text:
import subprocess

# third party
import docopt

# the ape
from ape.main import main

# this documentation
from commons import catch_exit
from baseusagestring import usage

print subprocess.check_output('ape -h'.split())

print subprocess.check_output('ape fetch -h'.split())

fetch_usage = """fetch subcommand

usage: ape fetch -h
       ape fetch [<name>...]  [--module <module> ...]

positional arguments:
    <name>                                List of plugin-names (default=['Ape'])

optional arguments:
    -h, --help                           Show this help message and exit
    -m, --module <module> ...      Non-ape modules
"""
catch_exit(fetch_usage, ['--help'])

arguments = "fetch Dummy Sparky Iperf --module pig.thing --m cow.dog".split()
output = docopt.docopt(doc=usage, argv=arguments, options_first=True)

arguments = [output['<command>']] + output['<argument>']
print docopt.docopt(doc=fetch_usage, argv=arguments)

print subprocess.check_output('ape list -h'.split())

list_usage = """list subcommand

usage: ape list -h
       ape list [<module> ...]

Positional Arguments:
  <module> ...  Space-separated list of importable module with plugins

optional arguments:

  -h, --help                 Show this help message and exit

"""
catch_exit(list_usage, ['-h'])

print docopt.docopt(list_usage, argv=['list'])

arguments = 'list man.dog bill.ted'.split()
base_output = docopt.docopt(doc=usage, argv=arguments, options_first=True)

arguments = [base_output['<command>']] + base_output['<argument>']
print docopt.docopt(list_usage, argv=arguments)

print subprocess.check_output('ape check -h'.split())

check_usage = """`check` sub-command

usage: ape check -h
       ape check  [<config-file-name> ...] [--module <module> ...]

Positional Arguments:

    <config-file-name> ...    List of config files (e.g. *.ini - default='['ape.ini']')

optional arguments:

    -h, --help                  Show this help message and exit
    -m, --module <module>       Non-ape module with plugins

"""

catch_exit(check_usage, argv=['-h'])

arguments = "check --module cow.dog.man ape.ini -m pip.ini".split()
output = docopt.docopt(doc=usage, argv=arguments, options_first=True)

arguments = [output['<command>']] + output['<argument>']

print docopt.docopt(doc=check_usage, argv=arguments)

print subprocess.check_output('ape help -h'.split())

help_usage = """`help` sub-command

usage: ape help -h
       ape help [-w WIDTH] [--module <module>...] [<name>]

positional arguments:
    <name>                  A specific plugin to inquire about [default: ape].

optional arguments:
    -h, --help            show this help message and exit
    -w , --width <width>  Number of characters to wide to format the page.
    -m, --module <module>     non-ape module with plugins

"""

catch_exit(help_usage, ["--help"])

output = docopt.docopt(usage, argv="help bob -w 30 -m cow.pipe".split(), options_first=True)
arguments = [output['<command>']] + output['<argument>']
print docopt.docopt(help_usage, arguments)


Rick Law & Diana Law Top Elder Law Attorneys! - Law Elder Law - a Division of Law Hesselbaum.
Rick Law & Diana Law Top Elder Law Attorneys!
We are grateful for our colleagues and we deeply appreciate the professional recognition.


The weakness of Kansai Paint is contrasted and nippon paint, his quality isn't sufficient. The second weakness is the Kansai Paint isn't sufficiently popular. At the point when Kansai Paint contrasted and nippon paint, individuals will pick nippon paint first. So that the first thing is need to upgrade their quality and making it become more famous, let the people when discuss the paint then firstly thing is thing the Kansai Paint.


Kyte, since their inception, have been a band forever bursting with promise. From their breathtaking early gigs via the self-titled EP of couple of years ago and onto the stunning cover of Peter Gabriel's Solsbury Hill, they've constantly progressed.
But new album Dead Waves finds them in much the same place we left them back in 2008 when they released the Two Sparks, Two Stars EP. They are still intent on making vast sweeping songs that are awash with emotion and electronic trickery. They're still capable of reducing grown men to tears (possibly). And yes, there are still moments where they sound a little like Sigur R�s.
Over the last couple of years the band have tightened up their production and drum samples, but The Smoke Saves Lives, which opens the album, sounds weirdly familiar; not unlike the first track of the Kyte EP, Planet. Splendid though it is, the similarity between these songs is worrying. Have Kyte blown their creative muse?
As it turns out, they haven't. There's still enough on the album to keep the newcomer entertained, and plenty of new ideas for the long term fan to indulge in. The Smoke Saves Lives, whilst familiar, is still a phenomenal opening blast. Epic in every way, it suggests Kyte have really aimed at vast and admirably succeeded. Massive keyboard chords hang heavy in the air and swirl around the ridiculously tender voice of Nick Moon. Despite being great at establishing contemplative moods, Kyte always seem to aim for the sky, as they do here, with the chorus positively soaring.
IhnFsa has a slightly '80s feel to it and an intro that takes a stoll on the oriental side. Moon however is busy getting surly with West End Girls as his vocals take on a distinctly Neil Tennant bent. It's a definite step away from the more post-rock influence of early Kyte material with a structure that adheres to a more conventional verse/chorus format; almost as if they've written a proper pop song. You're Alone Tonight continues in this pop-tinged vein, with Moon keeping up his Pet Shop Boys schtick, with a breathily sultry vocal delivery. An incessant 8-bit keyboard part completes a strangely romantic track.
Elsewhere Kyte are just as heartbreakingly desolate as before. The barren No-one Is Angry, Just Afraid is a minimal masterpiece full of space. Whispers of "fighting to stay alive" make for a bleak canvas which Kyte then colour gradually with waves of synths and understated guitars. It's one of the band's most beautiful songs.
There are many of these moments on Dead Waves, and they make this an album of considerable merit. Once again Kyte have proved they're worth checking out, even if over the course of a full album they'd do well to try mixing things up a little. Even the most beautiful vistas get boring if you gaze at them all the time.


text:
Harri Shanahan, Siân A. Williams
15 - Contains strong sex references.
Rebel Dykes
One of the hits of 2021 BFI Flare Festival, Rebel Dykes follows a tight-knit group of friends who met at Greenham Common peace camp and became artists, performers, musicians and activists in London. A hot, heady, punky, sexy mash-up of animation, previously unseen rare archive footage and new interviews tells the story of a radical scene: squatters, BDSM nightclubs, anti-Thatcher rallies, protests demanding action around AIDS and the fierce ties of chosen families. Co-directors Harri Shanahan and Siân A. William have created one of the most innovative and inspiring debut documentaries of 2021
Select your Tickets

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


The annual VideoRay conference (VIPS) in October this year saw the release of two new forward looking multibeam sonars.
Seattle based manufacturer Blueview have added a 130 degree sonar to their popular 900KHz series. The P900-130 also features greater range and depth rating than previous models without any reduction in performance or update rate. The increased field of view is a huge benefit when used with an ROV as a search or navigation tool, and its small size and weight make it ideal for use on the VideoRay Pro4 ROV.
Tritech have announced the release of the Gemini 720i, a forward looking 720KHz sonar with 120 degree field of view. The sonar provides very detailed images from close range out to a maximum of 120m with very high update rates, making it suitable for a wide range of ROV and AUV applications.


THURSDAY, July 9, 2015 (HealthDay News) -- End-of-life care can be fraught with difficult decisions, but a new study finds that since 2000 there has been no increase in the number of Americans with cancer who compose "living wills" to help guide the process.
The study, led by Dr. Amol Narang of the Johns Hopkins School of Medicine in Baltimore, did find a rise in the percentage of cancer patients who had designated power of attorney to another person -- from 52 percent of patients surveyed in 2000 to 74 percent in 2012.
However, there were no significant changes in the use of living wills -- which help loved ones make decisions about care should the patient become incapacitated -- or in the percentage of patients who had frank discussions about end-of-life care.
Still, Narang's team said that by 2012 many patients had made some effort at "advance care planning," with about 81 percent having completed at least one form of directive -- power of attorney, a living will or end-of-life care discussions.
These efforts can be crucial when the patient becomes unable to decide important issues for themselves, the study authors said.
"Without written or verbal direction, surrogate decision makers may struggle to make care decisions consistent with patient preferences," they wrote. "As such, policy and health system initiatives that support wider adoption of clinician-patient discussions of end- of-life care preferences are essential."
The new study is published July 9 in the journal JAMA Oncology.
In the study, Narang's group looked at data from nearly 2,000 family members -- mainly partners, spouses and children -- of cancer patients who had died between 2000 and 2012.
During that time, there was little change in hospitalization rates (as opposed to the use of hospice care) at the end of life, with 29 percent spending time in a hospital at the end of life in 2000, versus 27 percent in 2012.
The number of patients who had received "all care possible" rose from 7 percent to 58 percent, the study found. Efforts to limit or withhold treatment near the end of life were associated with living wills and end-of-life discussions, but not with power of attorney, the study authors noted.
They said that any end-of-life discussion "must also include surrogate decision makers," and these conversations should seek to "educate surrogates on the goals, values and care preferences of their loved ones."
"This shows that naming a person to make decisions for you is not the only answer -- one must hold discussions to allow individuals to make decisions as one would want," said Dr. Maria Carney. She is chief of the division of geriatrics & palliative care of medicine - internal medicine at Long Island Jewish Medical Center in New Hyde Park N.Y. and North Shore University Hospital in Manhasset, N.Y.
"These discussions need to occur, and even guidance on how to have these discussions may be needed," Carney said.
Dr. Sean Morrison is co-director of the Patty and Jay Baker National Palliative Care Center at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai in New York City. He believes that while advance directives can help ensure that patients receive the end-of-life care they desire, they are only "a very small part of the solution."
Morrison believes that, beyond living wills and other advance care directives, "we need to redesign medical education so that all physicians receive training in having difficult conversations -- something that in 2015 still does not occur."
He also believes that hospice remains out of the reach of some terminally ill patients. "We need to redesign the health care system, such that those patients who decline ineffectual and burdensome treatments near the end of life have universal access to hospice and comfort-directed care that optimizes their quality of life," Morrison said.
In a related study, also in the same issue of JAMA Oncology, researchers led by Dr. Jennifer Mack of the Dana-Farber Cancer Institute in Boston report that many American teens and young adults dying of cancer were often still receiving intensive care, even as they neared the end of their lives.
"Although adult patients who know they are dying usually do not want to receive aggressive care, which is associated with poorer quality of life near death, we do not know whether adolescents and young adults feel the same way," Mack's team wrote.
Her team looked at data on 663 patients, aged 15 to 39, in California who died of cancer between 2001 and 2010. The most common types of diagnoses were gastrointestinal, breast and genitourinary cancers, along with leukemia and lymphoma.
Eleven percent of the patients received chemotherapy within 14 days of death. In the last 30 days of life, 22 percent of patients were admitted to the intensive care, 22 percent had more than one emergency department visit and 62 percent were hospitalized.
Overall, 68 percent of the patients received at least one medically intensive end-of-life care measure.
Are these treatments desired by these young patients or their caregivers? The study authors say that remains unclear.
"High rates of intensive end-of-life measures in this population may not be a failure of communication or palliative care," they wrote, "but might reflect very different values for end-of-life care in these young people compared with older adults."
Carney said the study left other questions unanswered.
"What we don't know is if patients and their families understood the severity of their illness and the prognosis at the time of these interventions," she noted. "Could open discussions and care focused on palliation of symptoms have impacted care at the end of life to be less intensive care? Were resources such as pain management, home-based palliative services or hospice care offered to support patients and families?
Find out more about living wills at the Harvard Medical School.


