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NUPSA Philosophy Sessions (c) William Pascoe, 2018 (independently written and produced, this content is not owned or provided by UON or any Government or Commercial entity, except externally sourced material)
What Even Is Philosophy? Ethics Epistemology Plato vs. Aristotle Rhetoric and Logic: How To Think And Argue Theory 2000 Indigenous Philosophy Politics and Strategy Aesthetics
Resources Bibliography
Plato vs. Aristotle
The School of Athens, Raphael, 1509-1511
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle are perhaps the most famous of all Western philosophers and certainly the most famous Ancient Greek philosophers. Socrates taught Plato and other students, and Plato taught Aristotle and other students. For some years Aristotle was the tutor of Alexander the Great.
Socrates did not write anything down but taught through dialogues, typically asking questions. His teaching is known to us almost entirely through Plato. Many of Plato's works are the dialogues of Socrates with other people on particular topics. It can be difficult to differentiate the work of Plato and the work of Socrates. Plato was certainly not merely a scribe, though as his independent works, such as the Republic demonstrate.
Socrates taught in public places and was dedicated to truthfulness, often exposing hypocrisy and criticising Athenian people. He was condemned to death for allegedly 'corrupting youth' with his teaching.
Plato founded a school just outside of Athens called the Academy where many students were taught, Aristotle among them. The Academy persisted for a long time after his death being a centre for later Hellenistic philosophy and it is regarded as the fore runner to the Western University - hence the terms academics and academia.
Aristotle attended the Academy and later founded his own school in a part of Athens used for public philosophy and speaking called the Lyceum. His school came to be called 'the Lyceum' and also the 'peripatetic' school which means walking about, since Aristotle walked as he taught.
Both the Lyceum and the Academy were destroyed in 86 BC by the Sulla, a Roman, but their philosophies carried on.
When learning about something or reading summaries and overviews we inevitably get an oversimplified view of ideas, and so can think something easy to dismiss that is not, or ridiculous when it's not so ridiculous when we see the chain of reasoning that got there. For example we might read that the difference between Plato and Aristotle is:
Plato believed in an ideal realm of 'forms', separate to this material world and the things in the world are as they are because they resemble, like poor copies or shadows, these perfect and eternal 'forms'.
Aristotle was much more down to earth and said the only reality is the world of matter or substance and if there are forms they are only secondary, not eternal, and are invented by our minds as generalisations we make about reality. We should try to understand the world around us first by observing it.
The works of philosophers fill books so, needless to say, these are always over simplifications. Reading a book, and reading it closely, gives a greater appreciation for the nuances, context and ramifications of someone's thought. The following provides some small examples of that. For example, the idea of 'forms' has implications across ethics, epistemology and politics. Aristotle and Plato are not necessarily in disagreement on all points, rather Aristotle accepts some of Plato's and Socrates arguments, but qualifies them and adds his own.
The method of Socrates, as it appears in Plato's books, which are dialogues between Socrates and others, is known as 'dialectic'. Here is an example from Gorgias:
Soc. Now I think, Gorgias, that you have very accurately explained what you conceive to be the art of rhetoric; and you mean to say, if I am not mistaken, that rhetoric is the artificer of persuasion, having this and no other business, and that this is her crown and end. Do you know any other effect of rhetoric over and above that of producing persuasion?
Gor. No: the definition seems to me very fair, Socrates; for persuasion is the chief end of rhetoric.
Soc. Then hear me, Gorgias, for I am quite sure that if there ever was a man who-entered on the discussion of a matter from a pure love of knowing the truth, I am such a one, and I should say the same of you.
Gor. What is coming, Socrates?
Soc. I will tell you: I am very well aware that do not know what, according to you, is the exact nature, or what are the topics of that persuasion of which you speak, and which is given by rhetoric; although I have a suspicion about both the one and the other. And I am going to ask-what is this power of persuasion which is given by rhetoric, and about what? But why, if I have a suspicion, do I ask instead of telling you? Not for your sake, but in order that the argument may proceed in such a manner as is most likely to set forth the truth.
Socrates here explains this method in a discussion about rhetoric with a famous sophist. He points out a difference between the rhetoric of the sophists, which intends only to persuade regardless of the truth, for example in order to win a case, and his own method which involves two people questioning each other with the intention of arriving at the truth.
Elsewhere, Socrates describes dialectic as a method of arguing backwards by questioning a premise to arrive at the truth, rather than forwards drawing conclusions from it. Knowledge is best derived from those truths and principles we have arrived at through dialectic.
For this to work we must be willing to change our views, rather than be intent on winning. It's important also that this is a dialogue. If we were alone there would be no way to test our theories, to expose weak arguments or raise to our awareness things we hadn't considered.
Aristotle includes dialectic but says that is only suitable for some situations and aims for a complete account of all things and all methods of reasoning for different situations and fields on knowledge.
Dialectic is one approach to knowledge among others. He builds on this with logic of various forms, categorisation, understanding of causation and rhetoric.
Aristotle builds on the work of his predecessors, accepting the parts that he finds valid and dismissing anything that doesn't stand up to criticism. Part of the method is to respect people who have thought a lot about it, but not uncritically.
In ancient greece episteme (knowledge) actually mean something including 'understanding' so an argument was thought necessary.
Some of the books where you can find these ways of reasoning discusses in detail are in a set called the 'Organon':
Categories: the intersection of grammar, reason as expressive of relationships in the real world (discusses substance and form).
Prior Analytics: rules of logic, including syllogisms. Discussing whether the argument itself is internally valid, or if there is false reasoning.
Posterior Analytics: how to use reaoning to know things about the world. This relates to the validity of arguments beyond the rules of logic and reasoning.
Topoi: tips useful for rhetoric including when you not necessarily prepared but need some tools for how to approach argument on the go.
An important Aristotelian distinction is between demonstration and dialectic.
A demonstration is a reasoned argument (such as by syllogistic logic) based on premises that are known to be true in and of themself (eg: 1+1=2; or 'all unicorns have horns' because having a horn is entailed in the idea of what it means to be a unicorn - it is a necessary condition, or part of the definition.)
Dialectic is a reasoned argument (such as by syllogistic logic) based on premises that are accepted to be true by anyone participating in the debate (eg: we might be talking to a group of people, and start by saying, "Ok, so I think we can all agree that apples are healthy. So if all apples are healthy..."
Note that the word 'dialectic' is defined differently in the works of Plato and Aristotle. I'm not sure if this is a problem with translation, or if they both simply use the word differently. Socrates starts with an agreed premise but doesn't accept it as true without questioning. By contrast Aristotle describes dialectic as arguing from an accepted premise. Note that a 'demonstration' in Aristotle's terminology would be coming from the result of Platonic (Socratic) dialectic.
Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them. (a) It is a 'demonstration', when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premisses which are primary and true: (b) reasoning, on the other hand, is 'dialectical', if it reasons from opinions that are believed on the strength not of anything else but of themselves: for in regard to the first principles of science it is improper to ask any further for the why ans wherefore of them; each of the first principles shoudl command belief in and by itself. On the other hand, those opinions are 'generally accepted' which are accepted by every one or by the majority, or by the philosophers - ie by all, or by a majority, or by the most notable and illustrious of them. Again (c), reasoning is 'contentious' if it starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are not really such, or again if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. For not every opinion that seems to be generally accepted actually is generally accepted... Further (d), besides all the reasonings we have mentioned there are the mis-reasonings that start from the premises peculiar to the special sciences..." Topics p188 (first page of Topics)
Note that these last two are about false reasoning, so not part of Aristotle's method per se. Aristotle is stating these as species of reasoning we might encounter and have to respond to with in the world.
Much of Aristotle's work is about methods for valid reasoning so we can't cover it all here. He is noted for formalising 'syllogisms' which remain one of the foundations of logic. These are statements such as 'If all A are B and C is A then C is B' and similar. They can be a bit dry to study, but there are only a small number of them and are an extremely powerful thing to know. We use them a lot in our arguments and reasoning without even knowing. Aristotle has a very thorough approach, breaking things into categories. For example, to make or refute an argument he says we may consider it in terms of 'definition', 'property', 'genus', and 'accident', and also types of 'predicates' that we can consider: essence, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, activity, passivity. We will look at these in the next session on logic an rhetoric, which will focus on Aristotle and classical rhetoricians such as Cicero.
Aristotle's view is that the aim of philosophy is towards the most general knowledge of first principles. This will apply to most things, and will enable us to draw the most conclusions:
"Such and so many are the notions, then, which we have about Wisdom and the wise. Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge; for he knows in a sense all the instances that fall under the universal. And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses. And the most exact of the sciences are those which deal most with first principles; for those which involve fewer principles are more exact than those which involve additional principles, e.g. arithmetic than geometry. But the science which investigates causes is also instructive, in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing. And understanding and knowledge pursued for their own sake are found most in the knowledge of that which is most knowable (for he who chooses to know for the sake of knowing will choose most readily that which is most truly knowledge, and such is the knowledge of that which is most knowable); and the first principles and the causes are most knowable; for by reason of these, and from these, all other things come to be known, and not these by means of the things subordinate to them. And the science which knows to what end each thing must be done is the most authoritative of the sciences, and more authoritative than any ancillary science; and this end is the good of that thing, and in general the supreme good in the whole of nature. Judged by all the tests we have mentioned, then, the name in question falls to the same science; this must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good, i.e. the end, is one of the causes.
Indonesian Wayang Kulit shadow puppets. (They are the 5 Pandava brothers from The Mahabharata, from the left, Bima, Arjuna, Yudhistra, Nakula and Sahadeva.)
The parable of the cave in Plato's Republic
One of the things Plato is most famous for is the theory of the forms. No orange is an exact sphere, so where does this sphericality come from? It comes from another reality of ideas, of forms, which our minds have access to when we think. Our thought of a perfect sphere is not something in the world that changes, decays and ceases to exist, but is outside of time, it is something we can all access in our minds. Plato calls this the 'form' of a sphere and it is only in imperfect, transient resemblance to this perfect eternal ideal 'form' of a sphere that we can say that the orange is spherical.
References to this theory occur throughout Plato's dialogues with some aspects touched on in different ways in different dialogues but perhaps the most thorough account, and the most famous is in Plato's Republic, around the allegory of the cave.
Setting up the dialogue
Socrates starts a new topic for dialogue by asking Glaucon to accept that an understanding of 'the good' is one of the most important things we might be able to have knowledge of. There is nothing worth having that is not good.
"...For you have often heard272 that the greatest thing to learn is the idea of good273 by reference to which274 just things275 and all the rest become useful and beneficial. And now I am almost sure you know that this is what I am going to speak of and to say further that we have no adequate knowledge of it. And if we do not know it, then, even if without the knowledge of this we should know all other things never so well, you are aware that it would avail us nothing, [505b] just as no possession either is of any avail276 without the possession of the good. Or do you think there is any profit277 in possessing everything except that which is good, or in understanding all things else apart from the good while understanding and knowing nothing that is fair and good278?" "No, by Zeus, I do not," he said.
Socrates points out common misconceptions and bad arguments about the 'Good'. Most people say 'the good' is pleasure, but contradict themselves when they admit that bad things can be pleasurable. More sophisticated people say that 'knowledge' is the good, but when questioned about what this knowledge is of, they end up saying 'knowledge of the good' and so have a circular argument (It is good to have knowledge. Knowledge of what? Knowledge of what is good.)
But, furthermore, you know this too, that the multitude believe pleasure279 to be the good, and the finer280 spirits intelligence or knowledge.281" "Certainly." "And you are also aware, my friend, that those who hold this latter view are not able to point out what knowledge282 it is but are finally compelled to say that it is the knowledge of the good." "Most absurdly," he said. "Is it not absurd," [505c] said I, "if while taunting us with our ignorance of the good they turn about and talk to us as if we knew it? For they say it is the knowledge of the good,283 as if we understood their meaning when they utter284 the word 'good.'" "Most true," he said. "Well, are those who define the good as pleasure infected with any less confusion285 of thought than the others? Or are not they in like manner286 compelled to admit that there are bad pleasures287?"
Socrates backs away from saying what the good is, claiming (pretending) that he hasn't yet attained that height of understanding, then starts using similes and parables to explain his point of view:
Socrates describes how vision requires not only the thing seen and the eye, but also light.
"Well, look at it thus. Do hearing and voice stand in need of another medium315 so that the one may hear and the other be heard, [507d] in the absence of which third element the one will not hear and the other not be heard?" "They need nothing," he said. "Neither, I fancy," said I," do many others, not to say that none require anything of the sort. Or do you know of any?" "Not I," he said. "But do you not observe that vision and the visible do have this further need?" "How?" "Though vision may be in the eyes and its possessor may try to use it, and though color be present, yet without [507e] the presence of a third thing316 specifically and naturally adapted to this purpose, you are aware that vision will see nothing and the colors will remain invisible.317" "What318 is this thing of which you speak?" he said. "The thing," I said, "that you call light."
Socrates points out that the Sun can't be looked at directly, but illumines everything else clearly.
"Is it not also true that the sun is not vision, yet as being the cause thereof is beheld by vision itself?" "That is so," he said. "This, then, you must understand that I meant by the offspring of the good323 which the good [508c] begot to stand in a proportion324 with itself: as the good is in the intelligible region to reason and the objects of reason, so is this in the visible world to vision and the objects of vision." "How is that?" he said; "explain further." "You are aware," I said, "that when the eyes are no longer turned upon objects upon whose colors the light of day falls but that of the dim luminaries of night, their edge is blunted and they appear almost blind, as if pure vision did not dwell in them." "Yes, indeed," he said. "But when, I take it, [508d] they are directed upon objects illumined by the sun, they see clearly, and vision appears to reside in these same eyes."
Socrates says that the form of 'The Good' is like the sun. Difficult to understand directly, but 'the good' is what enables us to 'see' or understand what is knowable and pleasurable.
"This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the idea326 of good, and you must conceive it as being the cause of knowledge, and of truth in so far as known.327 Yet fair as they both are, knowledge and truth, in supposing it to be something fairer still328 than these you will think rightly of it. But as for knowledge and truth, even as in our illustration [509a] it is right to deem light and vision sunlike, but never to think that they are the sun, so here it is right to consider these two their counterparts, as being like the good or boniform,329 but to think that either of them is the good330 is not right.
