The National Association of Nigerian Students (NANS) has tackled the Akwa Ibom State Governor, Mr. Udom Emmanuel, over an alleged negligence to their welfare, which borders on payment of bursary, issuance of scholarship, improved condition of learning and grants for special students (Law and Medical students).
The students body also raised the alarm to threat to lives of its leadership particularly of its President, Comrade Danielson Akpan.
Addressing a press conference in Uyo on Tuesday, the NANs president said since the Akwa Ibom State Government has failed to honour the one week ultimatum issued it to pay up the bursary owed it's students, the students have no option than to embark on massive protests.
He also warned Governor Emmanuel to risk vote apathy from the students community if he fails to yield to their course.
Akpan recalled that since the ultimatum was issued to the state government on January 12, 2019, his executive members and himself have been inundated with harassments and threats to their lives noting that governor Emmanuel should be held responsible incase something bad happens to him or any of his executive members.
He wondered why Gov. Emmanuel led administration was unable to pay bursary, which is their constitutional right but has the money and resources to quickly pay not less than N100 million to some unidentified students within one month just to seek political endorsement.
The statement partly read, "NANS has demanded for immediate payment of bursary and scholarship. The ultimatum elapsed today as the Akwa Ibom government has deliberately refused to pay bursary to students since assumption of governor Emmanuel to office.
"A government that courts students on political praise singing cannot but be determined to punish them for ignorantly signing out their future in exchange for political patronage.
"The students, not those usually hired for political endorsements are determined this time to secure their rights. They have decided to embark on massive protests; there will be total resistance to the sheer neglect of the rights of students.
"We can no longer remain pawns on their chessboard. The Udom government has denigrated Akwa Ibom students and it is time to say Enough is Enough!
"Ever since we issued the ultimatum, we are aware that there are plans to silence our position and possibly come after key officials of the NANS leadership, particularly the president of NANS. We have been reliably informed that some thugs have been contracted to hack down NANS president. We are calling on the entire world to hold governor Udom responsible should anything happens to the NANS president or any of the officials.
"Having failed in delivering dividends of democracy in the educational sector, the governor resorted to hiring the students for political endorsements. It is the height of degradation of our dignity. This total neglect of education is akin to taking us back to the inglorious days of slavery, human capital under development and poor education.
On why the agitation was coming few days to the elections and whether it was politically motivated, the outspoken President said, "The time to fight for our rights is now, besides i assumed office as the NANS president few months ago.
"Our course has nothing to do with political lines, recall that few days ago we gave an ultimatum to President Buhari concerning the ASUU strike, that was what compelled the Federal government to reconvene a meeting with ASUU which i believe will yield positive results.
"It is not about a political party but about government. It is mischievous for Akwa Ibom state government to hide under the umbrella of lack of funds to not pay bursary. Akwa Ibom is one of the richest if not the richest state in the country.
Rivers State pays bursary, Delta state pays too, as a matter of fact I was invited as the president of NANS to launch that of 2018/2019 bursary as at October 2018 in Delta state. Delta students around the length and breath of the world are captured in bursary. Rivers and Delta are in the category of Akwa Ibom state.
"There are states that are financially handicapped that cannot take care of themselves not to talk more of bursary and scholarship yet they are doing it. For instance Nasarawa state is known to be financially handicapped, yet, the governor pays bursary and even the welfare of special students were taken care of. The governor even went as far as providing grants and laptops for them.
"States like Zamfara, Borno that are ridden with crises are investing so much in the education sector. Can you compare their federal allocations and the IGR accrued to those states to Akwa Ibom State," he queried.
Akpan, who, however, noted that successive governments in Akwa Ibom paid bursary to the students from Akwa Ibom State, urged the students to remain law abiding and non-violent as they stage protests to pursue their rights in legitimate and intellectual ways.
However, when the Commissioner of Information, Mr. Charles Udoh was contacted to get his reaction, he said, "First and foremost I wish to state that the authentic NANS leadership have been in discussions with representatives of the state government to agree modalities for Registration, Verification and pre-qualification of beneficiaries. These are requisite processes that must be completed before computation and execution.
"Any NANS group threatening to carry out a protest is obviously on the path of a political motivated blackmail to smear government.


The subject develops a student's knowledge of cell and developmental biology, introduced in second year subjects. The subject is arranged for students to gain an understanding of the approaches used to study cell biology and developmental biology and an appreciation of the major concepts involved in the development of a range of organisms – including microbes, invertebrates, vertebrates and plants. A particular focus is the range of approaches (genetic, cellular, anatomical and physiological) that are used to investigate biological systems and address current biological and biomedical problems, including human development, health and disease. This multi-disciplinary subject is co-taught by staff in the departments of Anatomy & Cell Biology, Botany, Genetics, and Zoology. A feature of this course is the application of this knowledge in pure and applied research and thus will provide a platform for students in many Life Science majors, including Biotechnology and Cell & Developmental Biology majors.
Its underlying theme is the relevance of ecological and evolutionary theory for understanding the distributions of species, their interactions, their life history characteristics and how these traits are impacted by changing environmental conditions. Topics include spatial ecology and metapopulations, climatic impacts on distribution and abundance, life history evolution and ecosystemstability and resilience. The skills developed in this subject provide an essential grounding for careers in ecology.
This subject deals with how plants function in relation to changing physical environments and is designed for students interested in plant biology and physiology, including those seeking majors in plant science, agricultural science, landscape management, and environmental science. The practical work includes a six-week research project on topics selected by students and run in small groups of 2-3.


To get an idea of how presidential politics has invaded every nook of the pink Texas Capitol, consider two recent scenes from the waning days of the legislative session.
At a press conference, Gov. George W. Bush castigates President Clinton for the Chinese spy scandal. "The balance of power is going to shift as a result" of China's alleged espionage, Mr. Bush warns. "The next president is going to have to deal with that."
Down the hall, as lawmakers debate bills on the floor, lobbyists wait outside, grumbling that the attention of the governor and his staff is everywhere but on state issues. "They have other things to do," says one with a shrug.
It's a complaint Bush has heard countless times during the past few months - and an indicator of how difficult it is to run for president while governing a state. With the office comes instant stature; with the presidential bid comes close national scrutiny. And in recent days, Bush has had to decide how to balance the two.
The result, experts say, has been something less than dynamic. While critics and comrades have taken different tones, most agree that the governor's steps have been cautious and his agenda has been limited.
Some point out that Texas governors' powers are weak. Others note that all the national attention may have tempered his desire to bite off a big issue. Regardless, the portrait of Bush painted in this legislative session, analysts say, is not one of a visionary, but a political pragmatist.
With the session ending over the weekend, Bush can claim some modest successes. Several of the bills that bear Bush's "compassionate conservative" trademark will be signed into law in June, including teacher pay raises, "meaningful" state tax relief, and a bill to limit lawsuits springing from Y2K computer glitches.
Lawmakers even managed to pass a controversial bill that requires a doctor to notify parents if their daughter is seeking an abortion.
But the session also had its share of flops. A Bush-backed "voucher" bill to give low-income parents state money to pay for private school tuition died in committee. And the James Byrd anti-hate crimes bill, named after the African-American from Jasper, Texas, who was dragged to death, was scuttled as well.
Bush denied requests to lobby on behalf of either bill, saying he would give them his consideration if and when they made it to his desk.
BUSH'S reluctance, or unwillingness, to twist arms for controversial bills has some lobbyists grumbling and and a few pundits chortling.
Asked to describe the governor's impact on this legislative session, liberal columnist Molly Ivins says: "Pretty much zip." But this hands-off brand of governance suits lawmakers just fine, she adds.
"People like 'Shrub' - he's a likeable guy," says Ms. Ivins, using one of her favorite nicknames for Bush. (Her other nickname is "Dubya," as in George "W." Bush.) "But Dubya doesn't have a position on anything. How much can a governor straddle? He's an artful straddlist, but this is ridiculous."
Others see a hands-off style, too. "In the last session, Bush was everywhere, knee-deep in negotiations," says Harvey Kronberg, publisher of a political newsletter called the Quorum Report. This time, "he was a nonplayer, from a Republican standpoint."
But out among the suited throngs who gather near the legislature door, one lobbyist, who requests anonymity, says Bush's style this session has been consistent with past efforts.
Pointing to a long list of successes from Bush's first legislative session, including new education spending, tort reform, and stiffer juvenile sentences, the lobbyist argues that many of these bills had already been lined up by Senate and House leaders before Bush was elected.
"Dumbo could have been governor and that stuff would have passed," he quips.
If there is ill feeling out there in the lawmaker and lobbying set, it may spring from the fact that Bush's work on legislation has been behind the scenes, but his presidential explorations have been front and center. Every week, Bush prepares for presidential politics by receiving briefings on national and foreign-policy issues.
Every day, fax machines across the city churn out updates of which prominent Republicans from Alaska to Nebraska have thrown their support behind Bush. The governor even found time last month to meet privately with the visiting prime minister of Slovenia.
But Bush supporters say all this preparation has not hampered his performance as governor.
"Governor Bush has been very engaged in the legislative process this session," says Linda Edwards, a Bush spokeswoman. "He has been meeting with legislators every day. The amount of time the governor has spent on bills this session is comparable to the time he's spent in past sessions."
FOR his part, Bush says voters can see his work in a more efficient state government.
"When all is said and done, people will say Governor Bush has been a fiscal conservative with a few priorities, and he slowed the growth of government," Bush said at a press conference.
But if Bush's leadership style seems to lack that revolutionary zip that fires up the partisans, it may be just part of being the cautious front-runner. After a year of impeachment hearings and partisan sniping, some experts argue that Americans may be ready for a little less vision, thank you.
"This is the kind of good economic time when it's possible to be elected without being terribly visionary or courageous," says Bruce Buchanan, presidential scholar at the University of Texas at Austin. "You can be a modest personality. I think he's a product of his time in that sense."


text:
Originally published: 2001-10-13 09:51:15
Last updated: 2001-10-13 09:51:15
Author: Richie Hindle

Rather than using Python's cgi.FieldStorage class, a simple dictionary is enough for 99% of CGI scripts.  This recipe shows you how to convert a FieldStorage object into a simple dictionary.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


text:
August Wilhelm Maybach (* 9. Februar 1846 in Heilbronn; † 29. Dezember 1929 in Stuttgart-Cannstatt) war ein deutscher Konstrukteur und Automobilpionier. Er war Mitbegründer der 1909 in Bissingen/Enz, Königreich Württemberg, gegründeten Maybach-Motorenbau GmbH und Namensgeber der Automobilmarke Maybach.

Wilhelm Maybach entwickelte als Mitarbeiter Gottlieb Daimlers in dessen Konstruktionsbüro mit der sogenannten "Standuhr" den ersten leichten und schnelldrehenden, und damit als Fahrzeugmotor besonders geeigneten, Verbrennungsmotor.

Leben und Wirken

Kindheit und Jugend
Als Wilhelm Maybach fünf Jahre alt war, zog seine Familie aus Heilbronn (Württemberg) in das 50 km entfernte Stuttgart, wo seine Eltern beide binnen drei Jahren starben. Weil er und seine vier Brüder zu Waisen geworden waren, erging im Stuttgarter Anzeiger ein Aufruf:

Daraufhin meldete sich der Pfarrer Gustav Werner und nahm den 13-jährigen Wilhelm in dem von ihm gegründeten Reutlinger Bruderhaus auf, in dem Waisenkinder aus armen Familien Erziehung und eine Ausbildung erhielten. Maybach wurde dort zum technischen Zeichner und Konstrukteur ausgebildet.

Im Bruderhaus zu Reutlingen schlossen Gottlieb Daimler und Maybach Bekanntschaft

In dem Bruderhaus lernten sich Maybach und Gottlieb Daimler kennen. Daimler war Leiter der Maschinenfabrik des Bruderhauses und erhielt Maybach als Assistenten zugeteilt. Daimler erkannte Maybachs Talent und wurde zu seinem Förderer. 1873 nahm Gottlieb Daimler Maybach mit zu der Gasmotoren-Fabrik Deutz bei Köln, dort wurde Maybach die Leitung des Konstruktionsbüros übertragen. Hier brachte Maybach den von Nikolaus Otto entwickelten Verbrennungsmotor mit Fremdzündung zur Serienreife. Als Daimler die Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft in Cannstatt gründete, wurde Maybach sein technischer Direktor und hatte damit maßgeblichen Anteil an der weiteren Automobilentwicklung.

Wegweisende Begegnung von Wilhelm Maybach mit Konsul Emil Jellinek
Um 1900 konstruierte Maybach auf Anregung des österreichischen Kaufmanns und Generalkonsuls Emil Jellinek (1853–1918) den Mercedes-Simplex, einen Rennwagen mit einem 35-PS-Vierzylindermotor und zwei Vergasern. Das Fahrzeug, ausgestattet mit Maybachs Erfindungen, dem Bienenwabenkühler und dem Zahnradgetriebe, stellte für damalige Verhältnisse das Auto der Zukunft dar. Jellinek nannte das Modell nach seiner Tochter Mercédès. 1904 entwickelte Maybach den ersten Sechszylinder-Mercedesmotor mit 70 PS. 1906 konstruierte er einen zukunftsweisenden 120-PS-Rennmotor mit hängenden Ein- und Auslassventilen, obenliegender Nockenwelle und Doppelzündung. Diese Kennzeichen wurden später bedeutend für die Mercedes-Flugmotoren (Mercedes D III) und für alle anderen Hochleistungsmotoren.

Familie und Firmengründung der Maybach-Motorenbau GmbH

Maybach heiratete 1878 die Maulbronner Wirts- und Posthalterstochter Bertha Wilhelmine Habermaahs (1851–1931); in Deutz kam 1879 ihr erster Sohn Karl Maybach († 1960) zur Welt, 1884 gefolgt vom zweiten Sohn Adolf († 1940 in Grafeneck) und der 1892 geborenen Tochter Emma († 1974).

Zusammen mit seinem Sohn Karl machte sich Maybach 1909 selbständig, und gemeinsam gründeten sie in Bissingen/Enz die Maybach-Motorenbau GmbH, die zunächst Motoren für Starrluftschiffe (Zeppeline) und später in Friedrichshafen Luxusautos herstellte (siehe auch MTU Friedrichshafen).

Wilhelm Maybach lebte bis zu seinem Tod in der Freiligrathstraße in Cannstatt in seiner Villa, die bis heute erhalten ist. Hier starb er am 29. Dezember 1929. Maybach wurde in unmittelbarer Nähe von Gottlieb Daimler auf dem Cannstatter Uff-Kirchhof (Abteilung 14) beigesetzt. Er war Mitglied des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure (VDI) und des Württembergischen Bezirksvereins des VDI.

Die Ende 2012 eingestellte Automobilmarke Maybach gehörte zur damaligen Daimler AG.

Siehe auch
 Mercedes-Benz Welt Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt

Ehrungen
 1916 wurde Wilhelm Maybach von der Technischen Hochschule Stuttgart die Ehrendoktorwürde verliehen.
 1922 wurde er mit der Grashof-Denkmünze des Vereins Deutscher Ingenieure ausgezeichnet.
Wilhelm Maybach ist namensgebend für folgende Einrichtungen:
 für die Wilhelm-Maybach-Schule, Gewerbliche Berufsschule in Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt
 für die Wilhelm-Maybach-Schule in Heilbronn, welche ein Technisches Schulzentrum für Aus- und Weiterbildung mit Technischem Gymnasium ist und insbesondere in den Bereichen Fertigungs-, Metall-, Kraftfahrzeug- und Elektrotechnik tätig ist.
 für die Wilhelm-Maybach-Oberschule 5. OR Spandau (Realschule) in Berlin-Spandau
 für die Wilhelm-Maybach-Schule, Förderberufsschule und Förderberufsfachschule in Reutlingen
 für das Wilhelm-Maybach-Labor – ein Technik-Labor des Science Centers experimenta in Heilbronn
 Stuttgarter Maybachstraße

Literatur
 Max J. B. Rauck: Wilhelm Maybach. Der große Automobilkonstrukteur. Rauck, Baar 1979.
 Harry Niemann: Mythos Maybach. 4. Auflage. Motorbuch, Stuttgart 2002, ISBN 3-613-02275-3.
 Harry Niemann: Maybach. Der Vater des Mercedes. 3. Auflage. Motorbuch, Stuttgart 2000, ISBN 3-613-02027-0.
 Harry Niemann: Wilhelm Maybach, König der Konstrukteure. Motorbuch, Stuttgart 1995, ISBN 3-613-01717-2.
 Kurt Rathke: Wilhelm Maybach. Anbruch eines neuen Zeitalters. Gessler, Friedrichshafen 1953.

 Dokumentarfilm im Auftrag der Mercedes-Benz AG 1995: Wilhelm Maybach – König der Konstrukteure von Harry Niemann BRD 1995/96.
 Reutlinger Künstlerlexikon. Bildende Künstlerinnen und Künstler mit Bezug zu Stadt und Kreis Reutlingen vom Mittelalter bis zur Gegenwart. Nous-Verlag der Kunsthandlung Heck, Reutlingen 1999, ISBN 3-924249-26-1.

Weblinks

 Wilhelm Maybach
 Arndt Brunnert: 29.12.1929 - Todestag des Autopioniers Wilhelm Maybach WDR ZeitZeichen vom 29. Dezember 2014. (Podcast)

Einzelnachweise

Maybach
Automobilpionier
Erfinder
Daimler-Motoren-Gesellschaft
Unternehmer (Automobilbau)
Unternehmer (Württemberg)
Ehrendoktor der Universität Stuttgart
Unternehmer (Stuttgart)
Person (Reutlingen)
Person (Deutz AG)
Person (Heilbronn)
Württemberger
Deutscher
Geboren 1846
Gestorben 1929
Mann

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


These days, even small interactions with police officers can turn frightening very quickly, and Champaign residents who feel threatened by aggressive officers of the law may be compelled to resist or run away. Unfortunately, any action that can be viewed as a person trying to get away from or avoid a peace officer who is acting in an official capacity may be labeled as resisting arrest or obstructing justice by a prosecutor. If the accused's actions result in the injury or death of an officer, he or she may face inflated penalties.
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If any extenuating circumstances resulted in injury or additional charges, the conviction penalties would additionally reflect this. Anyone facing charges of resisting a peace officer in Champaign should contact an attorney who can quickly work to reduce or eliminate the accusations brought against you.
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text:
US- Venezuela Relations: A Case Study of Imperialism and Anti-Imperialism
By James Petras :: 10.05.2013
US relations with Venezuela illustrate the specific mechanisms with which an imperial power seeks to sustain client states and overthrow independent nationalist governments. By examining US strategic goals and its tactical measures, we can set forth several propositions about (1) the nature and instruments of imperial politics, (2) the shifting context and contingencies which influence the successes and failures of specific policies and (3) the importance of regional and global political alignments and priorities.
A comparative historical approach highlights the different policies, contexts and outcomes of imperial policies during two distinct Presidential periods: the ascendancy of neo-liberal client regimes (Perez and Caldera) of the late 1980's to 1998; and the rise and consolidation of a nationalist populist government under President Chavez (1999-2012).
During the 1980's and 1990's US successes in securing policies favorable to US economic and foreign policy interests under client rulership fixed, in the mind of Washington, the optimal and only acceptable model and criteria for responding (negatively) to the subsequent Chavez nationalist government.
US policy to Venezuela in the 1990's and its successes, were part and parcel of a general embrace of neo-liberal electoral regimes in Latin America. Washington and its allies in the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) promoted and supported regimes throughout Latin America which privatized and de-nationalized over five thousand public enterprises in the most lucrative economic sectors. These quasi-public monopolies included natural resources, energy, finance, trade, transport and telecommunications. Neo-liberal client regimes reversed 50 years of economic and social policy, concentrated wealth, deregulated the economy, and laid the basis for profound crises, which discredited neo-liberalism. Continent-wide popular uprisings and regime changes, led to nationalist populist governments.
The historical-comparative approach allows us to analyze Washington's response to the rise and demise of neo-liberal clients and the subsequent ascendency of populist-nationalism and how regional patterns and changes influence the capacity of an imperial power to intervene and attempt to re-establish its dominance.
The key to understanding the mode and means of imposing and sustaining imperial dominance is to recognize that Washington combines multiple forms of struggle, depending on resources, available collaborators, opportunities and contingencies.
In approaching client regimes, Washington combines military and economic aid to repress opposition and buttress economic allies by cushioning crises. Imperial propaganda via the mass media provide political legitimacy and diplomatic backing, especially when client regimes engage in gross human rights violations and high level corruption.
Conversely when attempting to weaken or overthrow a nationalist-populist regime, the empire will resort to multiple forms of attack including (1) corruption (buying off government backers) (2) funding and organizing opposition media, parties, business and trade union organizations, (3) organizing and backing disloyal military officials to violently overthrow the elected government (4) support employers' lockouts to paralyze strategic sectors of the economy (oil)(5) financing referendums and other 'legal mechanisms' to revoke democratic mandates, (6) promoting paramilitary groups to destabilize civil society and sow public insecurity and undermine agrarian reforms; (7) finance electoral parties and non-governmental organizations to compete in and delegitimize elections; (8) engage in diplomatic warfare and efforts to prejudice regional relations; (9) establish military bases in neighboring countries, as a platform for joint military invasions.
The multi-prong, multi-track policies occur in sequence or are combined, depending on the opportunities and results of earlier tactical outcomes. For example, while financing the electoral campaign of Capriles Radonski in April 2013, Washington also backed violent post-election assaults by rightist thugs attempting to destabilize the government.
Secretary of State Kerry while pursuing an apparent effort to re-open diplomatic relations via negotiations simultaneously backed a highly inflammatory declaration by Samantha Power, US United Nations representative, vowing aggressive intrusion in Venezuela's domestic politics.
US-Venezuelan relations provide us with a case study that illustrates how efforts to restore hegemonic politics can become an obstacle to the development of normal relations with an independent country. In particular, the ascendancy of Washington during the "Golden Age" of neoliberalism in the 1990's, established a fixed 'mind set', which was incapable of adapting to the changed circumstances, of the 2000's, a period witnessing the demise and discredit of 'free market' client politics. The rigidity derived from past success led Washington to pursue a 'restoration politics' under very unfavorable circumstances, involving military, clandestine and other illicit policies with very improbable possibilities of success.
The unfavorable outcome of US efforts to destabilize a democratically elected nationalist popular regime in Venezuela occurred when Washington was heavily engaged in multiple, prolonged wars and conflicts in several countries (Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Libya). This validates the hypothesis that even a global power is incapable of waging warfare in multiple locations at the same time.
Given the shift in world market conditions, including the increase in commodity prices, (especially energy), the relative economic decline of the US and rise of Asia, Washington lost a strategic economic lever – market power – in the 2000's, a resource which it possessed during the previous decade.
Given the shift in political power in the region, the rise of popular-nationalist governments in most of Latin America, Washington lost regional leverage to 'encircle', 'boycott' and intervene in Venezuela. Even among its few clients, like Colombia, Washington could do no more than create 'border tensions' rather than a joint military attack.
Comparative historical analysis of the strategic changes in international and regional politics, economies, markets and alignments provides a useful framework for interpreting US-Venezuelan relations, especially the successes of the 1990's and the failures of the 2000's.
US-Venezuela Patron-Client Relations 1960's -1998
During the 40 year period following the overthrow of the Dictator Perez Jimenez (1958) and prior to the election of President Hugo Chavez (1998) Venezuela's politics were marked with conformity to US political and economic interests on all strategic issues. Venezuelan regimes followed Washington's lead in ousting Cuba from the Organization of American States, breaking relations with Havana and promoting a hemispheric blockade. Caracas followed Washington's lead during the cold War, backed its counter-insurgency policies in Latin America. It opposed the democratic leftist regime in Chile under President Allende, the nationalist governments of Brazil (1961-64) and Peru (1967-73), Bolivia (1968-71) and Ecuador (in the 1970's). It supported the US invasions of the Dominican Republic, Panama and Grenada. Venezuela's nationalization of oil (1976) provided lucrative compensation and generous service contracts with US oil companies, a settlement far more generous than any comparable arrangement in the Middle East or Latin America.
During the decade from the late 1980's to 1998, Venezuela signed off on draconian International Monetary Fund programs, including privatizations of natural resources, devaluations and austerity programs which enriched the Multinational Corporation (MNC), emptied the Treasury and impoverished the majority of wage and salary earners. In foreign policy Venezuela aligned with the US, ignored new trade openings in Latin America and Asia and moved to re-privatize its oil, bauxite and other primary resources. President Perez was indicted in a massive corruption scandal. Implementation of a US-IMF austerity program led to a massive popular uprising and the massacre of over a thousand protestors. The subsequent Caldera regime presided over the triple scourge of triple digit inflation, 50% poverty rates and double digit unemployment.
Venezuela touched bottom at the peak of US hegemony in the region. The inverse relation was not casual, as Venezuela under Caldera followed austerity, open markets and US centered policies which undermined any public policies to revive the economy. Moreover, world market conditions were unfavorable, as oil prices were low and China was not yet a world market power.
US and the Rise of Chavez: 1998-2001
The US viewed the Venezuelan elections of 1998 as a continuation of the previous decade despite significant political signs of changes. The two parties, which dominated and alternated in power, the Christian Democratic COPEI, and the social democratic Democratic Action Party, were soundly defeated by a new political formation headed by a former military officer, Hugo Chavez, who led an armed uprising six years earlier and who had engaged in a massive grass roots campaign, attracting radicals, revolutionaries, opportunists and defectors from the two major parties.
Washington's successes over the previous decade, the entrenched ascendancy of neo-liberalism and the advance of a regional US free trade agreement blinded the Clinton regime from seeing (1) the economic crisis and discredit of the neo-liberal model; (2) the deepening social and economic polarization and hostility to the IMF-USA among broad sectors of the class structure; (3) the decay and discredit of its client political parties and regimes. Washington tended to write-off Chavez's promises of a new constitutional order and new "Bolivarian" foreign and domestic policies which included promises of nationalist-populist reforms, as typical Latin campaign rhetoric. The general thinking in the State Department was that Chavez was engaging in electoral demagogy and that he would "come to his senses" after taking office. Moreover Washington's Latin Americanists believed that the mix of traditional politicians and technocrats in his motley coalition would undermine any consequential push for leftist radical changes.
Hence Washington under Clinton did not adapt a hostile position during the first months of the Chavez government. The watchword among the Clintonites was "wait and see" and count on long-standing ties to the major business associations, friendly military officials, and corrupt trade union bosses and oil executives, to check or block any new radical initiatives emanating from Congress or the Executive. In other words Washington counted on using the permanent state apparatus to counter the electoral regime.
Chavez recognized the institutional obstacles to nationalist socio-economic reforms and immediately called for constitutional changes, convoked elections for a constituent assembly, which he won handily. Washington's growing concerns over the possible consequences of new elections were tempered by two factors: (1) the mixed composition of the elected assembly (old line politicians, moderate leftists, radicals and 'unknowns'); (2) the 'moderate' appointments to the Central Bank and the orthodox economic policies pursued by the finance and economic ministry. Prudent budgets, fiscal deficits and balance of payments were at the top of the agenda.
The new constitution, included clauses favoring a radical social and nationalist agenda, and led to the defection of some of the more conservative early supporters aligned with Washington which in turn signaled the first overt signs of US opposition. Veteran State Department officials debated whether the new radical constitution would form the bases of a leftist government or whether it was standard symbolic fare, rhetorical flourishes to be heavily discounted, merely symbolic changes by a populist president to satisfy the Latin temperament in hard times but not likely to be followed by substantive reforms. The hard liners linked to the exile Cuba lobby argued that Chavez was a "closet" radical, who was preparing the way for more radical 'communist' measures. In fact Chavez policies were both moderate and radical. His political zig-zags, reflected his efforts to navigate a moderate reform agenda without alienating the US and the business community on the one hand, and on the other hand he sought to retain and respond to his mass base among the impoverished slum dwellers (rancheros') who voted for him.
Strategically Chavez succeeded in creating a strong political institutional base in the legislature, civil administration and military which could (or would) approve and implement his national-populist agenda. Unlike Chilean Socialist President Allende, Chavez first consolidated his political and military base and then proceeded to socio-economic changes.
By the end of 2000, Washington moved to regroup its internal client political forces into a formidable political opposition. Chavez was too independent, not easily controlled, and most important moving in the "wrong direction", away from a blind embrace of neo-liberalism and US centered regional integration. In other words while Chavez was still well within the parameters of US hegemony, the direction he was taking portended a possible break.
The Turning Point: Chavez Defies the 'War on Terror' 2000-2001
The decade beginning the new millennium was a tumultuous period which played a major role in defining US-Venezuelan relations. Several inter-related events polarized the hemisphere, weakened Washington's influence, undermined collaborator client regimes and led to a major confrontation with Venezuela.
First, the neo-liberal model fell into deep crises throughout the region; discrediting the US backed clients in Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, Brazil and elsewhere. Secondly, repeated major popular uprisings occurred during the crises and populist-nationalist politicians came to power, rejecting US-IMF tutelage and US centered regional trade agreements. Thirdly, Washington launched a global "war on terror", essentially an offensive military strategy, designed to overthrow adversaries to US domination and Israeli supremacy in the Middle East. In Latin America, Washington's launch of the "war on terror" occurred precisely at the high point of crises and popular rebellion, undermining any regional support. Fourthly, beginning in 2003, commodity prices skyrocketed, as China's economy took off, creating lucrative markets stimulating high growth for the new left of center regimes.
In this vortex of change, President Chavez rejected Washington's "War on Terror", arguing against "fighting terror with terror". By the end of 2001, Washington dispatched a top State Department official, Marc Grossman, to Caracas where he bluntly threatened dire reprisals – thinly veiled destabilization measures – if Caracas failed to fall-in with Washington's attempt to reimpose global hegemony. Chavez dismissed Grossman and realigned with the emerging Latin American nationalist populist consensus. In other words Washington's aggressive militarist posture polarized relations, increased tensions and, to a degree, radicalized Venezuela's foreign policy.
Washington's interventionary machinery went into high gear: Ambassador Shapiro held several meetings with FEDECAMARAS (the business association) and the trade union bosses of the CTV. The Pentagon and the Southern Command met with client military officials. The State Department increased contacts and funding for opposition NGO's and right-wing street gangs. The date of the coup was set for April 11, 2002. Meanwhile, the Chavez government began to assess its resources. Loyalist military groups especially in the armored battalions and paratroops were contacted.
Local neighborhood committees emerged and set out to mobilize the poor around a more radical social agenda and to defend the government, as the US backed opposition escalated street fighting. The coup was welcomed and openly supported by Washington and its semi-official mouthpiece the New York Times, and the rightwing Spanish Prime Minister Aznar. The illicit regime moved quickly to arrest President Chavez, dismiss Congress, dissolve political parties and declare a state of emergency. The masses and leading sectors of the military quickly and massively responded: millions of poor Venezuelans descended from the ranchos and amassed before Miraflores, the Presidential Palace, demanding the return of their elected President and repudiating the coup. The constitutionalist military led by an elite paratroop battalion threatened a full scale military assault. The coup makers, politically isolated and militarily outgunned, surrendered. Chavez returned to power. The US policy of regime change to restore hegemony was defeated; important assets were forced into exile and purged from the military. Washington played a risky card and lost on several fronts. First of all US support for the coup, strengthened the Bolivarian anti-imperialist sectors of Chavez's movement. Chavez discarded illusions of "reaching an accommodation" with Washington. Secondly, the loss of key military assets weakened the possibility of Washington launching a future coup. Thirdly, the complicity of the business groups weakened their role in influencing Chavez's economic policies, forcing him toward a more statist economic strategy. Fourthly, the mass mobilization of the poor to restore democracy pressured the government to increase social spending on welfare programs. Anti-imperialism, social welfare and national security concerns led Chavez toward strategic ties with Cuba, as a natural ally.
Washington's escalation of aggression and overt commitment to regime change altered the entire relationship to one of permanent hostility. Spurred on by its backing of a failed coup, Washington resorted once again to 'direct action', backing a "boss's lockout" of the strategic oil industry led by "client assets" among the executives and sectors of the petroleum workers union.
Washington put into practice in Venezuela the global militarization of US foreign policy. Under the subterfuge "War on Terror" formula for global intervention, (which included the invasion of Afghanistan, 2001) and later the war against Iraq (2003) imperial policymakers plunged ahead with new aggressive policies.
The pretext for aggression against Venezuela was not directly linked to oil or Chavez's appeal for Latin American integration. The trigger was Chavez's rejection of Bush's world view of global empire conquered by force of arms and sustained by collaborator vassal states. The oil conflicts – Chavez nationalization of US oil concessions and his appeal for regional integration excluding the US and Canada, were a result of and in response to US overt aggression. Prior to the US backed April 2002 coup and the oil-executives lockout of December 2002 – February 2003, there were no major conflicts between Chavez and US petroleum companies; Chavez's conception of Bolivarian unity of all Latin American states was a "vision" not a concrete program for action. Chavez's takeover of US oil concessions was a defensive political move to eliminate a political adversary controlling the strategic export and revenue sectors. He did not intervene against European oil companies. Likewise, Chavez's move to promote regional organizations flowed from his perception that Venezuela required closer ties and supportive relations in Latin America to counter US imperial aggression.
In other words US empire builders used (and sacrificed) economic assets to restore hegemony via military means. The military and strategic dimensions of the US Empire took precedence over Big Oil. A pattern evident in all of its subsequent imperial endeavors in Iraq, Libya and Syria and its severe economic sanctions against Iran. The same hegemonic priorities were evident in Washington's intervention in Venezuela.
Contrary to some theorists of imperialism, who argue that imperialism expands via economic "dispossession", recent history of US Venezuela relations demonstrates that 21st century US imperialism grows via political intervention, military coups and by converting economic collaborators into political agents willing to sacrifice corporate wealth to secure imperial military-political domination.
The decision by imperial policymakers to overthrow Chavez was based on his opposition to Washington's global military strategy. The White House thought it had strong assets in Venezuela: the mass media, two major opposition parties, the principle business federation (FEDECAMARAS), the official trade union bureaucracy, sectors of the military and the church hierarchy … Washington did not count on the unorganized masses and popular movements with powerful loyalty and affection for President Chavez. Nor did imperial strategists recognize that strategic military units like the paratroops retained national, personal and political ties with the democratically elected President.
The rapid restoration of Chavez to power (48 hours) was the first blow to Washington's restorationist pretentions. The second was the defeat of the US backed oil executives lockout. Washington counted on its close ties with the senior executives of the state oil company (PDVS) and the heads of the oil workers union. Washington failed to take account of the minority of executives and close to half of the oil workers who opposed the lockout and the fact that Latin American oil producers would supply Chavez and break the lockout.
The twin defeats, the military-business coup and the bosses' lockout had a profound impact on US-Venezuelan relations. The US lost strategic internal assets – business and trade union elites fled to exile or resigned. Pro-US oil executives were replaced by nationalists. Moreover, Washington's direct imperial intervention radicalized the Chavez government, which moved decisively from conciliation to confrontation and opposition. Venezuela adapted to the new active radical mood of the country by launching a nationalist, populist agenda and actively promoting Latin American integration. Venezuela launched UNASUR, ALBA, PetroCaribe and scuttled a US centered free trade treaty.
The loss of key assets undermined Washington's direct action military strategy. The White House turned to is remaining political and social assets channeling funds to the electoral parties and especially to so-called non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Washington via the National Endowment for Democracy and other "front groups" bankrolled a recall referendum which was decisively defeated, demoralizing the right-wing electorate and weakening remaining US assets.
Having lost on the military, economic and electoral front, Washington sought to delegitimize the government by boycotting Congressional elections, leading to the final debacle. Pro-Chavez parties swept the election, gained an overwhelming majority, and proceeded to approve all of the government's nationalist-social reform agenda. The US backed opposition lost all institutional leverage.
The US imperial failures between 2002-2005 did not merely reflect mistaken policies but had a deeper cause: the incapacity to make a proper estimate of the correlation of forces. This strategic failure led it to continue to throw its shrinking domestic assets into conflict with less resources and backing. Despite repeated defeats, Washington failed to realize that popular power and nationalist allegiances within the military could successfully counter US business-military intervention. Political hubris informed by military-driven imperialist ideology blinded Washington to the on-the ground realities that Chavez possessed popular support and was backed by nationalist military officers. Acting under increasingly unfavorable conditions, but desperate for some political 'victory', Washington plunged from one adventure to another, without reflecting on lost assets or declining opportunities. It failed to take account of decisive political shifts in Latin America and favorable conditions in the world economy for petrol exporters. To support a recall referendum in the face of double-digit growth, a radicalized mass public and booming commodity prices, was the height of imperial imbecility.
Imperial Policy During the Commodity Boom 2004-2008
With virtual no active assets of consequence, Washington turned toward an 'external strategy' linked to its only loyal collaborator, the death squad narco-President Alvaro Uribe of Colombia. Washington secured seven military bases, airfields, Special Forces missions and a platform for cross border intrusions. The strategy was to launch a joint intervention based on the pretext of Venezuelan links to the FARC guerillas.
However, full scale imperial warfare in Iraq, a prolonged war in Afghanistan, threatened conflicts with Iran, low intensity warfare in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan, weakened Washington's capacity to engage in a new prolonged war in Venezuela. US intervention would be opposed by every country in the region. Colombia was not willing to go it alone especially with a full-scale guerrilla war internally.
Because of Venezuela's trade surplus and high export revenues traditional Washington financial levers like the IMF and World Bank were inoperative. Likewise Venezuela signed multi-billion dollar military trade agreements with Russia, undermining a US arms sales boycott. Trade agreements with Brazil and Argentina lessened Venezuela's dependence on US food imports.
All non-US MNC in the petroleum sector continued operations, ignoring the conflicts with US companies. The government's selective nationalization program and moderate increases in taxes and royalty payments weakened EU support for the US, given the high price of oil (exceeding $100 dollars a barrel). Chavez's left-turn was well funded. The massive allocation of oil revenues for a wide-range of social programs, ranging from subsidized food, housing and welfare, and free health and educational programs, led to the massive reduction of poverty and unemployment and secured an electoral majority. Washington's "pivot to the Middle East" led to the US becoming bogged down in a series of prolonged wars, eroding Washington's quest for regional power.
More significantly, the State Department and Pentagon's Latin Americanists remained tied to the 1990's paradigm of free markets and vassal states at a time when the most important countries in the region were moving toward greater independence in trade, greater intra-regional integration and social inclusion. Unable to adapt to the new regional realities, Washington witnessed the region's rejection of US centered free trade accords. China displaced, the US as the regions' main trading partner. The loss of collaborator military elites as coup-makers for empire, further eroded imperial reach. Coup efforts in Bolivia and Ecuador failed and radicalized political relations toward the US.
However, Washington was not without partners: bilateral trade agreements were signed with Chile, Panama, Colombia and Mexico. The Pentagon engineered a coup in Honduras. The National Security Agency engaged in major cyber spying operations in Brazil, Mexico and the rest of the continent. The White House poured over six billions into Colombia's armed forces as a proxy for the US military. These "gains" had little impact. US support for the Honduran military coup displaced a Venezuelan ally in ALBA but led to Washington's diplomatic isolation and discredit throughout Latin America. Even Colombia, its closest client, opposed the coup. US military support for Colombia temporarily contributed to border tensions with Venezuela but with the election of a new President (Santos), Colombia moved toward reconciliation and peaceful coexistence with Venezuela. Under President Uribe trade fell to less than $2 billion; with Santos' conciliatory policy it rose to nearly $10 billion.
Washington's external strategy was in shambles. Cyber spying by the NSA was exposed by Edward Snowden and resulted in greater animosity toward Washington, especially from Brazil, which cancelled a White House visit and allocated $10 billion to fund a nationally controlled IT system. Imperial policy makers relied exclusively on interventionist strategies which depended on military-intelligence operations, an approach which was out of touch with the new configuration of power in Latin America. In contrast, Venezuela deepened its economic ties with the new regional and global economic power centers, as the foundations for its independent policies.
Chavez and President Maduro's regional strategy was seen in Washington as a security threat rather than an economic challenge to US hegemony. Venezuela's success in promoting bilateral ties, even with US clients like Colombia and Mexico, and several English-speaking Caribbean islands, undermined efforts to 'encircle and isolate' Venezuela. Caracas success in financing and backing multi-lateral regional economic and political organizations – that exclude the US– in South America and the Caribbean reflects the power of oil diplomacy over saber rattling. Venezuela's promotion of PetroCaribe, aligned a number of neo-liberal and center-left regimes in the Carribbean, previously under US hegemony, with Venezuela. In exchange for subsidized oil prices, medical aid and interest free loans, they rejected US intrusions. ALBA brought together several center-left governments, including Bolivia, Ecuador and Nicaragua into a common political bloc opposing US interventionism.
ALBA firmly rejected coups in Latin America and Washington's overseas wars in Libya, Syria and elsewhere. Venezuela successfully joined the powerful economic bloc, MERCOSUR, enhancing its trade with Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. Venezuela's strategic alliance with Cuba (oil for medical aid) enormously improved Caracas capacity to implement its free health program, an important welfare reform which solidified Chavez and Maduros' electoral base among the poor and undermined Washington's funding of NGO "grassroots" subversion in poor neighborhoods. Venezuela successfully undercut Bush and Obama's efforts to use Colombia as a "military proxy" through a historic peace and reconciliation agreement with President Santos. Colombia agreed to end its cross-border paramilitary and military incursions and support for US destabilization operations in exchange for Venezuela closing guerrilla sanctuaries, reopening trade relations and encouraging the FARC to enter into peace negotiations with the Santos regime. Santos' embrace of Venezuela's trade and diplomatic ties, eroded Washington's 'outside military strategy' and forced imperial policy-makers to emphasize relying on internal clients engaged in electoral politics and 'direct action' (sabotage of electoral power grids, hoarding of essential foodstuff).
While Washington's imperial rhetoric emphasizes Venezuela as a "security threat" to the Hemisphere, no other country subscribes to that doctrine. Latin America sees Caracas as a partner in integration and a lucrative market. Moreover, US diplomacy does not follow trade: only Mexico is more dependent on the US oil market than Venezuela. Venezuela's dependence on the US market for oil is in the process of changing. In 2013 Venezuela signed off on a $20 billion dollar investment and trade deal with China to exploit "heavy oil" in the Orinoco Basin. Venezuela's trade ties to the US contrast with the hostile diplomatic relations which have led to the mutual withdrawal of ambassadors and continuing US gross interference in Venezuela's electoral process. For example in March 2013, two US military attaches were expelled for attempting to recruit Venezuelan military officials. Later the same year in September, three Embassy officials were expelled for plotting destabilization activity with members of the far right opposition.
Imperialism's Multi-Track Opposition
US hostility toward Venezuela is based on three levels of conflict. At the country-level, Venezuela marks out a new development paradigm which features public ownership over the free market, social welfare over multi-national oil profits, and popular power over elite rule. At the regional level, Venezuela promotes Latin American integration over US centered Latin American Free Trade Agreements; anti-imperialism over "pan-Americanism"; foreign aid based on reciprocal economic interests; and non-intervention as opposed to US military pacts, narco-military intrusions and military bases.
At the global-level Venezuela has rejected the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, ignored US trade sanctions toward Iran, opposed Washington and NATO's bombing of Libya and proxy invasion of Syria. Venezuela condemns Israeli colonization and annexation of Palestine. In other words Venezuela upholds national self-determination against US military driven imperialism.
Chavez and Maduro pose a successful alternative to neo-liberalism. Venezuela demonstrates that a highly globalized, trade dependent economy is compatible with an advanced welfare program. The US, on the other hand, as it "globalizes", is eliminating welfare programs to finance imperial wars. Venezuela is telling the US public that a market economy and large social welfare budget are not incompatible. This paradigm conflicts with the message from the White House. Moreover, US Empire builders have no economic initiatives to counter Venezuela's regional and global alliances. Unlike the 1960's when President Kennedy proposed the "Alliance for Progress" involving trade, aid and reforms to counter the revolutionary appeal of the Cuban revolution. In contrast Bush and Obama "offer" costly military and police co-operation and warmed over neo-liberal clichés accompanied by market constraints.
Despite severe diplomatic setbacks, regional isolation, the loss of a military platform, and a commodity driven economic boom in Venezuela, Washington persisted in its efforts to destabilize Venezuela. Beginning in 2007, imperial strategy re-focused on electoral processes and destabilization. The first success was the defeat by less than 1% of Chavez constitutional amendments in December 2007 right after a substantial Presidential victory. Apparently the overtly socialist constitution was too radical for a sector of the Venezuelan electorate.
From 2008 onward Washington pumped large sums into a variety of political assets including NGOs and middle class university students' organizations engaged in agitation and street demonstrations. The goal was to exploit local grievances. US funding of proxies promoted extra-parliamentary, destabilization activity, disrupting the economy while blaming the government for public insecurity and covering up opposition violence.
Business owners were encouraged to engage in hoarding in order to provoke shortages and popular discontent; the media blamed state "inefficiency". Opposition political parties received financial backing, on condition that they unified and ran on a single slate in contesting elections and questioned the legitimacy of elections (claiming 'fraud') after their defeat.
In summary US efforts to restore hegemony relied on surrogates, which ran the gamut from violent paramilitary groups, NGO's, political parties, elected officials and manufacturing and commercial executives, linked to the production and distribution of essential consumer goods.
Washington's shifts in policies, from internal violence (coup of 2002, oil lockout of 2002-03), and external military threats (2004-2006), to a return to internal electoral politics and business destabilization campaigns reflects attempts to overcome failed policies without surrendering the strategic objective of restoring hegemony via overthrowing the elected government ("regime change" in the imperial lexicon).
Seven Keys to Imperial Politics: An Overview
Washington's decade and a half efforts to restore hegemony and reimpose a client regime revolve around imperial capacities to secure seven strategic goals.
1) Imperial capacity to successfully overthrow a nationalist government revolves around possessing a unified client military command. Chavez ensured that he retained loyal strategic military sectors able to counter the imperial proxies.
2) Imperial capacity to militarily intervene depends on not being tied down in ongoing serial wars and on securing regional partners willing to jointly engage. Neither condition was present. US imperial policy concentrated its military forces in the Middle East and South Asia, in prolonged wars which created public antipathy to launching another war in Venezuela. The attempt to convert Colombia into an active ally in war failed because of the economic trade losses incurred by the Colombian business elite in the run-up to border skirmishes. Washington offered little or nothing in economic compensation or alternative markets for Colombian exporters since most of US "aid" (Plan Colombia) involved military transfers and sales.
3) The imperial destabilization campaign ran through strategic assets because of premature, ill-calculated and high risk operations in which one failure led to even higher risk interventions in an effort to cover-up a bankrupt strategy. The US backed coup of 2002 was clearly based on poor intelligence and underestimation of President Chavez's support. Washington failed to appreciate Chavez's astute institutional changes, in particular the promotion of loyalist sectors of the armed forces. Blinded by ideological blinders, Washington counted on its business allies and trade union bureaucrats to "turn-out the crowds" to back the junta and provide a legal cover. In the face of serious losses resulting from the subsequent purging of client elites in the military and business associations, Washington unleashed its client oil executives and trade union officials to mount an oil lockout, which lacked backing among the loyalist military. Over time the shutdown of oil production and delivery, alienated wide swathes of the business community and consumers, suffering from the absence of transport and distribution of commodities. The defeat of the oil lockout resulted in the purge of over ten thousand US clients among senior and middle management and the reorientation of the PDVSA (the state oil company) into a formidable political instrument funding Venezuela's comprehensive social welfare programs.
Increases in social spending in turn provided a powerful boost in Chavez's electoral support and consolidated his mass base among the vast majority of the poor. Imperial strategists then converted their extra-parliamentary defeats into an electoral rout by launching a referendum in the face of the Chavez offensive and suffered a decisive and demoralizing defeat. To make a virtue of multiple disasters, Washington backed a boycott of Congressional elections which resulted in near unanimous Chavista control of Congress and a mandate to legally approved Chavez executive prerogatives. Chavez used executive decrees to promote an anti-imperialist foreign policy without even minimum opposition.
4) Imperial 'neo-liberal' and 'war on terror' ideological warfare was launched in Latin America against Venezuela (2001 onward) at the precise moment of widespread revolts, uprisings and client regime changes throughout the region. The continental rebellion against US centered free-market regimes, resonated with Chavez's nationalist-populism. As a result Washington's ideological appeals fell on arid soil. The dogmatic embrace of a failed development strategy and the continued embrace of hated clients ensured that Washington's ideological war against Venezuela would boomerang: instead of isolating and encircling Venezuela, it led to greater Latin American regional solidarity and the isolation of the US. Instead of dumping discredited clients and attempting to adapt to the changing anti-neo-liberal climate, Washington, for internal reasons (the ascent of Wall Street), persisted in pursuing a self-defeating propaganda war.
5) Imperial efforts at the restoration of hegemony required an economic crises, including low world market prices and weak demand for commodities, declining incomes and employment, severe balance of payment problems and fiscal deficits to provide leverage to destabilize targeted regimes. None of these conditions were present in Venezuela. On the contrary commodity demand and prices boomed. Venezuela grew by double-digits. Unemployment and poverty sharply declined. Easy and available consumer credit and increased public spending greatly expanded the domestic market. Free health and education and public housing programs grew exponentially. In other words global macro-economic and local social conditions favored the anti-hegemonic perspectives of the government. US and clients' efforts to demonize Chavez failed. Instead of embracing popular programs and focusing on problems of implementation and mismanagement, Washington embraced local political clients associated with the deep socio-economic crises of the 'lost decade' (1989-1999) prior to Chavez assent to power. Imperial critics in Latin America easily refuted Washington's attacks on the Chavez development model by citing favorable employment, income, purchasing power and living standards compared to the previous neoliberal period
6) Imperial policy makers emphasized global ideological-military confrontation at a moment when leaders and public opinion in Latin America were thinking and pursuing market opportunities. The "War on Terror", Washington's hobby horse for global supremacy, had minimum support; China's demand for Latin America commodities led to the Asian country displacing the US as the major market for Latin exports. Global militarism was not conducive to restoring hegemony when the Latin consensus pivoted around markets, poverty reduction, democracy and citizen participation. During past decades US global militarism resonated in Latin America when it was ruled by military regimes. Washington's attempt to resort to the earlier period of military rule by backing a military coup in Honduras was soundly denounced throughout the continent, not only by center-left governments but even by conservative civilian regimes, fearful of a return to military rule at their expense.
7) The change from a Republican to a Democratic regime in Washington, did not result in any substantive change in imperial policy toward Venezuela or Latin America. It only led to the entrée of the "double discourse". Obama spoke of a "new beginning", 'new overtures' and 'shared values'. In practice Washington proceeded to military provocations from its bases in Colombia, backed the Honduras military coup, supported a violent destabilization campaign in April 2013 following the defeat of its Presidential candidate Henrique Capriles Radonski by the Chavista, Nicholas Maduro. The Obama regime was the only one in the hemisphere (and the OECD) which failed to recognize the legitimacy of the Presidential election results. Political changes in imperial countries, from a liberal to a conservative president (or vice versa), does not in any way affect the deep imperial state, its military interests or strategies. President Obama's resort to the double discourse, to talk diplomatically and act militarily, as a mode of hegemonic rule, quickly lost its attraction and effectiveness even among centrist-post-neo-liberal leaders.
Imperialism is not simply a 'policy' it is a structure, with a powerful military aid financial component which depends on strategically placed collaborators and supporters in targeted countries, operating in favorable (crises ridden) environments. Imperialism flourishes when its military and diplomatic approach serves economic interests which benefit the 'home market' and rewards local collaborators. In the second decade of the 21st century, the predominance of 'military driven imperialism' bleeds the home economy, impoverishes the targeted society and depresses living standards. Destructive wars even weaken client elites.
Latin American and Venezuelan development oriented leaders look elsewhere, to newly emerging economic powers with growing markets. They pursue economic ties which are not accompanied by military and security threats of intervention. Chinese investments are not accompanied by military missions and massive spy networks like the CIA, DEA and NSA posing armed threats to national sovereignty.
The Imperial Dynamic and the Radicalization of Venezuelan Politics
Imperial intervention can have multiple and contrasting effects. It can intimidate a nationalist government and force it to renege on its electoral promises and revert to a liberal agenda. It can lead to an accommodation to imperial foreign policies and force a progressive government to moderate domestic reforms. It can lead to concessions to imperial interests, including military bases, concessions to extractive capital including the dispossession of local producers to facilitate capital accumulation. Covert or overt intervention can also radicalize a moderate reformist government and force it to adopt anti-imperialist and socialist measures as defensive strategy. Over time incremental changes can become the bases for a pro-active radical leftist agenda.
The range of systemic responses illustrates the analytical weakness of the so-called "center-periphery" framework, which lumps together (a) disparate political, social and economic internal configurations, (b) opposing strategies and responses to imperialism and (c) complex international relations between imperial and nationalist regimes. The polar opposite responses and political-economic configurations of the US and China (so-called "centers") to Venezuela further illustrates the lack of analytical utility of the so called "world system" approach in comparison with a class anchored framework.
The imperial dynamic, the drive by Washington to reassert hegemony in Venezuela by overthrowing the nationalist regime, had the unintended consequence of radicalizing its policies, consolidating its power and furthering the spread of anti—imperialist programs throughout the region. In the first years of the Chavez government, roughly between 1999-2001, Venezuela pursued largely orthodox policies, friendly relations with Washington, while espousing a Bolivarian vision. In practice Chavez did not put into practice his vision, nor provide any resources to fund a regional organization that excluded the US.
Washington, at this time, retained ties to its clients in the opposition. It sought to influence a motley collection of opportunist politicos who jumped on the Chavez bandwagon, to counter the left political sectors of the coalition government.
The first break in peaceful co-existence was precipitated by Washington's big push for global power via the so-called "War on Terror" doctrine. Its ultimatum that Chavez support its military offensives targeting Afghanistan and Iraq or face retaliation provoked the break. Chavez resisted and adopted the position that the "War on Terror" violates international law. In other words, Venezuela upheld traditional international norms at a moment of Washington's embrace of global military extremism. Washington perceived Chavez's policy as setting an example or precedent for other "recalcitrant" states within Latin America and across the globe. As a result beginning with an overt State Department warning that "he (Chavez) would pay a price" for not submitting to the US global military offensive, Washington rapidly proceeded to put into operation plans to overthrow the 'government via the coup of April 2002. If the trigger to US imperial intervention was Chavez lawful opposition to the global military strategy, the defeat of the coup and his restoration to power, led a redefinition of Venezuelan-US relations. Bilateral relations went from co-existence to confrontation. Venezuela began the search for regional allies, actively supporting left and nationalist movements and governments in Latin America. Simultaneously it pursued relations with imperial rivals and adversaries including Russia, China, Belarus and Iran.
Washington launched a second effort to unseat Chavez by backing the oil executives lockout – severely damaging the lifeblood of the economy. The defeat and purge of the US backed PDVS oil executives, led to the radicalization of social policy – vast reallocation of oil revenues to working class based social programs. Chavez appointed nationalists to key economic ministries selectively nationalized some enterprises and decreed a radical agrarian reform involving the expropriation of fallow landholdings. In part the radical policies were 'pragmatic', defensive measures in pursuit of national security. They also were a positive response (payback for support) to the newly mobilized urban and rural poor. Radicalization was also a response to pressure from the nationalist and socialist sectors of the newly formed Socialist Party and trade union confederations. US imperial efforts to isolate Venezuela in the Hemisphere, in the same fashion that it accomplished this policy with regard to Cuba in the 1960's failed. The region was moving in line with Venezuela: nationalist populist and leftist movements and electoral alliances were replacing US client regimes. Washington's policy backfired by regionalizing the conflict under unfavorable conditions, Venezuela gained popularity and support while Washington exposed its isolation and witnessed the demise of its effort to secure a regional free trade agreement.
The threat from the US pushed Chavez to redefine the nature of the political process from 'reform' to 'revolution'; from moderate nationalism to 21st century socialism; from a bilateral conflict to a regional confrontation. Venezuela sponsored and promoted several key alliances including ALBA and PetroCaribe; Chavez later broadened Venezuela's regional ties to include UNASUR and MERCOSUR.
Venezuela's radical rejection of US hegemony was, however, tempered by structural limitations which provided US empire builders and internal clients with access points to power. The 'socialization' program did not affect 80% of the economy. Banking, foreign trade, manufacturing and agriculture remained under private ownership. Over 80% of the mass media remained in the hands of US backed private owners. Transport, food distributors and supermarkets remained privately owned. Electoral processes remained vulnerable to foreign funding by the National Endowment for Democracy and other US conduits. While the mixed economy and open electoral system, secured approval from Latin America's center-left regimes and neutralized hostile US propaganda, they also allowed the empire through its clients to engage in sabotage and hoarding of vital consumer goods, violent electoral confrontations and permitted the mass media to issue open calls for insurrectionist activity.
The dialectic confrontation between US imperial aggression and Venezuelan nationalism deepened the revolution and spread its appeal overseas. Venezuela's successful defiance of US imperialism became the defining reality in Latin America.
Imperialism based on militarism and regime destabilization led Venezuela to begin a process of transition to a post neo-liberal, post capitalist economy rooted in regional organizations. Yet this process continued to reflect economic realities from the capitalist past. The US remained Venezuela's most important petroleum market. The US, caught up in Middle-East wars and sanctions against oil producers (Iraq, Iran, Libya and Syria) was not willing to jeopardize its Venezuelan petrol suppliers via a boycott. Necessity imposed constraints on imperial aggression and Venezuela's anti-imperialism.
US-Venezuela relations is a casebook study of the complex, structural and contingent dimensions of imperialism and anti-imperialism. Contemporary US empire building, with its global engagement in prolonged serial wars and deteriorating domestic economy, has witnessed a sharp decline in its capacity to intervene and restore hegemonic influence in Latin America. Latin America, in particular Venezuela's success in resisting imperial threats, demonstrates how much imperial power is contingent on local client regimes and collaborator military elites to sustain imperial hegemony. The entire process of imperial capital accumulation through direct exploitation and 'dispossession' is based on securing control over the state which in turn is contingent on defeating anti-imperialist and nationalist governments and movements. Imperialist hegemony can be based on either electoral processes ("democracy") or result from coups, lockouts and other anti-democratic, authoritarian mechanisms. While historically, economic interests are an important consideration of imperial policymakers, contemporary US imperialism has confronted emerging nationalist governments because of their rejection of "global war" ideology. In other words Venezuela's rejection of the ideology and practice of offensive wars and violations of international law is the trigger that set in motion imperial intervention. Subsequent conflicts between Washington and Caracas over petrol expropriations and compensation were derived from the larger conflict resulting from the practice of imperial militarism. US oil companies became economic pawns not the subjects of imperialist policymakers.
US imperialist relations to Latin America have changed dramatically in line with the internal changes in class relations. US financial and militarist elites, not industrial-manufacturers dictate policy. The relocation of US manufacturers to Asia and elsewhere is accompanied by the ascendancy of a power configuration whose political pivot is in the Middle East and in particular, in their own words, "securing Israeli superiority in the region". This has had two opposing effects: on the one hand it has led imperial policymakers to pursue non-economic military agendas in Latin 'America and on the other to "neglect" or allocate few resources, investments and attention to cultivating ties in Latin America. Inadvertently, the "mid-East pivot" and the militarist definition of reality has allowed Latin America to secure a far greater degree of independence and greater scope for cultivating diverse economic partners in the 21st century than was the case for the greater part of the 20th century.
Have US-Latin American relations permanently changed? Has Venezuela consolidated its independence and achieved the definitive defeat of imperial intervention? It would be premature to draw firm conclusions despite the substantial victories which have been achieved during the first decade and a half of the 21st century.
Pro-US regimes and elites still wield influence throughout Latin America. As was evident in the Presidential elections in Venezuela in April 2013, the US funded opposition candidate Henrique Capriles came within 2% of winning the election. And Washington, true to its destabilizing vocation, refused to recognize the legitimacy of the outcome. Since those elections, several members of the Embassy have been implicated in plots to overthrow the elected government. The ongoing intrusive imperial cyber spying system run by the US National Security Agency is a new element in colonial intervention reaching into the highest spheres of the political and economic systems of the entire region including Venezuela and Brazil the largest country in Latin America. On exposure, Washington affirmed its right to colonize and dominate Brazilian and Venezuelan cyber-space and control all communications between strategic elites.
Obama's affirmation of the "right to spy" prompted new anti-imperialist measures, including proposals to end ties to US based and controlled information networks. In other words new imperial methods of colonization based on new technologies trigger new anti-imperial responses, at least for independent states.
The anti-neoliberal governments in Latin America heading up the struggle against US hegemony, face serious challenges resulting from the continuing presence of private banking and finance groups, US based multi-nationals and their local collaborators in electoral parties. Except for Venezuela and Bolivia, on-going US-Latin American joint military programs provide opportunities for imperial penetration and recruitment.
The high dependence of Venezuela and the other center-left countries (Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, etc.) on commodity exports (agriculture, minerals and energy) subjects their finances, and development and social welfare programs to fluctuations and sharp downturns in revenues.
So far world demand for Latin commodities has fueled growth and independence and weakened domestic support for military coups. But can the mega-cycles continue for another decade? This is especially important for Venezuela which has not succeeded in diversifying its economy, oil accounting for over 80% of its export earnings. The China trade, which is growing geometrically, has been based on exports of raw materials and imports of finished goods. This reinforces neocolonial economic tendencies within Latin America.
Intra- Latin American trade (greater integration) is growing and internal markets are expanding. But without changes in class relations, domestic and regional consumer demand cannot become the motor force for a definitive break with imperialist dominated markets. In the face of a second world economic crisis, the US may be forced to lessen its global military incursions but will it return to hemispheric dominance? If commodity demand lessens and the Chinese economy slows, do the post-neoliberal regimes have alternative economic strategies to sustain their independence?
Imperial power in Latin America, and in Venezuela in particular, has suffered serious setbacks but the private property power structures are intact and imperial strategies remain. If the past half-century offers any lessons, it is that imperialism can adapt different political strategies but never surrenders its drive for political, military and economic domination.
Political Chronology of Venezuela
December 1998: Chavez elected
1999: Three referendums all successful: to establish constituent assembly to draft new constitution; to elect membership of constituent assembly; to approve new constitution.
July 2000: 'Mega-election': to elect President, national legislators and state and municipal officials. Chavez wins 6 year term with approx. 60% of the popular vote, his Patriotic Pole coalition wins 14 of 23 governorships and majority of seats in National Assembly
April 2002: Failed US backed military-civilian coup
December2, 2002 – Feb. 4, 2003: Failed oil executive and businessmen lockout to topple Chavez government.
August 2004: Recall referendum which Chavez wins by substantial margin
December 2005: Legislative elections: opposition boycotts, results in Chavez supporters dominating the National Assembly.
December 2006: Chavez re-elected with approx. 63% of the popular vote
December 2007: Chavez constitutional amendment package ('socialism in the 21st century') narrowly defeated in national referendum
2008: Chavez moves to unite supporters into a single party – the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV)
November 2008: State and municipal elections: pro-Chavez candidates won 17 of 22 governors' races and 80% of more than 300 mayoral races
January 2009: National Assembly votes to hold referendum on constitutional amendment to abolish terms limits for all elected government officials.
February 2009: Referendum approved 55% to 45%.
September 2010: National Assembly elections, Chavez supporters won 98 seats (94 for PSUV candidates) versus 87 seats for opposition parties (65 won by 10 opposition parties known as Democratic United Platform/MUD). But the Government failed to win enough seats to enact various part of government agenda such as approving constitutional reforms.
October 2012 Presidential elections: Chavez wins with approx. 55% of popular vote.
December 2012: State and municipal elections, PSUV sweeps to victory.
April 2013: Chavez successor Nicholas Maduro wins election by 51% to 49%.
October 6, 2013 - Posted by	aletho | Economics, Timeless or most popular	| Hugo Chávez, Inter-American Development Bank, James Petras, John Kerry, Latin America, United States, Venezuela, War on Terror

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


I am getting into the mood and dreaming of a sunny Xmas vacation!
Bertha is removable from the beach ball and can sit somewhere else.
This is a full hard Sculpture (including the beach ball), painted and sealed with varnish for protection.


text:
Courting Fame
WRITTEN BY RACHEL BURCHFIELD | PHOTOGRAPHED BY JOE WORTHEM
North Mississippi's high school basketball teams are on fire.
In the South, football is king. But in north Mississippi lately, another sport has taken center stage, or, rather, center court — basketball. North Mississippi high school basketball is booming, thanks to a recent spate of state championship appearances by a number of teams, both girls and boys, and through national recognition recently received by Arteria Clifton, coach of Okolona High School's boys' team. This year, with the 2019 championship tournament about to begin, many local teams are vying for first in their divisions. Take a look at a few stand-out teams' recent successes, and meet some of the student athletes who put forth extraordinary effort on the court.
COACH ARTERIA CLIFTON
Okolona High School
LAST SEASON:
Division 1A Okolona won the boys' basketball state championship tournament.
Okolona was arguably the best boys' basketball team in the state last season and the winner of the 1A state championship. For coach Arteria Clifton, the win was personal. Clifton is a product of the small town and has "nothing but love" for it, he said. In addition to coaching, he teaches eighth grade science and biology and coaches at the high school level. And he's good at what he does — so much so that USA Today took notice, naming him the state's boys basketball coach of the year.
"It's just a blessing," Clifton said. "There was a lot of hard work involved in that."
Clifton has been coaching since 2002, first at the junior high level, then at the high school level coaching girls, and now at the high school level coaching boys. His players would describe his coaching style as passionate, demanding, fair and consistent, Clifton said.
"I preach discipline and hard work," Clifton said. "I want to see kids thrive and hopefully play at the next level."
JAMAL MOORE & JACORIUS STANFIELD
Jamal Moore, 17, and Jacorius Stanfield, 19 — both seniors at Okolona — were part of last year's state championship winning team. Winning was an exciting moment, Jacorius said, and Jamal agreed. "It made me feel proud," Jamal said. "It's something not everyone can have. Not everyone has that chance." Jamal, a guard, said he fell in love with basketball in the first grade, and Jacorius, a front guard, said basketball has been a part of his life since his cousin introduced him to the game at age 10. "I just love playing," Jacorius said.
SIARRA JACKSON
Ripley High School
Ripley made it to the third round of the 4A girls' basketball state championship tournament.
Basketball is all in the family for Siarra Jackson, 16, a junior forward for Ripley High School. Her grandmother played in high school, and Siarra started playing when she was little. By the time she was a teenager, she had made the team. She averages an impressive 11 rebounds per game and was selected to play in the North South All Star game in March. The best part of the season? "Scoring," she said.
ANTHONY NICHOLS
Tupelo High School
Tupelo played in the first round of the 6A boys' basketball state championship tournament.
Senior Anthony Nichols, 17, plays small guard and power forward for Tupelo. He's been playing since he was 5, first on Little League and recreational teams, but in middle school, he didn't make the team. He got the last laugh, though — he's a standout now, averaging 10 points and seven rebounds per game. "Basketball relieves all stress," Anthony said. "Being on the court makes me happy."
GARA BETH SELF
Ingomar Attendance Center
In the 2A division, the Ingomar girls' team swept the tournament and took home a state championship victory.
For Gara Beth Self, 18, a senior front guard for Ingomar, basketball is in her blood. Her mom was a basketball player and she instilled it in her ever since she could walk. Now, she's carrying the game on to a new generation. "I like having little kids look up to me," Gara Beth said.
T.J. HANNAH
Saltillo High School
The Saltillo boys' team made it to the third round of the 5A state championship tournament.
As soon as he laid his hands on a basketball for the first time as a fifth grade student, T.J. Hannah fell in love with the sport. The 16-year-old junior is a forward for Saltillo High School, and he boasts rebounds in the double digits, a statistic he is proud of. "I just love the game," T.J. said.
CHE'MYA CAROUTHERS
The Tupelo girls' team also had a run at the state championship, making it to the third round of the 6A tournament.
Every time she steps on the court, Che'mya Carouthers, 18, a junior power forward for Tupelo, is working to improve. "I have a drive to want to be better every game," Che'mya said. But it's not just about personal goals — also important are her teammates, being a team player and "just being out there."
A Grand Tradition


The smart home automation industry constantly is changing.
Just as quickly as people are adopting smart home devices across the world, the industry is evolving and manufacturers are improving their technologies.
It means that as technology grows, you'll have more access to a wide range of home automation options that can improve and simplify your lifestyle.
Even if you already have a home automation system, most are scalable to allow you to add new devices.
Below, we explore three of the best new smart automation features you'll want to know about for your Los Angeles, CA home.


What is your biggest fear? What is the thing that keeps you up at night? Have you ever been so afraid that you became paralyzed, unable to respond to the situation in front of you? At some point or another, each of us grapples with fear. Sometimes it's the small stuff that we know we shouldn't sweat so much. Other times, our fear is so vivid - so real - that it can consume us, keeping from speaking and acting as we normally would.
In the season of Lent, we have an opportunity to search ourselves and the world around us. As we make our way from Ash Wednesday to Easter, we reflect on our fears, our struggles, and everything that keeps us from wholly embracing the great gift of resurrection offered to us in Jesus. God's grace is steady, constant, and abundant and yet there are seasons of life when God feels distant or it is difficult to accept that love. What stands in our way of being Easter people?
This week's reading from Scripture comes from Luke 13:31-35, an interaction between Jesus and the Pharisees. While many interpret the pharisees words differently in it, I hear advice that comes from fear. Have you ever spoken or acted not out of confidence but from fear? How do we as Christians live in the midst of our fear.


Greetings! In Episode 23 of the MBS Podcast, Greg and Andy discuss the big news about Warcradle purchasing US, DW, and FSA from the dearly departed Spartan Games. Next, they dig into the first ever MBS Faction Showcase, which is dedicated to the Fortune Hunters from DeepWars, by Antimatter Games. In the second segment Greg and Andy review the Naval Command ruleset, from Rory Crabb games.


Home / Featured / Hats for Headway 2014 – Competition Announcement!
Hats for Headway 2014 – Competition Announcement!
Friday 23rd May is Hats4Headway Day and you're all invited to take part regardless of whether you're in the office, at school or making your merry way round the Island.
Why not get sponsored for wearing your funny hat all day? Organise a 'Keep your hat on challenge'? If found not wearing your hat you get fined! Host a hat relay where you swap hats on the hour? Run a design a hat competition or give a prize for funniest hat or even organise a hat themed cake sale!
This year we will also be running a completion with 2 categories – adults and children's most fun hat (or hat themed cake!). Headway's very own craft group will be judging this year's entries and are looking for fun and original designs.
The prizes will be a cycle helmet of the winner's choice from the Headway Jersey Charity shop. As this year's Action for Brain Injury Awareness Week theme focuses on the fact that we are all at risk from brain injury we are keen to encourage islanders to reduce the risks. Wearing a helmet is a simple way we can all help to protect ourselves when out and about on the busy streets of Jersey.
Entering the competition couldn't be easier, simply create a hat or a hat themed cake, take a photo and upload it on to Facebook, Instagram or Twitter accompanied with #headwayjersey. Alternatively, you can simply add Headway Jersey on Facebook and link your photo to our page.
Extra point will be awarded if you get a photo of yourself with the Storm Troopers and add #stormtoopersjersey. The Stormtroopers support our campaign to wear protective head gear when taking part in sports and cycling. They will be stationed at Bean Around the World coffee shop in Halkett Street. We will also have a representative out in the west of the island… details to be announced!
So how can wearing a hat really make a difference! By wearing (or baking!) a hat you are helping to create awareness of brain injury as well as raising funds. There are many people in the Island who live their lives with a brain injury, as well as affecting the individual it also has a dramatic impact on families and carers. Headway Jersey, the brain injury charity, helps by providing support, information & services from the Headway Centre at La Coie. It is open 5 days a week and runs a minibus service to ensure those in need can access various services to help rehabilitate, develop life skills and prevent social isolation to its members.
For more information call 505937 or email [email protected].