It may have been expedient for the Pakistan People's Party leadership to outsource the security policy to the army, but as a constitutional entity elected for delivering governance, it cannot absolve itself.

The opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, has been too busy responding to the populist antics of Imran Khan whose understanding of foreign and security policy is problematic to say the least. So far, Khan has found two punching bags: the United States and the Pakistani liberals (one often wonders who they are) and holds them responsible for extremism and terrorism. This simplistic worldview makes for good headlines and content for shallow TV debates, but it surely weakens the consensus against which Pakistanis need to be a part of. The brave Awami National Party, which has been fighting it out despite severe setbacks and loss of its leadership and workers, needs support from other parties, especially the mainstream ones.

In this milieu, Pakistanis are the victims. On the one hand, they are under the illusion that elected leaders have all the powers to fix the country, especially its security climate, and on the other, they are also getting indoctrinated by the continuous anti-American propaganda and conspiracy theories. The army is still figuring out ways to stay relevant in its regional ambitions with respect to Afghanistan and the rising power of India, and the politicians are keen to play it to their advantage for the forthcoming elections.

Given such a complex environment and the real challenges that the security establishment faces, it makes one wonder from where the idea of launching Allama Tahirul Qadri came. Allama's plans to turn Islamabad into Tahrir Square is a formula for chaos. Unlike Egypt, Pakistan is a democracy gearing for a general election. Allama is a scholar of note and has millions of followers, but that does not mean he understands politics or understands the unenviable art of governing Pakistan. At best, he is being manipulated by forces that always want to achieve 'positive results', to use a Zia-ul-Haq phrase, from the electoral process. It gives some measure of satisfaction that the major parties are united in their resolve not to let Qadri and his backers derail the parliamentary system and constitutional provisions.

But how can the civilians and the military elites fight extremism if they will not work towards political stability and focus on policy-making through open and transparent means? It is time that a concerted effort is made which involves the political parties, the military, the media and the civil society to agree on a long-term policy on combating violent extremism.

To begin with, we need to limit our ambitions in Afghanistan, start getting serious about mosque-madrassa reform and decide on the multitude of proxies that have turned against us. Once the state and its lords show resolve, Pakistanis will follow.

_January 2013_
13.

Different Strands of Violence

Holding a peaceful election in 2013 would perhaps be one of the important milestones in countering the power and influence of the extremists

In less than two months, nearly 90 million Pakistanis will vote to elect new federal and provincial governments. This democratic transition has been hailed as a major victory for Pakistan's fledgling democracy beset by regional instability and worsening domestic security climate.

During the first quarter of 2013, thirty-five sectarian attacks have taken place in Karachi and Quetta. In the same period, there have been at least 144 suicide bombings and attacks on state installations in various parts of the country. Given this unfortunate situation, there is widespread fear that the forthcoming elections may entail unprecedented violence and god forbid, high profile assassinations.

However, 'violence' needs to be unpacked and examined in the context of Pakistani politics. Violence is the outcome of multiple factors that work independently at times, and sometimes jointly, to create a semi-anarchic situation leaving citizens and political parties insecure; at such times, the state seems to be on the retreat and the militant groups appear to be on the ascendant.

First, we are gripped by the larger, unholy alliance between Al Qaeda, the Taliban (especially the Pakistani factions) and sectarian outfits such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, bolstered by other banned terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba. Details of these groups and the specific nature of their activities are all too well-known and recorded by both Pakistani and foreign analysts. There is a strange paradox at work here. The state is under attack by these groups and, at the same time, it is trying to explore the options of negotiating with these groups for some kind of a truce. The backdrop, of course, is the post-NATO situation in Afghanistan where Pakistan is keen to book a seat at the Afghan power table.

This strand of violence is affecting much of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (at least four agencies are battlegrounds between the Pakistan army and the militants), and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has issued incredibly brazen statements such as the one which urges people to boycott the public rallies of the Pakistan People's Party and the Awami National Party. The space for these relatively progressive and moderate parties is, therefore, shrinking with each passing day.

For instance, the Awami National Party is likely to hold no rallies and only go for door-to-door campaigning. Its leadership has been advised by the party not to be physically present during the electoral campaign. The Pakistan People's Party chairperson, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari, is not in the country and although speculations on his arrival have been reported in the press, the actual situation not being deliberated is the simple fact that Bilawal Bhutto is not secure in Pakistan given that his mother, Benazir Bhutto, was killed five years ago after an election rally in Rawalpindi.

The other dimension of this battle is how the terror network has extended beyond Federally Administered Tribal Areas and has turned Karachi into its new conflict zone. Ironically, Karachi, not unlike Federally Administered Tribal Areas, suffers from an underdeveloped state syndrome where state-building, for a host of complex political and historical reasons, could not take place since the 1950s.

Declan Walsh and Zia-ur-Rehman, in their recent report for _The New York Times_ (28 March 2013) state: 'The grab for influence and power in Karachi show that the Taliban have been able to extend their reach across Pakistan, even here in the country's most populous city... No longer can they be written off as endemic to the country's frontier regions.'

Multiple reasons have been cited to explain this phenomenon. It is commonly understood that many militants are fleeing from the northwest of the country and finding refuge in the burgeoning Pakhtun enclaves in the metropolis. However, the strategic location of Karachi as Pakistan's largest port, and the venue for NATO supply lines and its exit next year, could be another reason for the Al Qaeda-led network to gain more control.

This alarming development has also led to an unspoken truce between the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and the Awami National Party in the city, with the latter shutting down dozens of its offices across the city. The more worrying signs are how the thin police force has been put on the defensive, the social development campaigns (such as polio vaccinations) are endangered and more significantly, parallel judicial systems are emerging in the metropolis where the Taliban demonstrate their proclivity for quick dispute resolution termed as 'justice'.

Unfortunately, the political parties through their short-sighted policy of patronizing criminal gangs have created an arena where the Taliban are finding it quite convenient to make alliances with well-established gangs and both groups are resorting to extortion, reflecting perhaps the desperate attempt to make up for a reduced funds inflow from the Middle East.

The second major challenge in terms of security relate to Balochistan where the Baloch separatist movement continues. The state, particularly the security establishment, is not keen to change its policy and scores of missing Baloch activists decimate the chances of any meaningful dialogue between the state and the separatists. The return of Akhtar Mengal, head of Baloch National Party, is a positive sign, but he is also facing many threats and in the insurgency-hit districts, especially in the south of Balochistan, elections are likely to be violent.

Media reports have already suggested that the intelligence agencies are warning the executive about the warring security scenarios. The interior ministry, in its assessment, has warned of a massive terrorist threat in the coming elections ( _Dawn_ , 28 March 2013).

Among other news, the interior ministry has noted that the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan is likely to carry out attacks in south Punjab, particularly Khanewal and Multan. It would be pertinent to note that south Punjab has been the breeding ground for terrorist networks and also a recruitment ground for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan warriors across the country. Sadly, the outgoing government of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, due to its expedient policy, turned a blind eye to this threat.

While the caretaker prime minister and the chief ministers have been appointed, their cabinets are still to be announced. At the time of writing these lines, there is no federal interior minister and even if we have all the ministers and bureaucrats in place, without the active participation of the military establishment, especially the ISI and the military intelligence, countering this threat may not be that easy.

It would be unrealistic and unlawful to expect a short-term caretaker administration to either reset national security or counter-terror policies. However, given that a caretaker administration is free of the day-to-day political compulsions of keeping coalitions intact, it is expected that they would make law and order their topmost priority.

The recent statements of the Punjab caretaker, Chief Minister Najam Sethi, are encouraging. However, statements alone will not solve the situation. A concentrated, joint intelligence operation needs to take place and the flashpoints in the country require extraordinary vigilance and swift action. Holding a peaceful election in 2013 would perhaps be one of the important milestones in countering the power and influence of the extremists who, in the first place, do not believe in constitutional democracy.

The election commission is chairing the electoral process, but it cannot achieve the objectives of holding a free and fair election on its own. The political parties have to display greater responsibility and ownership of this agenda and they also need to adhere to the code of conduct which has the potential to minimize political violence before and during the polls. Most importantly, the parties need to beef up their internal security protocols at corner meetings, rallies and other campaign related activities. After all, they are the key stakeholders in the democratic process.

_March 2013_
14.

Balochistan – Pushed to the Wall

There must be something terribly wrong with the state of Pakistan that in its largest province, state schools no longer recite the national anthem and are giving up on the Pakistani flag. Tragic that such alarming reports flashed in the national newspapers and on the Internet are the subject of little debate and introspection across the country. Either that nobody really cares as to what happens to the tribals in the southwest of Pakistan, or that there is soft censorship at play. Such is the level of self-censorship on the issue of Balochistan that the ongoing insurgency finds scant mention in the otherwise hysterical electronic media of Pakistan. True, there are brave exceptions in the public arena, but the eerie silence on Balochistan is disturbing for any Pakistani who believes in the territorial and federal integrity of Pakistan.

Dozens of Baloch political activists have been reported dead only during the last six months. It is difficult to ascertain exact numbers, given the lack of credible information. But it is palpable that violence defines the state of Balochistan. On one hand, there are Baloch activists, leaders and professionals who are being targeted by 'unknown' forces, and on the other, thousands of 'settlers' (mostly Punjabis) have been leaving the province as their lives are no longer secure. A wide array of Baloch separatist groups exist in the province whose source of funding is unknown and whose political agenda is vague, despite the overall banner of 'independence'.

The history of Balochistan is scarred by the imposition of a national narrative and its symbolic manifestation remains the refusal of the Khan of Qalat to accede to the new state of Pakistan in 1947. Thus, historical grievance has swollen to a degree where 'Pakistan', at least in the 'Baloch' districts, is now an imagined enemy to be countered with the narratives spun by the separatists. There is also the story of 'exploitation': from the inadequate and perhaps misappropriated Sui gas royalties to the Gwadar port which is not under Baloch control; the natural wealth of the province is perceived as being looted by 'foreigners'.

Despite the turbulent history of the 1970s and powerful nationalistic sentiments, the Mengals and Bugtis attempted to engage with Islamabad to achieve a respectable quantum of autonomy in the 1980s and 1990s. Unfortunately, Pakistan's national politics and the ruling elites (largely from the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) were too preoccupied with their own short-term agendas. Thus, the marginalization of the province continued as Pakistan failed to develop a viable model of economic development founded on trade and commerce which may have led to national integration of sorts.

Instead, our focus since the 1980s has been the bolstering up of a security state at the expense of people's welfare and integration of marginalized communities into the mainstream development process. The Musharraf decade (1999-2008) reversed the earlier trends of Islamabad-Balochistan rapprochement and engagement. If anything, the Pakistan army's ruthless modernization project bypassed the Sardars and the Baloch middle classes and instead drummed up the bogey of 'foreign intervention'. Worse, it exacerbated the crisis through the brutal murder of Nawab Bugti. It is ironic that Bugti was consistently a proponent of the Pakistani federation and had been an uneasy partner of Pakistan's security establishment. However, his death signified the narrowing of the space available for dialogue, negotiation on autonomy and perhaps, reconciliation with a wounded territory.

It is also true that Balochistan is a playground for various external powers, including India and the United States to 'punish' Pakistan for its strategic adventurism in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Thus, the exiled tribal leaders from the Marri and Bugti clans may have found foreign benefactors in pursuing their separatist agenda. An unfriendly regime in Kabul sponsored by the US has not helped matters either, given that safe havens exist for the separatist elements and their leadership in Afghanistan. However, the Pakistani state and its various spokespersons, many of them riding the media tiger these days, have been unable to inform and educate public opinion on what sort of foreign intervention and financing networks exist in Balochistan. In the absence of concrete evidence, many rational Pakistanis find it difficult to fully subscribe to the US or India 'intervention-theory', howsoever true it might be. Notwithstanding the challenges, blanket repression and targeting of Baloch activists is not going to lead us anywhere. Instead, such a strategy can only backfire as it is already paying no dividends to the country and its future.

The Pakistan People's Party-led coalition started off by tendering an unconditional apology to the Baloch. It even struggled to offer the 'Aghaz-e-Huqooq-e-Balochistan' package as an instrument of reconciliation. The three critical ingredients of this package were: a) recovery of 'missing persons' in the province; b) reduction of the arbitrariness of the federal security agencies such as the rangers; and c) providing employment to all graduates from the province. On all three fronts the Pakistan People's Party-led coalition, alas, has not delivered. The missing persons remained missing or worse, dead. The provincial government is a dummy mediator as Balochistan continues to be ruled from Islamabad and its security apparatus. Finally, the implementation of the employment package has been far slower than expected.

It has been rightly pointed out that the civilian government is not in charge of Balochistan policy, as the province and its affairs are inextricably linked to the national security paradigm. After all, it is India that the Pakistan army has to resist in the barren tracts of the province, and the US and its stooges in Afghanistan, which have to be 'countered' effectively. Conspiracy analysts have also cited a Chinese dimension to the whole affair. However, it remains unclear as to what extent China is interested or involved in the affairs of the province, except perhaps for its commercial interests and its search for energy trade routes.

So what are the prospects for Balochistan's secession? Unlike East Pakistan (Bengal), Balochistan is not an ethnically homogenous region. Thanks to the Afghan jihad and internal migrations in the region, the Pashtun population of the province has increased over the past three decades, almost rivalling the native Baloch. We cannot determine such facts in Pakistan, given the little respect for facts that we have. A census has been due for a few years now, but cannot be held for all sorts of reasons. However, if and when the census is held, we will find out the quantitative ethnic composition of the province in precise terms. More importantly, secession would require foreign intervention of the 1971 variety. Pakistan's nuclear status simply precludes that. Few in the region or across the globe would want more instability in Pakistan beyond current levels.

Therefore, the Balochistan quagmire has now moved beyond the domain of a federal dysfunction to a contest of regional politics. India, Afghanistan and indirectly, the United States are now additional stakeholders in the contest, whether we like it or not. Islamabad will have to pursue a three-pronged strategy.

First, it will need to engage with Baloch leaders at a political level after a ceasefire of sorts is achieved. There could be multiple options for working out a range of solutions to maximize political and economic autonomy for the province within the federal framework. The scale of such autonomy cannot be equivalent to the current framework of the 1973 Constitution (amended umpteen times). It would need to be a national solution and hence, would require multi-party consensus on a type of autonomy for the Baloch people. This imperative cannot be further delayed and the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz should take the lead for their present and future governments will remain unstable if Balochistan cannot be governed constitutionally.

The second aspect of Islamabad's strategy should be to resume dialogue with India and Afghanistan in the context of a regional settlement likely to occur in the short-term. The Baloch separatist leadership is not going to change its mind until regional powers such as India and the US agree to find a solution to this conundrum and abandon the 'fix-Pakistan' policy. Of course, Islamabad will have to make concessions and rein in its network of non-state actors.

Thirdly, while the above-stated strategies are implemented, the provincial government and its capacities need to be fixed immediately so that the perception of gross ineptitude, corruption and powerlessness is reduced. At present, the provincial government inspires little confidence among the provincial populace, let alone the angry Baloch.

Concurrent to what happens at high-level strategic negotiations, Pakistani media and its civil society cannot abandon their duty to highlight the woes of all those Baloch who are being killed, tortured or abducted. We cannot remain insensitive, sitting in Islamabad, Lahore or Karachi, to what is happening in our country. Pakistan's existentialist crisis is compounding and the least we can do is generate a healthy, informed debate on how to confront decades of marginalization and exploitation of a province that is our very own.

_April 2011_
15.

It's Time to Engage with Baloch Nationalists

As Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy recently wrote: 'Men like Rohrabacher are no friends of the Baloch. But what can stop their meddling? The answer can only come once we dump the myth of Pakistan being one nation, one people.' The continuous undermining of Pakistan's pluralism, citizenship rights and quest for self-rule has led to a situation where the Pakistani flag is not welcome in many parts of its largest and most neglected province.

This is not the first time that the country has faced a dire situation. In 1971, we were faced with a similar dilemma and the civil-military elites of West Pakistan bungled badly. Their mishandling was exacerbated by an external intervention and for years, we have been fed stories of how all was hunky dory in the more populous wing of Pakistan until the evil 'Hindu' India destroyed the 'Muslim' Pakistan.

It takes a questionable resolution tabled in the US congress by Dana Rohrabacher, an extremist republican with a dubious past, to alarm the mainstream Pakistani politicians and media about the plight of Baloch people. Yet again – a 'conspiracy' to disintegrate the land of the pure has been reiterated. The good part is that the Balochistan issue – something that the media was afraid to talk about for so long – has now become a subject of prime-time, and sometimes ill-informed, discussions on national television.

We cannot absolve ourselves of the decades-long discrimination that the province and its people have faced due to a variety of reasons. Whether it is the misuse of its natural resources such as natural gas, gold, etc., or its leverage in the federal power structure, the scorecard is pretty grim. In real terms, the issue of provincial autonomy has only been resolved recently via the 2010 18th Amendment. But even that seems to fit the clichéd description of being 'too little, too late', given how the Baloch nationalists view it.

Historically, the civilian and military rulers have been trigger-happy when it came to Balochistan. For instance, the initial dispute of Kalat's forced inclusion into Pakistan is an ongoing problem which was never resolved. In 1972, the 'elected' leader, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, started an operation to crush an insurgency. General Zia offered carrots to the Baloch tribal leaders and kept things under central 'control' without any move towards resolving the fundamental issues: self-rule, resource distribution and development.

However, the fourth military rule under General Pervez Musharraf embarked on a mega-modernity project ignoring the history, alienation and festering wounds of the local people. Ambitious plans to introduce 'modern' policing systems (ironically based on the colonial policing structures that the British left us), development and completion of the Gwadar Port with highways connected to cantonments were part of this package from Islamabad.

The Baloch rejected this initiative and thus began another operation against the locals. The year 2006 was the highpoint of this struggle when the eighty-year-old Nawab Akbar Bugti (ironically always a pro-federation politician) was brutally killed in a cave. Trumpets were blown and Musharraf is on record to have said that he will teach others a lesson.

This was the turning point and the low-grade insurgency has now turned into a full-scale war against the weapon of the Pakistani state – its security agencies. This has not come without a great deal of collateral damage, for instance, as many teachers in the province are Punjabis and mohajirs, the killings of non-Baloch civilians is further denuding the prospects of education for the young.

While the state – especially the military – denies that such 'operations' are underway, the media, especially social media, have been reporting gruesome tales of abduction, torture and murder of many young Baloch nationalists.

The tragedy is that the strategy of the state and the militants both appear to be patently flawed. The Pakistani government has yet to show credible evidence of Indian or USA involvement in Balochistan. Because of the lack of transparency, dealings with the province has become a major farce. The interior minister's media-bravado is no longer taken seriously and no one believes what the security establishment says. There seems to be a serious dearth of imagination while searching for solutions.

On the other hand, the leaders of the Baloch people – incidentally most of them are tribal chiefs – are making open appeals to India, USA and the other world powers to intervene. However, this can only feed into a vicious cycle of state repression. The US will not support Baloch because they are concerned about their quest for autonomy. It will only support this cause if it would align with the security interests of the country. Side-lining Pakistan and its powerful army is not on the US agenda for now.

Balochistan is a complex issue where history and geography intersect with the imagined notions of a centralized and nationalistic Pakistan. It is time to reconsider that and find ways which can lead to a meaningful engagement with the Baloch nationalists. For that to happen, the security operations must end immediately, resource distribution formulae be worked out, commissions be set up to investigate the brutalities and if needed a constitutional amendment be introduced to enhance autonomy or even reconfigure it. This parliament has undertaken historic constitutional reforms via the 18th, 19th and 20th Amendments. Why not a 21st or 22nd Amendment?

_March 2012_

III

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GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS & REFORM
Introduction

The parliament elected in 2008 has made at least one significant contribution to the nation's polity: it amended the constitution to improve its federalist structure. Pakistan's history is replete with efforts to grapple with federalism and the delicate Centre-province balance. From the very beginning of its existence, inequality of income and services between the provinces led to the smaller federating units regarding the federation and the larger provinces with suspicion. The country's major political parties arrived at a rare consensus to address these imbalances.

This political unanimity resulted in the 18th Amendment to the constitution, passed with the support of all political parties in 2010. The 18th Amendment is a package of 102 amendments to various sections of the constitution, including the deletion of the Concurrent Legislative List – areas in which both the Centre and provinces can legislate on – and making key areas of policy exclusively provincial domains. A few subjects were moved to the Federal Legislative List. The amendment strengthened and expanded the purview of the Council of Common Interests (the inter-provincial body to negotiate and settle federal matters). The amendment also aimed to strengthen the National Economic Council, an apex planning forum, by enhancing provincial representation to the body.

The 18th Amendment was backed by the 2009 7th National Finance Commission award which reallocated the share of the provinces in federal tax revenues. The provinces' share in the net federal resources rose to 57.5 per cent from 49 per cent, while the share of the federal government came down to 42.5 per cent. During 2010–2014, the total expenditure of the provincial governments increased from almost Rs 1000 billion to Rs 1800 billion – an increase of 80 per cent. Nearly 90 per cent of this amount was financed by federal transfers. In the same period, federal revenues increased threefold from Rs 520 billion to Rs 1545 billion. A key challenge that is faced by all provinces of Pakistan is to enhance their own revenues as they finance 11 per cent of their expenditures through provincial tax and non-tax sources.

However, despite these achievements, fundamental reforms – such as restructuring the civil services, establishing local governments and improving the tax machinery – could not be carried out.
1.

Civil Service Reform for Improving State Capacity

Pakistan's inability to provide security and justice to its citizens and failure to deliver on basic services is a common theme in our political discourse. Political parties that are in power make tall claims of doing this, that and the other, but in effect their reliance on a state apparatus which is unable to deliver is a known reality. During the last four years, other than taking very cosmetic steps, the way our executive branch of the state is organized has remained unchanged.

Whereas a beginning has been made to shift power from the centre to the provinces, the provincial administrations continue to work according to structures that were established nearly 160 years ago. Much has been said and written about a long-pending civil service reform, but nothing has been achieved except a partial reform in the 1970s.

Pakistan is a populous country now and its problems have grown exponentially over the past few decades. Yet the inability of the state to respond to the challenges is spectacular. Also, the word 'reform' is a joke now for every time it is mentioned the transformationists make fun of it and the agents of the status quo start citing the failed experiments of the past.

What impedes reform then? Working on various projects with federal and provincial government departments and agencies teaches you that their governance structures are overwhelming when it comes to negotiating for even minor changes.

Without a holistic policy framework and political will, 'change', as most donor-assisted projects argue, is not easy to achieve. We also hear of the clichéd, oft-cited lack of 'political will' when it comes to reform. The Pakistani parliament, by enacting the 18th, 19th and 20th Amendments, has shown the way forward. A political consensus on reform is vital for it to be implementable and meaningful.

The consensus in the Pakistani context would imply compacts between the political and the technocratic, the federal and the provincial, and more often than not, between the civil and military branches of the state.

Of late, the reformist solutions require some sort of judicial endorsement as well. What is clear is that there are no short-cut solutions and no alternatives to political engagements in the reform process. The failures of the Ayub and Musharraf-led reforms to the civil service are cases worth citing here.

In both cases, the military regimes tried to devolve power to an extent so that they could get away with the lack of democracy at the central and provincial levels. But these efforts did not strengthen democracy. Musharraf's local government system vanished within months of his departure from the scene.

Given these constraints, there is an urgent need for the political parties to reflect on this serious dilemma. The way the federal and provincial secretariats function is antiquated and inefficient. The police is being managed through a nineteenth-century law and the court procedures also follow at least a century-old set of rules. Assuming that Pakistani democracy is now an irreversible reality, how will the political parties deliver the goods without thinking of such reforms?

Even the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, which has captured the imagination of young men and women who are disappointed with the 'old' players, has regurgitated lots of rhetoric and promises made earlier with little policy input on a wider restructuring of the government.

At the same time, the media, which uses a simplistic and populist line of commentary, fails to generate the kind of debates we need. For instance, what sort of court systems will work better? What is the extent of local government functions and their revenue-generating power? Should we retain huge secretariats and send more officials to the districts and tehsils? These issues remain unresolved despite the sixty-five years of 'nationhood' with colonial status quo ruling the roost.

After the devolution of certain mandates and functions in 2011, it was expected that the provincial governments would rearrange their administrative structures. Little progress has been noted other than in one or two provinces. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Punjab provinces have made some changes and formed multiple committees to look into the matter.

This is a classic opportunity for the political parties to set into practice structures that will be facilitative for the democratic process and will help establish more responsive governance.

In the recent years, I was part of a research team that looked at the resizing of the provincial secretariat in the Punjab province. The key recommendation was that nearly three-dozen departments could be reduced by at least one-third by removing duplication, and several entities (companies and boards set up by the government) could be streamlined and merged to gain efficiency and achieve better coordination.

Luckily, the Punjab government was embarking on a process of reshaping and it did merge a few departments, but the full scope of a restructuring could not be achieved.

The research also recommended that a full-scale justice department was needed to oversee prosecution, issues relating to the provincial judiciary and legislation. Similarly, a land-management department or authority was required which could replace the colonial land administration and modernize its functions. Several such studies and recommendations are available, should the political parties wish to consult them.

Across Pakistan, the Rules of Business, which drive government operations, are obsolete or ineffective. They have to be realigned as well. The devolution of powers to the provinces and future local governments will not work if such structural changes are not made and the top-heavy provincial administrations are not shaken up.

In many provinces for instance, social protection functions are dispersed between zakat, labour, education and social welfare departments. Once the Benazir Income Support Programme and Bait-ul-Maal (a welfare fund) are added to this list, it becomes even more complex. In this situation, it is difficult to track who receives what from the government, raising the possibility of multiple payments to the same household or individual.

At the central level, it is unclear if the federation will reform the gargantuan, unwieldy structures of federal civil services and devolve management to the provinces. Without this particular step, the full devolution of powers will not be achieved. The provinces manage their own cadres, which have historically felt subservient to the federal and more powerful civil service cadres. There is much to be done if we need to make the public servants more accountable and effective. And there is little progress in this direction.

Nonetheless, the proposals culled by the commission headed by Dr Ishrat Hussain are the most recent efforts at meaningful research. The creation of national and provincial executive services is a feasible and much needed idea.

Opening up the senior positions to private sectors and other technical experts will also ensure that there is better capacity within the civil service. The well-known complaint of too many generalists in the government can also be handled through such a strategy.

The political parties are gearing up for a general election in the next six months or so. They are also working on their manifestoes and this would be a good time for their leaders and policy wonks to look at the earlier reports on civil service reform and make some use of them.

The media must also play its due role. Instead of looking at the sensational failures or gaps in the delivery of government services, it might attempt to highlight the structural and organizational issues within the civil service and government operations that need attention.

There are long-standing issues of pay and pensions, of government land and of diminishing internal accountability. Within the ambit of public services, police and prosecution reform is of immense importance.

All provinces are grappling with insurgencies, worsening law and order and daily reports of under-performance and corruption. As the people's representatives, it is imperative that politicians take charge of this situation instead of another messiah proposing a technocratic reform-model, thus undoing all that has been achieved in the past few years.

Without a meaningful civil service reform, state capacity cannot improve in the dire circumstances that we face today.

_November 2012_
2.

Poverty and Inequality – The Brewing Storm

As I sipped the tenderly brewed coffee facing the lush green golf course of a relatively new Lahore Country Club, the new reality of Pakistan became a little clearer. The sprawling premises of the club was a preserve of the railways department until the inefficient Pakistan railways could no longer manage it and doled it to the new, oligarchic big business of Pakistan. Much ado was made when the land owned by the railways was privatized and questionable deals were transacted in that moderately unenlightened era. Nothing came out of the public questioning and today a lavish country club, far removed from its downmarket environs, has sprung up for the affluent and the upwardly-mobile classes of Lahore and Punjab.

The classic barriers to entry created by the cliques that lord over Pakistan's elite clubs are being undone. Pay a handsome fee now (way over a million rupees) and voila, you are a member to this new 'club' built by appropriating and perpetuating the Raj's exclusive and elitist social and physical structures. And reminding one of the nasty remarks of Churchill on how the brown, rapacious Rajas would appropriate the space created by the wise and just colonists. As my host elaborated on the entry procedures to Lahore's rich club, I could not help but remember the compensation to a suicide bomber that has also increased over the years and now hovers between one to two million rupees. A grossly-overlooked fact is that the grinding poverty in the pockets of Pakistan, seemingly unaffected by the consumerist prosperity, is the key to our current turmoil and violence.

At the end of the day, the ideological battles, the foreign interventions and incursions aside, are all about inequality and the fact that the staggering poverty is now a stark social reality. Apathy to the shameful criminal inequities is another visible trend. Take the new avatars of Pakistan – the media hosts at the leading television channels: the rants and ramblings overly obsess with ideology, of myopia and inward-looking discourses that promote xenophobia. Let Pakistan follow Iran without a drop of gasoline; let it be a Vietnam-in-the-making, forgetting that Pakistan's heterogeneity and complexity defies even the best of sociologists and policy experts. Nowhere is poverty, especially in the tribal belt, given the importance that it should be.

And when the international do-gooders want to do something about poverty, they come up with packages that have been tried and tested across the globe with dismal results. How can piecemeal advisory aid impact a widening policy vacuum due to decades of misrule? What happened to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas' electoral reforms, plans to introduce local self-governance in the tribal areas, and the correction of a draconian legal regime meant to advance the great game and British colonialism? Above all, the much-touted second and now third prong of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas policy, namely development, employment and economic opportunity? The dehumanizing poverty that facilitates selling the lives of young men in the name of esoteric jihad is nothing but years and years of exploitation and now a manifestation of unbearable poverty.

The truth is that Pakistan's elites – both the elected and the unelected – and their purported watchdogs are fairly oblivious to the fundamental reality of how the consumerist culture and emergence of 'richistans' in a sea of squalor and violence are aggravating deprivation, dispossession and hunger.

Never before has a predominantly agricultural country been food-deficient and a victim of blatant capitalist speculation. Monopolies are not a new phenomenon; however, cartels control oil, cement and all other elements of economic activity and survival. Yet, these are issues skirted around and a hapless civilian government, a product and victim of both the powerful elites and their machinations, is the prime target of media critique. The corporate media not unlike India and other iniquitous societies is by and large indifferent to such monopolies and the capitalist machinations; much of its solution for inflation is executive control of prices.

The emergence of such 'richistans' is not restricted to Pakistan alone. Globalization has to sell fabulous, vulgar wealth as a spectator sport and the ultimate marker of achievement. And the world's war and oil industry have to fuel this all-pervasive greed.

True, the skewed growth during the last eight years has enabled many people to gate-crash into the world of elitism and create newer islands of 'richistans'. But the question is, at what and whose expense? Income and resource distribution have worsened and without a plan for redistribution, there is no way to achieve peace, security and sustained progress in Pakistan. Sooner or later, the surrounding 'pooristans', 'tribalistans', 'conflictistans' and 'violenceistans' will gobble up these 'richistans'.

Estimates suggest that food price inflation has led to a significant increase in Pakistani poverty levels. A 20 per cent inflation in food prices theoretically results in an 8 per cent increase in the poverty head count. Furthermore, the official estimates suggest that inflation is galloping at above 30 per cent. We are heading towards a situation where 50 per cent of the population will be poor. Needless to mention, this situation ought to be the foremost priority of the state and its international partners. Domestic rhetoric on ideology and the global rants on terror can only destabilize Pakistan further which is in no one's interest. The ruling party needs to revisit its social agenda and reclaim its original redistributive ethos. This is the time for initiating land reform; for increasing access of the poor to productive resources and undoing the structural roots of poverty. These policy priorities must drive the stabilization packages proposed by all and sundry. The urgency of the storm, which has brewed for a long time, needs to be recognized. It is already thumping the fragile contours of Pakistani society.

_October 2008_
3.

Pakistani Reform – The Task Ahead

Pakistan crossed a major milestone last week by achieving a historic consensus on the 18th Amendment with 105 clauses, additions and deletions to the Constitution. The distortions inserted by the military rule have been done away with. Political elites this time, however, have gone a step further and improved the state of provincial autonomy. Perhaps this is where a civilian negotiation and democratic politics of compromise has been most effective. Who would have thought a few years ago that this was achievable? There were many sceptics who thought that the amendments might not be approved. However, the 'corrupt' and 'incompetent' politicians have proved everyone wrong.

Leaving aside the discourse of corruption, the National Reconciliation Ordinance and a vociferous media campaign against the president, the achievements in the last one year by all political parties have been tremendous. The Awami National Party, after its initial truce with the militants, has stayed the course and resisted Talibanization by giving full support to the army operations against the militants. The Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, despite their rhetoric and political point-scoring, have worked together on the National Finance Commission award and now on the implementation of the Charter of Democracy that has become the basis for the amendments to become a reality.

The nay-sayers of democracy and the political process forget one fundamental fact: a federal structure cannot work without a robust political process. A start has been made through the recent successes after a decade of 'controlled democracy'. However, despite the march towards the democratic ideal, there are clear and present dangers that keep democracy as fragile as ever.

The dangers are not difficult to state: (a) a political class that is adept at wrangling and the unelected institutions of the state whose quest for power is an ever-present reality; (b) the dwindling state of the economy that shows little or faint signs of recovery. This would spell disaster for any civilian government, regardless of which party is enjoying power at the centre; (c) the transition required at the federal and provincial levels of governance will also be a challenge, bringing the issues of state capabilities into the limelight.

Some credit should go to the otherwise-discredited President Zardari, who has relinquished his powers to appoint or sack prime ministers, service chiefs and judges. He has agreed to the abolition of limits restricting prime ministers to two terms, clearing the way for Nawaz Sharif, the opposition leader, to become prime minister yet again. And he has given the chief justice a veto over the appointment of fellow judges.

**Political Elites:** There is no denying that history has been made. It is rare to find a politician who gives up powers of his own accord. The incumbent president who had no credibility to begin with, thanks to years of witch-hunts, media trials and transgressions, has proved all his critics wrong. His role and powers have been reduced to that of a figurehead.

Nevertheless, the relentless campaign against him continues unabated. This does not augur well for the future of the democratic process. It is a truism that no political party wants an early general election. The public position of the parties is clear on that front. Yet, the mounting campaign against the president who happens to be the leader of the largest political party implies that the consequences of his exit from office, stripped of all powers, will lead to further instability. An in-house change that comes out of the exigencies of power politics will also set a wrong precedent that the two main parties have worked to avoid at all costs.

**Unelected Institutions:** The key power wielders in Pakistan are now two institutions of the state, the army and the judiciary. The latter has acquired power on the basis of a populist movement and its decisions thus far have taken cognizance of the public mood. Whether it was to set the price of sugar or the re-opening of the Swiss cases against the president, there seemed to be a clear tilt towards the popular as opposed to the technically legal.

The army has also recovered from the setbacks caused by the Musharraf era. First, it has shown great resolve against the militants in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and has earned public approval. In addition, the belligerence of the Indian leadership has also made the army central to the debate on Pakistan's survival. Most importantly, the West, especially the US, has also formally recognized the army as the counterpart negotiator. The Western world views the Pakistan army as central to its Afghanistan strategy even at the expense of the full authority of its civilian government.

Several analysts, however, maintain that the swing of the power pendulum towards the army and the judiciary is a danger to the future of the hard-earned civilian governance achieved after prolonged struggles on the Pakistani streets.

A particular matter of concern is the issue of presidential immunity which has been brought into the public forum through the judgments of the supreme court. Whereas Article 248 of the constitution is quite unambiguous on this issue, there are strong indications that the court is in a mood to re-interpret the article and submit the judicial process to a populist clamouring for accountability and anti-corruption.

Policy initiatives over the last year have shifted from the federal cabinet and the parliament to the General Headquarters and the courts. Whether it is policy regarding India, war against terrorism, prices of essential commodities, promotions within the civil service or appointments of judges, the elected government has a very limited role to play and has had no choice but to submit to the decisions of the other two powerful institutions of the state.

**State Capacity:** The 18th Amendment calls for a major shifting of powers and functions from the centre to the provincial governments. Questions have already been raised on the limited capacity of the provincial governments to adjust to newer realities and whether they are prepared to assume enhanced responsibilities – from regulatory mechanisms to policy-making, curriculum-development or even legislation. What will happen to the mammoth federal bureaucracy and how would it manoeuvre to preserve its vested interest is a question to be reckoned with. In addition, the provincial governments have already rolled back the comprehensive local government reform initiated by General Musharraf, leaving a huge governance vacuum at the local level. Rights, entitlements and services are mediated and negotiated at the lowest level of governance. The citizenry is soon going to find itself pushed into a corner with the local state in the process of transition, while the provincial government is too busy acquiring and consolidating new-found powers. In the short-term, there is going to be administrative chaos, if not anarchy, at all four provincial capitals. If we add the usual power struggles between the centre and the provinces, this process is going to be messy and, dare one say, conflictual?

**Missing Amendments:** As noted above, the political consensus achieved thus far is phenomenal by all accounts. However, the reforms committee and the parliament have ignored two issues. First, the status of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas has been left untouched. What were the reasons for not addressing this war zone and global hotspot by the maverick political elites of Pakistan? If they were scared of the national security apparatus, they could have engaged with the General Headquarter as they generally do at the drop of a hat. Second, the Islamic provisions unlawfully inserted by General Zia-ul-Haq are very much there, keeping Zia's ghost alive and kicking, even though his name has been deleted from the basic document. For instance, the prerequisite that the prime minister be a Muslim is completely unjustifiable. Given that Pakistan is a Muslim-majority country, why should such a provision be retained in the basic governance document? This is just a simple case of pandering to the mullah lobby, and the process since 1948 remains unchanged.

**The Ailing Economy:** The larger issue remains: how will the improved constitutional structure lead to economic progress, more jobs and opportunities for the millions living below or a little above the poverty line? The growth rate is struggling to increase over the rate of population increase per annum. The 25 per cent inflation rate is the highest ever witnessed by Pakistanis, and all estimates and forecasts suggest that the price of food is going to further increase. The ongoing energy crisis has depleted what little industrial capacity there was, and the political squabbling over the type of power plants means that any solution to this crisis would be controversial and used for political gains. This is perhaps an area where the political elites need to reconvene and think beyond their immediate power-interests. Pakistan is in desperate need of structural reform. Only 2 per cent of the population pays taxes and there is little or no collection under the head of agricultural income tax. Similarly, the economic policy-making process is completely in the hands of the international financial institutions and generalist bureaucrats at the top. Unless the major political parties agree on an economic reform agenda and fully implement it, we will remain a debt-trapped, cash-starved failing economy. The current signs are not promising: there is deep suspicion about the economic management at the centre and there is a lack of bipartisan consensus. In this situation, the democratic experiment reignited in 2008 faces a major challenge. Perhaps this is the biggest threat to the survival of democracy in the country. The fundamental cause for the lack of economic performance is political instability and that may not go away so easily. Therefore, another reforms commission is required to deliberate and come up with a package that includes protection of citizen rights and confronting the economic oligarchies by strengthening the competition commission of Pakistan.

In conclusion, we have come a long way from the dark years of military dictatorship, but we are still not poised to enjoy political stability, democratic governance and economic progress. Geo-strategic compulsions, over-powerful institutions of the state and dismal economic conditions may just dilute the effect of the recent constitutional amendment passed by the parliament. Finally, the ability of the state to deliver on all these fronts is weak and under severe challenges, and it is time the Raza Rabbani committee is followed by several commissions to implement the reforms recommended for the political and economic domains. Otherwise, we will continue to be trapped in the cursed cycle of history.

_April 2010_
4.

Pakistan's Crumbling Institutions

Pakistan's instability is a cliché, almost a self-fulfilling prophecy. All the theoretical ingredients for stability are there: an elected government, a strengthened parliament, a working relationship between the government and the opposition, and above all a free media and an independent judiciary. Despite such a promising milieu, there is chaos, misgovernance and instability all around. The paranoid conspiracy theorists would, of course, blame the enemies of Pakistan, which range from India to Israel and from the United States to the Qadianis. The astrologers insist that Pakistan was created under a negative cosmic spell. However, the answer to the conundrum of Pakistan's instability lies in the way its state was fashioned in or rather sustained after 1947.

True, the civil-military relationship and using Islamism as a tool for the legitimization of the unaccountable governance has been a problem from the very start. However, the fundamental nature of the institutions that have wielded and distributed power has remained unchanged for decades. It is only with the assertion of the judiciary and a relatively free media that Pakistan's political culture is changing. But it remains to be seen how long it will be before the unaccountable executive culture regains its ascendancy.

Essentially, public institutions can only be effective if they evolved rules of the game that are fair and open. In our case, due to the distorted political development, we have a political culture that is neither citizen-oriented nor based on even the fundamental notion of fair play. Hence the continuous inability of the 'system' – as a network that is mediated by power wielders – to establish a framework that is workable and legitimate in the eyes of the public.

Over time, the colonial state had established a governance schema that was immune to local pressure and was not accountable to the natives. The Raj infrastructure, therefore, remained free of the niceties, such as citizen responsiveness. The mode was to establish a strong legal framework and then impose regulation over the society whether it was legitimate and sensitive to the citizens or not. This is why we have a governance culture that tolerates the assassination of prime ministers and judicial murders carried out with sophistication. Our state was quick to form brigades of jihadis without stopping to think how these men will be reintegrated into society once the jihad was over. As we have seen, the jihad is not over yet, despite our public statements contrary.

Such exercise of power without accountability and responsibility is also a hallmark of civilian leaders. Bhutto's turbulent rule through 1972-77 displayed similar characteristics when it came to roughing up the opponents and taking measures which would have a pernicious effect on our long term development. One such issue was the declaration of Ahmadi sect as non-Muslim in 1974 through a constitutional amendment. This decision by Bhutto and his Parliament continues to haunt us and remains an indelible blot on our national conscience.

General Zia stretched this doctrine of state impunity to new heights and created a state that was to harm the society, perhaps forever. However, the civilian governments of the 1990s were not immune to it. For instance, the creation of the Taliban under Benazir Bhutto's second tenure and the alleged hijacking of Musharraf's plane are pertinent events. If the institutions were working, both these prime ministers would have taken recourse to the electorate rather than obeying the flawed decisions of the security establishment.

Today, the civilian government is once again embroiled in a similar situation. It has relinquished all policy initiatives to the security establishment and the little area of autonomy they enjoyed is now under constant and rather intense vigilance by the superior courts. Thus, the unelected institutions of the state are also working in a manner that is neither rule-bound nor cognizant of the powers of the parliament.

The president is a party head and refers to the sacrifices of the Pakistan People's Party at the drop of a hat. True, accidents of history have landed him in the current job. There is no legal or constitutional bar on his political activities. However, as a symbol of the federation, he has to be more circumspect than perhaps he is. But this does not imply that the witch-hunt pleas in the high courts should be applied with any seriousness. However, the political party that he heads has little say in correcting the course or holding his performance to account. In his case, he has 'inherited' power and in the case of his opponents they have 'acquired' it.

In a similar fashion, the army issued a public statement against the Kerry-Lugar Bill last year which, according to the rules, was not permitted. In addition, the statements by the army leadership often borderline and sometimes overlap with the mandates of the civilian authority. There is, of course, a widespread perception even among the strongest of democrats that the army will have to intervene when a constitutional and political deadlock occurs.

If we were to turn to the judiciary, then the situation gets even more confounding. One cannot comment on sub judice cases. However, the judgments that have been delivered so far are worrying. For example, asking a political government to issue a documented statement against its head, who incidentally happens to enjoy constitutional and sovereign immunities, to a foreign court for prosecution is baffling to say the least. Leaving aside these politically contentious issues, the very fact that the courts tried to act as regulators of sugar and oil prices was also clearly out of line. In fact, one respected judge of the supreme court admitted that such matters were outside the 'jurisdiction' of the courts, but they had to meet the people's expectations. This leads us to the question: are the judges bound by the legal frameworks or populist demands?

Even the overuse of Article 2A inserted by a dictator these days is a pointer to the fact that the primacy of Islam in our polity is being wrongly interpreted by all and sundry including the gatekeepers of the Constitution. From Zardari's disqualification to banning the Internet and social networking sites, this infamous article is getting a reputation as a stick for the state to use willy-nilly. Of course, the political government is bearing the brunt of such developments, but this only confirms that the rules of any game in Pakistan are neither clear nor binding.

In a culture where the elite who comprise and control the state are unaccountable, public resources become 'privatized' in a broader sense. The rich and powerful do not pay taxes; politicians with astounding levels of wealth pay negligent amounts of taxes; the big businesses evade taxes and the state machinery responsible to collect them becomes a party to the collective malfeasance and plunder. Once the defence expenditure and debt-servicing requirements are fulfilled, a puny amount remains with the government to undertake development and introduce public welfare schemes. The result is that Pakistan, with a population of 180 million, has less than 2 million taxpayers. The bulk of revenues are generated through anti-poor indirect taxation which keeps the state machinery alive.

The current plans to impose a value-added tax are, therefore, meeting resistance and the provinces show little interest. Although the IMF programme requires the government to introduce VAT, it seems unlikely to happen. Millions are spent on luxuries and perks for the senior civil and military officials and the elected representatives keep on increasing their stipends. The net result of this scenario is that essential providers of public services – the thana and revenue officials, teachers, doctors, paramedics, etc., get a pittance and are unable to meet the expectations of the citizens.

The inability of Pakistan's institutions to deliver these services has led to a crisis of legitimacy and a complete lack of trust in the state's abilities. The recent economic meltdown has aggravated things to such a level that the government does not have enough money to pay the independent power producers and the country has been plunged into darkness for twelve to sixteen hours a day in recent months. Once again the civilian government is unable to undertake structural reforms due to the lack of a consensus in the country. National security remains paramount due to the Indian threat, we are told, and now the insurgencies in the northwest. When the government wants a hefty civilian aid package, it is construed as a sell-out by the media and the establishment. Our institutions, therefore, are accustomed to keeping the status quo and appropriating public resources as it reinforces the existing patterns of power.

Given the governance patterns delineated above, reform is a distant dream. All efforts to reform the civil service have been non-starters. Pay and Pension Commissions are formed and their recommendations are rarely taken into account. Ironically, the recent wave of 'reform' was introduced by a military regime during 1999-2002, but its mode and process was not owned by the representative political parties. Therefore, lack of accountability remains a hallmark. The superior courts' judges are only accountable to their internal bodies, the army has its own methods, bureaucracy rarely fires people and now a free media is only following the established norms. Its anchors predict the demise of individuals and governments with impunity and some even advise the jihadis as to how they should treat the infiltrators and enemy-agents. In the meantime, the media barons and journalist associations remain silent.

In these circumstances, sustaining the electoral process and the representative system remains the only way forward. However, given the recent trends of limiting space for a civilian government's decision-making, control over economy, security, foreign policies and encroachment of authority by the unelected institutions, it remains unclear if democracy has a bright future.

If the current trends continue and the economy fails to recover, there is a strong chance that national security concerns and promotions of justice become the new alibi for an extra-constitutional intervention. The danger is that such a development will undo a fragile state. Never has the state been so dependent on political stability, and never has the same been so elusive.

_May 2010_
5.

Innovations for Public Accountability

Much has been written about corruption and how there seems to be no way out of the morass we find ourselves in. The recent survey of Transparency International and other such research indicate that most citizens are dissatisfied with the way the state works. Small wonder that we have insurgencies and a growing gap between the public expectations and the state machinery. It is also a cynical truism that change cannot come from within the system, but sometimes there are exceptions. One such exception is when a district management officer took the lead two years ago and set up a model of tracking and addressing corruption. Zubair Bhatti, the District Coordination Officer (DCO) was posted in Jhang where he started a small initiative in the district.

Given its simple nature and adequate media coverage, very soon the 'model' became a guiding principle for the Punjab government. It definitely goes to the credit of the chief minister that he noted such a development and paid attention to it. This is why Shahbaz Sharif has gained a favourable reputation over the years. I know many analysts have issues with the Shahbaz Sharif administration, but the truth remains: this is a government whose leadership is responsive to the citizens' concerns.

What is the Jhang model and why is it important? As is widely known, petty corruption occurs because of a lack of political will; even if the political will were present, the lack of reliable information and effective outreach gives rise to malfeasance. Information and feedback have helped develop effective modes of governance across the world. For instance, in Bangalore, India, citizen report cards were introduced by a civic group and now their use is widespread. These scorecards highlight the specific issues with services and enable the government to make changes. Focusing on the citizen means that all change and reform must be guided by the information given by the citizens.

In Jhang, Bhatti, a pro-active District Coordination Officer had directed all clerks in the district, who handled land transfers, to submit a daily list of transactions, giving the amount paid and the cell phone numbers of the buyer and the seller. Thereafter, the District Coordination Officer called the buyers and sellers to undertake spot checks to find out whether they had been asked to pay bribes or commissions. In the process, some of the lower officials were taken to task and this spread the right kind of message among the land-registration staff: there was citizen voice and accountability. This model was then applied to state service providers, such as vets who are accustomed to taking bribes from farmers.

The spread of cell phones to every corner of the country – 20 per cent of the poorest Punjab households have cell phones, according to a recent survey – provides a huge opportunity to tap citizen feedback and ensure that his or her voice is being heard. The state can potentially reach the citizens and check if he or she was the target of extortion or received low-quality service. Information and distance are no longer insurmountable obstacles.

The _News_ reported it and later international publications such as _The Economist_ also covered this development. Such was the impact of this simple tool that the chief minister and senior bureaucrats took note of this development and now the Punjab government has decided to scale up this operation. It is definitely a heartening development, especially when one is so used to finding no light at the end of Pakistani tunnels of officialdom.

Technology has also helped facilitate this concept. For instance, mobile phones are now a key instrument to advance and deepen citizen information levels. Cell phones are almost universal. Officials in remote corners of the districts can use this gadget to extort money from citizens for ordinary transactions – a health centre operation, registration of property, domicile issuance, driving licence, etc. – services that are meant to be either free or at nominal official cost or with well-defined user charges. The idea of using information and getting feedback removes distances and layers of officials between the supervisor and the citizen to allow the supervisory officers to directly find out if money was extorted or his/her concern was ignored or squashed.

Thus, by a direct connection to the user of a public service, the chain of collusion among petty officials can be undone by regular monitoring from the district or provincial headquarters. The government of the Punjab has now started to implement this in several districts and divisions, most notably in Bahawalpur, with a focus on property registration. The idea that the chief minister, a commissioner or a District Coordination Officer can check on the delivery of a bribe-free service is quite a novel one. It has started to show some results, although there is still a long way to go.

It is unfortunate that the discourse on corruption in Pakistan is limited to high-level scandals. The everyday corruption that disempowers the citizen is often neglected or rendered invisible. TV anchors spend hundreds of prime time hours to dig out old and new scandals with a primary focus on the politicos. This has been our national tragedy since the 1950s. After 1947, it was actually issues of evacuee property and the complete lack of accountability of the bureaucracy that fostered a culture of embezzlement and malfeasance. But even then, the target was the politicians who were disqualified one after the other for their irregularities.

Last month, when I visited Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for a research assignment, I was amazed to find out how the Jhang model had been noted by the key officials in the province. In fact, the commissioner of Peshawar was apparently calling up the citizens randomly to check if they had paid a bribe. This is how a good idea is spread and institutional culture can evolve incrementally.

However, the long-term success of implementing the Jhang model anywhere, including in the Punjab, requires strong political support, at least for a period of five to ten years. Experience from Bangalore suggests that citizen report cards only worked when the state supported the idea of its implementation and used the citizen feedback to improve the quality, range and reliability of services. In Bangalore, public transport has been improved, petty corruption has been reduced and services like water and garbage collection are significantly better.

In our context, this initiative must not be implemented in a piecemeal manner. It needs to be institutionalized through a regulation that binds senior officers posted at the district level. If and when the local governments are elected to power, this feature of institutional reform should also become a part of their mandates. This is the only way it can outlast one regime.

However, we cannot be oblivious to the larger issues. Zubair Bhatti, the innovator, left the civil service soon after he had implemented this initiative. The reasons were, of course, personal. But this exit from the service is not an enigma – a lot of capable officers have been leaving the service as the human resource policies of the national and the provincial governments do not reward innovation and those who bring change. Status quo is likely to be rewarded almost always. This leaves us with the dilemma of improving the work environment and compensation packages for the public servants. For instance, most of the civil servants (except the judges in the Punjab) earn a wage that cannot even pay for the basic needs of a family. In such an environment, corruption, dejection and frustration brew and this is a matter for urgent attention.

Whilst the chief minister of the Punjab has taken bold decisions, such as the increase in judicial salaries and improving the police compensation, he would be well advised to pay more attention to the state of the public service, especially the executive officers who enforce the writ of the state and regulate rights and entitlements. There are issues such as the federal versus provincial service and their respective share of posts. Indeed, the issue of salaries is well known, but nobody wants to do anything about it other than the customary routine increases such as the one this year. Increasing salaries by 50 per cent when food inflation has been over 30 per cent in recent years is hardly a major change. Most importantly, merit and performance need to be made the cornerstones of civil service management. Favouritism is still the order of the day, not just in the Punjab, but across the country and some would say, across South Asia. This requires a major policy shift and change of strategy by the elected governments.

The survival of the Pakistani state, to a great degree, rests upon making the system work and allowing the governance structures to implement policies. At present, we are far away from this goal.

Pakistan's citizens desperately need the attention and protection of the state. Their voice needs to be heard and factored into the accountability process. The civil service structure must deliver and there should be many more models such as the Jhang variety. All these innovations must be welcomed as we face the alarming prospect of state failure.

_June 2010_
6.

A Reform Agenda to Address Challenges

Strange things are happening. Two months after a natural disaster hit millions of people and created the essential prerequisites for an economic meltdown, the focus of Pakistan's ruling elite – elected and unelected – remains on power politics. As if the utter lack of preparedness to cope with a disaster was not enough, the response to the disaster and its monitoring by a holier-than-thou media is baffling. The prime cause of the post-floods mismanagement, if one were to believe the analysts on prime time TV and opinion piece writers from the press, is the corrupt clique headed by Mr Zardari. Those with the most religious bent of mind have cited divine wrath as a cause of this calamity. A few right wing newspapers have even blamed the United States and India to have caused this natural disaster to punish Pakistan for its nuclear weapons. The genesis of such intellectual confusion and distortion of public debate lies in the way the Pakistani mind has evolved into a hydra-headed, paranoid and militarized being. This has been the greatest contribution of the Pakistani state: to shape and craft a society that places a premium on nuclear weapons over citizen welfare, demonizes the political process and celebrates religious militancy as a just cause. This is why militarism of a softer variety is back in full force. Undoubtedly, the Pakistan army has done a tremendous job in rescuing people and ensuring that relief efforts are well-executed. However, this is neither unusual nor a matter of surprise as it happens to be an organized institution. But to apply this success in an emergency situation by a force trained to deal with urgent situations onto the domain of national governance brings back the central issue of Pakistan's statehood: the unresolved and now perhaps permanent civil-military imbalance. It started with the TV channels eulogizing army efforts and creating a binary between the army and the civvies – a half-truth and a rhetorical polemic with little substance. This was followed by calls for army intervention by the Muttahida Quami Movement and its nemesis, Mr Imran Khan. Luckily for Pakistan, the generals appear to be in no mood to intervene and rock the boat. Well, at least for now.

