Update: The 22.89 figure is apparently extremely erroneous. Minimum wage in Lebanon is $500. An MP's salary is slightly less than $8000 when you include all benefits so in the best case scenario, the factor to multiply is 16 nothing more. Moreover, I was also informed that comparing the salary of a Lebanese MP with benefits to the basic salary of MPs (without benefits) only leads to a severely skewed representation.
14 is the number of laws our parliament passed in 2012, even less in 2011.
2 is the number of general sessions it holds per year.
128 is the number of its current members, set to become 134 soon (link).
23 is approximately how many times the salary of a Lebanese MP is above and beyond that of Lebanon's minimum wage. That number is set to increase soon because "they need more money to do their jobs." (Number is from this infographic, which might be false).
A chat with one of our MPs a while ago revealed to me that some members in our parliament are actually poor. Stop laughing, okay?
It turned out they need the extra money in order to be able to do their "job" in better ways. You know, not writing laws.
What are we paying our MPs for exactly and who is to blame for this? Not the MPs.
Being a Lebanese MP means you're surrounded by a clout, a prestigious halo that needs to be maintained at all times. To that effect, there are certain standards of living to be kept. We pay for their convoys, their bodyguards, security measures (and maybe yachts, fancy apartments, etc.) But it's not because the MPs demand it (I'm sure they don't mind it), it's because we expect it of them.
There's a mentality among Lebanese people that if someone is not fancy enough, then that person is not cut out for certain jobs. I know this firsthand now that I'm entering the practical aspect of my future profession. The residents and interns at Lebanese hospitals are forced to wear ties and suits because – and I paraphrase – some patients immediately dismiss doctors not wearing ties and designer shirts because your dress code reflects on your medical knowledge that's for sure.
Our country is also run on a clientalism system. The more money our MPs get, the more personal favors they can bestow upon their voters, the more votes they get and the longer they stay in office.
We perpetuate this every single time we ask one of those MPs to help us secure a job, get admitted to some university, secure a building license, lay down some asphalt on our houses' driveways. As a way to compensate them, we go and drop their name in a voting box while wearing a custom-made shirt with his or her name emblazoned on it.
As long as we keep voting for people because of who they are and how they served us personally instead of what they actually accomplished while in office – not that we have a decent media source for such things to begin with – we don't really get to complain about overblown MP salaries.
It's a sad reality. But it's not changing anytime soon.
This entry was posted in Lebanon and tagged Lebanon, parliament, salary. Bookmark the permalink.
Thank you for covering the Take Back Parliament infographic. Unfortunately though, the update you recently included is not accurate. The minimum wage in Lebanon is actually 675,000 LBP (450 USD) and (quoting http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/12188) each MP gets 12,750,000 LBP a month. The ratio is this 18.89. If you include all benefits, this number goes up to 15.45 million LBP (each MP receives 2.7 million LBP every month) — and the ratio to 22.89.
The basic salary in Lebanon is 700,000. The salary of an MP with every single benefit is 11.4 million LL per month. The basic salary without benefits is 6 million.
My source regarding the above numbers is highly, highly credible.
If you do relevant ratios, you'll get 8 if we're comparing basic salaries only and 16.28 if we're comparing the benefit-inflated MP salary.
Regarding the minimum wage, the Ministry of Labor states that the minimum wage in Lebanon is LL 675,000. (موقع وزارة العمل على الانترنت – مرسوم تعيين الحد الادنى للاجور – موقع وزارة http://www.labor.gov.lb/_layouts/MOL_Application/AllLegalText.aspx?lang=ar&type=3).
Regarding the MP salaries, all sources we were able to find, including Al-Shahriya (the initial source of the infographic) which specializes in numbers and stats and Al-Akhbar, which states the records of the Ministry of Finance as its source (I honestly don't have time to go through the published budget right now) cite the same numbers. The 11.4 million you cite did not include all benefits, and was a monthly cash installment, up to the recent raise. This is explained in an "Al Fasaad" interview with actuary Ibrahim Muhanna on Al Jadeed (the interview was done in Dec 2010 which was before they raised the basic salaries of all MPs, Ministers, PM and President). Conclusion: According to the sources I am citing, the 11.4 million is an old figure and does not include all benefits.
Regardless, the truth is that the MPs are overpaid for what they do (which you point out in your blog post). A tenth of a law per MP per year should cost the public much much less than 11.4 or 15.45 million.
I am really not one to comment on things, but when I read your blog, and I came across it by pure mistake, I was really shocked by the figures on the infograph, 22.9 times minimum wage , while every other country is like 10 times .
then I read the comments of maya, and your rebuttal, and I decided to check more in the numbers.
I currently live in Virginia, and here In the US the salaries are clearly posted, a US senator gets paid 174000 dollars a year, assuming minimum wage mentioned in your graph are true (17,400 dollars a year) thought I couldn't find minimum wage in the us, there is a minimum hourly wage, not a yearly or monthly one, but reading maya's comments and your rebuttal ( I assume she has something to do with the people who published the graph, since she was so keen on defending the figures), its clear that when she calculated a Lebanese mp salary, she included in it all the benefits, while I have to clear out that a us senator gets paid174,000 $/year is without the benefits, the benefits of a us senator totals to about 1.5 million dollars a year, so if that is included to the basic salary, the total amount is about 750 times minimum wage in the us.
this prompted me to check more in the numbers, so I called a local Lebanese mp and Lebanese parliament, and asked them directly about the salary at hand, they were nice to give me the number which is 11.2 million LL including all the benefits ( staff, secretary driver fuel and a bunch of other stuff I couldn't understand, and was promised that a scan of the pay slip would be mailed to me soon), while the basic salary is around half of that.
meaning that when you want to compare basic salary to basic salary of a Lebanese mp and a us senator they are both about 10 times minimum wage, but when you want to compare salary with benefits the Lebanese one is 16.5 to ( not even 22.89) to 700+ to the us senators.
that made me want to look even more into the numbers, while I couldn't find the figures for the Arabian countries, but all western European countries have the salaries posted on public sites, to my surprise these numbers (basic arithmetic's) also didn't "check" with the ones posted on the graph, and are in most cases 10 fold the ones published on the graph when benefits were included, and a bit off when basic salaries were only calculated.
while I do agree about elie's article, especially clientalism which is a way of life in Lebanese politics, and the love of the Lebanese for the show off and how they judge mainly on appearances, and while personally I m not fond of any politician whether Lebanese or not, and believe all politicians to be self centered(to be polite), and honestly I don't know if 11.2 million LL/month is enough for a Lebanese mp to do a good job or not, since I don't live here and I don't know the fees required by a good legal expert, researcher or any other expert for that matter, which is a requirement for any mp to do a good job, hell I don't even know the price of stationary in Lebanon, so I m really not in a position to defend either point of view.
I wrote this comment for only one reasons, is that I was REALLY SHOCKED and actually disgusted, by the people who published this graph, the fact that you used flawed numbers( and I was one to fall for the trickery) just so you can promote your point of view, and go on your wild witch hunt, doesn't make you any better than the people you are trying to criticize, it only shows that you are willing to use any means even immoral ones to attain your goals ,and if I was to vote I would NEVER replace these people with YOU cause I for one would prefer overpaid people not doing their jobs, to immoral Machiavelli people.


text:
Wits Boytjies back in business
by Nokuthula Zwane | Feb 17, 2017
VICTORY: FNB Wits gave FNB CUT a run for thier money during the varisty Cup gme by 43-3 at the Wits Rugby Stadium. Photo: Nokuthula Zwane
FNB Wits seemed to be back on its feet on Monday night after a rocky start to the Varsity Cup season. The home side came away with an easy victory against Central University of Technology (FNB CUT) at the Wits Rugby Stadium with a final score of 43-3.
Wits lost its first two matches of the season but dominated proceedings against the side from Bloemfontein putting in five tries. The Wits Boytjies ended the first half of the match with 22 points on the board leaving the FNB CUT at a standstill with three points.
The visitors never quite recovered and ended the match with the same three points but picked up as many injuries along the way. Man of the match, FNB Wits lock Rhyno Herbst, was awarded with a cash prize of R1500 for his efforts.
Without changing much of their strategy in this game, Head Coach of the FNB Wits, Hugo Van As, said, "We were definitely looking into being better in our execution for the night". The team was attempting to recover from their previous outing after losing to University of Free State (UFS).
"We are still a little disappointed about our previous games because we had the opportunity to have a better performance," Van As said.
"There are a lot of things to improve as a team if we want to be in the top four of the competition," said Van As.
Warren Gilbert, Wits captain said, "The past three games were very disappointing for us, where we noticed that at the last 20 minutes of each game we would fade away." This appeared to have changed in Monday night's game with a stronger performance from the Boytjies.
"We set out as a team to re-write the history books of Wits rugby, thus the first two games was a chapter and last night's game was another chapter in our books," said Gilbert.
FNB WITS
Tries: Wandisile Simelane, Graham Logan, Justin Brandon, Constant Beckerling, Ameer Williams
Converstions: Warren Gilbert (4)
Penalties: Warren Gilbert (2)
FNB CUT
Penalties: Martin Jacobs
Wits Vuvuzela, Steinhoff interfaculty rugby league 2016 kicks off. April, 8, 2016.
Wits Vuvuzela, Wits are rugby champs. April, 19, 2016.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Description: Deep brain stimulation therapy is widely used to treat movement disorders such as essential tremor, Parkinson's disease, and dystonia, and indications continue to expand. Similarly, DBS systems continue to evolve offering clinicians and patients new programming options. A basic understanding of the DBS procedure, the different DBS systems, patient selection criteria, and postoperative programming strategies is essential for successful outcomes. Each issue will be discussed, with an emphasis on practical information for clinicians. This course has been divided into two sequential sessions. Those registering for the course are encouraged to participate in both sessions for a comprehensive overview of the topic. Part I focuses on basic DBS principles and programming issues in movement disorders. It will include an overview of new DBS systems, making it of interest to even more experienced programmers. Part II focuses on advanced DBS programming, trouble shooting, directional DBS in movement disorders, and also highlights DBS in non-movement disorder conditions. At the conclusion of this program, attendees are invited to "continue the conversation" as it relates to coding by engaging in small group conversation with the director and faculty. This program complements Deep Brain Stimulation I: Brain Principles and Programming in Movement Disorders, but covers independent topics.
Completion Message: Participants will be able to describe advanced DBS programming strategies, troubleshooting, and novel ways to optimize current delivery, including directional stimulation. They will also be aware of DBS applications in non-movement disorder conditions.


