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Externalism About Mental Content
First published Mon Oct 21, 2002; substantive revision Tue Aug 17, 2010
Many of our mental states such as beliefs and desires are intentional mental states, or mental states with content. Externalism with regard to mental content says that in order to have certain types of intentional mental states (e.g. beliefs), it is necessary to be related to the environment in the right way. Internalism (or individualism) denies this, and it affirms that having those intentional mental states depends solely on our intrinsic properties. This debate has important consequences with regard to philosophical and empirical theories of the mind, and the role of social institutions and the physical environment in constituting the mind. It also raises other interesting questions concerning such matters as the explanatory relevance of content and the possibility of a priori self-knowledge.
2. The Classic Arguments for Externalism
3. Responses to the Classic Arguments
4. The Scope of Externalism
5. Externalism and Mind-Body Theories
6. Externalism and Self-knowledge
7. Externalism and Mental Causation
8. Externalism and Cognitive Science
9. Active Externalism
In its most general formulation, externalism with regard to a property K is a thesis about how K is individuated. It says that whether a creature has K or not depends in part on facts about how the creature is related to its external environment. In other words, it is metaphysically possible that there are two intrinsically indistinguishable creatures, only one of which has property K, as a result of them being situated in different environment. To give a trivial example, externalism is true of mosquito bites since having them requires having been bitten by a mosquito. A mark on the skin created by careful micro-surgery is not a mosquito bite, even if it is intrinsically indistinguishable from a real one.
Individualism or internalism with respect to a property K says that whether a creature has K or not supervenes on its intrinsic properties only. It follows that facts about the environment play no role in determining whether or not the creature has property K. Notice that internalism does not deny that the environment can causally affect whether something has K. For example, external factors such as exposure to radiation can cause cancer in an individual, but having cancer is still an internal physical state.
This article reviews the externalism vs. internalism debate about mental content. An intentional mental state is a mental state of a particular psychological type with some particular mental content. For example, believing that it is raining and hoping that it is raining are intentional mental states with the same content but of distinct psychological types. Whereas believing that it is raining and believing that it is sunny are states with distinct contents but of the same psychological type.
For the purpose of discussion, knowledge will not count as a psychological type. Externalism is clearly true of knowledge of the environment, since one can know that it is raining outside only if it is indeed raining outside. But this kind of externalism is not too interesting. Externalism is true here only in part because knowledge requires veridical contents. What is controversial is whether externalism extends to mental states belonging to psychological types which do not have such a requirement, e.g. intentions, beliefs and desires. This is what the externalism debate on mental content is about. If having a mental state of psychological type T and content C supervenes purely on the intrinsic properties of a subject, then internalism is true of that mental state, and its mental content is said to be "narrow". Otherwise, externalism is true of that mental state and its content is said to be "wide" or "broad".
Among intentional mental states, a distinction is sometimes drawn between those that are de dicto (of the dictum or proposition) and those that are de re (of the thing). De re mental states, usually ascribed in English with an of or about locution (e.g. 'Smith believes of (about) the water in his glass that it is thirst-quenching.') are, like states of knowing, fairly straightforwardly externalist, since believing of x that it has some property apparently requires x's existence, and x will often be some object or kind in the creature's external environment. Externalism about de dicto intentional mental states, those ascribed in English with 'that-clauses,' (e.g. 'Smith believes that the water in his glass is thirst-quenching.') is the controversial variety. (See the entry on propositional attitude reports and its supplement on the de re/de dicto distinction.)
There is an interesting question concerning how to understand the crucial distinction between a creature's external properties and those that are intrinsic or internal. Many contributors to the debate over externalism take internal properties to be physical properties of a creature that do not depend for their instantiation on any property instantiated outside the boundary of the creature's body and brain, and this is how the distinction will be understood here. However, a difficulty with this understanding of the distinction, pointed out by Farkas (2003), is that it appears to rule out the possibility of antiphysicalist internalists. This is ironic, given that Descartes is often held up as a paradigmatic example of an internalist about mental content. Williamson (2000) suggests that internalism can also be understood as the doctrine that mental content supervenes on environmentally-independent phenomenal states, and Farkas (2003) makes a similar proposal.
The most well-known arguments for externalism typically make use of thought-experiments where physically identical individuals are embedded in different social or physical environment. It is then argued that some beliefs and thoughts are possessed by one individual but not the other. This shows that some mental contents fail to supervene on intrinsic facts, and so externalism is true.
Many of these thought experiments were inspired by the related discussion on semantic externalism, the thesis that the meaning and reference of some of the words we use are not solely determined by the ideas we associate with them or by our internal physical state. In Kripke (1972), it was argued that the reference of proper names and natural kinds is determined in part by external causal and historical factors. In the famous "Twin Earth" thought experiment in Putnam (1975), we are asked to imagine that in 1750, there was a remote planet, Twin Earth, which was exactly like Earth except that instead of water (H2O), it had a different substance twin-water, say a different chemical compound XYZ. The macro properties of XYZ are supposed to be just like water : it looks and tastes like water, and it could be found in the rivers and oceans on Twin Earth, and so on. However, back in 1750 nobody on Earth or Twin Earth could distinguish between water and XYZ. Still, according to Putnam, an individual on Earth in 1750 who used the word "water" would have been referring to H2O and not XYZ. Of course, this person did not know that water is H2O. But according to the externalist, this should not have prevented him from referring to H2O when he used the term "water". If he had pointed to a sample of XYZ and said "That's water," he would have said something false. Similarly, when an individual on Twin Earth in 1750 used the word "water", he would have been referring to XYZ and not H2O.
Although such a thought experiment was designed to establish semantic externalism, it can be extended to mental contents as well (see McGinn(1977)). Thus, consider an individual on Earth who sincerely uttered "water quenches thirst" before 1750. Such an individual would be expressing his belief that water quenches thirst, a belief that is true if and only if H2O quenches thirst. The externalist then asks us to consider a physically identical counterpart of this individual on Twin Earth. Being a resident on Twin Earth, this counterpart had only encountered twin-water, and had never encountered samples of water or heard about water from other people. According to the externalist, our intuition tells us that this individual on Twin Earth does not believe that water quenches thirst. When he uttered "water quenches thirst", he was instead expressing the belief that twin-water quenches thirst, a belief with different truth-conditions. In short, these two individuals had different beliefs despite being intrinsically identical (ignoring the fact that the human body is about 60% water). It follows that some beliefs do not supervene on intrinsic facts, and therefore externalism is true.
The argument just discussed aims to show that some beliefs involving natural kind concepts depend on the identity of certain physical substances in our environment. Call this version of externalism natural kind externalism. A different version of externalism, social externalism, is defended by Tyler Burge (especially Burge(1979) and Burge(1986)). Burge makes use of similar arguments to show that social institutions also play a role in determining the contents of some beliefs and thoughts, including those that do not involve natural kind concepts.
In one such argument, we are to imagine an English-speaking individual, say Jane, who suspects she has arthritis as a result of having an ailment in her thigh. This individual, not being a doctor, does not know that arthritis is a condition of the joints only, and so when she sincerely utters "I have arthritis in my thigh" she is expressing a false belief. Burge then asks us to consider a counterfactual situation where Jane has the same internal state and history, except that she grew up in a community where the word "arthritis" is used to apply to a different disease, say tharthritis, which includes rheumatoid ailments of not just the joints but also the thighs. According to Burge, in this counterfactual situation, Jane lacks the belief that she has arthritis in her thigh, or any other beliefs about arthritis, as no-one in her linguistic community possesses the concept of arthritis. When she sincerely utters "I have arthritis in my thigh", she is instead expressing the true belief that she has tharthritis in her thigh. Since the intrinsic facts about the individual are the same, but the beliefs are different, this is taken to show that externalism is correct. Furthermore, because the two situations differ only in the linguistic usage of the community, it is suggested that mental contents depend in part on communal linguistic practice.
The thought experiments above have generated a huge literature. Many authors remain unconvinced that they support externalism. Some, for example, reject the use of thought experiments in determining whether content is wide or narrow. Cummins (1991) argues that empirical research is needed to find out about the nature of belief, not thought experiments. It might turn out that psychologists make use of belief content in their best psychological theories in an internalist manner, contrary to our folk intuitions. Similarly, Chomsky (1995) argues that the intuitions elicited by the above thought-experiments at most constitute data for ethnoscience, but "the study of how people attain cognitive states, interact, and so on, will proceed along its separate course." He believes that the notion of content in such thought experiments play no useful role in scientific theorizing.
A somewhat different empirical challenge to the externalist thought experiments may be brewing in the new "experimental philosophy" movement. It is possible, as experimental philosophers appear to have shown regarding intuitions about other prominent philosophical thought experiments, that externalist intuitions are a culturally local product. Weinberg et al. (2001) report that the Gettier intuition tends not to be had by East Asian subjects, and Machery et al. (2004) say that a majority of the East Asian subjects they surveyed had intuitions that favor the descriptivist theory of reference supposedly refuted by Kripke (1972). Surely, there will soon be cross-cultural empirical data on externalist intuitions. If it is found that only Westerners, for example, tend to have externalist intuitions, that could form the basis of a new kind of empirical critique of externalism.
A second line of criticism disagrees with the intuition that different belief ascriptions are true of the physically identical subjects in the two environments. Unger (1984) suggests that perhaps XYZ is a kind of water, depending on how the details of Putnam's thought experiment are spelt out. Crane (1991) argues that in Burge's example, there is no reason for thinking that Jane has different concepts in the two situations, as her dispositions remain exactly the same. Crane thinks that in both situations, Jane lacks the concept of arthritis, but possesses the concept of tharthritis. So Burge was mistaken in attributing to Jane in the actual world the belief that she has arthritis in her thigh. Instead, in both worlds, Jane has the belief that she has tharthritis in her thigh. The only difference is that when she utters "I have arthritis in my thigh", her utterance expresses her belief correctly only in the counterfactual world, and not in the actual world. The contents of her beliefs in both cases are exactly the same. Georgalis (1999) takes a similar view, but unlike Crane, he thinks that Jane literally believes that she has arthritis in her thigh in both worlds, and that it is wrong to attribute to her the belief that she has tharthritis. This is also the position taken by Wikforss (2001), though for reasons very different from Georgalis's. (See also Segal (2000).)
A third line of criticism (Loar (1988), Patterson (1990)) concedes that different belief ascriptions are true of the physically identical subjects, but denies that it implies externalism. It is submitted that there is a distinction between linguistic content and psychological content. The former refers to the contents of the embedded that-clauses in belief attributions, such as the content of "arthritis is painful" in the statement "Jane believes that arthritis is painful." Psychological content, on the other hand, refers to the contents of intentional mental states that is invoked in psychological explanations of behavior. On this view, the linguistic contents of that-clauses in belief ascriptions do not accurately capture the psychological contents of mental states. One example used to argue for such a position is a variation of Burge's thought experiment inspired by Kripke's (1979) discussion of different but related issues. Suppose Jane studys French and learns the meaning of the French word "arthrite", namely a rheumatoid ailment that affects the joints only. However, she fails to realize that "arthrite" and "arthritis" refer to the same illness, as she mistakenly believes that the latter is not restricted to the joints. Suppose further that she describes her ailment in her thigh as "arthritis", and she also thinks that she has an ailment in her knee joint to which the French term applies. In such a situation, the claim "Jane believes that she has arthritis" seems to be true twice over. But the problem with this attribution is that it fails to distinguish between the two distinct beliefs that Jane has about her ailments. When a French doctor offers Jane a cure for arthritis, she would gladly accept it but continue to look for a cure for the ailment in her thigh she calls "arthritis". On this line of thought, this shows that Jane has two beliefs with distinct psychological contents that ordinary belief attributions fail to capture. What the externalist thought experiments show is that ordinary belief ascriptions are sensitive to external facts, but it does not follow that psychological contents are therefore wide. (But see Stalnaker (1990) and Frances (1999), both of whom argue that psychological contents so understood might still be wide.)
Another popular response to the classic arguments is again to draw a distinction between two kinds of content. However, this time the distinction is between two kinds of content that intentional mental states possess. It is first of all conceded that beliefs and thoughts have wide contents, as shown by the thought experiments. However, it is suggested that intentional mental states also possess a kind of narrow content that does not depend on the environment. For example, Fodor (1987) agrees that physically identical individuals have different wide contents when embedded in different contexts. However, Fodor suggests that their beliefs still have the same narrow contents, which are functions from contexts to wide contents. Narrow contents and contexts are supposed to explain how identical individuals acquire wide contents, and they are supposed to play a central role in psychological explanation. (See the entry on narrow content, and further discussion below.)
Finally, some authors (e.g. Horowitz (2002, 2005)) deny that there is any sense in which one's external environment determines the de dicto contents of one's mental states. In fact, Horowitz alleges that the various assumptions required by the arguments for externalism are inconsistent (though see Brueckner (2005) for a reply).
Among those who accept externalism, one important issue concerns the implicit philosophical assumptions that ground the intuitions behind the thought experiments. There are two main approaches here. The causal-information theoretic approach explains content in terms of counterfactual or informational dependencies that hold between internal states and the environment in normal or ideal situations (Dretske (1981), Stalnaker (1993)). The teleological approach, on the other hand, says that the contents of internal states are fixed by their design or evolutionary function (Millikan (1984), Papineau(1993)). If these theories of content are correct, they explain why intentional mental states have wide contents and provide a theoretical basis for externalism. (See the entries on mental representation, and teleological theories of mental content.)
The evaluation of the classic arguments is still a matter of active debate. But even if we accept Putnam's and Burge's thought experiments, they show at most that some mental states have wide contents. These are the states to which teleological or causal-informational theories of content apply. But this is not enough to show that all beliefs and thoughts have wide contents.
Burge (1986) believes that his arguments apply to any thought that involves observational and theoretical notions, natural and non-natural kind notions, or indeed "any notion that applies to public types of objects, properties, or events that are typically known by empirical means." However, it has been suggested that Burge's arguments apply only to deferential concepts that involve conceptions of other speakers or a socially shared language (see Loar (1990)). This raises the question of whether there are non-deferential concepts to which externalism does not apply. For example, it might be argued that some very basic logical notions are indeed non-deferential. Consider a mono-lingual English speaker who believes that something exists, or who believes that what will be, will be. Unlike the previous examples, it is difficult to imagine a world in which her physical duplicate does not have the same beliefs, even if the duplicate's linguistic community uses words like "exist", "something", "will be", etc. with somewhat different meanings. If this is correct, then the classical arguments fail to show that all mental contents are wide.
The thesis that all mental contents are wide is defended by Davidson (1987) in his "swampman" thought experiment. Davidson asks us to imagine him being reduced to ashes by lightning in a swamp, while at the same time an exact physical replica of him is produced by pure coincidence. This is unlikely to be sure, but arguably nomologically possible. According to Davidson, the swampman that is produced would have no intentional mental states whatsoever, even though it would behave just like him and would appear to other people as having thoughts of its own. Davidson does not explain why this claim should be accepted. But he claims, "what a person's words mean depends in the most basic cases on the kinds of objects and events that have caused the person to hold the words to be applicable; similarly for what the person's thoughts are about." Presumably, we should refrain from attributing thoughts to the swampman because it lacks internal states with the right kind of causal history. But it is not clear why this causal requirement applies to all thoughts. Some philosophers take the position that the contents of some of our thoughts are determined by their conceptual or computational role, which might not depend on the environment. If such theories are correct, swampman might possess some thoughts despite its causal origin, and so some contents might be narrow after all. (See the entry on causal theories of mental content.)
In other work, and compatibly with his swampman example, Davidson defends what Bridges (2006) describes as "transcendental externalism," a view according to which the very possibility of thought depends on a creature being involved in a complex causal relationship—"triangulation"—involving a second creature and a shared environment. Unlike the standard forms of content externalism discussed so far, Davidson's transcendental externalism does not maintain that causal interaction with specific external objects or natural kinds is necessary for specific intentional mental states, but the view is still strongly externalistic in that both social and external physical environments are held to be metaphysically necessary for thought.
A different route to a kind of transcendental externalism can be found in the so-called "skeptical argument" attributed to Wittgenstein in Kripke (1982). Roughly, the argument is that our usage of any linguistic expression must be finite in that the term has only been applied to a finite range of cases. But the meaning of a term prescribes its correct application in infinitely many other novel situations that we have not encountered before. A skeptic can therefore come up with different theories of what we mean by the term, theories that accord with our past usage, but whose prescriptions in the novel situations diverge from one another. According to Kripke's Wittgenstein, all physical facts about our limited linguistic dispositions or cognitive capacities are finite in character. They are not sufficient to determine which of the skeptic's theory gives the correct meaning of the term we use. This goes to show that there are no intrinsic facts that determine the meaning we associate with the term. If this argument is valid, the same is true of the contents of our thoughts and concepts. According to Kripke, this skeptical argument shows that we cannot "speak of a single individual, considered by himself and in isolation, as ever meaning anything." Instead, it is argued that meaning and content can only be justifiably ascribed to an individual when considered as a member of some linguistic community.
Exactly how the skeptical argument is supposed to go and whether the argument is sound is controversial (See the review in Boghossian (1989b)). Some believe that the argument is too strong in that it seems to establish meaning eliminativism rather than externalism. Another criticism (e.g. McGinn (1984), Soames (1998)) is that the argument makes the assumption that semantic facts about meaning and content are reducible to non-semantic ones, an assumption which many philosophers reject. For these and other reasons the skeptical argument is not widely accepted.
The discussion above concerns the content of cognitive states such as beliefs and thoughts, of which a subject might or might not be conscious. In perhaps the most interesting and controversial proposal concerning the reach of externalism, it has recently been argued that externalism is also true of all conscious mental states. Conscious mental states are mental states with phenomenal characters, states for which there is something it is like to have them. According to some authors, such as Tye (1995, 2000), Dretske (1995), Lycan (1987, 1996), and Thau (2002), all conscious mental states have wide contents. Furthermore, though this is a logically separable thesis known as representationalism or intentionalism, the phenomenal characters of these conscious states are supposed by these and other authors to supervene on their contents. For example, Tye (1996) suggests that the content of a perceptual state is the state of affairs that the state causally correlates with under optimal conditions. On such a view, if two intrinsically identical individuals are embedded in appropriately different environments, their perceptual states will correlate with different external conditions and so acquire distinct wide contents. Given representationalism, the perceptual experiences of these individuals will then be phenomenally different, despite their sameness of intrinsic properties. However, some (e.g. Block (1990, 1995), Deutsch (2005)) believe that phenomenal character does not supervene on mental content. Others ( e.g. Carruthers (2000), Rey (1998), Chalmers (2005)) argue that experiences have narrow content, and that phenomenal character reduces to narrow and not wide content. Representationalists assert that phenomenal character depends on content. However, Horgan and Tienson (2002) claim that content and character are mutually dependent. They then use this mutual dependence to argue that, since, as they also believe, phenomenal character is narrow, there are severe liabilities with a wholly externalist account of the mind. See the entry on consciousness and intentionality and representational theories of consciousness, for further discussion.
Externalism has important consequences for a number of different mind-body theories. Burge(1979) believes that externalism refutes individualistic theories of intentional mental states. These are theories that define or explain what it is for a person to have an intentional mental state purely in terms of intrinsic facts about that person without reference to the environment. Examples of such theories include the identity theory, and functionalism in its traditional guise. Though externalism may be incompatible with these internalist forms of physicalism, this should not be taken to imply that externalism is itself an antiphysicalist doctrine, for one might hold that although mental contents do not supervene on narrow physical properties, they do supervene on wide physical properties. There is no obvious reason for physicalism about the mind to require a creature's mental properties to supervene on its narrow physical properties. (For discussion of the requirements on physicalism, see the entry on physicalism.)
McGinn (1989) and Burge (1986,1993) both argue that externalism refutes the token-identity theory (and hence type-identity theory as well). Token-identity says that each particular mental state token is identical to a physical brain state token. McGinn and Burge rely on a modal argument : the brain states of a subject would remain the same if the environment were to be different, as long as her intrinsic properties did not change. But her intentional mental states could have been different. So by Leibniz's law, mental states are distinct from brain states. However, Davidson (1989) rejects this argument. He points out that it is plausible to take a particular sunburn as identical to a certain state of the body, even if the very same bodily state could have been caused by something other than exposure to sunlight, and so would not have been a sunburn. The modal argument is also criticized in Gibbons (1993), who claims that a belief state token can remain identical to a brain state token, even if its content had been different, as long as we reject the assumption that mental state tokens have their contents essentially. A similar position, though argued in much greater detail, is taken by Frances (2007). (See also MacDonald (1990) and Rowlands (1992).)
As for functionalism, one way to deal with externalism is to adopt a divide-and-conquer strategy. One might try to explain what it is to be a particular kind of mental state (e.g. belief) individualistically, while adopting an externalist theory of content. For example, a functionalist might adopt the position that an internal state is a belief state in virtue of having the right kind of internal functional role. The content of such an internal state, however, can depend on its relationship with the external environment. (See Chapter 3 of Fodor (1987))
An alternative strategy for functionalism is to extend the theory so that it becomes compatible with externalism. Functionalism says that a mental state is defined by its functional role, which includes the relations that the state bears to inputs, outputs and other mental states. In typical formulations of functionalism, the inputs and outputs are usually taken to be objects or states that stop at the body boundary, and do not belong to the external environment. Block (1990), Harman (1987) and Kitcher (1991) have suggested a "long arm" functionalism that drops this requirement in order to accommodate externalism.
Externalism is also connected with issues surrounding our introspective knowledge of our own mental states. Such knowledge appears to be a priori, or at least privileged, in that it is acquired without relying on empirical evidence or observations. On the face of it, externalism threatens the existence of such privileged knowledge. If the contents of our thoughts are determined in part by our relations to the environment, then one might think that external observations are needed in order to know what we think. But self-knowledge does not come about through empirical investigations. So either contrary to appearance we do not really know the contents of our own thoughts, or if we do, externalism is false.
One way to resist this conclusion is to reject the implicit assumption that to know one's own thoughts one must know the environmental conditions that make such thoughts possible. Burge (1988) draws an analogy with perception, pointing out that unless one embraces skepticism, perceptual knowledge does not require knowledge of its enabling condition. However, even if this is sufficient to disarm the argument that externalism is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge, this still falls short of identifying the mechanisms that make such knowledge possible. Burge's proposal is that privileged self-knowledge has a reflexive, self-referential character. In basic cases such as thinking that "I am thinking that p", one not only has the first-order thought that p but also thinks about it as one's own. Since the object of the second-order judgment is none other than the first-order content it is logically impossible to misjudge the content of the first-order thought, even if this content depends in part on external conditions.
A number of authors remain unconvinced that externalism is compatible with privileged self-knowledge. Arguments for incompatibility are usually of two kinds. One type of argument, introduced in Boghossian (1989a), uses slow switching cases where a subject travels between two different physical environment or linguistic communities, say between Earth and Twin Earth. The subject, however, is unable to discriminate between the two places. According to many externalist theories of content, which concepts are possessed by the subject will depend on factors such as the time he has spent on each of the two planets. When the subject is having an occurrent thought which he expresses by saying "there is water around", he might be thinking about water if he has been living on Earth, or he might be thinking about twin-water if he has already moved to Twin-Earth and have lived there for a long time. It is then argued that since the subject is unable to distinguish between the two places, he will not be able to know by introspection alone whether he is having water or twin-water thoughts. This is taken to show that externalism is incompatible with privileged self-knowledge. Falvey and Owens (1994) object that, although externalism does entail that, in slow switching cases, an agent might not be able to introspectively distinguish her water thoughts from her twin-water thoughts, this is not a bar to a noncomparitive type of priviledged self-knowledge. A different strategy against the slow-switching argument, pursued by Brown (2004), Sawyer (1999), and Warfield (1992, 1997), is to argue that, although introspective indistinguishability does undermine self-knowledge in the slow switching cases, since such cases are merely hypothetical, they pose no real threat to any actual person's self-knowledge. However, Ludlow (1995) takes the slow switching cases a step further by suggesting that they are sometimes actual, not just hypothetical. He claims that this happens all the time when we move in and out of linguistic communities, as in the case of a person who travels between the US and England, without knowing that "chickory" has different meaning in British and American English. (But see Warfield (1997) for a reply.)
Another type of incompatibility argument (McKinsey (1991), Brown (1995), Boghossian (1998)) aims to show that externalism leads to some implausible conclusions about what can be known a priori. According to this line of argument, if social or natural kind externalism is correct, having thoughts with wide contents depends on the presence of certain substances or communal practice in the environment. So if we have privileged knowledge of our own thoughts, we can infer a priori that one's external environment contains some natural kind, or there exists apart from oneself a community of speakers. But it is implausible that we can gain empirical knowledge of the external world this way, relying only on introspection and armchair reflection on externalism. So either externalism is false, or we do not have privileged access to the contents of our thoughts. These arguments differ with regard to what it is that can be inferred a priori given that we know we have a certain thought. Boghossian (1998) argues that knowing that one has thoughts about water allows one to infer that one has been in causal contact with water. But according to McLaughlin and Tye (1998), this is true only if one also knows that the concept of water is an atomic concept that succeeds in denoting a natural kind. But since we do not know a priori whether a concept succeeds in referring to anything at all, no information about the external world can be derived solely on the basis of externalism and knowledge of our thoughts. (See also Gallois and O'Leary-Hawthorne (1996).) Davies (1998) and Wright (2000) offer a different reply to this second type of incompatibility argument. Both argue that, while a subject might be a priori justified in believing that she has a certain thought, and also a priori justified in thinking that the having of that thought depends on the presence of certain substances or communal practice in the environment, this a priori justification does not transmit to belief in the existence of those external substances or practices. For criticisms of this reply, see McLaughlin (2003) and Brown (2004).
Some externalists (e.g. Sawyer (1998)) seem willing to bite the bullet and say that, since externalism is true (and we know it) and we have priviledged access to our thoughts, we also have a kind of a priori access to our external environment. Sawyer does not take this to imply that externalism combined with self-knowledge is an antidote to skepticism about the external world, though since Putnam (1982) there has been interest in the extent to which externalist considerations may be used in arguing against skepticism. See the entry on Brains in a vat for more on the topic of externalism and skepticism.
Judging by the number of published papers on the topic, the issue of the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge is a central concern for philosophers of mind. The literature on the topic is now vast. For more detailed discussion of the incompatibility arguments, see the papers in Ludlow and Martin (1998), Wright, Smith and MacDonald (1998), and Nuccetelli (2007).
Another debate that arises out of externalism concerns the legitimacy of wide contents in causal explanations. Most philosophers agree with Davidson (1980) that beliefs and desires play an important role in the causal explanation of actions. However, it has been argued that causal explanations of behavior should appeal only to the local properties of our bodies, properties that describe what is happening here and now within us (Stich (1983)). On the face of it, there is a problem reconciling these two theses with externalism. Externalism says that our mental contents are determined by causal, social or historical factors, factors which extend spatially and temporally beyond the here and now. So the locality requirement seems to imply that wide mental contents cannot be causally explanatory role because of their relational nature.
In reply, externalists (e.g. Wilson (1995)) note that relational properties do enter into causal explanations in many other non-mental domains. For example, we might say that a machine has broken down due to overuse, which is a relational property. One might also argue that the appeal to mental content in causal explanation is on a par with the routine appeal to representational properties in understanding computational systems. The failure of NASA's Mars Climate Orbiter in 1999 was attributed to a design oversight, where an algorithm fails to convert navigational data from English units to metric. Whether this explanation satisfies the locality requirement or not, it does seem to invoke wide representational contents. If it qualifies as a legitimate causal explanation, it is not clear why the same should not apply to explanations that appeal to wide mental contents. Williamson (2000) has argued that wide contents actually have special explanatory value. They provide us with a better understanding of the connection between the mental states of an agent and his actions in the non-immediate future, because our actions typically involve complex interactions with the environment. See also Peacocke (1993), Jackson (1996), Yablo (1997), and the entry on mental causation.
Even if all mental contents of folk psychology turn out to be wide contents, it does not follow that this is also true of the contents of mental states and representations postulated by psychology and cognitive science. Fodor (1987) agrees that the classic thought experiments have indeed shown that many mental states have wide contents, at least according to folk psychology. Nonetheless, he argues that physically identical subjects are psychologically similar in an important way. Their mental states have the same casual powers, and science should capture this common aspect by postulating a shared narrow content which is determined by our intrinsic properties.
However, such arguments for narrow content are controversial, resting on assumptions about causation or scientific methodology which are not widely accepted. Furthermore, there has been no consensus as to the nature of narrow content, or indeed whether narrow content is something that is expressible. Fodor (1994) himself has changed his mind and has decided that narrow content is probably not needed in cognitive science after all. (For further discussion, see Burge (1986), Peacocke (1994), and also the entry on narrow mental content.) In the absence of a convincing general argument for narrow content in cognitive science, or a general argument against wide content, it is useful to look at actual cases of scientific theories and see if they invoke wide or narrow contents. Here are a few pertinent examples :
1. It might be thought that representations involved in sensation and perception are particularly good candidates for which externalism is true, given their role in providing information about the environment. For example, in discussing the nature of representations that animals employ in navigation, the psychologist Gallistel (1990) takes a representation in the brain as representing the environment when "there is a functioning isomorphism between an aspect of the environment and a brain process that adapts the animal's behavior to it." Clearly, any content assigned according to such a principle would be wide. One might look at other theories in cognitive science and see whether they postulate wide contents or not. Burge (1986) has argued that this is indeed the case with Marr's computational theory of vision. For rebuttals and further discussion regarding externalism in theories of visual perception, see Segal (1989), Davies (1991), Butler (1996), Chomsky (2000), and Silverberg (2006).
2. Another interesting issue to explore is the relationship between innate knowledge and externalism. Some developmental psychologists, such as Spelke (1994), have argued that human beings are innately endowed with a number of systems of knowledge relating to such domains as physics, language, psychology, number and geometry (see Elman et. el (1996) for a dissenting view, and Griffiths (2001) for a critique of the notion of innateness in cognitive psychology.). For the internalist, the innate contents of these systems are prime candidates for narrow content, perhaps genetically encoded through the process of evolution. On the other hand, an externalist might argue that the existence of innate contents does not vindicate internalism. For example, an externalist could hold that innate contents are wide contents, because they supervene on a creature's dispositions to enter into causal relations with the environment. See Cowie (1999), Pitt (2000) and Fodor (2001) for further discussion.
3. The study of semantic knowledge is one area where externalism has direct methodological consequences on cognitive science research. Suppose semantic externalism is correct, that the meanings of words as used by a speaker depends in part on his relations to the physical or social environment. It then follows that externalism is correct with regard to semantic knowledge. Yet many philosophers and linguists would insist that the study of a speaker's semantic knowledge is the study of a purely internal psychological state. In Chomsky (1986), a distinction is made between E-language and I-language. The conception of E-language is that of a convention-based natural language, a social object, whereas I-language is a biologically-endowed language faculty internal to the brain. An individualist theory of semantic knowledge will then be part of the theory of I-language, or some related system of a similar status. For further discussion, see Larson and Segal (1995), and Ludlow (1999, 2003), and Pitt (2000).
In all versions of externalism discussed earlier, the mental contents of a subject depend in part on aspects of the environment which are clearly external to the subject's cognitive processes. For example, the twin-water in Putnam's thought-experiment or the relevant linguistic community in Burge's are not part of the subjects' ongoing mental processes. In contrast, active externalism asserts that the environment can play an active role in constituting and driving cognitive processes. Hutchins (1995) argues that the successful completion of a typical commercial flight requires complex interaction between the pilots and the instruments in the cockpit. He claims that an adequate analysis of the task would need to treat the whole distributed system as a cognitive system with memories, representations, and cognitive processes that extend outside the pilots' heads. Clark and Chalmers (1998) is a widely-discussed defense of active externalism. In one argument, they introduce a thought experiment where someone with Alzheimer's disease has to rely on a notebook to retain information and find his way about. Clark and Chalmers argue that because the notebook plays an active role in the cognitive life of the patient, its contents actually constitute some of that person's non-occurrent beliefs, and so these belief contents are "not in the head". See also Hurley (1998), Wilson (1994), Haugeland (1995) and Noë (2005).
Whether we should regard the notebook as an extended part of that person's belief system is a controversial matter. The issue concerns the conditions under which representational objects or states are regarded as part of a cognitive system. Adams and Aizawa (2001) claim that cognitive processes involve only representations with intrinsic content, and so the notebook should not be regarded as part of the subject's cognitive process, because the notebook contains only symbols with non-intrinsic contents derived from our linguistic intentions. But Clark (2010) argues that this requirement is too strong. Cognition might involve mental imagery using diagrams with derived content, or biological routines that store bitmap images of printed texts. For further discussion of related issues, see the papers collected in Menary (2010).
In considering whether a process constitutes a mental process external to a cognitive subject, an important background question is how the subject is to be individuated. In particular, where lies the physical boundary of the subject? One view is that perception marks the boundary where the world and the body meet. In the case of the Alzheimer's patient, since the patient has to flip through the pages of the notebook and read the entries, this shows that the notebook as the object of perception and action should be regarded as external to the mind. Chalmers himself expresses some sympathy to this response in his preface to Clark(2008).
On the other hand, suppose we agree that the notebook is part of the patient's belief system, and so mental contents can extend beyond the brain. However, it might then be argued that in so doing we are in effect extending the physical boundary of that person beyond his brain. The notebook has now become a spatially scattered part of his extended self. If this is right, then it has not been shown that the patient's mental contents are determined in part by factors external to the subject. It merely shows that one can extend the physical boundary of the subject by augmenting additional hardware. This conclusion differs from those of the earlier arguments for externalism, where mental contents are supposed to depend on factors that are clearly external to the subject.
Enhancing our cognitive abilities with additional hardware might become commonplace with the development of computer technology and increasingly sophisticated brain-computer interfaces. For example, we might implant micro-processors and radio transmitters into our brains in order to access external databases, or to outsource computational-intensive processing. To what extent the additional hardware is or is not part of the extended mind might even depend on normative and legal issues. Imagine a scenario where our memory systems connect to an external computer database. When we wonder whether a proposition P is true, it might trigger a remote search, and the result returns as an occurent belief. In such a scenario, we would all be accessing the same database. So should we say that our minds actually overlap because we share the same cognitive resource? But if the servers are actually owned by a commercial company, legal considerations might mitigate against the idea that the servers are part of us. On the other hand, if a user owns a database server and has exclusive access, we might be more inclined to say that the server is part of his extended mind. So the exact boundary of the mind might turn out to involve normative and legal considerations. This raises the question of whether there is a coherent and unitary psychological conception of what a mind really is.
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cognitive science | consciousness: and intentionality | mental causation | mental content: narrow | mental content: teleological theories of | mental representation | supervenience
Joe Lau <jyflau@hku.hk>
Max Deutsch <medeutsc@hkusua.hku.hk>


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Swirling beneath the surface
By eyes4earth @eyes4earth · On January 26, 2011
Seven days. Eleven people. Plenty of powerful stories. An intense and inspiring week of interviewing for research on meaningful nature experiences causes one to reflect on what is actually being perceived and going on behind the veil of visible reality.
We have just completed a week-long road trip along the southern Cape of South Africa. From Grahamstown to Cape Town we are grateful to have had the chance to enter into dialogue with some remarkable people who, each in their own humble way, had their own stories of meaningful nature experiences and profound encounters with wildlife to share.
The week delivered more inspiration than we could have imagined…and certainly expected. Some stories bordered on the bizarre. Others inched towards the incredible.
From up close and '(inter)personals' with otters, elephants, lions, leopards, baboons, sharks, monkeys, antelope, snakes, owls, swallows… Or, without animals, it may have been a pivotal moment – in a group or alone – where suddenly there was a realization. A realization – which is often still being 'realized' – but nevertheless has stayed with the person until this time.
We were presented with a whole spectrum of stories. And clearly when it comes to labeling or categorizing such stories, there is 'no one size fits all'. It shouldn't still come as a surprise, but more than ever it was clear that people's stories do not fit into the models or categories which I have framed or labeled based on my own past experience.
These stories caused us to re-think some basic assumptions of what constitutes a meaningful nature experience. It took us further down the rabbit hole in terms of coming to a consensus on the perceived impacts of invasive alien species on human experience. And, without a doubt, the views and insights elicited from interviewees threw so much of our accepted current educational system – and ways of learning – into serious question.
Each interviewee contributed some unique insight of value…which helped deepen our own understanding and clarity of what exactly it is that we are trying to gain from this research.
Were there common themes or trends? Well, the real analysis of this research is for the months ahead. But a few things naturally stood out:
The impact of early childhood experience and youth contact with nature: almost all interviewees (who have had meaningful nature experiences later in life) were subject to significant close contact with nature as a child. And they often had the opportunity to explore natural areas;
Sense of place and belonging: A few interviewees had their profound experiences in places where they had spent a significant period of their life. It was as if they were 'going deeper' into particular places and spaces;
Role of the environment: Whilst the majority of the powerful stories were experienced in 'wild areas', they were certainly not limited to there. Sometimes wildlife literally came knocking on the household window;
Impact of education: the fact that our education heavily shapes our perception and even our experience was massively reinforced – and probably none more so than the contentious issue of how one (emotionally and intellectually) responds to the presence of alien invasive (exotic/non-native) animal and plant species;
Definition of synchronicity: few interviewees were able to define and a number had not heard of it. But almost all 'felt' their way to their own understanding of the concept. Most subsequently came to something close to the commonly accepted definition (i.e. a meaningful coincidence which appears to go beyond the probability of chance; an outer (physical) event corresponding meaningfully and causally to one's inner thoughts);
Swirling beneath the surface: It felt like there was an underlying thread that tied people and their stories together. Most interviewee's stories imbued a sense of 'a something' swirling beneath the surface of visible reality. It was a quality which resonated with a vibration of unexplained mystery. Interviewees exhibited an understandable shyness about some experiences – and an interpretation was only truly revealed through further questioning. The idea of 'an energy' or an 'energetic communication' was cited in some cases. This interpretation is something which we also came across in 2010 when interviewing tertiary students about their understanding of profound encounters with wildlife.
We're still on the lookout for more stories of your own meaningful nature experiences and/or profound encounters with wildlife. So please don't be shy and share by emailing Matt at info@eyes4earth.org.
Sincere thanks again to the interviewees for their time, energy and personal and profound insights. Cheers to Andy for his astute audio recording, shared reflections and committed presence.
eyes4earth.org acts as outreach for doctoral research being carried out by Matthew Zylstra through the Department of Conservation Ecology & Entomology at Stellenbosch University in partnership with the TsamaHUB. Research is generously funded by the Centre of Excellence for Invasion Biology (CIB).
And yet we know…
Hatred, even of meanness
Contorts the features
Anger, even against injustice
Makes the voice hoarse. Oh, we
Who wanted to prepare the ground for friendliness
Could not ourselves be friendly.
— Bertold Brecht

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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News / Yemen
Food insecurity in Yemen to rise from 2mn to over 3mn in just 6 months: UN agencies
Thursday, 23 July 2020 10:11 AM [ Last Update: Thursday, 23 July 2020 10:11 AM ]
The file photo shows Yemeni children present documents to receive desperately-needed food.
United Nations agencies warn of an "alarming increase" in the number of people facing "acute food insecurity" in Yemen amid a crippling siege by the Saudi-led military coalition and the coronavirus pandemic.
The grim analysis was made public in a Wednesday report by the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN Children's Fund and the Food and Agriculture Organization.
According to the report, the overall economic decline made worse by the Saudi-led siege and the coronavirus pandemic, coupled with flash floods and desert locust invasions, are threatening to reverse hard-earned food security gains in the warn-torn peninsular Arab country.
The analysis, conducted in 133 districts in southern Yemen, forecast that the number of people facing high levels of "acute food insecurity" will rise from two million to 3.2 million in the next six months.
"The people of Yemen have already been through a lot and are resilient. But they are facing now too many hardships and threats all at once - from COVID-19 to Desert Locusts invasions. Small-holder farmers and families who depend upon agriculture for their livelihoods need our support now more than ever," said FAO Representative in Yemen Hussein Gadain.
The expected jump in food insecurity would mean that 40 percent of the population would be affected from July through December, a 15 percentage-point increase from the first six months of the year.
Yemen bombardment: Saudi-led warplanes target residences, kill civilians
At least nine civilians have been killed in fresh Saudi-led airstrikes against a residential area in Yemen's northern province of al-Jawf.
"We must act now. In 2019, thanks to a massive scale-up, WFP and partners were able to reverse the deterioration in the worst-hit areas of Yemen. The warning signs have returned and with coronavirus pandemic added to the mix, it could get a lot worse if humanitarian action is delayed," said Laurent Bukera, the WFP country director in Yemen.
Separately, Lise Grande, the UN humanitarian coordinator for Yemen, also said that Yemen was again on the brink of a major food security crisis.
"Unless we receive the funding we need now, we won't be able to do the same this time," she added.
The analysis proposed recommendations "for urgent actions," such as ensuring unhindered food assistance, rehabilitating local water infrastructures damaged by flash floods, aiding farmers, promoting good nutritional practices, and boosting early warning and general food security monitoring systems.
Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen in March 2015 to restore power to its former regime and crush the popular Houthi Ansarullah movement, whose fighters have been of significant help to the Yemeni army in defending the country against the invaders.
The ongoing war has killed tens of thousands of Yemenis and pushed the entire country close to the brink of famine. The brutal military intervention has also taken a heavy toll on the country's infrastructure, destroying hospitals, schools, and factories.
UN warns nearly 10 million people facing acute food shortages in Yemen
The UN has warned that nearly 10 million people are facing acute food shortages in war-torn Yemen.
The imposed war initially consisted of a ceaseless airstrike campaign but was later coupled with a crippling naval and aerial blockade and the deployment of ground mercenaries to Yemen.
The blockade, particularly on Hudaydah port city, a lifeline for the impoverished nation, has also left the country highly vulnerable against the COVID-19 pandemic.
Yemen Houthis Saudi aggression United Nations fao food famine
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Worker marching with others at Coleman A. Young Center Aug. 2, 2012. Local 207 has been conducting periodic informational pickets to mobilize its members for the possibility of a strike.
VOD UPDATE SEPT. 27, 2012: Detroit's AFSCME Local 207 , representing workers at the Detroit Water & Sewerage Dept., voted to authorize a strike yesterday, with 64 percent of members voting "YES," according to union officials. Local 2920, representing clerical and other DWSD workers, authorized a strike Sept. 25 if ongoing contract negotiations fail. Union leaders are still negotiating, but have said that negotiations are so far not productive. The Detroit Water Board recently approved a $46 million second-stage contract with the EMA Group, which involves cutting 81 percent of the DWSD workforce. The locals are asking all city workers to join to fight the city's nullification of their union contracts under the Detroit PA 4 consent agreement, and severe lay-offs, wage and benefit reductions, and entire department cuts that have resulted. They are also asking for broad community support.
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text:
Boeken Boek
He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. 11 He came unto his own, and his own received him not. 12 But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name...
A collation of the principal English translations of the sacred Scriptures - Pagina 268
door Charles Roger - 1847 - 323 pagina's
Volledige weergave - Over dit boek
Sacred Extracts: Or, Books and Chapters Selected from the New and Old ...
1788 - 577 pagina's
...not that Light^ but was lent to bear witnefs of that Light. 9 That was the true Light which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. 10 He was in the world, and the world was made by him; and the world knew him not. 1 1 He came unto his own, and his own received him...
The History of the Life and Death of Our Blessed Saviour
Catherine D'Oyly - 1794 - 711 pagina's
...admit of of any other interpretation than what the words themfelves naturally convey to our minds. "11. He came unto his own, and his " own received...name. " 13. Which were born, not of blood, •' nor of the flefh, nor of the will of man, " but of God. " 14. And the word was made flefh, " and dwelt...
Morsels of Criticism: Tending to Illustrate Some Few Passages in ..., Volume 2
Edward King - 1800
...beginning of the Gofpel of St. John, the Beloved Difciple. John, chap. i. Ver. il. He came unto His own, and His own received Him not. 12. But as many as received HIM, to them gave He power to become, What ? Power to become the Sons of God. rsxvx 0EO~T Power to become,...
...witness of that Light. R The divinity S. John. of Chfist. 9 That was the true Light, •which lightcth every man that Cometh into the world. 10 He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the World knew him not. _ 1 1 He came unto his own, and his own received...
The Holy Bible: Containing the Old and New Testaments : Translated ..., Volume 4
...not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. 9 That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. 10 He was in...on his name ; 13 Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. 14 And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt...
...He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. 1 1 He came unto his own, and his own received him not. 12 But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God, even to them that believe on his name : 1$ Which were...
An English Harmony of the Four Evangelists: Generally Disposed After the ...
William Newcome - 1809 - 476 pagina's
...lighteth every man that cometh into the world. ' , , 1O He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. 11 He came unto his...on his name : 13 Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. 14 And the Word was made flesh, and dwelt...
A Harmony of the Four Gospels: in which the Natural Order of Each ..., Volume 1
James Macknight - 1809
...We meet with a passage of this kind in the very entrance of his book. Chap. i. 11. " He came to his own, and his own received him not. 12. But as many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God,ci>en to them that believe on his name. 1 3. Which were...
A Brief View of the Doctrines of the Christian Religion as Professed by the ...
John Bevans - 1810 - 111 pagina's
...like precious rfaithwith u«, through the righteousness of God, and our Saviour Jesus Christ. John i. 12. But as many as received him, to them gave he power...on his name: 13. Which were born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God. 1 Peter i. 21. Who by him do believe...
An Abridgment of Scripture History, Consisting of Lessons Selected from the ...
Sarah Trimmer - 1811 - 168 pagina's
...not that Light, but was sent to bear witness of that Light. That was the true Light, which lighteth every man that cometh into the world. 10 He was in the world, and the world was made by him, and the world knew him not. He came unto his own, and his own received him not....


There is an interesting anecdote related to animals which a person keeps as pet. Whether, the horse, dog, cat or mouse every animal signifies human behaviour. With the traits of animals in humans and vice versa it makes difficult to stay away from each other. Even, if a person does not have pet animals at home if he goes riding on a Victoria the heart goes thumping to the tip tap of the horse.
Getting playful with the animal like instinct in human being can give an ecstasy beyond doubt. The humans birth date coincides with the animal instinct in them. If a person has traits of dog, then he could be compared with the most watchful which is of bully breed as well as sweetness when it comes to French bulldogs.
The dogs who are sincere and do not disturb in your work style but loyal while sticking to the family and giving love in return are far better than any other human being who are ready to ditch you at small instance. A person who have dog trait can never be disloyal but also helps in developing a healthy social network within the society.
With the dog being treated the most unfair as people understand their behaviour to be promiscuous in Indian context, still stand out to be one of the most loyal breed. Similarly, the person who has traits of dog is very humble and lead a hassle free along with humble and very down-to-earth. They keep the distinguished friends near them and try to stay within their friend circle.
Now, talking about the nearness to the dog it can be done if you get a nearness to the quality breed. The breeding centres which could be found in our neighbourhood can help to get the best of the breed. People looking for dogs with various newly breeding techniques which gives the new offspring without getting health compromised can visit the vet for more details.
It is necessary to get a pet as it gives equal love to the children and to the pet owner which improves human and nature bonding giving a super calm effect. Also, the female dog gives breed to the new pups much to the delight of the children who give attention to the pups thus bringing lovingness towards the newly born animals. This gives the children the understanding about the offspring and the nature's importance in their lives. They also get engaged apart from school work leading the less of parental guidance as they found a healthy companion in the pet.
The dogs who are bully breed turn out to be the most tamed one with the influence of human beings and the Pit bull or the American Bully gives the most in terms of companionship as they are the newly formed breed.
With breeding in the normal way stands out to be better rather than artificial insemination its good to get into the Whatsapp or other social networking sites such as Facebook where one could find dog owners and communicate with them during the breeding season for the healthy managing of your dog.


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Game Thread: New York Yankees vs. Chicago White Sox 9/25
The New York Yankees and the Chicago White Sox are ready to face off head-to-head tonight inside Yankee Stadium with two red hot pitchers taking the mound for their respective teams. The Yankees will send CC Sabathia to the mound looking for another impressive start since getting a new protective brace for his right knee while the White Sox will counter with Carlos Rodon who has thrown seven consecutive quality starts. The game will be played at 7:05 pm ET and can be seen on the YES Network and MLB TV.
After tonight you have just six more opportunities to see the Yankees at home before the playoffs. Click the Yankees Ticket link at the top of the blog and plan your family trip to the Bronx before the Yankees are gone for the winter. If you can't make it, or even if you can for that matter, be sure to at least jump on Twitter and give @GreedyStripes a follow to interact with us and cheer on the home team for the rest of the regular season and beyond.
Sabathia is ready to mow down the White Sox and the Yankees offense is ready to go for the jugular. Let's watch it all unfold, Go Yankees!
Labels: @GreedyStripes, American League East, Carlos Rodon, CC Sabathia, Chicago White Sox, Game Thread, MLB TV, New York Yankees, Playoffs, Postseason, Twitter, Yankee Stadium, Yankees Tickets, YES Network
Pulaski Yankees Represented in Appalachian League Top 20 Prospects List
Minor League Baseball is officially in the books with all minor league affiliates in teams schedules over so let me officially welcome you to post-season prospect list season. We started the season a bit early about a week or so ago posting our Post-Season Top 10 Prospects List, SEEN HERE, and Baseball America began their season recently by releasing the Appalachian League's Top 20 Prospects for free, no subscription needed HERE.
The Appalachian League is a part of the Rookie level of the minor league system and the Yankees have one minor league affiliate there, the Pulaski Yankees. In BA's Top 20 prospect list the Yankees had one of their Yankees from Pulaski make the cut, shortstop Hoy Jun Park who ranked #12.
Here is the write up for Park from BA:
"Park is a rangy shortstop with quick feet, slick actions and smooth glove work … he could develop into an outstanding defender," said the subscriber-only scouting report. "His swing has some length to it, but he creates intriguing torque with long levers and quick hands … He showed the ability to punch the ball to the opposite field or pull the ball over the fence."
Park, just 19-years old, was one of the lesser names in the Yankees international signing spree that left the team with spending restrictions for the next two signing periods. Park garnered a $1.16 million bonus and rewarded the team by hitting .239/.351/.383 with five home runs and 12 stolen bases in his professional debut season.
The Houston Astros outfielder Kyle Tucker, the fifth overall draft pick from the 2015 MLB First Year Players Draft, took home the top spot while the Atlanta Braves third baseman Austin Riley and the Minnesota Twins shortstop Jermaine Palacios rounded out the top three.
Labels: Appalachian League, Hoy Jun Park, International Free Agents, International Spending, Korean Baseball Organization, New York Yankees, Prospects, Pulaski Yankees, Top Prospects List, Yankees Prospects
Looking Back at my 2015 MVP Award Predictions
The MVP Award is probably the most prestigious award in all of sports and especially in Major League Baseball and like every other award this season I took a stab at predicting it before the season. It's becoming a common theme that I'm not too great at these but honestly I'm okay with that. I take a stab at them and wrong or not I bring you the answer when it becomes applicable. I don't hide behind the short memories of some and I don't only post the predictions that make me look like the "Yankees Wizard." I'm humble, I wonder if Yoenis Cespedes and Giancarlo Stanton are.
It's time for the big awards to be given out as I take a stab at predicting the American League and National League MVP Awards. These predictions are such a crap shoot and so much goes into them and so much can alter the award winner during the season it's almost silly to attempt to predict it in March but it's all for fun anyway so why not.
For the American League I am going to go against the grain a little bit and pick a member of the Detroit Tigers, just not the Detroit Tigers player that you would expect. I am going to go with Yoenis Cespedes winning the award and not Victor Martinez or Miguel Cabrera. With that kind of protection in the lineup and that many runners on base in front of him Cespedes should see plenty of fastballs this season, and we all know Cespedes is a dead fastball hitter. He should hit his fair share of home runs and doubles while knocking in a ton of RBI and scoring a ton of runs. He may not compete for a batting title but I expect the Cuban, who FYI is playing for a contract since he is a free agent at the end of the season, to be right there in the MVP discussion this season.
For the National League I am going to pick a familiar face in Giancarlo Stanton of the Miami Marlins. Until Stanton gives me reason to pick someone else for the award I am going to pick him year in and year out, which makes next year's post a little anti-climactic for you guys. Stanton is still the best hitter in all of the game and especially all of the National League and has a chip on his shoulder in 2015. He has a much improved team around him, a lot of money to justify to the fans that he deserves and he wants to prove that he can still hit after taking a fastball to the face that ended his 2014 season. He will do all that and then some in 2015, mark my words.
As we look at my prediction for the final, and the biggest, award in Major League Baseball this season were in a word, wrong. Many are giving the NL MVP Award to Bryce Harper this season while some, and when I say some I mean only the Mets fans, are saying that Cespedes deserves the nod in the NL. Meanwhile in the AL, you know that league that Cespedes is no longer in hence he cannot win the award there, Josh Donaldson and Mike Trout are going at it for the award. I didn't mention either of them, that's my bad.
Labels: American League, Awards, Giancarlo Stanton, Miami Marlins, Miguel Cabrera, MVP, National League, New York Yankees, predictions, Victor Martinez, Yoenis Cespedes
Game Preview: New York Yankees vs. Chicago White Sox 9/25
The New York Yankees and the Chicago White Sox will continue their four-game series tonight in the Bronx as the Yankees look to wrap up a postseason berth. New York has done well against Chicago this season and there is no reason, in my mind at least, for the team not to win this series. Chicago is moving their starting rotation around and there is a slight chance the team might miss Jeff Samardzija, not that the team didn't bomb him last time they faced him. The Yankees will send CC Sabathia to the mound tonight to face off with the White Sox rookie Carlos Rodon. The game will be played at 7:05 pm ET and can be seen on the YES Network and MLB TV.
Sabathia has been thanking the person or people who made his protective knee brace for three starts now as the Yankees have seen vintage Sabathia since coming off the disabled list. Sabathia is 2-1 with a 1.04 ERA since coming off the DL earlier this month whole holding opponents to a .190 batting average in 17.1 innings.
Rodon is making his first career start tonight inside Yankee Stadium and it couldn't have come at a better time for the rookie. Rodon saw his ERA sit at 5.00 even on August 5th and has dropped it all the way to 3.78 with seven straight quality starts.
New York honored the late Yogi Berra before last night's game but there would be no better to truly honor the Yankees legend then to make the postseason and win the World Series. No man reached the World Series more as a player, coach and manager and no other man and no other soul went to his grave with 10 World Series rings. There's no need to get ahead of yourselves though, take this one game at a time and that one game begins tonight inside Yankee Stadium. Go Yankees!
Labels: American League East, Carlos Rodon, CC Sabathia, Chicago White Sox, Game Preview, Jeff Samardzija, MLB TV, New York Yankees, Playoffs, Postseason, World Series, Yankee Stadium, YES Network, Yogi Berra
Looking Back at my 2015 Cy Young Award Predictions
The bigger awards in Major League Baseball, the MVP Award and the Cy Young for both respective leagues, are usually a little easier to predict than say the Comeback Player of the Year. Well, unless you're me. For a guy that got donned the "Yankees Wizard" for my in-game predictions last season down the stretch I sure get these wrong a lot. Oh well, so is life. See below for my original post where I picked Rick Porcello of the Boston Red Sox and Clayton Kershaw of the Los Angeles Dodgers to win the AL and NL Cy Young Awards in 2015.
Today we move into the bigger awards as I take a stab at predicting the American League and National League Cy Young Award winners. This was one of the few awards I actually did well with last year so I feel confident that I can do that again in 2015.
For the American League winner I am going to go with Rick Porcello of the Boston Red Sox. Porcello had a career season in 2014 with the Detroit Tigers before being traded over to a much improved Boston Red Sox team this winter. Many speculators have stated that the Red Sox don't have an ace heading into this season but as much as I hate to admit it, Porcello could (and will) be that guy for Boston. The Red Sox have this uncanny ability of taking in your tired, your hungry and your mediocre and turning them into stars, David Ortiz for example, and I believe they will do it again with Porcello in 2015.
For the National League I am going to pick a familiar face in the ace for the Los Angeles Dodgers, Clayton Kershaw. When Kershaw gives me a reason not to pick him then I will, not until then. The Dodgers lefty is clearly the best regular season pitcher in the game right now and shows no signs of slowing down or changing that in 2015. It's an easy pick and it's a safe pick but sometimes those kind of picks, the obvious picks, are the best picks and that's my pick.
In a word that may or may not be a real word, LOL. Rick Porcello? Seriously? Over David Price? Over Dallas Keuchel? LOL. Kershaw has pitched well but he may be overshadowed by both his teammate Zack Greinke and the Chicago Cubs ace Jake Arrieta. I have a legit chance at predicting the National League Cy Young Award but my AL prediction was just TURRIBLE.
Labels: Awards, Boston Red Sox, Clayton Kershaw, Cy Young Award, Los Angeles Dodgers, New York Yankees, predictions, Rick Porcello
Quick Hit: Korean OF Ah-Seop Son To Be Posted
The New York Yankees could be in the market for an outfielder this offseason as Chris Young hits free agency once again but could that search take them all the way to Korea? Ah-Seop Son of the Korean Baseball Organization is expected to be posted this winter after spending parts of nine professional seasons in the KBO. Could the Yankees be interested in the 27-year corner outfielder?
Son batted .324/.412/.476 with 12 home runs and 11 stolen bases this season in 476 plate appearances finishing off another strong season for the left-hander. Son has batted at least .306 or better in the past six seasons in the KBO and has a career triple slash of .330/.405/.471. Those stats sound great and so does the expected salary, somewhere around Jung-Ho Kan's four-year deal worth $11 million with a $5 million posting fee, but the part that sounds less than ideal for the Yankees is the "left-handed" part.
Barring a trade the Yankees will have an outfield of lefty Jacoby Ellsbury, lefty Brett Gardner and switch hitter, although he is much better left-handed, Carlos Beltran. The Yankees almost need a right-handed bat and a right-handed bat Son is not. That alone will likely keep him off the Yankees in 2016.
Labels: Ah-Seop Son, Brett Gardner, Carlos Beltran, Hot Stove, International Free Agents, International Spending, Jacoby Ellsbury, Jung-Ho Kang, Korean Baseball Organization, New York Yankees, Quick Hit, Rumors
Scoreboard Watching: September 25, 2015
It's Friday and we have a great weekend's worth of Major League Baseball ahead of us. The Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim are still trying to fight their way into the playoffs while many teams are looking to lock up playoff berths all weekend. It's going to be a fun weekend and it starts tonight with this full slate of games.
New York Yankees vs. Chicago White Sox
Toronto Blue Jays - OFF
Houston Astros - OFF
Texas Rangers @ Oakland Athletics
Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim - OFF
Cleveland Indians @ Minnesota Twins
Labels: Cleveland Indians, Houston Astros, Los Angeles Angels of Anaheim, Minnesota Twins, New York Yankees, Playoffs, Postseason, Schedule, Scoreboard Watching, Texas Rangers, Toronto Blue Jays, Yankees Schedule
Luis Sojo to be Inducted into FSL Hall of Fame
Tampa, FL.- The Florida State League Hall of Fame Committee announced today the 2015 Class of Inductees which includes former Tampa Yankees Manager Luis Sojo.
Sojo managed the Tampa Yankees for seven seasons and accumulated a .528 winning percentage and a Florida State League record 504 wins. He led the Tampa Yankees to the FSL title in 2009, and was named the league's "Best Managerial Prospect" byBaseball America. Sojo played in parts of seven seasons with the New York Yankees and contributed to four World Series Championships (1996, 1998, 1999, 2000). He drove in the title-clinching run in Game 5 of the 2000 World Series against the New York Mets. He worked as a coach for the Yankees at the Major League level in 2004 and 2005. Sojo is part of an elite group of players to record 1,000 hits in MLB and the Venezuelan Winter League, and managed the Venezuelan National Team in the 2006, 2009 and 2013 World Baseball Classic. Sojo was originally signed by the Toronto Blue Jays as a non-drafted free agent in 1986, and spent parts of 13 seasons with five different teams.
Click here to read about all of the 2015 Florida State League Hall of Fame Inductees.
The 2015 Class will be inducted into the Florida State League Hall of Fame on November 10, 2015 at the Sheraton Sand Key Resort in Clearwater Beach. The ceremony is open to the public and tickets are $75.00 per person. Dress is cocktail attire. More information will be available closer to the event. Please call 386-252-7479, or email fslbaseball@cfl.rr.comwith any questions.
Labels: Florida State League, Hall Of Fame, Luis Sojo, New York Yankees, Prospects, Yankees Manager, Yankees Prospects
This Day In New York Yankees History 9/25: Derek Jeter is Amazing
Derek Jeter played the final game of his Yankees career inside Yankee Stadium on this day in 2014 and Jeter went out only the way that Jeter could go out, dramatically. New York had a huge lead in the contest leaving many to speculate how and when manager Joe Girardi would take Jeter out for his standing ovation but David Robertson blew a save in the 9th inning setting up Jeter's heroics one last time. Jeter came up in the bottom of the ninth and laced the first pitch he saw through the hole on the right side scoring Antoan Richardson to give the Yankees a walk off victory. Jeter. Is.Amazing.
The 2009 New York Yankees team was good, really good in fact, and absolutely earned the nickname of the Bronx Bombers. On this day in 2009 Alex Rodriguez hit a third inning home run for the Yankees 127th home run at home of the season, a new franchise record. The 2004 and 2005 Yankees both went yard 126 times each at the old Yankee Stadium before the new record was set.
Also on this day in 1998 the Yankees set an American League record with their 112th win of the season, a 6-1 victory over the Tampa Bay Devil Rays. The 1906 Chicago Cubs went 116-36 and still hold the major league record for victories in a season.
Finally on this day in 1968 Mickey Mantle stepped up to the plate for his last Yankee Stadium at bat. Coincidentally tonight is Derek Jeter's final Yankee Stadium at bat but I digress. Mantle would walk against Luis Tiant before the Yankees fell to the Indians 3-0.
Labels: 1998 Yankees, Alex Rodriguez, Derek Jeter, Derek Jeter Day, Home Runs, Mickey Mantle, New York Yankees, retirement, Yankee Stadium
Game Thread: New York Yankees vs. Chicago White So...
Pulaski Yankees Represented in Appalachian League ...
Game Preview: New York Yankees vs. Chicago White S...
Looking Back at my 2015 Cy Young Award Predictions...
This Day In New York Yankees History 9/25: Derek J...


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Gridiron Club Annual Awards
In addition to the renowned Bulger Lowe, Swede Nelson, and Walter Brown Awards, the Gridiron Club bestows awards honoring between 15 and 20 of New England's finest athletes, coaches, and officials from all levels of competition.
The club also partners with the Massachusetts High School Football coaches Association to recognize the "Super 26" All-State High School team. The Club under its stewardship also awards the nations' oldest award in men's collegiate ice hockey, the Walter Brown Award, as well as the Joe Concannon Award.
Bulger Lowe Award
Named in honor of George H. "Bulger" Lowe. Awarded to the best Division I-A/I-AA players in New England. In 1982, offensive and defensive categories were established.
Nils V. "Swede" Nelson Award
For outstanding achievement in academics, athletics, sportsmanship and citizenship.
Tom Yewcic "Man of the Year"
Selected by the Executive Committee of the Gridiron Club. Presented each fall at NFL Legends Night dinner.
Walter Brown Award
Best American-born Div I College Hockey Player in New England.
Joseph P. Zabilski Award
Named in honor of Joe Zabilski, Boston College '43, coach of Northeastern University, and former Gridiron Club president. Awarded to New England's best collegiate players in Divisions II and III.
Joe Concannon Award
New England's Best American-born Division II-III hockey palyer.
John Baronian Award
Lifetime Contribution to Football. In 2002, re-named in honor of John Baronian (Tufts '50), former president of the Gridiron Club and 1982 winner of the National Football Foundation and Hall of Fame's Contribution to Amateur Football Award.
Joseph V. McKenney Award
Named in honor of Joe McKenney, former head coach of Boston College and distinguished college referee. Joe was a member of the officiating crew in the "Fifth Down Game" between Cornell and Dartmouth. Awarded to the best collegiate official in New England.
Awarded to New England's best head coach of the year. Divisional categories were established in 2001.
Assistant Coach of the Year
Awarded to an assistant college football coach who has consistently brought out the best in his players and has been an example of excellence and dedication in the coaching profession.
Henry Smith Courage Award
To the high school player who has been an inspiration to all through by displaying exceptional courage twhile dealing with and overcoming especially challenging events or circumstances. Named in honor of Henry Smith, former Gridiron Club tpresident.
Dr. Joseph H. Burnett Award
To the outstanding high school player in the City of Boston. Named for Dr. Joseph Burnett, for many years the attending physician for schoolboy games at White Stadium, Dorchester.
William J. Stewart Jr. Award
To the high school football official of the year. Named in honor of Bill Stewart Jr., long time coach of three sports at Boston English High and a legendary official of professional, college, and high school sports.
William H. Ohrenberger Award
To the high school coach of the year. Named for Dr. Bill Ohrenberger, one of nine founding members of the Gridiron Club, its president in 1945-46, coach of Boston English 1932-45, and that school's Coach of the 20th Century.


After the success of the first part of "Geometric Parts Compilation", Doma Musique presents a second section of musical geometry.
"Geometric Parts Compilation 2" will offer you the possibility to observe the importance of musical geometry. Everything can be represented by rhythms ... Find out it by yourself!
Dry But Funky, Polors, Shcaa, Garlik, Slasman Makocic, Minitronik, Haruyuki Yokoyama and Eran Ben Zeev. A collection of artists geometrically perfects. They are each and every one of the pieces that form "Geometric Parts Compilation 2".