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Live Without Limits
Super-focused 121
Purpose and Alignment
Courage The Mastermind
Live Without Limits Ltd. - Privacy Policy - version: March 2019
This Policy sets out the obligations of Live Without Limits Ltd., a company registered in England under number 11638612, whose registered office is at 18 The Lagger, Chalfont St. Giles, HP8 4DG ("the Company") regarding data protection and the rights of staff, customers, business contacts etc. ("data subjects") in respect of their personal data under Data Protection Law (all legislation and regulations in force from time to time regulating the use of personal data and the privacy of electronic communications including, but not limited to, EU Regulation 2016/679 General Data Protection Regulation ("GDPR"), the Data Protection Act 2018, and any successor legislation or other directly applicable EU regulation relating to data protection and privacy for as long as, and to the extent that, EU law has legal effect in the UK).
This Policy sets the Company's obligations regarding the collection, processing, transfer, storage, and disposal of personal data. The procedures and principles set out herein must be followed at all times by the Company, its employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company.
"consent" means the consent of the data subject which must be a freely given, specific, informed, and unambiguous indication of the data subject's wishes by which they, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action, signify their agreement to the processing of personal data relating to them;
"data controller" means the natural or legal person or organisation which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal data. For the purposes of this Policy, the Company is the data controller of all personal data relating to staff, customers, business contacts etc. used in our business for our commercial purposes;
"data processor" means a natural or legal person or organisation which processes personal data on behalf of a data controller;
"data subject" means a living, identified, or identifiable natural person about whom the Company holds personal data;
"EEA" means the European Economic Area, consisting of all EU Member States, Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway;
"personal data"means any information relating to a data subject who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, identification number, location data, an online identifier, or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural, or social identity of that data subject;
"personal data breach" means a breach of security leading to the accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to, personal data transmitted, stored, or otherwise processed;
"processing" means any operation or set of operations performed on personal data or sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as collection, recording, organisation, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, restriction, erasure or destruction;
"pseudonymisation" means the processing of personal data in such a manner that the personal data can no longer be attributed to a specific data subject without the use of additional information, provided that such additional information is kept separately and is subject to technical and organisational measures to ensure that the personal data is not attributed to an identified or identifiable natural person; and
"special category personal data" means personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, trade union membership, health, sexual life, sexual orientation, biometric, or genetic data.
3. Scope
3.1 The Company is committed not only to the letter of the law, but also to the spirit of the law and places high importance on the correct, lawful, and fair handling of all personal data, respecting the legal rights, privacy, and trust of all individuals with whom it deals.
3.2 The Company's Data Protection Officer is Sandra Illsley, (+44 (0) 7398 826610 / sandra@lwlcoaching.co.uk). The Data Protection Officer is responsible for administering this Policy and for developing and implementing any applicable related policies, procedures, and/or guidelines.
3.3 The Data Protection Officer is responsible for ensuring that all employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company comply with this Policy and, where applicable, must implement such practices, processes, controls, and training as are reasonably necessary to ensure such compliance.
3.4 Any questions relating to this Policy or to Data Protection Law should be referred to the Data Protection Officer. In particular, the Data Protection Officer should always be consulted in the following cases:
a) if there is any uncertainty relating to the lawful basis on which personal data is to be collected, held, and/or processed;
b) if consent is being relied upon in order to collect, hold, and/or process personal data;
c) if there is any uncertainty relating to the retention period for any particular type(s) of personal data;
d) if any new or amended privacy notices or similar privacy-related documentation are required;
e) if any assistance is required in dealing with the exercise of a data subject's rights (including, but not limited to, the handling of subject access requests);
f) if a personal data breach (suspected or actual) has occurred;
g) if there is any uncertainty relating to security measures (whether technical or organisational) required to protect personal data;
h) if personal data is to be shared with third parties (whether such third parties are acting as data controllers or data processors);
i) if personal data is to be transferred outside of the EEA and there are questions relating to the legal basis on which to do so;
j) when any significant new processing activity is to be carried out, or significant changes are to be made to existing processing activities, which will require a Data Protection Impact Assessment;
k) when personal data is to be used for purposes different to those for which it was originally collected;
l) if any automated processing, including profiling or automated decision-making, is to be carried out; or
m) if any assistance is required in complying with the law applicable to direct marketing.
4. The Data Protection Principles
This Policy aims to ensure compliance with Data Protection Law. The GDPR sets out the following principles with which any party handling personal data must comply. Data controllers are responsible for, and must be able to demonstrate, such compliance. All personal data must be:
4.1 processed lawfully, fairly, and in a transparent manner in relation to the data subject;
4.2 collected for specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes and not further processed in a manner that is incompatible with those purposes. Further processing for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes or statistical purposes shall not be considered to be incompatible with the initial purposes;
4.3 adequate, relevant, and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for which it is processed;
4.4 accurate and, where necessary, kept up to date. Every reasonable step must be taken to ensure that personal data that is inaccurate, having regard to the purposes for which it is processed, is erased, or rectified without delay;
4.5 kept in a form which permits identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the personal data is processed. Personal data may be stored for longer periods insofar as the personal data will be processed solely for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes, or statistical purposes, subject to implementation of the appropriate technical and organisational measures required by the GDPR in order to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject;
4.6 processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, including protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction, or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational measures.
5. The Rights of Data Subjects
The GDPR sets out the following key rights applicable to data subjects:
5.1 The right to be informed;
5.2 the right of access;
5.3 the right to rectification;
5.4 the right to erasure (also known as the 'right to be forgotten');
5.5 the right to restrict processing;
5.6 the right to data portability;
5.7 the right to object; and
5.8 rights with respect to automated decision-making and profiling.
6. Lawful, Fair, and Transparent Data Processing
6.1 Data Protection Law seeks to ensure that personal data is processed lawfully, fairly, and transparently, without adversely affecting the rights of the data subject. Specifically, the GDPR states that processing of personal data shall be lawful if at least one of the following applies:
a) the data subject has given consent to the processing of their personal data for one or more specific purposes;
b) the processing is necessary for the performance of a contract to which the data subject is a party, or in order to take steps at the request of the data subject prior to entering into a contract;
d) the processing is necessary for compliance with a legal obligation to which the data controller is subject;
d) the processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person;
e) the processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest or in the exercise of official authority vested in the data controller; or
f) the processing is necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the data controller or by a third party, except where such interests are overridden by the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject which require protection of personal data, in particular where the data subject is a child.
6.2 If the personal data in question is special category personal data (also known as "sensitive personal data"), at least one of the following conditions must be met:
a) the data subject has given their explicit consent to the processing of such data for one or more specified purposes (unless EU or EU Member State law prohibits them from doing so);
b) the processing is necessary for the purpose of carrying out the obligations and exercising specific rights of the data controller or of the data subject in the field of employment, social security, and social protection law (insofar as it is authorised by EU or EU Member State law or a collective agreement pursuant to EU Member State law which provides for appropriate safeguards for the fundamental rights and interests of the data subject);
c) the processing is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or of another natural person where the data subject is physically or legally incapable of giving consent;
d) the data controller is a foundation, association, or other non-profit body with a political, philosophical, religious, or trade union aim, and the processing is carried out in the course of its legitimate activities, provided that the processing relates solely to the members or former members of that body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection with its purposes and that the personal data is not disclosed outside the body without the consent of the data subjects;
e) the processing relates to personal data which is manifestly made public by the data subject;
f) the processing is necessary for the conduct of legal claims or whenever courts are acting in their judicial capacity;
g) the processing is necessary for substantial public interest reasons, on the basis of EU or EU Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, shall respect the essence of the right to data protection, and shall provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and interests of the data subject;
h) the processing is necessary for the purposes of preventative or occupational medicine, for the assessment of the working capacity of an employee, for medical diagnosis, for the provision of health or social care or treatment, or the management of health or social care systems or services on the basis of EU or EU Member State law or pursuant to a contract with a health professional, subject to the conditions and safeguards referred to in Article 9(3) of the GDPR;
i) the processing is necessary for public interest reasons in the area of public health, for example, protecting against serious cross-border threats to health or ensuring high standards of quality and safety of health care and of medicinal products or medical devices, on the basis of EU or EU Member State law which provides for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of the data subject (in particular, professional secrecy); or
j) the processing is necessary for archiving purposes in the public interest, scientific or historical research purposes, or statistical purposes in accordance with Article 89(1) of the GDPR based on EU or EU Member State law which shall be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection, and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.
If consent is relied upon as the lawful basis for collecting, holding, and/or processing personal data, the following shall apply:
7.1 Consent is a clear indication by the data subject that they agree to the processing of their personal data. Such a clear indication may take the form of a statement or a positive action. Silence, pre-ticked boxes, or inactivity are unlikely to amount to consent.
7.2 Where consent is given in a document which includes other matters, the section dealing with consent must be kept clearly separate from such other matters.
7.3 Data subjects are free to withdraw consent at any time and it must be made easy for them to do so. If a data subject withdraws consent, their request must be honoured promptly.
7.4 If personal data is to be processed for a different purpose that is incompatible with the purpose or purposes for which that personal data was originally collected that was not disclosed to the data subject when they first provided their consent, consent to the new purpose or purposes may need to be obtained from the data subject.
7.5 If special category personal data is processed, the Company shall normally rely on a lawful basis other than explicit consent. If explicit consent is relied upon, the data subject in question must be issued with a suitable privacy notice in order to capture their consent.
7.6 In all cases where consent is relied upon as the lawful basis for collecting, holding, and/or processing personal data, records must be kept of all consents obtained in order to ensure that the Company can demonstrate its compliance with consent requirements.
8. Specified, Explicit, and Legitimate Purposes
8.1 The Company collects and processes the personal data set out in Part 24 of this Policy. This includes:
a) personal data collected directly from data subjects.
b) not used.
8.2 The Company only collects, processes, and holds personal data for the specific purposes set out in Part 24 of this Policy (or for other purposes expressly permitted by the GDPR).
8.3 Data subjects must be kept informed at all times of the purpose or purposes for which the Company uses their personal data. Please refer to Part 15 for more information on keeping data subjects informed.
9. Adequate, Relevant, and Limited Data Processing
9.1 The Company will only collect and process personal data for and to the extent necessary for the specific purpose or purposes of which data subjects have been informed (or will be informed) as under Part 8, above, and as set out in Part 24, below.
9.2 Employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company may collect personal data only to the extent required for the performance of their job duties and only in accordance with this Policy. Excessive personal data must not be collected.
9.3 Employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company may process personal data only when the performance of their job duties requires it. Personal data held by the Company cannot be processed for any unrelated reasons.
10. Accuracy of Data and Keeping Data Up-to-Date
10.1 The Company shall ensure that all personal data collected, processed, and held by it is kept accurate and up-to-date. This includes, but is not limited to, the rectification of personal data at the request of a data subject, as set out in Part 17, below.
10.2 The accuracy of personal data shall be checked when it is collected and at regular intervals thereafter. If any personal data is found to be inaccurate or out-of-date, all reasonable steps will be taken without delay to amend or erase that data, as appropriate.
11. Data Retention
11.1 The Company shall not keep personal data for any longer than is necessary in light of the purpose or purposes for which that personal data was originally collected, held, and processed.
11.2 When personal data is no longer required, all reasonable steps will be taken to erase or otherwise dispose of it without delay.
11.3 For full details of the Company's approach to data retention, including retention periods for specific personal data types held by the Company, please refer to our Data Retention Policy.
12. Secure Processing
12.1 The Company shall ensure that all personal data collected, held, and processed is kept secure and protected against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against accidental loss, destruction, or damage. Further details of the technical and organisational measures which shall be taken are provided in Parts 25 to 30 of this Policy.
12.2 All technical and organisational measures taken to protect personal data shall be regularly reviewed and evaluated to ensure their ongoing effectiveness and the continued security of personal data.
12.3 Data security must be maintained at all times by protecting the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of all personal data as follows:
a) only those with a genuine need to access and use personal data and who are authorised to do so may access and use it;
b) personal data must be accurate and suitable for the purpose or purposes for which it is collected, held, and processed; and
c) authorised users must always be able to access the personal data as required for the authorised purpose or purposes.
13. Accountability and Record-Keeping
13.1 The Data Protection Officer is responsible for administering this Policy and for developing and implementing any applicable related policies, procedures, and/or guidelines.
13.2 The Company shall follow a privacy by design approach at all times when collecting, holding, and processing personal data. Data Protection Impact Assessments shall be conducted if any processing presents a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects (please refer to Part 14 for further information).
13.3 All employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company shall be given appropriate training in data protection and privacy, addressing the relevant aspects of Data Protection Law, this Policy, and all other applicable Company policies.
13.4 The Company's data protection compliance shall be regularly reviewed and evaluated by means of Data Protection Audits
13.5 The Company shall keep written internal records of all personal data collection, holding, and processing, which shall incorporate the following information:
13.5.1 the name and details of the Company, its Data Protection Officer, and any applicable third-party data transfers (including data processors and other data controllers with whom personal data is shared);
13.5.2 the purposes for which the Company collects, holds, and processes personal data;
13.5.3 the Company's legal basis or bases (including, but not limited to, consent, the mechanism(s) for obtaining such consent, and records of such consent) for collecting, holding, and processing personal data;
13.5.4 details of the categories of personal data collected, held, and processed by the Company, and the categories of data subject to which that personal data relates;
13.5.5 details of any transfers of personal data to non-EEA countries including all mechanisms and security safeguards;
13.5.6 details of how long personal data will be retained by the Company (please refer to the Company's Data Retention Policy);
13.5.7 details of personal data storage, including location(s);
13.5.8 detailed descriptions of all technical and organisational measures taken by the Company to ensure the security of personal data.
14. Data Protection Impact Assessments and Privacy by Design
14.1 In accordance with the privacy by design principles, the Company shall carry out Data Protection Impact Assessments for any and all new projects and/or new uses of personal data which involve the use of new technologies and where the processing involved is likely to result in a high risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects.
14.2 The principles of privacy by design should be followed at all times when collecting, holding, and processing personal data. The following factors should be taken into consideration:
a) the nature, scope, context, and purpose or purposes of the collection, holding, and processing;
b) the state of the art of all relevant technical and organisational measures to be taken;
c) the cost of implementing such measures; and
d) the risks posed to data subjects and to the Company, including their likelihood and severity.
14.3 Data Protection Impact Assessments shall be overseen by the Data Protection Officer and shall address the following:
a) the type(s) of personal data that will be collected, held, and processed;
b) the purpose(s) for which personal data is to be used;
c) the Company's objectives;
d) how personal data is to be used;
e) the parties (internal and/or external) who are to be consulted;
f) the necessity and proportionality of the data processing with respect to the purpose(s) for which it is being processed;
g) risks posed to data subjects;
h) risks posed both within and to the Company; and
i) proposed measures to minimise and handle identified risks.
15. Keeping Data Subjects Informed
15.1 The Company shall provide the information set out in Part 15.2 to every data subject:
a) where personal data is collected directly from data subjects, those data subjects will be informed of its purpose at the time of collection; and
b) where personal data is obtained from a third party, the relevant data subjects will be informed of its purpose:
i) if the personal data is used to communicate with the data subject, when the first communication is made; or
ii) if the personal data is to be transferred to another party, before that transfer is made; or
iii) as soon as reasonably possible and in any event not more than one month after the personal data is obtained.
15.2 The following information shall be provided in the form of a privacy notice:
a) details of the Company including, but not limited to, contact details, and the names and contact details of any applicable representatives and its Data Protection Officer;
b) the purpose(s) for which the personal data is being collected and will be processed (as detailed in Part 24 of this Policy) and the lawful basis justifying that collection and processing;
c) where applicable, the legitimate interests upon which the Company is justifying its collection and processing of the personal data;
d) where the personal data is not obtained directly from the data subject, the categories of personal data collected and processed;
e) where the personal data is to be transferred to one or more third parties, details of those parties;
f) where the personal data is to be transferred to a third party that is located outside of the EEA, details of that transfer, including but not limited to the safeguards in place (see Part 31 of this Policy for further details);
g) details of applicable data retention periods;
h) details of the data subject's rights under the GDPR;
i) details of the data subject's right to withdraw their consent to the Company's processing of their personal data at any time;
j) details of the data subject's right to complain to the Information Commissioner's Office (the "supervisory authority" under the GDPR);
k) where the personal data is not obtained directly from the data subject, details about the source of that personal data;
l) where applicable, details of any legal or contractual requirement or obligation necessitating the collection and processing of the personal data and details of any consequences of failing to provide it; and
m) details of any automated decision-making or profiling that will take place using the personal data, including information on how decisions will be made, the significance of those decisions, and any consequences.
16. Data Subject Access
16.1 Data subjects may make subject access requests ("SARs") at any time to find out more about the personal data which the Company holds about them, what it is doing with that personal data, and why.
16.2 Employees wishing to make a SAR should do using a Subject Access Request Form, sending the form to the Company's Data Protection Officer at sandra@lwlcoaching.co.uk.
16.3 Responses to SARs must normally be made within one month of receipt, however, this may be extended by up to two months if the SAR is complex and/or numerous requests are made. If such additional time is required, the data subject shall be informed.
16.4 All SARs received shall be handled by the Company's Data Protection Officer.
16.5 The Company does not charge a fee for the handling of normal SARs. The Company reserves the right to charge reasonable fees for additional copies of information that has already been supplied to a data subject, and for requests that are manifestly unfounded or excessive, particularly where such requests are repetitive.
17. Rectification of Personal Data
17.1 Data subjects have the right to require the Company to rectify any of their personal data that is inaccurate or incomplete.
17.2 The Company shall rectify the personal data in question, and inform the data subject of that rectification, within one month of the data subject informing the Company of the issue. The period can be extended by up to two months in the case of complex requests. If such additional time is required, the data subject shall be informed.
17.3 In the event that any affected personal data has been disclosed to third parties, those parties shall be informed of any rectification that must be made to that personal data.
18. Erasure of Personal Data
18.1 Data subjects have the right to request that the Company erases the personal data it holds about them in the following circumstances:
a) it is no longer necessary for the Company to hold that personal data with respect to the purpose(s) for which it was originally collected or processed;
b) the data subject wishes to withdraw their consent to the Company holding and processing their personal data;
c) the data subject objects to the Company holding and processing their personal data (and there is no overriding legitimate interest to allow the Company to continue doing so) (see Part 21 of this Policy for further details concerning the right to object);
d) the personal data has been processed unlawfully;
e) the personal data needs to be erased in order for the Company to comply with a particular legal obligation.
18.2 Unless the Company has reasonable grounds to refuse to erase personal data, all requests for erasure shall be complied with, and the data subject informed of the erasure, within one month of receipt of the data subject's request. The period can be extended by up to two months in the case of complex requests. If such additional time is required, the data subject shall be informed.
18.3 In the event that any personal data that is to be erased in response to a data subject's request has been disclosed to third parties, those parties shall be informed of the erasure (unless it is impossible or would require disproportionate effort to do so).
19. Restriction of Personal Data Processing
19.1 Data subjects may request that the Company ceases processing the personal data it holds about them. If a data subject makes such a request, the Company shall retain only the amount of personal data concerning that data subject (if any) that is necessary to ensure that the personal data in question is not processed further.
19.2 In the event that any affected personal data has been disclosed to third parties, those parties shall be informed of the applicable restrictions on processing it (unless it is impossible or would require disproportionate effort to do so).
20. Not used.
21. Objections to Personal Data Processing
21.1 Data subjects have the right to object to the Company processing their personal data based on legitimate interests, for direct marketing (including profiling), and processing for scientific and/or historical research and statistics purposes.
21.2 Where a data subject objects to the Company processing their personal data based on its legitimate interests, the Company shall cease such processing immediately, unless it can be demonstrated that the Company's legitimate grounds for such processing override the data subject's interests, rights, and freedoms, or that the processing is necessary for the conduct of legal claims.
21.3 Where a data subject objects to the Company processing their personal data for direct marketing purposes, the Company shall cease such processing promptly.
21.4 Where a data subject objects to the Company processing their personal data for scientific and/or historical research and statistics purposes, the data subject must, under the GDPR, "demonstrate grounds relating to his or her particular situation". The Company is not required to comply if the research is necessary for the performance of a task carried out for reasons of public interest.
22. Not used.
23. Direct Marketing
23.1The Company is subject to certain rules and regulations when marketing its products and services.
23.2 The prior consent of data subjects is required for electronic direct marketing including email, text messaging, and automated telephone calls subject to the following limited exception:
a) The Company may send marketing text messages or emails to a customer provided that that customer's contact details have been obtained in the course of a sale, the marketing relates to similar products or services, and the customer in question has been given the opportunity to opt-out of marketing when their details were first collected and in every subsequent communication from the Company.
23.3 The right to object to direct marketing shall be explicitly offered to data subjects in a clear and intelligible manner and must be kept separate from other information in order to preserve its clarity.
23. 4 If a data subject objects to direct marketing, their request must be complied with promptly. A limited amount of personal data may be retained in such circumstances to the extent required to ensure that the data subject's marketing preferences continue to be complied with.
24. Personal Data Collected, Held, and Processed
24. 1The following personal data is collected, held, and processed by the Company (for details of data retention, please refer to the Company's Data Retention Policy):
a) Identifiers - name, email address, phone numbers - held to enable contact with clients.
b) Session notes - outline summary of session held to facilitate next session.
25. Data Security - Transferring Personal Data and Communications
The Company shall ensure that the following measures are taken with respect to all communications and other transfers involving personal data:
25.1 All emails containing personal data must be encrypted;
25.2 All emails containing personal data must be marked "confidential";
25.3 Personal data may be transmitted over secure networks only; transmission over unsecured networks is not permitted in any circumstances;
25.4 Personal data may not be transmitted over a wireless network if there is a wired alternative that is reasonably practicable;
25.5 Personal data contained in the body of an email, whether sent or received, should be copied from the body of that email and stored securely. The email itself should be deleted. All temporary files associated therewith should also be deleted;
25.6 Where personal data is to be sent by facsimile transmission the recipient should be informed in advance of the transmission and should be waiting by the fax machine to receive the data;
25.7 Where personal data is to be transferred in hardcopy form it should be passed directly to the recipient or sent using a named courier service;
25.8 All personal data to be transferred physically, whether in hardcopy form or on removable electronic media shall be transferred in a suitable container marked "confidential".
26. Data Security - Storage
The Company shall ensure that the following measures are taken with respect to the storage of personal data:
26.1 All electronic copies of personal data should be stored securely using passwords;
26.2 All hardcopies of personal data, along with any electronic copies stored on physical, removable media should be stored securely in a locked box, drawer, cabinet, or similar;
26.3 All personal data stored electronically should be backed up. All backups should be encrypted;
26.4 No personal data should be stored on any mobile device (including, but not limited to, laptops, tablets, and smartphones), whether such device belongs to the Company or otherwise without the formal written approval of the Data Protection Officer and, in the event of such approval, strictly in accordance with all instructions and limitations described at the time the approval is given, and for no longer than is absolutely necessary;
26.5 No personal data should be transferred to any device personally belonging to an employee, agent, contractor, or other party working on behalf of the Company and personal data may only be transferred to devices belonging to agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company where the party in question has agreed to comply fully with the letter and spirit of this Policy and of the GDPR (which may include demonstrating to the Company that all suitable technical and organisational measures have been taken).
27. Data Security - Disposal
When any personal data is to be erased or otherwise disposed of for any reason (including where copies have been made and are no longer needed), it should be securely deleted and disposed of. For further information on the deletion and disposal of personal data, please refer to the Company's Data Retention Policy.
28. Data Security - Use of Personal Data
The Company shall ensure that the following measures are taken with respect to the use of personal data:
28.1 No personal data may be shared informally and if an employee, agent, contractor, or other party working on behalf of the Company requires access to any personal data that they do not already have access to, such access should be formally requested from the Data Protection Officer;
28.2 No personal data may be transferred to any employee, agent, contractor, or other party, whether such parties are working on behalf of the Company or not, without the authorisation of the Data Protection Officer;
28.3 Personal data must be handled with care at all times and should not be left unattended or on view to unauthorised employees, agents, contractors, or other parties at any time;
28.4 If personal data is being viewed on a computer screen and the computer in question is to be left unattended for any period of time, the user must lock the computer and screen before leaving it;
28.5 Where personal data held by the Company is used for marketing purposes, it shall be the responsibility of the Data Protection Officer to ensure that the appropriate consent is obtained and that no data subjects have opted out, whether directly or via a third-party service such as the TPS.
29. Data Security - IT Security
The Company shall ensure that the following measures are taken with respect to IT and information security:
29.1 All passwords used to protect personal data should be changed regularly and should not use words or phrases that can be easily guessed or otherwise compromised. All passwords must contain a combination of uppercase and lowercase letters, numbers, and symbols. All software used by the Company is designed to require such passwords;
29.2 Under no circumstances should any passwords be written down or shared between any employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company, irrespective of seniority or department. If a password is forgotten, it must be reset using the applicable method. IT staff do not have access to passwords;
29.3 All software (including, but not limited to, applications and operating systems) shall be kept up-to-date. The Company's IT staff shall be responsible for installing any and all security-related updates after the updates are made available by the publisher or manufacturer as soon as reasonably and practically possible, unless there are valid technical reasons not to do so;
29.4 No software may be installed on any Company-owned computer or device without the prior approval of the the Data Protection Officer.
30. Organisational Measures
The Company shall ensure that the following measures are taken with respect to the collection, holding, and processing of personal data:
30.1 All employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company shall be made fully aware of both their individual responsibilities and the Company's responsibilities under Data Protection Law and under this Policy, and shall be provided with a copy of this Policy;
30.2 Only employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company that need access to, and use of, personal data in order to carry out their assigned duties correctly shall have access to personal data held by the Company;
30.3 All sharing of personal data shall comply with the information provided to the relevant data subjects and, if required, the consent of such data subjects shall be obtained prior to the sharing of their personal data;
30.4 All employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company handling personal data will be appropriately trained to do so;
30.5 All employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company handling personal data will be appropriately supervised;
30.6 All employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company handling personal data shall be required and encouraged to exercise care, caution, and discretion when discussing work-related matters that relate to personal data, whether in the workplace or otherwise;
30.7 Methods of collecting, holding, and processing personal data shall be regularly evaluated and reviewed;
30.8 All personal data held by the Company shall be reviewed periodically;
30.9 The performance of those employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company handling personal data shall be regularly evaluated and reviewed;
30.10 All employees, agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company handling personal data will be bound to do so in accordance with the principles of Data Protection Law and this Policy by contract;
30.11 All agents, contractors, or other parties working on behalf of the Company handling personal data must ensure that any and all of their employees who are involved in the processing of personal data are held to the same conditions as those relevant employees of the Company arising out of this Policy and Data Protection Law;
30.12 Where any agent, contractor or other party working on behalf of the Company handling personal data fails in their obligations under this Policy that party shall indemnify and hold harmless the Company against any costs, liability, damages, loss, claims or proceedings which may arise out of that failure.
31. Transferring Personal Data to a Country Outside the EEA
31.1 The Company may from time to time transfer ('transfer' includes making available remotely) personal data to countries outside of the EEA
31.2 The transfer of personal data to a country outside of the EEA shall take place only if one or more of the following applies:
31.2.1 the transfer is to a country, territory, or one or more specific sectors in that country (or an international organisation), that the European Commission has determined ensures an adequate level of protection for personal data;
31.2.2 the transfer is to a country (or international organisation) which provides appropriate safeguards in the form of a legally binding agreement between public authorities or bodies; binding corporate rules; standard data protection clauses adopted by the European Commission; compliance with an approved code of conduct approved by a supervisory authority (e.g. the Information Commissioner's Office); certification under an approved certification mechanism (as provided for in the GDPR); contractual clauses agreed and authorised by the competent supervisory authority; or provisions inserted into administrative arrangements between public authorities or bodies authorised by the competent supervisory authority;
31.2.3 the transfer is made with the informed and explicit consent of the relevant data subject(s);
31.2.4 the transfer is necessary for the performance of a contract between the data subject and the Company (or for pre-contractual steps taken at the request of the data subject);
31.2.5 the transfer is necessary for important public interest reasons;
31.2.6 the transfer is necessary for the conduct of legal claims;
31.2.7 the transfer is necessary to protect the vital interests of the data subject or other individuals where the data subject is physically or legally unable to give their consent; or
31.2.8 the transfer is made from a register that, under UK or EU law, is intended to provide information to the public and which is open for access by the public in general or otherwise to those who are able to show a legitimate interest in accessing the register.
32. Data Breach Notification
32.1 All personal data breaches must be reported immediately to the Company's Data Protection Officer.
32.2 If an employee, agent, contractor, or other party working on behalf of the Company becomes aware of or suspects that a personal data breach has occurred, they must not attempt to investigate it themselves. Any and all evidence relating to the personal data breach in question should be carefully retained.
32.3 If a personal data breach occurs and that breach is likely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of data subjects (e.g. financial loss, breach of confidentiality, discrimination, reputational damage, or other significant social or economic damage), the Data Protection Officer must ensure that the Information Commissioner's Office is informed of the breach without delay, and in any event, within 72 hours after having become aware of it.
32.4 In the event that a personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk (that is, a higher risk than that described under Part 32.3) to the rights and freedoms of data subjects, the Data Protection Officer must ensure that all affected data subjects are informed of the breach directly and without undue delay.
32.5 Data breach notifications shall include the following information:
32.5.1 The categories and approximate number of data subjects concerned;
32.5.2 The categories and approximate number of personal data records concerned;
32.5 3 The name and contact details of the Company's data protection officer (or other contact point where more information can be obtained);
32.5.4 The likely consequences of the breach;
32.5.5 Details of the measures taken, or proposed to be taken, by the Company to address the breach including, where appropriate, measures to mitigate its possible adverse effects.
35. Implementation of Policy
This Policy shall be deemed effective as of 08 March 2019. No part of this Policy shall have retroactive effect and shall thus apply only to matters occurring on or after this date.
This Policy has been approved and authorised by:
Name: Sandra Illsley
Position: Data Protection Officer / Director
Due for Review by: 06 March 2022
Signature: S Illsley
tel: +44 (0) 7938 826610
sandra@lwlcoaching.co.uk
18 The Lagger,
Chalfont St Giles,
HP8 4DG
Thanks for getting in touch.
Privacy Policy | Terms of use | Cookies Policy © 2018-2022 Live Without Limits Ltd.


text:
Kermit The Frog Turning 50
August 11, 2005 / 5:21 PM / AP
Kermit the Frog, that Muppet of all Muppets, has got to have other Hollywood stars green with envy.
He's turning 50 years old next month but doesn't look a day over... well, he looks pretty much the same as in the mid-'50s, when he made some of his earliest appearances with puppeteer pal Jim Henson on the local Washington, D.C. TV show, "Sam and Friends."
And Kermit doesn't seem to have aged a day since getting his star-making breaks in the late 1960s, in the telefilm "Hey Cinderella" and on the children's TV series "Sesame Street."
Billie Eilish to sing theme song for new James Bond movie
"Well, you know, it's interesting being 50," Kermit said in a recent interview with AP Television News. "You start to reflect on your life. And you look back over the years at everything you've ever done. And, with age, middle age comes wisdom. But I have to say that I'm not sure that 50 for me is the same as 50 in people years."
In honor of Kermit's birthday, Buena Vista Home Entertainment has just released "The Muppet Show: Season One," a four-DVD box set that delivers all 24 episodes of the first season of the variety series, which originally aired from 1976-81.
"(It) has never been released in its entirety before; this is the first time," Kermit noted. "And, on there, not only do we have all those amazing guest stars like Sandy Duncan and Candice Bergen and Ruth Buzzi, Florence Henderson -- all those original folks who worked with us back in the '70s. But we also have the original tape that we did to try to sell 'The Muppet Show,' as an extra, which I don't think the public has seen before."
Other DVD bonuses include the original "Muppet Show" pilot, in which Kermit barely appeared, as well as a first-season gag reel.
Besides the Muppets themselves, "The Muppet Show: Season One's" star attractions are, indeed, the star attractions, including such legends as Lena Horne, Vincent Price and Ethel Merman.
"I'd have to say one of the memorable ones was probably the first guest we had, which was Juliet Prowse: a beautiful lady and talented performer," Kermit said. "She probably took a big chance coming on with a lot of farm animals."
The frog also appears in another new DVD release, the telefilm "The Muppets Wizard of Oz," which originally aired in May.
"It stars Queen Latifah, David Alan Grier, and Jeffrey Tambor, along with Ashanti as Dorothy," said Kermit. "And Gonzo plays The Tin Thing, because he's not really a man. Fozzie is The Cowardly Lion. I am The Scarecrow. So, it's sort of a Muppet adaptation."
The DVD delivers an extended cut of the film, running 20 minutes longer than the broadcast version. And if that wasn't enough, we're likely to see a lot more of the green guy over the next year.
"I will be celebrating my 50th year in show business starting this September, and that's going to be like a yearlong celebration," he said. "And it'll be a whole year filled with things having to do with being green and frogs and all that sort of stuff."
As for Kermit's own private birthday bash? He's unsure what to expect, but he's prepared for anything from that wacky Muppet menagerie -- even exotic dancers.
"Listen, you can send a stripper to my party if you like," he said. "It won't affect me because, as you can see, I am appearing naked, which I always try to do because I'm kind of a natural guy."
Michael Cidoni
© 2005 The Associated Press. All Rights Reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten, or redistributed.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


Why have they portrayed this guy with such a nose? Sorry I dont know what coin it is.
Re: Look at the nose!
You must be right! How could it possible come out that misaligned?
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Overlooking Uptown's Romare Bearden Park, Loft & Cellar will provide Charlotte with a one stop destination for food, drinks and live music. Each of the three levels has its own vibe and its own bar. The Cellar is a 20-seat intimate dining experience in the wine cellar and is only available reservation. The main dining room is a little cozier and is perfect for date night. The Loft has an energetic vibe and is perfect for large groups. Expect lots of live music and a rotating art wall in the Loft. Now to the food. Executive Chef Nicolas Daniels draws inspiration from his native Chilean background and his many travels to create imaginative a la carte plates. The plates and signature cocktails are paired to perfection!


text:
Red Sox outlast Harvard in Fenway Park launch
Crowd of 3,000 shivers through seven innings
By Melville E Webb Jr. Globe Staff,April 10, 1912, 8:08 a.m.
More than 3,000 dyed-in-the-wool fans sat out in Boston's new baseball park yesterday afternoon, all shivering with the cold, while snow flurries flew everywhere about, to watch the Boston Red Sox play their annual game with the Harvard Varsity nine.
It was no day for baseball, but rather than disappoint the crowd, Jake Stahl, the new manager, sent his players against the college boys for seven innings, beating them 2 to 0. Stahl, and all his players as well, was accorded a welcome the warmth of which was torrid in comparison with the weather, but the ball game did not amount to a great deal.
All afternoon only four Harvard men reached first base, one on a base hit, this a single, which was made by Capt Potter, being the Cambridge nine's only hit off the delivery of Casey Hageman, the $5,000 beauty from Denver; the other crimson-legged players received a pass to first and the other Cambridge player reached Stahl's corner on a forceout play at another base.
The professionals, however, did not do any hitting to speak of, for they made only four singles, two of them by Hageman himself and each of these producing a Red Sox run.
Sam Felton, Harvard's football player and great kicker, was in the box for Harvard for five innings. He was not hit hard, but he gave no fewer than nine bases on balls and hit a man; this served to slow up the play, and then the Sox, when they did get a ball near the plate, were unable to hit it safely. Thirteen Red Sox were left on base.
Bases full, but no runs
In the first inning a muffed fly by Wigglesworth, Yerkes' hit and a base on balls filled the corners for Boston but Lewis could only roll an easy ball to the pitcher. In the second inning, however, Boston scored a run on the combinations of bases on balls to Krug and Thomas and a hit by Hageman, the latter player producing another single three innings later, which, combined with Gardner's hit and a pass to Krug, developed another run.
Harvard did not see first base until the fifth, when Potter opened with a single, only to be caught off second after he had stolen the base. Then in the sixth Wigglesworth was passed, going to second on a dropped ball by Catener Thomas, taking third on a forceout, and then being nipped at the plate by Jake Stahl when an attempt was made to steal in a run.
The crowd was a great tribute to the Red Sox boys and to their popular manager, Jake Stahl. The Red Sox' new ball park of course served as a magnet to draw out the fans, but what the lovers of the game really came to see was the team itself. The Harvard team also had a lusty-lunged following, which, however, was furnished with no great degree of excitement with which to keep warm.
On the whole, however, the college players did very well in the field, although they were very shy with the hickory. Potter, Clarke and Wingate made one double play that set the professionals thinking, while out in center field Wigglesworth picked out two hard fly balls as they came swooping along through the snowflakes. "Wiggy" dropped one fly, sent to him by Speaker, but it was a remarkably high hit, and besides the ball was covered with mud and it fell into Wigglesworth's hands like so much lead.
Felton fools Jake and Tris
The Boston men were not able to hit Felton very hard. While he was always at odds with the plate and had the short end of the corner decisions that were made by Umpire Jack Stafford, Felton had deceptive change of pace. He caught both Stahl and Speaker for strikes and in the course of the afternoon fanned Lewis, Yerkes and Hageman. Felton has picked up a little on his position play and with control will be of a lot of value to the Harvard nine this season.
Manager Stahl complimented the Harvard team by sending in his regular players, which was not done last year. All the real fellows were in the lineup except the battery and "Heinie" Wagner. The fans, however, had a good look at Krug and must have admired the speed that this young fellow shows in getting about the short field. Hageman did not extend himself very much, although at that he had nine strikeouts to his credit.
The crowd began to come out early to inspect the new ball park, but when the game began the 3,000 were lost in the great concrete and iron structure. Also there were some hundreds of fans in the right field and center field bleachers where they got a lot of action in the outfield.
Had the day been at all propitious for baseball, there surely would have been 30,000 fans inside the new fences. As it was, hundreds who would not for the world miss an opening strolled out to the park for a peek at the boys then to turn homeward after kicking their heels on the seats for a few innings.
The crowd came out early, however, and found as much enjoyment in watching the players practice as it did in the game. The favorites, all of them, had to acknowledge continuous greetings while the new men also were the center of all eyes. But there wasn't much of a chance to size many of them up.
Everything was hustle and bustle about the park yesterday and things in the Fenway surely suggest that all will be in prime readiness for the regular league opening a week from tomorrow. All of the runways are not finished and a few hundred seats remain to be placed; but yesterday Eddie Riley and John Harrison were on deck with many huge tubs of hot coffee, and thus was subscribed one of the great hits of the afternoon.
The field was too soft for much really fast baseball, and the continuous passing of batters to first base by Felton, with the usually one-two-three order of the college men's retirement before the Red Sox pitcher, did not serve to make for much excitement. But it was an opening, and that was something.


Messed up my English A Lit HL Paper 2!
IN PAPER 2, I JUST COMPARED INSTEAD OF COMPARING AND CONTRASTING!! What's the maximum grade I can get out of 25?
Your analysis may not be as sophisticated as when you do both, but you should not worry -- you can still get high marks. Remember that you will also be marked for language, knowledge, understanding, ... and a purely comparative can still be "effective". That's my understanding, anyway. Don't worry in the least. You have done nothing wrong Rest easy.


text:
A US Reapproachment With Iran?
March 1, 2010 by jginsberg
Stratfor's George Friedman makes a compelling argument that current American policy towards Iran involves two equally unappetising options – either pursue a policy of sanctions that has been rendered ineffective by the refusal of China and Russia to participate, or to pursue military action and risk the consequences of outright failure or an indecisive outcome that would leave the region destabilized.
Friedman argues that the U.S. has previously shown itself willing to ally with an enemy of that enemy had common interests – examples he cites are Roosevelt's agreements with Stalin and Nixon's approach to Mao. Is such a stunning reversal of course under consideration by the Obama Administration? Friedman suggests that it just might be.
The United States apparently has reached the point where it must either accept that Iran will develop nuclear weapons at some point if it wishes, or take military action to prevent this. There is a third strategy, however: Washington can seek to redefine the Iranian question.
As we have no idea what leaders on either side are thinking, exploring this represents an exercise in geopolitical theory. Let's begin with the two apparent stark choices.
Diplomacy vs. the Military Option
This report is republished with permission of STRATFOR
The diplomatic approach consists of creating a broad coalition prepared to impose what have been called crippling sanctions on Iran. Effective sanctions must be so painful that they compel the target to change its behavior. In Tehran's case, this could only consist of blocking Iran's imports of gasoline. Iran imports 35 percent of the gasoline it consumes. It is not clear that a gasoline embargo would be crippling, but it is the only embargo that might work. All other forms of sanctions against Iran would be mere gestures designed to give the impression that something is being done.
The Chinese will not participate in any gasoline embargo. Beijing gets 11 percent of its oil from Iran, and it has made it clear it will continue to deliver gasoline to Iran. Moscow's position is that Russia might consider sanctions down the road, but it hasn't specified when, and it hasn't specified what. The Russians are more than content seeing the U.S. bogged down in the Middle East and so are not inclined to solve American problems in the region. With the Chinese and Russians unlikely to embargo gasoline, these sanctions won't create significant pain for Iran. Since all other sanctions are gestures, the diplomatic approach is therefore unlikely to work.
The military option has its own risks. First, its success depends on the quality of intelligence on Iran's nuclear facilities and on the degree of hardening of those targets. Second, it requires successful air attacks. Third, it requires battle damage assessments that tell the attacker whether the strike succeeded. Fourth, it requires follow-on raids to destroy facilities that remain functional. And fifth, attacks must do more than simply set back Iran's program a few months or even years: If the risk of a nuclear Iran is great enough to justify the risks of war, the outcome must be decisive.
Each point in this process is a potential failure point. Given the multiplicity of these points — which includes others not mentioned — failure may not be an option, but it is certainly possible.
But even if the attacks succeed, the question of what would happen the day after the attacks remains. Iran has its own counters. It has a superbly effective terrorist organization, Hezbollah, at its disposal. It has sufficient influence in Iraq to destabilize that country and force the United States to keep forces in Iraq badly needed elsewhere. And it has the ability to use mines and missiles to attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian Gulf shipping lanes for some period — driving global oil prices through the roof while the global economy is struggling to stabilize itself. Iran's position on its nuclear program is rooted in the awareness that while it might not have assured options in the event of a military strike, it has counters that create complex and unacceptable risks. Iran therefore does not believe the United States will strike or permit Israel to strike, as the consequences would be unacceptable.
To recap, the United States either can accept a nuclear Iran or risk an attack that might fail outright, impose only a minor delay on Iran's nuclear program or trigger extremely painful responses even if it succeeds. When neither choice is acceptable, it is necessary to find a third choice. [Read more…]
Filed Under: American Foreign Policy, China, Iran, Obama Administration, Russia Tagged With: Iran, Obama
Difficult Choices for Obama: Iran and Afghanistan
September 28, 2009 by jginsberg
from Stratfor
During the 2008 U.S. presidential campaign, now-U.S. Vice President Joe Biden said that like all U.S. presidents, Barack Obama would face a foreign policy test early in his presidency if elected. That test is now here.
His test comprises two apparently distinct challenges, one in Afghanistan and one in Iran. While different problems, they have three elements in common. First, they involve the question of his administration's overarching strategy in the Islamic world. Second, the problems are approaching decision points (and making no decision represents a decision here). And third, they are playing out very differently than Obama expected during the 2008 campaign.
During the campaign, Obama portrayed the Iraq war as a massive mistake diverting the United States from Afghanistan, the true center of the "war on terror." He accordingly promised to shift the focus away from Iraq and back to Afghanistan. Obama's views on Iran were more amorphous. He supported the doctrine that Iran should not be permitted to obtain nuclear weapons, while at the same time asserted that engaging Iran was both possible and desirable. Embedded in the famous argument over whether offering talks without preconditions was appropriate (something now-U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton attacked him for during the Democratic primary) was the idea that the problem with Iran stemmed from Washington's refusal to engage in talks with Tehran.
We are never impressed with campaign positions, or with the failure of the victorious candidate to live up to them. That's the way American politics work. But in this case, these promises have created a dual crisis that Obama must make decisions about now. [Read more…]
Filed Under: Afghanistan, American Foreign Policy, Asia, Iran, Obama Administration Tagged With: afghanistan, Iran, Obama, u.s. foreign policy
The Real Struggle for Power in Iran and Implications for the U.S.
July 4, 2009 by jginsberg
Reprinted with permission from Stratfor
Speaking of the situation in Iran, U.S. President Barack Obama said June 26, "We don't yet know how any potential dialogue will have been affected until we see what has happened inside of Iran." On the surface that is a strange statement, since we know that with minor exceptions, the demonstrations in Tehran lost steam after Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called for them to end and security forces asserted themselves. By the conventional wisdom, events in Iran represent an oppressive regime crushing a popular rising. If so, it is odd that the U.S. president would raise the question of what has happened in Iran.
In reality, Obama's point is well taken. This is because the real struggle in Iran has not yet been settled, nor was it ever about the liberalization of the regime. Rather, it has been about the role of the clergy — particularly the old-guard clergy — in Iranian life, and the future of particular personalities among this clergy.
Ahmadinejad Against the Clerical Elite
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ran his re-election campaign against the old clerical elite, charging them with corruption, luxurious living and running the state for their own benefit rather than that of the people. He particularly targeted Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, an extremely senior leader, and his family. Indeed, during the demonstrations, Rafsanjani's daughter and four other relatives were arrested, held and then released a day later.
Rafsanjani represents the class of clergy that came to power in 1979. He served as president from 1989-1997, but Ahmadinejad defeated him in 2005. Rafsanjani carries enormous clout within the system as head of the regime's two most powerful institutions — the Expediency Council, which arbitrates between the Guardian Council and parliament, and the Assembly of Experts, whose powers include oversight of the supreme leader. Forbes has called him one of the wealthiest men in the world. Rafsanjani, in other words, remains at the heart of the post-1979 Iranian establishment.
Ahmadinejad expressly ran his recent presidential campaign against Rafsanjani, using the latter's family's vast wealth to discredit Rafsanjani along with many of the senior clerics who dominate the Iranian political scene. It was not the regime as such that he opposed, but the individuals who currently dominate it. Ahmadinejad wants to retain the regime, but he wants to repopulate the leadership councils with clerics who share his populist values and want to revive the ascetic foundations of the regime. The Iranian president constantly contrasts his own modest lifestyle with the opulence of the current religious leadership.
Recognizing the threat Ahmadinejad represented to him personally and to the clerical class he belongs to, Rafsanjani fired back at Ahmadinejad, accusing him of having wrecked the economy. At his side were other powerful members of the regime, including Majlis Speaker Ali Larijani, who has made no secret of his antipathy toward Ahmadinejad and whose family links to the Shiite holy city of Qom give him substantial leverage. The underlying issue was about the kind of people who ought to be leading the clerical establishment. The battlefield was economic: Ahmadinejad's charges of financial corruption versus charges of economic mismanagement leveled by Rafsanjani and others. [Read more…]
Filed Under: American Foreign Policy, Iran, Middle East, Obama Administration Tagged With: Ahmadinejad, Iran, Mousavi, Rafsanjani
Iran and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Near Term
November 10, 2008 by jginsberg
Reprinted With Permission from Stratfor.com
After a three-month hiatus, Iran seems set to re-emerge near the top of the U.S. agenda. Last week, the Iranian government congratulated U.S. President-elect Barack Obama on his Nov. 4 electoral victory. This marks the first time since the Iranian Revolution that such greetings have been sent.
While it seems trivial, the gesture is quite significant. It represents a diplomatic way for the Iranians to announce that they regard Obama's election as offering a potential breakthrough in 30 years of U.S. relations with Iran. At his press conference, Obama said he does not yet have a response to the congratulatory message, and reiterated that he opposes Iran's nuclear program and its support for terrorism. The Iranians returned to criticizing Obama after this, but without their usual passion.
The Warming of U.S.-Iranian Relations
The warming of U.S.-Iranian relations did not begin with Obama's election; it began with the Russo-Georgian War. In the weeks and months prior to the August war, the United States had steadily increased tensions with Iran. This process proceeded along two tracks.
On one track, the United States pressed its fellow permanent members of the U.N. Security Council (Russia, China, France and the United Kingdom) and Germany to join Washington in imposing additional sanctions on Iran. U.S. Undersecretary for Political Affairs William J. Burns joined a July 19 meeting between EU foreign policy adviser Javier Solana and Iranian national security chief Saeed Jalili, which was read as a thaw in the American position on Iran. The Iranian response was ambiguous, which is a polite way of saying that Tehran wouldn't commit to anything. The Iranians were given two weeks after the meeting to provide an answer or face new sanctions.
A second track consisted of intensified signals of potential U.S. military action. Recall the carefully leaked report published in The New York Times on June 20 regarding Israeli preparations for airstrikes against Iran. According to U.S. — not Israeli — sources, the Israeli air force rehearsed for an attack on Iran by carrying out a simulated attack over Greece and the eastern Mediterranean Sea involving more than 100 aircraft.
At the same time, reports circulated about Israeli planes using U.S. airfields in Iraq in preparation for an attack on Iran. The markets and oil prices — at a high in late July and early August — were twitching with reports of a potential blockade of Iranian ports, while the Internet was filled with lurid reports of a fleet of American and French ships on its way to carry out the blockade.
The temperature in U.S.-Iranian relations was surging, at least publicly. Then Russia and Georgia went to war, and Iran suddenly dropped off the U.S. radar screen. Washington went quiet on the entire Iranian matter, and the Israelis declared that Iran was two to five years from developing a nuclear device (as opposed to a deliverable weapon), reducing the probability of an Israeli airstrike. From Washington's point of view, the bottom fell out of U.S. policy on Iran when the Russians and Georgians opened fire on each other.
The Georgian Connection
There were two reasons for this.
First, Washington had no intention of actually carrying out airstrikes against Iran. The United States was far too tied down in other areas to do that. Nor did the Israelis intend to attack. The military obstacles to what promised to be a multiday conventional strike against Iranian targets more than a thousand miles away were more than a little daunting. Nevertheless, generating that threat of such a strike suited U.S. diplomacy. Washington wanted not only to make Iran feel threatened, but also to increase Tehran's isolation by forging the U.N. Security Council members and Germany into a solid bloc imposing increasingly painful sanctions on Iran.
Once the Russo-Georgian War broke out, however, and the United States sided publicly and vigorously with Georgia, the chances of the Russians participating in such sanctions against Iran dissolved. As the Russians rejected the idea of increased sanctions, so did the Chinese. If the Russians and Chinese weren't prepared to participate in sanctions, no sanctions were possible, because the Iranians could get whatever they needed from these two countries.
The second reason was more important. As U.S.-Russian relations deteriorated, each side looked for levers to control the other. For the Russians, one of the best levers with the Americans was the threat of selling weapons to Iran. From the U.S. point of view, not only would weapon sales to Iran make it more difficult to attack Iran, but the weapons would find their way to Hezbollah and other undesirable players. The United States did not want the Russians selling weapons, but the Russians were being unpredictable. Therefore, while the Russians had the potential to offer Iran weapons, the United States wanted to reduce Iran's incentive for accepting those weapons.
The Iranians have a long history with the Russians, including the occupation of northern Iran by Russia during World War II. The Russians are close to Iran, and the Americans are far away. Tehran's desire to get closer to the Russians is therefore limited, although under pressure Iran would certainly purchase weapons from Russia, just as it has purchased nuclear technology in the past. With the purchase of advanced weapons would come Russian advisers — something that might not be to Iran's liking unless it were absolutely necessary.
The United States did not want to give Iran a motive for closing an arms deal with Russia, leaving aside the question of whether the Russian threat to sell weapons was anything more than a bargaining chip with the Americans. With Washington rhetorically pounding Russia, pounding Iran at the same time made no sense. For one thing, the Iranians, like the Russians, knew the Americans were spread too thin. Also, the United States suddenly had to reverse its position on Iran. Prior to Aug. 8, Washington wanted the Iranians to feel embattled; after Aug. 8, the last thing the United States wanted was for the Iranians to feel under threat. In a flash, Iran went from being the most important issue on the table to being barely mentioned.
Iran and a Formal U.S. Opening
Different leaks about Iran started to emerge. The Bush administration posed the idea of opening a U.S. interest section in Iran, the lowest form of diplomatic recognition (but diplomatic recognition nonetheless). This idea had been floated June 23, but now it was being floated after the Russo-Georgian War. The initial discussion of the interest section seemed to calm the atmosphere, but the idea went away.
Then, just before U.S. presidential elections in November, the reports re-emerged, this time in the context of a new administration. According to the leaks, U.S. President George W. Bush intended to open diplomatic relations with Iran after the election regardless of who won, in order to free the next president from the burden of opening relations with Iran. In other words, if Obama won, Bush was prepared to provide cover with the American right on an opening to Iran.
If we take these leaks seriously — and we do — this means Bush has concluded that a formal opening to Iran is necessary. Indeed, the Bush administration has been operating on this premise ever since the U.S. troop surge in Iraq. Two things were clear to the Bush administration in 2007: first, that the United States had to make a deal with the Iraqi Sunni nationalist insurgents; and second, that while the Iranians might not be able to impose a pro-Iranian government in Baghdad, Tehran had enough leverage with enough Iraq Shiite factions to disrupt Iraq, and thus disrupt the peace process. Therefore, without an understanding with Iran, a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq would be difficult and full of potentially unpleasant consequences, regardless of who is in the White House.
The issue of Iran's nuclear program was part of this negotiation. The Iranians were less interested in building a nuclear weapon than in having the United States believe they were building one. As Tehran learned by observing the U.S. reaction to North Korea, Washington has a nuclear phobia. Tehran thus hoped it could use the threat of a nuclear program to force the United States to be more forthcoming on Iranian interests in Iraq, a matter of fundamental importance to Iran. At the same time, the United States had no appetite for bombing Iran, but used the threat of attacks as leverage to get the Iranians to be more tractable.
The Iranians in 2007 withdrew their support from destabilizing elements in Iraq like Muqtada al-Sadr, contributing to a dramatic decline in violence in Iraq. In return, Iran wanted to see an American commitment to withdraw from Iraq on a set timetable. Washington was unprepared to make that commitment. Current talks over a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between Washington and Baghdad revolve around just this issue. The Iraqi Shia are demanding a fixed timetable, while the Kurds and Sunnis — not to mention foreign governments like Saudi Arabia — seem to be more comfortable with a residual U.S. force in place to guarantee political agreements.
The Shia are clearly being influenced by Iran on the SOFA issue, as their interests align. The Sunnis and Kurds, however, fear this agreement. In their view, the withdrawal of U.S. forces on a fixed timetable will create a vacuum in Iraq that the Iranians eventually will fill, at the very least by having a government in Baghdad that Tehran can influence. The Kurds and Sunnis are deeply concerned about their own security in such an event. Therefore, the SOFA is not moving toward fruition.
The Iraqi Stumbling Block
There is a fundamental issue blocking the agreement. The United States has agreed to an Iraqi government that is neutral between Washington and Tehran. That is a major defeat for the United States, but an unavoidable one under the circumstances. But a U.S. withdrawal without a residual force means that the Iranians will be the dominant force in the region, and this is not something United States — along with the Iraqi Kurds and Sunnis, the Saudis and Israelis — wants. Therefore the SOFA remains in gridlock, with the specter of Russian-Iranian ties complicating the situation.
Obama's position during the election was that he favored a timed U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, but he was ambiguous about whether he would want a residual force kept there. Clearly, the Shia and Iranians are more favorably inclined toward Obama than Bush because of Obama's views on a general withdrawal by a certain date and the possibility of a complete withdrawal. This means that Obama must be extremely careful politically. The American political right is wounded but far from dead, and it would strike hard if it appeared Obama was preparing to give Iran a free hand in Iraq.
One possible way for Obama to proceed would be to keep Russia and Iran from moving closer together. Last week, Obama's advisers insisted their camp has made no firm commitments on ballistic missile defense (BMD) installations in Poland and the Czech Republic, repudiating claims by Polish President Lech Kaczynski that the new U.S. president-elect had assured him of firm support during a Nov. 8 phone conversation. This is an enormous issue for the Russians.
It is not clear in how broad of a context the idea of avoiding firm commitments on BMD was mentioned, but it might go a long way toward keeping Russia happy and therefore making Moscow less likely to provide aid — material or psychological — to the Iranians. Making Iran feel as isolated as possible, without forcing it into dependence on Russia, is critical to a satisfactory solution for the United States in Iraq.
Complicating this are what appear to be serious political issues in Iran. Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been attacked for his handling of the economy. He has seen an ally forced from the Interior Ministry and the head of the Iranian central bank replaced. Ahmadinejad has even come under criticism for his views on Israel, with critics saying that he has achieved nothing and lost much through his statements. He therefore appears to be on the defensive.
The gridlock in Baghdad is not over a tedious diplomatic point, but over the future of Iraq and its relation to Iran. At the same time, there appears to be a debate going on in Iran over whether Ahmadinejad's policies have improved the outlook for Iran's role in Iraq. Finally, any serious thoughts the Iranians might have had about cozying up to the Russians have dissipated since August, and Obama might have made them even more distant. Still, Obama's apparent commitment to a timed, complete withdrawal of U.S. forces poses complexities. His advisers have already hinted at flexibility on these issues.
We think that Bush will — after all his leaks — smooth the way for Obama by opening diplomatic relations with Iran. From a political point of view, this will allow Bush to take some credit for any breakthrough. But from the point of view of U.S. national interest, going public with conversations that have taken place privately over the past couple of years (along with some formal, public meetings in Baghdad) makes a great deal of sense. It could possibly create an internal dynamic in Iran that would force Ahmadinejad out, or at least weaken him. It could potentially break the logjam over the SOFA in Baghdad, and it could even stabilize the region.
The critical question will not be the timing of the U.S. withdrawal. It will be the residual force — whether an American force of 20,000 to 40,000 troops will remain to guarantee that Iran does not have undue influence in Iraq, and that Sunni and Kurdish interests are protected. Obama promised to end the war in Iraq, and he promised to withdraw all U.S. troops. He might have to deal with the fact that he can have the former only if he compromises on the latter. But he has left himself enough room for maneuver that he can do just that.
It seems clear that Iran will now return to the top of the U.S. foreign policy agenda. If Bush re-establishes formal diplomatic relations with Iran at some level, and if Obama responds to Iranian congratulations in a positive way, then an interesting dynamic will be in place well before Inauguration Day. The key will be the Nov. 10 meeting between Bush and Obama.
Bush wants to make a move that saves some of his legacy; Obama knows he will have to deal with Iran and even make concessions. Obama also knows the political price he will have to pay if he does. If Bush makes the first move, it will make things politically easier for Obama. Obama can afford to let Bush take the first step if it makes the subsequent steps easier for the Obama administration. But first, there must be an understanding between Bush and Obama. Then can there be an understanding between the United States and Iran, and then there can be an understanding among Iraqi Shia, Sunnis and Kurds. And then history can move on.
There are many understandings in the way of history.
Filed Under: American Foreign Policy, Iran Tagged With: Iran, u.s. foreign policy
Obama's Challenge
November 6, 2008 by jginsberg
reprinted from Stratfor.com with permission
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The 2008 U.S. Presidential Race
Barack Obama has been elected president of the United States by a large majority in the Electoral College. The Democrats have dramatically increased their control of Congress, increasing the number of seats they hold in the House of Representatives and moving close to the point where — with a few Republican defections — they can have filibuster-proof control of the Senate. Given the age of some Supreme Court justices, Obama might well have the opportunity to appoint at least one and possibly two new justices. He will begin as one of the most powerful presidents in a long while.
Truly extraordinary were the celebrations held around the world upon Obama's victory. They affirm the global expectations Obama has raised — and reveal that the United States must be more important to Europeans than the latter like to admit. (We can't imagine late-night vigils in the United States over a French election.)
Obama is an extraordinary rhetorician, and as Aristotle pointed out, rhetoric is one of the foundations of political power. Rhetoric has raised him to the presidency, along with the tremendous unpopularity of his predecessor and a financial crisis that took a tied campaign and gave Obama a lead he carefully nurtured to victory. So, as with all politicians, his victory was a matter of rhetoric and, according to Machiavelli, luck. Obama had both, but now the question is whether he has Machiavelli's virtue in full by possessing the ability to exercise power. This last element is what governing is about, and it is what will determine if his presidency succeeds.
Embedded in his tremendous victory is a single weakness: Obama won the popular vote by a fairly narrow margin, about 52 percent of the vote. That means that almost as many people voted against him as voted for him.
Obama's Agenda vs. Expanding His Base
U.S. President George W. Bush demonstrated that the inability to understand the uses and limits of power can crush a presidency very quickly. The enormous enthusiasm of Obama's followers could conceal how he — like Bush — is governing a deeply, and nearly evenly, divided country. Obama's first test will be simple: Can he maintain the devotion of his followers while increasing his political base? Or will he believe, as Bush and Cheney did, that he can govern without concern for the other half of the country because he controls the presidency and Congress, as Bush and Cheney did in 2001? Presidents are elected by electoral votes, but they govern through public support.
Obama and his supporters will say there is no danger of a repeat of Bush — who believed he could carry out his agenda and build his political base at the same time, but couldn't. Building a political base requires modifying one's agenda. But when you start modifying your agenda, when you become pragmatic, you start to lose your supporters. If Obama had won with 60 percent of the popular vote, this would not be as pressing a question. But he barely won by more than Bush in 2004. Now, we will find out if Obama is as skillful a president as he was a candidate.
Obama will soon face the problem of beginning to disappoint people all over the world, a problem built into his job. The first disappointments will be minor. There are thousands of people hoping for appointments, some to Cabinet positions, others to the White House, others to federal agencies. Many will get something, but few will get as much as they hoped for. Some will feel betrayed and become bitter. During the transition process, the disappointed office seeker — an institution in American politics — will start leaking on background to whatever reporters are available. This will strike a small, discordant note; creating no serious problems, but serving as a harbinger of things to come.
Later, Obama will be sworn in. He will give a memorable, perhaps historic speech at his inauguration. There will be great expectations about him in the country and around the world. He will enjoy the traditional presidential honeymoon, during which all but his bitterest enemies will give him the benefit of the doubt. The press initially will adore him, but will begin writing stories about all the positions he hasn't filled, the mistakes he made in the vetting process and so on. And then, sometime in March or April, things will get interesting.
Iran and a U.S. Withdrawal From Iraq
Obama has promised to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq, where he does not intend to leave any residual force. If he follows that course, he will open the door for the Iranians. Iran's primary national security interest is containing or dominating Iraq, with which Iran fought a long war. If the United States remains in Iraq, the Iranians will be forced to accept a neutral government in Iraq. A U.S. withdrawal will pave the way for the Iranians to use Iraqi proxies to create, at a minimum, an Iraqi government more heavily influenced by Iran.
Apart from upsetting Sunni and Kurdish allies of the United States in Iraq, the Iranian ascendancy in Iraq will disturb some major American allies — particularly the Saudis, who fear Iranian power. The United States can't afford a scenario under which Iranian power is projected into the Saudi oil fields. While that might be an unlikely scenario, it carries catastrophic consequences. The Jordanians and possibly the Turks, also American allies, will pressure Obama not simply to withdraw. And, of course, the Israelis will want the United States to remain in place to block Iranian expansion. Resisting a coalition of Saudis and Israelis will not be easy.
This will be the point where Obama's pledge to talk to the Iranians will become crucial. If he simply withdraws from Iraq without a solid understanding with Iran, the entire American coalition in the region will come apart. Obama has pledged to build coalitions, something that will be difficult in the Middle East if he withdraws from Iraq without ironclad Iranian guarantees. He therefore will talk to the Iranians. But what can Obama offer the Iranians that would induce them to forego their primary national security interest? It is difficult to imagine a U.S.-Iranian deal that is both mutually beneficial and enforceable.
Obama will then be forced to make a decision. He can withdraw from Iraq and suffer the geopolitical consequences while coming under fire from the substantial political right in the United States that he needs at least in part to bring into his coalition. Or, he can retain some force in Iraq, thereby disappointing his supporters. If he is clumsy, he could wind up under attack from the right for negotiating with the Iranians and from his own supporters for not withdrawing all U.S. forces from Iraq. His skills in foreign policy and domestic politics will be tested on this core question, and he undoubtedly will disappoint many.
The Afghan Dilemma
Obama will need to address Afghanistan next. He has said that this is the real war, and that he will ask U.S. allies to join him in the effort. This means he will go to the Europeans and NATO, as he has said he will do. The Europeans are delighted with Obama's victory because they feel Obama will consult them and stop making demands of them. But demands are precisely what he will bring the Europeans. In particular, he will want the Europeans to provide more forces for Afghanistan.
Many European countries will be inclined to provide some support, if for no other reason than to show that they are prepared to work with Obama. But European public opinion is not about to support a major deployment in Afghanistan, and the Europeans don't have the force to deploy there anyway. In fact, as the global financial crisis begins to have a more dire impact in Europe than in the United States, many European countries are actively reducing their deployments in Afghanistan to save money. Expanding operations is the last thing on European minds.
Obama's Afghan solution of building a coalition centered on the Europeans will thus meet a divided Europe with little inclination to send troops and with few troops to send in any event. That will force him into a confrontation with the Europeans in spring 2009, and then into a decision. The United States and its allies collectively lack the force to stabilize Afghanistan and defeat the Taliban. They certainly lack the force to make a significant move into Pakistan — something Obama has floated on several occasions that might be a good idea if force were in fact available.
He will have to make a hard decision on Afghanistan. Obama can continue the war as it is currently being fought, without hope of anything but a long holding action, but this risks defining his presidency around a hopeless war. He can choose to withdraw, in effect reinstating the Taliban, going back on his commitment and drawing heavy fire from the right. Or he can do what we have suggested is the inevitable outcome, namely, negotiate — and reach a political accord — with the Taliban. Unlike Bush, however, withdrawal or negotiation with the Taliban will increase the pressure on Obama from the right. And if this is coupled with a decision to delay withdrawal from Iraq, Obama's own supporters will become restive. His 52 percent Election Day support could deteriorate with remarkable speed.
The Russian Question
At the same time, Obama will face the Russian question. The morning after Obama's election, Russian President Dmitri Medvedev announced that Russia was deploying missiles in its European exclave of Kaliningrad in response to the U.S. deployment of ballistic missile defense systems in Poland. Obama opposed the Russians on their August intervention in Georgia, but he has never enunciated a clear Russia policy. We expect Ukraine will have shifted its political alignment toward Russia, and Moscow will be rapidly moving to create a sphere of influence before Obama can bring his attention — and U.S. power — to bear.
Obama will again turn to the Europeans to create a coalition to resist the Russians. But the Europeans will again be divided. The Germans can't afford to alienate the Russians because of German energy dependence on Russia and because Germany does not want to fight another Cold War. The British and French may be more inclined to address the question, but certainly not to the point of resurrecting NATO as a major military force. The Russians will be prepared to talk, and will want to talk a great deal, all the while pursuing their own national interest of increasing their power in what they call their "near abroad."
Obama will have many options on domestic policy given his majorities in Congress. But his Achilles' heel, as it was for Bush and for many presidents, will be foreign policy. He has made what appear to be three guarantees. First, he will withdraw from Iraq. Second, he will focus on Afghanistan. Third, he will oppose Russian expansionism. To deliver on the first promise, he must deal with the Iranians. To deliver on the second, he must deal with the Taliban. To deliver on the third, he must deal with the Europeans.
Global Finance and the European Problem
The Europeans will pose another critical problem, as they want a second Bretton Woods agreement. Some European states appear to desire a set of international regulations for the financial system. There are three problems with this.
First, unless Obama wants to change course dramatically, the U.S. and European positions differ over the degree to which governments will regulate interbank transactions. The Europeans want much more intrusion than the Americans. They are far less averse to direct government controls than the Americans have been. Obama has the power to shift American policy, but doing that will make it harder to expand his base.
Second, the creation of an international regulatory body that has authority over American banks would create a system where U.S. financial management was subordinated to European financial management.
And third, the Europeans themselves have no common understanding of things. Obama could thus quickly be drawn into complex EU policy issues that could tie his hands in the United States. These could quickly turn into painful negotiations, in which Obama's allure to the Europeans will evaporate.
One of the foundations of Obama's foreign policy — and one of the reasons the Europeans have celebrated his election — was the perception that Obama is prepared to work closely with the Europeans. He is in fact prepared to do so, but his problem will be the same one Bush had: The Europeans are in no position to give the things that Obama will need from them — namely, troops, a revived NATO to confront the Russians and a global financial system that doesn't subordinate American financial authority to an international bureaucracy.
The Hard Road Ahead
Like any politician, Obama will face the challenge of having made a set of promises that are not mutually supportive. Much of his challenge boils down to problems that he needs to solve and that he wants European help on, but the Europeans are not prepared to provide the type and amount of help he needs. This, plus the fact that a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq requires an agreement with Iran — something hard to imagine without a continued U.S. presence in Iraq — gives Obama a difficult road to move on.
As with all American presidents (who face midterm elections with astonishing speed), Obama's foreign policy moves will be framed by his political support. Institutionally, he will be powerful. In terms of popular support, he begins knowing that almost half the country voted against him, and that he must increase his base. He must exploit the honeymoon period, when his support will expand, to bring another 5 percent or 10 percent of the public into his coalition. These people voted against him; now he needs to convince them to support him. But these are precisely the people who would regard talks with the Taliban or Iran with deep distrust. And if negotiations with the Iranians cause him to keep forces in Iraq, he will alienate his base without necessarily winning over his opponents.
And there is always the unknown. There could be a terrorist attack, the Russians could start pressuring the Baltic states, the Mexican situation could deteriorate. The unknown by definition cannot be anticipated. And many foreign leaders know it takes an administration months to settle in, something some will try to take advantage of. On top of that, there is now nearly a three-month window in which the old president is not yet out and the new president not yet in.
Obama must deal with extraordinarily difficult foreign policy issues in the context of an alliance failing not because of rough behavior among friends but because the allies' interests have diverged. He must deal with this in the context of foreign policy positions difficult to sustain and reconcile, all against the backdrop of almost half an electorate that voted against him versus supporters who have enormous hopes vested in him. Obama knows all of this, of course, as he indicated in his victory speech.
We will now find out if Obama understands the exercise of political power as well as he understands the pursuit of that power. You really can't know that until after the fact. There is no reason to think he can't finesse these problems. Doing so will take cunning, trickery and the ability to make his supporters forget the promises he made while keeping their support. It will also require the ability to make some of his opponents embrace him despite the path he will have to take. In other words, he will have to be cunning and ruthless without appearing to be cunning and ruthless. That's what successful presidents do.
In the meantime, he should enjoy the transition. It's frequently the best part of a presidency.
Filed Under: American Foreign Policy, European Foreign Policy Tagged With: afghanistan, baltic states, Iran, iraq, mexico, Obama, russia, u.s. foreign policy