Once the threat of the prospect of direct military rule was not given due attention, disguised formulae for indirect military rule have been propagated by the disgruntled among the political class and TV anchors. Debates have been held on General Kakar's formula, the Bangladesh model of technocratic supremacy or a national government comprising clean politicians. Sadly, judicial activism, howsoever earnest it might be, has not helped either. The reopening of the National Reconciliation Ordinance implementation debate, preceded by interim orders on the 18th Amendment case, has created a situation of uncertainty and near-collision between the executive and the judiciary. Mercifully, a showdown has been avoided in the short term.

Even prior to the floods the basic issues of economic management, political governance and terrorism had haunted the body-politic and continue to do so. However, the remarkable apathy that was displayed by those who matter to 'real' issues once again shows the inherent culture of a post-colonial state: one which abandoned the reform agenda in the 1970s and since then has been eaten away from within, and by geopolitical imperatives, to literally prove that Jinnah's anguish on having created a 'truncated' and 'moth-eaten' Pakistan was valid.

In these circumstances, reform and social change are often confused with the change of heads and which group of rent-seeking and patronage-doling elites should share power with the permanent establishment, i.e., the military-bureaucratic complex, the big business and the 'foreign' interests in Pakistan.

It is, therefore, critical to speak of a reform agenda for Pakistan and argue that the long-neglected agenda of state-building should now dominate public discourse. Let us recount the five key issues that require the attention of Pakistanis, their rulers and international partners.

**Political Stability:** The search for stability is now a cliché and almost an unachievable goal in Pakistan. Having said that, it remains a paramount objective. The fragile democratic government has to be allowed to complete its tenure. It may reshuffle the cabinet, change the prime minister or even elect another set of coalition parties to govern, but there is little use in repeating past mistakes through unrepresentative experiments in governance. They have never delivered in a factionalized, diverse and tense federation. Pakistan's key institutions – the army, judiciary and the parliament – stand to gain if they resolve to keep the system intact.

**Economic Recovery:** Nothing is more important than to revitalize the economy at this juncture. A low economic growth rate (0 to1 per cent) and high inflation (25 per cent if efforts are not made to improve the situation) are a disaster formula, given our needs and the population explosion. The illogicality of raising taxes and improving collection makes little sense as tax-collections cannot rise in times of recession. More importantly, the incentives for domestic investment need to be restored as we are now chronically suffering from low savings (18 per cent) and investment rate compared to so many other economies. Aid may be necessary in the short term, but focus needs to shift to trade and the national security state will have to change its course and look eastwards to trade with India for an immediate boost to small-scale manufacturing and agro-based industries.

**Energy Rents:** Pakistan has been marred by its national security paradigm when it comes to forging regional alliances for energy trade. A decade has been lost quarrelling over minor details and putting bilateral issues with India before everything else. It is essential that energy-deficient India is now used as a huge opportunity by the Pakistani state to achieve major growth gains and employment in the immediate term. The various pipelines and energy corridors earlier planned now need to be put into place. Yes, Balochistan is a problem, but what stops the federal authorities to engage with the separatist leaders and allay their concerns and fears?

**Full Implementation of 18th Amendment:** Related to the above, the political class has made a historical beginning by correcting the earlier wrongs through devising a new framework for federal governance. It should be a priority, but a government on a life-boat can hardly achieve that if the opposition does not work with it. The provinces have to fast-track their capacities and institutional reform to take additional responsibilities. In fact, post-flood reconstruction provides a unique opportunity for the provinces to put their institutions in order, devolve more power to the local level and create lean and efficient provincial governments that can deliver and not just collect and pocket rents. The redundant provincial departments need to be abolished and capacities should flow to the local level.

**Anti-terrorism Efforts:** It would be a non-starter if the Pakistan People's Party-Awami National Party combined continues to be at the forefront of countering militancy. The government will not succeed if Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and other political forces do not join hands to fight the biggest menace of our times.

**Social Protection and Youth:** Given the alarming rates of poverty and youth population, it is essential that the state must arrest an impending social holocaust and focus on those vital areas and programmes that cater to the young, poor and marginalized sections of Pakistan. This is necessary to achieve higher rates of economic growth and also for the realignment of national priorities in the context of the dangers that afflict Pakistani society.

In conclusion, the Pakistani state needs to address issues that cast a dark shadow over its future. The media and the chatterati need to take stock of the actual crises rather than glorify palace intrigues and monitor power-politics.

_October 2010_
7.

18th Amendment – More Questions than Answers

The short and interim order has disappointed many quarters that had been lobbying for a grand showdown between the judiciary and the parliament. Institutional conflicts can engineer systemic breakdowns. However, the apex court has avoided the route of appeasing its core constituency – the activist lawyers and bars – which has been clamouring for a governance paradigm that locates judicial dominance at its centre. Pakistan's quest for parliamentary democracy has sought representative rule, therefore no unelected institution, however effective or popular, can appropriate that space. The interim order on the petitions challenging the 18th Amendment to the constitution has tacitly acknowledged this reality.

The bone of contention in this saga has been the insertion of Article 175A which revised the mode of appointments to the superior courts by introducing two broad-based panels – a judicial commission and a parliamentary committee – to make the process of appointing judges inclusive, less discretionary and transparent. Several other new clauses were also challenged, but Article 175A was the main subject of debate and discussion as a few purists from the lawyers' movement deemed it to be against the Independence of the judiciary as enshrined in the Constitution.

The decision also comes in the wake of an ongoing crisis comprising judiciary-executive collision on a number of issues. In the past two years, for right or wrong reasons, almost every executive decision of import has been challenged in the courts, thereby creating a dichotomy akin to good versus evil in terms of decision-making. Let it be clear that this is not the reality. It is a perception carefully crafted by the media and sections of the opposition who have strategized to use legality and judicial activism as mechanisms to settle scores with the ruling party and, by extension, the coalition. The court has, by and large, acted with judicial propriety and has avoided the brinkmanship suggested in TV talk shows and belligerent political statements.

However, the four-month-long hearing of the petitions against the 18th Amendment and the court's tardiness in announcing the interim order have raised several concerns. The powers of the court to strike down or amend constitutional provisions were discussed threadbare, at times in an informed manner, but most of the time in a partisan and political fashion. Similarly, the obiter dicta on an undefined and unsettled issue, the basic structure of Pakistan's all-weather constitution, were not encouraging.

Now that the order is out, it is essential to review the implications of the thorny issues of constitutionalism, political stability and rule of law in the country. The eighteen-page-long order exclusively discussed Article 175A on the appointment of judges. The supreme court's direction in effect states that the judicial appointment process under the new Article 175A should resemble the old process even when filtered through the judicial commission and the parliamentary committee. In the previous mode of appointments, the chief justices of the supreme court and the high courts were the decision-makers, and their nominations could not be ignored by the prime minister or the president without a satisfactory explanation.

With the new order, the judiciary has jealously guarded its powers to appoint judges which in a way defeats the purpose of the new method of appointment, a method that required a broad-based selection process, involvement of the parliament and was in accordance with the international best-practices devised by democracies.

After the judgment, the names of potential candidates will be 'initiated' by the chief justices while the chief justice of Pakistan will 'regulate' the meetings and affairs of the judicial commission. Intriguingly, the parliamentary committee will hold its proceedings in camera and, if a candidate forwarded by the judicial commission is rejected, the parliamentary committee will have to register its reasons (justiciable by the supreme court) for doing so. Critics have characterized this as putting old wine in new bottles and a dilution of the spirit of Article 175A approved through parliamentary consensus. The matter has been referred back to the parliament which by itself is an extraordinary step as there is no explicit or implicit power with the court to tell the parliament what to do.

**More Questions than Answers:** It remains unclear if the other clauses challenged in over two-dozen petitions have been settled or not. Thus the grey areas remain. This implies that the unclear fate of the new Articles will evoke partisan criticism and, as some commentators have suggested, keep a Damocles' sword hanging over the parliament. The larger implication will be that the legitimacy of the entire 18th Amendment as a duly deliberated and passed constitutional change will be called into question, thereby diminishing the central concept of political transformation and decentralization from the federation to the provinces.

**Separation of Powers:** There is a settled legal doctrine in our constitution. The organs of the state have clear mandates and jurisdictions. Legal experts have pointed out that referring a matter to the parliament – the originator of the constitution – by the judiciary is akin to overstepping its mandate. True that the court has the power to review constitutional amendments and interpret them, but it does not have any inherent power to amend the constitution. The directives to the parliament as to how it should operationalize its scheme are unprecedented. The working of a parliamentary committee is the exclusive mandate of the parliament, and in any case, the rules of business for the committee for appointing judges are still to be devised. By telling the elected representatives what to do, the conventions of parliamentary democracy are challenged.

**Transparency in Governance:** The insistence to hold in-camera proceedings of the parliamentary committee negates the principle of transparency that is central to the concept of good governance. Why should the public not be made aware of the deliberations of their representatives about who sits on judgment at the taxpayers' expense and whether the appointees are fully qualified or not? In several jurisdictions – let's not talk about India here when it suits our biases – parliaments are getting a greater role in the selection of judges. The fear of semi-literate Member National Assemblies (often with fake degrees) judging the judges-to-be is pointless. If this were the case, we should discard democracy as the generals have always done in our history.

**Minimizing Discretionary Powers:** Whether it is the executive or the judiciary, discretionary power leads to sub-optimal decisions. Absolute powers in the hands of the prime ministers, chief justices and others state functionaries are at variance with the concept of inclusive governance. Thus, the widening of the decision-making process through commissions and opinions of a wide range of stakeholders is most desirable. It is hoped that the parliament and the courts will find a way out when this issue is finally resolved next year.

**Political Instability Will Grow:** Given the long adjournment and unanswered questions, the uncertainty will grow and the warring politicians and forces that want democracy to be scuttled will continue to use this period for tactical games against the parliament and the civilian government. However, this is not the intent of the supreme court which has acted wisely in the given circumstances. Nevertheless, such an unintended consequence will be unfortunate for the country and its civilian governance.

At a time when the crises facing Pakistan have snowballed into a battle for survival, such developments will be tragic. It is time the parliament and the executive took a pragmatic view of the situation without compromising on the separation of powers. This will not be an easy job and shall be a tightrope walk between constitutionalism and political compromises. Let's hope that the parliament is up to the challenge and the supreme court continues to manifest its concern for the democratic system.

One simple fact is paramount: the interest, independence and efficacy of civilian institutions are inextricably linked to a healthy evolution of democratic governance. Any diversion or collision will plunge us into a vortex of chaos and grave existential danger.

_October 2010_
8.

Devolution – Unpacking the Higher Education Commission Debate

The 18th Amendment approved by the parliament in 2010 signified a new era in Pakistan's troubled federalism. Given our turbulent constitutional history, the new governance arrangements approved by all parties and federating units settled for a leaner centre and addressed long-standing demands for provincial autonomy. But the implementation of this amendment has been slower than expected, largely for reasons of capacity, both at the federal and provincial levels. Despite the constraints, the Implementation Commission has delivered fairly well. Thus far, ten ministries have been devolved. Five ministries – local government, special initiatives, zakat and ushr, population welfare and youth affairs – were devolved in late December 2010. The recent batch of federal ministries being devolved includes: ministries of education, social welfare and special education, tourism, livestock and dairy and culture.

**Media Rants:** In recent days, a new controversy on the devolution of the Higher Education Commission) has plagued the implementation process with respect to the 18th Amendment. Television channels have aired the views of technical experts as well as the usual suspects who rant on every talk show on almost every subject under the sun, be it defence, culture, or cricket. The move towards the devolution of the Higher Education Commission's powers and functions to provinces has been construed as another move by the semi-literate and 'corrupt' politicians to thwart the degree validation process which has been part of our pseudo-political discourse. Such an argument is pretty lame, as the rule to have a degree to be eligible for an election has been done away with. The Musharraf scheme of a grand Higher Education Commission, BA-holding legislators and 'controlled democracy' obviously failed in 2008 when the electorate rejected his party and elected representatives who sent him home.

**A Non-discourse:** Most of what has been said on the Higher Education Commission constitutes a plethora of comments, hysterics and 'opinions' on the subject which has side-tracked the debate altogether. From a national discourse on fostering federalism, we are now arguing whether the Higher Education Commission was an effective body or not. There have been sporadic protests– overplayed by the media – and random statements of vice chancellors who seem to be vacillating from one position to another. Furthermore, the former head of the Higher Education Commission, the talented Dr Atta-ur-Rahman, has not helped matters either. His direct invitation to the army to step in and rescue the Higher Education Commission is simply problematic. What do the armed forces have to do with this issue? They are legally not in charge, and when an educationist makes such wild calls, we can easily surmise that Pakistan's democracy remains a sham, especially when it comes to the educated elite.

**Sanity, at Last:** Najam Sethi, on his TV show, argued for a reasoned debate on the Higher Education Commission issue and emphasized that the devolution of powers or functions to the provinces cannot be compromised. In a follow-up tweet on the Internet, he added: 'Higher Education Commission debate should be how to minimally retain its best federal and international aspects while gradually transiting to maximally efficient devolution.' Dr Pervez Hoodbhoy, otherwise a fierce critic of the Higher Education Commission, has also alerted that a sudden dissolution of the Higher Education Commission will result in a 'free fall' due to a lack of technical capabilities in the provinces and the important work that the Higher Education Commission was undertaking. Similarly, Dr Pervez Tahir, former chief economist of the country, has also argued the Higher Education Commission case in his op-eds published in an English daily (8 April 2011). Sceptics have also argued that we may lose nearly half-a-billion dollars of foreign aid due to be directed towards higher education reform in the country. It has been argued that specialized regulation of higher education requires advanced capabilities that are missing in the provinces.

**Devolution, a Must:** Conversely, passionate proponents for total devolution of the Higher Education Commission – unsurprisingly from the smaller provinces – argue that this body has not created a revolution despite the sevenfold increase in its budget during the Musharraf era. Instances have been cited where the Higher Education Commission failed to regulate many institutions, especially those related to the armed forces and had let many malpractices continue in the country. One firebrand Member of National Assembly from Awami National Party opined during a discussion: 'I am convinced standards of education in general and higher education in particular will improve when Higher Education Commission is devolved to the provinces. I think we should all welcome the change and extend support to the provincial governments to ensure the devolution process is effective and smooth.' Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, the bold critic of Pakistan's security establishment has also questioned the efficacy of the Higher Education Commission decisions and supported its full devolution.

**Unpacking the Issues:** Centralization of Higher Education Commission planning and resource management is the issue here, not the regulatory aspects per se. What needs to be understood is that the provinces, as the revenue generating units, want full control over the Higher Education Commission budget and spending priorities. This is a fair demand given that we have a decentralized governance framework and the National Finance Commission Award of 2010 has increased the provincial shares in national revenues. It would be senseless for a body such as the Higher Education Commission to fund laboratories in universities from Islamabad when education is a provincial subject. Therefore, we need to separate the two issues: the regulatory powers of the Higher Education Commission that determine quality control, and the actual execution of 'schemes' to use the favoured parlance of Pakistan's public sector development process. Therefore, we have three aspects to address: a) standard-setting and quality control; b) foreign education and aid management; and c) physical works and improvements in the facilities within universities.

**The Constitutional Way:** The Council of Common Interests formulates the policy in Part II of the Federal Legislative List contained in the Fourth Schedule of the constitution as amended in 2010. Section 7 of this list states that the 'coordination of scientific and technological research' is a federal function. Similarly, Section 12 is clear that the federation is also empowered to set 'standards in institutions for higher education and research, scientific and technical institutions' along with 'education' with respect to 'Pakistani students in foreign countries and foreign students in Pakistan' (Section 17). Thus, the ultimate arbiter of this issue is the Council of Common Interests – the apex mechanism in the constitution which mediates federal relations.

Given this clear prescription in the Constitution, the Higher Education Commission devolution can be phased in a manner in which functions such as quality assurance, foreign scholarships and donor-financed programmes are retained under federal control. All other functions can swiftly be devolved to the provinces as the momentum to change Pakistan's governance cannot be halted. This is a rare opportunity which cannot be squandered. Therefore, an amended and rationalized Higher Education Commission needs to stay in place.

**Learning from Past Mistakes:** A major wave of devolution came about in the wake of Musharraf's devolution reform in 2001-2002. Admittedly, that was done in haste under a particular authoritarian agenda, but there are lessons inherent in this experience. Overnight transition did not work out well as the districts and tehsils did not have the required capabilities or resources and often faltered in discharging their functions under the new governance architecture. We are not known for managing change as it is induced through military 'revolutions', executive diktats and foreign advisories. Managing change is a sophisticated process that needs to be carefully deliberated and planned. The Higher Education Commission is no exception. All of its good work, notwithstanding many failures, cannot be undone in one stroke. A hasty devolution will result in a crisis of sorts as the provinces are not yet ready with the requisite capabilities to manage universities and deal with specialized problems that are associated with such oversight.

**Which Way Now?:** The way forward, therefore, comprises four major steps:

First, the unbundling of the Higher Education Commission mandates and functions needs to take place and considered by the Council of Common Interests as well as the implementation commission tasked with the devolution of powers to the provinces.

Second, regulatory and policy issues need to be kept federal in a single institution instead of diffusing them to the Cabinet Division (validating degrees), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (international scholarships) and Ministry of Inter-provincial Coordination (administration of the National College of the Arts) which would read like a recipe for disaster. These federal ministries have generalist cadres of civil servants whose record of handling their normal work routines is unenviable to say the least.

Third, to fulfil the demands of constitutional governance, the budgets and projects can be transferred to the provinces which have sufficient capabilities to handle physical works and even management through their higher education departments or wings.

Lastly, a detailed programme for capability assessment and development with the provinces needs to be designed immediately and implemented in the next twelve months, whereby some of the regulatory functions can be handed over to the provinces by April 2012.

Thereafter, a smaller and more efficient Higher Education Commission can operate under the Cabinet Division carrying out the essential standard-setting, internal and external coordination and quality assurance, and monitoring functions.

_April 2011_
9.

Devolution of Powers — The Challenges Ahead

Perhaps the best thing about contemporary Pakistan is the way its governance arrangements are being restructured to undo the bitter, brutal legacy of centralization. Had we undertaken such reform decades ago, Pakistan would have been a far better place. The 18th Amendment reflects a broad political consensus on how Pakistan can actually evolve into a real federal state as opposed to the notional federalism of the past where provincial autonomy had become a residue of central patronage and not guaranteed by the Constitution.

Nevertheless, the devolution of powers in 2011 faces two major dilemmas:

First, the provinces are currently operating as centralized bureaucratic apparatuses with little or no powers and accountabilities at the local levels.

Second, and perhaps far more important, the provinces have to build their technical and political resources to handle the new powers and functions which are now flowing at an unprecedented speed.

These two challenges are the real test of civilian governments and it remains to be seen if they can handle it lest other messiahs or messiah-proxies enter the arena and reverse this process. Knowing Pakistan's history, anything is possible! This is a country plagued by a lack of political stability and policy continuity. We shall examine the pitfalls and challenges that lie ahead in this transitional process.

**Progress So Far:** During the first two phases of the devolution, ten of the forty-eight ministries at the federal level were to be devolved. The committee set 30 June 2011 as the deadline for this process. Taking up these recommendations, the federal cabinet devolved ministries for special initiatives, Zakat and Ushr, population welfare, youth affairs, and local government and rural development to the provinces in December 2010. The provinces also inherited office buildings, equipment, development funds and projects for the fiscal year 2010-2011. All international matters of these ministries were transferred to the Economic Affairs Division and some planning-related matters to the Planning and Development Division. However, overall planning for the ministries that are being transferred or will be transferred in February 2011 will be the responsibility of provincial governments.

On 05 April 2011, the second phase of the devolution process commenced, with the devolution of the ministries for education, social welfare and special education, tourism, livestock and dairy, rural development and culture. According to reports, the Commission for Implementation of the 18th Amendment has also approved a plan for the transfer of three federal ministries, including sports, women's development and environment, to the provinces in the third phase.

**Unclear Federal Arrangements:** While the centre has abolished ten ministries so far, there is a deadlock over staff and resources. Provinces complain that they cannot pay the wage bill of surplus staff and the centre has retained all the existing federal public servants, as any move to whittle down to the right size will be fraught with political dangers. Similarly, after June 2011, who will pay the staff? If the federal government continues to foot the salaries bill, then it will not be able to rationalize its size and the temptation for re-centralization will remain. Secondly, the federal government's move to shift attached bodies and autonomous organizations to Cabinet Division and such other dysfunctional ministries is even worse. There needs to be a more thorough assessment of the post-devolution architecture of the central authority. It appears, with due respects to a great reformer, Raza Rabbani and his colleagues, patchy, ad hoc and devoid of long-term thinking.

**Resistance by the Bureaucracy:** The Implementation Commission for the 18th Amendment has already voiced its concerns over how the federal bureaucracy is resisting reform. Add to this the vested interests whose power, pelf and rents are endangered and the plot thickens. As the case of the Higher Education Commission demonstrates, powerful lobbies can play the game of resistance well. The Higher Education Commission debate is being argued along the lines of why the Higher Education Commission is so effective instead of what justification the Commission has to resist after the political executive has agreed to devolution? There are vested interests, such as the drug companies that might find it easier to deal with central authorities rather than the messy governance dynamics in the provinces. These issues require critical thinking and more technical options than a simple case of 'doing the devolution' in a hurried manner. Above all, it also necessitates the need for civil service reform.

What happened to civil service reform? Since the 1970s, we have not initiated any kind of civil service reform in Pakistan. The 1970s reforms were partial and more symbolic than substantive. Now is the time to rethink the efficacy and necessity of federal services, such as the District Management Group and the police. If the provinces are going to be managing their administrations, should we not move to revamped provincial civil service cadres that classify officials according to expertise, skills and integrity instead of seniority and province versus federal divide? The federal government has an ideal opportunity to retain a small, highly-trained and effective group of federal officials instead of mammoth armies of 'cadres', Central Superior Services inductees and group-wise services which work like clans and tribes rather than a professional class of managers. We hope the federal government is going to do something about it. The best way forward is to pick up the thread where the Ishrat Hussain committee left off. The proposals in that report are fresh and lying unattended. Someone needs to read them.

**Provincial Capabilities:** While a few provinces, such as the Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, have started to make preparations for the new roles and responsibilities, the situation in Sindh and Balochistan is somewhat worrying. The key reason for the lack of clarity relates to the political environment existing in these provinces. The federal government has the onus of helping the provinces out and the Council of Common Interest must take note of the situation and appoint special purpose committees to review the situation. A good solution would be to use scores of officers who are currently side-lined as Officer on Special Duty to start working in these roles. Leveraging existing resources is not only sensible, it will set a good precedent for the provinces too. Officers cannot be declared as idle; taxpayers are paying for their salaries and perks.

**Education and Health:** The complete devolution of education is underway and the provincial education, and in some cases higher education, departments need to bolster their capabilities. This may be a good opportunity to engage in public-private partnerships with the education institutes, think-tanks and NGOs. Using domestic expertise can only help provinces in handling the vertical programmes and improving the service delivery. Similarly, for health services, provinces need to gear up their resources in anticipation of the devolution of the national health ministry. A few experts have raised concerns about the public interest areas that may be affected in the wake of the devolution.

In particular, setting standards, managing health information, disease security, compliance with international regulations and the regulation of medicines and related products are domains where the federal government has an edge. It has been argued that in most countries a ministry or a semi-autonomous public regulatory authority, such as the Food and Drug Administration in the United States, regulates medicines and drugs centrally. Even countries such as India where some (but not all) aspects of drug regulations were previously decentralized, are now moving towards centralized regulatory arrangements. These are important policy debates that should start now and further delay may harm public interest in the short to medium terms.

**Culture:** With the abolition of the central culture ministry, the important areas of conservation of heritage and archaeology have also been decentralized. Most provinces lack the essential technical capabilities to manage the old sites which are important for conservation. Lest we squander whatever we have, the provinces should immediately move to take federal staff or hire new ones to avoid disruptions.

**Planning for the Burgeoning Youth:** In a country where 65 per cent of the population is below the age of twenty-six (and the new census may show this percentage to be higher) the devolution of the youth ministry requires special handling by the provinces. Currently, youth affairs are lumped with information or such other ministries and, therefore, are treated as just another bureaucratic outfit. In fact, planning and preparing for a young Pakistan is now an urgent priority. It would be best to add the youth to the planning and development departments along with authorities that are focusing on skills development. All these issues are interrelated.

**Province to Local:** The most urgent complementary reform relates to the revitalization of local governments that were packed with members of the current coalitions in the provinces. This has been an inimical development and the devolution from the centre will be meaningless if centralization at the provincial level is not taken care of. It is necessary that the provincial laws – that exist in draft forms – are debated and approved by the legislatures. Political parties must remember that at the end of the day an election will assess their effectiveness in delivering basic services and not their stance on USA drones or foreign policy shenanigans that occupy the central position in policy discourses. The Pakistani state has to be rescued and that too at the local level where it interacts with the citizens. The current absence of local state can only endanger Pakistan's future.

The recent resignation of Ishaq Dar, the vice-chairman of the implementation commission, indicates the contested nature of the devolution process. Many analysts believe that smaller provinces are keen to push the agenda while Punjab has reservations about the way the process is being handled. It is, therefore, imperative that this process continues through a consensual approach and not be derailed. Concurrently, provinces must fast-track their preparations and think of devolving powers and resources to local governments. The impediments to full provincial autonomy under the 18th Amendment need to be tackled despite the odds. This may be our last chance to do so.

_April 2011_
10.

Towards a Decentralized Pakistan

On 01 July 2011, the third phase of the redistribution of federal powers and functions was completed whereby seven federal ministries now stand devolved. These include the ministries of health, food and agriculture, labour and manpower, environment, women's development, sports and minorities affairs. Earlier, ten ministries were devolved to the provinces with the abolition of the concurrent list under the 18th Amendment.

**Implementing the 18th Amendment:** The process has been fraught with political bickering between the centre and the provinces and resistance by powerful groups which are beneficiaries of a centralized Pakistan. However, these political and administrative contests have not undermined the process of devolution. A major factor in negotiating this transition has been the role of Mian Raza Rabbani who heads the Implementation Commission for the 18th Amendment to the Constitution.

Most significantly, the political parties have shown their willingness to work together in achieving the intended results of the provincial autonomy related clauses. Having said that, the real test of the elected civilian governments has just begun. Large scale restructuring of the federal government and transfer of new functions to the provinces implies that there is much more needed than executive notifications and political rhetoric.

**Beyond Executive Notifications:** Four challenges are of urgent importance:

  * To ensure that the devolution process is completed and not truncated or manipulated to suit the ends of the political parties. At the same time the regulatory capacity of the state, already weakened over decades, must not be diluted during the transition
  * The corresponding institutional expertise is also devolved to the provinces and where missing, the centre should advise and facilitate institutional strengthening
  * A civil service reform is required to achieve responsive and citizen-oriented governance – the larger goal of the 18th Amendment
  * Decentralization of provincial powers is also needed and the local government system should be reintroduced

Unpacking and addressing these four imperatives is now an urgent responsibility which the federal and provincial governments cannot absolve themselves of.

**Is Devolution Complete?:** Within hours of the issuance of the 30 June notification by the federal government the largest constituent unit of the federation, the Punjab province, sent a long letter of protest highlighting how several functions of the 'devolved' ministries were still retained by the centre. The examples of 'partial devolution' in the complaint by the Punjab province are instructive. For instance, while the ministry of labour and manpower has been devolved, the attached workers welfare fund and the employee's old-age benefits institution have not been decentralized. Similarly, while devolving the health ministry, the drug regulatory authority is still a central subject. Another body of dubious performance, the Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services Corporation, remains intact despite the 18th Amendment.