Socrates then describes a line divided into knowledge and opinion, with opinion divided into illusion and belief, and knowledge divided into mathematical reasoning and dialectical reasoning. Socrates draws a distinction between dialectic which starts from some premise and questions it to find truths and principles and the sciences about the world and of mathematics which draw conclusions from some initial assumption. These two kinds of reasoning go in opposite directions. One questions assumptions to find knowledge, while the other reasons from assumptions to find knowledge.
"Understand then," said I, "that by the other section of the intelligible I mean that which the reason353 itself lays hold of by the power of dialectics,354 treating its assumptions not as absolute beginnings but literally as hypotheses,355 underpinnings, footings,356 and springboards so to speak, to enable it to rise to that which requires no assumption and is the starting-point of all,357 and after attaining to that again taking hold of the first dependencies from it, so to proceed downward to the conclusion, [511c] making no use whatever of any object of sense358 but only of pure ideas moving on through ideas to ideas and ending with ideas.359"
Plato Republic Book 6
The allegory of the cave is perhaps the most famous passage in Plato's works.
"Next," said I, "compare our nature in respect of education and its lack to such an experience as this. Picture men dwelling in a sort of subterranean cavern1 with a long entrance open2 to the light on its entire width. Conceive them as having their legs and necks fettered3 from childhood, so that they remain in the same spot, [514b] able to look forward only, and prevented by the fetters from turning their heads. Picture further the light from a fire burning higher up and at a distance behind them, and between the fire and the prisoners and above them a road along which a low wall has been built, as the exhibitors of puppet-shows4 have partitions before the men themselves, above which they show the puppets." "All that I see," he said. "See also, then, men carrying5 past the wall [514c] implements of all kinds that rise above the wall, and human images [515a] and shapes of animals as well, wrought in stone and wood and every material, some of these bearers presumably speaking and others silent." "A strange image you speak of," he said, "and strange prisoners." "Like to us," I said;
Plato develops this allegory throughout Book 6 using it to demonstrate many points. In the allegory someone escapes the cave and sees the road above, the real things in the sunlight. Through question and answer Socrates shows this person would be at first confused, and then come to understand the truth about reality. They would still find it difficult to look at the sun. http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D6&force=y
- They would not wish to return.
- If they returned, nobody would believe them, and even be angry at them for telling lies (reference to Socrates)
- Yet if anyone knew overall, they would urge the philosopher to return and explain, and those in the cave would want to learn the truth.
- So the metaphysical view of 'form's relates to morality and politics.
Aristotle's discussion of predication and substance relates to Plato's Theaetetus. We won't discuss it, due to time, but here it is as it's wroth a look if you have the time for a little contemplation of form, substance and the nature of reality.
Theaetatus
For I must repeat what I said before, that neither the agent nor patient have any absolute existence, but when they come together and generate sensations and their objects, the one becomes a thing of a certain quality, and the other a percipient. ...
But now, since not even white continues to flow white, and whiteness itself is a flux or change which is passing into another colour, and is never to be caught standing still, can the name of any colour be rightly used at all? ...
But if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right: you may say that a thing is or is not thus; ...
And you would admit that what you perceive through one faculty you cannot perceive through another; the objects of hearing, for example, cannot be perceived through sight, or the objects of sight through hearing? ...
SOCRATES: Very good; and now tell me what is the power which discerns, not only in sensible objects, but in all things, universal notions, such as those which are called being and not-being, and those others about which we were just asking--what organs will you assign for the perception of these notions?
THEAETETUS: You are thinking of being and not being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also of unity and other numbers which are applied to objects of sense; and you mean to ask, through what bodily organ the soul perceives odd and even numbers and other arithmetical conceptions.
SOCRATES: You follow me excellently, Theaetetus; that is precisely what I am asking.
THEAETETUS: Indeed, Socrates, I cannot answer; my only notion is, that these, unlike objects of sense, have no separate organ, but that the mind, by a power of her own, contemplates the universals in all things. ...
SOCRATES: The simple sensations which reach the soul through the body are given at birth to men and animals by nature, but their reflections on the being and use of them are slowly and hardly gained, if they are ever gained, by education and long experience.
THEAETETUS: Assuredly.
SOCRATES: And can a man attain truth who fails of attaining being?
THEAETETUS: Impossible.
SOCRATES: And can he who misses the truth of anything, have a knowledge of that thing?
THEAETETUS: He cannot.
SOCRATES: Then knowledge does not consist in impressions of sense, but in reasoning about them; in that only, and not in the mere impression, truth and being can be attained?
THEAETETUS: Clearly.
SOCRATES: And would you call the two processes by the same name, when there is so great a difference between them?
THEAETETUS: That would certainly not be right.
SOCRATES: And what name would you give to seeing, hearing, smelling, being cold and being hot?
THEAETETUS: I should call all of them perceiving--what other name could be given to them?
SOCRATES: Perception would be the collective name of them?
THEAETETUS: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Which, as we say, has no part in the attainment of truth any more than of being?
THEAETETUS: Certainly not.3
SOCRATES: And therefore not in science or knowledge?
THEAETETUS: No.
SOCRATES: Then perception, Theaetetus, can never be the same as knowledge or science?
THEAETETUS: Clearly not, Socrates; and knowledge has now been most distinctly proved to be different from perception.
SOCRATES: But the original aim of our discussion was to find out rather what knowledge is than what it is not; at the same time we have made some progress, for we no longer seek for knowledge in perception at all, but in that other process, however called, in which the mind is alone and engaged with being.
Aristotle's view of substance is described mainly in Categories and Metaphysics.
"Again, colour is present in body, therefore in individual bodies, for if there were no individual body in which it was present, it could not be present in body at all. Thus everything except primary substances is either predicated of primary substances, or is present in them, and if these last did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist." Categories p9
"The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities. From among things other than substance, we should find ourselves unable to bring forward any which possessed this mark. Thus, one and the same colour cannot be white and black. Nor can the same one action be good and bad: this law holds good with everything that is not substance. But one and the self-same substance, while retaining its identity, is yet capable of admitting contrary qualities." p13 Categories.
The terms 'substance' is a translation of 'ousia' in ancient Greek, which means 'a being' - a noun form from the verb 'to be'. It refers to the thing which is, so has also been translated as 'essence', as it is not necessarily 'material' which is implied by the word 'substance'. (It is debatable and there has been much critique over whether such an 'essence' exists - what we interpret as a single entity (such as this cat called 'Snoops') with properties attached to it, such as whiskers, the ability to purr, a tortoiseshell pattern), it doesn't necessarily follow that there is a real thing to which these are attached. There may only be a collection, an aggregate, of properties.)
Note Aristotle's method of drawing distinctions, echoed in Avicenna, to then reason about them, and understand their relationships. For Aristotle there are things which are predicated and things which aren't.
The term 'predicate' is grammatical but is applicable to logic, and also to the world that we are talking about when we use grammar and logic to talk about the world. A sentence is made up of a subject and a predicate. In the sentence, 'The chair is green.' The chair is the subject and whatever we may say about it is the predicate. Note that the chair is not necessarily green. It could be red, yellow, purple, etc. In the following sentences Helen is the subject and the rest are predicates: "Helen is a woman.", "Helen is beautiful.", "Helen went to Troy." etc.
Forms are predicated so cannot exist without substance.
If there is change, there is a change from one 'form' to another. So from 'sad' to 'happy', from 'green' to 'yellow', from 'walking' to 'running'. There must be something which this change happens to. Something which changes from one emotion, colour or movement to another. It is this which provides continuity of identity across time. This is the 'thing' to which things happen, or 'substance'. It is the 'form' or those things which are 'predicated' that change while the 'substance' or 'essence' or we might say, 'object' or 'thing', persists.
This 'substance' does not require those things which are predicated on it in order to exist. Rather those things which are predicated on it require that substance to exist. I can exist without necessarily being one colour or another, without necessarily being happy or sad. I could walk, run, sit, or something else. Whereas these properties, or 'forms' which are predicated do require something to be instantiated in, in order to exist. There cannot be 'yellow' without there being something that is yellow. There can't be 'happiness' without there being something that is happy. For Aristotle then, the most fundamental 'being', the being which is real, is 'substance' or 'essence', 'ousia'. These is no need to resort to abstract ideal ideas to account for what exists.
This is in direct contrast to Plato and Socrates, who argued that because things in the world change they have less reality than those ideas which are perfect and eternal.
To look at it more abstractly consider a sphere and an orange. Plato would say, no orange is an exact sphere, so where does this sphericality come from? It comes from our minds. Our thought of a perfect sphere is not something in the world that changes, decays and ceases to exist, but is outside of time, it is something we can all access in our minds. Plato calls this the 'form' of a sphere and it is only in imperfect, transient resemblance to this perfect eternal ideal 'form' of a sphere that we can say that the orange is spherical.
Aristotle, in contrast to Plato and Socrates, says that there is no need to invent another reality to which we have access. It is only because of our experiences of oranges and other roughly spherical things that our minds gradually create a general idea of a perfect circle. However the circle cannot really exist except in substances, like oranges. The only real things are the individual particulars. These are prior, and our thoughts about them, such as the idea of a sphere, are posterior - derived from them. A sphere is predicated on an actual orange - eg: 'This orange is spherical'. (Ok, now if you are thinking, 'This sphere is orange.' you are of course just talking about the colour, not this piece of fruit. However, couldn't we say, "This sphere is imperfect like a fruit"? Aristotle is making a statement not just about grammatical construction but about the real world. He is asserting that mental ideals or 'forms' are secondary to substance which we can generally understand as 'matter'.)
Aristotle notes that some predicates are special cases, particularly species and genera. A 'species' is a type of thing. Genera is a more general category of species. These Aristotle refers to as 'secondary substances' because although they are not the individual man, they still exist materially. In the statement, "Odysseus is a man." the predicate is a species and refers to material substantial men, not just a property that a man might have. Similarly with the genera 'animal'. What is true of the species is true of the individual and what is true of the genera is true of the species.
One of the main arguments Aristotle provides for substance and not forms as primary and real is causation. He describes four causes: material, formal, efficient, final.
Incidentally, bearing these in mind is helpful in problem solving - when looking at a problem, you can ask, what is the cause of this? Material, formal, efficient, final?
Now that we have established these distinctions, we must proceed to consider causes, their character and number. Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the 'why' of (which is to grasp its primary cause). So clearly we too must do this as regards both coming to be and passing away and every kind of physical change, in order that, knowing their principles, we may try to refer to these principles each of our problems.
In one sense, then, (1) that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called 'cause', e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.
In another sense (2) the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are called 'causes' (e.g. of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally number), and the parts in the definition.
Again (3) the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed.
Again (4) in the sense of end or 'that for the sake of which' a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about. ('Why is he walking about?' we say. 'To be healthy', and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. All these things are 'for the sake of' the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities, others instruments.
This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term 'cause' is used.
Aristotle, Physics, Book II, Part 3
Here we see Aristotle state that knowledge requires that we are able to explain, 'why'. This is in agreement with Plato and Socrates.
Next he describes the 4 causes, another key aspect of Aristotle's philosophy. A consideration of causation and predication is what leads Aristotle to the conclusion, against Plato and Socrates, that the primary and real existents are substantial, or material, not Platonic forms. If forms such as whiteness, are predicates, they are accidental and changeable, so they can't be the cause, but must be instead something which is causes. They must be a change which is caused to happen to something - the substance.
"After the systems we have named came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had pecullarities that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians. For, having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about ethical matters and neglecting the world of nature as a whole but seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for the first time on definitions; Plato accepted his teaching, but held that the problem applied not to sensible things but to entities of another kind-for this reason, that the common definition could not be a definition of any sensible thing, as they were always changing. Things of this other sort, then, he called Ideas, and sensible things, he said, were all named after these, and in virtue of a relation to these; for the many existed by participation in the Ideas that have the same name as they. Only the name 'participation' was new; for the Pythagoreans say that things exist by 'imitation' of numbers, and Plato says they exist by participation, changing the name. But what the participation or the imitation of the Forms could be they left an open question.
"Further, besides sensible things and Forms he says there are the objects of mathematics, which occupy an intermediate position, differing from sensible things in being eternal and unchangeable, from Forms in that there are many alike, while the Form itself is in each case unique.
"Since the Forms were the causes of all other things, he thought their elements were the elements of all things. As matter, the great and the small were principles; as essential reality, the One; for from the great and the small, by participation in the One, come the Numbers.
"But he agreed with the Pythagoreans in saying that the One is substance and not a predicate of something else; and in saying that the Numbers are the causes of the reality of other things he agreed with them; but positing a dyad and constructing the infinite out of great and small, instead of treating the infinite as one, is peculiar to him; and so is his view that the Numbers exist apart from sensible things, while they say that the things themselves are Numbers, and do not place the objects of mathematics between Forms and sensible things. His divergence from the Pythagoreans in making the One and the Numbers separate from things, and his introduction of the Forms, were due to his inquiries in the region of definitions (for the earlier thinkers had no tincture of dialectic), and his making the other entity besides the One a dyad was due to the belief that the numbers, except those which were prime, could be neatly produced out of the dyad as out of some plastic material. Yet what happens is the contrary; the theory is not a reasonable one. For they make many things out of the matter, and the form generates only once, but what we observe is that one table is made from one matter, while the man who applies the form, though he is one, makes many tables. And the relation of the male to the female is similar; for the latter is impregnated by one copulation, but the male impregnates many females; yet these are analogues of those first principles.
"Plato, then, declared himself thus on the points in question; it is evident from what has been said that he has used only two causes, that of the essence and the material cause (for the Forms are the causes of the essence of all other things, and the One is the cause of the essence of the Forms); and it is evident what the underlying matter is, of which the Forms are predicated in the case of sensible things, and the One in the case of Forms, viz. that this is a dyad, the great and the small. Further, he has assigned the cause of good and that of evil to the elements, one to each of the two, as we say some of his predecessors sought to do, e.g. Empedocles and Anaxagoras.
Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book I, Part 6
"Our review of those who have spoken about first principles and reality and of the way in which they have spoken, has been concise and summary; but yet we have learnt this much from them, that of those who speak about 'principle' and 'cause' no one has mentioned any principle except those which have been distinguished in our work on nature, but all evidently have some inkling of them, though only vaguely. For some speak of the first principle as matter, whether they suppose one or more first principles, and whether they suppose this to be a body or to be incorporeal; e.g. Plato spoke of the great and the small, the Italians of the infinite, Empedocles of fire, earth, water, and air, Anaxagoras of the infinity of things composed of similar parts. These, then, have all had a notion of this kind of cause, and so have all who speak of air or fire or water, or something denser than fire and rarer than air; for some have said the prime element is of this kind.
"These thinkers grasped this cause only; but certain others have mentioned the source of movement, e.g. those who make friendship and strife, or reason, or love, a principle.
"The essence, i.e. the substantial reality, no one has expressed distinctly. It is hinted at chiefly by those who believe in the Forms; for they do not suppose either that the Forms are the matter of sensible things, and the One the matter of the Forms, or that they are the source of movement (for they say these are causes rather of immobility and of being at rest), but they furnish the Forms as the essence of every other thing, and the One as the essence of the Forms.
"That for whose sake actions and changes and movements take place, they assert to be a cause in a way, but not in this way, i.e. not in the way in which it is its nature to be a cause. For those who speak of reason or friendship class these causes as goods; they do not speak, however, as if anything that exists either existed or came into being for the sake of these, but as if movements started from these. In the same way those who say the One or the existent is the good, say that it is the cause of substance, but not that substance either is or comes to be for the sake of this. Therefore it turns out that in a sense they both say and do not say the good is a cause; for they do not call it a cause qua good but only incidentally.
"All these thinkers then, as they cannot pitch on another cause, seem to testify that we have determined rightly both how many and of what sort the causes are. Besides this it is plain that when the causes are being looked for, either all four must be sought thus or they must be sought in one of these four ways. Let us next discuss the possible difficulties with regard to the way in which each of these thinkers has spoken, and with regard to his situation relatively to the first principles
"Let us leave the Pythagoreans for the present; for it is enough to have touched on them as much as we have done. But as for those who posit the Ideas as causes, firstly, in seeking to grasp the causes of the things around us, they introduced others equal in number to these, as if a man who wanted to count things thought he would not be able to do it while they were few, but tried to count them when he had added to their number. For the Forms are practically equal to-or not fewer than-the things, in trying to explain which these thinkers proceeded from them to the Forms. For to each thing there answers an entity which has the same name and exists apart from the substances, and so also in the case of all other groups there is a one over many, whether the many are in this world or are eternal.
"Further, of the ways in which we prove that the Forms exist, none is convincing; for from some no inference necessarily follows, and from some arise Forms even of things of which we think there are no Forms. For according to the arguments from the existence of the sciences there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences and according to the 'one over many' argument there will be Forms even of negations, and according to the argument that there is an object for thought even when the thing has perished, there will be Forms of perishable things; for we have an image of these. Further, of the more accurate arguments, some lead to Ideas of relations, of which we say there is no independent class, and others introduce the 'third man'.
"And in general the arguments for the Forms destroy the things for whose existence we are more zealous than for the existence of the Ideas; for it follows that not the dyad but number is first, i.e. that the relative is prior to the absolute,-besides all the other points on which certain people by following out the opinions held about the Ideas have come into conflict with the principles of the theory.
"Further, according to the assumption on which our belief in the Ideas rests, there will be Forms not only of substances but also of many other things (for the concept is single not only in the case of substances but also in the other cases, and there are sciences not only of substance but also of other things, and a thousand other such difficulties confront them). But according to the necessities of the case and the opinions held about the Forms, if Forms can be shared in there must be Ideas of substances only. For they are not shared in incidentally, but a thing must share in its Form as in something not predicated of a subject (by 'being shared in incidentally' I mean that e.g. if a thing shares in 'double itself', it shares also in 'eternal', but incidentally; for 'eternal' happens to be predicable of the 'double'). Therefore the Forms will be substance; but the same terms indicate substance in this and in the ideal world (or what will be the meaning of saying that there is something apart from the particulars-the one over many?). And if the Ideas and the particulars that share in them have the same form, there will be something common to these; for why should '2' be one and the same in the perishable 2's or in those which are many but eternal, and not the same in the '2' itself' as in the particular 2? But if they have not the same form, they must have only the name in common, and it is as if one were to call both Callias and a wooden image a 'man', without observing any community between them.
"Above all one might discuss the question what on earth the Forms contribute to sensible things, either to those that are eternal or to those that come into being and cease to be. For they cause neither movement nor any change in them. But again they help in no wise either towards the knowledge of the other things (for they are not even the substance of these, else they would have been in them), or towards their being, if they are not in the particulars which share in them; though if they were, they might be thought to be causes, as white causes whiteness in a white object by entering into its composition. But this argument, which first Anaxagoras and later Eudoxus and certain others used, is very easily upset; for it is not difficult to collect many insuperable objections to such a view.
"But, further, all other things cannot come from the Forms in any of the usual senses of 'from'. And to say that they are patterns and the other things share in them is to use empty words and poetical metaphors. For what is it that works, looking to the Ideas? And anything can either be, or become, like another without being copied from it, so that whether Socrates or not a man Socrates like might come to be; and evidently this might be so even if Socrates were eternal. And there will be several patterns of the same thing, and therefore several Forms; e.g. 'animal' and 'two-footed' and also 'man himself' will be Forms of man. Again, the Forms are patterns not only sensible things, but of Forms themselves also; i.e. the genus, as genus of various species, will be so; therefore the same thing will be pattern and copy.
"Again, it would seem impossible that the substance and that of which it is the substance should exist apart; how, therefore, could the Ideas, being the substances of things, exist apart? In the Phaedo' the case is stated in this way-that the Forms are causes both of being and of becoming; yet when the Forms exist, still the things that share in them do not come into being, unless there is something to originate movement; and many other things come into being (e.g. a house or a ring) of which we say there are no Forms. Clearly, therefore, even the other things can both be and come into being owing to such causes as produce the things just mentioned.
"Again, if the Forms are numbers, how can they be causes? Is it because existing things are other numbers, e.g. one number is man, another is Socrates, another Callias? Why then are the one set of numbers causes of the other set? It will not make any difference even if the former are eternal and the latter are not. But if it is because things in this sensible world (e.g. harmony) are ratios of numbers, evidently the things between which they are ratios are some one class of things. If, then, this--the matter--is some definite thing, evidently the numbers themselves too will be ratios of something to something else. E.g. if Callias is a numerical ratio between fire and earth and water and air, his Idea also will be a number of certain other underlying things; and man himself, whether it is a number in a sense or not, will still be a numerical ratio of certain things and not a number proper, nor will it be a of number merely because it is a numerical ratio.
"Again, from many numbers one number is produced, but how can one Form come from many Forms? And if the number comes not from the many numbers themselves but from the units in them, e.g. in 10,000, how is it with the units? If they are specifically alike, numerous absurdities will follow, and also if they are not alike (neither the units in one number being themselves like one another nor those in other numbers being all like to all); for in what will they differ, as they are without quality? This is not a plausible view, nor is it consistent with our thought on the matter.
"Further, they must set up a second kind of number (with which arithmetic deals), and all the objects which are called 'intermediate' by some thinkers; and how do these exist or from what principles do they proceed? Or why must they be intermediate between the things in this sensible world and the things-themselves?
"Further, the units in must each come from a prior but this is impossible.
"Further, why is a number, when taken all together, one?
"Again, besides what has been said, if the units are diverse the Platonists should have spoken like those who say there are four, or two, elements; for each of these thinkers gives the name of element not to that which is common, e.g. to body, but to fire and earth, whether there is something common to them, viz. body, or not. But in fact the Platonists speak as if the One were homogeneous like fire or water; and if this is so, the numbers will not be substances. Evidently, if there is a One itself and this is a first principle, 'one' is being used in more than one sense; for otherwise the theory is impossible.
"When we wish to reduce substances to their principles, we state that lines come from the short and long (i.e. from a kind of small and great), and the plane from the broad and narrow, and body from the deep and shallow. Yet how then can either the plane contain a line, or the solid a line or a plane? For the broad and narrow is a different class from the deep and shallow. Therefore, just as number is not present in these, because the many and few are different from these, evidently no other of the higher classes will be present in the lower. But again the broad is not a genus which includes the deep, for then the solid would have been a species of plane. Further, from what principle will the presence of the points in the line be derived? Plato even used to object to this class of things as being a geometrical fiction. He gave the name of principle of the line-and this he often posited-to the indivisible lines. Yet these must have a limit; therefore the argument from which the existence of the line follows proves also the existence of the point.
"In general, though philosophy seeks the cause of perceptible things, we have given this up (for we say nothing of the cause from which change takes its start), but while we fancy we are stating the substance of perceptible things, we assert the existence of a second class of substances, while our account of the way in which they are the substances of perceptible things is empty talk; for 'sharing', as we said before, means nothing.
"Nor have the Forms any connexion with what we see to be the cause in the case of the arts, that for whose sake both all mind and the whole of nature are operative,-with this cause which we assert to be one of the first principles; but mathematics has come to be identical with philosophy for modern thinkers, though they say that it should be studied for the sake of other things. Further, one might suppose that the substance which according to them underlies as matter is too mathematical, and is a predicate and differentia of the substance, ie. of the matter, rather than matter itself; i.e. the great and the small are like the rare and the dense which the physical philosophers speak of, calling these the primary differentiae of the substratum; for these are a kind of excess and defect. And regarding movement, if the great and the small are to he movement, evidently the Forms will be moved; but if they are not to be movement, whence did movement come? The whole study of nature has been annihilated.
"And what is thought to be easy-to show that all things are one-is not done; for what is proved by the method of setting out instances is not that all things are one but that there is a One itself,-if we grant all the assumptions. And not even this follows, if we do not grant that the universal is a genus; and this in some cases it cannot be.
"Nor can it be explained either how the lines and planes and solids that come after the numbers exist or can exist, or what significance they have; for these can neither be Forms (for they are not numbers), nor the intermediates (for those are the objects of mathematics), nor the perishable things. This is evidently a distinct fourth class.
"In general, if we search for the elements of existing things without distinguishing the many senses in which things are said to exist, we cannot find them, especially if the search for the elements of which things are made is conducted in this manner. For it is surely impossible to discover what 'acting' or 'being acted on', or 'the straight', is made of, but if elements can be discovered at all, it is only the elements of substances; therefore either to seek the elements of all existing things or to think one has them is incorrect.
"And how could we learn the elements of all things? Evidently we cannot start by knowing anything before. For as he who is learning geometry, though he may know other things before, knows none of the things with which the science deals and about which he is to learn, so is it in all other cases. Therefore if there is a science of all things, such as some assert to exist, he who is learning this will know nothing before. Yet all learning is by means of premisses which are (either all or some of them) known before,-whether the learning be by demonstration or by definitions; for the elements of the definition must be known before and be familiar; and learning by induction proceeds similarly. But again, if the science were actually innate, it were strange that we are unaware of our possession of the greatest of sciences.
"Again, how is one to come to know what all things are made of, and how is this to be made evident? This also affords a difficulty; for there might be a conflict of opinion, as there is about certain syllables; some say za is made out of s and d and a, while others say it is a distinct sound and none of those that are familiar.
"Further, how could we know the objects of sense without having the sense in question? Yet we ought to, if the elements of which all things consist, as complex sounds consist of the clements proper to sound, are the same.
Virtue and the Good Life
TBC - out of time :(
Meno for virtue as knowledge, and circular reasoning, start with definition, JTB, also Theatetus.
Aristotle Bk 1 Ethics, dismissing Plato's Good. Aristotle - good at it's purpose, but drawing on Plato, the analogy of a good knife being one that is good at cutting is from Plato's Republic. So, learning how to be who they are as best they can. Note that this is a lesson from Bhagavad Gita.
Living well, having pleasure is good, and to do this requires wisdom/knowledge. Epistemology and ethics are bound up - the purpose of knowledge is to be good at living well. This becomes a definition??? what knowledge is is what makes us better at living well.
Plato, equality, disinterested philosopher king. An early description of a utopian vision that would require revolutionary change. Aristotle, more conservative.
Debate Continues
The English poet Coleridge famously said, "Every man is born an Aristotelian or a Platonist." He meant that there are two types of people in the world, broadly matching the general attitudes of Plato and Aristotle - some of us always look to some pure ideal place separate to the earth for answers, while others don't trust anything to be real unless they can kick it's tyres.
After their deaths Plato's academy and Aristotle's Lyceum continued under different heads of school with debate continuing alongside other schools of philosophy. Neoplatonism was popular in the late Roman Empire. Aristotle was a major source for Islamic philosophy, and so the development of Natural Philosophy or 'Science' as we know it today, given the focus on method and a full, well reasoned, often causal explanation of the material world.
In Europe the works of Aristotle became available to late Medieval universities through the works of Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) who argued for the preservation of philosophical enquiry against religious dogma. Aristotelianism became the standard attitude in European universities until the Renaissance when the Medici family in Florence sponsored a revival of neo-Platonism.
The contrast between the two is reflected in the enlightenment debate between rationalism (Plato) and empiricism (Aristotle).


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iAngels Weekly Deal Digest – July 7th, 2016
July 7, 2016 /in Weekly Deal Digest /by Max Marine
As another week in Israel draws to a close, we saw a gentle $35mm flow into cybersecurity, cleantech, medical devices, and business analytics. Quite a stark contrast to the flurry of June announcements, so this week's digest should be a bit easier on your brain.
Seed Rounds
HGT Solutions, a provider of energy saving solutions for smart cities, raised $2mm from HG Holdings.
Zirra, a business analytics provider to early-stage investors, raised an undisclosed sum from private angels.
Series A Rounds
Twistlock, an enterprise security suite for virtual containers, raised $10mm led by Ten Eleven Ventures, with participation from YL Ventures and Rally Ventures.
Series B Rounds
Nyxoah, a medical device company developing a solution to combat Obstructive Sleep Apnea, raised $20mm led by Glide Healthcare, with participation by Novallia and private investors.
FST Biometrics, a security and automation technology company for government, commercial, and residential buildings, extended its previous $15mm Series B by $3mm from a single private investor.
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Max Marine
Max Marine is an iAngels Investment Analyst. Prior to iAngels, Max was a Junior Partner at Venture1st, providing marketing and communications support to Israeli start-ups. Max passed the three CFA exams consecutively, holds an MS in Investment Management, and a B.B.A. in Finance, Real Estate, and Risk Management and Insurance from Temple University's Fox School of Business. Contact him at [email protected]
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iAngels June Deal Digest – Monthly Wrap Up iAngels Weekly Deal Digest – July 14th, 2016

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


I've been meaning to write a post about this guy for a while now, and after browsing his Facebook page and checking out how much time he devotes to posting and replying to fans, I decided to spread the love.
If you're a serious car guy you'll have probably heard about Magnus Walker or seen pictures of his fleet of custom Porsches. His story is one of pure inspiration and one I truly admire because of what he has achieved from a handful of cash and a shot at a dream.
The following video is a documentary about this Urban Outlaw's journey, from the UK's glum city of Sheffield to the sun-soaked streets of Los Angeles, and how his clothing empire allowed him to fuel his passion for Porsche. As well as the fashion world, Magnus has made big waves in the automotive world, featuring in Jay Leno's Garage alongside his "277" 1971 911T (my personal favourite), and you only have to google his name to find many more inspiring videos.
I don't need to write much more as I'll let the star of the article fill you in himself. I just hope I remain true to myself and live the way I want to live – this man has proven it's entirely possible. Sit back and prepare for some gorgeous and original retro designs and what's it like to have a personal showroom packed with classic Porsches.
Other WTFs include its $108,000 price tag and its weight: 3057-lbs – a third of this is due to batteries. This fully electric tandem two-seater shifts its big weight with two Advanced DC FB1-4001 9″ motors, both producing an amazing 1500-ft-lbs of torque.
The battery packs can also be upgraded from lead-acid to Nickel-metal hydride (Ni-MH) or lithium-ion (Li-ion) in the future. This will dramatically improve vehicle performance – 80% charge takes 10 minutes; full charge under 3 hours. The range isn't too bad either, the standard pack offering 80 miles from a full charge.
So what we have is a quirky little sleeper, an eco-friendly midget capable of embarrassing some supercars – as you know, Gargling Gas is a mad Sleeper fan. It's easy to park and drive around the city. The dash looks like it came from a proper race car, and the interior is finished to a high grade. The only feature I don't like is the cheap looking wheels – they look like something Ford used in the 90s.
I don't know about you, but I'd love to own one for a month or so, just to see the expressions of incredulity on Porsche, Lambo and Ferrari owners' faces as this innocuous little machine leaves them silently behind.
When it comes to cars I don't fall into a category or genre. Some may assume I'm a WRX/EVO yob, yet I spend a lot of time drooling over muscle cars. Drifting YouTube videos take up the majority of my recreational viewing, yet I read about British classics and restorations. One minute I might be watching a review of the latest SRT Viper, and the next, an instalment of Street Outlaws and the 1000+bhp drag monsters. You may spot me dragging my jaw across a field at a classic car show, but there are occasions you won't see me at all when I'm surreptitiously rubbing up against the rear end of a 60s Alfa Spyder.
I get the impression Johnny Knoxville possesses the same attitude towards cars, as apart from his love for Ferraris, he is always seen in beaten up 70s classics such as the Cadillac and Lincoln. His first car was a red 65 Mustang, and although he thought that was a great car, it's his current 70 Cadillac Eldorado (pictured HERE) he loves the most. Johnny also owns a brand new Caddy, but when Top Gear asked what model, he didn't have a clue.
The Gumball 3000 rally has also seen the American Daredevil in different cars. Pictured above are part of MTV's Jackass crew chilling on a battered Jaguar XJ6, a car Knoxville nabbed from a chop shop at the last minute. In 2005 Knoxville appeared in a movie adaption of the 80s TV series, The Dukes Of Hazzard, and in the same year, he took on the Gumball 3000 in his 'General Lee' Ferrari 575.
Another recent movie, Bad Grandpa, saw Johnny drive around in a 1970 mint green Lincoln Continental – after some time trying to find the perfect car for the movie and character, Knoxville's love for the 70s boxy bodies eventually selected the boat pictured below.
So you see, this guy does have a natural eye for cool rides – he has the ability to spot that X Factor, something that doesn't necessarily need millions of dollars to obtain.
I'll leave you with this 30 minute documentary entitled Detroit Lives, a film focussing on the once thriving 'Motor City'. It's a little depressing but it does feature Knoxville cruising in a cool Caddy convertible.
I've been writing for Celebrity Carz for a while now and I love tapping into what the celebs are doing with their rides. Part of me is addicted to singling out the ones who spend ludicrous amounts of cash ruining a perfectly good car, but there is another side of me (honestly) that appreciates a celebrity's knowledge when it comes to cars.
So from time to time I'll post some of the stars and cars, whether hideous or highly appealing. Please feel free to slate them or me if you disagree with my comments – there's nothing like a "debate" when it comes to cars and styling.
If you follow my blog you'll come across some sleeper posts every so often. You either get them and understand the need to drive a wolf in sheep's clothing, or you simply can't understand why you would dumb a performance vehicle down. Remove the badges, grills and actually disguise the big exhaust? What, are you crazy?
You see, there's something smug about out-dragging a Porsche in something deemed only fit for a run to the shops. I love this concept and will build one at some point in my life – perhaps dumb down a wagon of some sort.
To any readers into this sleeper business, I was happy to find the latest edition of Mighty Car Mods on YouTube. These funny Aussies know a thing or three about building a sleeper, and Marty has revealed his new Subaru project. It's a wagon (with the help of STI components) that can already hit the 1/4 mile in 11.9 seconds. The aim is to make it even quicker, to hit the 11 second mark – that's damn quick for a wagon they affectionately call "Gramps".
Check out Gramps and tune in to see what this rather affable vehicle will be capable of.
Every car site has reiterated the terribly sad news about the death of Paul Walker, but I want to steer clear of all the tragedy and touch upon his genuine love of cars.
Thanks to the Fast & Furious franchise, the world of Japanese tuner cars opened up to the globe, where kids idolised the movie's characters and started modding their own cars (mainly Hondas). The Tokyo Drift instalment revealed how the kids in Japan drive, and with the help from a certain Ken Block, drifting exploded in the States.
To a lot of people the Fast & Furious scene spells trouble, hooligans that drone around the streets with their big exhausts looking for races. In reality, this is an entirely false perception as kids who modify their rides usually have to work hard for the parts and then labour over them in their spare time. It brings people together who have a common interest and gives enthusiasts something creative and positive to do.
Paul Walker was a main character in the Fast & Furious movies, a chiselled and good looking man who could drive like a rally champion.
Like his character on screen, Walker loved cars off screen. He had an impressive collection and knew what he had tucked away. Not only knowledgeable about his cars, he also drove them… hard.
Take a look at this article I wrote for Motor Ward after Fast & Furious 6 and see just what Paul Walker had tucked in his garage.
Do Reality Celebs Deserve The Fame… And The Cars?
Of course they don't – I'll put that out there from the beginning because those who disagree can simply stop reading.
These so-called C-list celebrities have found fame and fortune simply being on reality programs, where they, themselves go about fulfilling a series of scripted scenes. There are a lot of these soul-sucking, train crash, car wreck programs but the worst has to be the States' Jersey Shore… hang on a minute, I stand corrected as we in the UK were subjected to an equally trite Geordie Shore.
Despite being separated by the Atlantic, these two groups of people (if you can call them that) are filmed going about their daily lives together in a house much like the idiotic Big Brother, which mainly involves partying, arguing, talking at length about emotions, crying (there's lots of that from the Snooki freak pictured above), fighting, falling down drunk and many lurid sexual encounters that scream STD.
When all is said and done these creatures are plastered over magazines and force-fed ludicrous amounts of money. One creature in particular is an orange pug-faced thing that calls himself "The Situation" (above) – if this arrogance isn't enough to want to hurt a person, I don't know what is. This talentless "Guido" (I think this means c**t in Italian) currently owns an M5, a Ferrari California and F430, a Caddy Escalade, a Bentley, a custom Jeep Wrangler, and a Lamborghini Gallardo… and for what?
When you see someone like Tom Cruise or Nicole Kidman cruising around in supercars, it's a given – they are hardworking actors who've been entertaining us for years. But these useless waste of spaces?
Not only have they been given this money, but they just buy the flashiest cars without any thought as to their heritage or future collectability. And what true petrolhead would buy both a Ferrari and a Lamborghini as convertible?
YES, yes I am bloody jealous!
Right, I'm off to watch the Brazilian Grand Prix qualifying as I've managed to wind myself up.
And remember: A book dies every time you watch reality TV.


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Q: Why do I need to specify a repository in my settings.xml file I've run into a strange Maven configuration issue that I have never encountered before, and am confused as to my solution.
I have a local Nexus server that I use as a mirror for everything.  Until now, I've only had the following mirror in my settings.xml file:
    <mirrors>
            <mirror>
                    <id>nexus</id>
                    <mirrorOf>*</mirrorOf>
                    <name>WADA Nexus</name>
                    <url>https://nexus.domain.org/repository/Public/</url>
            </mirror>
    </mirrors>

However, I recently wanted to create my own custom parent pom that I have deployed to my Nexus repo.  In my project, I have pointed to my parent pom:
   <parent>
            <groupId>org.domain</groupId>
            <artifactId>root-pom</artifactId>
            <version>1.0.0-SNAPSHOT</version>
    </parent>

However when I now try to run my build, it fails with the following:
ERROR: Failed to parse POMs
org.apache.maven.project.ProjectBuildingException: Some problems were encountered while processing the POMs:
[FATAL] Non-resolvable parent POM: Could not find artifact org.domain:root-pom:pom:1.0.0-SNAPSHOT and 'parent.relativePath' points at wrong local POM @ line 9, column 10

For some reason, maven is not trying to look up the parent pom in my Nexus repo.
My only workaround was to define a random repository value in my settings.xml file:
 <repositories>
    <repository>
      <id>nexus</id>
      <releases>
        <enabled>true</enabled>
        <updatePolicy>always</updatePolicy>
        <checksumPolicy>warn</checksumPolicy>
      </releases>
      <snapshots>
        <enabled>true</enabled>
        <updatePolicy>never</updatePolicy>
        <checksumPolicy>fail</checksumPolicy>
      </snapshots>
      <url>https://www.google.com/anythingCanGoHere</url>
      <layout>default</layout>
    </repository>
  </repositories>

Since I've mirrored all Repos/URLs, I can set that url to any value and maven will now pick up my parent pom.
So, why do I even need to specify the repository at all?  Shouldn't maven automatically try to resolve the parent pom against maven central or some other default repository?

A: It is not a strange configuration issue, but simply a misunderstanding from your side. What you have done is to populate <distributionManagement/> in your parent POM and added a catch-all mirror in your settings.xml with your local Nexus instance and expect it to work.
Do you actually know what you are mirroring? No! The default, hardcoded repo in Maven is Maven Central. It is a release repo which does not contain any snapshots. Therefore you see the ERROR. The bogus repo is necessary to enable Maven to request snapshots from your Nexus instance otherwise it will only request releases. Nexus in turn has a repo group with Central and your hosted release and snapshots repos.
As long as you don't define any snapshot repos in your POMs (which you shouldn't) Maven will never be able to download any snapshots.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Ikeda Tsuneoki
池田恒興
Ikeda Clan
Settsu Province
Lifespan: Tenbun 5 (1536) to 4/9 of Tenshō 12 (1584)
Rank: bushō, daimyō
Clan: Ikeda
Lord: Oda Nobuhide → Oda Nobunaga → Oda Nobutada → Oda Hidenobu → Hashiba Hideyoshi
Father: Ikeda Tsunetoshi
Mother: Yōtokuin
Wife: Zenōin
Children: Motosuke, Sen, Terumasa, Nagayoshi, Nagamasa, Wakamandokoro, Tenkyūin, daughter (formal wife of Asano Yukinaga), daughter (formal wife of Oda Katsunaga), Nanjō
Ikeda Tsuneoki served as a bushō and daimyō during the Sengoku and Azuchi-Momoyama periods. He was one of four senior retainers of Oda Nobunaga who participated in the Kiyosu Conference to decide upon Nobunaga's successor. His sons included Ikeda Motosuke and Ikeda Terumasa.
Tsuneoki was the lord Inuyama Castle in Owari Province, Hyōgo Castle in Settsu Province, and Ōgaki Castle in Mino Province. His common name was Katsusaburō. He also used the self-proclaimed title of Kii-no-kami, or Governor of Kii. In later years, after entering the priesthood, he adopted the name of Shōnyū. In certain military chronicles, his real name is referred to as Nobuteru, but this cannot be authenticated from older sources written during this period.
In 1536, Tsuneoki was born as the son of Ikeda Tsunetoshi, a retainer of the Oda clan of Owari Province. His mother was Yōtokuin. There are assorted theories as to whether he was from Owari, Mino, Settsu, or Ōmi province. According to the Shinchō kōki, an authenticated biography of Oda Nobunaga, an individual from the village of Isshiki in the Kaitō District of Owari served as a yoriki, or security officer, of Tsuneoki, and there is a basis that he is from this area. His father, Tsunetoshi, died early. His mother, Yōtokuin, served as the nursemaid for Oda Nobunaga and later became a consort of Nobunaga's father, Oda Nobuhide.
During his childhood, Tsuneoki worked as a servant of the Oda clan. In 1560, he participated in the Battle of Okehazama; in 1565, the invasion of Mino Province; and, in 1570, the Battle of Anegawa. He became the lord of Inuyama Castle on the border of Owari and Mino provinces and was awarded 10,000 kan. Thereafter, Tsuneoki joined, in 1571, the Burning of Mount Hiei to subdue the followers of the Ishiyama-Hongan Temple; attacks against the Nagashima Ikkō-ikki, and, in 1573, the Siege of Makishima Castle. In 1574, he entered the mountain fortress of Ori Castle in eastern Mino to pin-down Akechi Castle after it was taken by Takeda Katsuyori. Tsuneoki was associated with Oda Nobutada, but, in 1580, after defeating Araki Murashige (who resisted Nobunaga in the Siege of Hanakuma Castle) Tsuneoki occupied his former territory.
In the third month of 1582, at the Conquest of Kōshū by the allied armies of the Oda and Tokugawa, Tsuenoki deployed his two sons, while Nobunaga ordered Tsuneoki himself to stay behind to defend Settsu Province. On 6/2 of Tenshō 10 (1582), Nobunaga died in a coup d'état by one of his senior retainers, Akechi Mitsuhide, in an event known as the Honnō Temple Incident. Tsuneoki converged with Hashiba Hideyoshi who rushed back to the capital with his army from an invasion of the western provinces. At the Battle of Yamazaki, Tsuneoki led a vanguard division of 5,000 soldiers in the right wing of the formation, defeating Mitsuhide, serving as a veteran of the Oda family.
At the Kiyosu Conference to determine the successor to the Oda family, Tsuneoki joined Hideyoshi and Niwa Nagahide by backing Nobunaga's lineal grandson, Sanpōshi (Oda Hidenobu), who was an infant at the time, in opposition to Shibata Katsuie. With respect to the re-allocation of territory, Tsuneoki received a fief of 120,000 koku in Settsu comprised of Ōsaka, Amagasaki, and Hyōgo. In 1583, Tsuneoki did not participate in the Battle of Shizugatake, but received 130,000 koku in Mino Province and entered Ōgaki Castle while his son, Ikeda Motosuke, entered Gifu Castle.
In 1584, at the Battle of Komaki-Nagakute against the allied forces of Tokugawa Ieyasu and Oda Nobukatsu, attention was given to his course of action, but, in the end, he joined on the side of Hideyoshi. In the event of victory, he was promised to receive Owari Province. At the outset of fighting, he attacked Inuyama Castle, then stopped at Jōjō Castle, and, together with Miyoshi Nobuyoshi (later known as Toyotomi Hidetsugu), Mori Nagayoshi (Tsuneoki-s son-in-law), and Hori Hidemasa, attempted to attack Ieyasu's main base in Mikawa Province. In the first half of the battle, a bullet struck his saddle, causing him to fall from his horse and, along with Nagayoshi, died in battle at Nagakute after being stabbed by a spear wielded by Nagai Naokatsu. Tsuneoki was forty-nine years old. His eldest son, Motosuke, was also killed in action so his second son, Terumasa, succeeded him as the next head of the clan.
His remains were taken by Tokugawa forces initially to be buried in Shinkyo in Tōtōmi Province. Later, he was re-interred at the Jiun sub-temple on the grounds of the Myōshin Temple in Kyōto.


text:
Biografia

Napoletana residente a Roma, in campo teatrale ha attraversato tutti i generi, dall'avanguardia (Brecht, Viviani), avendo iniziato nelle cantine off della sua città, Napoli, al musical (con Antonella Steni, Fiorenzo Fiorentini ecc.), alla commedia napoletana (con Mario Scarpetta e altri), alla sceneggiata napoletana (rimasti famosi i suoi ruoli di "malafemmina" con Pino Mauro, Mario Merola, Beniamino e Rosalia Maggio), al repertorio plautino (con Tato Russo e con Antonio Casagrande).

In campo cinematografico è stata diretta da Fellini (La città delle donne e Ginger e Fred), Liliana Cavani (La pelle), Giancarlo Giannini (Ternosecco), Pasquale Festa Campanile (Gegè Bellavita), Tornatore (Malèna).

Ha partecipato a varie fiction televisive e condotto numerose trasmissioni radiofoniche, spaziando da quelle culturali a quelle canore, al varietà. Gabriella Di Luzio è soprannominata dalla stampa "l'ultima sciantosa" per il repertorio della Belle Époque, ironicamente interpretato nei suoi spettacoli canori.

Ha poi scritto un libro sulla propria battaglia contro il cancro e un romanzo, uscito nel 2012. È morta a Roma il 30 marzo 2016 all'età di 65 anni.

Filmografia
 Onore e guapparia, regia di Tiziano Longo (1977)
 Napoli... i 5 della squadra speciale, regia di Mario Bianchi (1978)
 Gegè Bellavita, regia di Pasquale Festa Campanile (1978)
 Napoli storia d'amore e di vendetta, regia di Mario Bianchi (1978)
 Attenti a quei due napoletani, regia di Mario Gariazzo (1980)
 Apocalisse di un terremoto, regia di Sergio Pastore (1982)
 Un jeans e una maglietta, regia di Mariano Laurenti (1983)
 Giuro che ti amo, regia di Nino D'Angelo (1986)
Ternosecco, regia di Giancarlo Giannini (1987)
I ragazzi della 3ª C (1987) - serie TV
 La ragazza del metrò, regia di Romano Scandariato (1988)
 Malèna, regia di Giuseppe Tornatore (2000)

Note

Bibliografia
 La morte ha bussato alla mia porta, Graus Editore, 2010
 Rapsodia degli amori perduti, Edizioni Galassia Arte, 2012

Collegamenti esterni

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


text:
Joey D. Richards
From a Biblical perspective, it's David vs. Goliath. Perhaps from a more modern-day perspective, it's Bambi vs. Godzilla.
Well, maybe not quite as much a mismatch as the latter.
But when Arizona Christian takes the field against Abilene Christian at 6 p.m. Saturday at Wildcat Stadium in a battle of ACUs, the Firestorm team from Arizona will be the overwhelming underdogs.
ACU will win ... and lose
Jeff Bowen, Arizona Christian's fourth-year coach, knows what kind of fight his NAIA team is getting into with a Division -FCS program such as Abilene Christian. But when all is said and done, it's still just football, Bowen said.
"It's just a game," Bowen said. "It's big versus little, all those little things that get played up. We're looking forward to it, and we're excited about the challenge – just to see where it all falls. They have an exceptional program. It's football at the highest level for us. We'll see what happens."
Who are these guys?
The Firestorm (0-1), coming off a 20-14 loss to Montana State-Northern, play in the Sooner Athletic Conference with Oklahoma Panhandle State, Langston (Oklahoma), Lyon (Arkansas) and Texas-based Wayland Baptist (Plainview), Southwestern Assemblies of God (Waxahachie), Texas Wesleyan (Fort Worth) and Texas College (Tyler), along with fellow Arizona school Ottawa.
Arizona Christian didn't even start playing football until 2014, and the Firestorm were originally in the Central States Football League. But the CSFL merged with the SAC in 2018.
Since going 2-7 their inaugural year in 2017, the Firestorm have not lost more than three games in a season. They were 8-3 last year, and they've beaten NCAA Division III Sul Ross State twice – 30-27 in overtime in 2016 and 42-20 last year. Sul Ross plays in the American Southwest Conference with Hardin-Simmons and McMurry. The Firestorm also have played DII teams Western New Mexico, Simon Fraser and Texas-Permian Basin – beating Simon Fraser 34-28 in 2017.
Still, a Division II or III opponent is a far cry from playing an FCS program such as Abilene Christian – an even bigger step up than when the Wildcats played FBS Baylor last year or Texas A&M next year.
"We're going there to play," said Bowen, who is 28-13 as the Firestorm's coach. "You don't want players hurt. But you want to show well and compete at a high level. It's a way for us to play at the highest level. Once it's over, we can evaluate where we're at and say, 'Hey, if you can get on the field and be competitive in that type of environment, that type of team, then it should pay dividends when we get into league play.'"
So how did these two teams end up playing each other? Both had an open date in Week 2.
"It fit our schedule, and we needed another game," Bowen said. "We had trouble finding a game that was anywhere near our vicinity. It's just us and Ottawa University here in Arizona. Sometimes you have difficulty finding games that fit into place."
Familiar territory
The Firestorm are no strangers to Abilene.
They needed a place to warm up when they first started playing Texas schools in 2015. Donnie Yantis, the Firestorm's first head coach, had a daughter running track at Abilene Christian – Taylor. Bowen said Taylor managed to arrange it so Arizona Christian could use the Wildcats' facilities for its walk through and preparation.
They've even worked out in Wildcat Stadium, which opened in 2017.
"It's a beautiful facility," Bowen said. "What they're doing there is very impressive with their athletic facilities. Our guys really enjoyed it. It was a great experience."
Bowen, who coached at Westview High School in nearby Avondale, another Phoenix-area town, for 11 years before joining the Firestorm staff in 2014, also knows current Wildcats assistant Clint Brown.
Brown, the Wildcats' defensive coordinator, had recruited Arizona when he was an assistant at Wayne State and South Dakota State and got to know Bowen well at Westview.
"He's been a great guy," Brown said. "I've known him almost 10 years. He's a really good dude."
Chance for Wildcats to get better
Brown, though, had nothing to do with getting the Firestorm on the schedule.
He was the defensive coordinator at South Dakota State when he took the same job with the Wildcats during the offseason.
Brown also knows the Wildcats (0-1) are heavy favorites, but he wants to see the team, especially his defense, correct its mistakes from last week's 51-31 loss to North Texas, a Division I-FBS team in Conference USA, and approach the game as any other.
"We talked about it," Brown said. "It doesn't matter who's the opponent, whether it's Division I or NAIA. We're competing against ourselves, and we have to understand that every week. We have to expect the unexpected from them and just follow our rules and play ball."
ACU coach Adam Dorrel echoed Brown's sentiment. He wants his team to correct last week's mistakes and focus on getting better as the Wildcats get ready for Southland Conference play the following week at Central Arkansas.
"We want to win," Dorrel said. "We want to play at a really, really high level. We want to put a really good product on the field for our fans. We want them to keep coming back for home football games."
Brown expects the Firestorm to play a physical game.
"Just from knowing (Coach Bowen) in the past, they're going to be a tough, hard-nosed team," Brown said. "That's how he was when he was a high school coach, and I know he's going to bring that with him to Arizona Christian. We're expecting a physical team, a physical football game from them, because that fits his personality."
Bowen said this isn't a game his team approaches with apprehension or fear – far from it. Instead, this is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity for the Firestorm.
"Every kid that plays in the NAIA, at some point in time, he had dreams and aspirations of being a Division I football player," Bowen said. "So, what better way for a young man playing NAIA football than to test his abilities and line up against a Division I team?
"Our guys don't look at it as a negative. It's a measuring stick on where our guys are at, and they're excited to play the game. Trust me, it's no secret we're playing a team that's above our heads."


text:
California Penal Code Section 290.008
CA Penal Code § 290.008 (2017)
(a) Any person who, on or after January 1, 1986, is discharged or paroled from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the custody of which he or she was committed after having been adjudicated a ward of the juvenile court pursuant to Section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code because of the commission or attempted commission of any offense described in subdivision (c) shall register in accordance with the Act.
(b) Any person who is discharged or paroled from a facility in another state that is equivalent to the Division of Juvenile Justice, to the custody of which he or she was committed because of an offense which, if committed or attempted in this state, would have been punishable as one or more of the offenses described in subdivision (c) shall register in accordance with the Act.
(c) Any person described in this section who committed an offense in violation of any of the following provisions shall be required to register pursuant to the Act:
(1) Assault with intent to commit rape, sodomy, oral copulation, or any violation of Section 264.1, 288, or 289 under Section 220.
(2) Any offense defined in paragraph (1), (2), (3), (4), or (6) of subdivision (a) of Section 261, Section 264.1, 266c, or 267, paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of, or subdivision (c) or (d) of, Section 286, Section 288 or 288.5, paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) of, or subdivision (c) or (d) of, Section 288a, subdivision (a) of Section 289, or Section 647.6.
(3) A violation of Section 207 or 209 committed with the intent to violate Section 261, 286, 288, 288a, or 289.
(d) Prior to discharge or parole from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, any person who is subject to registration under this section shall be informed of the duty to register under the procedures set forth in the Act. Department officials shall transmit the required forms and information to the Department of Justice.
(e) All records specifically relating to the registration in the custody of the Department of Justice, law enforcement agencies, and other agencies or public officials shall be destroyed when the person who is required to register has his or her records sealed under the procedures set forth in Section 781 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. This section shall not be construed as requiring the destruction of other criminal offender or juvenile records relating to the case that are maintained by the Department of Justice, law enforcement agencies, the juvenile court, or other agencies and public officials unless ordered by a court under Section 781 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(f) This section shall remain in effect only until January 1, 2021, and as of that date is repealed.
(Amended by Stats. 2017, Ch. 541, Sec. 5. (SB 384) Effective January 1, 2018. Repealed as of January 1, 2021, by its own provisions. See later operative version added by Sec. 6 of Stats. 2017, Ch.541.)
290.006.a


This walk curves around from Graham car park, taking in the secluded Little Beach and Caves Bay before finishing at Mt Bouddi's Dingeldei Picnic Area. The walk passes through many different types of vegetation. The service trail from above Little Beach to above Caves Bay is very sandy, in contrast to the dirt track followed for the rest of the walk. This walk has excellent views of headlands and out into the Tasman Sea.
From the car park, this walk follows the 'Little Beach' sign along the management trail, passing around a gate. The walk heads down the hill, crosses a creek, and climbs up the hill out of the gully. The walk then winds down to a signposted intersection, with a bush track to the right.
Continue straight: From the intersection, this walk heads down the hill, following the 'Little Beach 200m' sign. After approximately 300m, the walk comes to Little Beach campsite and continues to the point where the creek meets the beach.
Little Beach, Bouddi National Park, is a small 100m-long stretch of sand and rocks, facing out to the Tasman Sea and South Pacific Ocean. The beach is backed by a gully and sided by steep rocky headlands. The beach has a south easterly aspect and has its own campsite.
Turn around: From Little Beach, this walk heads up the grass hill of the campsite, leaving the beach behind. The walk follows the track past the bins and the toilet, going up the hill. The walk continues uphill for a while to the signposted intersection.
(0.91km) Int. Bouddi Trail Access and Little Beach Trk → Sandy Clearing Little Beach Access Trail Int.
Turn left: From the intersection, this walk heads up the hill, following the 'Maitland Bay' sign. The track winds up the hill, tending left along a white sandy section of track, then continues through the scrub for approximately 300m to the signposted intersection in a large sandy clearing.
Veer right: From the intersection, this walk follows the 'Bombi Point' arrow along the sandy track, going down the hill. The track winds down the hill for some time before climbing to the signposted intersection.
Continue straight: From the intersection, this walk follows the management trail down the hill, keeping the sea far on the left of the track. The trail continues down to a large sandy area marked by a 'Little Beach car park' sign.
Veer left: From the intersection, this walk follows the management trail down the hill, in the opposite direction to the Little Beach car park. The trail winds down the spur for some time, then straightens out and continues for a while before ending in a larger clear area, signposted 'Bouddi Coastal Walk'.
Turn right: From the clearing, this walk follows the 'Maitland Bay' arrow along the bush track, going down the hill and keeping the ocean to the left. The walk then descends and climbs steeply, with numerous steps, crossing two creeks, before coming to a third creek crossing with a wooden bridge. From the bridge, the walk climbs to the top of the stairs then continues along the hillside to the signposted intersection.
Turn left: From the intersection, the walk follows the 'Maitland Bay' arrow along the bush track, going down the hill. After a while, the walk drops into a clearing, on the saddle between the headland and the spur, and turns right, going down some steep steps to the beach.
Turn left: From the intersection, this walk follows the cliff line out towards the sea, beneath the rocky headland. The walk heads over rocks and boulders, to the rock flats at the point. Here lies the S.S.Maitland shipwreck. At the end of this side trip, retrace your steps back to the main walk then Veer left.
The S.S. Maitland was a paddle steamer brought to Australia from Glasgow, Scotland, to transport people and cargo between the Hunter and the Hawkesbury Rivers. There was no rail line from Newcastle to Sydney in the 1800's. The Maitland was on its route out of the Barrenjoey Headlands when it was overwhelmed by the aptly-named 'Maitland Gale'. The storm which wrecked the Maitland also took numerous other ships on May 6, 1898. Of the 36 passengers aboard the Maitland, 24 lost their lives. Many of the survivors were commended for their heroism. Wreckage of the Maitland can still be seen today, with parts of the boiler and a section of the iron hull strewn across the rock flats of the point. The bay was previously known as Boat Harbour, then renamed Maitland Bay after the disaster in 1898. More info.
Turn right: From the intersection, this walk follows the 'Mt Bouddi' arrow up the hill. The walk climbs many steps to the lookout, at the top of a small rocky hill.
Bouddi Lookout, Bouddi National Park, is a great first look at the Bouddi Coast as you come out of the bush on Bouddi Spur. There are views of the Pacific Ocean crashing into the heath covered headlands in front of the lookout. Not as grand a view as other lookouts in the area, but worth a pause on your way to the Bouddi Coast Track.
Continue straight: From the lookout the walk follows the bush track away from the sea, across a saddle, and goes up the hill. The track meanders for some time before climbing some sets of stairs to reach the Dingeldei Picnic Area and Mt Bouddi car park (at the end of Mt Bouddi Rd, off Scenic Road).
The Dingeldei Memorial Shelter was built in 1962, thanks to volunteers. A.W. (Bill) Dingeldei was a trustee of the park who did considerable work on it himself. Today the Dingeldei picnic area is a quiet, leafy spot, perched on the hill behind Mount Bouddi. The picnic area contains a picnic table, toilets, BBQ and rubbish facilities. It also has a new car park with ample spaces.
Around 2.7km of this walk has short steep hills, whilst the remaining 2.4km has gentle hills with occasional steps.
4.3km of this walk follows a formed track, with some branches and other obstacles and another 460m follows a rough track, where fallen trees and other obstacles are likely. The remaining (280m) follows a clear and well formed track or trail.
Around 4.4km of this walk has directional signs at most intersection, whilst the remaining 630m is clearly signposted.
This whole walk, 5km requires no previous bushwalking experience.
Around 3.2km of this walk has limited facilities (such as not all cliffs fenced), whilst the remaining 1.9km is close to useful facilities (such as fenced cliffs and seats).
A list of walks that share part of the track with the Little Beach to Mount Bouddi Track walk.
This walk from Grahame Drive car park to Little Beach follows the service trail straight through the tall forest, down the hill to the isolated beach. The beach is popular with surfers, and the campsite provides a nice place for a rest. A great spot to get your toes wet during a BBQ lunch (great BBQ facilities provided by NPWS).
A list of walks that start near the Little Beach to Mount Bouddi Track walk.
http://new.wildwalks.com/wildwalks_custom/includes/walk_fire_danger.php?walkid=nsw-bouddinp-lbtmbt Each park may have its own fire ban, this rating is only valid for today and is based on information from the RFS Please check the RFS Website for more information.


text:
Q: Multiple log files I'm just acquainting myself with the logging module and am confused about the proper way to handle different levels. This flow chart indicates that nothing below the set level gets passed to the logger object so why would anyone log anything below the set level? Should I make multiple log file? For example, logging.basicConfig(filename='general_log.log',level=logging.WARNING) and logging.basicConfig(filename='detailed_log.log',level=logging.DEBUG) in a single script?

A: Multiple logging Levels are for different purposes.
For example as a developer when you are developing some new functionalities, you can set your logging level to DEBUG which can help you debug your code and you can set your logging level to INFO when run your program in production. All the debug level logging will be muted.
You can make multiple log files. For example if you want to trace the ERROR logs easier, you can log them into a separate file and it saves time to find them in your regular log file.

A: https://docs.python.org/2/library/logging.html#logging.basicConfig
This function does nothing if the root logger already has handlers configured for it.

Calling logging.basicConfig a second time likely won't do anything.
To log to multiple files, you'll need to configure more than one handler:
LOGGING = {
    'version': 1,
    'disable_existing_loggers': False,
    'formatters': {
        'verbose': {
            'format': '%(levelname)s %(asctime)s %(process)d %(thread)d %(name)s:%(lineno)s %(funcName)s() %(message)s'
        },
    },
    'handlers': {
        'file1': {
            'level': 'WARNING',
            'class': 'logging.FileHandler',
            'filename': 'general_log.log',
            'formatter': 'verbose',
        },
        'file2': {
            'level': 'DEBUG',
            'class': 'logging.FileHandler',
            'filename': 'detailed_log.log',
            'formatter': 'verbose',
        },
    },
    'root': {
        'handlers': ['file1', 'file2'],
        'level': 'DEBUG',
    }
}
logging.config.dictConfig(LOGGING)