text:
Can the Idlib Memorandum Freeze the Conflict?
Kirill Semenov
During their Sochi talks in September 2018, Vladimir Putin and Recep Tayyip Erdogan reached an agreement on preserving the de-escalation zone in Idlib and abandoning the military operation that the Assad regime had been preparing to launch against the opposition groups in Idlib. The main provisions of the Sochi agreements boil down to the establishment of a demilitarized zone, 15–20 kilometres deep in the de-escalation area and the withdrawal by the conflicting parties of their heavy weaponry, including armoured vehicles, artillery, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) by October 10, and of radical terrorist groups by October 15 (the units of moderate rebels will hold their positions). Free movement and freight carriage is set to be restored on the M4 (Aleppo to Latakia) and M5 (Aleppo to Damascus) roads.
A Step Toward a "Turkish Republic of Northern Syria"?
Ankara has consistently advocated for the preservation of the opposition-controlled de-escalation zone, and it was the efforts of Turkey, and of Erdogan personally, that averted the military threat to Idlib, even if temporarily. Many provisions of the Sochi agreements rely on the so-called "white paper" that Turkey conveyed to Russia back in July. Ankara's demonstration of military power also played a role. Between the Tehran summit of the "Astana troika" and the Sochi talks, the Turkish military was actively building up its forces in the Idlib de-escalation zone, boosting them with tanks and artillery. At the same time, additional weapons were supplied to the Syrian National Army units deployed in the Turkish "buffer" zone in Northern Aleppo, and its forces were ready to move to Idlib to assist the local opposition groups.
These steps indicate that Turkey is ready to press for the Province of Idlib to gradually turn into a Turkish "protectorate," as happened in the regions of Northern Aleppo, which fell under the country's "security umbrella" following the Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch operations. Accordingly, preserving the opposition's control over the regions remaining under its power gives Turkey a chance to head up and supervise the peaceful process together with Russia. Should Idlib transition under Assad's control before a final political settlement in Syria is achieved, Turkey would essentially be left out of Syrian settlement, which would strip its fosterlings in the ranks of Syria's opposition of any say and the opportunity to be represented in the transitional governmental bodies.
Therefore, it is important for Turkey to prevent the fragmentation of Idlib's de-escalation zone and keep it under Turkish control without allowing the Russian military police to "take root" there as patrols or outposts, let alone as any administrative bodies of the Syrian regime. This is why Ankara supported the position of the Syrian rebel groups that opposed the Russian military presence in the demilitarized zone or their deployment along M4 and M5 routes. Ankara believes that Turkish troops are capable of handling the task independently. A compromise with Russia could be achieved on the issue. Turkey agreed to the demilitarized zone going exclusively through opposition-controlled territories. Consequently, the withdrawal of heavy weaponry will only apply to the insurgents, and not to the "conflicting parties" as the memorandum stated. In response, Ankara insists that any Russian military presence in the demilitarized zone is unacceptable.
Additionally, Syrian refugees pose an extremely grave problem for the Turkish leadership. The country's population is growing progressively more discontented with accommodating several millions of Syria's forced migrants in the long term. Applying the Lebanese scenario to resolve this problem is unacceptable for Ankara, since it would mean pushing the refugees back into Syria while the current regime is in power. Recep Erdogan has repeatedly stated that Bashar al-Assad is guilty of the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Syrians and has even called him a "murderer." For Turkey, the most convenient solution would be to create the necessary conditions for accommodating Syrian refuges in opposition-controlled territories. Camps are being built in Northern Aleppo that can take in over 150,000 forced migrants. Nonetheless, the Turkish "protectorate" areas in Northern Aleppo may not be enough. Therefore, the de-escalation zone in Idlib could become the principal region for returning Syrian refugees from Turkey once the required infrastructure is in place. However, it will only be possible if the danger of Syria's governmental troops conducting a military operation there is averted and if the issue of terrorist groups present there is resolved.
Has the Triumphant Progress Stopped?
For Damascus, the Sochi agreements effectively put an end to a victorious 2018. Over that time, Damascus took control over opposition enclaves one by one: Eastern Ghouta, Al-Dumayr and Eastern Qalamoun, Yarmouk, Homs, Deraa and Quneitra. It seemed that one last push would have been enough to ensure a complete triumph for Bashar al-Assad. Therefore, there is reason to believe that, despite official statements, the Syrian authorities were not satisfied with the terms of the Sochi memorandum. The Syrian regime insisted on a military operation without taking into account many risks, such as the large numbers, motivation and equipment of the Idlib insurgents, who, unlike in other regions where Bashar al-Assad had achieved success, could count on military and other support from Turkey. In addition, Ankara had 12 observation points transformed into fortified bases along the perimeter of the de-escalation zone.
Nonetheless, Damascus did not resign itself to the current situation, and its representatives have said that the opposition has until December to reconcile and put down their weapons, although there are no such provisions in the Sochi agreements. For the Syrian regime, transforming Idlib into a Turkish "protectorate" is all the more unacceptable because it essentially rules out a military solution to the Idlib problem in the foreseeable future. That is, al-Assad's regime would like to view the Sochi agreements as the first stage of the process to force the Syrian opposition to lay down their arms and reconcile following the scenario implemented in the south of the country. Damascus is likely to put pressure on Russia to pay greater attention to Syria's wishes and channel the process of implementing the Sochi agreements into the direction that Damascus needs.
Moscow between Ankara and Damascus
Moscow is in a rather tricky position as, on the one hand, it is forced to take the position of Damascus into account, while, on the other, it understands that it is futile to engage in an open confrontation with Ankara. Moscow is still forced to look for compromise options in implementing the Sochi agreements. Nonetheless, Russia has demonstrated that it still has a decisive word in Syrian affairs, as well as enough influence on both Damascus and Tehran to prevent a military operation with as much as a decision only. In addition, Russia can count on Turkey making concessions on the political track of the Syrian settlement process. In practice, Turkey can be expected to promote various "frozen" projects more actively within the peace process that would stand no chance of being implemented in the event that military actions were to start. This applies in particular to those initiatives that were spearheaded and elaborated by Moscow, such as forming a constitutional committee where serious shifts were taking shape following the Geneva talks on September 10–11. Such a situation could have a positive effect on Russia's plans to involve the countries of the European Union and the Persian Gulf in restoring the Syrian infrastructure, which would allow the process of returning the refugees to start.
Therefore, if the military escalation around Idlib continues to defuse, Ankara will be able to influence the Syrian opposition, forcing it to be more receptive to suggestions coming from Russia as part of the political settlement process. Thereby, Turkey will attempt to preserve Russia's interest in further deferring the military operation until it is removed from the agenda completely, which, on the one hand, will promote the success of Russia's peaceful initiatives and, on the other, oppose radicals in Idlib and demonstrate specific steps taken in that area.
Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham
Turkey consistently works to undermine the standing of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) that in early 2017 subsumed Jabhat al-Nusra (Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) in Idlib. In summer 2017, the large group Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki split from the HTS. The presence of Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki had made it possible to claim that the transformation of Jabhat Fatah al-Sham into Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham was not another re-branding of Jabhat al-Nusra. The HTS's positions were further weakened when Jaysh al-Ahrar split from it as it set a course for restoring ties and developing cooperation with its "parent" structure Ahrar al-Sham. Turkey appears to have played the key role in the HTS split, since the excessive strengthening of the radicals, who had established their control of the province's capital of Idlib shortly before that, was against Turkey's interests. Ankara still has influence over various groups that are part of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, as well as over the leaders of the organization. Apparently, further steps should be expected from Ankara to stimulate individual HTS factions capable of reaching and maintaining an agreement to split from the alliance and join the moderate opposition. To make the HTS more amenable, Ankara put the alliance on the list of terrorist groups in late August. Thus, even though today Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham controls a little over a half of Idlib's de-escalation zone, it remains significantly weakened compared to the winter–summer of 2017. The HTS numbers have fallen almost twofold since then and are now estimated at 12,000–15,000 militants. Additionally, the Turkistan Islamic Party consisting of 2300 Uighur militants actively interacts with the HTS.
The HTS units are highly combat-effective and, in terms of their combat capabilities, are no worse than the larger groups of moderate opposition. Nonetheless, during the fighting that took place in February–April 2018 between Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and Jabhat Tahrir Suriya (the Syrian Liberation Front), the former lost many of its positions in Idlib. After moderate groups assembled in the National Front for Liberation, these factions gained even greater superiority in numbers, which could push the HTS to make further concessions and comply with the provisions of the Sochi agreements on the HTS withdrawing from the 15-kilometer demilitarized zone.
The HTS is split on the issue of implementing the Sochi agreements. Consequently, as of the writing of this article, this group has not yet declared its position. The debate between followers of the two major factions still continues in the HTS's Shura Council. One faction is the pro-Turkey Syrian bloc that insists on withdrawing the HTS forces from the demilitarized zone and further integration into the moderate opposition, since they connect their future with Syria. The other group is comprised of hard-liners, the "intractables," many of whom are foreigners who may make their presence known once again in the event of a fresh exacerbation. And in case of failure, they plan to leave the country and continue their subversive activities in other regions.
The "Syrian" part of the HTS is ready to gradually transition to the moderate opposition camp. Should the group continue to fragment, its radical wing is ready for a rapprochement with their former partners who had split from the HTS when it declared it was cutting ties with Al-Qaeda. These radicals have formed their own association, Hurras ad-Din, which is currently an Al-Qaeda branch in Syria. However, it is not a serious force, with no more than 800 people. Another group of the "intractables" is Ansar al-Din, numbering 300 people, which is a part of the HTS that refused to join the organization, judging it to be too moderate. Thus, radical groups in Idlib number up to 20,000 people in total. The province also has IS units, however, they are represented solely by secret underground cells.
The National Front for Liberation (Jabhat al-Wataniya lil-Tahrir)
In addition to causing dissent among radicals, Ankara has been working successfully on rebuilding the positions and consolidating the forces of the moderate opposition. In February 2018, Jabhat Tahrir Suriya (the Syrian Liberation Front), an alliance that proved capable of opposing the HTS and of pushing back against HTS radicals in Idlib, was established. The next stage was deploying the National Front for Liberation in May 2018; Jabhat Tahrir Suriya joined in August.
Establishing the National Front for Liberation in May 2018 was an important step on the way toward installing Turkey's control over the armed opposition in Idlib with the prospect of its further integration in the united Syrian National Army. Establishing the National Front for Liberation drew a line under the process of separating moderate opposition from radicals: all the groups (besides Jaysh al-Izzah) that are outside the National Front for Liberation in Idlib can be called "radical."
The next stage, in turn, envisions the merger of the National Front for Liberation deployed in Idlib with the Syrian National Army (SNA) formed in the Syrian protectorate of Northern Aleppo. The plan is to gather all the moderate opposition forces under its banner. However, the National Front for Liberation can merge with the SNA if the Idlib problem is resolved in accordance with the "Turkish scenario," i.e. after de facto transforming the region into Turkey's "protectorate." It should be kept in mind that the SNA forces did not take part in the military operations against Assad's regime in Idlib. They operate solely in the regions covered by the Turkish "security umbrella" and were primarily geared for military operations against Syrian Kurds from the Democratic Union Party.
Virtually all factions surviving into the eighth year of the Syrian conflict and operating under the Free Syrian Army "brand" joined the National Front for Liberation: the Free Idlib Army, Jaysh al-Nasr, Jaysh al-Nukhba, the Free Syrian Army 2nd army (Jaysh al-Thani), the Free Syrian Army 1st Coastal Division, the Free Syrian Army 2nd Coastal Division, the Free Syrian Army 23rd Division, Daraya's Shuhada al-Islam, Liwa al-Hurriya and several other small Free Syrian Army factions, including units brought into Idlib from Damascus and other regions. Nonetheless, the National Front for Liberation's principal assault force is comprised of moderate Islamist groups such as Faylaq al-Sham, Jabhat Tahrir Suriya (a coalition of Ahrar al-Sham and Harakat Nour al-Din al-Zenki), Suqour al-Sham and Jaysh al-Ahrar (with the exception of the first group, they all joined the National Front for Liberation somewhat later, in August 2018). Today, the National Front for Liberation numbers 50,000–55,000 militants.