While Punjab may be protesting too much in view of the recent escalation in the Centre-Punjab conflict, there is a need to view devolution not as a formalistic transfer of the ministerial apparatus, but of decision-making powers and the ability to negotiate and transact public policy choices.

**Partial Reform Syndrome:** Development theorists have highlighted the pitfalls of the 'partial reform syndrome' in many contexts. Institutional and political factors are vital in shaping incentives for policy makers to implement reforms. Gaps between stated and actual commitments to reform differ most of the time, and the case of devolution under the 18th Amendment is no different. A centralized culture of exercising power will not go away in months or years. It will require decades and negotiations via 'triangles of accommodation' among bureaucrats, politicians and strongmen. In Pakistan's case, multinational corporations, business lobbies and other non-state actors such as contractors, middlemen, etc. also set the policy course. The greatest challenge to devolution, therefore, is overcoming the partial reform syndrome and Punjab has made a good start by highlighting it and calling for mediation at the level of the Council of Common Interests.

**Regulatory Expertise:** Important ministries, such as health, agriculture, women's development and environment, have been undertaking regulatory functions. The drugs' authority is still at the centre but there needs to be a debate about where it belongs. Being overly centralized and a preserve of a few bureaucrats, the regulation of drugs has been a joke where powerful multinational pharmaceutical companies have prevailed over a weak and vulnerable group of mandarins. Environment is another area where weakened regulation will enhance the risks to the economy and society. Climate change agenda requires strong regulation at all levels. Expertise on these matters must not be lost or undermined during the current transition and, therefore, should remain a focus of policy debate and political negotiations. And let's not forget how important labour standards and the need to address various policy issues are. Devolving the labour ministry must not result in the weakening of enforcement of the state's obligations to the working class.

**Inadequate Federal Arrangements:** The post-18th Amendment changes appear to be hurried and devoid of imagination. Instead of thinking out of the box, the cabinet, inter-provincial coordination and the planning and development divisions have been saddled with additional responsibilities. The under-performance and weak capabilities of these institutions was already a matter of concern for the last few decades. For instance, the economic affairs division gets donor support for even basic innovations. It will be extremely difficult for these inefficient bureaucratic layers to handle new vital responsibilities without technical staff, budgets and swift decision-making powers. This is why regulatory issues relating to education, health and other sectors require more innovative and independent arrangements. Perhaps the next phase of the ongoing process should devote exclusive attention to this.

**Provincial Institutions and their Expertise:** At this stage, it is also unclear how much of devolution has taken place in terms of staff. Media reports suggested that provinces were not keen to take all the federal employees on board due to financial constraints. But general administrative staff is available everywhere, it is the technical staff that matters. Environmental experts, engineers, archaeologists and finance specialists are required with new powers at the provincial levels, especially in the smaller provinces. This is why it may be important to discuss staffing plans at the provincial levels along with changes in legislation and rules of business. Scores of laws and rules assign responsibilities to central authorities and, therefore, the provinces will now need to get down to the serious business of framing new laws and ensuring that they are not replicas of archaic colonial legal frameworks.

Specifically, the labour, women's development and environment departments are the most side-lined and under-funded provincial departments. They will be undertaking a host of functions and projects which require suitable staff and resources. In view of the climate change phenomena, the provincial environment departments need a fresh role and reorganization that can only be approved if the chief ministers and their cabinets are on board. Donor coordination requirements will also increase at the province level, and this requires a new business model within the province which is less archaic and inefficient than the present arrangements.

**What Happened to Civil Service Reform?:** It has been reported that yet another civil service reform commission is on the cards. Dozens of such committees and commissions have made recommendations, perhaps not so much at the provincial level. As I have argued before, the Ishrat Hussain commission has proposed a useful reform agenda that needs to be taken forward. The proposal of easier entry and exit into the public service and the creation of a national executive service are ideas that must not be trashed just because status quoists in the bureaucracy find them unappealing.

Provinces are now going to handle the business of seventeen federal ministries, and most importantly, are to be exclusively in charge of policy-making in crucial areas such as health, education, gender, agriculture and environment to name a few. Reliance on donor-funded consultants cannot be the norm. Instead, departments must hire, train or re-designate people to core positions to fulfil the requirements of effective policy implementation. Three competencies – financial and budgetary expertise, sector specialism and gender-sensitive policy skills – are needed in most departments. Without civil service reform, devolution of policy-setting will be unachievable and the current reform may just not achieve its intended purposes.

**Devolving Powers to the Local Level:** Provinces such as the Punjab and Balochistan are way too populous and geographically large to ensure effective policy implementation and service delivery without further devolution. The state is bound by the clauses of the constitution to set up a local government system. Yet, the rollback of Musharraf's devolution has not been followed by a credible alternative. Admittedly, these are not easy times for the federal and the provincial governments; nevertheless, they have to focus on local governance and install strong accountability mechanisms. Electoral accountability is globally known to be the best way of giving people a voice and making the leaders and service providers at the grassroots level work as responsive state functionaries.

Sadly, the provincial governments are not keen and the ruling coalition is also wary of sharing powers with local representatives. This attitude and power-culture defeats the intent of the 18th Amendment and the current devolution. There are multiple possibilities to be explored without resorting to the 1979 or 2001 models of devolution. However, the federal government must lead this process and facilitate inter-provincial dialogue. Parliamentarians need to think beyond their short-term and ineffective patronage systems to set up local government systems. In fact, this may be the right time to think of province-specific arrangements that cater to the unique needs of each province. Civil society and media need to build pressure on this front. Thus far, the policy discourse is populist, foreign-policy obsessed and too removed from people's everyday concerns of reliable and timely services, security and a responsible state.

Despite the public cynicism and the 'anti-democracy' discourse in the media, the parliament has led a vital reform with far-reaching effects. After a century-and-a-half, the arbitrary colonial state is being decentralized addressing the historical struggles for provincial autonomy in the contemporary history of Pakistan. However, the challenges are manifold and quite formidable in nature. The provinces will have to steer the process of consolidating the constitutional gains through effective institutional restructuring to ensure that the implementation of the 18th Amendment does not turn into an intra-bureaucracy power shift. This is the time for sub-national social movements and for the media and academia to articulate a reform agenda and pressurize the provincial elites to undertake the reforms essential to bridge the gap between the state and its citizens.

_July 2011_
11.

The Debate on New Provinces in Pakistan

Since 1977, military or quasi-military governments have ruled Pakistan. The basic tenet of such a governance structure has been centralization and denial of the multiple identities that Pakistanis have. The recent reform via the 18th Amendment has opened up a debate on new provinces. Not long ago, division of the provinces was a taboo. But not anymore. This by itself is a major victory for the quasi-democratic process started in 2008, howsoever flawed and contradictory it might be.

Remember this is a country where the largest federating unit – East Pakistan (Bengal) was denied its due in power and resources leading to the tragic events of 1971. From 1955 to 1970, ethnic, linguistic and local identities were forcibly negated under the One Unit. After the creation of Bangladesh, the federal debate focused on Punjab versus the rest of Pakistan. Even the elected prime minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto ordered Army operations in Balochistan and the North West Frontier Province to quell insurgencies and demands for local autonomy. Zia's rule (1977-1988) was a major setback for the federal project as Sindh was at the receiving end and the smaller provinces were remote-controlled from Islamabad. During the decade of democracy (1988-1999), things improved albeit only marginally.

Musharraf's rule witnessed the brazen undermining of provincial identities and powers through a centrally imposed local government system and army action in Balochistan, Federally Administered Tribal Areas and parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The brutal murders of Akbar Bugti and Benazir Bhutto were viewed as another attempt by the 'Punjab-dominated' army to eliminate leaders from smaller provinces. Since Musharraf's departure and the return of an elected parliament, major structural reforms have been introduced in the form of a revised formula for national revenue-sharing, the clauses on provincial autonomy and the abolition of seventeen federal ministries. The transition is slow as the implementing national and provincial bureaucracies are change-averse, and the 'systems' – the institutions, norms and formal rules – have yet to adapt to new realities.

Today, there is a fairly well-informed debate taking place in the national media on the creation of the Hazara, Seriaki and/or Bahawalpur subas (provinces). There have been a few references to partitioning the Pakhtun areas of Balochistan and merging them with the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. Political cards have also been played in the name of dividing the Sindh province, enabling the creation of Karachi as a separate federal unit. On the latter proposal the major stakeholder, the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, has clearly articulated its point of view that it does not want a separate Karachi province.

Demands for another constitutional amendment for new provinces on administrative, ethnic and linguistic or a combination of all such imperatives have been made. In part, this discourse is shaped by the electoral politics of the ruling Pakistan People's Party and its new found ally, the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid which are the proponents of southern Punjab and Hazara provinces respectively. Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid supports both while Pakistan People's Party is using the division of the Punjab as its master card for public mobilization in the next election, especially in its likely contest with the Pakistan Muslim League faction led by Nawaz Sharif.

Pakistan People's Party's co-chairperson and the president of the country, Asif Ali Zardari, has proved himself to be a deft player of political cards. Hitherto, the Pakistan People's Party had maximized its unique position as a federalist party and had expressly used the 'Sindh card'. However, over the last few months, it is also championing the cause of a Seriaki province. This enables the party to consolidate its electoral support in Sindh and south Punjab. Whilst the northern and central districts of the Punjab are considered to be strongholds of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, the Pakistan People's Party is attempting to protect its base in the south. Furthermore, it is also eyeing a split vote between the two Pakistan Muslim Leagues in the northern/central constituencies of the province, thereby cornering the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. This is a smart strategy and is likely to keep the debate alive beyond the next election. Similarly, by lending tacit support for a Hazara province, the Pakistan People's Party is also helping the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid gain ground in the Hazara districts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa traditionally aligned with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz.

Nevertheless, the issue of creating more provinces should not be restricted to short-term electoral gains. There are strong administrative grounds to improve the way the provinces are governed. The increase in Pakistan's population and the intra-provincial inequities are also a matter of public concern. Punjab, for instance, has a population of over 100 million people. It is simply impossible to rule such a huge province from Lahore and that too through the creaky bureaucratic machinery. The Seriaki belt has complained time and again of not getting adequate development funds as the concentration of development has been in the 'urban' areas of the Punjab. Similarly, the relative under-representation of south Punjab in the bureaucracy is another grievance articulated by its political representatives. The issue of a linguistic and cultural identity is also another factor that augments the case for a separate province. However, there is little consensus on whether there needs to be one or two provinces in the south as Bahawalpur (a former princely state) has an historical claim on provincial status. Much more needs to be done beyond political rhetoric.

The position of the Awami National Party on a Hazara province is ambivalent, thus far. The party had surely moved on from its earlier stance on the indivisibility of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, but it will not be easy to get a new province going unless there is accommodation either through the integration of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and/or inclusion of the Pakhtun districts of Balochistan.

In terms of economic viability, it has been stated that a Hazara province was a feasible proposal given its natural resources and ability to generate revenues. On the other hand, the Seriaki province will be the least viable province due to its agrarian base and positioning in terms of water resources. The Pakhtun belt of Balochistan earns its money through trade with Afghanistan and has coal reserves in the Loralai and Zhob regions, estimated at roughly 200 million tonnes. While it may not fully benefit the long-term economic gains of remaining with Balochistan, it will not be all too worse off by merging with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

Having said that, a full-scale economic assessment of the proposed new provinces is also a neglected area that the political parties are yet to take up. In general, the political parties have limited technical resources to undertake such analyses, and this is where the civil society, think-tanks and academia must step in. Other than the collective in Karachi, very few thought-leading outfits have ventured to make such feasibility studies. Such thinking is necessary to shape the political argument and ensure that the creation of new provinces will not result in dependent units where the elite capture its institutions, thereby denuding the entire purpose of an administrative reshaping of provinces.

Achieving an agreement on more provinces will not be an easy task. For instance, the new provinces will need to handle forty-seven devolved subjects from the concurrent list. In the absence of finances and with limited administrative experience, the prospects become even more complicated. In the past, provinces have resisted the levying of VAT on services given the weak tax machineries and potential socio-political upheaval. However, on the positive side, the federal government now has thousands of employees in the surplus pool that could be relocated to the new provinces if the proposals materialize.

There are strong political, cultural and governance arguments for new provinces. At the same time, creation of new provinces requires critical thinking as well as studying the experience of India, which now has twenty-nine provinces and the process that the country followed whereby relatively peaceful re-shaping of boundaries was accomplished through a political process. Power has been centralized for too long in Pakistan and it has only resulted in nurturing narrow oligarchies and lobbies that profit from centralized rule at the expense of the citizen. Having said that, the creation of new provinces without effective local government structures will not lead to improved governance. Power would still remain in the hands of the provincial elites. Pakistan needs both decentralization and actual distribution of power, both of which are unattainable without a responsive local government system.

In the short term, demands for new provinces will provide a newer arena for politics, taking a diverse country such as Pakistan in the right direction. The one-nation, one-faith bogey has not delivered in the six decades of its existence. However, formidable legal, economic and administrative challenges remain which need to be tackled through a national commission as proposed by Mian Nawaz Sharif. A parliamentary commission should look into all these challenges and achieve consensus to construct a new Pakistan that the civilians urgently need.

_August 2011_
12.

Tackling the Local Governance Crisis

Pakistan's governance crisis has manifested itself in various ways, including the inability of the state to provide services and create a responsible relationship with its citizens. Throughout its history, the greatest paradox has been that of creating an effective system of local government.

The military regimes were always keen to create local governments as they wanted to bypass national and provincial politics and create a constituency of support for martial rule. This is why the three longest serving dictators – Generals Ayub, Zia and Musharraf – were quick to create local governance structures. The elected governments on the other hand, have been wary of local governments and since 2008, Pakistan's unelected local institutions were managed by provincial bureaucrats.

Musharraf's empirical local government was perhaps the boldest as it aimed to increase the power of elected officials and abolished the office of district magistrates and divisional commissioners. The bureaucracy as well as the provincial elites, due to various reasons, resisted it.

The key issue was that while the provinces were meant to transfer power and resources, they were still controlled by the strong central government and subject to unfair federal revenue-sharing arrangements. The latter was corrected by the previous government and the 18th Amendment also transferred powers. While these transformational reforms were being carried out, the provincial governments, during 2008-2013, remained averse to holding local government elections.

The irony is that Musharraf's cronies in the shape of the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid had already subverted the 2001 local government law and had initiated a reversal of various features therein. For instance, the key service departments also with the highest potential of kickbacks and commissions, for e.g., the public health and engineering department, were gradually recentralized. The Police Order of 2002 was also abandoned by the political elites during Musharraf's tenure. By 2008, it was formally laid to rest, thereby ending the little movement towards reform.

There is no doubt that Musharraf and his junta's agenda was not to deepen democracy at the local level. The cynical use of local governments was to create an artificial constituency in support of military rule. However, the conduct of the political elites was tantamount to having thrown out the baby with the bathwater in 2008. If the local government system had flaws, they could have improved them instead of scrapping it altogether.

The political parties in Pakistan have another rationale to jettison the local governments and dispense with their noisy existence. Patronage and resources are tightly-controlled by party machineries to benefit their constituents and lackeys at the local level. With local governments, patronage has to be shared, which also dilutes the ability of party leaders to grant favours when in power. Also, the larger issue of party funding remains unresolved in Pakistan. Patronage is also used as a means to sustain party structures. Several cash handouts and welfare schemes, and the way these were managed, reflect a party's interests preceding redistributive efforts.

With the new elections and federal and provincial governments, the debate on local governments has restarted. Two factors have led to the re-emergence of the debate. First, the commitment by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf to hold local government elections in the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa has generated a competitive momentum which both the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz and the Pakistan People's Party cannot ignore simply for political reasons. Second, the renewed activism of the judiciary in asking for local government elections has catalysed political clamouring. There were petitions pending for the past three years as well, but this time the courts seem determined to push the local government agenda, which among other things there is also the constitutional obligation of provincial governments.

The Sindh government recently announced that it was going to revive the 1979 law. However, reports suggest that now a committee is deliberating the precise contours of the system that will be in place. Punjab has prepared a draft bill which by and large retains the 1979 bureaucratic model with some improvements.

In the new local government scheme, there is a proposal to set up education and health authorities along with reconciliation councils to resolve disputes at local levels. Proposals for panchayat systems and a municipal police in cities are being considered as well, which is a welcome step. The proposed law has a clause 14(1) which states that quotas would be filled indirectly by elected Local Government members, hence creating the potential for nepotism and cronyism.

The Tehreek-e-Insaf criticism of the draft legislation also mentions that the Punjab government wants DCOs and commissioners to maintain law and order, thereby confirming their fear that the provincial government would control local affairs.

In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the provincial minister for local government has recently stated that they might hold elections by October or November 2013. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa government plans to introduce a new law to replace the earlier 2012 law.

In line with its manifesto, the Tehreek-e-Insaf envisages a four-tier system of local, village/neighbourhood, union, tehsil and district councils. Its vision document has a detailed plan to create grassroots structures, but media reports have also suggested that the selection processes mentioned by the party needs to be revisited.

Balochistan had enacted a law earlier which mirrors the 1979 Ordinance with heavy involvement of the bureaucracy. The new provincial government may take a while to announce and work on the kind of vision it has for the local government.

In summary, the political parties, driven by the political climate, are now moving towards local governments. It is a welcome step, even if it means that the bureaucratic control of local authorities and service providers would not be replaced by democratic accountability. Having said that, it is vital for the provincial governments to make their plans public for wider debate and commentary. What is clear is that Pakistan's governance will further crumble if local governance arrangements are not sorted out.

Three factors ought to be kept in mind:

  * Social sectors require complete decentralization and service providers need to be accountable to the locally elected officials
  * Law and order capabilities cannot improve if police laws are not enacted by the provinces which complement the local governments and also clarify the fuzzy, ad hoc relationships between the province and the local governments
  * Finally, we need to think creatively to include women, the marginalized and the peasantry into the local bodies which may help avoid an elite capture of local institutions and also increase public trust in participatory democracy

_July 2013_
13.

Civil Service Is No Longer an Alluring Job for the Youth

A little news item that appeared a few weeks ago was ignored by our all-knowing analysts and TV channels. Reportedly the Federal Public Service Commission failed to recruit all the vacancies that were advertised for the Central Superior Services competitive examination held in 2007. Out of 290 available posts, the number of successful candidates was merely 190, leaving almost 100 vacancies unoccupied.

Last year, too, the government could not get enough number of successful Central Superior Services candidates for the available posts and forty-seven vacancies remained. Such instances have occurred before, but given the state of unemployment, i.e., to put it mildly, shocking.

The truth of the matter is that entering the civil service is no longer an alluring career option for the talented young men and women of this country. Perhaps, the greatest damage to the attractiveness of the civil service came in the wake of the devolution plan that rendered the most coveted service group – District Management Group – unpalatable. Within days, the district administrators had no prescribed career-paths and they had to be subservient to small-time political cronies of the central political elites.

However, this would be too simplistic an explanation. The last decade has also witnessed Pakistan's fitful integration into the global economy, resulting in the expansion of private sector opportunities with higher salaries. The remuneration of a new entrant into the civil service is just about a third of what a telecom company would pay its junior employee. With money as a new god in the age of globalization, choosing a dysfunctional civil service would make little sense.

The almost sinister destruction of the District Management and the centuries old office of the district magistrate or its historical predecessor, the _mansabdar_ , was historical and reflected the petty tensions within the Executive where the rival services viewed the District Management as an unfairly privileged elite service. The martial mind viewed it as an alternative power centre that needed to be neutralized for effective capture of civilian institutions.

Today, all the major civil service training academies are headed by former army men; most poignantly the civil service reform unit in Islamabad is headed by a general as well.

It is ironical that opportunities for rent-seeking have multiplied under the newly devolved structures. The district coordination officer, the new avatar for the erstwhile deputy commissioner and his staff have a wider menu of commissions and kickbacks along with the political honchos, thereby defying even a faint possibility of electoral accountability. The testimony of this comes from none other than the former chief minister of Punjab. It is, therefore, not the lack of 'extra' income that has made the District Management unattractive. It is the loss of the unique service culture where the deputy commissioner and his team functioned as relatively neutral state agents, mediated between the citizens and the state, and could potentially resist political influence.

From the citizens' perspective, two immediate after-shocks haunted the local governance patterns. First, the reconfiguring of the 'system' led to an unbridled and unchecked police force interacting directly with citizens with remote or little supervision. Second, the absolute collapse of local citizen interest regulation which evolved over 150 years of governing experience. There are two to three hundred local and special laws, ranging from price control and natural resource management (water, irrigation and land) to public health (adulteration, hygiene, etc.) and environmental protection (forest, wildlife, pollution, etc.). This is not to say that prior to 1999 the police was supervised effectively by the district magistrate or that the local regulation was optimal or efficient. In fact, decades of politicization of civil service had resulted in ugly distortions of the so-called 'system'.

If the old system was not delivering or was a colonial relic there were other ways to handle it other than to throw out the sick baby along with the bath water and usher in multiple patronage-seekers and distributors. After all, civilian administrations in India, Bangladesh and Malaysia and in many other countries continue with local adaptation and contextualization. Why could we not learn from our much-feared neighbour especially the way its organic growth of local institutions blends grassroots democracy with the Raj's administrative framework?

Whilst these systemic tremors were felt by the citizens in whose name a reform was imposed from the top, the provinces felt completely bypassed, thus reincarnating the old demons of troubled federalism. Services such as health and education were meant to improve. Whilst the budgetary allocations went up, the results were nowhere to be seen as the provincial secretariats appropriated more powers and local rent-seeking replaced the earlier patterns of malfeasance.

The much touted system of police accountability through the public safety commissions was a still-born concept. It never took off at the local level as the nominees to these institutions were selected along party and patronage lines, thereby eroding the capability of these bodies. Where this commission showed some teeth, its members were the first ones to bear the brunt of police excess. The naïveté of appointing the provincial police officers through a panel, desirable as it is, and ensuring that he (indeed, they are all men!) completes his tenure, foundered upon the rocks of provincial politics.

The lure of raw power was reflected in the group allocation preferences that the civil service candidates indicated from 2000 onwards. Joining the Police Force became the top preference of those who appeared in the competitive examinations, followed by Customs and Income Tax. For a while, the Customs group was the prime choice, especially during General Zia-ul-Haq's tenure, despite it being a period when the society ought to have become more spiritual in the face of a heavy dose of dubious 'Islamization.' Alas, the monetization of the 1980s and the brutalization of 'governance' were the direct results of these authoritarian spells.

Things have come to such a pass that there aren't enough qualified candidates in a country of 170 million to fill the empty entry-level posts. If on one hand this trend betrays the decline of institutions, on the other, it spells doom for the future of Pakistan's governance. There can be no compromise on the part of a capable civil service to manage and implement policies. Yes, the private sector is more attractive and perhaps will always be, but what about the state's regulatory and redistributive functions? The goal of a capable state cannot be compromised or ignored.

There is no alternative to increasing the salaries of the civil servants and making the promotion policy and work-environment more attractive. Otherwise, the dangerous trend that has already set in will perpetuate. Thankfully, it is not irreversible.

The political parties are now calling for a revision of the devolution system and the monstrous possibility of another disruption looms large. Another 'revolution' will lead to fresh systemic jolts and the ensuing painful period of transition would further fuel the current climate of instability. There needs to be a two-pronged strategy: implement civil service reforms at the central level and fix the gaps in the local government systems, paying attention to the way provincial governments set policies and supervise local bodies. The solutions are well known to all and sundry and there is no need for another commission or a white elephant body to carry the changes through.

If only the political parties – and the corporate media – would halt their posturing, stop targeting or extolling specific individuals and focus on institutions! The prospects of this happening are remote, but this is a fast changing Pakistan. The moment is now, or perhaps, never.

_July 2008_
14.

Dealing with the Devastating Floods

Pakistan's devastating floods have opened up a Pandora's Box of governance dysfunctions and historical distortions that have plagued the polity since Independence. It remains to be seen what the outcome of the greatest calamity in our recent history will be. Various estimates show that the floods have affected 18 to 20 million people. The death toll has crossed the figure of 2000 while 2 million houses have been damaged or destroyed. Floodwaters are receding in many areas and although there are concerns about standing water that remains in Punjab and other areas, the worst of the current flooding is taking place in Sindh.

The disaster is still not over, but the fissures within Pakistan have started to erupt and are once again proving how vulnerable the state is and how fractured Pakistani society has become. Five key crises have emerged, some old and some new. However, they all point to the fact that our continuous refusal to address structural problems remains a key challenge.

**Martial State Syndrome:** Pakistan's history is an uninterrupted tale of direct and indirect military rule and centralization. Each time there is a crisis there is a need to resort to the de facto, real governance paradigm: the military rule. Therefore, Altaf Hussain of the Muttahida Qaumi Movement and Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf are not saying anything new. The perennial search for a messiah, rooted in the religious ideology that the state and the education system have fostered, is back in full force. This time the media and other discordant voices are calling for another phase of direct military rule.

It remains unclear whether this goal will be achieved in the short term. The odds are against a direct military intervention, given the army's involvement in war against militancy and extremism in the country. Similarly, the generals may not be very keen to take charge of a country deep in crisis. Yet, the calls for regime change are meaningful. There is another dimension to this crisis and that relates to the superior courts who have now formally entered the power-wielding quartet (comprising the parliament, the army, the judiciary and the media).

There have also been calls for a Bangladesh model that empowers the judges to take the reins of power as honest and impartial caretakers until the next election. Given that the elections are at least two-and-a-half years away, this may not be a feasible idea.

**Economic Instability:** Our growth rate had fluctuated under different eras of history. The recent floods will certainly lead to an economic downturn. The ministry of finance and its advisers have predicted a zero per cent growth rate and 25 per cent inflation rate. This would spell another disaster for food security and the endemic problem of poverty.

It is unclear how the government, the incumbent or a future dispensation will be able to arrest the economic decline. The international community, it appears, is not going to bail out Pakistan after the relief phase is over. Loans worth 3.5 billion dollars have been announced by the international finance institutions, but the debt servicing needs are going to further exacerbate the woes of the economy and leave limited fiscal space for the gigantic task of reconstruction that may involve 10 to 20 billion dollars. A damage assessment is being carried out by International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and the government, and only after this will the picture be clear.

At this crucial juncture of Pakistan's history it is clear that political instability is going to fuel economic uncertainty and therefore, going to lead to an economic collapse unless, of course, the quartet appreciates the gravity of the challenges and attempts to induce political stability by not attempting to sabotage the current quasi-civilian order.

However, the chances of such a consensus are remote as the various power players are treating this situation as an opportunity to leverage their interests and stakes, thereby rendering the primary task of dealing with the disaster toothless. Therefore, attaining economic stability is a distant dream unless the parameters of the political game are redefined.

**Collapse of Civilian Administration:** Floods have only exposed what analysts had been saying for a long time. Pakistan's governance institutions in the civilian domain have lost their efficacy and relevance. Even after a month of flooding and wide-scale devastation, the civilian machinery has been unable to rise to the occasion. The national and provincial disaster management authorities are having to be bailed out by the donors because the state lacks the inherent capacity to plan and execute emergency measures.

Pakistan's failure to undertake any meaningful civil service reform in the last four decades means that millions of under-paid, unaccountable and disenchanted public sector employees are not geared towards service delivery let alone dealing with disasters.

It has been a while since the National Disaster Management Authority Ordinance lapsed. The procedures for the establishment of a new commission is yet to be set in motion and the provinces are more interested in scoring points against the centre rather than coordinating relief and rehabilitation plans and delivery.

Reform is not a short-term programme; therefore, the situation is not going to change within the next year or so. It is crucial that the process begins now. There was never a more urgent need for introducing reforms than this particular moment. First and foremost is the need to revive the local government system that had been made dysfunctional by the elected governments in 2008. This unwise policy choice, despite its legitimacy, is now ineradicable and will continue to haunt the state as well as the elected officials as they have no credible means of ensuring delivery of aid other than to rely upon the unelected and corrupt machinery of the revenue departments or seek help from non-governmental networks.

Furthermore, it is also imperative to set the right structures at the provincial and district levels to ensure that citizens' voices and accountability are kept in view in the post-relief phase. The chances on this front are not too promising as there are complaints of political partisanship, hijacking of aid and ignoring the marginalized.

**Disaffection and Militancy:** Contrary to several claims of the optimistic analysts, the relief efforts by the faith-based – and in some cases banned – organizations is not a positive trend. In a country which is already fractured and split on the issue of religious militancy, this is a recipe for further unrest. Take the case of SWAT where pundits had observed that land struggles were a major cause for militancy. The floods have displaced the poor and once the situation returns to normalcy the land rights of tenants or farm workers will return to the spotlight.

In the absence of dispute resolution or mechanisms to redress complaints this will be an ideal playground for the jihadis to motivate the poor and invite them to their ranks or seek their political support. The situation in southern Punjab will be the same because the networks of militancy in this area are just as well-organized and deeply entrenched.

It should not be forgotten that the suspension of the military operation for several weeks may have given militants the opportunity to regroup. The recent wave of terror in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Lahore indicates that the terrorists are back and have no qualms about hurting the state when it is at its most vulnerable with its disaster-management efforts amidst political squabbling and division along various ideological lines.

Even if we discount the prospect of more recruitment of militants, the influx of several displaced and dispossessed into the urban centres will be a major boon for the criminal networks operating in the cities. A nexus between these elements and the militant groups has also been observed. Although we lack accurate data in this context, anecdotal evidence of the increased number of incidents of bank robberies during the rise of the Taliban in 2008-2009 is a rough indicator.

Popular disaffection with the state has been a theme well-displayed by the media circus of Pakistan. Iniquitous land relations in Sindh and other rural areas heavily hit by the floods will become a major source of public disenchantment with the state agencies. This is a situation that Pakistan can ill afford as the country needs to focus on the issues of terrorism and rebuilding the economy. How the policy-makers handle this is also an area about which the public is in the dark. In fact, the million-dollar question is whether the civilian governments are aware of the 'national security' game plan.

**Weakened Constitutionalism and Federalism:** The 18th Amendment had provided a sound framework for Pakistan to exist and prosper as a functional federation. Its implementation is still a pending task and seems confounded by several factors. First, the supreme court's hearing of the cases against the Amendment and the recent injunction suspends the constitutional provisions in effect. Had these provisions been inserted by a dictator, it would not have been an alarming issue. However, when a new framework for governance, approved by the four provinces and two chambers, is called into question by a bench of appointed judges (with competing claims of popular legitimacy), it is a worrying signal. We cannot expound further as the case is sub judice and the final verdict will make the situation clearer.

The second issue is that of the emerging resource crunch given the provinces' dire need for reconstruction. The tensions are going to affect already tenuous federal arrangements. If the centre raises funds through external debts, then it gets a policy lever to exert on the provinces which rightly feel empowered after the 18th Amendment.

Finally, rumours of extra-constitutional arrangements (national government, Bangladesh model or a martial law) imply that the implementation or even the fate of the 18th Amendment may now be uncertain. This is nothing short of an upheaval as Balochistan is already harbouring separatist sentiments and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is facing the wrath of those who want to set up real Islamic Emirate[s]. If the current party in power at the centre is given the boot, then the alienation of Sindh cannot be ruled out. How will the country and its federal order, painfully corrected in recent years, survive? These are alarming prospects.

In conclusion, Pakistan's ruling elites need to overcome their penchant for palace intrigues and power maximization tricks and realize that this may be their last chance to save the country, as we know it.

First, the democratic forces must stick together to fight the prospect of authoritarianism, Fascism and media-propelled right-wing revolution in the middle classes.

Second, the focus should be on the economy because the post-relief phase requires Pakistan to recover from a mammoth shock. Internal resource mobilization and cutting down on current expenditure – including deferring payments on debts – should be a clear agenda point.

Thirdly, the local government system should be strengthened at once and local capacities be enhanced to deal with the mayhem in eighty districts.

Finally, the Pakistan army should also remember its core mandate of protecting Pakistan from its enemies – this time the enemy lies within.

It is heartening to know that there is the realization of this imperative in the top command. Pakistan cannot afford political or economic instability. This time the spiral of uncertainty might implode the state itself.

_September 2010_

IV

* * *

FOREIGN POLICY
Introduction

The military has traditionally defined national security as 'confronting what it termed "security dilemmas" posed by the country's hostile relations with India and Afghanistan'. It contextualizes these dilemmas by pointing at geography, historical disputes, an insecure region and the ongoing geopolitics involving great powers in South Asia. These narratives are conveyed to – and internalized by – citizens through textbooks, mainstream media and official policy documents. Pakistan's relations with the US and China are also guided by the military's definition of national interest. During 2008-2013, there was no change in Pakistan's approach to foreign powers despite the efforts of the civilian coalition. The only exception was with China: while the military spearheaded close defence cooperation, the civilian government sought economic assistance and enhanced trade.

Nevertheless, the Pakistan government attempted to improve relations with India and Afghanistan. Political leaders called for bringing an end to the country's enduring conflict with India and improving the estranged relationship with Afghanistan. Regrettably, in the Pakistan People's Party government, the military remained firmly in charge of the security interests with only marginal improvements in relations with those two neighbours. In 2008, Pakistan and India teetered on the brink of nuclear war following the terrorist attacks in Mumbai allegedly carried out by a Pakistan-based terrorist outfit. While the country's difficult and intriguing relationship with the United States led to rounds of diplomatic engagement and military containment, both were managed directly by the military. Pakistan-USA tensions culminated in a near-rupture of bilateral ties in May 2011 following a unilateral US raid in Pakistan to eliminate Osama bin Laden.
1.

Policy Shifts Not War

The dastardly attacks in Mumbai have irritated the old wounds and replayed the familiar, jingoistic tunes across the Indo-Pak borders. The Pakistanis, clamouring for friendship with their larger and problematic neighbour, have condemned these attacks in no uncertain terms. Who could be a worse victim of terrorism than Pakistan in these extraordinary times? Yet, the Indian media and sections of its establishment are quick to involve 'Pakistan' as the key perpetrator of the terror regime. This has obviously angered some and allowed a few Cold War practitioners to call for self-defence and fighting with India till the last. The truth is that much of the Pakistani nation does not want war. Hopefully, the Indian citizens are also not looking at war as a solution, or so it seems.

It is almost a cliché to state that war is not a solution to the current imbroglio, despite the hysterical calls by the Hindu right to 'neutralize' Pakistan. The saner elements in India have already pointed to the implicit and deep-seated issues of misgovernance, short-termism and the mess of Partition that were neither carefully deliberated nor rectified during all these decades. The non-state actors in both India and Pakistan have gained ascendancy due to the power distance of the Raj induced steel-frame structures of governance. If there are dozens of districts in India that operate beyond the writ of the formal state, there are areas in Pakistan that are not just outside the scope of the formal state but in a state of rebellion due to the war on terror.

Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, an ignored persona in Pakistan, termed the partition of India as a partition of Indian Muslims. Whether we like it or not, this tragedy has happened in actual terms, leaving scars and wounds that will take years to heal. As if the 1947 bloodshed was not enough, the 1971 war of liberation fought by the Bengalis against the Pakistani state further divided the mass of Muslims into three distinct categories under tottering, imagined nation-states.

Kashmiris are up in arms once again in India – this time Pakistan cannot be blamed for the excesses of the Indian state noted by the international groups and the bold sections of Indian intelligentsia. The inimitable Arundhati Roy has already called for India's 'azadi' from Kashmir. The rise of the Hindu dominance movements allegedly to correct the wrongs of 1000 years of misdoings by the Muslims, and the concurrent branding of Muslims as terrorists have further fuelled the alienation of Indian Muslims. This is not just a Pakistani position, but a fact recognized by many Indian thinkers themselves.

In Pakistan, years of misguided policies using jihad as a policy instrument have also brutalized the society with a dogmatic interpretation of the lofty Islamic notions of struggle, change and self-improvement. Thus we have bigoted and political jihad factories that appear to be drifting away from the central hold and assuming a life of their own.

So we have a self-fulfilling cycle of violence, hate and war-mongering. Acts of violence in India are blamed on Pakistan and groups of Indian Muslims, thereby, adding to further profiling of a beleaguered community that is huge in numbers despite being a minority. Pakistan plays up this trend and attracts the criticism of the Indian extremists for sponsoring terror by misleading the minority youth. And any insurgency in Pakistan is immediately traced to Indian intervention, real or fabricated. The wound festers and bleeds unabated.

Things have come to such a pass that we have jihadist state officials, especially a few retired ones who use war as a road to Pakistani (read Islamic) glory, TV presenters who predict that India will be ruled by Muslims once again and madressahs that preach violence and hatred. On the Indian side, the involvement of serving and retired army officers in communal, barbaric violence is also a matter of public record. In addition, you have serving chief ministers and leaders of political parties who preach hatred and talk of 'fixing' the Muslims within India and beyond through regional and global coalitions that would make Gandhi and Nehru turn in their graves.

Religion and communalism sell where economic opportunity is in short supply and where the modes of governance reinforce exploitation and alienation. This is the crux of the problem that is faced by India and Pakistan, and to some extent by Bangladesh as well, where abuse of religious sentiment has gained currency much to the horror of the secular Bengalis. Therefore, the need of the hour is for India and Pakistan to acknowledge that they have to cooperate and address the menace of poverty, social and cultural exclusion and rethink their eagerness to espouse the neo-liberal mantra of growth at any cost and identify consumerism with general prosperity. This requires fundamental policy shifts within these states. Calls for war and revenge are mere ruses to avoid taking the hard route to reform and social transformation. The entrenched civil and military bureaucracies would need to take a backseat in the policy-setting process.

Pakistan's current and former presidents have presented India with some unprecedented proposals that include a shift from the traditional positions of Kashmir, trade-facilitation and responsible agreements on the use of nuclear warheads, among others. The recent Mumbai attacks have occurred right after President Zardari articulated bold and fearless proposals for long-lasting peace.

This is why the Indian establishment needs to review its current spell of belligerence aimed at the domestic, pre-election milieu and understand that this is what the terrorists are aiming for: a breach and reversal of what was optimistically named as an irreversible peace process. Pakistan needs to ensure that it provides full cooperation in future investigations to allay the fears of the Indian public. This is how the cycle of violence, hostility and war-mongering will start to break. Any kind of war – surgical, targeted, small scale or large scale – is not the answer. The sub-continental states have to reinvent themselves after six decades of independence and re-examine how the colonial legacies of social and economic exclusion, the great games and communalism have to be done away with.

If we as a region fail to act, history will be brutally candid about our collective illusions, suicidal streaks and the shared contempt for history.

_December 2008_
2.

Who Will Win the Game?

I have been amazed at the reaction that my little piece _Policy Shifts Not War_ published on these pages on 04 December has generated, especially from the other side of the border. My email inbox was inundated with a wide variety of views and comments, some of which were quite unsavoury and abusive. However, the silver lining is that there were many voices from the other side that called for regional cooperation and finding alternative solutions to mindless jingoism. Most Pakistanis, while disagreeing with my interpretation of Partition, expressed their sadness at the Mumbai mayhem and reiterated that a war had to be avoided at all costs.

The media factor has been much analysed over the past few years. As a powerful player in the game, the role of the Indian, and to a great extent, the Pakistani media industries has been far from satisfactory. As another formal institution with charitable rhetoric, it is emerging as yet another tool for reinforcing conformity, boundaries and that famed refuge of the scoundrels.

Media polls with shady sample sizes are confirming that the 'public' in India wants revenge, thus isolating the sensible Indian leadership that has tried to undo the legacy of the past. Similarly, the belief that surgical strikes and eliminating the so-called hideouts for terrorists in Pakistan is a magic bullet that will create a terror-free region. Nothing could be farther from reality, if only the lessons from the US misadventures, bloody at that, are kept in view. Aggression and violence breed further violence. The relative degrees of failure in Iraq and Afghanistan are rude reminders of how the neoconservatism, or its ideologically equivalent Hindutva strategy, is bound to create more problems than solve anything.

If anything, the bloated and under-performing state and its agencies should be questioned, as have the people of Mumbai who want accountability before anything else. From disaster-preparedness to intelligence failures, the list is long. The process seems hauntingly familiar to what happened in Islamabad a little while ago. The question is: where have we landed ourselves after six decades of hard-earned Independence? Was the replacement of the central Raj state with that of native elites the purpose of Independence? And what happened to opportunity, equality and self-realization that independent people are supposed to enjoy? The region is still marked by extreme inequities, castes, sects, tribes, illiteracy and mortality, not to mention killing of unborn girls with advanced technological tools.

In such a complicated environment, the list of Indian billionaires, nuclear weapons and one-upmanship on intimacy with neo-imperialists have become a measure for state-success. Surely something is fundamentally wrong somewhere and the elites – the elected in India and the unelected in Pakistan – appear unwilling to address the seriousness of the situation. The greatest of ironies is that despite the ideological and nationalistic divisions, all else is shared, including the curse of poverty.

Yet, the simplistic solutions, thanks to the mass-scale reach of corporate media, are counting nuclear warheads and strikes against terror. The jihad factories are nothing but an imperial tool for global dominance. Surprising that both the Indian and Pakistani states want to be allied with global powers and use such intimacy for the protection of the nation state and its flawed ideology. Deep down, both the societies for centuries have been nothing but plural, diverse and complex entities where the one-state-fits-all formula simply does not work.

Closer to home, the ideal of Pakistan has been under grave threat from the elected and unelected elites and extremist forces. The Mumbai tragedy and the daily carnage in Pakistan are reflective of our collective inability to provide citizenship to the vast numbers of 'subjects' and to contain oligarchies that exercise and reproduce power in South Asia. After all, Mumbai is also the striking arena of shining India where a billion-dollar house is under construction, and where slums are expanding and the non-locals put under duress to evacuate the city, at least until recently.

This is a direction that is dangerous and goes beyond the calls for war, revenge and fixing Pakistan. If only the wiser and more nuanced sections of the mainstream Indian media would understand. Threats will only strengthen the forces in Pakistan that have cherished confrontation, and silence the majority that wants an end to the mess at home and in the region. All I have to say to my Indian friends is: please do not drown out the voices that are looking for long-term solutions. The moderate Pakistanis will also lose out in this hysteria and the beating of war drums. Who will then articulate the need for peace and cooperation? Is that what the linear view of 'Pakistan' and 'Pakistanis' in India is aiming at? We sincerely hope not.

As a reader reminded me, Mr Jinnah and the Muslim League had accepted the cabinet mission proposals in 1946 that would have created a confederation of three loosely-affiliated regions with a recognizable central government responsible for defence, currency and foreign affairs. The congress rejected it and that was when Partition assumed the inevitable uncontrollable dynamic.

In a way, the current twist of history cannot be ignored. Today, the Indian leadership and its vast body of intellectuals need to engage with Pakistan's civilian government and strengthen its domestic position. Aggression will weaken or annihilate it and rob Pakistan of a chance for nurturing democracy after a nine-year-long arbitrary rule. And those who want peace will be marginalized further. The terrorists would have won the game.

There may be a chance to scuttle this: the elected governments of India and Pakistan, backed by informed citizenry, need to step up and play their due role.

_December 2008_
3.

1971 – The Forgotten Silence

This week marks the thirty-seventh anniversary of the tragic events of 1971 that led to the dismemberment of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh. This time the sixteenth day of that deadly December drew little attention in the mainstream media as the new Pakistan struggles to manage the multiple crises of statehood, governance and cohesion.

Whether we like it or not, history and its bitter truths have to be confronted. When the united Punjab was being ruled by the unionists and the congress, and the North West Frontier Province had a chief minister from the congress, the Khudai Khidmatgar alliance and almost all the custodians of South Asian puritanical Islam were opposed to Pakistan. In contrast, the peasantry and the intelligentsia of East Bengal were spearheading a movement for Pakistan. There were indeed economic reasons, but there was an unchallengeable mass support for and belief in Pakistan. What happened after 1947 is well-known, and within two decades or so, those who wanted Pakistan in the first place were subjected to state excesses and brutal treatment by the groups and elites that had actually little commitment to Pakistan or its idea. Nothing could be more ironical.

It is of little significance to remember the exact chronology of events or to indulge in a blame-game. The truth is that we as a state and society lost our majority province after pushing its people into a situation where independence through a War of Liberation was the only choice. India, of course, played a huge role in transacting this deal, but the west Pakistani elites had prepared the ground and sown the seeds of mistrust to a great degree. Thus, the Pakistan created by its founding members was no more in 1971, further subdividing the Muslims of the subcontinent. A bitter lesson in history was in the making. If only we were capable of paying heed to it.

What followed after 1971 was even stranger. After the ritualistic mourning and dozen memoirs of former soldiers and bureaucrats, a meaningful silence echoed in the remainder of Pakistan, save a few sporadic voices from the beleaguered intelligentsia. It was not until three decades later, and that too under a military dictator, that Pakistan made a feeble effort towards an apology of sorts. The same military ruler, General Musharraf, was bold enough to publish sections of the Hamoodur Rahman Commission report. Perhaps it was too late. Many a younger generation had no clue, given that the Pakistani textbooks had little to say about it, and whatever was recorded was purely from a narrow, jingoist Indo-Pak rivalry perspective where all evil was to be located in the misdeeds of the Hindu teachers in east Pakistan. A footnote, at best.

This is why we have hobbled from one crisis to another. We are simply reluctant to learn from the fiasco of 1971. That the principles of federalism are important for diverse societies to flourish and that civil-military imbalances cannot result in healthy states are lessons ignored, at best side-lined in the unimplemented clauses of the constitution or red-taped files of national commissions and committees. Above all, not admitting that we had wronged our citizens by invading them, howsoever misled they may have been sows mistrust amongst the disadvantaged sections. Or that political questions cannot be resolved without political processes and consultative systems of governance. Alienation of the citizen from the state, therefore, reigns supreme, especially in the neglected parts of Punjab and in various corners of the smaller provinces.

This distance of the state from the ruled is now coming to haunt us. So we have a young man from a small hamlet in Punjab who has neither education nor economic opportunity, except to be recruited by questionable organizations, and therefore ends up in Mumbai and puts us all to shame. In southern Punjab, Balochistan and parts of the tribal belt, examples are countless where citizenship is a non-existent concept. There is simply a void of services, of obligations outlined in the constitutional principles of policy and of rights trumpeted as 'fundamental'. The issues of import instead, are as to which of the chief justices was right in favouring his progeny or if the appointments made by an acting governor are kosher or not. No introspection, no looking back or searching within the troubled folds of the body-politic?

The greatest legacy of 1971 and our collective, shameless silence is the result of this utter lack of soul-searching. The unprecedented existentialist crises of Pakistan is yet again being reduced to 'foreign intervention'. If it is not the US, it is India and/or Israel. A country of 170 million cannot be hostage to an array of foreign intelligence agencies only. Its existence needs to be acknowledged before the necessary corrective steps can be taken. I am not arguing that foreign hands are not there or that the geo-strategic imperatives of global and regional power-players are altogether absent. It is only when the fissures and cracks within a society move beyond normal limits that the foreign hands find it easy to exploit them for their self-interest. Nothing proves it better than the tragedy of 1971 – it was a collective, shared tragedy that has been under-reported and under-played by the forces that perpetrated it in the first place.

The basic unresolved question of 1971, i.e., the fair sharing of power between the various centres of political influence is alive in Jinnah's Pakistan of 2008. It's true that we have started the process of reclaiming civilian control of institutions, but the process is fractured and fraught with multiple routes to reversal. Impatience with democracy and civilian institutions, now fuelled by an unregulated electronic media and the rendition of the entire country into a proxy war-zone, has put us back into the uncertain times.

It is amazing that despite the lapse of so many decades, the right wing is churning out the same diagnoses and solutions. The groups that were hankering for Bengali blood and crush-Hindu recipes are uttering similar diatribes. The information industry that was silent under censorship is reproducing the familiar tunes of jihad even when ostensibly free. Refusal to learn from history is surely our peculiar forte.

December, above all, should remind us that socio-political injustice cannot continue in perpetuity – it leads to grave consequences. It also faces us to restate that military might cannot be the only guarantor of our sovereignty and definition of nationhood. And, without a functional federal system, we cannot create a sense of belonging and move above ethnicity, tribe, sect, caste and biradari. Redistribution of power and fulfilling the mandates of a responsible state cannot be overlooked, nuclear prowess notwithstanding.

All is not lost. We have, at of the year 2008, a growing middle class, urbanized pockets of civic action and fortunately a democracy of sorts. No foreign power has prevented us from reopening the issue of land reform, taxing the super-rich, investing in education and healing the festering wounds of Balochistan.

We ought to apologize to our Bangladeshi friends and begin a new era of honesty. After all these years, what stops us from making Pakistan and Bangladesh visa-free countries for students and visitors and trade partners? Let us begin to tackle history for a change.

_December 2008_
4.

Say No to War

Little did we know that the imminence of war between India and Pakistan would once again become a possibility, howsoever faint or misguided? The ruling political junta in India is talking war following the media frenzy over the Mumbai carnage. Once again, it is time to be 'tough' with Pakistan. This is a surprise given that the interlude of peace under General Musharraf and all the offers of conflict resolution were either stalled by the red-tapism of Indian bureaucracy or became a victim of political inaction. At home, we have air-force planes hovering the wintry skies of Lahore causing consternation, not only to the peaceniks, but also to the overwhelming majority of the common citizens. After all, what have they got to do with the power game in Islamabad and Delhi, the media hysteria or even the terror cartels?

True that circumstantial evidence points to the fact that the metaphor of our times, Ajmal Kasai, socially upgraded as the Urduized Kasab, is linked to the little town of Faridkot in Pakistani Punjab. However, much of the international community has reminded India that there is little or no evidence of any direct involvement of the Pakistani state, let alone its fragile civilian government. Yet, the rhetoric of unilateral strikes by the Indian foreign minister, and now the venerable Sonia Gandhi, is having their desired effect here – war-mongering, preparedness assessments and the much trumpeted security strategy through the nuclear option.

As citizens, we often wonder what we have done to deserve yet another phase of uncertainty and war-hysteria. Why is it that the peoples of the subcontinent are always a pawn in the hands of powerful establishments and imperial games? The plain truth is that war is devastating and will resolve none of the thorny issues faced by India and Pakistan. If anything, for Pakistan, the three wars with India over the past six decades bear testimony to this truth; one of these wars ended up dismembering Pakistan. Jingoism must recognize its limits.

The most horrifying of prospects, a nuclear war, is currently being argued as if the weapons of mass destruction are a child's toys. TV anchors are hollering about Pakistan's readiness for a nuclear war. The masculine, aggressive war machismo only conceal or underplay the ugly truth of a nuclear war. If there is, God forbid, such an eventuality, it will wipe out almost all of Pakistan and much of northern India. In numerical terms the hundreds of millions of citizens, fodder for the egos and militaristic nationalisms in South Asia, do not deserve such a treatment in the twenty-first century. This madness must stop, and the media, in Pakistan as well as India, has to give up the negative and regressive leaps that it has become so fond of taking.

By fuelling the nuclear hysteria and displaying needless bravado, the Indo-Pak media industries are trivializing the lethal, long-term consequences for humanity that a nuclear confrontation will result in. When the supreme leader of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh calls for a nuclear war against Pakistan, such idiocy is similar in its perversity of TV heroes in Pakistan who weave tales of patriotism by bragging about the capacity and capability of nuclear weapons under Pakistan's control. This is ludicrous! A real war will annihilate generations and those who had nothing to do with it in the first place. This sheer powerlessness of the common citizenry across the borders is shocking.

The security of India and Pakistan is not related to nuclear capability. The internal fault-lines that have not been corrected over decades are more combustible. Lack of opportunity for the underclass and lower-caste Indians, including the Muslims, will continue to make India an insecure and violent society. In Pakistan, the endemic marginalization of the smaller provinces, the tribal belt and the rural poor will continue to feed the suicide factories. There is little emphasis on such challenges and instead the cosmetic, FOX News style skin-deep worldview has become a replacement for policy debate, engagement and public education.

The people of Pakistan and India do not want war. But the ruling elites in both the countries are hell-bent on chanting the war mantra to prove their machismo to their right-wing fringes. A population of one-and-a-half billion cannot be hostage to such adventurers and chess-board players.

Arundhati Roy and others in India, quite bravely, have urged the Indian state and society to look at the monster in the mirror and many observers in Pakistan have also taken an unconventional line in this dangerous game of legitimizing aggression and violence with the deadly deployment of nuclear armament. However, these views are in a minority and the monsters of jingoism and nationalism have unleashed their dragons against the voices of sanity. Not surprising for the nation-state business in the subcontinent where we have three constructed nations armed with weapons and managed by the leftovers of a colonial bureaucracy.

This is not an occasion for war or mobilization of troops and missile-pads. Deterrents are not meant to be launched. Why can't the two governments sit down and tackle these issues? They are not kindergarten students that require the mediation of third parties and agenda-laden sections of the international community. If the Indians feel that they have been wronged, allegedly, by Pakistani non-state actors, they should hand over well-documented evidence and leads to their Pakistani counterparts. Moreover, the Pakistani state should extend full cooperation and address the issues, taking corrective actions, some of which have already been taken in compliance to the United Nations diktat.

There is no alternative to dialogue and engagement here. If India thinks that it can strike and Pakistan thinks that they can use their nuclear capability, then both are wrong.

History will not be kind to such short-sightedness. More importantly, the future generations are at stake. It is imperative that the myopic, power-hungry elites of India and Pakistan recant their obsessive war mantra.

_December 2008_
5.

Irrational Discourse on Raymond Davis

**Honour Politics:** More often than not, we as Pakistanis feel that we are not given the respect we deserve as a sovereign nation and that we are not taken seriously by the international community. We feel unfairly lumped together with a few bad apples marring our national character through their involvement in terrorism, illegal immigration and other grave misdemeanours, whereas the vast majority of Pakistanis are peaceful, law-abiding citizens. Now we have before us an opportunity to prove those who would judge us by our green passport dead wrong and do the right thing, despite popular protests being whipped up for political gain.

Did the US diplomatic staffer, Raymond Davis, commit cold-blooded murder of two innocent, cellphone-and-gun-loving boys, or was it self-defence against blatant dacoity? The answer is worth investigating, but not all that relevant. Davis ostensibly carries a Diplomatic Passport, as stated by our interior minister, and he was allowed to travel to Pakistan by our own foreign ministry. As galling as it might be to some quarters, we will have to let him go, not because we want to aid and abet murder, but rather, by respecting the long-established principle of diplomatic immunity we show our strength and stability to the world, and show the international community that we are not a 'rogue' or 'terrorist' state, but rather one which respects international standards, conventions and agreements.

**A Principle Here:** The tradition of diplomatic immunity goes back a long time. In 1814, the Congress of Vienna met to straighten out national borders after the Napoleonic wars. Ambassadors from all major powers redrew Europe's map and in doing so, specifically noted the strong protection that ambassadors were owed while in host countries. This vision was later codified in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a UN-based conference and treaty to which Pakistan and the United States and are both signatories.

But why agree to a system in which we're dependent on a foreign country's whim before we can prosecute a criminal inside our own borders, under our own laws? The practical answer is because we depend on other countries to honour our own diplomats' immunity just as scrupulously as we honour theirs. The concept of diplomatic immunity – safe passage for diplomats in potentially hostile territories – has always existed in some form for many centuries. Envoys between armies, waving a white flag, have long been accepted as safe from attack. The principle involved isn't law or treaty so much as Pakistan's blatant self-interest: if we go after their emissaries, they'll go after ours.

**International Law Matters:** Today, boldly showing that Pakistan respects the concept of diplomatic immunity is extremely important. We need to make sure that foreign diplomats – especially our own diplomats abroad – are not incarcerated for arbitrary or political reasons. By subjecting Raymond Davis to these local court proceedings, we are basically declaring open season on our own representatives overseas to be intimidated and harassed. Furthermore, by ignoring the principle of diplomatic immunity, we are further alienating ourselves from the society of civilized nations. Do we, as a nation, aspire to be taken seriously in international fora, or would we rather join the ranks of tin-pot dictatorships like Belarus, Burma, Zimbabwe and Turkmenistan? It is already hard enough to travel on a green passport. Let us not make it difficult for Pakistan's own representatives on international assignments; let us project the true character of Pakistan as a nation of law and peace.

Why does the world honour diplomatic immunity, despite its rapists, paedophiles, torturers, drug dealers, thieves, arms-smugglers and yes, murderers – these are the kinds of criminals the foreign authorities let slip past their justice system on a regular basis, to the overwhelming chagrin of their public and legislatures. Why? Because the overarching and long-established principle of diplomatic immunity is far too important for any other nation, for that matter, to sacrifice for short-term political gains.

Much has been made in the press here of the rare exception where the immunity of the Georgian diplomat, Georgi Makharadze, who killed a sixteen-year-old girl while driving drunk, was waived. However, this was uniquely remarkable for in almost every other case, once invoked, diplomatic immunity gets any and all miscreants who have it off scot-free; they are quickly whisked home where they may or may not face trial.

Examples abound of criminal activity perpetrated by diplomats serving in the US going unpunished due to their immunity. Take the case of the Bangladeshi woman, who was enslaved by a senior Bahraini envoy to the UN and his wife. In 1999, she charged the couple of having confiscated her passport, beating her and paying her a minimal $800 for ten months of work, during which time she was allowed out of their New York apartment only twice. When she sued her employers, the US Justice Department dismissed the case because the Bahraini envoy and his wife had diplomatic immunity. Salem Al-Mazrooei, apprehended by the Virginia police after driving four hours to have sex with who he thought was a thirteen-year-old girl, was immediately released as soon as it became clear that he was a UAE diplomat, and he quickly left the country without prosecution.

In 1984, two Libyan diplomats who shot and killed the British policewoman, Yvonne Fletcher, from inside the Libyan Embassy in London were returned home and never prosecuted. In January 2001, a Russian diplomat in Ottawa, Canada, hit two pedestrians with his car, killing one and seriously injuring the other. Andrei Knyazev was previously stopped by police on two different occasions on suspicion of alcohol-impaired driving. Although a request by the Canadian government to waive his immunity was refused, Knyazev was prosecuted in Russia for involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to four years in prison, serving time in a penal colony.

Under the Vienna Convention, the most a host country can ever do is expel a diplomat, declaring them persona non grata (PNG), or a person who is officially no longer welcome. After being PNG-ed, the diplomatic status may be revoked and the diplomat may be arrested like a regular citizen if he continues to remain in the country by his or her own free will. In some circumstances, the person committing the crime faces trial in their home country, like the US marine assigned to the US embassy who was involved in a fatal car accident in Bucharest, Romania. He was later court-martialled and convicted of several charges, but not manslaughter.

The crimes by diplomats are also financial, costing the United States a fortune in unpaid fines, taxes and other fees. From 1997 to 2002, foreign diplomats in New York City racked up over 150,000 illegal parking tickets totalling $18 million in fines, and city officials had no means of collecting these. Outrage over the abuse of diplomatic immunity was so widespread that the nationally-televised comedy show _Saturday Night Live_ satirically portrayed UN diplomats proposing going to lunch with as many illegally-parked vehicles as possible and in light of their diplomatic immunity, spending the afternoon stealing from a high-end boutique to the horror of then-secretary of state, Colin Powell. Almost none of the tickets were ever paid by the foreign missions or their representatives.

Furthermore, everyone knows that the three regimes with which the US has its most antagonistic relationships with are Iran, North Korea and Cuba. The rancour has existed for decades on both sides and yet, each year, USA authorities permit their UN ambassadors, ministry functionaries and even heads of state to romp around New York, making inflammatory, anti-American speeches at the UN and elsewhere. Why would America let these diplomats roam free in its largest city, while at the same time actively opposing their regimes at every turn? Again, the overriding principle is that of respecting diplomatic immunity and ensuring that international norms are observed in law.

The fact is that diplomatic immunity is too vital for the effective execution of statecraft in modern day. Governments need to ensure that they treat diplomats – even those who commit crimes – as inviolable, so as to ensure that their own envoys and representatives can freely go about their business without the fear or risk of persecution and harassment by an otherwise hostile host nation.

**Hysteria in Pakistan:** The case of Raymond Davis, unfortunate as it is, has provided the Pakistan's right wing, now on the ascendant to whip up anti-Americanism, to become the greatest emotional banner of our nationalism. The religious parties, soon after their alliance on blasphemy law, now want Davis to be tried and punished or even worse 'traded' for Afia Siddiqui. The two cases are different: one involves the murky world of terror networks and the other at best a reckless security 'advisor' of the US embassy. Talk show after talk show has condemned the US and its high-handedness and has invoked national pride and the abstract notion of 'justice' here. As if by hanging Davis, Pakistan can avenge America for its support to Israel or for the drone attacks in the northwest. The reality could not be more complex and nuanced. Although we may hate the US, in these times we have to build and reformulate our bilateral relationship based on mutual respect.

Empty rhetoric will not do. We have to act as a mature, rational nation and discard the policy of blind hatred towards others. More importantly, we need to recognize that until we take care of our internal issues and challenges of poverty, inequality and the skewed political participation of the people, we cannot be truly sovereign.

_February 2011_
6.

Saving a Rocky Relationship

The rationale behind the killing of Osama bin Laden is another hurdle to tackle and we are at a critical moment of another re-evaluation of the Pakistan-USA relation, just a few months after the close of the Raymond Davis saga.

Pakistan-USA relations are subject to global scrutiny and elude a definitive assessment due to the nature of a partnership scarred by history, competing interests and an unflattering public opinion. Recent surveys such as the BBC World Service Poll indicate that most westerners perceive Pakistan negatively while opinion polls, such as by the PEW (a research centre) in Pakistan, confirm that the US is neither trusted nor liked by a sizeable majority of its citizens. In this game, the media can play the role of a mediator of sorts and allow for the flexibility to overcome the potentially explosive fault-lines between the two countries.

In this context, bin Laden's death may have provided another excuse for the growing anti-Americanism to mobilize public opinion against a mutually constructive bilateral relationship. The clandestine raid by the US forces was met with anger and scepticism in Pakistan. Pakistan's right-wing media has, as usual, condemned the US. Even with a deep mistrust on both sides about each other's position regarding Afghanistan, the ISI and the CIA had always cooperated, except now.

The general sentiment is that the Americans were obviously hankering after exclusive credit. A high-ranking security official summed up the bitterness in the military saying, 'What they (the Americans) did was a brazen betrayal and treachery on their part.' In their attempt to gain political credit for eliminating bin Laden, the United States 'has hugely discredited Pakistan and its military establishment.' ( _The News_ , 27 May 2011)

Pakistan's strategic importance for the US will not decrease despite the elimination of Osama bin Laden. Pakistan's cooperation had served US interests well in the past, especially during the Cold War and the US rapprochement with China. The US interest in ensuring the security of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal will remain as strong as ever. After the bin Laden killing, the US toned down its suspicions of Pakistani complicity. Hillary Clinton, during her recent visit to Pakistan, ruled out the possibility of any complicity, but has continued to stress the need for a thorough enquiry regarding any possible complicity at the lower levels.

The Pakistani army and the ISI do not find any difficulty in accepting this demand. The US has also agreed to downsize the presence of its intelligence and Special Forces. In fact, it agreed to make a small reduction in the number of personnel posted in Pakistan even before the Abbottabad raid in response to a Pakistani demand after the Raymond Davis incident in January. Then again, the US obviously feels confident that a further reduction should not affect its capability on the ground in Pakistan.

While relations between Pakistan and the US at a diplomatic level appear strained publicly, many suspect that secret negotiations were always ongoing between the intelligence agencies in both countries. In the context of the fledgling democratic process in Pakistan, greater transparency would make the task of a meaningful engagement and finding workable solutions more likely.

In addition to this, the United States needs to recognize some imperatives vis-à-vis Pakistan. Even though Secretary Clinton called for Pakistan to avoid 'anti-Americanism and conspiracy theories' while dealing with 'internal problems', it is because of internal problems that an outside enemy is blamed. Despite public statements backed by public officials against drone attacks, new revelations about the precision and the expansion of drone strikes by the military establishment have changed the narrative.

The USA needs to consider the following:

  * Pakistan's security establishment will not be satisfied unless the Kashmir question is addressed by the architects of the USA foreign policy. President Obama, during his election campaign, highlighted 'Kashmir' but nothing has been done. Most Pakistanis expected Obama to mediate on this issue. However, India has precluded any such external intervention, thereby making the task of the Obama administration even more problematic
  * USA support to the civilian government suffers from a policy hiatus as well as inefficient disbursement of 'aid' meant to promote democracy, governance and development. Two years since the approval of the Kerry-Lugar legislation, only a fraction ($300 million) of promised assistance ($3 billion) has been delivered. Distribution has gone through USAID channels which have bureaucratized the essential need for flexibility and political ownership of aid in Pakistan. Without broad-based ownership and efficient delivery modalities of US assistance, its results at best would remain tentative. Similarly, the US's obsession to work with the Pakistan army continues and the various rounds of strategic dialogues conducted with the army leadership indicate that the civilian government has been recognized as secondary in the power reality of Pakistan. The US must support and strengthen Pakistan's civilian government and resist making direct deals with the army
  * The continuation of drone strikes, resulting in many civilian casualties, helps nobody. It may achieve the short-term target of eliminating a group of terrorists, but leaves profound after-effects that will stymie the future trajectory of US engagement in the region. Drone strikes need to be reviewed and their efficacy should be re-examined as to how the collateral damage is creating more recruits for the anti-USA terror networks. Instead, the US must find a way to reassure Pakistan that India would not emerge as a hegemonic power in the region; and this may act as an incentive for Pakistan to take care of extremists in its fold

On the Pakistani side, the dangerous game played by the security establishment in whipping up passions against the US is detrimental to Pakistan's future interests. Anti-American rhetoric needs to be discarded in favour of a more realistic articulation of Pakistan's long-term national interests, such as economy, trade and social development in marginalized regions of the country.

The lessons of history are clear. Pakistan cannot fight the menace of terrorism alone. It functions in a region with too many competing interests and therefore, engagement with other stakeholders such as India, Iran and China is essential. In fact, Pakistan is in a unique position to facilitate a regional dialogue on terrorism and provide inputs for an Afghanistan settlement in the wake of the US withdrawal from the country.

It is in everybody's interest that the situation in neighbouring Afghanistan, which is keeping the Americans in the region, be resolved as soon as possible through a process that accommodates multiple interests and uses bargains and diplomacy over drones and smart bombs.

_June 2011_

Pakistan – Fixing the Civil-Military Imbalance

Sovereignty is the flavour of the month in Pakistan. Since the capture and questionable assassination of Osama bin Laden, the Pakistani discourse has been dominated by endless references to national sovereignty, honour, defence and pride. This jolt to the Pakistani state of mind has come at a time when the media is relatively free, the vibrant and boundless Internet flashes news by the second and there is quasi-democracy straddling both the opportunism of the political elites and the tunnel vision of the permanent ruling class – the security establishment.

That the Americans would conduct a surgical strike in the heart of a military complex and 'eliminate' the poster-boy of Islamism has perturbed the right wing and their patrons who had striven for decades to construct a xenophobic and paranoid mindset justifying the country's military machine. Arguments on incompetence or complicity are lethal for the uber-nationalistic narratives. Hence the dilemma, perhaps the greatest of crises for the right wing in Pakistan.

**A Step Forward:** The parliament has had a joint session which ended up passing a resolution with calls for an independent commission, thereby scuttling the initial plan of conducting an army-led investigation endorsed by the ruling coalition. This is a step forward by all accounts and the leaked snippets from the joint session reveal that there was some degree of hard talk between the khakis and the civvies, even if it was personalized and, in some cases, devoid of the larger political context.

**Many Steps Backward:** The joint session of the parliament, however, could not come up to the public expectations by asking the more pressing questions. For example, what was bin Laden doing in Abbottabad or Haripur for that long? Furthermore, the larger questions of reviewing the Afghanistan and India policies or the strategy to fight terrorism hardly featured in the joint decree. Instead, the easy route was adopted by espousing the anti-American cause. We shall shoot the drones the next time it happens, thundered the politicians without asking about the secret deals made between the Musharraf administration and its USA counterparts, especially the CIA. The emotive and serious issues of drone attacks requires a national policy consensus. Instead, there is the blame game: the military passes the buck to the civilians and the civilians, in turn, vie among themselves to appear more anti-American than the other.

'Until access is provided to independent monitors, it is difficult to sift fact from fiction and to make sense of the facts on the ground,' said Ali Dayan Hasan, Pakistan's representative for the Human Rights Watch. He added, 'The rhetoric on this matter (drones) from all sides notwithstanding, Pakistan's political and military class is complicit in this affair.' The failure to achieve a consensus on an anti-terrorism strategy and the contours of the partnership with the US continues to rattle and misinform the national discourse on militancy.

**Mainstream Politics and the Holy Cow:** Despite the disappointing proceedings of the parliament, Nawaz Sharif, Quaid of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, has taken a radical position on the role of the army and intelligence agencies in Pakistan's politics. He cited the appropriation of 'policy' by the secret agencies and repeated military interventions as the root cause for Pakistan's current mess. At the same time, his criticism of the civilian government has been measured and cautious with a clear view not to upset the 'system' in which his party is a stakeholder and a long-term player. His bold statement indicating that India is not our enemy has also been lauded by many and is in direct conflict with the security establishment's India-centric worldview.

**No Consensus on Taking on the Military:** On the civil-military imbalance, a wider political compact is needed. The ruling coalition have thrown their weight behind the army in this game of wits. Their objective is survival in office and smooth sailing until the next election. As Ali Dayan Hasan put it: 'Nawaz Sharif will gain in short term popularity, but in the long term the impact of his politicking will remain minimal in the absence of a broader political compact to confront the military.' Hasan echoes the various voices within Pakistan's media and civil society that, 'Pakistan People's Party's position in this matter has been a disappointment and it remains to be seen whether the adoption of a pro-military stance will pay the dividend that Mr Zardari seeks by way of achieving security of tenure.'

In a way, this is not a surprising state of affairs. Pakistani political elites have time and again displayed their propensity to focus on short-term retention of power and patronage in favour of a long-range strategy to deal with the embedded imbalances. The last effort that took place via the Charter of Democracy (2006) was scuttled due to the typical power play between the Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz.

**Remembering Charter of Democracy:** It would be worthwhile to remind the major political parties that not so long ago they had signed a vital agreement. It is important to remind the readers of what the Charter of Democracy entailed:

'Clause 32 - The ISI, Military Intelligence and other security agencies shall be accountable to the elected government through Prime Minister Secretariat, Ministry of Defence and Cabinet Division, respectively. Their budgets will be approved by a Defence Committee of the Cabinet after recommendations are prepared by the respective ministry. The political wings of all intelligence agencies will be disbanded. A committee will be formed to cut waste and bloat in the armed forces and security agencies in the interest of the defence and security of the country. All senior postings in these agencies shall be made with the approval of the government through the respective ministry.

Clause 33 - All indemnities and savings introduced by military regimes in the constitution shall be reviewed.

Clause 34 - Defence budget shall be placed before the parliament for debate and approval.

Clause 35 - Military land allotment and cantonment jurisdictions will come under the purview of the defence ministry. A commission shall be set up to review, scrutinize and examine the legitimacy of all such land allotment rules, regulations and policies, along with all cases of state land allotment, including those of military urban and agricultural land allotments since 12 October 1999 to hold those accountable who have indulged in malpractices, profiteering, and favouritism.'

The truth is that both the major parties, Pakistan People's Party and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, reneged on this important agreement. When the Pakistan People's Party-led government tried to attack the political wing of the ISI, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz opposed it tooth and nail, calling it an attack on national institutions. The Pakistan People's Party later imposed governor's rule and dislodged the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz government in the Punjab, and the rest as they say, is history.

**Aid Politics:** The US has been providing substantial amounts of military assistance since a decade ago. US military aid to Pakistan was approximately $4 billion from fiscal years (FY) 2002 to 2010. Security assistance support was $462 million in FY 2008, $884 million in FY 2009, and $1114 million in FY 2010. In addition, Coalition Support Fund reimbursements for expenses incurred by Pakistan for its assistance to US military operations from 2001 to early 2011 have been roughly $8.88 billion. Under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid programme, only $300 million has been disbursed against the target of nearly $3 billion.

This asymmetry is a cause for concern. However, the recent decision by the Punjab government to shun USA civilian assistance is a political one and needs to be revised. Once again, political posturing is dominating the need for a genuine debate on what kind of aid we need. If anything, the political players should be asking for a review and accountability of direct military aid rather than undoing the projects that may lead to better services for ordinary citizens.

It is never too late to move towards a correction of the civil-military imbalance in Pakistan. Democratic development by its very nature is an evolutionary game. A staged and negotiated civil-military compact can bring change. Rhetoric and posturing might just be counterproductive when there is actually a war in the neighbourhood, insurgencies across the country and when a major blow has been dealt to the military's image, at least on the domestic front. It is necessary to rationalize military expenditure, introduce accountability measures and for a change, initiate civilian supervision on national security issues.

For this to happen, the political elites need to understand their historic role at this particular moment. They have to be persistent and cautious. Three immediate steps can set the way forward:

First, the independent commission should investigate into the bin Laden raid and affix responsibility. This commission should be monitored by the defence committee which already includes all the representatives of the various political parties. Making its findings public would be most vital.

Second, debate on the mechanisms to make the army expenditure more open and transparent should take place in consultation with the chiefs of the armed forces. However, the political parties will need to debate this first in the parliamentary committees, and then move towards an intra-state dialogue.

Third, an open debate on the Afghanistan and India policies, interrelated for reasons well-known, ought to take place. Such debates should be exhaustive entailing an active role of the cabinet's defence committee in policy-making and negotiations with the US and other regional players. It is vital that the political parties avoid grandiloquent public statements on these issues until they have achieved a consensus of sorts. Such historic moments simply cannot be squandered. At the end of the day, it is also in the interest of the military to redeem its image and undo some of the historical mistakes that it has made. The initiative lies with the political parties of Pakistan. Even if they were to make small gains, they may be able to partially fulfil their mandate of 'fixing' Pakistan's governance.

_June 2011_
8.

No More Escape Routes

Our foreign minister, Hina Rabbani Khar, has warned the United States that if the accusations against Pakistan continue, the US might lose an ally. This statement comes in the wake of the US statements that the Pakistan-based Haqqani network has allegedly been involved in the recent acts of terrorism in Afghanistan, directly threatening and sabotaging NATO and USA interests.

The US blames the Haqqanis for the attacks on their embassy and NATO headquarters in Kabul, and also for the offensives against the US troops in Wardak province earlier in September. The US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, has used unprecedented and strong language against Pakistan's premier spy agency, ISI, and the security establishment for nurturing proxies. Pakistan-USA relations, at the brink of improving, have reverted back to the nadir in the decade-old war on terror.

The US Senate Appropriations Committee has passed a bill which makes all US aid to Pakistan tied to cooperation with the US in fighting 'the Haqqani network and other terror groups associated with Al Qaeda'. On the Pakistani side, a vast majority of Pakistanis support a confrontational policy and shunning 'America's war'. This emotional position needs a realistic reassessment and Pakistan should simply keep its economic interests above everything else.

At the same time, we should reflect on why the Haqqani network from north Waziristan has been operating across the Durand Line. Sixty years of policy choices have once again brought us to a critical phase today. The United States and its various policy-making arms and bodies have diagnosed the key cause of their failure in Afghanistan as Pakistan's support to the Taliban, especially to the Haqqani network that it protects. This is not the first time that the US has bellyached about the 'double-game' being played by Pakistan's security establishment. The problem with such a narrative is that it glosses over the monumental follies of the US strategists and their war machines.

Since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the US has received substantial assistance from Pakistan. This fact cannot be denied as most of it is documented and on record. Whether it is allowing for NATO supply routes to the war zone or the crackdown on Al Qaeda, Pakistan has delivered on several fronts. Therefore, narrowing the current rhetoric and reducing it to Pakistan's culpability is neither accurate nor fair. What the US establishment has not recognized thus far is the central issue of Pakistan's desire to have a neutral, if not friendly, western border.

The US endgame in Afghanistan that has begun now, for understandable reasons, keeps American interests above everyone else's. In a similar fashion, Pakistan's military-intelligence complex, for historical reasons, does not want to be encircled by India on both the sides. Yes, it is quaint, 101-type thinking but what can be done about it. Military paradigms and institutions do not change overnight or even in a few years. Institutional change needs generations and endemic political movements to change the way the state operates. The tragedy of Pakistan is that its civilians are almost always willing to be in bed with the khakis and ready to be second-in-command even when they are in the enviable position of being able to effect a change.

Take the case of the recent backlash against the security establishment after the 02 May 2011 strike on Osama bin Laden's compound. Public opinion, while enraged at the US breach of an imaginary 'sovereignty', was equally embittered about the incompetence of our armed forces. Never has the Pakistan military been in such a defensive position on the domestic front. However, the ruling coalition did not seize the moment to sort out the long-standing issue of civil-military imbalance. The opposition party, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz called for military accountability, but it is far from certain if it would have collaborated with its arch rival, the Pakistan People's Party, to effect any structural changes. The last time the Pakistan People's Party undertook a few steps to re-orient the ISI, it received zero support from the other parties.

Ironic as it may sound, Pakistan's grandiose foreign policy ambitions – checking the big neighbour India, strategic depth in Afghanistan, attainment of nuclear weapons – were all laid out by the hugely popular Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Since the 1990s, the political parties have changed tack and now articulate for a far more realistic foreign policy. However, they are not sufficiently empowered to translate that into reality due to might of the military and the way the army has the ability to garner the support of other unelected institutions, such as the judiciary and the media for its 'line'.

Therefore, to expect the military-oriented approach on Afghanistan to change anytime soon is little less than fanciful. It will not relinquish its space in the sun, unless of course it risks a huge reduction in its primary position within the country and its strategic leverage in the region. Thus, the choice is hard and if the US is serious about getting a fairer deal for all parties, it will need to examine this issue and bring all the concerned parties to the table, i.e., Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and Iran. Short of a regional solution, sustainable peace cannot be achieved in the region.

Coming back to short-term prospects, the situation is grim. Pakistan's security establishment has been fighting Pakistani Taliban in SWAT and parts of Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and has been at best ambivalent about the Afghan Taliban, including the infamous Haqqani network that, according to media reports, has been operating from Pakistan. Pakistan's military should also review the Taliban rule in Afghanistan and how they were not always the kind of partners and proxies we had envisioned.

Supporting extremist ideologies at home and abroad is outright dangerous. This is not the Pakistan of the 1990s. Two decades later, we have a far more polarized polity with Al Qaeda's local allies in large numbers. Al Qaeda's nihilistic ideology, it should be remembered, is against the organization of the Pakistani state itself. How would Pakistan's security establishment wield power in the absence of a functional state? Time and again, its capability, or lack thereof, to manage domestic affairs has been exposed. Furthermore, national security doctrines cannot play out in a cash-strapped country struggling with stagnation and hyperinflation.

During the last decade, Pakistan received assistance worth $20.7 billion out of which $14.2 billion went to the military. The civilian share was around $6.5 billion. Under the Kerry-Lugar-Berman aid legislation, Pakistan was to receive $1.5 billion every year, however, the actual disbursement has been around $480 million for the past two years.

It is for Pakistan to decide whether it wants to choose a path of isolation and hand over the reins of the country to Al Qaeda and its affiliates, thereby putting our long-term future at stake, or adopt a realistic path where it prioritizes its national interests and simultaneously remains a responsible member of the international community.

_September 2011_
9.

Time to Move On

The recent escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan comes after an uninterrupted peace process for two years during which both countries made substantial progress in burying the hatchet and moving on. For many cynics, hawks and naysayers on both sides, the events of 2012 were alarming. Beyond the regular continuation of high-level parleys, three concrete achievements were made in the bilateral relations.

First, the hardline position on terrorism and the Jammu and Kashmir dispute held by India and Pakistan was tweaked to achieve an atmosphere conducive to dialogue. India showed flexibility on its rigid position on the ghastly Mumbai attacks of 2008, and Pakistan showed maturity in admitting that Pakistani citizens had infiltrated India and were part of a larger plan to cause mayhem in Mumbai. More importantly, the festering dispute of Jammu and Kashmir was relegated to one of the more difficult issues to be dealt with in the future.

Second, Pakistan did the unthinkable by announcing that it would grant the Most-Favoured Nation (MFN) status to India for the purposes of trade. Satisfactory progress on this front also took place during 2012 and trade liberalization is already underway, generating more and more stakes into the peace process.

Third, the visa accord signed between India and Pakistan changed the cold war culture created by both the states since 1965. In particular, visa liberalization for businessmen, setting up of banks in both the countries and allowing investments was a historic landmark.

By the end of 2012, it was believed that a new beginning had been made and the peace process was immune to the cyclical shocks embedded in the history and the culture of this region. However, the start of 2013 belied this optimism and the incidents on the Line of Control have once again pushed the two countries into an uncertain phase where the future trajectory of bilateral cooperation and confidence-building seems jeopardized.

Firing across the Line of Control has resulted in the deaths of Pakistani and Indian soldiers. After 2003, when the Line of Control ceasefire was agreed to, this came as a serious blow to peace. For nearly a month, escalation continued with confrontation being managed by the two governments that have shown some measure of restraint, but allowed non-state institutions such as the media to blow things out of proportion. This is much truer for the Indian side where sections of the media, especially television channels, sensationalized the Line of Control crisis and undermined the efforts of the Indian government to contain the crisis.

Several sane voices within India itself were agitating the issue. For instance, Amitabh Mattoo, also an active member of the Track-II initiatives, wrote: '... India's Pakistan policy is far too important to be left to TV anchors, with their wars over Television Rating Points and their penchant to appeal, often to the lowest common denominator of public opinion. Indeed strident debates in the Indian media – frightening in their Manichaean simplicity – reflect a total lack of appreciation of the intricacies of the Gordian knot of bilateral relations.'

But that is perhaps a reflection of the 'national confusion' that exists in India about Pakistan, complicated by the communal question and the nationalistic narrative which views Pakistan as a historical 'aberration'. Pakistan's existential angst is defined by India, although it is undergoing a historic shift due to years of flawed security and foreign policies and the associated misgovernance within the country. There is an opportunity here for India to engage and help Pakistan come out if it. More so as it is in its own interest to have a peaceful and stable region. However, short-term considerations have always overshadowed the need for long-range policy vision.

Pakistan and its media were embroiled in an internal political turmoil when the war drums were being beaten across the border. A fast urbanizing country with increased civilian space is grappling with a state that has moved from crisis to crisis and is now haunted by its own jihadi assets. It would be a gross exaggeration to say that the Pakistani military is following the business-as-usual approach with respect to India given its tacit support to the elected government in nurturing the peace process in the recent past. Perhaps cynicism on the Indian side about Pakistan runs deeper than we know.

Having said that, the peace constituency in Pakistan has grown and solidified and, despite the recent skirmishes and cooling off, the political parties are not repeating the old tactic of one-upmanship on the India policy. The politicians, smarter than ever before, know that they would be playing into the hands of the martial lobbies if they made the conflict with India a populist cause.

The unprecedented consensus on peace with India is acknowledged by the neighbour, but not fully appreciated for its historic nature. Pakistan's political parties of almost all varieties, the big businesses, most of the media and civil society are united in their resolve not to squander this historic opportunity.

A decade ago, it would be unthinkable to write the way Pakistan's senior editor, M. Ziauddin wrote: 'I confess that I find it almost impossible not to agree with the position taken by India's government, its people at large and its media, generally over the recent ceasefire violations across the Line of Control. Many of my countrymen would regard me as unpatriotic for even harbouring such a thought.'

In such a political environment, India's resolve to stay the course would be vital. It must not let political expediency or the lunatic fringes overtake its policy focus. Improving sixty-five years of bitterness will not be achieved in a few years. There has to be a long-term commitment and readiness to install shock-absorbing measures as trust grows gradually and not without dangerous chances of reversal.

I was part of a recently concluded Track-II dialogue (by Jinnah Institute, Pakistan, and Centre for Dialogue and Reconciliation, India) which made some pertinent recommendations for improving bilateral relations. The joint statement issued by legislators, former diplomats, media-persons, policy experts and academics highlighted the pending agenda that needs urgent attention. The key notes were:

'We appreciate that 2012 was a year of progress in Indo-Pak relations during which the robustness of India-Pakistan dialogue was tested and despite challenges to the process, considerable headway was made on issues of trade and visa liberalization.

The political question of Jammu and Kashmir remains unresolved. We urge that India and Pakistan remain engaged and the four-point formula devised in 2006-2007 should be used as a basis for further dialogue.

We urge that media be given unfettered access on both sides. The governments must allow the circulation of newspapers, distribution of television signals and increase in the number of accredited journalists in both the countries.

We recommend that visas for journalists and their spouses should be facilitated without unnecessary delays.

We urge both the governments to engage on the regional implications of the NATO pull-out from Afghanistan in 2014 through dialogue on regional cooperation.

We recommend that previously agreed proposals to resolve long-standing issues such as Siachen and Sir Creek should be accepted immediately so that both the countries can move forward in focusing on the core issues between the two countries.

We note that recent incidents on the Line of Control underline the need to reinforce the 2003 ceasefire agreement and recommend that new mechanisms be devised such as increased demilitarized zones. There is an urgent need to reduce the eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation on the Line of Control.

We recommend that roaming cellular facilities should be provided to the people of both the countries.

We recommend that culture, sports and humanitarian concerns should be prioritized by both the countries in the bilateral parleys.

We demand the resumption of the suspended bus service and cross-Line of Control trade on the Poonch-Rawalakot route; the stranded passengers must be allowed to return from the same route...'

Let's hope that dialogues in both formal and non-formal spheres continue and help the two nations deal with their historical baggage. It would be unacceptable if the two countries continue to behave in an irresponsible manner. More importantly, as a Pakistani, I want my country to take the lead and immediately announce the Most-Favoured Nation status to India and demonstrate that it means business.

_January 2013_

V

* * *

MEDIA
Introduction

The media, after decades of state censorship, gradually regained some freedom under General Musharraf's rule. This liberalization of 2002 saw the media evolve and take on a political role. During 2007, the Pakistani press allied with the lawyers' movement and led a political movement to oust a military dictator. Musharraf hit back by banning all media channels. Thus, when the new democratic government took office, one of its first steps was to restore the broadcast of private television stations. However, as the years rolled by, media too became a contender in the political rat race between various stakeholders. Because it has historically been viewed as a 'state-building' instrument, the media's role in democratization was constrained. It remained vulnerable because of a skewed financial model of the industry. Government, military, intelligence apparatus, political parties, activists, supreme court and militant groups have all exploited its financial vulnerability and its need to seek ratings for their political squabbling.

Media narratives continue to be problematic. In fact, the media industry caters to a middle class that is averse to competitive democratic politics. Worse, sections of the media promote extremism through their reporting and commentary. Both these trends are not conducive to strengthening democracy in Pakistan.
1.

Pakistan's Media Opinion – The Column Industry

What is so peculiar about the Pakistani media opinion factories churning out problems and solutions products day after day? Frankly, they are self-perpetuating oligarchies and boring at best. The slightly discerning mortals who browse the daily newspapers in English and vernacular languages or bother to engage with the electronic media discussions are struck by certain repetitive trends. Let me map them out before rambling any further. On a note of caution, there is no intention of making generalizations here. Exceptions, they say, prove the rule!

**The Curse of Self-importance:** Nowhere else would you find brazen references to the importance of a writers' opinion, particularly among the Urdu language newspaper columnists. Despite the slow growth of readership, the 'kalam-navees' industry is flourishing. A few years ago, a new Urdu newspaper with a hefty advertising budget ensured that a few big names in the column industry were under its wings.

One saw TV commercials with celebrity columnists announcing how they were switching to the new publication and how their avid readers must follow. New columnists follow their seniors in terms of writing with a clear, often not-so-subtly articulated, sense of self-importance. Many of them mention how a state functionary called on them or invited them over for a discussion. The best example is a senior and much respected political commentator published in an Urdu daily who frequently quotes his previous columns as if they were voices of the oracle. While reading an otherwise well-written piece, you are suddenly reminded by him of something written years ago by the same gentleman insisting how prophetic his words were.

There are others who write a full piece on a day spent at the Governor's house in the provincial capital or on a leader's aircraft or even a luncheon hosted by the Pir of Pagara. It is sometimes embarrassing when a couple of journos writing in the same newspaper, relate their individual experiences of attending a collective meeting with the chief minister that often ends with a punchline on the vision or personal kindness (more so in Zia era) of powerful persona concerned. Printing fan-mail is another favourite pastime of our columnists. An indicator of their grandeur and invincibility, perhaps.

Some opinion-makers in the English language are in the same league. A senior journalist with a penchant for reproducing his court petitions in entirety claims a grand position in making or breaking events. It is not uncommon to read him addressing the general or the prime minister directly and warning him/her of the fateful 'anjaam' if their advice is not heeded. In Urdu press, ' _hukmarano hosh ke nakhun lo'_ or, rulers, act sanely, is a favourite byline. A few Urdu newspapers actually conduct raids to expose stories of injustice and corruption. Great, but isn't that the task of agencies that function with taxpayers' money, and thereby, are accountable to the public.

**Go Where the Power Goes:** I am no political activist. And I earnestly believe that some measure of grace is far more important than the particular ideology or political affiliation one holds. Even if people strive to be pragmatic or blow with the opportunistic winds which define Pakistan's ethical climate, some subtlety can do us all good.

I vividly remember those exciting mornings after General Musharraf's takeover in 1999 when I made it a point to read all the papers. Whilst, during pre-Musharraf days, I found the comparisons of his predecessor with Mohammad Bin Qasim, at the least inaccurate, I was horrified to read the same columnists working hard to prove the same person's villainous, scheming and naive (yes, all in one go) nature.

There was one such luminary of the 'columnstan' (yes, this is what it is!) who happened to be in the Sharif kitchen cabinet and was also incarcerated briefly after the declaration of emergency, proved his innocence in the public domain by undermining his former benefactors.

Let me also cite another case from the English language 'columnstan'. A suave writer on economic and political issues who had written enthusiastic columns on the eve of 1997 elections and continued eulogizing the successful Sharif brothers was among the first ones to condemn them after their fall. He was also a regular member during our retired General's entourage on foreign tours and ponders a lot on the recent economic miracle.

Another Urdu newspaper columnist who only writes on 'non-political issues' is an example of journalistic expediency. His writings on the younger Sharif's leadership and achievements quickly found an echo in his later writings on the progress in the Punjab crediting the succeeding chief executive.

**The Writer is a Former...:** With due respect to all the bright diplomats who navigated our foreign policy, led our missions abroad, increased Pakistan's trade and inflow of tourists: please reconsider the burden of writing. Last week, I counted that almost every day in our leading English newspapers former ambassadors had held forth on issues from Islamic Ummah, terrorism, Middle Eastern crisis, domestic policies and tonnes of policy advice to the rulers. Most of the writings were well-intentioned though generally quite dull, much like the dispatches that they were trained to write. The more important question is what did they do while holding senior positions. Did they furnish truthful advice to their bosses that they now generously dole out to the common readers? Some questions have no answers, I guess.

Perhaps the former category is epitomized by the born again democrat, a retired, demigod, civil servant who enjoyed positions of authority under most regimes and who was a reliable advisor to a galaxy of constitutionalists, including General Zia and Ghulam Ishaque Khan. The gentleman is extremely cross with our present general in command because of his new-found fondness for constitutionalism and democracy. Amazing that newspapers management and editorial teams are oblivious to the image such gentlemen hold in the public eye. Our memories are not that short after all.

And the piece of cake will be taken by a polished writer based abroad and who held senior positions in a renowned international financial institution. His weekly dose of what should be Pakistan's policy and strategy regularly falls on deaf ears. His column starts with what he wrote the last time and makes sure that he gives us good tidings of the forthcoming article wonder prescription. Not just that, he comes across as patronizing about Pakistan's progress and in that vein often pats the back of our leaders, as if his endorsement of their decisions means anything. But then why does he still live abroad? Some readers wonder and whisper.

**Qualified to Comment?:** Mostly No.

This is perhaps the most irritating group, often found on the pages of Urdu newspapers. Writers with unclear expertise, driven by rhetoric and gup-shup culture, recklessly comment on the economy, technology, global warming and renewable energy. There is an indecent play of ideology and jingoism in their ranting, but sometimes it is just a reflection of medieval cultural practices. Inaccuracies (2-3 lakhs), no recourse to data ( _ba-khabar-zaraiy_ or informed sources and generally speaking) and sitting on judgment (we don't want the American dollars). By the way, most of these West-bashers have email addresses flaunted at the end of every column they bequeath to the public. Bill Gates was not born in Raiwind, exactly.

I humbly suggest that they should focus more on what they are good at: narrating _mirasi_ and sardar jokes with _qaseedas_ or _ghadar_ sentences to individuals they like or dislike!

**Obsession with Regression:** Why are so many Urdu columns, save great exceptions, on politics or to be specific, the _jor-taur_ (wheeling-dealing) stories? Is it the predominance of ideology, nurtured by the medieval court intrigue culture, filtering through political comment? Our friends in the Urdu press and now the electronic media are driven by self-propelled engines of a make-belief ideology. Read the articles on how debates on Hudood Ordinance were inviting the wrath of Allah and how we all were doomed by even debating the fine print of a man-made law. Add to this the way our changed Taliban policy is ghaddari to the Muslim cause.

This reminds one of the naivete of the Khilafat movement when the South Asian hysteria for the restoration of Khilafat was dashed by the Turks abolishing it themselves. Stereotypes on women's roles, shoddy defence of the maulvi and extolling irresponsible behaviour displayed by the unfortunate Late Amir Cheema who killed a kafir in Germany (or the release of a spy after thirty-five years) are common themes in our current opinion affairs.

There is a long way to go before we can see some signs of responsibility that is as important as ensuring and safeguarding of the press freedoms.

_April 2008_
2.

Beyond Censorship

Pakistan is a captive country. Since the Partition, its ruling elites have used a self-serving version of 'Islam' to control a secular and pluralistic society. In particular, the ghost of General Zia-ul-Haq thrives in the polity and fashions institutional behaviour. Since the 1980s, discriminatory laws against women, minorities and blasphemy have further fractured the society. General Musharraf tried to reverse the tide of Islamism after a decade of ineffectual civilian governments, but it was perhaps too late by then. In the twenty-first century, when democracy has been restored, many Pakistanis had hoped that the dark shadows of authoritarianism and its bedfellow, militant Islamism, would recede. It seems that there is a long way to go before such hopes are realized.

Censorship is nothing new either. We are a country that banned Fatima Jinnah's speech on radio when she criticized the military takeover by Ayub Khan. The rest is history – Ayub Khan banned newspapers and Zia-ul-Haq punished errant journalists and publications. Even Bhutto could not resist censoring portions of Fatima Jinnah's memoir entitled, _My Brother_ , where Jinnah's critical remarks on the intentions of Liaqat Ali Khan and other stalwarts of the Pakistan movement could not be published, always in the name of Islam and national interest.

Half-a-decade after Danish cartoons representing Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) led to widespread protests across the country, a silly Facebook page announcing a drawing competition led to an uproar in Pakistan where minority groups used a conservative judiciary to impose a ban on Facebook and over 800 other websites that ostensibly contain blasphemous materials. These included YouTube and Wikipedia among others.

A group of right wing activists and lawyers created an uproar in the Lahore High Court on 19 May and the court gave in to the articulate minority who are now well-known for influencing the state and civic institutions. Millions of Pakistani-origin Facebook users were shell-shocked at this decision, most notably the youth.

Interestingly, Article 2A (which declares Islam as the supreme law) of the constitution inserted by General Zia was deployed by lawyers to ban the boundless Internet. In 2008, Pakistan had signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which it promptly forgot about. Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights says that all individuals have a fundamental human right 'to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers... through any other media of his choice.' The one-sided take on communication and expression shows that our institutions do not understand that speech and information in new media are equally protected under the right pertaining to freedom of expression. However, such arguments hold little value when you live in a country where the state is driven by urges to control rather than allow a rational and educated society to evolve.

Pakistan is a young country. Half of its 180 million citizens are under twenty, two-thirds below thirty and by 2030 there will be another 85 million young people. This 'youth bulge', as decreed by the social scientists, is also a major user of the Internet.

There have been articulate voices, but the danger of being labelled 'blasphemous' kept many dissenting notes silent. The day the ban was imposed, a young comrade, Rab Nawaz, wrote to me that banning Facebook 'should be hailed as the continuity of maniac actions'. He called a little later to ask, 'Did the people actually want to block Facebook? They might emphatically answer "yes", but that is what religious rhetoric is all about. Very few of them can be expected to boycott Facebook if the government does not do it. After the ban, the demand for lifting the ban itself becomes blasphemous.'

The following day, when I tried to access my emails on my BlackBerry, there was a calculated indifference shown by the gadget. After a flurry of frantic calls, I discovered that the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority had blocked all handset services and Internet browsing. Minutes later, I blogged on my e-zine calling this 'absolute madness'; such was my rage. The Internet is no longer a pastime, but a professional necessity and a tool that keeps life going. Over the past few days, I have received hundreds of messages and comments on my blogs, some of which had to be blocked for fear of being construed as a non-believer in an Islamic Republic. Many comments are from a few gleeful Indians who thought this was another imagined victory of the 'secular' over the religious state. But that is altogether another debate.

Rumaisa Mohani complained: 'Do we respect ourselves, as mentioned in the words of Iqbal?... Because if we don't, then we will have to accept what others say about us and do to us. The pictures, cartoons and insulting remarks are increasing day by day, only because we are getting used to them.' Another fervent ban-supporter, Sardar Mohkim Khan, noted: 'I think Mark Zuckerburg should take notice and give his social network's Terms of Use a good read.'

But my young friends and colleagues were outraged in Lahore. Ziyad Faisal, a graduate, echoed my own view that this ban had little to do with insults to the Prophet (PBUH), and it was just another excuse for 'authorities with a conservative-populist mindset to clamp down on communications'. Faisal, ruefully added, 'General Zia-ul-Haq would be a happy man in his grave today.'

Amongst the younger generations, there is a new consciousness on resistance against arbitrary state-action. Since the lawyers' movement and an evolving tradition of civic action, the reactions are promising. Ammar Rashid, a young researcher at the Lahore University of Management Sciences, complained that 'the ban by the Pakistani state is ludicrous'. Rashid added that the ban sent largely 'vacuous messages of aggressive (and impotent) intent to the Western world' and did little to check the spread of hate-speech against Islam.

A final-year law student, who did not want to be named, complained that the ban 'demonstrated the reactionary and incompetent nature of our senior judiciary. Whereas cases that involve the lives and livelihoods of a sizeable number of the population languish in the courts for decades, it took less than a week for the esteemed Justices to issue an edict in this case.'

Saadia Gardezi, a young academic at the Lahore School of Economics, made me laugh when she mentioned how 'after the recent "ban" policies of our government, I think it's time to move to China. I hear people are free there'. I liked her statement that drawing caricatures of someone 'I respect so much is hurtful, but we live in a nasty world. This sort of "counterterrorism" is only going to grow, the more we protest. Will we ban the Internet then?'

Babar Mirza, a student from a small town in the Punjab and on his way to the US for higher education, made a rather profound observation: 'Both sides in this debate suffer from an unreasonable reliance on reason. They both have their laws on their sides, but there is not even a hint of magnanimity. The cartoonists wanted to provoke the 'Muslims' and the 'Muslims', in their turn, seemed to love nothing more than getting provoked!'

I wonder if perhaps this is the essential dilemma in an age of Islamophobia.

Facebook blocked the page with the caricatures from being accessed in Pakistan and the ban was lifted on 31 May, but not until after zealots in Pakistan had tested their power over the society by blackmailing the state in the name of the religion. Pakistan needs an untrammelled democratic phase to get this corrected. The chances of democracy's survival however remain uncertain. Nevertheless, the youth of Pakistan give one the hope that they will not accept the formulas crafted by the ancient regime.

_June 2010_
3.

Media Should Not Turn into a Holy Cow

Much has been said about media accountability and the dire need for a regulatory framework for Pakistan's new power centre. Pakistani media earned its freedom and independence after a long, often bloody, struggle against military dictators and civilian autocrats. Countless journalists were imprisoned, harassed and even killed in this decade-long fight for free speech, otherwise a much-touted fundamental right in every version of the Pakistani Constitution. There is no question that a viable democracy and a culture of accountability can only exist with a robust and independent media.

Globalization and the rise of electronic media in Pakistan, ironically under General Musharraf, is a relatively new phenomenon and has changed the contours of the power matrix in the country. If anything, electronic media and its older cousin, the print media, with a plethora of columnists, are now an established group with considerable influence as well as nuisance value. Actualization of the newly-acquired powers was best demonstrated during the anti-Musharraf movement from 2007 to 2008. This was a startling development and pleased most Pakistanis as they found the echo of their daily trials and tribulations in the direct and frank reporting by the numerous TV channels.

**Ambiguous Regulatory Framework:** The sudden liberalization of private television channels took place in an environment when a regulatory framework had barely been established. The Pakistani Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) came into existence during an un-represented regime and, therefore, it lacked the essential process of consultation, ownership and national consensus. On one hand, media oligarchies emerged despite the vague announcements that cross-ownership would not be permitted. On the other hand, electronic media showed little interest in developing a common code of conduct and finding ways of self-regulation. The results and the initial phase were disasters. Human limbs and heads found ample air time, thereby glorifying terrorism and violence, and impacting the collective psychology of the viewers through a gradual process of desensitization. Furthermore, objectivity was thrown out of the window and partisan, one-sided rants became the order of the day.

**Lawyers and the Media Alliance:** The lawyers' movement witnessed an intense form of civic activism and unprecedented representation of the Pakistani middle class in mainstream political discourse. Seemingly a momentous development, this mobilization entered the public domain regurgitating the 'anti-politics' biases of Pakistan's conservative middle class. This resulted in severe distortions of the political expression and what politics 'stood' for. First, the idea of 'rule of law' – that cannot be separated from political and social justice – was personified by a handful of judges who were products and allies of Pakistan's regressive establishment throughout their careers. The movement also projected the misconception through the media discourses that the individual judges could lead to political, economic and social transformation of Pakistan. This became a 'truth' of sorts. Minority voices, such as this scribe, alerted that without structural transformation, individual judges could not achieve much. Struggles within the ruling elites could be disruptive, but rarely leads to transformative social change. The results today are clear: the lawyers are beating up every public official and journalist who attempts to question their activities. The conduct of judges also leaves much to be desired as they are acting like politicians.

**Holy Cow Syndrome:** Pakistan's security establishment was hoisted on to a pedestal as the holy cow. Anyone who ventured to challenge the predominance of the national security apparatus was immediately branded as unpatriotic and a new divine edict to rule was crafted by the nefarious generals: Musa, Ayub, Yahya, Zia and later Musharraf. These 'saviours' took the reins of power with identical intentions and left the country in an almighty mess. General Zia-ul-Haq, during his eleven-year rule (1977–88), tops the list of wilful destroyers of Pakistani society. Ironically, the holy cow status of the Pakistan army was shaken under General Musharraf and the street agitation of 2007 in which the Pakistan army was challenged on its recruiting stronghold, i.e., the Punjab. This was the turning point in our history. However, due to the uncertain commitment to democracy by Pakistan's upwardly mobile middle class, this grand moment of political course correction was squandered. Instead of strengthening the parliament and civilian supremacy over the unelected institutions, the middle class and media created two more holy cows: the judiciary and the ostensibly 'free' media that are happy to invoke military interventions to keep the Parliament under check.

**Purist Discourse:** Such has been the trajectory of national affairs that any objective or independent comment on the two new holy cows is instantaneously construed as an attack on these arguably vital institutions of polity. For instance, judges are very much a part of the Pakistani mainstream. Therefore, their decisions in a free society are open to academic and reasoned comment. However, we have witnessed the unfortunate trend of complete deification of the superior court judges by media activists. Similarly, any informed or well-meaning comment on media transgressions has been greeted by the same fate.

**More of the Same:** Thus far, the two established trends in Pakistan, anti-politician rhetoric and glorification of religion continue to remain on the ascendant in public discourse. Until the Pakistan army decided to fight the Taliban in the northwest and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, the media on balance glorified the so-called resistance of warriors to the infidel western imperialism. This came as a major blow to the moderate politics espoused by the Pakistan People's Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz. Concurrently, the vilification of the politicians from 2008 to the present is a major pastime of the media and now the judiciary has been added to the list on the fake degrees issue.

**Partisan Politics and Media:** In light of the above-mentioned developments, the media has been consistently in awe of the changed priorities of the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz in terms of supporting the lawyers' and judges' movement and the allied media freedoms, given that General Musharraf resorted to censorship and a brutal crackdown in November 2007.

President Zardari was a hero until he played the media-lawyers game and thereafter, with his wavering commitment to the judges' issue, overnight he was turned into the worst thing that ever happened to Pakistan. Such was the nature of the media hysteria that Zardari and Musharraf were bracketed in the same category without any understanding of Pakistan's history, the fragility of its democratic dispensation and the principle of objectivity in reporting and analysis. Dates of Zardari's ouster and a bloody end were announced with impunity. All this while, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz remained the preferred choice of our daring activists. This honeymoon ended with the issue of fake degrees.

**Demolishing the Politician:** Fake degrees of several legislators is now the hottest news item and yet another opportunity to malign democracy. Over 150 legislators at various levels are reported to have submitted fake degrees to the election commission in 2008. The debate, however, has provided the ammunition to deride the entire political class for being immoral, unfit to govern by historical TV presenters and civic activists. They have conveniently forgotten that many of these fake degree holders were creatures of the establishment, responding to unjust laws and banished by the military and the judiciary time and again. In fact, there is no crisis as such because by-elections can resolve the issue. But the hysteria around this fact was so intense that legislators with proper degrees also felt offended and had to strike back.

**Punjab Assembly Resolution:** In this context, the provincial assembly passed a resolution with consensus chiding the irresponsible sections of the media. Evidently, there was nothing wrong with a particular view of the politicos, but soon this resolution turned into a moralistic and heated debate with journalists protesting over an imagined impending censorship. No such action was either announced or deliberated by the elected governments. This was a particular view that could have been countered through reasoned debate and rational discourse. However, emotionalism held sway and within a few days, the same assembly had to undo this resolution and pass another one that favoured the media.

Many pertinent questions have arisen from this conduct of journalists as well as legislators. The political parties have to display more scrutiny and devise ways of achieving internal accountability. The media at its end has to work towards self-regulation and setting a code of conduct. It should be reiterated that freedom of the media is linked to democratic development. By tarnishing the image of civilian politicians and diminishing the trust in democracy, the media would be doing a big disservice to its future and credibility.

Three important policy imperatives must be kept in view:

  * Electronic and print media have to work quickly towards a regulatory framework. The state should have nothing to do with this process and it should remain within the realm of the media
  * Political parties must also show restraint while engaging with the media and they should demonstrate that their internal processes are transparent and rule-based
  * Finally, media barons and owners of newspapers must ensure that the media does not become another interest group like the lawyers, fluent in occasional violence and drunk on moral superiority

_July 2010_
4.

Media Freedoms and Judicial Accountability

Media freedom in Pakistan is no longer a cause for celebration. Recent events have shown that journalists are facing pressure from all sides. Historically, it was state power, especially of the executive, that curbed the freedom of speech and attacked journalists. We have entered a new phase of the struggle today when power is being dispersed and hence, journalists are under attack by non-state actors. Dozens of Pakistani journalists have died in recent years and several face threats and intimidation from the militants and mafias in the country.

Last year, Saleem Shahzad was brutally murdered and to date we don't know if there was a killer or some invisible hand that felled the journalist. Similarly, a young reporter, Wali Baber, died in Karachi and such is the might of his killers that all the witnesses in his case have also been neutralized. Senior journalist and popular TV anchor, Najam Sethi, is under threat and recently two TV anchors, Hamid Mir and Mohammad Malick, were intimidated. In the Federally Administered Tribal Areas region and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces, insurgents and militants kill or attack reporters with impunity.

This is a major challenge to Pakistan's fragile democracy. Press freedom and the right to information are non-negotiable rights which are central to the idea of a democracy. Sadly, the government and the failed criminal justice system have not come to the rescue of the victims. The powerful intelligence agencies, urban gangs and militants have inroads into the 'system', thereby impeding any form of justice. Little wonder that Pakistan is turning into a violent country and adapting to the widespread denial of justice.

Other than the physical threats, the pressures on the media are tremendous. For decades, the army brooked no criticism and had made fool-proof arrangements to control the narrative and promote a particular version of 'truth' and 'history'. The civilian governments have followed suit. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and later Mohammad Nawaz Sharif as powerful prime ministers were keen to control the media. While the journalists showed admirable resilience, the media houses also learnt the art of playing politics and by the end of Musharraf's rule, a small group of media moguls emerged as a major power centre in their own right.

This rise of media power coincided with the emergence of the judiciary as an independent state institution with popular legitimacy. In fact, the media played a major role in the lawyers, and later the judges, movements. These two forces were closely aligned in their zeal to hold the civilian government in check and ensure that it did not overstep its boundaries.

This nexus seems to be under strain as the media by its very nature can only be competitive and relevant if it reports, disseminates 'information' and asserts its independence. In the case of the judiciary, after the initial consensus and support, the print and electronic media started to give space to the criticism of judicial verdicts.

For instance, the supreme court judgement on the national reconciliation ordinance in 2010 attracted immense media commentary, some of which was not too flattering to the courts. Since then, the media has been the only platform where judges have been judged. This is, indeed, a curious situation as the superior courts are only accountable to themselves or, as the axiom goes, to their conscience.

The key institution – Supreme Judicial Council – mandated with judicial accountability has always been an inactive body. It is wholly under the control of the judges. The only breach that the parliament has made is through a token parliamentary commission which screens the candidates for judicial appointments, but even then, this decision is subordinate to court proceedings.

Other than that, there is virtually no means for tracking judicial accountability. It is true that judicial independence requires the courts to be independent of interference and controls, but accountability to the public is essential for all pillars of the state. The judges cannot be exempt from this principle of a democratic and rule-based society. Our Constitution's structure and scheme are fairly clear: Pakistan is a parliamentary democracy and the people's will is only second to that of Allah.

There are two ways to resolve this situation. First, by activating the internal accountability measures, and second, to accept external accountability as a tenet of a democratic society. Fair comment on judicial verdicts only leads of improvements in jurisprudence and administration of justice.

The recent controversy about a press release issued by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) relates to the issue of judicial orders regarding media coverage. Human Rights Watch Asia Director, Brad Adams has said that judges do not enjoy 'special immunity from criticism'.

According to the HRW press release, on 09 October Justice Shaukat Aziz Siddiqui of the Islamabad High Court 'issued a restraining order to the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority to stop airing criticism of the judiciary on television'.

The court sought to justify its order by asserting that the media ban was 'to ensure that no programme containing uncommendable, malicious and wicked material is telecast by any of the channels in which the person of the honourable chief justice of Pakistan and other honourable judges of the superior court are criticized, ridiculed and defamed'.

Other instances cited by the HRW include the directions to Pakistan's media regulator, Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority, to implement its orders on restricting programming considered anti-judges. Lahore and Islamabad High Courts have been active on this front.

While the judges have a point in preventing malicious content, the fact of the matter is that when serious allegations are levelled against the relative of a judge, it becomes difficult to stop people from commenting on it.

This is especially relevant when the courts are extremely active in checking corruption and fixing the 'governance' of the executive and screening parliamentarians. More often than not, benches reportedly pass unflattering remarks about parliamentarians and also judge the performance of elected provincial governments. The politicians and civil society have the right to demand similar accountability and transparency from the judiciary.

Moreover, the media has to sell news and opinions on this. This is the complex reality of a society where freedoms are guaranteed by the Constitution. Indeed, defamation must not occur and, once again, the courts have the responsibility to define, adjudicate and develop a case law on defamation which is seriously lacking in this country.

The best analysis of the media vs judiciary debate has come from Justice (r) Tariq Mahmood who says that overuse of the contempt law by the courts is counterproductive while maintaining that the TV channels have been sensationalizing needlessly and crossing lines.

Several writers, such as this scribe, have been advocating media responsibility and accountability, but restraining orders on the media are not the solution. In fact, a healthy society should not muzzle a difference of opinion. Many Pakistanis believe that the chief justice of Pakistan is personally honest and that the allegations against his son have been exaggerated. There is almost blind faith in the top judge among most in urban Pakistan. When there is such a strong support for the leadership, then why fall prey to the exercise of contempt law? The judges will only enhance their credibility when they allow for similar scrutiny as they allow for other organs of the state.

Unfortunately, the media discourse on the judiciary has been personal and not issue-based. If viewed in the larger context, the case of Arsalan Iftikhar is a non-issue. A rich property tycoon and political operator belonging to Rawalpindi is settling scores for his delayed cases. The real issue is about the millions of cases pending in the country and most of these cases fall under the purview of the high courts in the provinces.

The supreme court only sets policies and that too with the consent of the high courts. In recent months, there have been no debates on what ails our justice system and how we can reform a crumbling structure.

A recent global comparison (report by the World Justice Project) places Pakistan at the bottom for its civil justice system and dismally low for the state of its criminal justice system. This is far more alarming than reports on the persons of judges and other remarks that the media blows out of proportion.

Those who find the HRW press release scandalous and a conspiracy against Pakistan need to revisit the facts on ground. The bulk of Pakistanis outside the middle class drawing rooms are clamouring for rights, justice and security. The denial of justice at the grassroots level is a bigger conspiracy.

Pakistanis are frustrated and turning to violence or non-state actors for dispute resolution. We will not be able to overcome this sorry state of affairs if we do not open up avenues of public debate and input into the way the country is governed and justice is administered.

The media should regulate itself and show more responsibility. Similarly, the courts should also keep themselves apprised of public opinion, even if it entails hearing unpleasant home truths. As the guarantor and enforcer of fundamental rights, it is even more important for them to show caution and restraint.

Our democratic experience will not evolve if we impede avenues for expression and accountability to the public. A free and independent judiciary can only survive and prosper in a democratic society.

_December 2012_
5.

Through the Looking Glass

It is ironic that the electronic media which played a decisive and significant role in the movement against a military dictatorship is now being cited as one of the causes for the fracture to the democratic transition started in 2008. Perhaps it is not by design. It is clear that the electronic media remains a nascent industry and, like the rest of the country, operates in a largely unregulated environment. Pakistan's overall governance climate is marked by dynasties, oligarchies and mafias. Why should we expect the media to rise above the larger culture? Nevertheless, given its important role in shaping public opinion and attitudes, the need for media responsibility has been increasingly articulated by a wide range of actors and not just the wounded political players.

The current media freedoms are unprecedented. Gone are the days when holy cows could not be touched and certain subjects were taboo in the public domain. Indeed, the national security paradigm propagated by the military is ascendant and the official history of Pakistan is the major narrative, but there are plenty of discordant and critical voices within the industry. However, the imperatives of a ratings– and advertisements– driven culture impair the ability to be objective and rational. This is why a highly-respected English channel had to switch to Urdu to cater to the cruel corporate dynamics. Concurrently, Pakistan with a largely static readership has witnessed the launch of two major English dailies and a third one is likely to be launched by the end of this year! The outreach of electronic media has also given it a taste of untrammelled power. Musharraf's downfall and the ability of the TV channels to question the army during 2007-2008 reshaped its role as a power centre to reckon with. In this tumultuous period, the judiciary also emerged as a new power centre and there has been a rare synergy between the two institutions in asserting their independence and guarding their turf vis-à-vis the executive, and after 2008, the parliament.

Many analysts have noted that this is not a healthy trend as the two new power centres are unelected and, therefore, not directly accountable. The judiciary is insular and can hardly be questioned, and media accountability is almost non-existent due to dysfunctional regulators. Hence, the last two years have witnessed chaotic power dynamics which do not bode well for democratic governance. The media houses assume the role of the people's representatives and some judges have remarked that they too, i.e., the judiciary, articulate the people's will.

As testified by Pakistan's history, the only workable governance framework is one which is representative. All military-led modes of governance have damaged an uneasy federation and caused upheavals. For the media itself, a democratic environment is crucial. Its long-term growth and survival is contingent on retaining its hard-won freedoms. These days preserving democracy is even more urgent as the rise of sectarian and extremist ideologies reject democracy, Constitutionalism and human rights. Therefore, the electronic media is now at the centre of these vital existentialist debates in the country. The record so far has been far from promising. Sections of the media continue to recycle the failed prescriptions of the security establishment.

  * As typical of the uninformed opinion industry that is the Urdu press, the electronic media has not kept up with the political consensus of fighting extremism and Islamism. Instead, there has been endless glorification of terrorists as mujahids and anti-USA fighters. There are channels that take credit for airing the views of the leaders of banned organizations and promoting their disturbing worldviews. It is not uncommon to find a vigorous defence of strategic depth on a daily basis, and celebrations on occupying Kabul next year whether we are able to keep the country at peace or not
  * The demonization of politics and politicians continues unabated. Undue attention is paid to the fake degrees of politicians whilst forgetting that the rules of the game were not set by the political class. Similarly, during the recent floods politicians of all hues and shades were painted as villains as opposed to the army that was donating its food rations (forgetting that the budgets for that institution were approved by the parliament)
  * Pakistan's ingrained 'political instability' is now the ultimate fodder for the breaking-news syndrome. Stories about the imminent clash of the institutions are flashed as a matter of routine, thereby generating an environment that is deeply hurtful for the economy and the investors. It is now difficult to separate fact from fiction. Whether it is the government-judiciary collision or the civil-military divide, the differences are accentuated to an uncontrollable degree, fulfilling several prophecies and serving the prophets of doom.

In this context, the recent calls for media accountability at various events in Islamabad, Karachi and Lahore are poignant. More voices in the civil society are backing the demand for media responsibility and objectivity. The government has a rare chance to forge a consensus on restructuring the useless ministry of information, reinvigorating Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority and strengthening the overall regulatory environment. The media should promptly respond to these calls and protect its credibility. With a failing economy and a fledgling democracy, the road ahead is fraught with uncertainties for the smug media industry.

_March 2011_
6.

Responsibility Must Anchor Freedom

It is a truism that media freedom in Pakistan today has been earned after a long struggle, a struggle that will in all likelihood continue in the years to come.

Deepening democratic traditions and their permeation in society are sine qua non for a free media. Whilst there can be no two opinions about the need for the independence of the media, the need for a greater responsibility and professionalism is also to be articulated in no uncertain terms. Such is the confusion and chaos triggered by an overgrown executive that the issue of responsibility has been side-lined by the overwhelming noises for media freedom, especially since the tinkering with the text and the application of the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority Ordinance.

We are now growing accustomed to a television culture that imitates the life of Pakistani tharras, chai-khanas and drawing rooms where politics is discussed ad nauseum. Rare exceptions include issue-oriented talk shows, but they appear bland unless their all-knowing hosts inject some political spice into them. Expertise is taken for granted; new-age generalists judge every subject under the sun and occasionally take themselves a bit too seriously. Yes, the commercial imperative of the media dictates programming patterns. But there has got to be a method to this madness.

The most recent occasion of electronic media wizardry was the announcement of the Pakistan People's Party-led coalition candidate for the unenviable job of prime minister. The moment the announcement was made, a leading channel played a popular Indian film song that lamented broken promises. In this case, it was the fabled promise of the prime ministerial cookie for Makhdoom Amin Fahim.

Admittedly, the party of the people and its allies were secretive about the process. The principle of transparency, ideally, is germane to elected institutions. However, this is neither an ideal world nor is it going to turn into one overnight. The way a momentous decision was trivialized was not in good taste. The news industry forgot that this was a party still recovering from the brutal murder of its omnipresent leader less than three months ago.

And then the vulnerable Makhdoom was grilled into a line of questioning by many channels, anticipating that he would bring the fissures within the party into the public domain. Much to their consternation, nothing of the sort came about. In fact, the icy Makhdoom, disappointed as he must be, maintained his dignity and decorum in the face of a media that desperately hoped for catchy breaking news.

Earlier, the guessing game on the prime ministerial nomination, played up into a teacup variety storm, was also unwarranted to a certain extent. For instance, the delay in requisitioning the session of the national assembly was far less analysed than why the Pakistan People's Party was unable to settle for Makhdoom. The discourse on the issue focused on 'loyalty', 'honour' and other such terms that go hand-in-hand with the patriarchal-authoritarian society, but not with the difficult task of inculcating democratic values.

Alas, the level of analysis was such that the 'potential' candidates were rarely compared in terms of merit, competence or likelihood of pulling together a difficult coalition. Furthermore, no one bothered to check how this process was managed in the region, especially in India where coalitions are now a norm. Sadly, the chequered history of the Pakistan People's Party media trials continues even when plural and relatively free voices abound.

Well, this is the beginning of a new journey. We have a mature political class that is willing to jointly challenge the historic control by non-elected institutions. This is something that is central to the future of all freedoms, including that of the media. As the first speech of the prime minister proved, democracy – truncated as it might be – is the only way of ensuring the independence of the judiciary.

The release of deposed judges came about, ironically, through the parliament. The sweet irony of it all was that this was a scene not envisaged by those who were urging all and sundry to boycott the elections. That a president sans uniform had limits to his powers was a nuance not debated. In other words, absent direct command of the military, even a former military general, as a civilian president cannot exercise much authority.

The channel gurus were more inclined to discuss the 'purity' of political positions. Considerable airtime was devoted to the Faustian 'deal' that was perhaps the last grand sin of Bhutto in the eyes of our puritans. Obviously she had to pay with her life for redemption.

In a similar vein, television debates on suicide bombings and war on terror reinforce the populism that endangers critical introspection and reduces the discourse to a level that, simply put, is simplistic. We all know that the demons of extremism have been nurtured for decades. They existed prior to the American invasion of Afghanistan and our frontline status. But discussions about the slow Talibanization of Pakistan being a reality are taboo, as the overwhelming majority of 'experts' consider this a 'reaction', thereby according a subtle legitimacy to the gruesome acts perpetrated in the name of religion.

Unwittingly, the agenda of the suicide brigades gets a helping hand when TV channels relay images of human limbs, severed heads and trucks ramming into security guards. I recall the ugly evening when bombs exploded prior to the chief justice's arrival at a rally in Islamabad last summer. This was the first time that I experienced the disturbing visuals betraying the lack of scrutiny. As violence is always gripping, it attracted the attention of my five-year-old and eventually we had to turn off the television.

Popular channels ran notifications urging parental guidance as if this would gloss the evident dearth of punctiliousness. However, this continued as a trend – entrenched, sensational – sadly when Pakistan was witnessing the worst spate of suicide bombings in our recent history. Decapitated heads metaphorically are embedded in our histories: from the Baghdad tales of minarets made of severed heads, to the Mongol invasions of Delhi and Lahore and the famed anecdote of Emperor Aurangzeb sending the head of Dara Shikoh to Shah Jahan.

Nevertheless, a modern, progressive Pakistan has to overcome this legacy of medieval barbarity and a free, mature media needs to assist in this process and condemn what is utterly condemnable.

Thus emerges the urgent need for self-regulation, codes of conduct and internal accountability. Let the media shun all 'advisories' – this should be done of their own volition. Globally, there are myriad examples to follow and the capable ones within the media are well aware of them. There would be no point in listing them here. Suffice to say that we, the engaged TV viewers, want a free media that is equally responsible and challenges the stereotypes and half-truths instead of reinforcing them.

A glorious future lies ahead for the electronic media; we have a powerful agent of change at a time when we had almost given up on the hope for a change.

_March 2008._
Epilogue

The democratic transition in Pakistan continues.

Since 2014, Pakistan's historic patterns are being repeated. The civilian government has been weakened due to domestic protests, ostensibly at the behest of the military, and the 'independent' media have been tamed to a large extent. The result has been a virtual coup – a post-modern version – where the military is back in the driving seat with a 2014 constitutional amendment that allows for military courts to try civilians. There are underlying structural reasons for this to have happened, but the geopolitical context provides some explanation as well, mainly how the military is seen by the West, the Middle East and China as a reliable partner.

The 2013 elections returned Nawaz Sharif and his party, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, to power. The second largest party in terms of electoral strength was Imran Khan's Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, and it managed to form a government in the insurgency-hit Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The Pakistan People's Party was reduced to a regional party in Sindh. This was the first peaceful, smooth transition of power in the history of the country, and the military, by and large, did not manipulate the elections.

The Army Chief General Kayani, days before elections, announced support for the electoral process and assured nation that polls will take place. By the time power was transferred to the incoming government, the military had partially gained some of its lost space but not enough to have interfered in the elections and the formation of the government. This was a major departure from the trend during 1988-1999 when the military determined how power was transferred to elected governments and on what terms.

Sharif was elected to office for the third time in May 2013, and made a dramatic comeback despite his tense history with the military. When he assumed power, it was hoped that he would strengthen the democratic project and check the power of unelected institutions, since he has long been known to call for the delinking of politics from the security establishment. However, the very opposite seems to have happened. Sharif appointed his handpicked general in November 2013 as the new army chief, but civil-military relations deteriorated due to two critical decisions of the Prime Minister's: first, the trial for treason of former dictator Pervez Musharraf and second, Sharif's continued commitment to normalize relations with India.

Elements within the military establishment hit back by undermining the political government and sponsored prolonged protests by Imran Khan and a charismatic cleric, Dr Tahir ul Qadri in Islamabad, which practically crippled the government for much of 2014. Khan had been alleging that the elections of 2013 were rigged and the government should resign. A judicial commission appointed later decreed that despite the irregularities there was no evidence of systemic rigging.

During these televised protests – also cited as a 'revolution' by a few media pundits – the demonstrators attacked the Parliament and the prime minister's house. Due to the worsening law and order situation, the government asked the military to mediate in order to resolve matters. This led to the beginning of a post-modern coup where the military stepped in on the invitation of civilian principals and handled political matters without directly taking over the reins of government. This military not only reclaimed the political space, but it also re-emerged, once again, as the 'arbiter' in political conflict. From a party in the system, military became guarantor of the political process. In June 2014, the army had launched a major offensive against the Pakistani Taliban in the northwest with little or no civilian input.

Several media reports suggested that the Army Chief General Raheel Sharif was not behind these protests, but a few outgoing generals wanted to overthrow the Sharif government. Nevertheless, the objective had been achieved. A considerably weakened Sharif has been attempting to regain lost ground. To mend his relationship with the army, the prosecution of former President General Pervez Musharraf has been suspended, and little headway has been made towards improving relations with India.

In December 2014, an army-run school in Peshawar was attacked, killing 148 children and school staff. The military from that point onwards has assumed charge of the counterterrorism efforts as well as the leading agent in setting the internal security policy. A constitutional amendment to set up military courts was demanded and within weeks the Parliament assented. Perhaps it's the first time in the recent history that military courts – empowered to try civilians – were set up negating the constitutional principles. The Parliament and almost all major political parties endorsed this backdoor coup. Since early 2015, the military broadened its remit by launching an anti-corruption crusade in the southern province of Sindh.

Alongside the jolts to the democratic process, the media also suffered setbacks during 2014. In 2016, it remains a tamed version of its earlier, exuberant presence. In April 2014, following an assassination attempt on a GEO TV presenter, Hamid Mir, the media industry was manipulated by the intelligence agencies. Mir's family and GEO TV named ISI as the perpetrator of the attack on the journalist. The political government and Prime Minister Sharif briefly supported GEO TV in its battle with the military, but soon backed out in the face of stiff resistance. Rival media channels joined in declaring GEO and Mir as traitors for having maligned a national institution. Admittedly, GEO did not adhere to journalistic principles, but the punishment meted out was rather severe and became a lesson for other media groups.

Later, GEO, arguably the most watched channel in Pakistan, surrendered, apologized and made peace with the military. Now it propagates the narrative of the military which it once dared to question. Media freedoms, to a great extent, have been curtailed, thereby aiding the return of martial rule in a new guise. The space for open debate in the Pakistani media has shrunk overtime. Since 2015, the military's public relations' wing has been successful in promoting the army as an institution that can save the country from terrorism.

For the first time in a decade, the incidence of terrorism declined. By end 2015, Pakistani public opinion supported military's efforts in bringing relative peace. Crackdown on the Pakistani Taliban has been fairly successful in limiting their ability to strike, though the long term counterterrorism measures are yet to be fully implemented. However, the Pakistani state has yet to limit the operations of militias that target India and Afghanistan

A key shift in recent years has been the announcement and work on the Pakistan-China economic corridor whereby the Chinese government will invest $46 billion in the next few years to build a trade route that will run through Pakistan and connect Chinese companies with the Gwadar port in the southwestern province of Balochistan. China is keen that Pakistan arrests the domestic unrest, cracks down on Islamic extremists and manages the conflict with India. Russia has also entered into various energy and defence deals with Pakistan with the similar object of incentivizing Pakistan to arrest the growth of transnational jihadism.

Viewed as the guardian of Pakistan's ideology and sovereignty, the army continues to enjoy widespread respect and support and is seen as the only institution that can deliver. At the same time, Pakistan's fast urbanization, demographic shifts, gradual development of electoral democracy and opening up of society through an expanded media have mounted challenges to the military. Insurgencies – of varying scales – in smaller provinces and tribal regions also confront the age old power structures. The business lobbies are keen to open up trade with arch-rival India; globalization and Pakistan's communications' revolution and a growing consensus on the continuation of the democratic rule are changing the future trajectory of democratization.

What does Pakistan's transitional environment portend for the future? The coming years will be marked by a military-civilian relationship, as opposed to classical, civil-military dyad. The forthcoming Chinese investment in Pakistan is likely to make the military more powerful, at least in the short term.

Will Pakistan turn into a Republic with a functional democratic system, a hybrid system where the military would have a stake in governance or would it keep vacillating between authoritarianism and controlled democratic dispensations? These are difficult questions to answer. One thing is certain: the democratic process is likely to continue, making direct military takeovers difficult, if not impossible. This by itself marks a new watershed moment in the country's history.
Notes

Part I

Chapter 7

 <http://pakistanconstitutionlaw.com/p-l-d-2005-sc-719/>

Chapter 8

 <http://www.dawn.com/news/684586/the-nro-mystery>

 <http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/27726/ki2010-special-chapter.pdf>

 <http://www.pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-77.pdf>

Part III

Introduction

 Constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act 2010 says that the commission held sixty-eight meetings over a period of eleven months with relevant federal and provincial government entities. Government of Pakistan, The constitution (Eighteenth Amendment) Act, 2010, <http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1302138356_934.pdf>, accessed 11 November 2015.
Acknowledgements

The idea for this collection came through a few readers who suggested that these articles should be compiled for record. I was reluctant at first, but now that this volume goes to print I need to thank all of them. I wish I had saved all those emails to individually name them.

Thanks are due to the editor of _The News on Sunday_ , Farah Zia, and her colleagues, Ather Naqvi and Mazhar Jadoon Khan who constantly encouraged me to write. In fact, Farah's dedication to journalism and writing has been a major inspiration for me. A few articles here are from _The News_ where Omar Quraishi was my editor and to date remains a supportive friend and colleague.

I must thank my colleagues Ali Abbas Abidi, Saadia Gardezi, Osama Nadeem, Mariam Saleem Farooqi and Asfandyar Khan – all bright, young Pakistani professionals – who assisted me at various stages, in fact checking and reviewing the hurriedly written drafts that had to meet stringent deadlines.

As always, my gratitude to Karthika VK for showing faith in me. A note of thanks for Ajitha and Sunayna Saraswat for the edits, and friend Kanishka Gupta for his systematic prodding and timely reminders.

Finally, I should mention some great friends, colleagues, mentors and critics in Pakistani journalism and intelligentsia who were always willing to discuss ideas and coach me. The list is long, but I need to mention my senior colleagues at weekly _The Friday Times_ – Najam Sethi and Jugnu Mohsin; Professors Saeed Shafqat, Dr Waseem, Dr Tariq Rehman; writers, scholars and thinkers such as Khaled Ahmed, Dr Ayesha Siddiqa, Dr Asad Sayeed, Asad Jamal, Salman Akram Raja; investigative reporters like Aoun Sahi, Taha Siddiqi, Waqar Gilani, Shahzada Ifran, Zahid Gishkori and many, many others. I learnt immensely from them.

Any mistakes and errors of analysis are solely mine.
About the Book

Since its creation in 1947, Pakistan has oscillated between weak democratic governments and brutal military dictatorships, the latter ruling for about half its existence. In 2013, for the first time, there was a peaceful transfer of power from a democratic government that had completed its tenure to another. The question is: will it last?

To understand this, Raza Rumi examines the crucial years between 2008 and 2013, which marked the transition from General Pervez Musharraf's authoritarian regime to a democratic order. Pakistan underwent a series of turbulent events in 2007, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in December of that year. Two months later, the elections returned her party to power, putting in place a hybrid military–democratic government. Grappling with the spillover of conflict in Afghanistan, jihadist insurgency and a fragile economy, this democracy had to contend with the imbalances inherent in the country's power structure.

Reported from the ground as these political developments were unravelling, Rumi provides a unique window to contemporary Pakistan – its democratic transition, internal security, extremism, governance, foreign policy and the future of democracy in the country.
About the Author

Raza Rumi is a Pakistani author, policy analyst and a journalist. He has been affiliated with _The Friday Times_ , Pakistan's foremost liberal weekly paper, as a writer and an editor for a decade. Raza is also a commentator for several Pakistani, regional and international publications. In Pakistan, he worked in the broadcast media as an analyst and hosted talk shows.

In 2014, Raza moved to the United States after an assassination attempt. Currently he is a scholar in residence at Ithaca College, New York. He is a fellow at National Endowment for Democracy (USA), the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World Affairs (USA) and Jinnah Institute (Pakistan). In the past, Raza has worked at the Asian Development Bank as a Governance Specialist and later advised several international development agencies such as UK AID, UNDP, UNICEF, World Bank, among others. In his early career he was a member of Pakistan Administrative Service and an official at the United Nations Peacekeeping Mission in Kosovo.

He is the author of _Delhi by Heart: Impressions of a Pakistani Traveller_ published by HarperCollins, India.

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# Table of Contents

  1. Cover
  2. Title Page
  3. Dedication
  4. Table of Contents
  5. Preface
  6. I DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
    1. Introduction
    2. 1. Pakistan's Ruling Coalition Must Not Splinter
    3. 2. Suicide Democrats
    4. 3. To Undo the Vicious Past
    5. 4. Should We Bid Farewell to Democracy in Pakistan?
    6. 5. How Instability Is Garnered
    7. 6. Democratic Governance Is the Only Option
    8. 7. Pakistan's Democracy Remains Fragile
    9. 8. Consensus Is Vital for Democracy
    10. 9. Governance Crises Cannot be Tackled by Old Formula of Changing Faces
    11. 10. Will the Court Punish Officials Who Violated their Oath?
    12. 11. Time for Complete Justice
    13. 12. Challenges of Political Transition
    14. 13. A Risky Transition?
  7. II SECURITY, CONFLICT & EXTREMISM
    1. Introduction
    2. 1. On Benazir's Death
    3. 2. Suicide Bombing - The Narratives of Terror
    4. 3. Confronting Militancy
    5. 4. What Is the Threat? What Is the Way Out?
    6. 5. Salmaan Taseer's Assassination and State Failures
    7. 6. Address Radicalization Before It's Too Late
    8. 7. Karachi Continues to Bleed
    9. 8. Myth and Reality of Extremism
    10. 9. The Killing of Shias Is a Rude Wake-up Call for the State and Society
    11. 10. Fighting the Existential Battle
    12. 11. Polio, Extremism and a Failing State
    13. 12. Reassessing Pakistan's Security Paradigm
    14. 13. Different Strands of Violence
    15. 14. Balochistan - Pushed to the Wall
    16. 15. It's Time to Engage with Baloch Nationalists
  8. III GOVERNANCE, INSTITUTIONS & REFORM
    1. Introduction
    2. 1. Civil Service Reform for Improving State Capacity
    3. 2. Poverty and Inequality - The Brewing Storm
    4. 3. Pakistani Reform - The Task Ahead
    5. 4. Pakistan's Crumbling Institutions
    6. 5. Innovations for Public Accountability
    7. 6. A Reform Agenda to Address Challenges
    8. 7. 18th Amendment - More Questions than Answers
    9. 8. Devolution - Unpacking the Higher Education Commission Debate
    10. 9. Devolution of Powers - The Challenges Ahead
    11. 10. Towards a Decentralized Pakistan
    12. 11. The Debate on New Provinces in Pakistan
    13. 12. Tackling the Local Governance Crisis
    14. 13. Civil Service Is No Longer an AlluringJob for the Youth
    15. 14. Dealing with the Devastating Floods
  9. IV FOREIGN POLICY
    1. Introduction
    2. 1. Policy Shifts Not War
    3. 2. Who Will Win the Game?
    4. 3. 1971 - The Forgotten Silence
    5. 4. Say No to War
    6. 5. Irrational Discourse on Raymond Davis
    7. 6. Saving a Rocky Relationship
    8. 7 Pakistan - Fixing the Civil-Military Imbalance
    9. 8. No More Escape Routes
    10. 9. Time to Move On
  10. V MEDIA
    1. Introduction
    2. 1. Pakistan's Media Opinion - The Column Industry
    3. 2. Beyond Censorship
    4. 3. Media Should Not Turn into a Holy Cow
    5. 4. Media Freedoms and Judicial Accountability
    6. 5. Through the Looking Glass
    7. 6. Responsibility Must Anchor Freedom
  11. Epilogue
  12. Notes
  13. Acknowledgements
  14. About the Book
  15. About the Author
  16. Copyright

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaBook