text:
Foreknowledge and Free Will
First published Tue Jul 6, 2004; substantive revision Thu Mar 13, 2008
Fatalism is the thesis that human acts occur by necessity and hence are unfree. Theological fatalism is the thesis that infallible foreknowledge of a human act makes the act necessary and hence unfree. If there is a being who knows infallibly the entire future, then no human act is free.
Fatalism seems to be entailed by infallible foreknowledge by the following informal line of reasoning:
For any future act you will perform, if some being infallibly believed in the past that the act would occur, there is nothing you can do now about the fact that he believed what he believed since nobody has any control over past events; nor can you make him mistaken in his belief, given that he is infallible. Therefore, there is nothing you can do now about the fact that he believed in a way that cannot be mistaken that you would do what you will do. But if so, you cannot do otherwise than what he believed you would do. And if you cannot do otherwise, you will not perform the act freely.
The same argument can be applied to any infallibly foreknown act of any human being. If there is a being who infallibly knows everything that will happen in the future, no human being has any control over the future.
The theological fatalist argument just given creates a dilemma because many people have thought it important to maintain both (1) there is a deity who infallibly knows the entire future, and (2) human beings have free will in the strong sense usually called libertarian. But the theological fatalist argument seems to show that (1) and (2) are incompatible; the only way consistently to accept (2) is to deny (1). Those philosophers who think there is a way to consistently maintain both (1) and (2) are called compatibilists about infallible foreknowledge and human free will. Compatibilists must either identify a false premise in the argument for theological fatalism or show that the conclusion does not follow from the premises. Incompatibilists accept the incompatibility of infallible foreknowledge and human free will and deny either infallible foreknowledge or free will in the sense targeted by the argument.
1. The argument for theological fatalism
2. Compatibilist responses to theological fatalism
2.1 The Aristotelian solution
2.2 The Boethian solution
2.3 The Ockhamist solution
2.4 The Molinist solution
2.5 The Augustinian/Frankfurtian solution
2.6 The denial of the necessity of the past and the denial of the transfer of necessity principle
3. Incompatibilist responses to theological fatalism
4. Theological fatalism and other forms of fatalism
5. Beyond fatalism
There is a long history of debate over the soundness of the argument for theological fatalism, so its soundness must not be obvious and the argument cannot be evaluated without giving it a more precise formulation. To do so, choose some proposition about a future act that you think you will do freely, if any act is free. Suppose, for example, that the telephone will ring at 9 am tomorrow and you will either answer it or you will not. So it is either true that you will answer the phone at 9 am tomorrow or it is true that you will not answer the phone at 9 am tomorrow. The Law of Excluded Middle rules out any other alternative. Let T abbreviate the proposition that you will answer the phone tomorrow at 9, and let us suppose that T is true. (If not-T is true instead, simply substitute not-T in the argument below).
Let "now-necessary" designate temporal necessity, the type of necessity that the past is supposed to have just because it is past. We will discuss this type of necessity in sections 2.3 and 2.6, but we can begin with the intuitive idea that there is a kind of necessity that a proposition has now when the content of the proposition is about something that occurred in the past. To say that it is now-necessary that milk has been spilled is to say nobody can do anything now about the fact that the milk has been spilled.
Let "God" designate a being who has infallible beliefs about the future, where to say that God believes p infallibly is to say that God believes p and it is not possible that God believes p and p is false. It is not important for the logic of the argument that God is the being worshiped by any particular religion, but the motive to maintain that there is a being with infallible beliefs is usually a religious one.
One more preliminary point is in order. The dilemma of infallible foreknowledge and human free will does not rest on the particular assumption of foreknowledge and does not require an analysis of knowledge. Most contemporary accounts of knowledge are fallibilist, which means they do not require that a person believe in a way that cannot be mistaken in order to have knowledge. She has knowledge just in case what she believes is true and she satisfies the other conditions for knowledge, such as having sufficiently strong evidence. Ordinary knowledge does not require that the belief cannot be false. For example, if I believe on strong evidence that classes begin at my university on a certain date, and when the day arrives, classes do begin, we would normally say I knew in advance that classes would begin on that date. I had foreknowledge about the date classes begin. But there is nothing problematic about that kind of foreknowledge because events could have proven me wrong even though as events actually turned out, they didn't prove me wrong. Ordinary foreknowledge does not threaten to necessitate the future because it does not require that when I know p it is not possible that my belief is false. The key problem, then, is the infallibility of the belief about the future, and this is a problem whether or not the epistemic agent with an infallible belief satisfies the other conditions required by some account of knowledge, such as sufficient evidence. As long as an agent has an infallible belief about the future, the problem arises.
Using the example of the proposition T, the argument that infallible foreknowledge of T entails that you do not answer the telephone freely can be formulated as follows:
Basic Argument for Theological Fatalism
(1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. [Supposition of infallible foreknowledge]
(2) If E occurred in the past, it is now-necessary that E occurred then. [Principle of the Necessity of the Past]
(3) It is now-necessary that yesterday God believed T. [1, 2]
(4) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T. [Definition of "infallibility"]
(5) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (p → q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]
(6) So it is now-necessary that T. [3,4,5]
(7) If it is now-necessary that T, then you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [Definition of "necessary"]
(8) Therefore, you cannot do otherwise than answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am. [6, 7]
(9) If you cannot do otherwise when you do an act, you do not act freely. [Principle of Alternate Possibilities]
(10) Therefore, when you answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am, you will not do it freely. [8, 9]
I have formulated the argument in a way that makes its logical form as perspicuous as possible, and there is a consensus that this argument or something close to it is valid. That is, if the premises are all true, the conclusion follows. The compatibilist about infallible foreknowledge and free will must therefore find a false premise. There are four premises that are not straightforward substitutions in definitions: (1), (2), (5), and (9). Premises (1) and (2) have been attacked in influential ways in the history of discussion of theological fatalism. Boethius and Aquinas denied premise (1) on the grounds that God and his beliefs are not in time, a solution that has always had some adherents. William of Ockham denied premise (2) on the grounds that the necessity of the past does not apply to the entire past, and God's past beliefs are in the part of the past to which the necessity of the past does not apply. This solution also has some contemporary adherents. Premise (9) has been attacked by a few contemporary philosophers who argue that the denial of (9) is consistent with maintaining that human beings have libertarian free will, the kind of free will that is incompatible with causal determinism. It has been proposed that Augustine had a form of this solution (Hunt 1999), although it was not attributed to him historically. The denial of (9) is mostly due to contemporary discussions of the relation between free will and the ability to do otherwise. Premise (5) has rarely been disputed, although it might have been denied by Luis de Molina (Freddoso 1988, 57-58), and it has been denied in some of the recent literature. Finally, we will consider the possibility that premise (2) can be rejected in a more radical way than the Ockhamist position. In addition to the foregoing compatibilist solutions, there are two incompatibilist responses to the problem of theological fatalism. One is to deny that God (or any being) has infallible foreknowledge. The other is to deny that human beings have free will in the libertarian sense of free will. These responses will be discussed in section 3. The relationship between theological fatalism and two other historically important forms of fatalism — logical fatalism and causal fatalism, will be discussed in section 4. In section 5 I will argue that the problem of fatalism is a special case of a more general problem in the metaphysics of time that has nothing to do with free will.
One response to the dilemma of infallible foreknowledge and free will is to deny that the proposition T has a truth value, nor does any proposition about the contingent future or its negation have a truth value. This response rejects the terms in which the problem is set up. The idea behind this response is usually that propositions about the contingent future become true when and only when the event occurs that the proposition is about. If the event does not occur at that time, then the proposition becomes false. This seems to have been the position of Aristotle in the famous Sea Battle argument of De Interpretatione IX, where Aristotle is concerned with the implications of the truth of a proposition about the future, not the problem of infallible knowledge of the future. But some philosophers have used Aristotle's move to solve the dilemma we are addressing here. In the recent literature this position has been defended by J.R. Lucas (1989), Richard Purtill (1988), and Joseph Runzo (1981), although it has not received much attention in the last decade or so.
This solution collapses truth into necessity and falsehood into impossibility, at least for propositions about the future. That may be sufficient to make it implausible to some logicians, but it is not clear that this move avoids the problem of theological fatalism anyway. According to the definition of infallibility used in the basic argument, if God is infallible in all his beliefs, then it is not possible that God believes T and T is false. But there is a natural extension of the definition of infallibility to allow for the case in which T lacks a truth value but will acquire one in the future: If God is infallible in all his beliefs, then it is not possible that God believes T and T is either false or becomes false. If so, and if God believes T, we get an argument for theological fatalism that parallels our basic argument. Premise (4) would need to be modified as follows:
(4′) Necessarily, if yesterday God believed T, then T will become true.
(6) becomes:
(6′) It is now-necessary that T will become true.
The modifications in the rest of the argument are straightforward.
It is open to the defender of this solution to maintain that God has no beliefs about the contingent future because he does not infallibly know how it will turn out, and this is compatible with God's being infallible in everything he does believe. It is also compatible with God's omniscience if omniscience is the property of knowing the truth value of every proposition that has a truth value. But clearly, this move restricts the range of God's knowledge, so it has religious disadvantages in addition to its disadvantages in logic.
This solution denies the first premise of the basic argument: (1) Yesterday God infallibly believed T. What is denied according to this solution is not that God believes infallibly, and not that God believes the content of proposition T, but that God believed T yesterday. This solution probably originated with the 6th century philosopher Boethius, who maintained that God is not in time and has no temporal properties, so God does not have beliefs at a time. It is therefore a mistake to say God had beliefs yesterday, or has beliefs today, or will have beliefs tomorrow. It is also a mistake to say God had a belief on a certain date, such as June 1, 2004. The way Boethius describes God's cognitive grasp of temporal reality, all temporal events are before the mind of God at once. To say "at once" or "simultaneously" is to use a temporal metaphor, but Boethius is clear that it does not make sense to think of the whole of temporal reality as being before God's mind in a single temporal present. It is an atemporal present, a single complete grasp of all events in the entire span of time.
Aquinas adopted the Boethian solution as one of his ways out of theological fatalism, using some of the same metaphors as Boethius. One of the metaphors is the circle analogy, in which the way a timeless God is present to each and every moment of time is compared to the way in which the center of a circle is present to each and every point on its circumference (SCG I, 66). In contemporary philosophy probably the most well-known defenders of the idea that God is timeless are Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (1981), who apply it explicitly to the foreknowledge dilemma (1991).
Most objections to the timelessness solution to the dilemma of foreknowledge and freedom focus on the idea of timelessness itself, arguing either that it does not make sense or that it is incompatible with other properties of God that are religiously more compelling, such as personhood (e.g., Pike 1970, 121-129; Wolterstorff 1975; Swinburne 1977, 221). I have argued (Zagzebski 1991, chap. 2) that the timelessness move does not avoid the problem of theological fatalism since an argument structurally parallel to the basic argument can be formulated for timeless knowledge. If God is not in time, the key issue would not be the necessity of the past, but the necessity of the timeless realm. So the first three steps of the argument would be reformulated as follows:
(1t) God timelessly knows T.
(2t) If E is in the timeless realm, then it is now-necessary that E.
(3t) It is now-necessary that T.
Perhaps it is inappropriate to say that timeless events such as God's timeless knowing are now-necessary, yet we have no more reason to think we can do anything about God's timeless knowing than about God's past knowing. The timeless realm is as much out of our reach as the past. So the point of (3t) is that we cannot now do anything about the fact that God timelessly knows T. The rest of the steps in the timeless dilemma argument are parallel to the basic argument. Step (5t) says that if there is nothing we can do about a timeless state, there is nothing we can do about what such a state entails. It follows that we cannot do anything about the future.
In my judgment the Boethian solution does not solve the problem of theological fatalism by itself, but since the nature of the timeless realm is elusive, the intuition of the necessity of the timeless realm is probably weaker than the intuition of the necessity of the past. The necessity of the past has the advantage of being deeply imbedded in our ordinary intuitions about time; there are no ordinary intuitions about the realm of timelessness. Perhaps, then, the view that God is timeless puts the theological fatalist on the defensive.
The next solution is due to the thirteenth century philosopher William of Ockham, and was revived in the contemporary literature by Marilyn Adams (1967).
This solution rejects premise (2) of the basic argument in its full generality. Following Ockham, Adams argues that premise (2) applies only to the past strictly speaking, or the "hard" past. A "soft" fact about the past is one that is in part about the future. An example of a soft fact about the past would be the fact that it was true yesterday that a certain event would occur a year later. Adams argues that God's existence in the past and God's past beliefs about the future are not strictly past because they are facts that are in part about the future.
Adams's argument was unsuccessful since, among other things, her criterion for being a hard fact had the consequence that no fact is a hard fact (Fischer 1989, introduction), but it led to a series of attempts to bolster it by giving more refined definitions of a "hard fact" and the type of necessity such facts are said to have — what Ockham called "accidental necessity" (necessity per accidens). One of the best-known Ockhamist proposals after Adams was made by Alvin Plantinga (1986), who defined the accidentally necessary in terms of lack of counterfactual power. For someone, Jones, to have counterfactual power over God's past beliefs, the following must be true:
(CPP) It was within Jones' power at t2 to so something such that if he did it, God would not have held the belief he in fact held at t1.
Plantinga argued that counterfactual power over God's past beliefs about human free choices is coherent and if it occurs, these beliefs are not accidentally necessary; they do not have the kind of necessity the past is alleged to have in premise (2) of the basic argument.
Notice that counterfactual power over the past is not the same thing as changing the past, nor is it the same thing as causing or bringing about the past. Changing the past is incoherent since it amounts to there being one past prior to t2 in which God has a certain belief at t1, and then Jones does something to make a different past. That requires two pasts prior to t2, and that presumably makes no sense. What (CPP) affirms instead is that there is only one actual past, but there would have been a different past if Jones acted differently at t2. (CPP) also does not require the assumption that what Jones does at t2 causes God to have the belief he has at t1. There is much debate about the way to analyze the causal relation, but it is generally thought that causation does not reduce to a counterfactual dependency of an effect on its cause. (CPP) is weaker than the claim that Jones' act at t2 causes God's belief at t1.
There was considerable debate over Ockhamism until the early nineties. Some of the defenses appear in Freddoso (1983), Kvanvig (1986), Zemach and Widerker (1987), Wierenga (1989), and Craig (1990). Some of the criticisms appear in Fischer (1983b, 1985b), Hasker (1989), Zagzebski (1991), Pike (1993), and Brant (1997).
It seems to me that it is very difficult to give an account of the necessity of the past that preserves the intuition that the past has a special kind of necessity in virtue of being past, but which has the consequence that God's past beliefs do not have that kind of necessity. The problem is that God's past beliefs seem to be as good a candidate for something that is strictly past as almost anything we can think of, such as an explosion last week. If we have counterfactual power over God's past beliefs, but not the past explosion, that must be because of something special about God's past beliefs that is intuitively plausible apart from the attempt to avoid theological fatalism. If it is not independently plausible, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Ockhamist solution is ad hoc.
The doctrine of Middle Knowledge was vehemently debated in the 16th century, with the version of Luis de Molina getting the most attention in the contemporary literature. Recently the doctrine has received strong support by Thomas Flint (1998) and Eef Dekker (2000). Unlike the other compatibilist solutions we are considering, which aim only at showing that infallible foreknowledge and human freedom are compatible, Molinism provides an account of how God knows the contingent future, along with a strong doctrine of divine providence. Middle knowledge is called "middle" because it is said to stand between God's knowledge of necessary truths and his knowledge of his own creative will. The objects of Middle Knowledge are so-called counterfactuals of freedom:
If person S were in circumstances C, S would freely do X.
Middle knowledge requires that there are true counterfactuals of this form corresponding to every possible free creature and every possible circumstance in which that creature can act freely. These propositions are intended to be contingent (a claim that has been disputed by some objectors), but they are prior to God's creative will. God uses them in deciding what to create. By combining his Middle Knowledge with what he decides to create, God knows the entire history of the world.
There are a number of objections to Middle Knowledge in the contemporary literature. Robert Adams (1991) argues that Molinism is committed to the position that the truth of a counterfactual of freedom is explanatorily prior to God's decision to create us. But the truth of a counterfactual to the effect that if I were in circumstance C I would do A is strictly inconsistent with my refraining from A in C, and so my refraining from A in C is precluded by something prior in the order of explanation to my act in C. And that is inconsistent with my acting freely in C.
There are a number of other objections to Middle Knowledge in the literature, as well as replies by its defenders. William Hasker (1989, 1995, 1997, 2000) has offered a series of objections and replies to William Craig, who defends Middle Knowledge (1994, 1998). Other objections have been proposed by Walls (1990) and Gaskin (1993).
Let us assume that the doctrine of Middle Knowledge is defensible. How does that avoid the conclusion of the argument for theological fatalism? Middle Knowledge does not entail the falsehood of any premise of the basic argument. Flint (1998) rejects some of the steps of the fatalist argument in addition to defending Middle Knowledge, which suggests that even though the theory of Middle Knowledge is a powerful theory of divine knowledge and providence, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to avoid theological fatalism by itself.
2.5 The Frankfurtian/Augustinian solution
Let us now look at premise (9). This is a form of the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP), a principle that has become well-known in the literature on free will ever since it was attacked by Harry Frankfurt (1969) in some interesting thought experiments. The point of Frankfurt's paper was to drive a wedge between responsibility and alternate possibilities, and to thereby drive a wedge between responsibility and libertarian freedom. In general, those defending libertarian freedom also defend PAP, and those attacking PAP, like Frankfurt, defend determinism, but some philosophers have argued that PAP is false even if we have libertarian free will. I have given such an argument (Zagzebski 1991), as has David Hunt (1999). Hunt (1996b, 1999) argues that the rejection of PAP from the perspective of a defender of libertarian freedom can be found in Augustine, but even if that is true, it is not a position historically associated with Augustine. The literature that clearly distinguishes the claim that free will requires alternate possibilities from the claim that free will requires the falsehood of determinism is contemporary. The former is a thesis about events in counterfactual circumstances, whereas the latter is a thesis about the locus of causal control in the actual circumstances. Aside from the foreknowledge literature, support for the rejection of PAP from the perspective of a free will/determinism incompatibilist can be found in Stump (1990, 1996), Zagzebski (2000), and Pereboom (2000).
Here is an example of a typical Frankfurt case intended to show that an agent can act freely even when she lacks alternate possibilities:
Black, an evil neurosurgeon, wishes to see White dead but is unwilling to do the deed himself. Knowing that Mary Jones also despises White and will have a single good opportunity to kill him, Black inserts a mechanism into Jones's brain that enables Black to monitor and to control Jones's neurological activity. If the activity in Jones's brain suggests that she is on the verge of deciding not to kill White when the opportunity arises, Black's mechanism will intervene and cause Jones to decide to commit the murder. On the other hand, if Jones decides to murder White on her own, the mechanism will not intervene. It will merely monitor but will not affect her neurological function. Now suppose that when the occasion arises, Jones decides to kill White without any "help" from Black's mechanism. In the judgment of Frankfurt and most others, Jones is morally responsible for her act. Nonetheless, it appears that she is unable to do otherwise since if she had attempted to do so, she would have been thwarted by Black's device. (Adapted from an example by John Fischer, 1982).
Most commentators on examples like this agree that the agent is both morally responsible for her act and acts freely in whatever sense of freedom they endorse. They differ on whether she can do otherwise at the time of her act. Determinists generally interpret the case as one in which she exercises compatibilist free will and has no alternate possibilities. Most libertarians interpret it as one in which she exercises libertarian free will and has alternate possibilities, contrary to appearances. As mentioned above, some philosophers have interpreted it as a case in which she exercises libertarian free will but does not have alternate possibilities. If Frankfurt cases can be successfully interpreted in this third way, then they can be used to show the compatibility of infallible foreknowledge and libertarian freedom.
But there is another way Frankfurt cases can be used to argue for the compatibility of foreknowledge and freedom. There is an important disanalogy between a Frankfurt case and infallible foreknowledge that supports the intuition that an agent retains alternate possibilities even when her act is infallibly foreknown. A crucial component of the standard Frankfurt case is that the agent is prevented from acting freely in close possible worlds. That aspect of the case is not in dispute. Black's device is counterfactually manipulative even if it is not actually manipulative. In contrast, infallible foreknowledge is not even counterfactually manipulative. There is no close possible world or even distant possible world in which foreknowledge prevents the agent from acting freely. Of course, if theological fatalism is true, nobody ever acts freely, but my point is that there is no manipulation going on in other possible worlds in the foreknowledge scenario. The relation between foreknowledge and human acts is no different in one world than in any other. But it is precisely the fact that the relation between the Frankfurt machine and Mary's act differs in the actual world than in other close worlds that is supposed to make the Frankfurt example work in showing the falsity of PAP.
To make this point clear, let us look at how the standard Frankfurt case would have to be amended to make it a close analogy to the situation of infallible foreknowledge. As I have argued previously (1991, chap. 6, sec. 2.1), the device implanted in Mary's brain would have to be set in such a way that no matter what Mary did, it never intervened. It is not even true that it might have intervened. Any world in which Mary decides to commit the murder is a world in which the device is set to make her commit the murder should she not decide to do it, and any world in which she does not decide to commit the murder is a world in which the device is set to prevent her from deciding to do it if she is about to decide to do it. Now of course this might be an impossible device, but it would have to be as described to be a close analogy to the foreknowledge scenario. And I propose that our reactions to this amended Frankfurt case are very different from typical reactions to the standard Frankfurt case. In the standard case it at least appears to be true that the agent cannot do otherwise, whereas in the case amended to be parallel to the foreknowledge case there is a very straightforward sense in which the agent can do otherwise because her will is not thwarted by Black in any possible world. The machine is ready to manipulate her, but it does not manipulate her, nor might it have manipulated her since it does not even manipulate her in counterfactual circumstances. We might think of the machine as a metaphysical accident — an extraneous addition to the story that plays no part in the sequence of events in any possible world. Possibly it is not clear in the amended story whether or not Mary has alternate possibilities. What the story shows, then, is that alternate possibilities are not always relevant to the possession of libertarian freedom.
A crucial premise of the basic argument for theological fatalism is premise (2), the principle of the necessity of the past. We have already discussed the Ockhamist response to this premise, which accepts (2) as applied to what is strictly past, but rejects it as applied to that part of the past that is not wholly or strictly past. It is worth asking, however, whether there is any such thing as the necessity of the past at all. What do we mean when we say that the past, the strict past, is necessary? When people say "There is no use crying over spilled milk," they presumably mean that there is nothing anybody can do now about the spilled milk; the spilling of the milk is outside the realm of our causal control. But it is not at all clear that pastness per se puts something outside the realm of our causal control. Rather, it is pastness in conjunction with the metaphysical law that causes must precede their effects. If we decided that effects can precede their causes, I think we would no longer speak of the necessity of the past.
So the necessity of the past is the principle that past events are outside the class of causable events. There is a temporal asymmetry in causability because everything causable is in the future. But some of the future is non-causable as well. Whether or not determinism is true, there are some events in the future that are causally necessary. If a future event E is necessary, it is causable, and not E is not causable. If the necessity of the past is the non-causability of the past, it seems a bit odd to pick out the class of propositions about the past as having an allegedly distinct kind of necessity since some of the future has that same kind of necessity.
This reveals a deeper problem in the idea of the necessity of the past. The modes of causable and not causable do not correspond to the standard modes of necessary, possible, impossible, and contingent. The actual past is not causable, but alternative pasts are not causable either. If it is too late to make something have happened, it is too late to make something else have happened instead. So if a proposition p about the past is not causable, not-p is also not causable. This is a disanalogy with the logical modalities since if p is necessary, not-p is the contrary of necessary; it is impossible. Another disanalogy between necessity and non-causability is that if p is necessary, p is possible, but if p is not causable, there is no category parallel to the possible that applies to p. The realm of standard modality is divided into the possible and the impossible. The necessary is a subset of the possible and the contingent is the possible that is not necessary. The modes I am suggesting divide events into the causable and the non-causable. There is a set of propositions p which are such that p is not causable and not-p is not causable. There is a set of propositions p which are such that p is causable and not-p is not causable. There may also be a set of propositions p which are such that p is causable and not-p is causable. Whether there are any propositions in the third category is part of what is at issue in discussions of fatalism. But these three categories show that the logical categories of causability and non-causability do not correspond to the standard modal categories of the necessary, possible, and impossible. The attempt to assimilate the causal categories to modal categories is a mistake.
These considerations indicate that premise (2) should be given up and replaced by:
(2a) If E is an event in the past, E is not now causable.
Consider next what happens if we alter the so-called necessity of the past to express the metaphysical principle that the past is not causable. Premise (5) becomes:
(5a) If p is not now causable and necessarily (p → q), then q is not now causable.
Principle (5a) is false. One obvious reason is that a logically impossible proposition entails every proposition. (5a) needs to be amended as:
(5b) If p is not causable, necessarily (p → q), and p is not logically impossible, then q is not causable.
But premise (5b) is also false because the truth of q may be a logically necessary condition for the truth of p, where p is not causable but q is causable. For example, p might be the proposition that I build a 200 story building by myself, a proposition that is causally but not logically impossible. The proposition that I build a 200 story building by myself entails that I build a building. The proposition that I build a building (a small one, with help) is causable.
The foreknowledge/free will incompatibilist must therefore find a principle in place of (5b) that is true and that permits the inference to the non-causability of the future. I know of no principle that is very close in structure to premise (5) of the basic argument, but there is such a principle in the literature on free will and determinism, proposed by Peter van Inwagen (1983) that can be used by the foreknowledge/free will incompatibilist. That principle, called rule Beta, is discussed in section 4 below.
3. Incompatibilist responses to the argument for theological fatalism
Ever since the dilemma of this article was identified, there have been philosophers who thought that something like our basic argument succeeds in demonstrating that infallible foreknowledge is incompatible with human free will. If they are incompatible, one of them must be given up. One might give up both, of course, but the dilemma has attracted so much attention in the history of philosophy because both the belief in a being with infallible foreknowledge and belief in the existence of libertarian free will are strongly entrenched in the world view of many philosophers. To give up one of these beliefs is difficult and often has many ramifications for one's other beliefs.
The denial of libertarian freedom has always had many supporters. The idea of making causal determinism the focal point of discussions of free will is modern in origin, and some philosophers think that the modern framing of the issue is confused. Philosophers who deny libertarian freedom may affirm a type of free will compatible with determinism, or they may instead simply accept the consequence that human beings lack free will.
The other incompatibilist position is to affirm libertarian free will along with the principle of alternate possibilities (premise 9), and to deny the possibility of infallible foreknowledge. This position has recently become well-known in the so-called "open God" theory (Pinnock et al. 1994). These theorists reject divine timelessness and immutability, along with infallible foreknowledge, arguing that not only should foreknowledge be rejected because of its fatalist consequences, the view of a God who takes risks is more faithful to Scripture than the classical notion of an essentially omniscient and foreknowing deity.
A form of fatalism that is even older than theological fatalism is logical fatalism, the thesis that the past truth of a proposition about the future entails fatalism. Aristotle discusses this form of fatalism in his famous Sea Battle Argument, mentioned in section 2.1 above. A clearer and more sophisticated form of the argument was proposed by Diodorus Cronus, whose argument is remarkably similar in form to our basic argument for theological fatalism. The logical fatalist argument parallel to our basic argument is as follows:
Argument for logical fatalism
Let S = the proposition that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.
(1L) Yesterday it was true that S. [assumption]
(2L) If some proposition was true in the past, it is now-necessary that it was true then. [Form of the Necessity of the Past]
(3L) That yesterday it was true that S is now-necessary. [1, 2]
(4L) Necessarily, if yesterday it was true that S, then now it is true that S. [omnitemporality of truth]
(5L) If p is now-necessary, and necessarily (if p then q), then q is now-necessary. [Transfer of Necessity Principle]
(6L) Therefore, that it is true that S is now-necessary. [3L, 4L, 5L]
(7L) If its being true that S is now-necessary, no alternative to the truth of S is now-possible. [definition of "necessary"]
(8L) So no alternative to the truth of S is now-possible [6L, 7L]
(9L) If no alternative to the truth of a proposition about the future is now-possible, then what the proposition is about will not be brought about by free human choice. [Version of Principle of Alternate Possibilities]
(10L) Hence, the sea battle tomorrow will not be brought about by free human choice. [8L, 9L]
Unlike the argument for theological fatalism, the argument for logical fatalism has few defenders. One reason is that (2L) is less plausible than (2). But recently Warfield (1997) has argued for the equivalence of the two forms of fatalism if God is necessarily existent and essentially omniscient. Responses have been given by Hasker (1998) and Brueckner (2000), and there is a rejoinder to both by Warfield (2000).
A well known argument that causal determinism leads to fatalism has a similar form. Let H = a complete description of the world at some time in the distant past. A = some future human act. L = a statement of the causal laws
Argument for causal fatalism
(1c) H and L
(2c) It is now necessary that H and L [the necessity of the past and the necessity of causal laws]
(3c) It is now necessary that [(H & L) → A] [thesis of causal determinism]
(4c) If it is now necessary that p and it is now necessary that (p → q), it is now necessary that q. [transfer of necessity principle]
(5c) It is now necessary that A. [2,3,4]
(6c) If it is now necessary that A, then A will be not be done freely.
Problems with the principle used in (4c) have been noted above, but a related argument using a different principle in place of (4c) originated with Peter van Inwagen (1983), who uses the argument to show the incompatibility of causal determinism and free will. Van Inwagen proposes a rule of inference that uses an operator "N" that is to be read as follows: Np = p and nobody has or ever had any choice about whether p. Van Inwagen calls his principle "Beta":
BETA: Np & N (p ⇒ q) /- Nq
The argument goes as follows:
(1) H and L [assumption]
(2) N (H & L) [version of the necessity of the past and causal laws]
(3) N [(H & L) → A] [thesis of causal determinism]
(4) N A [2,3, rule Beta]
Principle Beta has been disputed in the literature on free will and determinism, and there are many suggested counterexamples and emendations to the principle. For example, Timothy O'Connor (2000) has defended the following qualified principle:
BETA2: Np & N (p ⇒ q) & q is made true later in time than p /- Nq.
BETA2 is harder to refute than BETA and also can be used to support the incompatibility of infallible foreknowledge and free will. The reader should refer to the literature on Beta and related transfer principles for evaluation of the rejection of these principles as a way out of the various forms of fatalism.
I have argued that the dilemma of theological fatalism is broader than a problem about free will. The modal or causal asymmetry of time, a transfer of necessity principle, and the supposition of infallible foreknowledge are mutually inconsistent. (Zagzebski 1991, appendix). If there is a distinct kind of necessity that the past has qua past, and which is not an implicit reference to the lack of causability of the past, then it is temporally asymmetrical. The past has it and the future does not. The necessity of the past and the contingency of the future are two side of the same coin. To say that the future is contingent in the sense of temporal modality does not imply that we have causal control over the entire future, of course. We lack control over part of the future because part (or even all) of it is causally necessary. But if the necessity of the past is distinct from the lack of causability, and is a type of necessity the past has just because it is past, the future must lack that particular kind of necessity.
The idea that there is temporally asymmetrical modality is inconsistent with the transfer of necessity principle and the supposition of infallible foreknowledge of an essentially omniscient deity. The inconsistency can be demonstrated as follows:
Dilemma of Foreknowledge and Modal Temporal Asymmetry
Again, let T = the proposition that you will answer the telephone tomorrow at 9 am.
(1f) There is (and was before now) an essentially omniscient foreknower (EOF) [Assumption for dilemma]
(1f) and the Principle of the Necessity of the Past tells us that
(2f) Either it is now-necessary that the EOF believed T before now or it is now-necessary that the EOF believed not T before now.
From (1f) and the definition of an EOF it follows that
(3f) Necessarily (The EOF believed before now that T → T), and necessarily (The EOF believed before now that not T → not T) .
By the Transfer of Necessity Principle (TNP), (2f) and (3f) entail
(4f) Either it is now-necessary that T or it is now-necessary that not T.
(4f) is logically equivalent to
(5f) Either it is not now-possible that T or it is not now-possible that not T.
From the Principle of the Contingency of the Future we get
(6f) It is now-possible that T and it is now-possible that not T.
But (6f) contradicts (5f).
The inconsistency shown in this argument has nothing to do with free will or fatalism. But the problem is even more general than this argument illustrates. The reason essential omniscience conflicts with temporal modality and the transfer principle is that the existence of an EOF requires that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future. But it straightforwardly follows from TNP that a proposition that is now-necessary cannot entail a proposition that is not now-necessary. So if the past is now-necessary and the future is not, a proposition about the past cannot entail a proposition about the future. The conclusion is that if asymmetrical temporal modality is coherent, it can obey TNP, or it can permit a proposition about the past to entail a proposition about the future, but not both.
The root of the problem, then, is that it is impossible for there to be a type of modality that has the following features:
(a) The past and future are asymmetrical in that the past is necessary with respect to this type of modality, whereas the future is contingent with respect to this type of modality.
(b) There are propositions about the past that entail propositions about the future.
(c) TNP obtains.
The problem of the alleged incompatibility of infallible foreknowledge and free will is therefore a special case of a more general problem that has nothing to do with either foreknowledge or free will. Temporally asymmetrical necessity and the transfer of necessity principle threaten a host of metaphysical theses that require that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future (e.g., Matter is indestructible). This is not an issue that can be evaded by denying the religious doctrine of divine foreknowledge.
It was suggested in section 2.6 that the problem may be (a) above. There is no temporally asymmetrical necessity. If the root intuition behind the necessity of the past is something like the non-causability of the past, there is another inconsistency. There is an inconsistency between the alleged non-causability of the past, the transfer of non-causability principle, and the supposition that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future. But in these arguments it is the transfer principle that is suspicious. I have discussed arguments of this kind in some detail in Zagzebski (2002b).
Regardless of what one thinks of the argument for theological fatalism, there is a more general problem in the logic of time and causation that needs to be addressed. Both the alleged modal asymmetry of time and the causal asymmetry should be examined in more detail, as well as the various transfer principles that result in an inconsistency with metaphysical theses that have the consequence that a proposition about the past entails a proposition about the future.
Adams, Marilyn. 1967. "Is the Existence of God a 'Hard' Fact?" The Philosophical Review 76: 492-503.
Adams, Robert Merrihew. 1991. "An Anti-Molinist Argument," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (Philosophy of Religion), James Tomberlin (ed). Atascadero, Calif: Ridgeview; 343-354.
Alston, William P. 1985. "Divine Foreknowledge and Alternative Conceptions of Human Freedom." International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18:1, 19-32.
–––. 1986. "Does God Have Beliefs?" Religious Studies 22 (Sept/Dec) 287- 306.
Aquinas, St. Thomas. Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 14, art 13.
–––. Summa Contra Gentiles I, chap. 66.
Basinger, David. 1986. "Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought," Religious Studies 22, 407-22.
–––. 1993. "Simple Foreknowledge and Providential Control," Faith and Philosophy 10, #3 (July), 421- 427.
Boethius. The Consolation of Philosophy, Book V, Prose vi.
Brant, Dale Eric. 1997. "On Plantinga's Way Out." Faith and Philosophy 14:3 (July), 378-387.
Brown, Robert F. 1991. "Divine Omniscience, Immutability, Aseity and Human Free Will," Religious Studies 27, 3 (Sept), 285-295.
Brueckner, Anthony. 2000. "On an Attempt to Demonstrate the Compatibility of Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," Faith and Philosophy 17:1 (January), 132-134.
Craig, William Lane. 1990. Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, Brill's Studies in Intellectual History 19. Leiden: E.J. Brill.
–––. 1994. "Robert Adams's New Anti-Molinist Argument," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54, 857-861.
–––. 1998. "On Hasker's Defense of Anti-Molinism," Faith and Philosophy 15:2 (April), 236-240.
Dekker, Eef. 2000. Middle Knowledge. Leuven: Peeters.
Dummett, Michael. 1964. "Bringing About the Past," Philosophical Review 73, 338-359; reprinted in his Truth and Other Enigmas (London: Duckworth, 1978).
Finch, Alicia and Ted Warfield. 1999. "Fatalism: Logical and Theological," Faith and Philosophy 16:2 (April), 233-238.
Fischer, John Martin. 1982. "Responsibility and Control." Journal of Philosophy 79 (January), 24-40.
–––. 1983. "Freedom and Foreknowledge," Philosophical Review 92 (January), 67-79.
–––.1985a. "Ockhamism," Philosophical Review 94 (January), 81-100.
–––.1985b. "Scotism," Mind 94 (April), 231-43.
––– editor. 1989. God, Freedom, and Foreknowledge. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
–––.1991. "Snapshot Ockhamism," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (Philosophy of Religion). Atascadero: Ridgeview, 355-372.
–––.1994. The Metaphysics of Free Will . Oxford: Blackwell.
Flint, Thomas. 1990. "Hasker's God, Time, and Knowledge," Philosophical Studies 60, 103-115.
–––.1991. "In Defense of Theological Compatibilism," Faith and Philosophy 8, 237-243.
–––. 1997. "Praying for Things to Have Happened," Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXI, ed. by Peter French et al, 61-82.
–––. 1998. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Forrest, Peter. 1985. "Backwards Causation in Defence of Free Will," Mind 94 (April), 210-217.
Frankfurt, Harry. 1969. "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," Journal of Philosophy 46 (December), 829-839.
Freddoso, Alfred. 1982. "Accidental Necessity and Power Over the Past," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63, 54-68.
–––.1983. "Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism," Journal of Philosophy 80, 257-78.
–––. 1988. Trans. and introduction to Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge, Part IV of Concordia. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Gaskin, R. 1993. "Conditionals of Freedom and Middle Knowledge," The Philosophical Quarterly 43:173 (October), 412-430.
–––.1994. "Molina on Divine Foreknowledge and the Principle of Bivalence," Journal of the History of Philosophy 32:4 (October), 551-571.
Goris, Harm J.M.J. 1996. Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God's Foreknowledge nad Irresistible Will. Utrecht/Louvain: Thomas Instituut/Peeters.
Griffin, David and John B. Cobb. 1976. Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition. Philadelphia: Westminster Press.
Hartshorne, Charles. 1941. Man's Vision of God. N.Y.: Harper and Bros.
–––. 1967. A Natural Theology for Our Time. Lasalle: Open Court Pub.
Hasker, William. 1989. God, Time, and Knowledge. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
–––. 1993. "Zagzebski on Power Entailment," Faith and Philosophy 10:2 (April), 250-255.
–––. 1995. "Middle Knowledge: A Refutation Revisited," Faith and Philosophy 12:2 (April), 223-236.
–––. 1997. "Explanatory Priority: Transitive and Unequivocal, a Reply to William Craig," Philosophy and Phenomological Research 57:2 (June), 389-393.
–––. 1998. "No Easy Way Out - A Response to Warfield." Nous 32, 361-363.
–––. 2000. "Anti-Molinism is Undefeated!" Faith and Philosophy 17:1 (January), 126-131.
Hawking, Stephen. 1988. A Brief History of Time. N.Y.: Bantom Books.
Hoffman, Joshua and Gary Rosenkrantz. 1984. "Hard and Soft Facts," Philosophical Review 93 (July), 419-34.
Hunt, David. 1992. "Omnisprescient Agency," Religious Studies 28 (Sept), 351-69.
–––. 1993a. "Simple Foreknowledge and Divine Providence." Faith and Philosophy 10:3 (July), 394-414.
–––. 1993b. "Prescience and Providence: A Reply to My Critics," Faith and Philosophy 10:3 (July), 428-438.
–––. 1995a. "Does Theological Fatalism Rest on an Equivocation?" American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April), 153-65.
–––. 1995b. "Dispositional Omniscience," Philosophical Studies 80 (December), 243-78.
–––. 1996a. "Augustine on Theological Fatalism: The Argument of De Libero Arbitrio III.1-4," Medieval Philosophy and Theology 6 (Spring), 1-30.
–––. 1996b. "Frankfurt Counterexamples: Some Comments on the Widerker-Fischer Debate," Faith and Philosophy 13, 395-401.
–––. 1999. "On Augustine's Way Out," Faith and Philosophy 16:1 (January), 3-26.
–––. 1999. "Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action," FPhilosophical Studies 97:2 (January), 195-227.
Kane, Robert. 1996. The Significance of Free Will. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
Kapitan, Tomis. 1993. "Providence, Foreknowledge, and Decision Procedure," Faith and Philosophy 10:3 (July), 415-420.
Kenny, Anthony. 1969. "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom," in Kenny, Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays. University of Notre Dame Press.
Kvanvig, Jonathan. 1986. The Possibility of an All-Knowing God. N.Y. St. Martin's Press.
Leftow, Brian. 1991a. Time and Eternity. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
–––. 1991b. "Timelessness and Foreknowledge," Philosophical Studies (U.S.) 63, 309-325.
Lewis, David. 1979. "Counterfactual Dependence and Time's Arrow," Noûs. 13 (November), 455-476.
Linville, Mark D. 1993. "Divine Foreknowledge and the Libertarian Conception of Freedom," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33:3 (June), 165-186.
Lucas, J.R. 1989. The Future: An Essay on God, Temporality, and Truth . London: Blackwell.
Mavrodes, George. 1984. "Is the Past Preventable?" Faith and Philosophy I (April), 131-146.
McCann, Hugh. 1995. "Divine Sovereignty and the Freedom of the Will," Faith and Philosophy 12, 582-598.
McKenna, Michael. 1997. "Alternate Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy," Journal of Social Philosophy 28:3 (Winter).
Mele, Alfred and David Robb. 1998. "Rescuing Frankfurt-Style Cases," Philosophical Review 107:1 (January), 97-112.
Molina, Luis de. See Freddoso 1988.
Mongkin, Charles and Menachem Kellner (eds.). 2000. Free Will and Moral Responsibility: General and Jewish Perpsectives. College Park, Md: University of Maryland Press.
Murray, Michael J. 1995. "Leibniz on Divine Foreknowledge of Future Contingents and Human Freedom," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55:1 (March), 75-108.
O'Connor, Timothy. 2000. Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Ockham, William. 1983. Predestination, Foreknowledge, and Future Contingents, 2nd ed & trans. by Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann. Indianapolis: Hackett.
Otsuka, Michael. 1998. "Incompatibilism and the Avoidability of Blame," Ethics 108 (July), 685-701.
Padgett, Alan. forthcoming. "Divine Foreknowledge and the Arrow of Time: On the Impossibility of Retrocausation," in God and Time, by Paul Helm, Alan Padgett, William Lane Craig, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Downer's Grove, Ill.: Inter-Varsity Press,
Padgett, Alan. 1992. Eternity and the Nature of Time, N.Y.: St. Martin's Press.
Pereboom, Derk. 2000. "Alternate Possibilities and Causal Histories," Philosophical Perspectives, edited by James Tomberlin, vol. 20.
Pike, Nelson. 1965. "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action," The Philosophical Review 74, 27-46.
–––. 1970. God and Timelessness. New York: Schocken.
–––. 1993. "A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge Problem," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (June), 129-164.
Pinnock, Clark, Richard Rice, John Sanders, William Hasker, and David Basinger. 1994. The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press.
Plantinga, Alvin. 1973. The Nature of Necessity. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
–––. 1977. God, Freedom, and Evil. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans
–––. 1986. "On Ockham's Way Out." Faith and Philosophy 3, 235-269.
Purtill, Richard. 1988. "Fatalism and the Omnitemporality of Truth," Faith and Philosophy 5:2 (April), 185-192.
Rauf, M.A. 1970. "The Qu'ran and Free Will." The Muslim World 60: 289-299.
Reichenbach, Bruce. 1987. "Hasker on Omniscience," Faith and Philosophy 4 (January), 86-92.
–––. 1988. "Fatalism and Freedom," International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (Sept), 271-85.
Robinson, Michael D. 1995. Eternity and Freedom: A Critical Analysis of Divine Timelessness as a Solution to the Foreknowledge/Free Will Debate. Lanham, Md: University Press of America.
Rowe, William L. 1999. "Problem of Divine Sovereignty and Human Freedom," Faith and Philosophy 16:1 (January), 98-101.
Runzo, Joseph. 1981. "Omniscience and Freedom for Evil," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12, 131-147.
Sanders, John. 1997. "Why Simple Foreknowledge Offers No More Providential Control Than the Openness of God." Faith and Philosophy 14:1 (January), 26-40.
Shanley, B. 1997. "Eternal Knowledge of he Temporal in Aquinas," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 71, 197-224.
–––. 1998. "Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 72, 99-122.
Sleigh, Robert. 1994. "Leibniz and Divine Foreknowledge," Faith and Philosophy 11:4 (October), 547-571.
Stump, Eleonore. 1990. "Intellect, Will, and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," in Christian Theism and the Problems of Philosophy, edited by Michael D. Beaty. University of Notre Dame Press, 254-85.
–––. 1996. "Libertarian Freedom and the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," in Faith, Freedom, and Rationality, edited by Jeff Jordan and Daniel Howard-Snyder. Lanham, Md: Rowman and Littlefield, 73-88.
Stump, Eleonore and Norman Kretzmann. 1981. "Eternity," Journal of Philosophy 78 (August), 429-58.
–––. 1991. "Prophecy, Past Truth, and Eternity," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (Philosophy of Religion), edited by James Tomberlin. Atascadero: Ridgeview Press, 395-424.
–––. 1992. "Eternity, Awareness, and Action," Faith and Philosophy 9, 463-82.
Swinburne, Richard. 1977. The Coherence of Theism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Talbott, Thomas. 1986. "On Divine Foreknowledge and Bringing About the Past," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1986), 455-469.
–––. 1993. "Theological Fatalism and Modal Confusion," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 33 (April), 65-88.
Tooley, Michael. 2000. "Freedom and Foreknowledge," Faith and Philosophy 17 (April), 212-224.
Van Inwagen, Peter. 1983. An Essay on Free Will. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Walls, Jerry L. 1990. "Is Molinism as Bad as Calvinism?" Faith and Philosophy 7:1, 85-98.
Warfield, Ted. 1997. "Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom are Compatible," Noûs 31:1, 80-86.
–––. 2000. "On Freedom and Foreknowledge: A Reply to Two Critics." Faith and Philosophy 17 (April), 255-259.
Whitehead, A. N. 1978. Process and Reality. D. R. Griffin and D. Sherburne (eds.). N.Y.: Macmillan Press.
Widerker, David. 1990. "Troubles With Ockhamism," Journal of Philosophy, 462-80.
–––. 1991. "A Problem for the Eternity Solution," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 29, 87-95.
–––. 1995a. "Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of Decisions," Faith and Philosophy 12 (January).
–––. 1995b. "Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Philosophical Review 104 (April), 247-261.
–––. 1996. "Contra Snapshot Ockhamism," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 39: 2 (April), 95-102.
–––. 2000. "Theological Fatalism and Frankfurt Counterexamples to the Principle of Alternate Possibilities," Faith and Philosophy 17 (April), 249-254.
Wierenga, Edward. 1989. The Nature of God. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
–––. 1991. "Prophecy, Freedom, and the Necessity of the Past," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (Philosophy of Religion), 425-446.
Wolterstorff, Nicholas. 1975. "God Everlasting," God and the Good: Essays in Honor of Henry Stob, edited by C Orlebeke and L.Smedes. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans.
Zagzebski, Linda. 1991. The Dilemma of Freedom and Foreknowledge. N.Y.: Oxford University Press.
–––. 1993. "Rejoinder to Hasker," Faith and Philosophy 10:2 (April), 256-260.
–––. 1997. "Foreknowledge and Freedom," Companion to Philosophy of Religion, edited by Philip Quinn and Charles Taliaferro. Oxford and N.Y.: Blackwell.
–––. 2000. "Does Libertarian Freedom Require Alternate Possibilities?" Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 14.
–––. 2002a. "Recent Work on Divine Foreknowledge and Free Will," The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, edited by Robert Kane. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 45-64.
–––. 2002b. "Omniscience and the Arrow of Time," Faith and Philosophy 19:4 (October), 503-519.
–––. 2004. "Omniscience, Time, and Freedom," Guide to Philosophy of Religion, edited by William Mann. Oxford and N.Y.: Blackwell.
Zemach, Eddy M. and David Widerker. 1987. "Facts, Freedom, and Foreknowledge," Religious Studies 23 (March), 19-28.
[Please contact the author with suggestions.]
Aristotle | Augustine, Saint | Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus | fatalism | free choice: medieval theories of[= liberum arbitrium] | freedom: divine | free will | God: concepts of | incompatibilism: (nondeterministic) theories of free will | incompatibilism: arguments for | Ockham [Occam], William | voluntarism, theological
Linda Zagzebski <lzagzebski@ou.edu>


Why use the PhD, thesis / Masters Dissertation, template?
Some time spent up front to learn the skills to create such a structured document will save you hours of tedious re-formatting before it is time to hand.This thesis template is a suggestion.
you can focus on the writing. If you need assistance, please visit the above drop-in classes offered by the University of Calgary Learning Commons. However, if you want to express your own creativity it is easy to change fonts, colour schemes and layout options without having to loose all the automation benefits of using the template. Find your version of Word below to download the tutorial appropriate to your needs. The dotx template can also be used by people using older versions of the Template. 785 532 Jun 21, 2018. Word can automatically generate a table of contents and list essay of figures with page numbers. Questions about the guidelines, or interpretation of them, should be directed to the. Our thesis formatting tutorial takes you step-by-step through the process of formatting your thesis from our template file. Please read the tutorial appropriate to your version of Microsoft Word before you decide which format to use. Sections Included in the PhD/Masters Template. All theses and dissertations, regardless of their source document (MS Word, LaTeX, Mac Pages, Generic epfl Template in Word. If you are using Word for Mac please comment on this post if you have any trouble as I would be interested to know. Then select the dotx template, and click Open. Its free for anybody to use, although an acknowledgment to Kayla and myself is appreciated. If your document looks good, and includes all the right parts in the right places the examiners are going to be more inclined to believe you know what you are talking about.
Microsoft Office Theme File, microsoft Word, this makes a big difference to you when you come to submit. And Word 2013, tables, the word template you can download here only works if you stick to the preformatted styles and if you respect the automatic fields hidden in the document. Comments AND word Mac users are encouraged to use Google to find D Thesis Template by Kayla Friedman and Malcolm Morgan is licensed under a 2007. That wont just look like a generic Word document.
The only PhD, thesis /Masters Dissertation template for Microsoft.We have developed Microsoft.
Automatically produced tables of contents, cover Page, references. Headers with Thesis title, roman Numerals for front matter page numbers. For more information on Nov 5, if you have come up with Version 3 or a template adjusted to your university. Using the template means hsc sample essay auden module c you dont need to find out how to do these things. List of Tables, introduction, guidelines for Masters Theses and Doctoral Dissertations for more information on the permitted formats. Authors name, download the scientific thesis template for Microsoft Word. Footers with chapter titles automatically inserted. Thesis, please note the templates and the following instructions are based on MS Word 2003. How to use the PhD Thesis Masters Dissertation Template and Information and Requirements for Cambridge University and the Department of Engineering.
We have developed Microsoft Word templates for your use when writing your thesis/dissertation.
Thesis Dissertation Formatting General Advice page.UVic Thesis Template MSWord 2009 Tip for Mac users with older versions of Microsoft Word you may not be May 10, 2018 Microsoft Word : A Word file in the correct format for UF Theses and The Word file can be used by both Mac and.I have not checked it with Word for Mac.


Check out Young Chris Feat. Rico Love "None Of Dem" Video, the latest visual from Young Chris, released on Friday, April 8th, 2011. Young Chris continues to impress with each new leak, and Young Chris Feat. Rico Love "None Of Dem" Video is no exception. It's strengthens Young Chris's already impressive body of work, which has seen positive change over the years. We're most definitely anticipating Young Chris's next offering.
Did you enjoy Rico Love's contributions to this video?
Peep the new visual for Young Chris's Young Chris "Behind The Scenes of "A$$ets" Video" Video.
Young Chris continues to impress with each new leak, and Young Chris Feat. Rico Love "None Of Dem" Video is no exception. It's strengthens Young Chris's already impressive body of work, which has seen positive change over the years. We're most definitely anticipating Young Chris's next offering.


text:
Southwest Airlines Resuming More Caribbean Flights
A beach in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic.
Southwest is returning several seasonal routes to the Caribbean, the carrier said this week.
Southwest has announced the return of several flights for the upcoming 2020 season, it said.
That includes nonstop flights from Atlanta to both Cancun on the Caribbean coast of Mexico and Punta Cana in the Dominican Republic beginning April 18, 2020.
Both of those routes will fly on weekends nonstop, according to the company.
Southwest also be resuming seasonal flights between Oakland and Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, also on Saturdays and Sundays, beginning in mid-April.
On April 18, Southwest will be resuming weekly Saturday service between New Orleans and Cancun as well.
Southwest has been steadily growing its footprint in the wider Caribbean region in recent years, both from the west coast and from growing hubs like Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
— CJ
cancun, caribbean, dominican republic, flights, mexico, nonstop, puerto vallarta, punta cana, southwest airlines
The Dutch Caribbean island of Aruba has announced another update of its entry rules for travelers, now effective in January 2022. The new rules, which apply to American and Canadian visitors, mean travelers will have two pre-testing options for …
A parade of cafes at the edge of the sand; tiny bars and art galleries; a soundtrack of clacking plates and mopeds and afternoon laughter, silent and loud in all the right ways. Across the wider Caribbean one can …

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


To view the 2D floorplan, please click on the link below. You can also view the floorplan in Interactive 3D by then clicking on "3D" at the top right of the webpage: Interactive 3D floorplan Located on the first floor, the apartment has two flexible bedrooms (double or twin) and two bathrooms. The master bedroom is ensuite and the second bedroom has an adjacent shower room and separate toilet. The open plan living area has a modern fitted kitchen, dining for 6 people and a comfortable seating area, including a corner sofa which converts to a double bed.


Beer Buddy Tumblers are the perfect cup for all your outdoor activities. Great for tailgating, by the pool, on a picnic or anywhere glass is just not a good idea. Features durable frosted double walled insulated acrylic, keeps drinks cold. BPA free and holds 14 ounces of your favorite beverage. Comes with closable blue lid top. Customize it with your monogram initials HERE.


Steve Jobs was an American entrepreneur and CEO of Apple Inc. He co-created the iMac, iTunes, Apple Stores, the iPod, the iTunes Store, iPhone, the App store and the iPad, all of which have become cultural icons in their own right. Steve is a shortened form of Steven, which in turn is a medieval English variant of Stephen.


This essay aims to clarify and alliterate the differences in the arguments and theories of the alternating scientific procedures expressed by the empiricist philosophers Hume and Popper.
Additionally, I have added the thoughts of Kuhn, a historian of science and of Feyerabend, an extremist philosopher who both provide their own opinions to the nature of science.
Finally, I offer my own humble opinions and answer the above question after talking in depth about the topic of this essay.
Hume was the main philosopher to start a controversy regarding the validity of the origination of all general scientific knowledge. His arguments against the use of various methods were answered and developed by Popper, which were then superseded by Kuhn and the Austrian born Feyerabend.
Hume recognized the weakness of using the method of scientific induction as a source of knowledge.
By ?induction?, I refer to the theory that when a being observes the activity of a group of objects, this person presumes that other items falling into this particular category must behave in the same way. For example: When I peacefully watch a group of swans while walking a dog by the lake, I notice they are all white. From this observation, I may presume it is probable that all swans must be white. This is true, of course, until I go to Australia and notice a black sawn. Then what happens?
It is through this lack of proof that Hume pointed out that all scientific finding based upon observation must be temporary and conjectural; i.e. cannot be claimed as fixed, true knowledge.
WriteWork contributors. "Does falsification provide an answer to the problems of induction?" WriteWork.com. WriteWork.com, 28 March, 2004. Web. 19 Apr. 2019.


Fact: I've had a very resonant chest my whole life. I feel this was amplified as a singer, but whatever. My entire life, whenever a baby was given to me, I would begin to speak and they would calm down because my chest vibrates so much. I've been called a Baby Whisperer long before I actually got into the baby business. Many of you have witnessed this at events….and I've even had some of you feel my chest to demonstrate it.
And at ABC Kids Expo last year I found a product in the Inventor's Connection that was brand-spankin-new—-like not even CLOSE to being on the market yet.
Meet Tranquilo Mat. This battery-powered mat is very thin, light, and has amazing effects on calming cranky bambinos. It's incredibly soothing and has a multitude of uses (just not IN car seats….but you all know that because you follow me, riiiiiiiiiiight???). It can go under a playmat or on top of baby in a bouncer—and it's very portable. It's really cool and I think will help a LOT of families out.


There are as many ways to pile flavour on a slice of crisp bread as there are cooks. Here are some ideas to help you find your favourite!
Smoked salmon is the ultimate party guest. It's versatile, gets along with lots of other ingredients and always adds a luxurious twist to the proceedings. It's also easy to work with because you're limited only by your imagination.
This fun snack is a tasty way to add some healthy flavour to a lunchbox or your table. It's one of our family favourites partly because it's so easy to make.
Mussels travel with their own built-in sauce base. They're easy to steam and, when you do, they release a flavourful broth that many connoisseurs swear is the best part. That broth can be flavoured any way you want, so mussels are also a great ingredient to freestyle with.
In Arabic, the word "hummus" means chickpeas. In the world of food, hummus is a dip or spread made from a purée of chickpeas, tahini, lemon, olive oil and garlic. It's very easy to make, very tasty and very healthy. It's a convenient snack and a frequent guest at our table.
Fresh cultured blue mussels are easy to cook as well as being a healthy and easy meal option. They're quick and tasty and can be eaten right out of the pot or used in a variety of recipes. Before you start cooking, you should always give your mussels a quick rinse. Cultured blue mussels are pre-cleaned so that's really all you need to do. The fresh water will cause the mussels to close. If there are any that don't close give them a quick tap, if they still don't close at least partially, simply discard them.
In the fall, when apples are in peak season, I always make a giant batch or two of applesauce and freeze it. It's one of my favourite things to do in the kitchen with my son Gabe. Then, all winter long, we're reminded of our favourite season.
Every fall when locally grown squash and apples appear in the farmers market I make this dish. It shows how well ingredients that grow together go together. That's why it tastes so good!


text:
About Jim Grey
Jim Grey takes photographs with vintage cameras, drives the old roads, and writes about his life. He lives in Indiana and likes it. More»
New posts Monday through Saturday!
Four times Freshly Pressed
Photographs and stories by Jim Grey
Who's Jim Grey?
The Michigan Road
The National Road
Personal, Stories Told
Why New Jersey's anti-bullying law is both too much and not enough
8 September 2011 Jim Greyabuse, children, education, fear, New Jersey, news, school 17 Comments
A few boys started to pick on me a little when I was in the fifth grade. I was never a fighter; I always wanted to get along, and so I always tried to just laugh it away. Sometimes they were a little belligerent, and I tried to keep the peace by appeasing them. When that didn't work I withdrew, often in tears, which only encouraged them.
There had been maybe 60 sixth graders in my elementary school, where the pecking orders had long been established. When we moved up to the middle school, our seventh grade class numbered more than 400. We boys had to figure out hierarchies anew, with all the one-upsmanship, displays of toughness, and putdowns that implies – made fierce by a puberty-fueled desire to impress the girls. But I was a late bloomer – boyish, scrawny, not chasing the girls yet. I was not tough and I still wouldn't fight. So I was a frequent stooge for boys trying to impress others or salve their own feelings of inadequacy.
This boy was miserable.
The least of it was the taunting and name calling. If you drop the r sound from my last name it sounds like "gay," so naturally I was routinely called James Gay. A few boys lisped the s. One boy even made up a little singsong taunt from it. Some boys cut right to the chase and called me a faggot.
The many times my books and folders were knocked sprawling from my hands for me to retrieve from under other students' feet were not the worst of it either.
No, the worst was the physical abuse.
On the bus, several boys liked to flick their index fingers hard into my ear. My complaints to the driver got me nowhere. Sometimes I'd get lucky and get the seat behind the driver. The boys wouldn't mess with me there.
At school, teachers and staff seldom visited one dim back hallway. After being deliberately tripped three times and then outright assaulted twice back there, I complained to the shop teacher whose classroom was around the corner. He said that he couldn't help me unless he saw someone hurting me. I wanted to say, "Then come out of your dang classroom and look!" I finally gave up using that hallway and went the long way, which involved going outside and around the building.
The gym teachers had looking the other way down to a science as the bigger boys would deliberately pass the basketball right into my face, spike the volleyball into my head, pitch the baseball at my gut, run me down on the track, and so on. After showering one day, several boys forced me into the adjacent restroom, all of us still naked, and tried to shove my head into the toilet. I hollered loud enough that the teachers couldn't ignore it, but when they came into the restroom they only told us to break it up. I refused to shower after that.
I dreaded going to school. I grew depressed and fearful, and withdrew deeply. It was bad enough that my dad, who is not the most emotionally astute man in the world, noticed that I wasn't myself. I told him what was going on, and he said that it would continue until I fought back. He tightly duct-taped a roll of pennies and told me to carry it for the day it came to blows, as the weight of the pennies in my fist would make my punch hurt more. The pennies in my pocket actually made me feel a little better, which might have been Dad's purpose all along. An assistant principal discovered my penny roll one day, called it a concealed weapon, and threatened to suspend me if I kept carrying it. Dad said that if I were suspended he would visit that assistant principal to find out why he allowed such bullying to go on in his school. I wondered why he didn't just go visit the assistant principal anyway.
I needed more help than I got.
There seems to be greater awareness of the bullying problem in schools today. Many schools have anti-bullying programs. In particular, New Jersey is trying to address the problem by passing a sweeping and complex law called the Anti-Bullying Bill of Rights, which took effect Sept. 1. After reading my story, you may be surprised to learn that I have mixed feelings about this law. I applaud that it prescribes training for students, teachers, administrators, and even school board members in recognizing bullying and in their responsibility to try to stop it and report it when they see it. But it is too complicated to administer, defines bullying too broadly, fails to recognize bullying's pernicious nature, and doesn't offer any meaningful help directly to the victim.
The law starts to go sideways when it tells teachers they risk their licenses when they fail to report bullying. It adds layers of bureaucracy when it mandates that any report of bullying must be escalated to the principal, who must begin an investigation within one day and complete it within ten, and report all investigations to state government twice yearly. It also fails to fund the additional staff it requires – anti-bullying coordinators at the school-system level and an anti-bullying specialist and "safety team" at each school. Pity the existing guidance counselors and social workers whose workload just increased. I fear all of this will lead overworked staff to comply just enough to avoid the law's penalties.
The law labels bullying as any act one student does to another that causes emotional or physical harm, but ignores bullying's inherent imbalance of power. By the law's definition a simple insult can be considered bullying, as can a straight up fight between two angry students. This could flood school officials with reports that aren't really bullying, but that they have to investigate and handle as such anyway.
Meanwhile, a determined bully will quickly learn when and where to deal out abuse to avoid detection, and may instill such fear in victims that they will not speak up for fear of retaliation. No law is powerful enough to reach into every dark corner in which a bully can lurk.
In the end, victims need direct help that this law does not offer. They may need counseling to work through the depression and fear they feel. They may need help in setting and defending their personal boundaries. They may benefit from training in self defense, because fighting back may sometimes be their only recourse when their back is against the wall. Through these things they can start to feel more personally powerful, which will make them a less likely target in the future.
I wish my dad had enrolled me in martial arts in the seventh grade, or at least taught me how to fight. I would have benefited from seeing a therapist to help me work through my emotional pain, deal with my depression, and help me build my confidence. The middle school owed me teachers and administrators who took me seriously when I complained. Fortunately that's just what I found when I escaped to the high school two years later. One day in the ninth grade one of my tormentors shoved me into my locker and shut the door. A custodian popped the lock when he heard me yelling and banging frantically. The teachers in the adjacent classrooms came to investigate and told an assistant principal what happened. I'm not sure what the assistant principal did to the boy, but he gave me a wide berth for a long time after that and never harmed me again. I got some of the help I needed, and nobody needed a law to compel it.
I'm still not tough, but I will stand up for myself today. It all started when I came to accept myself for who I am. Read that story.
→ I stopped at McDonald's on my last road trip
← Whatever happened to Tadmor?
17 thoughts on "Why New Jersey's anti-bullying law is both too much and not enough"
I'm sure part of the anti-bullying law that seems tough to swallow is part of a CYA mentality by school corporations to avoid being named in lawsuits that could stem from injury. Can't say that I blame them for that. I have a whole new respect for you my friend. I managed to squeeze through with only being assualted once, in 6th grade, but I might have also had that one coming to me. Then I went to a small private school….I'd like to think that I could have handled myself at LaVille….but I can't be certain.
8 September 2011 at 7:55 am	 Reply
Thanks Kurt. Certainly part of this law's thrust is to protect the schools, because they can say they followed the law and were thus doing everything required of them. I just wish this law offered more real help to the bullies and the victims.
So sorry to hear you had such rough bullying experiences as a child. Kids (and adults) can be so cruel. Makes one wonder where all of that negative energy and need for power comes from.
I've turned my experiences around and let them make me a better man. Most bullies feel powerless or angry somehow themselves and are just taking it out on people who will take it.
ryoko861 says:
My husband could have written this. He was bullied alot in school (he's from North Jersey, I'm from Central Jersey). Same crap you had to go through. He was a shy boy, just enjoyed the simple things in life. His hometown was a poor town of immigrants that worked at the paper mill. Bullying was just part of the school picture. He did retaliate when he got into high school. But it has left him emotionally scarred and we still have to deal with it sometimes. I was bullied sometimes as well, but I took matters into my own hands. After kicking Todd L square in the shins for taunting me for so long, the boys left me alone.
I think dealing with the students involved is more the answer. Reporting it to the state isn't going to get anyone anywhere other than statistics. DYFS and other child services are overwhelmed with domestic issues. The parents and the school officials need to address it on a psychological level with those involved. It's not the 50's any more where the child would come home with a black eye and the dad would just choke it up to typical school follies. Alot of it stems from kids either being abused at home or seeking attention. Or like you said making up for the inadequacies. I know of some parents that are definitely the root of a child acting out in school. Most schools have a zero tolerance rule now for bullying.
I will admit, I'm glad I'm out of the school years. Mine are older and I only have to deal with one in county college which means I have to deal with moron teachers who think they know everything. These are the teachers that have never left the school system. They've lived and breathed it since Kindergarten. They, too, have their way of bullying. I've been tempted more than once to go in and have words with some of them for the way they treat the kids. Even directors are pompous asses at times. Give someone a little authority and they think they're god.
I agree, you have to deal with the students involved. Schools have to have an environment where that is expected and encouraged. My middle school was kind of a war zone; I think the teachers and administrators often felt powerless over the kids! It allowed a lot more nonsense to go on than ever should have.
Definitely! It really has to be expected and encouraged and stressed that bullying will NOT be tolerated! Kids shouldn't be afraid to go to school. Bad enough getting to go because they don't like it, but add fear into the equation….
When authority breaks down and the kids start to have control, then there's a problem.
12 September 2011 at 12:51 pm	 Reply
Thanks for sharing this. I'm a So. Bend native, too, yearbook geek and yep, you guessed it, a victim of bullying. (went to HS w/ Kirsten P.) Now I'm a parent of two kids-both have been victims of middle school bullying. Fortunately, they had a great principal and I was on good terms with the school administration. I share your concerns with the New Jersey law-too much bureaucracy and not enough personal investment on the part of admin and teachers. The prevalent culture should be one in which faculty truly want kids to be safe and able to learn. The past few years here, in Indianapolis, really educated me on the intensity of bullying and the ability of faculty, staff, coaches, and county officials to ignore and/or minimize bullying (assualt) and its impact.
8 September 2011 at 7:29 pm	 Reply
Stephanie, thanks for chiming in. I'm sorry your kids have been bullied. But at least when a school's administration is good, it trickles down to the teachers, and bullying problems can be more easily dealt with.
Janet Olson Chlebek says:
Jim, I can relate. As you know in middle school is where I first meet you and many people that we continued on with until graduation of high school. My Elementary years were very sheltered and protected, middle school was a rude awakening for me since I was a shy, peaceful kind of girl. When I got to middle school many girls threatened to beat me and my best friend up for just looking at them and many boys would pinch our butts in the hallway during passing period. My best friend and I were just the kind of girls that didn't defend ourselves and were almost like "deer in a head light" to the whole situation, we didn't know to deal with it?,We would just console each other and it seemed to help.I remember the hall going to Orchestra that was very scary and was so relieved to finally make it in there safe. I didn't continue with orchestra in 8th grade for that reason. Currently and have been throughout my dealings with kids in the school system very sensitive to students in my classroom who are quiet and non-aggressive and I always protect them. It does not take much for the teacher to enforce the no-bully policy.
Janet, I had been sheltered and was naive, like you. The stuff I put up with in the 5th and 6th grade was minor compared to what I got in middle school, and I was just flat unprepared for how bad it got. I didn't have a best friend coming in to middle school and felt very alone.
That music hallway was not very well covered by teachers and staff, and a lot of nonsense could go on in there. Same for the hall that went from the gym out to the art/shop classes; that's where I was assaulted.
I'm sorry to learn about the abuse you experienced in school. It sounds as bad if not even worse than anything I experienced. However, as a gay man, I do favor laws like the one in New Jersey — not because I favor the expansion of the "nanny state" as some would it — but because bullying leads to an increase in suicide among those being bullied and because I think it is worth every effort to prevent this tragedy among gay youth and those (like yourself) who are straight but incorrectly perceived to be gay.
8 September 2011 at 11:58 pm	 Reply
Thanks, yes, I think something needs to be done, but I still think this law misses the mark a bit.
Lone Primate says:
Yeah, boy, can I relate. I got picked on a lot in grade four, and some guys made life really rough on me from about grade seven to grade nine. It eased up after that. But you never quite leave it behind, and it leaves a lot of smouldering resentment. I got by on two things, basically… fantasizing about going down to the gym and coming back to class with an aluminum baseball bat (it was always aluminum! I guess I figured wood would break…) and making my objections known in no uncertain terms; and by reminding myself that school doesn't last forever. And it didn't. It seems to me that by the time you hit the latter years, even the bullies have taken their lumps and most normal human beings develop enough empathy to drop it. I even wound up pretty good friends with one guy who used to ride me.
Reading your account, though, takes me right back. That sense of powerlessness, bleakness, the eternity of the situation as it seems at the time. "Anonymous" is right; you can be led to some pretty dark thoughts, both suicidal and homicidal.
While it's not perfect — what piece of human legislation ever is? — I applaud New Jersey's effort. Like other challenges in the recent past — racism, drunk driving, sexual discrimination — the practicalities of the law are far, far less important than the FACT of the law itself. It says: this matters to society. Society is acting on this in an official capacity. Society no longer winks at this. And it's the awareness of that, really, that causes change. If the fact that New Jersey now threatens litigation as a response to bullying and the turning of blind eyes to it saves just one kid from suffering what you did, or some parent finding that kid at the end of a rope, it's entirely to the good in my books. Let the bullies sweat for a change; they'll be better people for it.
13 September 2011 at 9:02 am	 Reply
LP, glad to see you around these parts again.
When I linked this on my Facebook page, people came out of the woodwork to tell their own stories of bullying — receiving and giving. It really touched a nerve. It was a pervasive problem among the people to whom I'm connected on Facebook.
Yes, this imperfect law has promise in increasing awareness of the problem and gives a very flawed but not useless way of handling bullying incidents that are observed and reported. I still wish for greater help for the victim, however, so they can build confidence and personal power and stop being a victim.
Jennifer S says:
It's interesting how bullying essentially never changes. This post reminds me so much of what happened with our son. I think the administration and teachers all have good intentions, but they can only respond to incidents that are brought to their attention and… as you point out… only then does the bureaucracy crank into action.
For students who are routinely bullied by groups of individuals, documentation becomes a real problem. A friend of my son's has left public school for this reason… as soon as his parents finished documenting one bully's actions, another bully would appear and the need to document new incidents would begin all over again. At a certain point, they decided they were finished letting their child feel isolated, abused and depressed in middle school just so the school could have proper paperwork prior to taking action.
This was a very effective post. I'm glad you directed me to it… and thanks for the words of support about our situation. I do hope we did the right thing, and that our son's come out stronger and smarter and more able to defend himself in a peaceful way. Eighth grade started a few weeks ago… and so far this problem has not recurred. I will keep taking my son's emotional temperature so he knows I'm here to help any time he needs me.
The difference between my middle school and high school were night and day around bullying. The high school had no comprehensive program — they just had administrators who identified the troublemakers and bullies and dealt with them consistently, swiftly, and firmly. I didn't entirely escape bullying in high school but it was down probably 90% over what I experienced in middle school.
What I'm saying here is that this documenting stuff is nonsense. The administrators know who the bullies are, and probably know how to deal with them too. So the documentation strikes me as a delay tactic or a smoke screen, which I find puzzling and disturbing.
24 September 2012 at 3:44 pm	 Reply


Before Hayes arrived we stopped traveling. I was at about 32 weeks when we took our last trip which was to Texas for Thanksgiving. Since then, we haven't traveled other than a short day trip to the beach. The thought of attempting an overnight with an infant sounded like a disaster we were self-inducing so we had avoided it all costs. As Hayes approached 3 months and he was sleeping much better and regularly, we decided it was time to give a good attempt. We knew we had some trips ahead with heading to Michigan and Texas over the next few weeks and we thought it was about time to give it a good try.
We chose a place close by and decided to head to the mountains in Asheville for a quick long weekend trip. The weather in Raleigh that weekend was going to be warm and it was busy with festivals so we felt it was a good weekend to disappear. We booked a cabin on Airbnb just outside of the city and lived out my little dream of moving back into the woods and in a cabin in a farmhouse modern style. It was the perfect place at a great price. The space was a studio style cabin and just perfect.
The first night we were there, Hayes crashed out with a small fight and Mike and I sat up drinking tea and listening to the sounds of the field around us. The singing of crickets and hooting of owls while the wind blew the trees all around us was better than perfect. When we lived in Michigan these sounds and feelings were very familiar and an everyday part of our life, but since moving to city we don't get the stillness and quiet we had become almost too accustomed to. In short, we had missed it more than we realized.
In the middle of the night though, Mike ended up getting sick with a nasty stomach bug. This ended up leaving us hunkered in for at least 24 hours as Mike shook it off and Hayes and I tried to keep our distance in hopes it wasn't super contagious. By Sunday morning Mike was better and we got the chance to get out as a family with the dogs and Hayes on a small hike for the first time.
We went to Linville Falls just outside of Asheville in the Pisgah National Forest. The layers of rock and water hidden in the woods is so beautiful. Just off of the Blueridge Parkway, this is a must see place. The cool streams of natural water flow with such force down the layers of rock.
Though Hayes didn't get to see any of it because he was passed out in our Baby Björn (which we are so in love with!) We all got to enjoy a little time see the beauty of the mountains. The dogs loved getting out and adventuring. They miss the times we would spend in Michigan hiking near daily even in the snow in Michigan. They love running wild in the woods and there aren't as many places near us this is something they can do.
In all honesty, he slept better there in the mountains than he had ever. He had some amazing naps and stretches and I think he is like his mama and enjoys the woods more than the city. We slept each night with the windows open in the loft and the fresh air was so different than being in the city at night.
I truly love reading your posts about the things you run into as being a new parent, and how well and naturally you guys manage to solve them!
Looks like a great little getaway! It's so nice to stray from your regular routine sometimes, isn't it? That cabin is too cute. Glad you enjoyed your time away!
Yeah we used his bassinet which is the Chico Lullago travel bassinet for the whole trip and it worked awesome. We kept everything else the same too including his routine and sound machine and he actually slept better than at home. Go figure! Have so much fun!!!
Love all your photos! What kind of camera do you use?
Okay I LOVE this cabin, and want to pack up and head there all the way from boston. but what I love is how much you appreciate every aspect of life. life can be wacky and crazy and overwhelming, sometimes we lose sight of things in all chaos. i see others who start to hate on certain aspects of their life when kids come on board (hating their pets, jobs, husbands, etc…) but this goes to show, keeping life as simple as possible allows you to appreciate the things the matter, nature, your pups, your husband, and your kiddo (ya'know all the things that are actually breathing). thanks for your voice! it's much appreciated.
I have been wanting to visit the south for some time now and asheville is at the top of my list. Until recently, and also after reading this post, I had no idea how much rugged terrain was in the south. I look forward to planning a trip to NC as well as TN where I hope to hike the smokies! Great post!


text:
Newcastle vs Manchester City, 2016 Premier League: Preview, Game time, TV schedule and online streaming info
By Renato Goncalves@renatodsg Apr 19, 2016, 1:00pm BST
Share All sharing options for: Newcastle vs Manchester City, 2016 Premier League: Preview, Game time, TV schedule and online streaming info
Dean Mouhtaropoulos/Getty Images
It is impossible for everyone who is a fan of Manchester City to forget about the Champions League semifinal. We are only a week away from a historic first trip to the European Cup Final Four, and Real Madrid certainly dominates the minds as we inch closer to such a big match.
But there is still Premier League football to play until then, and with five games to go, every one of them means securing a spot among the league's top four teams, and victories are a must. That is the case on Tuesday when the Citizens visit relegation candidates Newcastle, who are desperate to pick as many points as they can to avoid going to the Championship.
After three straight wins in the league and regaining the usual world-beating form, City are overwhelming favorites in this match, and that's where the danger lies. The Magpies will play at home and have a talented side who is certainly capable of beating City. For the Citizens, a victory is key for the league and for the confidence level ahead of the biggest game in the history of the club.
So yeah, you should watch Newcastle vs Manchester City. It's a huge game.
Date/Time: Tuesday, April 19, 2016, 7:45pm local time (BST, UK), 2:45pm ET, 11:45am PT (US), 12:15am IST (India, next day)
Venue: St. James' Park, Newcastle upon Tyne, England
Referee: Kevin Friend
TV: Sky Sports 1 (UK), NBCSN (US), TSN (Canada), Star Sports HD 1 (India), more
Online: SkyGO (UK), NBC Sports Live Extra (US), NBC Deportes En Vivo Extra (US - Spanish), more
(Listings via LiveSoccerTV)
Newcastle vs Manchester City, 2016 Premier League: All Updates
Newcastle 1-1 City: 3 Things We Learned
Newcastle vs Man City: How to Watch Online, TV
Pellegrini: 'Newcastle are dangerous'
Manchester City Represented in FIFA FIFPro World XI A good day for City.


We're so confident that you'll love OOWHEE! Slip-Free Rulers that we are able to offer each one with a money back guarantee. Watch the video & see for yourself how great they are!
OOWHEE! Slip-Free Ruler was created by a quilter. The patent-pending process on the underside of the ruler keeps this ruler from slipping. The process is latex free and 100% effective. Stop the frustration of dealing with rulers that slip. We're so confident that you will love your OOWHEE! Slip-Free Ruler, if you're not satisfied, we will refund your money!
See for yourself why so many women say "OOWHEE!" when you try the OOWHEE! Slip-Free Ruler.
Already own enough rulers? We understand.
This is why we offer the opportunity to have your own collection of rulers treated with our Slip-Free process.
Decide how many of YOUR rulers that you would like to have the Oowhee! Slip-Free Ruler process applied to.
Find the shopping cart item below for the quantity you chose in step 1.
Add that item to your cart.
Be sure to include your name & return address on the envelope!
We apply the Oowhee! Slip-Free patent-pending process to your rulers as soon as we receive them.
Please allow 10 days for processing time & shipping.
Remember that 1,2 or 3 rulers are just $30 total, not each. 4,5 or 6 rulers are $40 total, 7, 8 or 9 rulers are $50 total.
If you are sending more than 9 rulers, call us for a quote.
Questions? Contact OOWHEE! Slip-Free Ruler via this website or call us at 413-323-1141.