The Syrian National Army
Even though the Syrian National Army (SNA) is not deployed in Syria's de-escalation zone, it does have an immediate influence on the situation in the region. Should the army's units be retrained, re-armed and equipped by Turkey and shifted to Idlib, the situation there could change in terms of both possibly repelling Bashar al-Assad's offensive and suppressing radicals there. Additionally, should the need arise, SNA units may come over to the National Front for Liberation side and join their "parent" units on the front, since both the National Front for Liberation and the SNA often comprise brigades from the same groups, for instance, Ahrar al-Sham.
The SNA is formed in the regions of the so-called Turkish "protectorate" or "buffer," i.e. in those Syrian regions where the Turkish military operates and which are covered by Turkey's aviation, thereby minimizing the possibilities of al-Assad's regime and its allies carrying out a military operation.
The SNA includes five legions or corps. Three (the 1st, 2nd and 3rd) were deployed in Northern Aleppo and one (the 4th) in Homs. After the region was surrendered to al-Assad's regime in May 2018, it was also deployed in Northern Aleppo. In July, the 5th legion began deployment in north-eastern regions of Idlib's de-escalation zone (the Aleppo province). Factions from the National Front for Liberation are expected to join it, and the legion may become a transition model for integrating the National Front for Liberation's Idlib factions into the SNA.
The 1st legion was formed from Turkoman brigades such as Mehmed the Conqueror Brigade and the Samarkand Brigade that formed the legion's core. It also includes the Descendants of Saladin Kurdish Brigade (pro-Turkish), Victory Brigades, the 21st united Free Syrian Army division, the 101st Free Syrian Army division etc. The SNA's 2nd legion is also considered Turkoman, and its principal parts are the al-Sultan Murad Division and the al-Hamza Division. Additionally, the legion includes the Mutasim Billah Brigade, the al-Safwa Battalions and others. The 3rd SNA legion may be called "Islamic," since it comprises moderate Islamic groups, such as three factions of al-Jabhat al-Shamiya: the Northern Storm Brigade, the Sword of the Levant Brigade and the Soldiers of Islam Brigades, as well as some Ahrar al-Sham units operating in Northern Aleppo such as Tajammu Fastaqim Kama Umirt and Liwa al-Manbij, among others. The 4th SNA legion is also considered "Islamic." It comprises Liwa al-Haqq, Faylaq Homs and Ahrar al-Sham brigades that had previously operated in Homs. As of August 2018, the SNA numbers 35,000 militants in total.
The process of units from other factions integrating into the SNA continues. The SNA may be boosted by units of Faylaq al-Rahman and Jaysh al-Islam being withdrawn from around Damascus and positioned in two camps around Afrin and al-Bab in the Turkish "protectorate" of Northern Aleppo. Today, at least Jaysh al-Islam already operates under the SNA's "umbrella," although it has not been fully integrated into its corps structure. Therefore, once fully deployed, the SNA may number 50,000 troops. Accordingly, if the NFL joins the SNA, they will number 100,000 troops total: these are the forces at the disposal of Syria's moderate opposition.
In addition to the National Front for Liberation and the SNA, the Jaysh al-Izzah group should also be counted as moderate opposition. It is the only faction flying the Free Syrian Army's flag that still preserved its independence and did not join alliances. It numbers 3500 fighters.
Thus, the balance of power between the moderate opposition and radicals gives reason to hope that Ankara's measures to ultimately free Idlib from terrorist groups will succeed. Although the Sochi memorandum does not provide a timeframe for "cleansing" the region of terrorist groups, or indeed the terms and methods of doing so, the temporary or long-term preservation of Idlib's status quo will largely hinge on the resolution of this very question.
First published in our partner RIAC
Related Topics:AlQaedaDefenseRussiaSyriaTerrorismTurkey
A gruesome murder bares world powers' flawed policies
Turkey plays Khashoggi crisis to its geopolitical advantage
Director of the Centre of Islamic Research at the Institute of Innovative Development
Eric Zuesse
The success of Turkey's takeover of Syria's most pro-jihadist province, Idlib, is making less and less likely that Syria will be able to continue maintaining Idlib as being a part of Syria. (This is something I had predicted, back on 14 September 2018, to be possible or even likely, and now it is actually happening.) On July 10th, Reuters headlined "Assad hits a wall in Syrian war as front lines harden", and reported that, "More than two months of Russian-backed operations in and around Idlib province have yielded little or nothing for Assad's side. It marks a rare case of a military campaign that has not gone his way since Russia intervened in 2015. While resisting government attacks, the insurgents have managed to carve out small advances of their own, drawing on ample stocks of guided anti-tank missiles that opposition and diplomatic sources say have been supplied by Turkey." It continues:
Moscow has appeared keen to preserve its ties with Ankara even as its air force bombs in support of Assad: Turkey says Russia has intervened to stop attacks on Turkish forces from Syrian government-held territory. … The Idlib area is dominated by Tahrir al-Sham, the jihadists formerly known as the Nusra Front. [And before that, they were called Al Qaeda in Syria, but Western news-agencies, such as Reuters, prefer not to mention that fact, especially because the U.S. used_Nusra to train 'our' proxy boots-on-the-ground 'moderate rebels' in Syria to bring down Syria's Government. Elsewhere, the Reuters article calls them 'insurgents'.] Some 300,000 people fleeing bombardment have moved toward the Turkish border since April, prompting the United Nations to warn that Idlib was on the brink of a "humanitarian nightmare".
For Ankara, the Syrian opposition's last major state sponsor, preventing another major influx of Syrian refugees is of paramount importance: Turkey already hosts 3.6 million of them. …
A Russian private military contractor who was based near Idlib province told Reuters that rebel fighters there are far more professional and motivated than their adversary. Pro-government forces cannot win the battle for Idlib unless Moscow helps them on the ground, he said. …
"Of course the regime [that's the legitimate Government, but Western 'news'-agencies such as Reuters call it 'the regime', and most of their audience don't even recognize that their own intelligence has just been insulted by Reuters when it calls Syria's Government a 'regime', which only the invading countries actually are] has the desire to recover Idlib by force [as if the sovereign Government of Syria doesn't have this right — it's Syrian territory, after all, but Reuters doesn't care about that fact], but … without the Russians it can't [tsk, tsk: those 'nasty' Russians are defending Syria from the supposedly 'kindly' U.S.-Saud-backed proxy-armies that are led mostly by Al Qaeda in Syria, and which invaders have actually destroyed Syria], because there are many militants and the Russians are completely committed to the Turks," the source said.
Reuters, naturally, quotes enemies, not defenders, of Syria. Western mainstream 'news'-media are constantly insulting the intelligence of their audiences, as if their audiences cannot distinguish propaganda from honest news-reporting. Unfortunately, however, their assumption on that might be right.
Syria's Government is fighting hard against jihadist forces in Idlib who meet Turkey's standard of being 'moderate rebels' against Syria's Government, but unless Russian forces there — which were invited in by Syria's Government, instead of being invaders there like Turkey and the United States are — will commit far more forces for the defense of Syria (which seems increasingly unlikely), Turkey will win Idlib as being a part of Turkey.
Consequently, Turkey is already starting to build infrastructure even immediately to the north and east of Idlib in order to stake its claim to a yet larger portion of Syria than just Idlib. This might not have been part of the deal that was worked out by Russia's Putin, Iran's Rouhani, and Turkey's Erdogan, in Tehran, on 9 September 2018, which agreement allowed Turkey only to take over — and only on a temporary basis — Idlib province, which is by far the most pro-jihadist (and the most anti-Assad) of Syria's 14 provinces. Turkey was instead supposed to hold it only temporarily, but the exact terms of the Turkey-Russia-Iran agreement have never been publicly disclosed.
Until that 9 September 2018 Tehran conference, Idlib had been the province to which Syria's Government was busing defeated jihadists who had surrendered instead of choosing to stay and die where they were. Syria's Government had given its surrounded jihadists this final option, in order to reduce as much as possible the numbers of jihadists' civilian hostages who would also likely be killed in an all-out bombing campaign there. So, the existing population of Idlib, which was already the most pro-jihadist in Syria, was now starting to overflow with the additional thousands of defeated jihadists who had chosen to surrender instead of to be immediately killed.
At that time, just prior to the Tehran conference — and this was actually the reason why the conference was held — the U.S. and its allies, and the U.N., were demanding that an all-out invasion of Idlib, which had been planned by the Governments of Syria and of Russia, must not take place, for 'humanitarian' reasons. There was all that 'humanitarian' concern (led by the United States) for the world's biggest concentration of Nusra and Nusra-led jihadists — and for Syria's most jihadist-supporting civilian population. So much 'kindness', such 'admirable' 'humanitarianism'. Furthermore the U.S. Government was threatening to greatly increase its forces against Syria if that invasion by Syria and by Russia into Idlib (which is, after all, part of Syria — so, what business is it, even of the U.N., at all?) were to be carried out. The Tehran conference was meeting in order to resolve that emergency situation (mainly America's threats of a possible war against Russia), so as to forestall this attack.
However, now that it's clear that Erdogan will not follow through on his generally understood promise that this would be only a temporary military occupation of Idlib, the question is: what can Syria and Russia and Iran do to keep Idlib inside Syria, and whether they even want to do so. If Syria loses those jihadists, then not only will it lose the perhaps hundred thousand surviving jihadists there — many of whom came from other countries in order to fight against Syria's secular Government — but also will lose some of those Idlib natives, who were always against Syria's secular Government. Since those people would no longer be voting against Bashar al-Assad, because they would become Turks, this would actually be a Syrian political advantage for Assad. Yet, he has been resisting it, in order to hold Syria together. He has always been committed to holding Syria together.
Turkey's negotiating position is exceptionally strong, because Turkey now is riding the fence between the U.S. alliance, NATO (of which Turkey has been the only predominantly Muslim member ever since it joined in 1952), versus Russia. According to a major report in English from Iran's Fars News Agency — which had translated from published Arab sources in many countries and which report hasn't been denied by any of them — Russia had saved Erdogan's life on 15 June 2016, when there was a coup-attempt to get rid of him. Headlining on 20 July, just five days after the failed coup, "Erdogan Warned of Incoming Coup by Russian Alert", Fars said that,
Several Arab media outlets, including Rai Alyoum, quoted diplomatic sources in Ankara as saying that Turkey's National Intelligence Organization, known locally as the MIT, received intel from its Russian counterpart that warned of an impending coup in the Muslim state.
The unnamed diplomats said the Russian army in the region had intercepted highly sensitive army exchanges and encoded radio messages showing that the Turkish army was readying to stage a coup against the administration in Ankara.
The exchanges included dispatch of several army choppers to President Erdogan's resort hotel to arrest or kill the president.
The standard treatment of this matter in U.S.-and-allied 'news'-media was to ignore the coup and to downplay any U.S. role in it, but other news-media haven't been so dismissive — for examples: On 29 July 2016, Erdogan tactfully suggested that "US general is on side of coup plotters: Erdoğan", as one Turkish newspaper headlined it. On 2 August 2016, the New York Times bannered "Turks Can Agree on One Thing: U.S. Was Behind Failed Coup". On 18 August 2016, I headlined at Strategic Culture Foundation, "What Was Behind the Turkish Coup-Attempt?" and provided some of the reasons why the U.S. regime almost certainly was. On 8 July 2019, Michel Chossudovsly, at his Global Research, headlined "A Major Conventional War Against Iran Is an Impossibility. Crisis within the US Command Structure" and he said, "Turkey's exit from NATO is almost de facto. America can no longer rely on its staunchest allies." He even said "Turkey is now aligned with Russia and Iran." However, his article didn't so much as even mention the coup — nor any other possible reason for this shocking switch.
In any case, after that event, Turkey's foreign policies definitely switched away from being clearly U.S.-allied, to being on the fence and calculated purely to serve Turkey's advantage, no longer tied, at all, to NATO or the U.S., and, in many important respects, very much contrary to the U.S. regime. In fact, Erdogan has been emphatic that this coup had been led by Fethullah Gulen, a billionaire Muslim cleric, formerly allied with Erdogan, who since moving to the U.S. in 1999 has been his bitter enemy. In fact, some of NATO's forces in Turkey were participating in the attempted coup. However, Erdogan holds on tenaciously to that NATO membership, because it gives Turkey enormous leverage it can use in order to grab territory from Syria, which the U.S. regime wants Turkey to do.
Here is how Erdogan has clearlly committed Turkey to taking at least parts of Syria's northeast:
On 6 June 2018, Reuters headlined "Turkish university to open campus in northern Syria" and reported that, "Turkey's Harran University, in the southeastern province of Sanliurfa [Turkey], said it is preparing to open a faculty in Al-Bab [Syria] for students in towns under Turkish control. … The Turkish cabinet has also approved opening a vocational high school in Jarablus [Syria] affiliated with Gaziantep University, Turkey's official gazette said on Tuesday."
On 30 July 2018, Syria.LiveuaMap headlined "Turkey start[s] to build highways starting from Cobanbey-al-Bab to Jarablus-Manbij in Syria" — all of which is in the parts of Syria's north that Turkey controls.
On 23 May 2019, Gaziantep University posted an announcement of "The Global Syrian Refugee Crisis" conference to be held in Gaziantep, Turkey, on 14-18 October 2019, and also announced that: "The medium of instruction of our university is entirely English in %80 of faculties and Turkish in some faculties. However, after the ferocious civil war in Syria, we opened four departments (Engineering, Architecture, Administration and Theology) that teach in Arabic language. This was achieved by hiring Syrian academic staff in these programs which created opportunities for refugee students who want to continue their studies in Arabic." So, it does seem to be Erdogan's intention that directly across the border in Syria, this part of what has, until recently, been a part of Syria, is to be instead a part of Turkey. This would be the chief favorable outcome for the U.S. regime resulting from the Syrian portion of the CIA-planted "Arab Spring" rebellions in 2011.
On 27 May 2019, the Daily Sabah headlined "Turkey to Build New Faculties to Promote Higher Education in Northern Syria" and reported that
Gaziantep University, located in southern Turkey close to the Syrian border, decided to offer education for Syrians living in the northern part of the war-torn country, the areas that were liberated by Turkey's two cross-border operations. …
The university applied to Turkish education officials to set up four faculties in northern Syria's al-Bab, Azaz and Mare districts, which is planned to focus on economics, business, teaching and engineering; some 2,700 prospective students have already taken proficiency exams. The faculties will be the second move by Gaziantep University as it previously opened a vocational school last year in Aleppo's Jarablus district. While vocational education currently continues in five departments, the university is planning to expand it with four more and to provide education for 500 students.
In 2016, Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield and cleared about 2,000 kilometers of area in northern Syria, which was once dragged into darkness by the Daesh terrorist organization.
This seems to reflect Syria's actual capitulation to Turkey, which henceforth is to control that area — permanently. The only question now is how large the seized area will turn out to be.
The first person, it seems, who recognized quickly the significance of this takeover was the tweeter "domihol" who on 28 May 2019 posted
Turkey is also throwing serious money at its seemingly permanent slice of Syria.
You don't build universities just so Damascus can take it over soon.
Right below that is his:
I'm sorry to say – my prediction for Syria's near and possibly medium term future still holds …
Dominic | دومينيك added,
[15 December 2018] prediction:
TRUMP gets the oil & gas
ERDOGAN gets the water
PUTIN gets the "mission accomplished" moment …
9:49 AM – 28 May 2019
However, his predictions there (as is routine for tweets, which are good for communicating only bumper-stickers) are unsupported by anything. For example: Where is Turkey's oil and gas? Is it actually anywhere near to the Turkish border? Here's a map which shows where it is, and that's certainly not near the Turkish border.
In addition, the U.S. regime is evidently preparing to assist Turkey's takeover of parts of Syria, but focuses it specifically against Iran. On 24 May 2019, the U.S. State Department advertised a "Grant Opportunity" for NGOs to be "Supporting Local Governance and Civil Society in Syria" and are offering up to $75 million to each, in order to "Counter extremism and disinformation perpetuated by Iranian forces" and "End the presence of Iranian forces and proxies in Syria" and otherwise support America's war against Iran. Perhaps the U.S. and Turkey have agreed that U.S. operations against Syria will continue in the Turk-seized areas after the U.S. occupation of the remaining parts of Syria has ended.
If Assad were to give a press conference now, the first question to ask would be: "Is Syria going to allow Turkish universities and highways to be built on Turk-seized Syrian territory?" Because, if the answer to that is anything like yes, then not only would it seem that Turkey has won against Syria and Russia and Iran, but so too has the U.S., whose fall-back position, ever since it first tried a coup in Syria in 1949, has been to at least break off a piece of Syria, when and if it failed to take the whole thing. The construction of a Turkish university, highway, and/or etc., in Syria, would be a huge apparent win for Donald Trump, but an even bigger apparent victory for Tayyip Erdogan, who now seems to be, yet again, a member of America's alliance against Russia. (And Iran, too, would seem to be endangered by Syria's apparent defeat in that part of Syria. But maybe not: is Turkey going to end altogether its alliance with the U.S.?)
Usually, successful aggression is impossible without allies, and the U.S., again, seems to have Turkey as one — and as an extremely important one (more important, perhaps, than ever before).
The U.S. Government wants to remove land from Syria's Government. The Turkish Government wants to be the Government that actually takes it. So, U.S. and Turkey seem to have made a deal. Turkey took Syrian territory while promising (as the Qatar regime's Al Jazeera headlined on 5 June 2018 — "YPG confirms withdrawal from Syria's Manbij after Turkey-US deal"). Al Jazeera reported there that, "The Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) said its military advisers would leave the town of Manbij a day after Turkey and the United States said they reached an agreement on the armed group's withdrawal." Those two foreign invaders against Syria (Turkey and U.S.) came to this agreement in Washington DC, regarding their respective invasions: Turkish forces won't conquer YPG (separatist-Kurd) forces in any part of Syria unless and until that part has already become instead a part of Turkey — swallowed-up by Turkey. The U.S. will be protecting those Kurds until the U.S. ends its military occupation of Syria. After that, those Kurds will be on their own.
Back on 10 January 2018, Elijah J. Magnier had commented, "Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad also considers Turkey to be another occupying force in northern Syria. He would like to liberate the entire Syrian territory, which is not the case with Russia, which would prefer to end the war as soon as possible and undertake the work at the negotiating table." Magnier seems to have been correct: Russia appears not to be objecting to Turkey's land-seizures in Syria. Therefore, Turkey is a "middle-man" between both U.S. and Russia — strategizing with both.
On 19 January 2018, Tony Cartalucci commented, "The Syrian government with support from its Russian, Iranian, and Lebanese allies has embarked on a major military operation to retake parts of Syria's northern governorate of Idlib. As it does so, the US and its regional allies are rushing to position themselves to ensure the permanent partition of Syria is achieved." He continued (all of which has likewise subsequently been borne out):
It should be noted that Afrin is located between [Idlib and] territory Turkey is currently occupying. Turkish troops, should they seize Afrin
[which they soon did]
, would effectively have expanded Turkey's "Euphrates Shield" by 30 miles (53 km) and present an opportunity for its troops to link up with troops of Turkey's "Idlib Shield." This would create a large, singular buffer zone within which US-NATO forces could harbor militants driven back by Syria's most recent offensive.
Depending on Turkey's success, the zone could be expanded even further, even as far as including Idlib city itself [which happened in September of that year] – thus granting the US an opportunity to present it as a second Syrian "capital" much in the way Benghazi was used in Libya during US-led regime change there. There remains, however, the fact that Idlib is openly occupied and administered by Al Qaeda, making the proposal of transforming it into an "opposition capital" particularly dubious.
Meanwhile, the US itself continues its own uninvited, illegal occupation of Syrian territory east of the Euphrates, having previously justified the invasion and occupation of Syrian territory under the guise of fighting the so-called "Islamic State" (ISIS). …
The US occupation of Syrian territory will be difficult for Damascus and its allies to contest without being drawn into a direct military confrontation. Turkey's occupation may be easier to confound, but if sufficient political will exists to maintain it along with US backing, it could effectively result in a Golan Heights-style occupation of Syrian territory [by Turkey] that provides a long-term geopolitical pressure point versus Damascus for years to come.
And while US efforts to destroy Syria have fallen short, the US now permanently occupies territory within one of Iran's closest and most important regional allies. Like a splinter under the skin turning septic, the US occupation will remain a constant potential source of wider infection both for Syria and the rest of the region.
Perhaps Cartalucci was the first person publicly to recognize what has been happening here.
On 8 February 2018, Russia's RT bannered, "US-led coalition conducts 'defensive' airstrikes against Syrian forces", and reported, "The US-led coalition has also firmly stressed its 'non-negotiable right to act in self-defense,' since its service members are embedded with the [anti-Syrian] 'partners' on ground in Syria. … 'It's very likely that the Americans have taken a course of dividing the country. They just gave up their assurances, given to us, that the only goal of their presence in Syria – without an invitation of the legitimate government – was to defeat Islamic State and the terrorists,' Lavrov said."
All of this, likewise, has since been borne out. Key was the September 2018 Tehran summit of Erdogan, Putin and Rouhani (Syria not even being represented there), to decide how to handle Syria's most pro-jihadist province: Idlib. (It's even more jihadist than Raqqah, where ISIS was headquartered, and which is the second-most-jihadist.)
On 9 September 2018, the Turkish-Government-controlled (and this also means anti-Syrian) Daily Sabah newspaper bannered "The outcome of the Tehran summit" and reported that:
We know for a fact that Erdoğan's goal was to prevent the Russians and the Assad regime from carrying out a comprehensive operation in Idlib. In this sense, he got what he wanted. At the joint press conference, the Russian president announced that the three countries, at the request of President Erdoğan, urged all parties to lay down their arms. As such, it became possible to prevent another humanitarian disaster, a new influx of refugees, the collapse of the Astana process [which Putin had established to replace the U.N.'s U.S.-approved peace process immediately after Obama bombed on 17 September 2016 Syria's Army at Deir Ezzor — which bombing by the U.S. violated the ceasefire agreement that Obama's Secretary of State John Kerry had just signed with Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on 9 September 2016] and the radicalization of moderate opposition, who would have moved closer to the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) [Al Qaeda in Syria]. At the same time, a clear distinction was made between 'terrorists' and opposition groups. At the same time, there is no doubt that the Iranian president's proposal to remove the United States from the east of the Euphrates river was in line with Erdoğan's own agenda.
Actually, however, the truthfulness of that last sentence is still very much in doubt.
The ultra-reliable Al Masdar News reported on 10 September 2018 that "Russia and Iran have already informed Turkey that they will not accept any jihadist factions inside of Idlib; however, the latter is attempting to convince Moscow and Tehran to avoid carrying out the attack in favor of Ankara clearing these groups." Putin and Rouhani accepted Erdogan's promise there (of "Ankara clearing those groups"), and consequently allowed Turkey's troops to handle Idlib. But, evidently, Erdogan had been lying about that. He didn't eliminate the jihadists — he has instead been protecting them (except that his forces attack the Kurdish-independence forces against Syria's Government, the anti-Assad fighters whom Erdogan authentically has been obsessed to kill).
The very next day, on September 11th, Paul Mansfield at Syria News headlined "Erdogan Buys Time for Terrorists at the Tehran Summit" and he observed that
The Turkish newspaper Daily Sabah released the components of Turkey's plan for Idlib. It doesn't take a genius to figure out it effectively means annexing Syrian territory, entrenching Turkish proxy Free Syrian Army forces, while falsely legitimizing their presence through a trilateral agreement, one made (it should be mentioned) without the presence of the country it concerns: Syria.
On 18 September 2018, another of the Turkish regime's major newspapers, Yeni Safak, headlined "Turkey tells 50,000 FSA fighters to be ready for deployment as tensions rise in Idlib" and reported that, "As the Assad regime and Russian warplanes viciously attack the last opposition-held stronghold of Syria's Idlib, Turkey ramped up its military reinforcements in northern Syria and instructed over 50,000 Free Syrian Army (FSA) [that being the Turkish-led anti-Assad] fighters stationed in Afrin, Azaz, Jarabulus, al-Bab and al-Rai to 'be ready for military deployment.'"
This anti-Syrian report continued, "The Bashar al-Assad regime recently announced plans to launch a major military offensive in Idlib, which is controlled by various armed opposition groups." It didn't mention that those "armed opposition groups" were the members of Al Qaeda-led forces defeated elsewhere in Syria who had chosen to be bused by the Syrian Government into the most pro-jihadist Syrian province, Idlib, instead of to be outright shot to death on-the-spot by Syrian troops, where they had been fighting. Such crucial information was left out of Western news-reports.
It went on: "An attack on Syria's Idlib, the last opposition-held stronghold, would be a massacre," and (since this newspaper reflected Erdogan's anti-Assad, meaning anti-Syrian, viewpoint) it alleged that "Russia and Assad regime target civilians" instead of try to exterminate jihadists — especially now in Idlib itself, to which Syria's Government had, indeed, been busing the surviving defeated jihadists. (As was previously noted, the only alternative that Syria's Government had had regarding those hold-out fighters would have been simply to go in and slaughter not only them but the human shields behind whom they were fighting, which would have enormously increased the civilian casualties, which the 'barbaric' Assad-led Government was always trying to avoid doing. So: that's how and why so many of the Al Qaeda-led forces came to be collected inside Idlib to begin with.)
Erdogan might be a double-agent here. But how could Turkey be building infrastructure in Syria and not be permanently taking that land? All of those "seems to be" could be wrong, but it's hard to see how Syria's Government could accept any such blatant grab of land away from their nation. I had written on 14 September 2018 about Erdogan's duplicity, headlining "U.S. Protects Al Qaeda in Syria, Proven":
Erdogan is in both camps — America's and Russia's — and playing each side against the other, for what he wants. But he could turn out to be the biggest loser from 'his' success here.
If he exterminates Idlib's jihadists, then the U.S. side will condemn him for it. But if he instead frees those jihadists to return to their home-countries, then both sides will condemn him for having done so.
The biggest apparent 'winner' from all this, Erdogan, could thus turn out to be the biggest real loser from it. And the biggest apparent 'loser' from it, Assad, could turn out to be the biggest real winner from it.
Then, three days later, on September 17th, I argued that the big winners from this will probably be Putin, Erdogan, Rouhani, and Assad. The headline of that was "Putin and Erdogan Plan Syria-Idlib DMZ as I Recommended", and the basic case was presented that this would turn out to be only a feint on Erdogan's part, and that he and Putin and Rouhani (and Assad) would all benefit from this feint by Erdogan, and take home the win. It still could be that. But only Erdogan himself probably knows. And who can read his mind? The main sign I would look at is whether Putin and Rouhani just ignore, as much as possible, Turkey's 'seizures' of Idlib and of the most-jihadist parts of Aleppo province bordering Idlib to Idlib's immediate east. (For example, this fundamentalist-Sunni family from Sweida — which is perhaps the most pro-jihadist southern province — migrated during the war to Al-Bab, which is Turk-controlled.) If Putin and Rouhani ignore Turkey's solidification of its control over those areas of northern Syria, then this is how the U.S. side and proxy forces — jihadists and Kurdish fanatics — might lose in Syria, and be forced out of there. This Turkish 'win' would entail a loss for both the U.S. and its proxy-forces, especially the Kurds. But it would also entail Syria's loss of the areas that were always the greatest thorn in Assad's side. In that case, America's former proxy-forces in northwest Syria — Al Qaeda's surviving Syrian forces, plus the separatist Kurdish forces — would henceforth be under Erdogan's control. If Putin, Rouhani and Assad won't object to that, then the main loser could be the U.S. regime, which would cede to Erdogan not only America's last holdout in Syria but also all of its proxy-forces in Syria, henceforth to be totally subject to whatever Erdogan has in mind for them. However, the biggest losers could still be the Turkish and the American regimes. But that would be true only if the surrounded U.S. forces in Syria's northeast become forced out. If the U.S. occupation stays in Syria, then the U.S. and Turkey will have taken all of northern Syria. But no oil or gas is there, either. (It's south of there.) What, consequently, is this war even about, any longer? Is it about contending national leaders who refuse to acknowledge defeat? Is that now the only real reason for all of this ongoing death, and destruction? Is it just pure ego?
If Turkey quits NATO, then the biggest loser from the end-part of the Syrian war would be the U.S. and its allies. But, of course, the biggest losers from the entire war are the Syrian people. There's no doubt, whatsoever, about that.
Author's note: first posted at The Saker
Sultana Yesmin
Following the years of tension over Iran's alleged efforts to develop a nuclear weapon, a long-term deal called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) between Iran and the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China, Russia – plus Germany, known as P5+1— was reached on July 14, 2015. Based on these developments, the UNSC Resolution 2231 endorsed the nuclear deal among these parties, adopted on July 20, 2015.
As per the deal, the IAEA remains under the charge to verify Iran's compliance with the nuclear-related provisions of the JCPOA set forth in the agreement. Iran started providing the IAEA with necessary information to complete its investigation on the past records of its nuclear activities. The IAEA inaugurated increased monitoring and confirmed Iran's adoption of numerous actions and key steps towards the limitation of its nuclear program.
Under the 2015 accord, Iran was allowed to enrich uranium only up to a 3.67 percent concentration, to stockpile no more than 300kg of the material, and to operate no more than 5,060 centrifuges. Iran also agreed to limit the size of its stockpile of enriched uranium, used to make both reactor fuel and nuclear weapons for 15 years – until 2031 and the number of centrifuges installed to enrich uranium for 10 years -until 2026.
These developments triggered the relief of sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union (EU), and the United Nations (UN) on Iran. The former US President, Barack Obama, referred to the deal as the significant step towards building "more hopeful world" and "opportunity to move in a new direction".
However, the first crisis over landmark nuclear deal arose soon after the announcement of the US President Donald Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018. In light of Trump's decision, the US took actions to re-impose all sanctions on August 6, 2018 that were lifted in connection with the JCPOA.
President Trump denounced the Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran as "defective, decaying, and rotten" as well as "one-sided deal". He also accused that the accord only restricted Iran's nuclear activities for a fixed period that failed to stop Iran from the development of its ballistic missiles and to facilitate real, comprehensive, and lasting solution of the nuclear crisis.
President Trump also raised the concern of the continuation of Iran's aggression and malign activities under the cover of the JCPOA to threaten the US and its allies as well as to exploit the international financial system and support terrorism and foreign proxies in favor of its withdrawal from the deal. Iran responded the US withdrawal from the JCPOA with its further preparation for the restoration of uranium enrichment required for both nuclear energy and weapons on an industrial level without any limitations.
The second tension over Iranian nuclear crisis emerged from Donald Trump's signing of an executive order imposing "hard-hitting" new sanctions on Iran on June 24, 2019 in response to the downing of an unmanned U.S. surveillance drone in international airspace by Iranian surface-to-air missile one week ago of the same month. Donald Trump also reaffirmed Washington's stand of continuing pressure on Tehran until latter's complete abandonment from nuclear activities.
It elevated tensions and worsened relations between the US and Iran. The confrontation was about to turn into military dimension though finally it did not happen thanks to Trump's swift repeal of its decision of launching military strikes against Iran.
The third and most recent crisis generated from Iran's announcement on boosting its uranium enrichment above the limit set by 2015 nuclear deal has drawn attention to international community in general and the involved global powers in particular, mostly the US, UK, and France. In the first week of July 2019, Iran declared to resume enriching uranium to higher levels, up to 5 percent concentration, to provide fuel required for its Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Iran also threatened to abandon more commitments under 2015 nuclear deal unless practical and tangible steps from the European powers are taken to implement European mechanism, known as, Instrument In Support of Trade Exchanges (INSTEX) in order to facilitate trade and circumvent US sanctions on Iran.
Iran argued for the decision of its uranium enrichment as a step against the Trump administration's unilateral exit from the 2015 nuclear deal and the re-imposition of multilateral sanctions in Iranian regime. Iran also accused that the world powers had failed to abide by their commitments. Since the beginning, Iran has been averring the development of its missile program as entirely peaceful and defensive in nature with the compliance of the principles verified by the IAEA.
In response, the US confirmed its policy of "maximum pressure" on Tehran acknowledged by the Trump administration referring to Iran's infringement to the limit as "playing with fire". The rest world powers such as the UK and Germany urged Iran for reversing its decision. France, Germany, and Britain expressed concerns over Iran's new announcement in the wake of heightening tensions certainly condemning Iran's decision as a "violation" of the nuclear pact.
The IAEA arranged an urgent nuclear agency meeting on July 10, 2019 requested by the US soon after Iran's confirmation of exceeding the stockpile of enriched uranium permitted under JCPOA. The rest concerned powers, Germany, France and the UK confirmed their supports for the JCPOA only after Iran's full compliance with its commitments. The closed-door meeting however ended without any unified stance.
However, China mentioned the US "unilateral bullying", e.g. the maximum pressure exerted by the US on Iran, as the major cause behind Tehran's announcement of breaching its uranium enrichment cap and the escalating Iranian nuclear crisis. China also expressed "regret" on Tehran's decision for further enrichment of its nuclear activities.
The re-imposition of the US sanctions and Iran's announcement of uranium enrichment have already generated high tension not only in US-Iran relations but also for global security. Iran's threat to enrich uranium beyond the limit has become a major issue of concern for the proliferation of nuclear weapons in Middle Eastern region. The peaceful solution of Iran nuclear crisis has thus become uncertain. The strategic rivalry among great powers, lack of mutual trust between the US and Iran, and absence of the fulfillment of commitments under the nuclear deal have been posing severe challenges to the durable solution of the nuclear crisis.
Is Iran safe for Americans to visit?
Afshin Majlesi
The matter of security in Iran is essentially considered as a complex question for any U.S. citizen willing to visit the Islamic Republic.
In this regard, Skift Inc., a New York City headquartered media company that provides news, research, and marketing services for the travel industry, has tried to answer the question from two different points of view; one from the U.S. government and the other by U.S. travel agents and tour operators.
On a Monday article, the media outlet noticed a hint of a "perception problem" deemed to be fueled by the Trump administration's rhetoric toward Iran.
Official answers to the query comes from the U.S. State Department, which has had a travel advisory against Iran since 1979, citing "the risk of kidnapping, arrest and detention of U.S. citizens." On the other hand, tour operators who spoke with Skift strongly disagree, maintaining that Iran has proven to be a safe and remarkably hospitable place for travelers, including Americans.
The dilemma arises when an antagonism intensifies between the Trump administration and Iran that makes some American tourists rethinking plans to visit the country though nearly all tour operators say Iran is a safe and hospitable destination even for U.S. visitors.
"It is a country that is often portrayed as unwelcoming, but the reality is quite the opposite," said Jenny Gray, the global product and operations manager of the Australia-based Intrepid Travel.
"Iranians are warm, friendly and eager to show off their country to foreigners. The feedback from our travelers is a testament to this."
"Once they [Iranian authorities] have been approved for entry [issuing visas], people are welcomed warmly—we've never encountered a problem or even a cold shoulder," said Robin Pollak, the president of Journeys International, which is offering Iran tours since 2015.
"People in Iran are very curious about visitors from a culture that is off-limits to them. They understand that American visitors do not reflect the way America is portrayed to them by their government," she added.
Janet Moore, owner of Distant Horizons, which has offered customized tours to Iran for over 20 years, says "We're used to getting questions on politics and safety, but this time frame seems more serious than what we've been through before."
"People are worried about the rhetoric from (President) Trump and (national security advisor John) Bolton. They don't want to be anywhere where there's military activity."
With an Iran tour scheduled for September, Moore said she's uncertain whether the trip will actually go forward.
"People have really started to get skittish," she said. "We're not getting new sign-ups and most of our American travelers have pulled out and are making alternative plans. While people feel Iran is probably still safe, they also feel it's something they can do later when things calm down."
Reverting to foreign arrivals, Skift reports that Journeys International has seen interest fall off sharply among its clientele, which is primarily from the U.S., during the past month.
G Adventures, which offers a 14-day Iran itinerary, says that bookings among American travelers has fallen by 14 percent this year, said communications director Kim McCabe. At the same time, she noted that bookings from non-U.S. travelers increased by about that same amount.
"Global visitor interest in Iran seems to be modestly growing," Kim said.
"Demand for Iran has been a real up and down situation," Moore said. "Four years ago it was at a high point. Then we ran into problems in 2017 when Trump announced the travel ban on Muslims. Some people cancelled travel plans to Iran because they feared Iran would stop issuing visas or that they would be met with antagonism."
Skift concludes that despite setbacks, the tour operators are optimistic about long-term growth in tourism to Iran, which in recent years has stepped up efforts to increase international visitation and has the stated goal of attracting 20 million annual visitors by 2025.
Last December, Ashely Duncan, an American fashion psychologist who accidentally landed in Iran, announced that her perception of the country was "totally different" from what mainstream Western media outlets portray.
Duncan told IRNA in an interview that "As an American, I did have a pleasant experience. I did not allow the politics and the diplomatic relationship to taint my view of Iran's people."
Iran hosts some of the world's oldest cultural monuments including bazaars, museums, mosques, bridges, bathhouses, madrasas, gardens, rich natural, rural landscapes as well as 22 UNESCO World Heritage sites.
IRENA and the RES4Africa Foundation have agreed to cooperate to increase the speed of renewable energy development in Africa in...
10 Instagram Worthy Spots in Kuala Lumpur


Don't miss the current winner of the BAFTA Award and the Oscar nominee in the Biography Dox section.
The latest National Geographic's documentary, Free Solo, directed by Elizabeth Chai Vasarhelyi and Jimmy Chin, to be screened at this year's ZagrebDox in the official Biography Dox section, won the BAFTA Award for Best Documentary. He was nominated for the prize together with two other documentaries included in this year's ZagrebDox program - They Shall Not Grow Old by Peter Jackson and Tim Wardle's Three Identical Strangers. Prior to nominations for the Oscar and BAFTA Awards, Free Solo won the best documentary award at the 43rd Toronto International Film Festival.
The most fearless among mountaineers are the free solo climbers who do not use ropes or any other kind of safety equipment. They also climb at great heights, so even the tiniest mistake could be fatal. This is Alex Honnold's speciality. Free Solo follows the American soloist Honnold as he prepares to climb El Capitan, the legendary 900-meter vertical rock face in Yosemite National Park. Even with safety equipment, it is an incredibly difficult climb. Ascending it requires complete focus, and Honnold believes that is why his first attempt fails – he feels there are too many people watching, and that includes the film crew. Honnold talks about what motivates him to be a free solo climber, about his fears, his family, and his blossoming relationship with fellow climber Sanni McCandless.


When getting divorced, Utah parents need to handle conversations about divorce with their kids carefully.
Among the many concerns that Utah parents can have when facing an upcoming divorce is their children. Worries about how kids will feel about the divorce, how they will react and how to maintain strong relationships going forward are all common and understandable. How conversations from the first, to those all through the process are handled, can make a big difference in how well kids go through a parental divorce.
The vision for down the road should be that kids can still have very positive relationships with moms and dads. The Huffington Post suggests that one way to achieve this is to avoid placing limits on when children can have contact with each parent. For example, when the children are at the father's house they should feel free to call or text the mother if they wish. The same holds true the other way around.
During a divorce, kids are likely to have questions and their ability to ask them and understand the answers will vary with their age and maturity. Today's Parent explains some of the emotional development of children at different stages and what conversations should be focused on.
Younger children will be most interested in what they directly experience. If they need to move, who will pick them up from daycare or school and whether or not they can keep their favorite stuffed animal can all be topics of questions from these kids. Parents should keep answers short and factual and avoid conversations about which parent has custody. Concepts like child custody and other divorce legalities are not appropriate for kids.
As kids move through the school-age years they can tend to want to blame someone or something for their parents' divorce. Moms and dads should be aware of this and help avoid this, especially when children take the blame themselves.
Tweens and teenagers may be more resistant to conversations about the divorce, but that does not mean they do not need their parents. At this point, parents should remain engaged and present despite what appears to be kids' efforts to push them away. This can give these kids the security they are actually seeking.
While having conversations with kids appropriate to their age level, when first telling them about the divorce, a single meeting with all siblings is best according to Psychology Today. This prevents any discord between siblings based upon who was told this important information first.
Issues like these represent just some of the many nuances that Salt Lake City parents can experience during a divorce. Working with an experienced family law attorney is important as it can ensure that all legal aspects are properly handled. This will allow parents the best ability to focus on the emotional need of their children.


text:
Q: AppController not found Can anyone tell what is wrong with my code.I am using cakephp 2.9.5.Getting error : Class 'app\Controller\AppController' not found
<?php
namespace app\Controller;
use app\Controller\AppController;

Class ProductsController extends AppController{

    public function index()
    {
        $prducts = $this->Product->find('all');

        print_r($prducts);
    }
}

?>

A: It is because you are using the wrong namespace for the controller. Controllers in CakePHP have their own seperate namespaces.
Replace
namespace app\Controller;
use app\Controller\AppController;

With
use AppController;

or use this
App::uses('AppController', 'Controller');

This should work.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Jump in, the water's fine: App lets hosts rent their pool by the hour
Samantha Raudins and Mark Williams The Columbus Dispatch USA TODAY NETWORK
No pool? No problem.
Swimply, an app that allows owners to rent their pools by the hour, has taken off during the coronavirus pandemic as community pools stay closed for the season and people look for ways to gather outdoors safely.
Swimply co-founder Asher Weinberger said he got the idea for the business after he bought his first home with a pool in 2018. He said friends and family members asked to use the pool and he wondered how he could schedule their visits and avoid liability.
That led Weinberger to partner with co-founder Bunim Laskin, and they began knocking on doors in their New York City neighborhood. Weinberger said they pitched their idea to 80 pool owners and got the door shut in their face by 76 of them.
Yet Swimply launched 13 months later and now has 200,000 app downloads and 6,000 listed pools, Weinberger said. Since the pandemic began, the app has experienced 3,300% growth.
"It's not just the public pools. What we're doing is we're replacing lots of other sectors. So, for example, where were people making their birthday parties? Maybe Chuck E. Cheese or places like that, and now there's nowhere to do that," Weinberger said. "There are people who do aquatic therapy or physical therapy, people go to the gym, they can't exercise — looking for a way to exercise right? We're not just replacing the public pool. We're just an entertainment, exercise and just general relaxation venue."
Weinberger, who still rents out his own pool, even to test underwater drones, said he made $15,000 last month in rental fees.
Weinberger said hosts — depending on the kind of pool and the offered amenities — could make around $5,000 per month for a pool that might otherwise be used only 15% of the time.
Swimply charges hosts a 15% fee and swimmers a 10% fee. Swimply, based in Long Island, New York, and hosts negotiate a price based on factors including pool size, demand, amenities and location. The rental fee generally ranges from $40 to $60 per hour.
Would-be hosts post their pools and amenities on the app, and swimmers can search for pools in their area by ZIP code, filter searches by amenities and book a time, Weinberger said.
Swimply advises hosts to cap their guest maximum at eight to ensure safety during the pandemic.
Gina Burnside has made about $1,000 beyond expenses by renting her pool at her Hilltop home since she joined Swimply on July 30. She has rented it 21 times and has eight more reservations.
She charges $45 per hour to use the pool, which includes a diving board. There also is access to a bathroom.
"I really didn't realize how many people want to use a pool right now because of the pandemic," she said.
Friends and family members have routinely used the pool, Burnside said, but she reserves it for herself on weekends.
"Why not have an extra side hustle while I'm working, while giving people the joy of swimming in a pool," she said.
As for amenities, more than 80% of the listed pools offer use of bathrooms, but if a host doesn't, the company will work with them to provide portable facilities. Other listings offer additional spaces such as basements or pool houses, which can be used by visitors and are cleaned regularly.
Swimmers sign a liability waiver as part of Swimply's terms of use, Weinberger said, and in the next year or so the company plans to add a $2 million insurance policy.
Entrepreneur David Schottenstein, a Columbus-based investor in Swimply, said he decided to buy in when the pandemic began to worsen.
"I started to think to myself, 'You know what, this is definitely something that the world is going to need for a long time to come.' And even without COVID, it made sense in a lot of ways," Schottenstein said.
He said he was surprised when he learned that his sisters, who live in Brooklyn, New York, already were using Swimply and that Columbus also has lots of people with — and without — pools.
"Columbus is really a fantastic market for them, obviously spring, summer, mostly because it's very seasonal, but I'm very excited that it's hitting my hometown," Schottenstein said.
Burnside said the end of COVID-19 won't mean the end of her renting her pool.
"Even without the pandemic, families want privacy and a place to go that doesn't have a bunch of people," she said.
sraudins@dispatch.com
@sam_raudins
mawilliams@dispatch.com
@BizMarkWilliams


'You can please some of the fish some of the time but not all of the piscene critters all of the time.' Of the original 27 conservations zones none were on or near the Yorkshire coast. The nearest is the Aln estuary.
Defra's new areas for marine conservation do include the Yorkshire locations of Holderness from Skipsea to Spurn Point and Runswick Bay both of which are important for various species including starfish and crabs. However Compass Rose, 20 miles off the Yorkshire coast, which is an important place for plaice, herring, lemon sole and sand eels, is one of 14 sites that has been dropped from the new consultation.
Are Marine Conservation Zones Strong Enough?
MCZs are 'multi-use areas' and not the far stronger no-take marine reserves. Multi-use will allow many activities to continue within them with their own set of restrictions and management.
Professor Callum Roberts, at the University of York a noted conservationists warns that missing key sites are still putting habitats and wildlife, ranging from large seagrass meadows to the spiny seahorse, at risk.


text:
Grand National 2017: Saphir Du Rheu to secure another big prize at Aintree
Simon Jackson / April 7, 2017
The Grand National is the World's greatest steeplechase. (Pic: Courtesy of Jockey Club Racecourses).
SAPHIR DU RHEU is taken to secure another big prize at Aintree by winning the £1million Randox Health Grand National at 5.15pm on Saturday.
The eight-year-old impressed trainer Paul Nicholls when justifying favouritism to win the Grade 1 Mildmay Novices' Chase at Aintree two years ago, before appearing to lose his way the next season.
Yet he looked more like his old self when returning with an improved effort to finish third in a Grade 3 at Ascot, before winning at Kelso, and was said by Nicholls to be in good form before finishing fifth in the Cheltenham Gold Cup.
"Saphir Du Rheu is back on track and won nicely at Kelso and before that ran really well at Cheltenham [in January], when second over an inadequate trip," Nicholls said ahead of the Cheltenham Festival.
"He fell in the Hennessy when I thought he had a big chance and that might have just woken him up. He had a fairly bad fall and everything galloped over him.
"Since that day, he has jumped very, very well. If he can jump and get his act together, he is a good horse.
"We thought he would be a superstar when he won a Grade 1 at Aintree [in April, 2015] but he lost his way a little bit. He has plenty of ability and we have not seen the best of him yet."
Saphir Du Rheu (18-1) is the shortest price of five entries for the 10 time champion trainer and will be ridden by stable jockey Sam Twiston-Davies whose father, dual Grand National-winning trainer Nigel Twiston-Davies, trains the biggest danger, Blaklion.
Twiston-Davies won the World's greatest steeplechase with Earth Summit (1998) and Bindaree (2002) and has said that Blaklion (12-1) "is very fairly handicapped" for the National.
Meanwhile the experienced amateur rider Sam Waley-Cohen bids to add to his tremendous record over the Aintree fences when he rides The Young Master (20-1). The jockey has won six races over the National fences and can finish in the money on Neil Mulholland's charge whose connections consider to be at his best at this time of year.
The Last Samuri (14-1) carries far more weight than when finishing second last year, but may still finish in the first five as can More Of That (12-1), who will have the services of Barry Geraghty. For those looking for a bigger price the Gordon Elliot-trained 50-1 shot Roi Des Francs can defy his long odds.
Grand National Tips: 1st Saphir Du Rheu; 2nd Blaklion; 3rd The Young Master; 4th The Last Samuri; 5th More Of That. Best outsider: Roi Des Francs
April 7, 2017 in Grand National. Tags: Blaklion, Grand National tips, London, more of that, Roi Des Francs, Saphir Du Rheu, The Last Samuri, The Young Master
Paul Nicholls: Saphir Du Rheu could get placed in Cheltenham Gold Cup
Cheltenham 2017: Horse Talk's best bets for The Festival
Paul Nicholls has strong hand in World Hurdle with Saphir Du Rheu and Zarkandar
← Grand National 2017: Dry ground forecast ahead of £1 million Randox Health Grand National
All-Weather Championships Finals: Lancelot Du Lac 'best he has ever been' ahead of sprint final →


text:
Which is the Sin City in world?
Las Vegas. Las Vegas is such a prominent sin city that it's even earned the nickname "Sin City".
What cities are known as Sin City?
Known for its gambling scene, it's no wonder why Las Vegas has been infamously referred to as "Sin City." By the time the practice was legalized in Nevada in 1931, after being outlawed in 1910, the city was already full of speakeasies and illicit casinos, as well as organized crime, according to History.com.
What is the most wicked city in the world?
"Considering its widely heralded reputation as 'the wickedest city in the world,' and as a hotbed of vice and iniquity, Chicago is an agreeable surprise," said the Rev. McCuaig last week, after a series of investigations.
Which is the Sin City of India?
Goa becoming 'sin city' of India: State Congress.
Which country has the most sin?
Australia is the most sinful nation on the Earth, a study has claimed as the country ranked first overall in seven deadly sins, which include lust, greed and pride.
Is Thailand a Sin City?
Welcome to the world's most notorious Sin City, Pattaya Thailand, where the beach front is lined with sex workers and the girls in the bars numbered, all with their price.
Is Bangkok a Sin City?
Bangkok, Thailand There's very little you can think of in terms of sin that doesn't go on in Bangkok. Without wanting to get into the darker side of the sex industry's ever more creative ways of luring tourists, there's also gambling, cheap drinks and debauched parties.
Is there a Sin City?
With male-focused entertainment and crime buzzing around, Las Vegas quickly earned its notorious nickname, Sin City.
Which country is the most sinful?
STOCKHOLM – A Swedish survey yesterday cast Spain as the most sinful nation among a group of leading industrialised countries.
Why is Pattaya called Sin City?
Pattaya, whether you are experiencing it by or night, it all boils to one Big Happy Ending – the reason why it is often called the Sin City. Don't be shocked or surprised to see scantily clad women/girls and often Lady Boys strut their stuff in public and it is not uncommon to hear a fierce "bargain" take place.
What does Pattaya mean in English?
proper noun A resort on the coast of southern Thailand, south-east of Bangkok.
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Seat length: Strollers infant. Wholesale bontrag carbon. Pads nursing. 360 degree double swivel seats. Yec043e. Automatic rollsStx-085eva. Stx-330. Product cart. Product weight: Tires: 103cm*68cm*41cm. Wholesale qibaer stroller. Cg358.
Five colors. Hh056. 2015012201748993. Cart 16. Children recliner. Red,blue,yellow. Red brick, eggplant purple, indigo, deep green, green, light grey. Ksf-033. Around 8.9kgColor: : Bicycle basket. 588ly. Pram frame. Foldable lightweight 3 in 1 baby stroller baby pram pushchairs for bab. 600d oxford cloth. Stroller size : 0-3years old. Storage bag. Pink,brown,red.
Inflatable wheel,titanium wheel. Baby stroller: 2015012201818432. Hhcg218248. Trolley folding. 80*57*110 cm. 0m-4y. One button to open. Wholesale kissbaby strollers. Kd269. Wheel type: Car body material: Electric toy. 360 degree rotation. Wholesale wheel motorcycle.


text:
Q: Find all dependencies on a primary key I have found out how to find all dependencies on a table.
However if I just wanted to know where this primary key is used, how would I do it?
I believe we use SQL Server 2005.

A: I assume you're looking for all foreign keys that are based on a given table (and it's primary key). If you were on SQL Server 2008+ you could use sp_fkeys.
EXEC sp_fkeys 'TableName'

As you're on 2005 you'll have to put together this data manually. Check this previous answer by Gishu, it should give you the script you're after.
https://stackoverflow.com/questions/483193/how-can-i-list-all-foreign-keys-referencing-a-given-table-in-sql-server


The Boltan Yellow Dome Support Pole Cap is designed to be placed on top of your tent pole to hold up the centre of the tarp.
It will support the tarp, and reduce pressure on the stitches and welds, which will extend the lifespan of your tarp, saving you money in the long term.
It also helps prevent water from pooling in the tarp, and may be used instead of a ridge pole.
The Boltan Yellow Dome Support Pole Cap would be a great addition to your next camping trip.


text:
package ogr.scorelab.ucsc.mobility_track;

import android.content.Intent;
import android.os.Bundle;
import android.os.CountDownTimer;
import android.support.annotation.Nullable;
import android.support.v7.app.AppCompatActivity;

/**
 * Created by Daniel on 2016-12-07.
 */

public class Splash extends AppCompatActivity {

    @Override
    protected void onCreate(@Nullable Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
        //remove actionbar to make it look better
        try {
            getSupportActionBar().hide();
        }catch(Exception i){}

        //display something on screen
        setContentView(R.layout.activity_splash);

        //wait 2 seconds
        new CountDownTimer(2*1000,1000) {
            @Override
            public void onTick(long millisUntilFinished) {}//not used, but mandatory

            @Override
            public void onFinish() {
                //go onto the next activity
                startActivity(new Intent(Splash.this,MainActivity.class));
                //close this activity
                finish();
            }
        }.start();
    }
}

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
Benjamin R. Naylor, Korean War veteran, researcher, school board chair, grandfather
Benjamin R. Naylor, Bennington VT, previously of Calais VT, passed away at Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center on September 7, 2022, after a long and well-lived life.
Ben was born at home in West Springfield, MA on December 23, 1931, to Benjamin E. and Charlotte (Ramsdell) Naylor. He attended local schools, and enlisted in the Air Force during the Korean War. Using the GI Bill, he received a B.A. in experimental psychology at UMass Amherst, continued his studies in graduate school at Kansas State University in Manhattan, Kansas, and then worked as a Research Assistant at The Menninger Foundation in Topeka, Kansas.
In 1967, Ben joined the Vermont Department of Mental Health as Chief of Research. He and his wife, Dorothy, and three children first settled at Kents Corner, Calais, Vermont, before moving to Collar Hill where they resided for over 50 years. The Collar Hill property allowed Ben and his family to have a backyard sugaring operation as well as harvest much of their vegetables, meat, and firewood. This endeavor gave Ben a great deal of satisfaction.
He took great interest in town politics: first serving on various committees during the establishment of U-32 High School and Calais Elementary School and later serving as Calais rep to the U-32 school board for 6 years, half of that time as chair. He was best known in town for strong, clear remarks and his attention to detail at March Town and School Meetings.
Ben and his wife started SideHill Farm Jam on a whim and it quickly became a Vermont specialty food small business; presently owned by their son, Kelt and his wife, Kristina in Brattleboro VT. As a specialty food pioneer, Ben spearheaded and then led the Vermont Specialty Food Association for several years.
Ben was introspective and his favorite pastime was thinking his way through various problems including (but not limited to) politics, environment, education, and community. He was particularly interested that there be fair and just outcomes for all stakeholders. His family valued the perspective this gave him when they found themselves in a jam (pun intended). His unbiased opinions allowed family members to find their own way which he would inevitably support.
Ben also relished telling (with embellishments) stories of adventures spanning his 90 years - from his long ago childhood to more recent adventures in Antarctica as well as along the coast of Labrador. Many remember his twinkly smile that signaled the beginning of a story, joke, or cheerful greeting.
Ben is survived by his wife of 62 years, Dorothy O. Naylor and his three children: daughter, Sonja N. Andrews, (Ross), Calais, VT; son, Kelt M. Naylor, (Kristina), Dummerston, VT; son, Benjamin E. Naylor, (Jennifer), Petersburg, NY and sister, Paula G. Naylor, Watertown, MA as well as 7 grandchildren: Lillian and John Andrews, Caroline and Max Naylor, and Aleana, Sophia, and Eli Naylor. Ben was predeceased by his infant son Kurt W. Naylor, his parents and his siblings, Miriam R. Wilska, Robert D. Naylor, and Ralph W. Naylor.
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Born in West Springfield, MA
Died in Lebanon, NH,
DETAILS OF SERVICES:
There will be a family gathering in the spring to scatter his ashes. In lieu of flowers the family is asking that you consider a donation to one of the following organizations:
Robinson Sawmill (P.O. Box 94 Calais, VT 05648-0094), https://www.robinsonsawmill.org/mission
Alzheimer's Association of Vermont (75 Talcott Rd, Suite 40, Williston, VT 05495).