The internet has allowed millions of entrepreneurs to start their own business. From content marketing firms to big e-commerce sites, tons of folks are hopping on the internet biz bandwagon. But 9 out of 10 of these companies are predicted to fail during their first year.
From starting a company for all of the wrong reasons, to poor management and insufficient capital, there are many risks involved to launching your own business. Here are five tips to abide by to ensure your company does not sink during its first year in business.
When you are the boss of a fledgling company, you need to not just prepare for a rainy day; you need to prepare for full-on thunderstorms. This means doing a lot of homework about the industry you want to enter into. Learn about your local competition and what they are doing wrong and right. Also, research other companies that are like yours and have failed to see what you should not do.
Also, it's critical that you have at least one year of savings in the bank before you take the initiative to launch your own company.
You should have a plan of action when it comes to obtaining the proper funds for your new business. Are you going to fund it yourself or are you going to woo investors to lend you money? You can also go to your bank and apply for a small business loan. Check out several different banks and shop around until you find the right one for you.
You will need to get the proper marketing skills in place to get the word out about your company. Hire a consulting firm to help you find new customers. Don't just take your campaign to the streets; take it online as well. Utilize the power of online marketing to help you reach your targeted market audience. Be sure to create Twitter, Instagram, Facebook, and a blog to find new potential customers.
Remember, that you should also not get press too early or too late. About two weeks before your biz launches, get the word out on social media, the local news, and to friends.
One of the hardest things to do after you fail is to get back up on your feet and try again. The same can be said about companies that fail. You should know that you can always try again. There are many serial entrepreneurs out there that had a few bumps in the road before they found something that worked for them.
Remember to work hard and never give up on your dream.
How Can You Make Yourself More Valuable to Potential Employers?


First of all, we discussed the situation Libya, even if it was not formally on today's agenda, given the recent developments. I am following the developments by the minute, which are definitely not going in the right direction.
First of all, urging all parties and all regional players to implement fully a humanitarian, immediate truce, as requested by the United Nations.
Secondly, to avoid further military escalation - and the news that are coming from the airport in Tripoli are definitely not going in that direction. We invite everybody to avoid further military action and go back to the negotiation table under the auspices of the United Nations and make sure that the Libyan people get what they really want, which is peace and stability for the country.
I think there is no single Libyan who is in this moment happy about the developments in the country. I think the political leadership and the military leadership of Libya need to take responsibility to deliver on a peaceful transition, finally. We will be there to accompany this.
I have seen unity of Member States in these respects. United, the European Union will reach out to the parties and to the regional players to push in this direction. And, obviously, we will keep in contact with the UN Special Envoy [for Libya, Ghassan Salamé] in these days, and as we have done so far, to strengthen and support his work as much as we can and as always.
We then discussed our support to the Afghanistan peace process. You might have seen the conclusions that have been adopted that highlight the concrete actions that the European Union is willing and ready to take in support of an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process, hopefully to be started already next week - as it was announced that intra-Afghan negotiations might start already next week.
We have been supporting enormously the work of the Afghan legitimate authorities in their preparation for that. I am glad to see that yesterday, President [of Afghanistan, Ashraf] Ghani announced the formation of the negotiating team and a senior council to lead them. I really hope that, also following our talks in Kabul a couple of weeks ago, this can open the way for negotiations that can lead to peace in Afghanistan without pre-judging neither the electoral process nor the achievements that the Afghan population has managed to reach, in particular on the rights of women, minorities and human rights in general terms.
We had then with the [Foreign] Ministers a discussion to prepare the Eastern Partnership celebrations, the 10th anniversary of the Eastern Partnership that we will celebrate together with our six Eastern partners in May in Brussels, with a ministerial meeting between the 28 Member States – or 27 – and the six partners of the Eastern Partnership and also a High Level Event on the following day. We have gone through all the achievements and the positive developments that we have seen in the six partner countries and also the further work that is needed to consolidate some of the work.
In general terms, if you look back to four or five years ago, we have had enormous progress on many different fields, from visa facilitation to the people-to-people contacts, trade and economic investments. Obviously, more needs to be done, in particular on good governance, anti-corruption and the rule of law. We are determined to do that in partnership with our friends in the East.
What I can say is that I see clearly – also by meeting them often – that each and every one of them, in its own way, is very much willing to get closer to the European Union. We will make sure that this desire is met with a similar amount of enthusiasm on our European Union side, in particular in May as we will be celebrating our ten years of partnership.
One is the access of humanitarian aid inside the country that we think is vital. It is extremely positive that the United Nations and the Red Cross started their work in a more effective manner on the ground. This is also thanks to our support. We will continue doing that.
We will also intensify our work on the second track, which is the political one, trying to prepare the ground for presidential election to be held in a free and transparent manner as soon as possible. This seems to be a very-far-away-objective, given the expression from [Nicolás] Maduro of not being willing to engage in this process for the time being. But I also believe that it is essential that we engage as we are doing with all Venezuelan parties to try and prepare the ground for that.
We have discussed how to practically do that. We have works ongoing that are led by the European Union, in particular the European External Action Service, to prepare a roadmap that could highlight the steps that might be needed or might be an option to be taken to lead the country towards a democratic, peaceful transition.
This is it from my side. I am ready to try to answer your questions.
Q. Sur le Venezuela, il y avait une deadline qui était fixée à 90 jours. Peut-on imaginer que cette deadline sera reportée et si oui, à quelles conditions? Est-ce que l'option des sanctions, comme l'a dit M. [Josep] Borrell, est sur la table même si rien n'a été décidé, comme un instrument pour essayer de faire progresser les choses au Venezuela et notamment du côté de[Nicolas] Maduro? Sur la Libye, vous avez parlé de l'unité. Les 28 sont-ils unis pour condamner l'offensive déclenchée par le Maréchal Haftar qui a pris tout le monde de court?
First, the International Contact Group does not have an expiry date. The terms of reference of the Group, that are public, refer to the fact that after 90 days, the Contact Group - which is not just the European Union, we also have partners from Latin America in it - will review its results, will review its work. But there is no expiry date for the Contact Group.
The Contact Group does not only belong to the European Union. It is a European initiative, but we share it with our Latin American friends. We will obviously around the 90th day of our work - in May - review the results of our work and decide on the way forward.
Again, it is not a limited experience in time. Obviously, we can always decide to put an end to it, together with our Latin American friends, but there is no ticking clock that brings us to the end of the work in automatic terms. As I said, the exact wording of the terms of reference is "after 90 days the Group will review the results of its work and decide on the way forward". This is what we will be doing. The Member States are fully aware and on board with that.
On sanctions, I want to be very clear, because I think it is extremely important that we pass a message of clarity, especially to the Venezuelan population.
The European Union does not have sanctions on Venezuela in place and it is not considering putting sanctions on Venezuela in place: we have targeted individual restrictive measures on individuals that have had responsibilities in terms of either violence or of obstructing the democratic process. These are measures that do not affect Venezuela as a country or the Venezuelan people, but affect the single individuals that hold specific institutional responsibilities that are linked to the use of violence.
It is possible, it is not excluded, that Member States will consider further restricted measures on individuals of similar nature. Obviously, we will be updated on this in the coming weeks. In particular in the case of either the use of force against the population or in case of limiting or damaging the use of legitimate democratic institutions and rules, Member States will proceed in adopting targeted individual restrictive measures.
We are not talking about sanctions in economic general terms against the country. Our primary concern is the improvement of the humanitarian situation in the country and the well-being of the Venezuelan population - even if it sounds surreal to say so in these conditions, but this is our primary concern. And almost 1 million of the Venezuelan population are also European citizens. We are brothers and sisters. First and foremost we care about their lives.
We will possibly work on individual restrictive measures on some elements of the regime. Again, this is not excluded, but also not decided today.
On Libya, we did not take any formal written conclusions today, but there is a clear consensus among Member States on the call, as I said, to immediately stop all military actions inside Libya, be it from Libyans or - hopefully not and never - from external actors.
Q. On Afghanistan, I know that you proposed and the EU Foreign Ministers today expressed support for a role of the EU as a guarantor in Afghanistan. Can you spell out what you have in mind - a guarantor for what? For the peace process? For the implementation of the peace plan which would obviously be a much bigger commitment? How can this work in a context where the US is indicating it is politically and militarily planning to withdraw?
If you read the Council Conclusions carefully, I think you will find many of the answers in the common position we have adopted today.
Let me be very clear on this: the European Union is already today playing a key role in trying to facilitate the beginning of the Afghan peace process. I said the beginning, because for the time being, there have been productive talks that we have accompanied, encouraged and supported between the US and the Taliban, but the Afghan peace process as such has not started yet.
We have worked together with the United States administration - this is one of the files on which we have been working more closely and better together with the United States administration so far - to prepare the ground for a full and immediate beginning of inter-Afghan talks, hopefully by next week already, in Doha.
The European Union has already been involved in the preparation of that, with contacts at all levels, with all different actors, none excluded, from our side, including my recent visits to Islamabad and to Kabul. There I reached out first of all to our Afghan friends, encouraging them to get ready for these negotiations, and also reassuring them that the European Union - in this case we are already a sort of guarantor, even if informally - will never accept to support any agreement or any process that would put in danger the achievements that have been already reached by the Afghan society, in particular in terms of human rights, minority rights, women's rights, girls' rights that are a treasure to be nourished and protected as much as possible. They are still not sufficient, but Afghanistan needs to build on them.
Another reassurance we have given is that we will continue to push for the democratic electoral process not to be taken hostage by the beginning of the negotiations. The formula I have used in Kabul and that the US Special Envoy [Zalmay Khalilzad] has used himself and praised himself has been: engage in the peace process as if you did not have any electoral campaign to run and engage in the electoral process as if you were not negotiating peace outside of the country. On this we are already guaranteeing the Afghans some basic standards that are key for them and are key for us.
The role that the European Union can have in the months ahead is multiple. We can for instance work on the inclusiveness of the negotiating teams. We have experience in this respect, I mentioned in particular the need to include women in the negotiations. No negotiation is sustainable if half of the population is excluded from them. This is a work we have been doing on Syria. We are continuing to do it on Syria but also in Libya, and we would be more than happy to support a similar work on Afghanistan. But not only women, also different political viewpoints, different elements of the civil society of the country.
We could work very usefully on the plans for the reintegration of the combatants and their families in the Afghan society. This is also a work that we have been doing in different conflicts, and as we have done for many different peace processes and peace agreements, we can act as a guarantor. In particular in Asia, think of Myanmar, think of the Philippines, the European Union is the guarantor of the peace agreements.
I have the impression that we are now still far from an agreement, but we could obviously play that role, both of guaranteeing the implementation of the agreement - the European Union has sufficient resources and presence on the ground to do so, and I would say even more importantly, the European Union enjoys sufficient trust from different sites and parties of the Afghan society, the region and the international community to play that role.
Obviously, we can also play a role of guaranteeing the process itself. I mentioned the fact that we have good relations with different players in the region. I think there is a clear awareness of the fact that peace in Afghanistan will require a concerted effort, if not a convergence of views, among different players that are very different and that have very different positions on many different things - from Iran to the United States, from China to Central Asia, to Pakistan.
The European Union has good relations, and I would also say the economic incentives that can make all these actors come together and enjoy the benefits of a peace process in Afghanistan that can be beneficial for the entire region. This is why, among the five points that are in our Conclusions and that I presented in Geneva last November, there is the possibility for the European Union to finance and support infrastructure, trade and economic agreements in the region because this could create the incentive for peace in the broader region that we can probably provide.
Q. Since you mentioned Iran, with them there is a process where until now you have talked about Yemen. Could the subject of Afghanistan be brought to the table as well?
We discussed both with our Iranian but also with our American friends the need to have a channel open and obviously we are ready to do that.
Q. There are some divisions or different approaches of some Member States, at least two – France and Italy – regarding the crisis in Libya. How did you manage to overcome these divisions to get a proper, united approach regarding Libya?
First of all, I did not have to invent anything special to bring unity around the table today because the European Union Member States today were extremely united about that.
I think that there have been divisions or different perspectives from some Member States in the past but I think that today all Member States realise two things. First of all, the need for a united European voice in a moment where other international and regional players appear to be supportive to the UN process in a less convinced manner. The responsibility that lies on our shoulders on showing unity and responsibility in this moment in support to the UN efforts is extreme and it is in the interest of all Europeans to avoid that this current military escalation develops even further and escalates to the level of a civil war.
All Europeans are united in trying to avoid that from happening and are sincerely, I believe, putting all their efforts in trying to avoid this. This is out of a sense of responsibility that we feel, you know that we had a Quartet meeting in Tunis just some 10 days ago and it was already clear back then that the European Union probably was the strongest and most convinced supporter of the UN efforts.
The others were also supportive but for us it is really a "DNA approach" that we have in all crises, but for Libya this is even more important given recent and less recent history. For us, it is essential that this process stays firmly in the hands of nobody else than the United Nations and the Libyans.
Then, it is also out of self-interest because the first to suffer from a military escalation are obviously the Libyans. This is why I made a very strong appeal to the Libyan leaders and in particular to [General Commander Khalifa] Haftar to stop military activities in this moment and to return to the negotiating table under UN auspices. We have an interest in avoiding that the situation deteriorates further.
Q. On Libya, do you still consider Libya a safe third country especially for the people right now? Did you discuss with the EU ministers any measures that you can take in order to prevent another refugee crisis or do you still trust the Libyan Coast Guards to rescue people at sea?
You might know that the European Union has not considered Libya to be a safe country in recent times. There is no change in this consideration. The recent developments sadly remind us all - if there was any need to do so - that Libya is still facing a difficult situation.
As far as the work with the Libyan Coast Guards is concerned, we are continuing and we will continue to work with them, in particular doing the training for the Libyan Coast Guards. You know that it has been a very important component of the work of [EUNAVFOR MED] Operation Sophia so far and it will continue to be a central part of the Operation activities. The human rights component of the training is for me particularly important.
We do not only train them to run their activities at sea as Coast Guards should do, but we also train them with the relevant UN agencies and NGOs to respect human rights at full, be it at sea or once people are disembarked in Libya. Again, I want to stress that the European Union's position has always been clear in not considering Libya to be a safe third country.
Q. Sur le Partenariat Oriental, vous dites qu'il faut qu'on soutienne avec enthousiasme – si possible - le fait qu'ils [les pays du Partenariat Oriental] se rapprochent de l'Union européenne. Qu'entendez-vous par là? Parce que dans la notion de rapprochement, il y a deux visions différentes au niveau européen: l'adhésion ou se rapprocher en étant le plus loin possible de l'adhésion.
Sur les relations avec le Royaume-Uni dans les opérations de PSDC – le Royaume-Uni a déjà plus ou moins quitté ces opérations – comment, d'un point de vue temporaire, pourrait-on conclure un accord pour que les Britanniques puissent continuer de participer aux opérations avant ou après le Brexit?
Avant [le Brexit], il n'y a aucun problème. Après, nous verrons. Je peux déjà vous dire que l'engagement de la Grande-Bretagne dans nos opérations et missions civiles et militaires est extrêmement réduit. Il était plus ou moins de 5% et maintenant, il a été presque complètement réduit, si ce n'est pas déjà fait, c'est une questions de jours. Nous sommes prêts à gérer la transition, si et quand cela se passera, d'une façon qui n'affectera d'aucune manière l'efficacité de nos opérations et missions. Nous aurons d'autres problèmes auxquels il faudra faire face mais nous en discuterons mercredi soir avec les chefs d'état ou de gouvernements.
Sur le Partenariat Oriental, je pense qu'il y a bien plus que deux options pour interpréter le niveau de rapprochement de nos partenaires à l'Union européenne. Il y a des considérations très différentes, premièrement de la part de nos partenaires. Certains d'entre eux envisagent un type de rapprochement, certains un autre type, et à l'intérieur même des pays, il y a un débat sur le type de relations et de proximité à avoir avec l'Union européenne.
Je pense qu'une des clés du succès du Partenariat Oriental que nous avons développé ces dernières trois, quatre années est le respect pour les différentes approches que chacun de nos partenaires a ou veut avoir par rapport à la relation à avoir et établir avec l'Union européenne.
Avec certains d'entre eux, nous avons des relations très étroites du point de vue économique, commercial et politique, et cela marche bien avec un impact positif sur leurs économies. Avec d'autres, nous avons intensifié nos relations sans aller jusque-là, cela a aussi bénéficié les populations dans ces pays ou dans l'Union européenne.
Je pense que le mot-clé ici est le respect. Respect pour les aspirations, mais aussi le respect réciproque de la part de nos partenaires envers les aspirations et les perspectives qu'ont les Etats-membres par rapport au futur de l'Union européenne.
Nous allons bien sûr discuter du futur du Partenariat [Oriental]. Au moment où nous célébrons ses dix ans, il est normal de se projeter aussi vers les dix prochaines années. C'est une discussion que nous aurons au mois de mai avec les Etats-membres.
Prenons les choses les unes après les autres, et essayons de travailler sur un agenda qui soit positif et concret pour les populations. Je pense à la libéralisation des visas, à l'intensification des rapports commerciaux, aux exportations, au nombre d'étudiants qui peuvent étudier dans les deux sens, aux infrastructures, au soutien à la société civile et aux médias dans ces pays.
Je pense à toute une série de mesures très concrètes qui ont déjà un impact extrêmement positif sur la vie des citoyens de ces pays et aussi des nôtres. Là sont la priorité et le focus principal de la célébration des dix ans du Partenariat [Oriental].
On Libya, do you think that the developments there could lead to a worsening situation with migration in the Mediterranean? In this context, will the [Operation] Sophia's mandate be sustained without naval operations?
You might find it hard to believe but today's discussions on Libya did not touch upon the migration issue. Let me stress this because it is very important. I think it is important for the Libyans and it is important for me, personally.
Libya is a country in itself and Libyans deserve peace, stability and security for themselves. Then, there is also a migration issue as a consequence of the instability and the security situation in the country. But the reason why we work on Libya and with Libyans is, first and foremost, the fate of the Libyans. I want this to be to be very clear.
Today, we did not discuss Libya as a transit country but as a country that is a neighbouring country to us, so close geographically, culturally and economically to many Member States, and so important for the security of Europe and of the entire region. This was the angle through which we discussed the situation in Libya today, and I think that this is the right angle to be discussed today.
On Operation Sophia, you know very well that I personally believe, and not only me personally, it was our assessment that a naval operation without naval assets cannot be expected to be as efficient on its mandate as it is supposed to be. This was the decision of the Member States and we are implementing it as we can.
I can only hope that Member States will find a different kind of agreement considering the need to keep extreme vigilance in the Mediterranean, on the migration flows and also on the security situation because Operation Sophia with naval assets was also implementing UN Security Council resolutions that are extremely important for security in the Mediterranean.
Without the naval assets, obviously this can be done to a very limited extent which is regrettable, and I can only hope that Member States will revert to that decision as soon as possible.


text:
Explore All Countries
Photos of Yemen
View 1 Photos about Photos of Yemen
Special Country Products
Locator Map
The Kingdom of Yemen (colloquially known as North Yemen) became independent from the Ottoman Empire in 1918 and in 1962 became the Yemen Arab Republic. The British, who had set up a protectorate area around the southern port of Aden in the 19th century, withdrew in 1967 from what became the People's Republic of Southern Yemen (colloquially known as South Yemen). Three years later, the southern government adopted a Marxist orientation and changed the country's name to the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The massive exodus of hundreds of thousands of Yemenis from the south to the north contributed to two decades of hostility between the states. The two countries were formally unified as the Republic of Yemen in 1990. A southern secessionist movement and brief civil war in 1994 was quickly subdued. In 2000, Saudi Arabia and Yemen agreed to delineate their border.
Fighting in the northwest between the government and the Huthis, a Zaydi Shia Muslim minority, continued intermittently from 2004 to 2010, and then again from 2014-present. The southern secessionist movement was revitalized in 2007.
Public rallies in Sana'a against then President Ali Abdallah SALIH - inspired by similar Arab Spring demonstrations in Tunisia and Egypt - slowly built momentum starting in late January 2011 fueled by complaints over high unemployment, poor economic conditions, and corruption. By the following month, some protests had resulted in violence, and the demonstrations had spread to other major cities. By March the opposition had hardened its demands and was unifying behind calls for SALIH's immediate ouster. In April 2011, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), in an attempt to mediate the crisis in Yemen, proposed the GCC Initiative, an agreement in which the president would step down in exchange for immunity from prosecution. SALIH's refusal to sign an agreement led to further violence. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 2014 in October 2011 calling for an end to the violence and completing a power transfer deal. In November 2011, SALIH signed the GCC Initiative to step down and to transfer some of his powers to Vice President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI. Following HADI's uncontested election victory in February 2012, SALIH formally transferred all presidential powers. In accordance with the GCC Initiative, Yemen launched a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) in March 2013 to discuss key constitutional, political, and social issues. HADI concluded the NDC in January 2014 and planned to begin implementing subsequent steps in the transition process, including constitutional drafting, a constitutional referendum, and national elections.
The Huthis, perceiving their grievances were not addressed in the NDC, joined forces with SALIH and expanded their influence in northwestern Yemen, which culminated in a major offensive against military units and rival tribes and enabled their forces to overrun the capital, Sanaa, in September 2014. In January 2015, the Huthis surrounded the presidential palace, HADI's residence, and key government facilities, prompting HADI and the cabinet to submit their resignations. HADI fled to Aden in February 2015 and rescinded his resignation. He subsequently escaped to Oman and then moved to Saudi Arabia and asked the GCC to intervene militarily in Yemen to protect the legitimate government from the Huthis. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia assembled a coalition of Arab militaries and began airstrikes against the Huthis and Huthi-affiliated forces. Ground fighting between Huthi-aligned forces and anti-Huthi groups backed by the Saudi-led coalition continued through 2016. In 2016, the UN brokered a months-long cessation of hostilities that reduced airstrikes and fighting, and initiated peace talks in Kuwait. However, the talks ended without agreement. The Huthis and SALIH's political party announced a Supreme Political Council in August 2016 and a National Salvation Government, including a prime minister and several dozen cabinet members, in November 2016, to govern in Sanaa and further challenge the legitimacy of HADI's government. However, amid rising tensions between the Huthis and SALIH, sporadic clashes erupted in mid-2017, and escalated into open fighting that ended when Huthi forces killed SALIH in early December 2017. In 2018, anti-Huthi forces made the most battlefield progress in Yemen since early 2016, most notably in Al Hudaydah Governorate. In December 2018, the Huthis and Yemeni Government participated in the first UN-brokered peace talks since 2016, agreeing to a limited cease-fire in Al Hudaydah Governorate and the establishment of a UN Mission to monitor the agreement. In April 2019, Yemen's parliament convened in Say'un for the first time since the conflict broke out in 2014. In August 2019, violence erupted between HADI's government and the pro-secessionist Southern Transition Council (STC) in southern Yemen. In November 2019, HADI's government and the STC signed a power-sharing agreement to end the fighting between them, and in December 2020, the signatories formed a new cabinet. In 2020 and 2021, fighting continued on the ground in Yemen as the Huthis gained territory, and also conducted regular UAV and missile attacks against targets in Saudi Arabia.
Visit the Definitions and Notes page to view a description of each topic.
Definitions and Notes
Middle East, bordering the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Red Sea, between Oman and Saudi Arabia
15 00 N, 48 00 E
Map references
total: 527,968 sq km
land: 527,968 sq km
note: includes Perim, Socotra, the former Yemen Arab Republic (YAR or North Yemen), and the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen)
country comparison to the world: 52
Area - comparative
almost four times the size of Alabama; slightly larger than twice the size of Wyoming
Area comparison map
Land boundaries
total: 1,601 km
border countries (2): Oman 294 km; Saudi Arabia 1,307 km
territorial sea: 12 nm
contiguous zone: 24 nm
continental shelf: 200 nm or to the edge of the continental margin
mostly desert; hot and humid along west coast; temperate in western mountains affected by seasonal monsoon; extraordinarily hot, dry, harsh desert in east
narrow coastal plain backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains; dissected upland desert plains in center slope into the desert interior of the Arabian Peninsula
highest point: Jabal an Nabi Shu'ayb 3,666 m
lowest point: Arabian Sea 0 m
mean elevation: 999 m
petroleum, fish, rock salt, marble; small deposits of coal, gold, lead, nickel, and copper; fertile soil in west
agricultural land: 44.5% (2018 est.)
arable land: 2.2% (2018 est.)
permanent crops: 0.6% (2018 est.)
permanent pasture: 41.7% (2018 est.)
forest: 1% (2018 est.)
Irrigated land
6,800 sq km (2012)
Population distribution
the vast majority of the population is found in the Asir Mountains (part of the larger Sarawat Mountain system), located in the far western region of the country
sandstorms and dust storms in summer
volcanism: limited volcanic activity; Jebel at Tair (Jabal al-Tair, Jebel Teir, Jabal al-Tayr, Jazirat at-Tair) (244 m), which forms an island in the Red Sea, erupted in 2007 after awakening from dormancy; other historically active volcanoes include Harra of Arhab, Harras of Dhamar, Harra es-Sawad, and Jebel Zubair, although many of these have not erupted in over a century
Geography - note
strategic location on Bab el Mandeb, the strait linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, one of world's most active shipping lanes
30,984,689 (2022 est.)
noun: Yemeni(s)
adjective: Yemeni
predominantly Arab; but also Afro-Arab, South Asian, European
Arabic (official); note - a distinct Socotri language is widely used on Socotra Island and Archipelago; Mahri is still fairly widely spoken in eastern Yemen
major-language sample(s):
كتاب حقائق العالم، المصدر الذي لا يمكن الاستغناء عنه للمعلومات الأساسية (Arabic)
The World Factbook, the indispensable source for basic information.
Arabic audio sample:
Muslim 99.1% (official; virtually all are citizens, an estimated 65% are Sunni and 35% are Shia), other 0.9% (includes Jewish, Baha'i, Hindu, and Christian; many are refugees or temporary foreign residents) (2020 est.)
MENA religious affiliation
0-14 years: 39.16% (male 5,711,709 /female 5,513,526)
55-64 years: 4% (male 523,769 /female 623,100)
65 years and over: 2.8% (male 366,891 /female 435,855) (2018 est.)
2022 population pyramid
Dependency ratios
total dependency ratio: 71.7
youth dependency ratio: 69.4
elderly dependency ratio: 4.7
total: 19.8 years (2018 est.)
female: 19.9 years
country comparison to the world: 198
1.88% (2022 est.)
24.64 births/1,000 population (2022 est.)
5.62 deaths/1,000 population (2022 est.)
-0.19 migrant(s)/1,000 population (2022 est.)
urban population: 39.8% of total population (2023)
total population growth rate v. urban population growth rate, 2000-2030
Major urban areas - population
3.292 million SANAA (capital), 1.080 million Aden, 941,000 Taiz, 772,000 Ibb (2023)
at birth: 1.05 male(s)/female
Mother's mean age at first birth
20.8 years (2013 est.)
note: data represents median age at first birth among women 25-49
164 deaths/100,000 live births (2017 est.)
total: 46.54 deaths/1,000 live births
male: 51.9 deaths/1,000 live births
female: 40.92 deaths/1,000 live births (2022 est.)
total population: 67.51 years
male: 65.19 years
female: 69.94 years (2022 est.)
3.01 children born/woman (2022 est.)
Gross reproduction rate
1.42 (2023 est.)
Contraceptive prevalence rate
Drinking water source
improved: urban: 98.5% of population
unimproved: urban: 1.5% of population
Current health expenditure
0.53 physicians/1,000 population (2014)
0.7 beds/1,000 population (2017)
Sanitation facility access
unimproved: urban: 16.5% of population
(2021 est.) <0.1%
Major infectious diseases
degree of risk: high (2020)
food or waterborne diseases: bacterial diarrhea, hepatitis A, and typhoid fever
vectorborne diseases: dengue fever and malaria
water contact diseases: schistosomiasis
note: on 21 March 2022, the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) issued a Travel Alert for polio in Asia; Yemen is currently considered a high risk to travelers for circulating vaccine-derived polioviruses (cVDPV); vaccine-derived poliovirus (VDPV) is a strain of the weakened poliovirus that was initially included in oral polio vaccine (OPV) and that has changed over time and behaves more like the wild or naturally occurring virus; this means it can be spread more easily to people who are unvaccinated against polio and who come in contact with the stool or respiratory secretions, such as from a sneeze, of an "infected" person who received oral polio vaccine; the CDC recommends that before any international travel, anyone unvaccinated, incompletely vaccinated, or with an unknown polio vaccination status should complete the routine polio vaccine series; before travel to any high-risk destination, the CDC recommends that adults who previously completed the full, routine polio vaccine series receive a single, lifetime booster dose of polio vaccine
Alcohol consumption per capita
total: 0.02 liters of pure alcohol (2019 est.)
beer: 0.02 liters of pure alcohol (2019 est.)
wine: 0 liters of pure alcohol (2019 est.)
spirits: 0 liters of pure alcohol (2019 est.)
other alcohols: 0 liters of pure alcohol (2019 est.)
total: 20.3% (2020 est.)
male: 32.5% (2020 est.)
female: 8.1% (2020 est.)
Children under the age of 5 years underweight
country comparison to the world: 1
Currently married women (ages 15-49)
60.4% (2023 est.)
definition: age 15 and over can read and write
female: 55% (2015)
Youth unemployment rate (ages 15-24)
total: 25.5%
Environment - current issues
limited natural freshwater resources; inadequate supplies of potable water; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification
Environment - international agreements
party to: Biodiversity, Climate Change, Climate Change-Kyoto Protocol, Desertification, Endangered Species, Environmental Modification, Hazardous Wastes, Law of the Sea, Marine Dumping-London Protocol, Nuclear Test Ban, Ozone Layer Protection, Wetlands
signed, but not ratified: Climate Change-Paris Agreement, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
particulate matter emissions: 44.96 micrograms per cubic meter (2016 est.)
carbon dioxide emissions: 10.61 megatons (2016 est.)
methane emissions: 8.03 megatons (2020 est.)
Revenue from forest resources
forest revenues: 0.04% of GDP (2018 est.)
Revenue from coal
coal revenues: 0% of GDP (2018 est.)
widespread lack of access: due to conflict, poverty, floods, high food and fuel prices - the number of food insecure people was projected to increase by over 1 million to 17.4 million between January and May 2022, increasing to 19 million starting from June until the end of the year; economic conditions in the country remain dire; the conflict is further hampering the already constrained livelihood activities and humanitarian access; income earning opportunities have declined due to COVID‑19‑related business disruptions (2022)
municipal solid waste generated annually: 4,836,820 tons (2011 est.)
municipal solid waste recycled annually: 386,946 tons (2016 est.)
percent of municipal solid waste recycled: 8% (2016 est.)
Total water withdrawal
municipal: 265 million cubic meters (2017 est.)
industrial: 65 million cubic meters (2017 est.)
agricultural: 3.235 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)
Total renewable water resources
2.1 billion cubic meters (2017 est.)
conventional long form: Republic of Yemen
conventional short form: Yemen
local long form: Al Jumhuriyah al Yamaniyah
local short form: Al Yaman
former: Yemen Arab Republic [Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen] and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen]
etymology: name derivation remains unclear but may come from the Arab term "yumn" (happiness) and be related to the region's classical name "Arabia Felix" (Fertile or Happy Arabia); the Romans referred to the rest of the peninsula as "Arabia Deserta" (Deserted Arabia)
name: Sanaa
etymology: the name is reputed to mean "well-fortified" in Sabaean, the South Arabian language that went extinct in Yemen in the 6th century A.D.
22 governorates (muhafazat, singular - muhafazah); Abyan, 'Adan (Aden), Ad Dali', Al Bayda', Al Hudaydah, Al Jawf, Al Mahrah, Al Mahwit, Amanat al 'Asimah (Sanaa City), 'Amran, Arkhabil Suqutra (Socotra Archipelago), Dhamar, Hadramawt, Hajjah, Ibb, Lahij, Ma'rib, Raymah, Sa'dah, San'a' (Sanaa), Shabwah, Ta'izz
22 May 1990 (Republic of Yemen was established with the merger of the Yemen Arab Republic [Yemen (Sanaa) or North Yemen] and the Marxist-dominated People's Democratic Republic of Yemen [Yemen (Aden) or South Yemen]); notable earlier dates: North Yemen became independent on 1 November 1918 (from the Ottoman Empire) and became a republic with the overthrow of the theocratic Imamate on 27 September 1962; South Yemen became independent on 30 November 1967 (from the UK)
Unification Day, 22 May (1990)
history: adopted by referendum 16 May 1991 (following unification); note - after the National Dialogue ended in January 2015, a Constitutional Drafting Committee appointed by the president worked to prepare a new draft constitution that was expected to be put to a national referendum before being adopted; however, the start of the current conflict in early 2015 interrupted the process
amendments: amended several times, last in 2009
mixed legal system of Islamic (sharia) law, Napoleonic law, English common law, and customary law
has not submitted an ICJ jurisdiction declaration; non-party state to the ICCt
citizenship by birth: no
citizenship by descent only: the father must be a citizen of Yemen; if the father is unknown, the mother must be a citizen
dual citizenship recognized: no
residency requirement for naturalization: 10 years
18 years of age; universal
chief of state: Chairperson, Presidential Council Rashad Muhammad al-ALIMI, Dr. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Sultan al-ARADA (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Faraj Salmin al- BAHSANI, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Abdullah Al-Alimi BA WAZIR (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Uthman Hussain Faid al-MUJALI (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council TARIQ Muhammad Abdallah Salih, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council 'Abd-al-Rahman ABU ZARA'A al-Muharrami al-Yafai, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Aydarus Qasim al-ZUBAYDI, Maj. Gen. (since 19 April 2022)
head of government: Chairperson, Presidential Council Rashad Muhammad al-ALIMI, Dr. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Sultan al-ARADA (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Faraj Salmin al- BAHSANI, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Abdullah Al-Alimi BA WAZIR (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Uthman Hussain Faid al-MUJALI (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council TARIQ Muhammad Abdallah Salih, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council 'Abd-al-Rahman ABU ZARA'A al-Muharrami al-Yafai, Brig. Gen. (since 19 April 2022); Vice Chairperson, Presidential Council Aydarus Qasim al-ZUBAYDI, Maj. Gen. (since 19 April 2022)
cabinet: NA
elections/appointments: formerly, the president was directly elected by absolute majority popular vote in 2 rounds if needed for a 7-year term (eligible for a second term); election last held on 21 February 2012 (next election NA); note - a special election was held on 21 February 2012 to remove Ali Abdallah SALIH under the terms of a Gulf Cooperation Council-mediated deal during the political crisis of 2011; vice president appointed by the president; prime minister appointed by the president
election results: 2012: in a special election held on 21 February 2012, Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI (GPC) was elected as a consensus president
note: on 7 April 2022, President Abd Rabuh Mansur HADI announced the dismissal of Vice President ALI MUHSIN al-Ahmar and the formation of a Presidential Council, an eight-member body chaired by former minister Rashad AL-ALIMI; on 19 April 2022, the Council was sworn in before Parliament and began assuming the responsibilities of the president and vice president and carrying out the political, security, and military duties of the government
description: bicameral Parliament or Majlis consists of:
Shura Council or Majlis Alshoora (111 seats; members appointed by the president; member tenure NA)
House of Representatives or Majlis al Nuwaab (301 seats; members directly elected in single-seat constituencies by simple majority vote to serve 6-year terms)
elections: Shura Council - last appointments NA (next appointments NA)
House of Representatives - last held in April 2019 (next to be held NA)
election results:
percent of vote by party - GPC 58.0%, Islah 22.6%, YSP 3.8%, Unionist Party 1.9%, other 13.7%; seats by party - GPC 238, Islah 46, YSP 8, Nasserist Unionist Party 3, National Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party 2, independent 4
highest court(s): Supreme Court (consists of the court president, 2 deputies, and nearly 50 judges; court organized into constitutional, civil, commercial, family, administrative, criminal, military, and appeals scrutiny divisions)
judge selection and term of office: judges appointed by the Supreme Judicial Council, which is chaired by the president of the republic and includes 10 high-ranking judicial officers; judges serve for life with mandatory retirement at age 65
subordinate courts: appeal courts; district or first instance courts; commercial courts
General People's Congress or GPC (3 factions: pro-Hadi [Abdrabbi Mansur HADI], pro-Houthi [Sadeq Ameen Abu RAS], pro-Saleh [Ahmed SALEH]
Nasserist Unionist People's Organization [Abdulmalik al-MEKHLAFI]
National Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party [Qassem Salam SAID]
Southern Transitional Council or STC [Aidarus al-ZOUBAIDA]
Yemeni Reform Grouping or Islah [Muhammed Abdallah al-YADUMI]
Yemeni Socialist Party or YSP [Dr. Abd al-Rahman Umar al-SAQQAF]
AFESD, AMF, CAEU, CD, EITI (temporarily suspended), FAO, G-77, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, ICRM, IDA, IDB, IFAD, IFC, IFRCS, ILO, IMF, IMO, IMSO, Interpol, IOC, IOM, IPU, ISO, ITSO, ITU, ITUC (NGOs), LAS, MIGA, MINURSO, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, NAM, OAS (observer), OIC, OPCW, UN, UNAMID, UNCTAD, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO, UNISFA, UNMHA, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNOCI, UNVIM, UNWTO, UPU, WCO, WFTU (NGOs), WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO
chief of mission: Ambassador Mohammed Al-HADHRAMI (since 2019)
chancery: 2319 Wyoming Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20008
email address and website:
Information@yemenembassy.org
https://www.yemenembassy.org/
chief of mission: Ambassador Steven H. FAGIN (since 1 June 2022); note - the embassy closed in March 2015; Yemen Affairs Unit currently operates out of US Embassy Riyadh
embassy: previously - Sa'awan Street, Sanaa
mailing address: 6330 Sanaa Place, Washington DC 20521-6330
telephone: US Embassy Riyadh [966] 11-488-3800
previously - [967] 1 755-2000
FAX: US Embassy Riyadh [966] 11-488-7360
YemenEmergencyUSC@state.gov
https://ye.usembassy.gov/
three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black; the band colors derive from the Arab Liberation flag and represent oppression (black), overcome through bloody struggle (red), to be replaced by a bright future (white)
note: similar to the flag of Syria, which has two green stars in the white band, and of Iraq, which has an Arabic inscription centered in the white band; also similar to the flag of Egypt, which has a heraldic eagle centered in the white band
golden eagle; national colors: red, white, black
name: "al-qumhuriyatu l-muttahida" (United Republic)
lyrics/music: Abdullah Abdulwahab NOA'MAN/Ayyoab Tarish ABSI
note: adopted 1990; the music first served as the anthem for South Yemen before unification with North Yemen in 1990
total World Heritage Sites: 4 (3 cultural, 1 natural)
selected World Heritage Site locales: Old Walled City of Shibam (c); Old City of Sana'a (c); Historic Town of Zabid (c); Socotra Archipelago (n)
Yemen is a low-income country that faces difficult long-term challenges to stabilizing and growing its economy, and the current conflict has only exacerbated those issues. The ongoing war has halted Yemen's exports, pressured the currency's exchange rate, accelerated inflation, severely limited food and fuel imports, and caused widespread damage to infrastructure. The conflict has also created a severe humanitarian crisis - the world's largest cholera outbreak currently at nearly 1 million cases, more than 7 million people at risk of famine, and more than 80% of the population in need of humanitarian assistance.
Prior to the start of the conflict in 2014, Yemen was highly dependent on declining oil and gas resources for revenue. Oil and gas earnings accounted for roughly 25% of GDP and 65% of government revenue. The Yemeni Government regularly faced annual budget shortfalls and tried to diversify the Yemeni economy through a reform program designed to bolster non-oil sectors of the economy and foreign investment. In July 2014, the government continued reform efforts by eliminating some fuel subsidies and in August 2014, the IMF approved a three-year, $570 million Extended Credit Facility for Yemen.
However, the conflict that began in 2014 stalled these reform efforts and ongoing fighting continues to accelerate the country's economic decline. In September 2016, President HADI announced the move of the main branch of Central Bank of Yemen from Sanaa to Aden where his government could exert greater control over the central bank's dwindling resources. Regardless of which group controls the main branch, the central bank system is struggling to function. Yemen's Central Bank's foreign reserves, which stood at roughly $5.2 billion prior to the conflict, have declined to negligible amounts. The Central Bank can no longer fully support imports of critical goods or the country's exchange rate. The country also is facing a growing liquidity crisis and rising inflation. The private sector is hemorrhaging, with almost all businesses making substantial layoffs. Access to food and other critical commodities such as medical equipment is limited across the country due to security issues on the ground. The Social Welfare Fund, a cash transfer program for Yemen's neediest, is no longer operational and has not made any disbursements since late 2014.
Yemen will require significant international assistance during and after the protracted conflict to stabilize its economy. Long-term challenges include a high population growth rate, high unemployment, declining water resources, and severe food scarcity.
Real GDP (purchasing power parity)
$73.63 billion (2017 est.)
-5.9% (2017 est.)
-13.6% (2016 est.)
$2,500 (2017 est.)
GDP (official exchange rate)
$54.356 billion (2018 est.)
Inflation rate (consumer prices)
GDP - composition, by sector of origin
agriculture: 20.3% (2017 est.)
industry: 11.8% (2017 est.)
GDP - composition, by end use
household consumption: 116.6% (2017 est.)
government consumption: 17.6% (2017 est.)
investment in fixed capital: 2.2% (2017 est.)
investment in inventories: 0% (2017 est.)
exports of goods and services: 7.5% (2017 est.)
imports of goods and services: -43.9% (2017 est.)
mangoes/guavas, potatoes, sorghum, onions, milk, poultry, watermelons, grapes, oranges, bananas
crude oil production and petroleum refining; small-scale production of cotton textiles, leather goods; food processing; handicrafts; aluminum products; cement; commercial ship repair; natural gas production
Industrial production growth rate
-5.23% (2018 est.)
7.299 million (2021 est.)
Labor force - by occupation
note: most people are employed in agriculture and herding; services, construction, industry, and commerce account for less than one-fourth of the labor force
13.57% (2021 est.)
Population below poverty line
Gini Index coefficient - distribution of family income
36.7 (2014 est.)
Household income or consumption by percentage share
lowest 10%: 2.6%
revenues: $2.821 billion (2017 est.)
expenditures: $4.458 billion (2017 est.)
Budget surplus (+) or deficit (-)
-5.2% (of GDP) (2017 est.)
74.5% of GDP (2017 est.)
Taxes and other revenues
9% (of GDP) (2017 est.)
-$2.419 billion (2016 est.)
$384.5 million (2017 est.)
$940 million (2016 est.)
Exports - partners
China 53%, Saudi Arabia 10%, United Arab Emirates 7%, Australia 5% (2019)
Exports - commodities
crude petroleum, gold, fish, industrial chemical liquids, scrap iron (2019)
$4.079 billion (2017 est.)
Imports - partners
China 25%, Turkey 10%, United Arab Emirates 9%, Saudi Arabia 8%, India 7% (2019)
Imports - commodities
wheat, refined petroleum, iron, rice, cars (2019)
Reserves of foreign exchange and gold
$946.047 million (31 December 2020 est.)
$1.414 billion (31 December 2019 est.)
Debt - external
Yemeni rials (YER) per US dollar -
1,035.467 (2021 est.)
743.006 (2020 est.)
214.89 (2018 est.)
population without electricity: 16 million (2019)
electrification - total population: 47% (2019)
electrification - urban areas: 72% (2019)
electrification - rural areas: 31% (2019)
installed generating capacity: 1.772 million kW (2020 est.)
consumption: 2,677,920,000 kWh (2019 est.)
exports: 0 kWh (2020 est.)
imports: 0 kWh (2020 est.)
transmission/distribution losses: 753 million kWh (2019 est.)
Electricity generation sources
fossil fuels: 84.6% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)
nuclear: 0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)
solar: 15.4% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)
wind: 0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)
hydroelectricity: 0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)
tide and wave: 0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)
geothermal: 0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)
biomass and waste: 0% of total installed capacity (2020 est.)
production: 0 metric tons (2020 est.)
consumption: 22,000 metric tons (2020 est.)
exports: 0 metric tons (2020 est.)
imports: 22,000 metric tons (2020 est.)
proven reserves: 0 metric tons (2019 est.)
total petroleum production: 70,100 bbl/day (2021 est.)
refined petroleum consumption: 75,700 bbl/day (2019 est.)
crude oil and lease condensate exports: 0 bbl/day (2018 est.)
crude oil and lease condensate imports: 0 bbl/day (2018 est.)
crude oil estimated reserves: 3 billion barrels (2021 est.)
Refined petroleum products - production
20,180 bbl/day (2015 est.)
Refined petroleum products - exports
Refined petroleum products - imports
production: 89.906 million cubic meters (2019 est.)
consumption: 89.906 million cubic meters (2019 est.)
exports: 0 cubic meters (2020 est.)
imports: 0 cubic meters (2021 est.)
proven reserves: 478.554 billion cubic meters (2021 est.)
10.158 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)
from coal and metallurgical coke: 79,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)
from petroleum and other liquids: 9.896 million metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)
from consumed natural gas: 183,000 metric tonnes of CO2 (2019 est.)
Energy consumption per capita
5.453 million Btu/person (2019 est.)
Telephones - fixed lines
total subscriptions: 1.24 million (2020 est.)
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants: 4 (2020 est.)
Telephones - mobile cellular
total subscriptions: 15,357,900 (2019)
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants: 55.18 (2019)
Telecommunication systems
general assessment: Yemen continues to provide an exceptionally challenging market for telcos; civil unrest has caused havoc and devastation across most parts of the country, while the threat of sanctions has also made it a challenging environment in which to operate; a large proportion of the population requires humanitarian assistance, and there is little disposable income for services upon which telcos can generate revenue; essential telecom infrastructure, such as mobile towers and fiber cabling, has often been targeted, destroyed, or damaged by the opposing sides in the ongoing conflict; these difficulties have proved to be a disincentive to telcos investing in infrastructure, with the result that the country lacks basic fixed-line infrastructure, and mobile services are based on outdated GSM; this has prevented the development of a mobile broadband sector, or the evolution of mobile data services; the ownership of telecommunication services, and the scrutiny of associated revenues and taxes, have become a political issue in Yemen; until telecom infrastructure can be improved across Yemen, and until civil unrest eases, there will be little progress for the sector (2022)
domestic: the national network consists of microwave radio relay, cable, tropospheric scatter, GSM and CDMA mobile-cellular telephone systems; fixed-line teledensity remains low by regional standards at roughly 4 per 100 but mobile cellular use expanding at over 55 per 100 (2019)
international: country code - 967; landing points for the FALCON, SeaMeWe-5, Aden-Djibouti, and the AAE-1 international submarine cable connecting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Asia and Southeast Asia; satellite earth stations - 3 Intelsat (2 Indian Ocean and 1 Atlantic Ocean), 1 Intersputnik (Atlantic Ocean region), and 2 Arabsat; microwave radio relay to Saudi Arabia and Djibouti (2020)
note: the COVID-19 pandemic continues to have a significant impact on production and supply chains globally; since 2020, some aspects of the telecom sector have experienced a downturn, particularly in mobile device production; progress toward 5G implementation has resumed, as well as upgrades to infrastructure; consumer spending on telecom services has increased due to the surge in demand for capacity and bandwidth; the crucial nature of telecom services as a tool for work and school from home is still evident, and the spike in this area has seen growth opportunities for development of new tools and increased services
state-run TV with 2 stations; state-run radio with 2 national radio stations and 5 local stations; stations from Oman and Saudi Arabia can be accessed
Internet country code
Internet users
total: 7,873,719 (2019 est.)
percent of population: 27% (2019 est.)
Broadband - fixed subscriptions
total: 391,000 (2020 est.)
National air transport system
number of registered air carriers: 2 (2020)
inventory of registered aircraft operated by air carriers: 8
annual passenger traffic on registered air carriers: 336,310 (2018)
annual freight traffic on registered air carriers: 3.27 million (2018) mt-km
Civil aircraft registration country code prefix
total: 57 (2021)
Airports - with paved runways
over 3,047 m: 4
2,438 to 3,047 m: 9
Airports - with unpaved runways
914 to 1,523 m: 16
641 km gas, 22 km liquid petroleum gas, 1,370 km oil (2013)
total: 71,300 km (2005)
paved: 6,200 km (2005)
unpaved: 65,100 km (2005)
by type: general cargo 2, oil tanker 4, other 28 (2021)
major seaport(s): Aden, Al Hudaydah, Al Mukalla
Military and Security
Military and security forces
Republic of Yemen Government (ROYG) forces; Ministry of Defense: Yemeni National Army, Air Force and Air Defense, Navy and Coastal Defense Forces, Border Guard, Strategic Reserve Forces (includes Special Forces and Presidential Protection Brigades, which are under the Ministry of Defense but responsible to the president), Popular Committee Forces (government-backed tribal militia); Ministry of Interior: Special Security Forces (paramilitary; formerly known as Central Security Forces), Political Security Organization (state security), National Security Bureau (intelligence), Counterterrorism Unit
Saudi-backed forces: paramilitary/militia border security brigades based largely on tribal or regional affiliation (deployed along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf)
United Arab Emirates-backed forces include tribal and regionally-based militia and paramilitary forces (concentrated in the southern governates): Southern Transitional Council (STC) forces, including the Security Belt Forces, the Shabwani and Hadrami "Elite" Forces, the Support and Backup Forces (aka Logistics and Support Forces), Facilities Protection Forces, and Anti-Terrorism Forces; Republican Forces; Joint Forces
Huthi: ground, aerospace (air, missile), naval/coastal defense, presidential protection, special operations, and militia/tribal auxiliary forces (2022)
note 1: under the 2019 Riyadh Agreement, the STC forces were to be incorporated into Yemen's Ministries of Defense and Interior under the authority of the HADI government
note 2: a considerable portion--up to 70 percent by some estimates--of Yemen's military and security forces defected in whole or in part to former president SALAH and the Huthi opposition in 2011-2015
Military expenditures
prior to the start of the civil war in 2014, annual military expenditures were approximately 4-5% of Yemen's GDP
Military and security service personnel strengths
information limited and widely varied; Yemen Government: up to 300,000 estimated military, paramilitary, militia, and other security forces; UAE- and Saudi-backed forces: estimated 150-200,000 trained militia and paramilitary fighters; Huthis: up to 200,000 estimated fighters (2021)
Military equipment inventories and acquisitions
the inventory of the Yemeni Government forces consists primarily of Russian and Soviet-era equipment, although much of it has been lost in the current conflict; since the start of the civil war in 2014, it has received limited amounts of donated equipment from some Gulf States, including Saudi Arabia and UAE
Huthi forces are armed largely with weapons seized from Yemeni Government forces; they are also reported to have received military hardware from Iran (2022)
Military service age and obligation
18 is the legal minimum age for voluntary military service; conscription abolished in 2001; 2-year service obligation (note - limited information since the start of the civil war in 2014) (2021)
Military - note
in 2015, a Saudi-led coalition of Arab states intervened militarily in Yemen in support of the Republic of Yemen Government against the separatist Huthis; as of 2022, Saudi military forces continued to conduct operations in Yemen; Saudi Arabia also has raised and equipped paramilitary/militia security forces in Yemen based largely on tribal or regional affiliation to deploy along the Saudi-Yemen border, especially the areas bordering the governorates of Saada and Al-Jawf
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) intervened in Yemen in 2015 as part of the Saudi-led coalition with about 3,500 troops, as well as supporting air and naval forces; UAE withdrew its main military force from Yemen in 2019, but has retained a smaller military presence while working with proxies in southern Yemen, most notably the Southern Transitional Council (STC); as of 2021, UAE had recruited, trained, and equipped an estimated 150-200,000 Yemeni fighters and formed them into dozens of militia and paramilitary units
Iran has provided some military and political support to the Huthis (2022)
Maritime threats
the Maritime Administration of the US Department of Transportation has issued Maritime Advisory 2022-003 (Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean-Violence Due to Regional Conflict and Piracy) effective 28 February 2022, which states in part the "Conflict in Yemen continues to pose potential risk to US flagged commercial vessels transiting the southern Red Sea, Bab al Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden. Threats may come from a variety of different sources including, but not limited to, missiles, rockets, projectiles, mines, small arms, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned surface vessels, or waterborne improvised explosive devices. These threat vectors continue to pose a direct or collateral risk to US flagged commercial vessels operating in the region. Additionally, piracy poses a threat in the Gulf of Aden, Western Arabian Sea, and Western Indian Ocean."
Terrorist group(s)
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)/Qods Force; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham - Yemen; al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
note: details about the history, aims, leadership, organization, areas of operation, tactics, targets, weapons, size, and sources of support of the group(s) appear(s) in Appendix-T
Disputes - international
Yemen-Oman: none identified
Yemen-Saudia Arabia: in 2004, Saudi Arabia reinforced its concrete-filled security barrier along sections of the fully demarcated border with Yemen to stem illegal cross-border activities, including militants and arms; in 2013 and 2015, Saudi Arabia again erected fences
Refugees and internally displaced persons
refugees (country of origin): 69,671 (Somalia), 20,306 (Ethiopia) (2022)
IDPs: 4.52 million (conflict in Sa'ada Governorate; clashes between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula and government forces) (2022)


text:
Nai-Chang Yeh (; born 1961) is a Taiwanese-American physicist specializing in experimental condensed matter physics.

Early life and education
She was born and grew up in Chiayi, Taiwan and received her B. Sc. from National Taiwan University in the capital Taipei City in 1983. She went to the US for graduate education and obtained her Ph.D. in physics in 1988 from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

In a personal statement on her life and career, Yeh has described her childhood intellectual and artistic curiosity leading her to excel academically. She credits her mother, a mathematics professor, and her Ph.D. supervisor Professor Mildred Dresselhaus as role models who helped to give her confidence in her ability to succeed in physics.

Career and research
Her research emphasis is the fundamental physical properties of strongly correlated electronic systems. She is best known for her work on a variety of superconductors, magnetic materials, and superconductor/ferromagnet heterostructures. She is also interested in the physics and applications of low-dimensional electronic systems such as graphene and carbon nanotubes. She contributed to the development of a faster technique to produce high-quality graphene. Her experimental techniques include development of various cryogenic scanning probe microscopes for applications to nano-science and technology, as well as superconducting resonator technologies that have been applied to high-resolution studies of superfluid phase transitions and Bose–Einstein condensation in helium gas. She also works on exploring properties of topological insulators.

She is Professor of Physics and the Fletcher Jones Foundation Co-Director of the Kavli Nanoscience Institute at the California Institute of Technology. Yeh was the first female professor in that department when she joined in 1989. She is also part of the Caltech Institute for Quantum Information and Matter.

Awards and recognition
She has been recognized by a number of professional associations:

Fellow, American Association for the Advancement of Science;
Fellow, American Physical Society ;
Fellow and Chartered Physicist, The Institute of Physics, UK;
David and Lucile Packard Fellow for Science and Engineering;
Sloan Research Fellow

She was lauded in Time magazine on Nov. 18, 1991, as a scientific "rising star" in California.
She is cited in the American Men and Women of Science.

References

葉乃裳教授專訪 (Interview with Professor Yeh Nai-Chang) (2007-9-1), Department of Physics, National Taiwan University, 2008

External links
California Institute of Technology faculty page
Chinese American Faculty Association 2001 Award
Yeh in nanoscience

American people of Taiwanese descent
American people of Chinese descent
American women physicists
Fellows of the American Association for the Advancement of Science
Living people
1961 births
Taiwanese women physicists
21st-century American physicists
People from Chiayi
National Taiwan University alumni
MIT Department of Physics alumni
Fellows of the American Physical Society
Sloan Research Fellows
California Institute of Technology faculty
American women academics
21st-century American women scientists

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Pixilart. Softrv stickers transparent aesthetic cute kawaii mochi? stickers transparent aesthetic cute kawaii mochi soft: Transparent: : eyes png transparent aesthetic Transparents aesthetic png aesthetics, transparent aesthetic? ceiaxostickers tumblr png transparent aesthetic cute: lyrics transparent here aesthetic Transparents alessia cara. Aesthetic png transparent, Fenice.


text:
HTC Incredible S comes to India
By Kunal Khullar	 On Mar 22, 2011
HTC is launching the Incredible S in the market. It will be packed with Android 2.2 Froyo and a huge 1GHz Scorpion processor and Adreno 205 GPU. It is expected to be priced around Rs. 29,000/- HTC Corporation has become a global leader in mobile innovation and design and has established itself in the Indian market.
Mr. Ajay Sharma, Country Head, HTC India said, "In today's mobile market, where one is bombarded with choices and features, users are looking forward to an offering which amalgamates the best of both. HTC has always endeavoured to take the mobile phone experience to a higher level and with the launch of the Incredible S is set to create a new paradigm in mobile experience for the users. The HTC Incredible S is the answer for those looking for the perfect combination of performance and style and will help them stand out from the crowd as an icon."
It sports a 4-inch WVGA Super LCD touch screen display with a resolution of 480×800 pixels. An 8 megapixel camera with autofocus and dual-LED flash that records video at HD 720p. Also a front facing camera for video calling.
The Incredible S will include the HTC Sense experience. The new HTC Sense experience offers a variety of enhancements that improve how people capture, create, share and access multimedia content. With a newly created camera experience, people can record HD videos or capture and edit images with a variety of fun camera effects.
With HTC Locations, a new differentiated online mapping experience, people have instant, on-demand mapping without download delays or incurring mobile roaming charges. HTC Sense also includes a new integrated online e-reading experience utilizing a new e-book store powered by Koboä and a new, mobile-optimized e-reader that offers the ability to highlight, annotate and quickly search for definitions or translate unfamiliar terms.
Reliance Communications launches website packages
The dream of wireless charging is becoming a reality, thanks to LG


text:
What It Takes to Build Your Own Successful Business
How two entrepreneurs overcame hurdles early on.
Jason Saltzman
Startup Mentor, Entrepreneur, CEO of Alley
December 1, 2017 2 min read
In this video, Entrepreneur Network partner Jason Saltzman sits down with two successful entrepreneurs to hear about their stories.
Joe Regal, the founder of Zola Books, wanted to change the book industry, so he quit his highly lucrative job to start Zola Books. He invested time and money into people who knew books, but he soon realized his company wasn't a traditional publishing company but a tech company. After initially outsourcing developers for the project, he scrambled to find the perfect developers for the project.
David Metz, founder of FleetWit, saw an opportunity with the skilled gaming industry. He brought to life FleetWit, an app where you can win money playing trivia. With the heavy lifting in the gambling laws already done by apps like DraftKings and FanDuel, guidelines for the app were clearly outlined. Metz, however, found his most resilient times to be fundraising. For most founders, this could feel like another job on top of your many other ones. Learn how this game-loving entrepreneur dealt with fundraising and how he doesn't like playing games when it comes to raising money.
Click play to learn more.
Related: 5 Tips to Become a More Productive Person
Entrepreneur Network is a premium video network providing entertainment, education and inspiration from successful entrepreneurs and thought leaders. We provide expertise and opportunities to accelerate brand growth and effectively monetize video and audio content distributed across all digital platforms for the business genre.
EN is partnered with hundreds of top YouTube channels in the business vertical. Watch video from our network partners on demand on Amazon Fire, Roku, Apple TV and the Entrepreneur App available on iOS and Android devices.
Click here to become a part of this growing video network.


text:
PLAR: Credit for Life Experience
Knowledge Makers
Office of the Vice-President Administration & Finance
> TRU Home > Office of the Vice-President Administration & Finance > Campus Master Plan
About the Vice-President
2015 Campus Master Plan Summary and Implementation Report
2003 Campus Plan
Planning Activities & History
The Reach
The role of the Campus Development Plan is is to provide the coordinating strategy and context for "learning and teaching" and represents a framework for the process of change so that the whole will always be more than the sum of its parts. The plan is both product and process thereby achieving continuity beyond a single building and encouraging orderly campus development within available resources and the unique regional environment.
At the February 13, 2015 TRU Board of Governors' meeting the 2015 Campus Master Plan Summary and Implementation Report was approved. This document outlines the design guidelines for campus development.
The 2013 Campus Development Plan was undertaken to reflect the campus expansion of the last decade and to set the state for future development tied to the new academic plan, research plan, enrolment growth and the Thompson Rivers University Community Trust (TRUCT) initiatives.
This plan was conceived in three phases, each driven by student enrolment thresholds. The plan also laid out a palette of building design characteristics which allowed for the development of unique architectural responses to each new building while maintaining a visual coherence among buildings.
The 2013 Campus Master Plan (8 MB) was adopted by the TRU Board of Governors on February 14, 2014.
The second plan was completed in 2003. This was built on the 1991 plan and was developed for the university by Stantec Consulting. The 2003 plan set a spatial and design context which governed the rapid expansion, continued growth of the Kamloops campus, landscape design plan and identified lands for endowment purposes (The Reach).
The McGill Corridor/Southgate Project began in Spring 2001 as a joint project between Thompson Rivers University (formerly the University College of the Cariboo) and the City of Kamloops. The project developed into a land use and design concept plan for McGill Road and the Southgate Industrial Park.
A long term plan was prepared in January 1991 by Downs/Archambault and Partners as a strategic instrument, both to guide the physical expansion of the College Campus and to provide an effective transition for Cariboo College from community college to university college to an independent university.


text:
Requests For Open Records Filed In Oconee County Deal With Horses, Dogs, Births, Deaths And Cell Towers
Snapshot Reveals Variety
Three people wanted to know about complaints filed with Animal Control.
Seven wanted information from Code Enforcement.
Four wanted marriage licenses, birth certificates, wills, or divorce decrees or other documents part of divorce filings.
Two wanted to know details of petitions filed by people opposed to selling liquor in county restaurants.
Greathouse At BOC Meeting
These queries–and 11 others, for a total of 27--were made through open records requests filed with Oconee County Clerk Jane Greathouse during a 53-day period stretching from Aug. 1 to Sept. 22.
Greathouse said they are pretty typical of the requests that come across her desk as the designated Open Records Officer for the county. Handing these requests is nearly a full-time job, she said.
I received copies of the open records requests in response to an open records request I filed with the county on Sept. 22.
I filed my request after I learned that someone had filed an open records request with the county for documents related to the Caterpillar project.
Included in the documents I received was an open records request from Jon Williams of Williams and Associates, 2470 Daniells Bridge Road, asking for the scoring sheets for bids submitted for the engineering work on the proposed Parkway Boulevard extension.
That request was filed on Aug. 27 and was followed on Sept. 4 by two from Abe Abouhamdan of ABE Consulting, 2410 Hog Mountain Road. Abouhamdan asked about the Caterpillar project, for which Williams had done design and engineering work.
Williams and Abouhamdan both had bid on the Parkway Boulevard project and were seeking information on the competing bid filed by the other. Ultimately, the contract went to Abouhamdan.
I filed five of the 27 open records requests handled by Greathouse during the seven-and-a-half-week period. All were to get information for posts for this blog.
Horses, Dogs, And IDA
The three requests to obtain documents from Oconee County Animal Control dealt with complaints filed–or that the requester believed were filed–about treatment of horses, a white husky, a redbone hound and a "skinny" dog.
The requests filed with Code Enforcement included two asking for the identity of the builder and plumber of a property with a Bogart postal address as well as information on the license and insurance of the builder and plumber.
Another filed on Aug. 12 by Mary Lenihan, no address given, asked for zoning information and historical records on a 31-acre property that is owned by the Oconee County Industrial Authority as part of its Gateway Park near Bogart. The property is south of SR 316 and separate from the main part of Gateway.
In July of 2013, the Development Authority agreed to sell 18 acres south of SR 316 to Andrew Clyde, who owns Clyde Armory, 4800 Atlanta Highway near Bogart.
Permits And Waste Hauling
An Atlanta resident asked about a construction permit.
A representative of an Athens law firm filed two requests about ordinances governing the issuance of a certificate of occupancy and building permits for a commercial office building and a third about the issuance of a business license for an exercise facility.
Simon Garrett of 1441 Dials Mill Road wanted to know about an inquiry received by Code Enforcement reporting demolition materials being hauled from Winder to the Dials Mill Road property.
Garrett had sought unsuccessfully in 2013 to obtain a special use permit to put a materials recovery facility on that property.
Liquor, Births, Deaths, Cell Towers
Annette Sledge, 1091 Crooked Creek Road, filed a request for letters sent to the members of the Board of Commissioners about the petitions she had filed opposing liquor by the drink in the county. A referendum authorizing liquor by the drink in county restaurants is on the ballot for the Nov. 4 election.
Blake Giles, editor of The Oconee Enterprise, filed an open records request to review those same petitions.
Two of the open records requests were for marriage licenses, birth certificates and wills and were addressed to Probate Court. Two dealing with divorces were directed to the Clerk of the Superior Court.
Jennifer Blackburn, an attorney for Verizon Wireless, filed an open records request on Sept. 5 after the Board of Commissioner denied the rezone request of Verizon that would have allowed for the construction of a cell tower on McRees Mill Road.
Blackburn wanted the ordinance that was voted down by the BOC at its Aug. 5 meeting.
Designated Officer
Clerk Greathouse is the designated open records officer for the county, and she handles the requests that come to the county.
Once Greathouse receives the request, she directs it to the appropriate office or department that handles the records being sought. Greathouse then provides the information to the requester.
Angela Helwig, who is the secretary to the county's Industrial Development Authority, is the designated open records officer for that group.
Most records held by the county are available to the public as a result of the Georgia Open Records Act.
The Oconee County web site allows citizens to file their requests online, and the bulk of those I reviewed were filed that way.
Posted by Lee Becker at 11:42 AM
Third Quarter SPLOST Revenue Grows Only Slightly A...
Requests For Open Records Filed In Oconee County D...


This is the English version of my previous German post about my little socks I want to fit into my flats. I tried several (free) patterns available in ravelry, but none fit my expectations, so I imprivised. I tried to write it down to share with you.
It is recommended you have already knit a sock or two and know what I am talking about, as this is not necessarily a pattern, just a recipe.
I knit a toe-up sock with 66 sts for my EU 40/41 sized feet. And I used a 2.75mm needle instead of a 2.5mm which I usually do. But my gauge was not awfully different as I am a tight knitter. Please take into consideration what you usually do when knitting a sock.
With Judy's Magic Cast On cast on 9/9 sts on your two needles. Knit one row.
Inc row: K1, kfb, k to 2sts before end of needle, kfb, K1. Do the same for the second needle.
Repeat those two rows until you have 33/33 sts.
Of your flats are less than 5.5cm from the tip of your big toe to the edge of your shoe on top, skip the following short row section.
Now knit all sts and pick up wraps and ktog with the wrapped st all over N1. K N2.
Put the sts on N1 in hold. Knit the sole sts in Stockinette Stitch for 40 rows or until you are 5cm before your heel.
Knit a short row/ boomerang heel.
Pick Up and k 36 sts on the side of the sole, put the sts from hold back on a needle and k them. PU and k 36 sts on the other side.
Now you already bind off. I used the same needle size to get a snug fitting of my toetsies.
BO the heel sts. The next 6 sts are BO with decreases. K2tog and slip the bound off st over the dec st. Repeat this twice. BO until 4 sts of your side remain, dec and BO twice. BO the top sts. Dec and BO twice in the other side, BO until 6sts of your side needle remain, dec and BO three times.
Cut yarn, weave in and knit the second toetsy.
so was suche ich schon wie verrückt.
Ich möchte so oder ähnlich ein Futter für meine Crocs machen.
Wo finde ich denn das gleiche in deutsch?
Bitte schicke mir doch einmal den Link.


Are you looking for the nearest fireworks display this Bonfire Night?
If so, look no further because The Courier and Weekly News have details of displays from all over our area, right here.
If you are organising a display and it isn't on the list below, email the details to news@leamingtoncourier.co.uk, making sure to tell us where and when your display is taking place (including the time), how much it costs and any other details including stalls, parking information.
OTHER: Parking available from £15 per car or £5 on foot. Bar, mulled wine and stalls.
OTHER INFO: Bonfire, fireworks display, hot dogs, pig roast, beef, cheese and veggie burgers, mulled wine, local beer and cider, soft drinks, homemade soup and hot chocolate.
HOW MUCH: Advance Tickets; adult £4.50, child £2.50, family £12.50. On the gate: adult £5, child £3. Under-3s go free.
TIME: Gates open at 5pm, bonfire lit at 5.30pm, quieter firework display 6.15pm, louder display 6.40pm.
OTHER INFO: Hot food, bar, soft drinks, sweets, and glow sticks.
TIME: Gates open at 5.30pm.
OTHER INFO: Two displays in the evening, running until 9pm. Funfair, DJ, refreshments and stalls. Car parking via mian school gate on Cubbington Road.
OTHER INFO: Live music, firework displays, stalls, refreshments, sports and short films to promote the youth centre.


Create a Extraordinary greeting cards, wonderful invitations, dashboards and stickers, art prints and posters, web design! Unique handwritten text Thank you, perfect for use on greeting cards, blog posts, gift tags, and more! Thank You Calligraphy Lettering Collection is decoration quotes that will help you create awesome greeting cards, and print on a mug, on a T-shirt, on a pillow, on a packages and other souvenir items. You will get different calligraphy flourishes, as well as big collection of carefully drawn lettering elements and quotes. All elements can be repainted in any color according to your desire. All files is in AI, EPS, SVG and PNG.


Have you ever considered that in this busy life, how and when you will need the love of your life in Guelp? If you are a member of Indian dating site, then you do not have to worry about it. By the time you start searching for Mr Right online, you will get attractive Indian men as well as women within a couple of minutes of your search.


text:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<feed><tipo>Rua</tipo><logradouro>A</logradouro><bairro>Formoza</bairro><cidade>Alvorada</cidade><uf>RS</uf><cep>94818508</cep></feed>

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub