Another long-time teacher dreams that on the first day of school, she's suddenly giving birth, without knowing that she was pregnant. Another dreams that she has to call up an administrator in the middle of the night to help her hide a dead body. Another suddenly realizes he has to take a final exam for a class he didn't know he had registered for — usually in German. Yet another faces down a never-ending sea of footwear, unable to choose what shoes to wear. The children have come and gone, and there are no shoes, and too many. What shoes? What shoes? How can we go on.
But wait. These are teachers. Grown adults. People who forged the path of their careers through many moons of Augusts and Septembers. Shouldn't their back-to-school dreams be filled with the nerdy pleasure of new textbooks and the satisfactory swipe of a juicy Expo marker across an impeccable whiteboard?
Of course not. Because the truth is, teachers are students who never, ever graduate. No matter how many times students grumble about the perverse pleasure teachers must take from assigning homework or giving tests, I assure you, any teacher worth her salt can still feel in her bones what it is like to be a student.
I was chewing chalk, which was odd, because my classroom doesn't even have a chalkboard. My mouth was full of it, but when I tried to spit it out, one of my teeth came with it — a molar, with a sharp, thin little root, so that it looked for all the world like a pushpin. The students were aghast. I was standing in front of the class, but I was suddenly struck with fear — I didn't want to be caught up there when the teacher came in.
Me, I've been teaching long enough to see kids I taught in 6th grade graduate and go off to college. I've seen students finish college and get internships with senators. I've seen weddings. I've seen funerals. I've seen students have children. Some day soon, I'll see students become teachers, too. It's only a matter of time.
Every year, I see high school seniors run the gambit of emotions as they make peace with their own burgeoning adulthood. I see them love and hate the school that raised them. I see them take ownership of that school, and then say goodbye to it, as if it will cease to exist without them.
And then, there is September.
And back we come, the teachers. Good old us.
The verb "to teach" has morphed quite a bit over time. The earlier usages were often directional — you could "teach" someone the door, or "teach" them the way to Scarborough Fair. In this way, it was a synonym for "show" or "point out," but it also carried the connotations of a process: to teach something was not just to identify it, but to guide, facilitate, to give complicit approval of someone else's arrival at that thing. If you "taught" someone the way to your heart, you were okay with them being there.
Real teaching has no room for threats, only consequences, and these can not be ambiguous. Healthy classrooms balance predictable structures with pathways of wonder. Good teachers ask questions that they can't answer — even if it is just "how did you figure that out?" or "why do you think that?" Good teachers wait for the answers. Good teachers teach towards something, but they're never quite sure how their students will decide to get there.
Often, the dreams are dreams of control: losing it, getting it, keeping it. Sometimes, the children light books on fire, they break windows, they laugh in your face. Sometimes, they bite each other, they draw on walls, they find pictures of you naked and email them to everyone they know. They pull the classroom carpet back to reveal trap doors with heavy metal locks and you say don't you dare unlock those locks and they do, anyway, and then the spider-zombies come. Sometimes, the students catch you crying in the custodial closet and they say don't worry, don't worry, do you want me to call your mom? Sometimes, you really wish they would.
If you want to be mean about it, you tell a high school teacher that they were an academic that didn't make it, and now they're a washed up nobody, a glorified babysitter who spends their days teaching ungrateful children how to do the things they failed to get "real" jobs doing, themselves.
And I'm sure there are some cases in which this is true, but those kind of teachers usually don't last long and they are rarely memorable. There may be as many bad teachers out there as there functional ones, and the really inspired ones may be few and far between. Trying to group all teachers into one category is like classifying all farmers, forensic analysts, new moms, and sanitation workers as People Who Deal With Poo. The craft and purpose behind the action seems to be critically important to the nature of your job description. Even the fact that we, as a society, have not come up with a more descriptive system of titling our teachers beyond basic subject matter is telling — we, as a whole, lack the ability to describe the how of teaching, so we fall back on the what: math, science, English, history.
And so we see to the heart of our nation's education crisis: teaching is seen as a simple skill set, not a craft. It is a thing you do to the children, not an art form that you cultivate with them. At times, it's even treated as a talent, or something intrinsic to your personality, like charisma or charm. We think good teachers are the likeable ones, or the ones who can command the attention of the class, or the ones who get you to score well on state tests.
Until we treat education as a career path, not a spiritual calling or a personality quirk, we will continue to struggle to distinguish between different kinds of teachers, and we'll be completely baffled as to how to evaluate their efficacy.
For me, there was Margaret, my elementary teacher, who didn't give a hoot about how well you organized your cubby, but who wouldn't let you off the hook when it came to sloppy thinking. Think what you think, and think it thoroughly, think it through to the end of the thought.
Then there was Mr. Lasser, the six foot tall pillar of integrity who scared the crap out of me not just because he could eviserate a snarky student with a single look, but because he would call me out on any fluffery that I could pass off on other teachers, and because he cared so damn much about the state of our young minds. I was one of his last students, ever — the year I graduated, he retired from a lifetime of teaching high school English. So we were a special class: his last chance to save the world. He pushed us harder than anyone. He brought us strawberries and powdered sugar to eat outside on the lawn in the spring. He told us, "a little soul searching is good for the soul, if not for the search." He taught me to write like myself, not like I thought a smart person might write. He taught me that I was a smart person.
Then there was a series of college professors — ones who coaxed and listened; ones who inspired and pounded and performed. Ones who fed me books and said, "I know, right?" when I was struck speechless by beauty. Then there were graduate professors, dear friends and mentors who taught me that to be a good poet you need to be a good person, and that being good doesn't always mean being good. There were teachers-on-fire who were so brilliant and damaged and full of love and hurt that I didn't know how long I could live in the crucible of their presence.
And then, there was me, being me, as a teacher. Teacher-me.
I think a lot about what my students think of me. Veteran teachers often tell new ones not to worry about such things — that it's not your job to make your students like you. But wanting them to like you, and thinking about what they think about you are two totally differernt things. And I hadn't ever met a teacher quite like me before, so I didn't know how to think about myself. I wasn't intimidating. I wasn't overly wise. I didn't have a ton of life experience. I often forget authors' names or titles of books or even whatever it was I was talking about before I got distracted by that kid who made a mobius strip out of a fruit roll-up and is proceeding to lick it round and round into infinity. I'm not particularly well-spoken or charasmatic — I grew up with an adorable speech impediment that still humbles me in moments of stress or fatigue. As a teacher, I experience a lot of stress, and fatigue.
The school principle has joined forces with Nevada's Cliven Bundy, who has convinced his heavily armed supporters to leave the land they haven't paid grazing fines on for twenty-five years and pick up the hobby of holding kidnapped people hostage inside the school building, which actually turns out to be a spaceship. So you, hero of your own dream, join the resistance movement and manage to escape the school-spaceship, at which point, you go to Whole Foods and buy some really, really gourmet produce. Would the kids like this $275 bottle of olive oil? Do we have the kitchenware to prepare this handcrafted designer pasta? And then you pack your supplies into recyclable brown paper bags and return to the spaceship, with the rest of the drones.
There was a time when you could say that "Grammar was taught him" — which, oddly enough, instead of being passive, actually put the power of the teaching into the hands of the subject (the grammar) instead of the teacher (who is noticeably missing from the sentence). Teach-ing, then, was an action that existed outside of the need for a teach-er. The verb "to teach" had its own agency, free of the teacher. Teaching could just teach, like rain can rain and shouts can shout. Grammatically, all it needed to drive it was its own objective: whatever was meant to be learned. In a way, then, the lesson itself takes on the power of the teaching. In the sentence "Grammar was taught him," look at the kind of verbs that you could substitute for "was taught" in order for it to make sense to our modern ear: grammar saw him, grammar recognized him, grammar loved him.
To teach is to make introductions, and hope for beautiful relationships.
Grammar slapped him, grammar bit him, grammar left him.
To teach is to be unable to make any promises about the nature of the relationship.
There are moments, few and far between, when I feel this: the teach-ness in the classroom, out of my hands, doing its work. There are days when writing is taught them, despite me, and damn if it's not awesome.
There is a black cat trapped in the Theater department. It holds a microchip with all my lesson plans. I must rescue it from the dark, windowless storage space below the stage, but I am afraid of getting caught — this place is Off Limits to all other teachers. I am doing something elicit. I have rallied several students to my cause! We have a dark sedan parked out back. We go in under the cover of night. The theater director is sleeping on a cot perched on top of the hatch that leads under the stage. There is a distant yowl. The theater director rustles in his sleep. I hand him a diet Coke and he drinks it. The cat appears in my arms.
Teachers love to talk about teaching. How fulfilling it is. How frustrating, yet inspiring. How nobel. But here's the thing you should know: it's hard work, yo. And it should be hard. Every day. Every year. Every single August, you should feel like your mouth is full of chalk and your teeth might fall out. Because it's so easy to give up and fall into mediocrity, even for those teachers who face down September with earnest hopes and pure hearts. What teacher does not want to make every class feel like it is the most important thing her students will do that day, as if every single day could bring her students to the edge of self-discovery, as uncomfortable a place as that might be? What teacher does not want her students to like her not for her charisma or kindness (or the candy in her desk drawer) but for her ability to alter their mental orbit, to add variation and control to their understanding of their universe?
So of course we dream of failing tests, of losing teeth, of getting stuck on buses. Of course. Of course.
It used to be that "to teach to" meant to train, or to make someone accustomed to something: my dog comes when he is called because he is taught to it. Notice the odd lack of the infinitive "to do" — he is taught to it, not taught to do it. In this usage, "taught" could be replaced by "used" or "accustomed," or even "in the habit of." To be "taught" is an adjective, like being savvy or hungry or wise — very different from having been taught to do something, like smile or fetch or say please. To be taught to something is to have experienced it, to be unflustered by an encounter with it in the future. I am taught to killing spiders in the bathtub, but I sure wish I didn't have to be.
There is something reassuring about this construction. It works as a reminder that good teaching stays with you, sticks to you, and continues to teach, long past the initial lesson. Effective teaching builds habits, sets pathways, finds familiarity in processes and motions. This use of "teach" has long outlived the teacher — she is not even anywhere in sight.
The day before school starts, I come into my classroom to find it filled with desks — big, long, heavy, 1970s Teacher Desks. They fill the space, lining the walls, blocking traffic, leaving no room for the children whatsoever. I call Maintenance to report the problem.
"What's wrong what that?" they ask.
"There are too many desks!" I say. I am flustered.
I know in my heart that they are right, but it makes me angry. I am upset. I try not to cry.
"It's for your own good," they say.
In an imperative construction, the infinitive form of the desired skill set (what is taught) is almost always more process oriented than the gerund form. To say, "teach me to write" is to request a process. You expect to engage in a series of lessons, of practices, of conversations. "Teach me writing," however, requests a product, as if this "writing" was a bunt cake that could be baked and handed off like a party favor at the threshold of the House of Education, thus requiring that the visitor never need to actually set foot inside: they need not wander the long corridors and the winding staircases, nor fear the mice that scurry in the walls, nor come to charish the way the sun dapples itself through the leadpane windows. In these examples, both the infinitive (to write) and the gerund (writing) function as nouns — yet the suggestion is that "to write" is a practice while "writing" is a piece of knowledge that can be transferred and owned.
Perhaps we teachers should stop claiming ownership of our subjects. Perhaps we should coax our fickle verb "to teach" to join forces with a preposition, so that we can teach to or teach for something, instead of simply teaching. I teach for English! rings of virtue and loyalty, rather than ownership. What would happen if teachers everywhere stopped identifying themselves by classroom subject, and embraced the (however awkward) preposition of process: what if, instead of being a math teacher, you were a teacher to math? This suggests a reason for teaching — I teach, in order to promote and celebrate the principles of math. The teaching, suddenly, is something other than the subject. The teaching is visible. The teaching is real.
The pleasure in this grammatical quirk lives in the playfulness of the preposition: if "to teach" is to point, then "to teach them to write" is to point out the road that leads toward the marvelous kingdom of Write. Being a teacher to math is to be a lighthouse, signaling the way to the land of Math.
A teacher goes to work with empty hands — she has nothing to give you. A teacher is a sign post, a map, a voice over a crackling walkie-talkie, an emergency dispatcher coaxing you to just keep talking, just stay on the line — but when the EMTs show up, they aren't your teachers: they're Think and Ask and Listen and Revise.
I dreamed I was the teacher who told you that every mind is a labyrinth in which there are no dead ends, only blind corners and false walls. I dreamed that I was the one who pushed you uncomfortably close to yourself, until you squirmed in the heat of your own awkward self-awareness. The one who didn't judge you for whatever you discovered about yourself in the midst of that heat. The one who forgave you for not doing your homework, but who still gave you a zero on the assignment. The one who never shushed or yelled or treated students with anything less than the respect that you would grant a real human. The one who coached you in how to tell your mother about that thing you needed to tell your mother, without you even having to define what the thing was that you needed to tell. The one who respected your privacy, who listened to your stories about friends but never asked their names. The one who taught you how to email a teacher and how to ask for what you needed. The one who always responded to your emails. The one in whose classroom you occasionally felt a Very Big Thing, a sensation of dizziness in the stomach, a dawning of connection, of importance, of something simultaneously in and out of your control — a completely secular kind of faith in the human-divine. The one who noticed when you were feeling this thing, and who helped you come back down to earth and find the words to write about the what and the why. The one who reminded you to get sleep, to eat lunch. The one who let you come into her classroom to eat in a quiet space if you needed it. The one who was quiet in this space with you.
Why do I teach? Because I believe that until you learn to listen — really listen to someone, whether it be verbally or through written communication — and until you learn to trace the traipsing and the lilting wander of another person's mind, you will be, on some basic human level, very lonely. A well-crafted essay is an invitation to dance, and while the author might be leading, you, the reader, must still move; you must be moved. Because the children always need saving and the teachers always need saving and the whole world is spinning and at least at school we can stand in the windows and point at things and say whoa, did you see that? as they fly by.
Harmony Button is a contributing editor for Paper Tape. She has been nominated for Pushcart and Best of the Web awards, and was awarded the Larry Levis Prize (Academy of American Poets). She attended Middlebury College and University of Utah (MFA). You can find her work in Colorado Review, Southwestern American Lit, Ithaca Lit, BlazeVOX, and other publications. She is currently English Department Chair of the Waterford School in Utah. More of her work can be found at harmonybutton.wordpress.com.
Follow along as Harmony takes the 30/30 challenge to raise money for Tupelo Press! She'll write and publish a poem a day for the month of September.


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Translating the Uncanny Valley
February 10, 2012 March 7, 2019 - Books, Interview, Reading, Uncategorized
Terrific interview between Mark Polizzotti and Mark Ford about (re)translating Raymond Roussel's Impressions of Africa and New Impressions of Africa at Bomb Magazine (the page says available online in full for a limited time, so you may want to check it soon):
Polizzotti: As I go groping along the same linguistic tether that Roussel grappled with, inevitably that tether will bear some of my fingerprints. Your version of New Impressions differs from those of Koch and Monk. You can defend it on the basis of needing to hew particularly closely to a deliberate meaning, but there's also a measure of your own personality even in that choice, just as there are traces of the personalities of Koch and Monk in theirs. It's what makes translations worth reading, and also what makes it desirable to retranslate periodically.
Ford: I guess, while translating New Impressions , I felt rather like one of the servants in the Roussel ménage in his mansion at Neuilly, toiling away to fulfill the master's bizarre but inflexible instructions. One of Roussel's cooks, André Guillot, left an account of working at 25 boulevard Richard-Wallace in which he remembers how none of the vegetables served could reveal the slightest trace of serration—if they did, they were sent back to the kitchen . . .
And which interview's assonance with my bedside reading (Lawrence Weschler's Uncanny Valley) I remark here, as is only proper with a book written by someone as mindful of "convergences" as Weschler; this from his essay, "Uncanny Valley: On the Digital Animation of the Face":
Faced with the claims of the ever more positivist Scholastics of his own time, [Nicholas of] Cusa likened true knowledge of God and the Infinite to a circle, within which was slotted a regular compounding n-sided polygon: a triangle, say, and then a square, a pentagon, a hexagon, and so forth. Keep adding sides– a hundred, a thousand, a million — and true, Nicholas conceded, it seems like you'd be getting closer and closer to the encompassing circle. But in fact, he went on to point out, you'd be getting further and further away, because a million-sided polygon, for example, has precisely that: a million angles, a million sides. Whereas a circle has no angles and only one "side."
Gabriel Blackwell
Gabriel Blackwell is the author of Madeleine E., The Natural Dissolution of Fleeting-Improvised Men, Critique of Pure Reason, and Shadow Man: A Biography of Lewis Miles Archer.
Nick Antosca's THE OBESE (Lazy Fascist Press)
Best of 2011, Part 4

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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The Baha'i Community
Baha'ism, a religion with more than six million adherents worldwide, was founded in Iran in the mid-nineteenth century by Mirza Husayn-Ali, who declared himself to be a prophet and adopted the name Baha'u'llah. He and his followers, known as Baha'is, quickly became subject to persecution. Baha'u'llah was exiled, first to Baghdad and then to Akka in Palestine, where he lived under imprisonment and house arrest by order of the Ottoman authorities until his death in 1892. The center of the new religion was established in Haifa, now in Israel, where it remains today.
The world's largest Baha'i community, numbering more than 300,000, is still to be found in Baha'u'llah's native Iran. The Baha'i community has had uneasy relations with Iran's rulers throughout its history. From its inception, in addition to being attacked as religious heretics for rejecting the orthodox Muslim belief that Muhammad is the "seal of the prophets" and that after Islam there will be no further divine revelation, Baha'is have been regarded with suspicion as agents of foreign powers sent to divide Muslims.11
Under the rule of the late Shah, Baha'is occupied some positions of influence at the palace, and the community prospered. However, with the overthrow of the Shah and the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979, several factors converged to lead to the Baha'is suffering some of the most intense persecution of their history. First, the revolution brought to power Iran's clerical establishment, which saw it as its mission to stamp out heresy and religious deviancy in Iran. The constitution of the Islamic Republic pointedly omitted Baha'ism from the list of recognized religions. Second, the view that Baha'is had been favored by the Shah and the imperial regime made the community a natural target for reprisals from the new government. Finally, the Baha'is' association, in the minds of Iran's new leaders, with Iran's bitter history of foreign interference in its domestic affairs made them a target of suspicion. The fact that Baha'i world headquarters is situated in what is now the state of Israel only adds to this suspicion, giving the Baha'is an association, if only geographic, with Zionism.
The authorities have sustained a virulent hostility towards Baha'is throughout the existence of the Islamic Republic, referring to Baha'is as a deviant or misguided sect. The U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance, Abdelfattah Amor, who visited Iran in December 1995, was told by government officials that Baha'is are "a political sect historically linked to the Shah's regime and, hence, counter-revolutionary and characterized by its espionage activities for the benefit of foreign entities, particularly Israel."12 The special rapporteur noted what he referred to as "instinctive rejection" towards the Baha'i community on the part of Iranian officials with whom he met.
This hostility towards Baha'is has resulted in the severe persecution of individual members of the Baha'i community and little or no toleration of organized religious activities by groups of Baha'is. Since 1983 Baha'i assemblies have been banned, and participation in Baha'i activities, such as festivals or acts of worship in private homes, is liable to prosecution.
The case of one Baha'i, Zabihullah Mahrami, provides a vivid example of the way in which the community has been treated under the Islamic Republic. Mahrami, a mid-ranking civil servant in the agriculture department of the Yazd provincial governorate, publicly renounced the Baha'i faith soon after the revolution in 1981. His adoption of Islam was reported in the newspaper. Thousands of Baha'is made similar pronouncements, particularly in the early years of the revolution, motivated, like Mahrami, by a desire to stay out of trouble and to keep their jobs.13 Thedismissal of Baha'is from public sector positions, the suspension of pension rights, and in some cases even the insistence that former public employees pay back their salaries to the state have been very commonly employed as punitive measures against Baha'is.
After a few years, as the revolutionary zeal of the first few years of the new republic began to lessen and the acute persecution of the Baha'is, which had included the execution of more than 200 adherents to the faith in the first six years of the revolution,14 became less vehement, Mahrami began attending Baha'i meetings and participating in Baha'i festivals again. In August 1995 he was brought before a Revolutionary Court15 in Yazd, where he was required to answer charges of apostasy, having renounced his purported declaration of conversion to Islam. At his first appearance before the court, Mahrami admitted that he had attended Baha'i meetings and festivals. He explained that he made his conversion to Islam "because prominent Baha'is were arrested and killed at the beginning of the revolution, my intention was to keep my family and myself safe; however, when it was determined that the Baha'is were no longer being bothered, I became a Baha'i again."16
The court, instead of moving immediately to a criminal trial, decided that it would seek to guide Mahrami back to Islam.17 When this did not work, he was charged with apostasy and insulting Islam, and on January 2, 1996, the court found him guilty as charged. The judge stated that his conduct was "a clear insult to the beliefs of one billion Muslims," and sentenced him to death. In addition, as he had no Muslim heirs and his Baha'i family was ineligible to inherit, all of his property was confiscated by the state.
Apostasy is not a crime under the penal code of the Islamic Republic. The Revolutionary Court cited a work of Ayatollah Khomeini's legal exegesis as the basis for the charge, rather than any existing legal statute of the country.18
The verdict of the Revolutionary Court was passed to the Supreme Court for approval. The Supreme Court, ruling at a time when the country was under intense scrutiny at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights following visits to the country by two special rapporteurs of the commission and the special representative on Iran, referred the case back to a civil court. The Supreme Court ruled that the Revolutionary Court was not the appropriate tribunal to address a case of this nature.
But the authorities did not comply with the Supreme Court ruling. Instead, they introduced new charges of espionage and brought Mahrami for trial before a revolutionary court again and, in February 1997, the head of the Revolutionary Court announced that Mahrami had been sentenced to death on charges of espionage for Israel.
The head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, responding to U.S. State Department criticism of the death sentences, asserted, "No one in Iran will be prosecuted or punished for having a specific ideology or view." Yet it is hardly credible that a new charge-of espionage for Israel-should emerge at an appeal hearing, when previous hearings in the trial had focussed on Mahrami's conversion from Islam and his religious beliefs.
Musa Talibi, who was also sentenced to death in February 1997 on charges of engaging in espionage for Israel, was originally arrested in June 1994 on charges of engaging in Baha'i practices and sentenced to eighteen months of imprisonment. The public prosecutor objected to the lightness of the original sentence, not because of any alleged charge of espionage, but rather because the judge had failed to take into account that Talibi was a convert from Islam and therefore an apostate.
In another recent case, two Baha'is, Kayvan Khalajabadi and Bahman Mithaqi, who were originally detained without charge in April 1989, were brought to trial in November 1993 on charges of "engaging in Baha'i activities" and sentenced to death on November 23, 1993, by the Revolutionary Court of Karaj.19 The verdict was confirmed by the Supreme Court in February 1996.20
At least eight Baha'is were detained for their religious beliefs in 1996 and remain in prison. A number of short term detentions also took place.21
The right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion set forth in Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights includes not only the freedom of belief, repeatedly referred to by Iranian government officials, but also the right, "individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching." The government's claim that it respects the religious freedom of Baha'is is without credibility as long as the Baha'i organization remains illegal in Iran and as long as "engaging in Baha'i activities" remains a crime subject to criminal prosecution.
There is widespread discrimination against Baha'is in education, professional life, and virtually every public sphere. For example the deputy minister of education told the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance that Baha'is were free to enter institutions of higher education as long as they did not "flaunt their beliefs."22 In other words, Baha'is who practice their faith are not given equal access to higher education. A secret memorandum on "the Bahai question" from the Iranian Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council, dated February 25, 1991, stated with reference to attendance at universities, "They should be expelled from the universities, either at the time of the admission procedure or during their studies, as soon as it becomes apparent that they are Baha'is."23
Similarly, with regard to employment in the public sector, a directive from the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs states:
The penalty incurred by those who belong to any of the misguided sects recognized by all Muslims as heretical deviations from Islam, or to organizations whose doctrine and constitution are based on rejection of the divinely-revealed religions, shall be permanent dismissal from public office ... and also from organizations that can be classed as governmental associations or offices...."24
This type of institutionalized discrimination against Baha'is is pervasive throughout the government. Baha'is working in the private sector have been adversely affected by the withdrawal or denial of necessary licenses to carry out certain kinds of business, obstructions in obtaining telephone connections, and the confiscation of property. For example, in a case settled on appeal in November 1994, the court ruled that property belonging to a Baha'i family named Irani-Nejad should pass to the Islamic Revolutionary Martyr's Foundation, a financial holding company controlled by Shi'a clerics, on the basis that "documents in the case file indicate that they belong to the misguided sect of Baha'ism."25 Prohibitions on the inheritance of property by non-protected unbelievers has led to cases of family property passing into the hands of the state.26 In his February 1997 report, the U.N. special representative on Iran reported, "In Yazd alone there were reportedly more than 150 cases relating to the confiscation of [Baha'i] property during 1996. The majority of Baha'is in Yazd are now prohibited from conducting any business transactions."27
In a case illustrating the open discrimination against Baha'i professionals, Mohammad Hazini, a lawyer, appealed against being barred from the practice of law. The review panel of the reorganization board of the Bar Association of Iran ruled on May 21, 1995 that, in accordance with Section 4 parts A and B of Article 5 of the Law on the Reorganization of the Lawyers Association, because of his membership in "the misguided Baha'i sect," Mr Hazini should be permanently barred from the practice of law.
Baha'is may also be denied equal protection by the courts in civil suits. For example, in May 1995 a court in Shahr-e Rey, a suburb of Tehran, refused to order the payment of compensation to the family of the victim of a fatal motorcycle accident because the deceased and the next-of-kin were Baha'is. The court found the defendant guilty of manslaughter but ordered that the fine be paid to a government fund in lieu of compensation.28
Iranian officials, in their meetings with Abdelfattah Amor, the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance, claimed that hostile acts against Baha'is could be attributed to "small extremist groups that had already existed before the Revolution and whose aim was to eliminate the Baha'is."29 However, documents like the 1991 memorandum from the Supreme Revolutionary Cultural Council clearly delineate an official policy of persecution. The discriminatory verdicts of hundreds of courts in cases large and small affecting the situation of Baha'is demonstrate the systematic and intentional nature of the human rights violations suffered by Baha'is in Iran.30 The egregious cases of Baha'is sentenced to death underline the severity of the persecution. In its treatment of the Baha'i minority, the government is far from meeting its obligations to respect, among other things, freedom of religion and equality before the law.
The majority of Iran's approximately 200,000 Christians belong to churches identified with distinct ethnic groups, including the Armenian, Assyrian, and Chaldean Orthodox churches. These churches, which account for more than 90 percent of Iran's Christians, carry out their services in their own languages and have engaged in little if any proselytization in the broader society.
Protestant Churches
In contrast, most of the 10,000 to 15,000 Iranian Protestants carry out their church services in Farsi, the official language, and seek to disseminate the Bible and other Christian texts in Farsi. Having their origins in Western missionary activity during the nineteenth century, these churches are built on a tradition of evangelism and conversion from other Christian denominations and other religions, including Islam. The Western origins of Iran's Protestant churches and the enduring links with similar congregations in the United States and Europe, together with the churches' readiness to accept and even seek out Muslim converts, have fueled government suspicion and hostility toward Iran's Protestants. Their treatment since the creation of the Islamic Republic has been markedly worse than that of the majority Christian denominations. Not only are Protestants subject to the institutionalized discrimination common to all non-Muslims in the Islamic Republic; they are also subject to persecution because of their religious activities.
In the early months of the post-revolutionary period there was extensive persecution of Protestant clergy. The largest Protestant denomination, the Episcopalians, were forced to cease their activities after the confiscationof church properties, the arrest of several pastors, and physical attacks on church leaders and their families.31 Small evangelical Protestant churches continued to function.
The persecution of Iran's evangelical Christians intensified during the 1990's. In December 1990, Reverend Hossein Soodmand, a pastor in the Evangelical Christian Church who had converted to Christianity from Islam, was sentenced to death by a revolutionary court in Mashad and executed. He was charged with apostasy and insulting Islam through his own conversion and by his efforts to convert other Muslims.
In December 1993, Reverend Mehdi Dibaj was sentenced to death by a Revolutionary Court in Sari. He had been detained in 1983 in Babol, where he was a minister of the Church of the Assemblies of God, and held for ten years without trial on charges of apostasy and insulting Islam. Rev. Dibaj had converted from Islam to Christianity in 1948.
Soon after Rev. Dibaj's sentencing, Bishop Haik Hovsepian Mehr, President of the Council of Evangelical Ministers of Iran and Secretary-General of the Church of the Assemblies of God, issued a public statement listing human rights violations suffered by members of the evangelical Christian community. These included the closure of churches, the beating and intimidation of converts from Islam, and the treatment of Rev. Dibaj.
Bishop Hovsepian Mehr's statement broke a silence on the persecution of Iran's Christian minority observed by many Christian leaders in Iran, partly because of official pressure but also out of an apparent belief that by not publicizing the abuses to which they and their communities were being subjected they might prevent government reprisals. In response to Bishop Hovsepian Mehr's statement, and his call to the U.N. special representative to investigate and report on the "denial of religious freedom"32 suffered by Iran's Protestant minority, the government pressured the leaders of all Christian denominations to sign statements attesting to their good treatment in the Islamic Republic. These statements were received by several international organizations, including Human Rights Watch. The Assemblies of God Church and other evangelical churches refused to sign such declarations. Their defiance was dealt with severely.
On January 16, 1994, Rev. Dibaj was released from prison after more than ten years of confinement, apparently as a result of the international pressure generated by the campaign initiated by Bishop Hovsepian Mehr. Just three days later, on January 19, 1994, Bishop Hovsepian Mehr was abducted in Tehran. According to official reports, police discovered his body in the street in Shahr-e Rey, a Tehran suburb; unable to identify it, they buried it immediately in a Muslim cemetery. After the family protested, the body was disinterred and reburied in a Christian cemetery.
On June 20, 1994, Rev. Dibaj disappeared after leaving a Christian conference in Karaj. Nothing was heard about his whereabouts until July 5, 1994, when Tehran police reported finding his body in a forest west of Tehran. The authorities denied the family's request that an independent autopsy be carried out on the body. He was buried on July 13, 1994.
After Bishop Hovsepian Mehr's killing, Reverend Tateos Mikaelian, Senior Pastor of St. John Armenian Evangelical Church, took over the position of president of the Council of Evangelical Ministers. On June 29, 1994,he too disappeared. On July 2, 1994, his son received a telephone call informing him that his father's body was in the morgue. He had been shot in the head three times.
After an initial silence from the authorities, punctuated by suggestions that the Protestant leaders had political agendas in addition to their religious activities, the government blamed the killings on the armed opposition group, the People's Mojahedine Organization of Iran (PMOI). A young woman, Farahnaz Anami, was arrested and accused of involvement in the killings. The government claimed that the PMOI had planned the killings in order to create strife between Christians and Muslims and to discredit the Iranian government at a time when its treatment of religious minorities was an issue of international concern.
From the outset, the manner in which Anami's prosecution was handled created doubts about the validity of the government's claims that the killings were the work of its opponents. Even if the government's claims were accepted at face value, they only account in part for the killings. In televised confessions, Farahnaz Anami admitted to her complicity in the murder of Rev. Tateos Mikaelian. She stated that she was the killer, that she lured the priest to his death by professing an interest in Christianity and then, with the help of an unidentified accomplice, shot him and placed his body in a freezer. The killers in the other cases have not been identified. According to Anami, the killer of Mehdi Dibaj is known to her, allegedly another PMOI member, but he has left the country.33
Anami was brought to trial together with two other women accused of planting bombs in Muslim shrines in Qom and Tehran. In a highly unusual development, they were brought to trial in March 1995 before a Revolutionary Court that was open to the public, including observers from Western embassies.34 The accused were assigned defense counsel and gave every appearance of confessing to their crimes without having been subjected to any kind of coercion. The trial was televised, and the judge opened the proceedings by describing the case as an example of how Iran was victimized by international terrorism. He said that the message of the trial was that Christian countries should not trust the PMOI because the organization kills Christians, and he urged the international community not to provide a haven for what he referred to as "anti-human hypocrites." The sentences of between ten and twenty years handed down by the court in September 1995 were remarkably lenient by the standards of the Islamic Republic. The court agreed to leniency because, it stated, the women had been misled by the opposition group.
Since their conviction, the women have been available for interviews by to human rights observers visiting the country. Human Rights Watch interviewed the women in Evin Prison in January 1996, at the government's suggestion. The interview took place in an office inside the prison. The Human Rights Watch researcher was alone with the three women, but a connecting door was left open and security personnel were present at a distance from which the conversation could be overheard. Farahnaz Anami repeated her stories of involvement in the killings, as she had told them in court. In reply to questions, Farahnaz Anami stated that she had never received any training in the use of firearms and that she had never even held a gun before shooting Rev. Mikaelian three times in the back of the head. The three women all claimed to have spent more than five years in prison for their support of the PMOI during the mid-eighties. They claimed that throughout that time they were well treated and never witnessed any ill-treatment or torture in the prisons. All of them confirmed that they had been well treated since their current arrest.
Even if one accepts the government assertion that Ms. Anami is Rev. Mikaelian's assassin, the government still has the obligation to find the killers of Rev. Dibaj and Bishop Hovsepian Mehr. As for the women's confessions, which were the only "evidence" presented, there is reason to question why the women received lenient sentences and why procedures in their trial differed so markedly from those followed in other trials before revolutionary courts, which routinely take place in secret with no respect for due process rights. The government provided no evidenceof PMOI involvement in the killings other than the uncorroborated confessions of the women. Moreover, the women's reports of their experience as political prisoners in the mid-eighties differs markedly from those of thousands of their fellow prisoners who were subjected to torture and summary execution.
The three killings shocked the Protestant community. In his December 1995 visit, U.N. Special Rapporteur on the Question of Religious Intolerance Amor noted "the traumatism caused to the Christian and Protestant communities by the murder of three Protestant pastors."35 In his report, however, the special rapporteur makes no assessment of the degree of official culpability for the three murders. "Regardless of the motives for those criminal acts," Amor simply remarked in his conclusions, "the special rapporteur strongly condemns them and sincerely hopes that such crimes will not recur."36
The previous treatment of Rev. Dibaj-who had been sentenced to death as an apostate and held for years in prison because of his religious beliefs-as well as the brutal treatment of other evangelical Christians, especially converts from Islam,37 demonstrates the government's hostility towards these Christian leaders, and raises questions about the government's involvement in the murders.
The killings resulted in an interruption in the flow of information about the persecution of the Protestant Church. Christian sources report that Protestant leaders in Iran have been intimidated from reporting on the situation of evangelical Christians in Iran, and have also discontinued their evangelizing activities among Muslims. However, accounts of persecution continue to emerge sporadically. For example, it has been reported that Rev. Harmik Torosian, a pastor in the Assembly of God Church in Shiraz, was detained in Shiraz in November 1995. He remains in detention and Christian sources reported that he is suffering from torture and ill-treatment.
At the end of September 1996, another Christian pastor, Mohammed Ravanbakhsh (officially named Mohammed Bagher Youssefi), was found dead in suspicious circumstances. Pastor Ravanbakhsh was serving as minister in an underground Assembly of God church in Sari, and was a convert from Islam. He had been a close associate of Rev. Mehdi Dibaj. Pastor Ravanbakhsh's body was reported to have been found hanging in a tree in a forest near Ghaem-Shahr in northern Iran. One of his legs had reportedly been broken before he died, making suicide an unlikely cause of death. Iranian Christians International (ICI), who reported his death, stated that he had been taken into detention prior to being killed.38 ICI characterizes Pastor Ravanbakhsh's death as part of a new wave of persecution of Evangelical Christians in Iran, dating from mid-1996:
Pastors have again been arrested, interrogated, and pressured to sign statements that they would not evangelize Muslims inside or outside their churches, admit Muslims to their churches, or baptize Muslim converts. They are forbidden to contact the outside world...39
In July 1996, Shahram Sepehri-Fard, the son of a prominent Protestant pastor who had converted from Islam, Rev. Sadegh Sepehri-Fard, was detained in Tehran on apparently fabricated charges of espionage and adultery. He was acquitted of these charges in October 1996 and fled Iran on his release from prison. Sepehri-Fard has declared that the real reason for his detention was his family's conversion from Islam to Christianity.
Rev. Khosrow Khodadi, a Muslim convert who served as pastor of a Pentecostal Assyrian Church in Hamadan until its closure in 1994, has been refused a passport to enable him to leave Iran. He previously traveled to Turkey but was deported for traveling on a forged passport. ICI reported that he has been detained several times and that he has been forced to relocate from Hamadan to Tehran where he is said to be kept under close surveillance. ICI also reported several other cases of Muslim converts to Christianity, some of whom have not wanted their names publicized, who have been detained and subjected to other pressures to force them to recant their Christian faith. Only two Protestant churches that preach in Persian have been allowed to remain open: the Assembly of God churches in Tehran and Rasht. Other Protestant churches conduct their services in Assyrian or Armenian and have no activities directed toward the majority Muslim population.
With regard to practicing their religion and maintaining churches and other religious institutions, the Assyro-Chaldean and Armenian Orthodox Christian minorities have suffered much less than the Protestants from state interference or prohibition of their activities. These communities maintain schools and engage in a broad range of social and cultural activities that are tolerated by the authorities. The religious authorities administer personal status courts dealing with such matters as marriage, divorce, and inheritance. However, in cases that extend beyond their own communities to involve Muslims, these Christians are subject to the same discriminatory treatment as other non-Muslim citizens of the Islamic Republic. The special rapporteur observed:
In the field of justice, especially at the lower levels of public courts, minority plaintiffs are usually discriminated against by judges, who treat them as members of a minority and not as Iranian citizens, applying their brand of Islam and taking decisions that are very often in favor of Muslims.40
Another factor to take into consideration when seeking to assess the human rights situation of the Armenian and Assyro-Chaldean Christian minorities, as well as the Jews and the Zoroastrians, is that these communities have tended not to call international attention to the problems or persecution that they may face. According to the special rapporteur, their representatives "emphasized the importance and usefulness of the dialogue between minorities and authorities as a way of reaching short-term, medium-term and long-term agreements, compromises and solutions."41 There is little information about the type of persecution endured by Orthodox Christians. This may indicate a lower level of persecution, but the difference in approach between the communities on the question of whether or not to publicize their difficulties internationally should not be discounted as a factor in the way that their human rights situation is perceived.42
Approximately 25,000 Jews live in Iran. More than twice that number have left the country since the creation of the Islamic Republic, driven to emigrate by several factors, including fear of persecution in a militant religious state in which official opposition to Israeli policies is often expressed in anti-Semitic language. The governmentmaintains that it protects the religious freedom of Iran's Jews. There are synagogues and recognized religious leaders. Like other non-Muslim minorities, the Jewish community elects its own representative to the parliament (majles). Although religious minorities are free to vote in presidential elections, they are not permitted to run for the presidency.
Information on the treatment of Jews in Iran is difficult to gather, owing in part to the apparent preference of community leaders not to publicize instances of mistreatment, if and when they occur. The organized community tends to publicly voice support for government policies, for example in denouncing Israel.
Generally speaking, Iranian Jews are not individually persecuted because of their religion. However, in cases where a Jew is prosecuted, such as the case of Hedayat Zendehdel, a convert to Islam brought to trial in 1996 on a vast array of charges including conspiracy, arms trafficking and espionage, the Jewish identity or origins of the defendant have been highlighted in a defamatory manner. For example, a commentary in the official daily newspaper Resalat concluded, let "Zendehdel be a symbol of the continued disgrace of the homeless Jews."43 He was executed.
Sunni Muslims
Sunni Muslims44 are by far Iran's largest religious minority, making up as much as 20 percent of the population. The great majority of Iranian Kurds, Baluchis and Turkamen are Sunni Muslims. The ascendancy of the Shi'a clergy since the formation of the Islamic Republic has accentuated Sunni grievances. Speaking at a conference in London in February 1997, Dr. Hossein Khalighi, an Iranian Sunni Kurd living in exile, stated:
We Muslim Sunni of Iran bear with daily insults ushered at us by the Shi'a clergy. They destroy our mosques to build and expand theirs, they humiliate our most sacred men and values in the officially controlled media, they encourage religious wars between Sunnis and Shi'as, they arrest, torture and kill Sunni Muftis and personalities, force Sunnis to convert to Shi'ism, forbid Sunni teaching in the schools in Sunni dominated areas, refer to Sunni ulama as apostates, and produce many volumes on Shi'ism while forbidding the printing of Sunni books.45
As Sunni Muslims, the majority of Iran's Kurds suffer religious discrimination in the Shi'a state. Kurds played an active role in the overthrow of the Shah, and among their demands for greater autonomy from the central authorities in Iran was the demand for more autonomy in the religious sphere. However, Ayatollah Khomeini declined to appoint as his representative in the Kurdish region the popular Sunni cleric, Ahmad Moftizadeh, choosing instead a Shi'a cleric with no local following.46 Sunni Kurds have seen their aspirations for greater autonomy and respect for their right to religious freedom denied. Friday prayer leaders, even in the Sunni mosques, are appointed by the central authorities. Shi'a proselytizing is encouraged. For example, in March 1995 the Friday prayer leaderin a mosque in Sanandaj announced that he would issue the call to prayer and carry out other religious rites in accordance with Shi'a traditions, regardless of the fact that he was serving a Sunni congregation.47
The death of a prominent Sunni cleric, Mollah Mohammed Rabi'i, in Kermanshah, the major city in the Kurdish region, on December 2, 1996, led to three days of violent clashes between Sunnis and the security forces. The demonstrators claimed that Mollah Rabi'i had been killed because of his activities as the prayer leader in the Al-Shafe'i mosque, the major mosque in this predominantly Sunni city. According to independent press reports, rioting arising from the death spread to other towns in the region.48
The Iranian government replied to the U.N. special representative's inquiry about the cause of death of Mollah Rabi'i:
In accordance with the autopsy report, Mr. Molla Mohammad Rabi'ei [sic] died as a result of a heart attack. The autopsy was carried out by the Kermanshah forensic department and in the presence of representatives of the judiciary, family members, some Sunni physicians and Sunni clergy.49
Regardless of Mollah Rabi'i's cause of death, the tensions between the Sunni Kurdish community and the authorities were all too apparent in the reaction to the incident.50 Because independent observers have difficulty gaining access to this part of the country, there is no clear information about casualties on both sides from the clashes, nor about the tactics employed by the security forces to quell the disturbances. Kurdish sources have reported that Revolutionary Guards fired on unarmed civilians in Kermanshah and the town of Jwanrow. Similarly, it is not known how many people remain in detention as a result of these clashes, nor what kind of treatment those in detention are receiving.
While Shi'a religious institutions are encouraged, Sunni institutions are blocked. For example, in 1993 a newly constructed Sunni mosque in Sanandaj was destroyed by a mob of Shi'a zealots. According to Sunni activists, the authorities took no action to restrain or to punish them. In 1994 the Sunni community of Sanandaj raised more than 10 million toumans in order to enlarge the Dar al-Ehsan mosque. Despite the fact that all the necessary building permits were obtained from local authorities, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance stepped in to block the new extension and confiscated the funds raised to carry out the project. Despite the fact that more than one million Sunnis live in Tehran, many of them Kurds, no Sunni mosque exists to serve their religious needs.
The Baluchis are another ethnic group that is predominantly Sunni Muslim. Many of the religious leaders from the Sunni Baluchi community go to Saudi Arabia for their religious training. This creates tension with the government because in Saudi Arabia religious students are exposed to instruction that is hostile to Shi'ism, especially from Wahhabi instructors who regard Shi'ism as heresy. Political tensions between the Iranian and Saudi Arabian governments only exacerbate this tension. Periodically Sunni religious leaders are detained and accused of being Wahhabi spies.
There are few Sunni seminaries in Iran. In February 1996 security forces raided the Salehabad seminary in Mashad, detaining members of the faculty and obliging seminary students to leave their studies to do their military service. In contrast, Shi'a seminary students are exempt from military service. This type of disruption of seminary education for Sunni clerics in Iran encourages them to seek their education in Saudi Arabia or Pakistan.
There are a number of incidents in which violence appear to have been politically motivated and in which the Iranian government appears complicit in the killing of Baluchi religious and political leaders. Haji Mohammed Ziaie, a prominent Sunni figure who had been critical of the government's policies toward the Sunni minority, particularly in Baluchestan, was killed under suspicious circumstances in July 1994. In 1992 Haji Ziaie visited Mecca in Saudi Arabia for a pilgrimage. On his return he was detained and interrogated on charges of having made contact with enemies of the Islamic Republic. He was held for a month and released. He remained active on Sunni issues and was a leading figure in protests following the destruction of the Sunni mosque in Mashad. He also protested against mass executions carried out in Baluchestan over many years in the name of combating drug trafficking.
In June 1994, Haji Ziaie was summoned to Tehran and forced to sign a statement that he would stop criticizing the government. From then on he was subjected to close surveillance and summoned on numerous occasions for interrogation. On July 15, 1994, he was summoned to Laar and was never seen alive again, according to Sunni activists interviewed in Europe in January 1997. Sunni activists who had been in direct contact with his family said that five days after he had been summoned, police informed his family that his body had been found in a valley and that he had been the victim of a car accident. The activists said that when the family received the body they noted that it had been decapitated, that an arm and a leg had been amputated and that his abdomen had been split open. However, the car he had allegedly been traveling in did not appear seriously damaged, making the family believe that Haji Ziaie had been murdered and that the government, which had summoned him to an appointment, was his killer. As no independent autopsy or inquiry into his death was carried out, the circumstances of his killing remain unclear. With his death a leading advocate of the rights of Sunni Baluchis was silenced.
As many as sixty Sunni religious leaders, mainly from the Baluchi community, are reported to be in prison for their support of demands for parity for Sunni Islam in Iran and for an end to repression in Baluchestan.51 These Sunni religious leaders had founded the Islamic Society Association in Zahedan, the major city in Sistan va-Baluchestan province, to promote the rights and interests of Sunni Muslims. One of the prisoners, Molavi Abdulrahman Alahverdi, a religious leader in the Baluchi town of Saravan, was detained in late February, apparently for his activities in support of the rights of Sunni Baluchis.
Molavi Ahmad Sayyad was a leader of the Baluchi Sunni community. On his return from religious studies in Saudi Arabia in 1990, he was imprisoned for five years on suspicion of having engaged in anti-government activities. At the end of January 1996 Sayyad was taken into detention by the authorities on returning from a visit to the United Arab Emirates. According to a report in the London Arabic daily Al-Sharq al-Awsat, his body was discovered outside the city of Bandar Abbas on February 2, 1996, bearing signs of torture.52 Again no official inquiry into the cause of death was carried out, but since Molavi Sayyad was last seen alive in the custody of the authorities, suspicion falls heavily on the government as his killer. The government's hand is also suspected in the unexplained killing of another Sunni Baluchi cleric, Abdol-Aziz Kazemi Vajd, whose body was found in suspicious circumstances outside the city of Zahedan on November 5, 1996.
Some leading figures in the Sunni Baluchi opposition movement have fled the country to avoid imprisonment and carry out their opposition activities from abroad. These opposition figures abroad have also been the target of fatal attacks in which the Iranian government is suspected of involvement. For example, on March 4, 1996, Molavi Abdul Malek, the son of the most prominent Sunni cleric in Iran, Molavi Abdul Aziz,53 was gunned down outside his house in Karachi, Pakistan. According to Sunni activists, he had been under constant surveillance by Iranian agents active in Karachi because of his activities on behalf of the Baluchi community.54
The recent arrests and killings of Baluchi religious leaders appears to be part of a concerted campaign to suppress Baluchi claims for parity for Sunni Islam and respect for their cultural and linguistic traditions. The heavy-handed war on drugs carried out in Baluchi areas for many years has resulted in many human rights violations and provided cover for acts of political repression by the government.
11 Suspicion of Baha'ism is not unique to Iran. Throughout the Middle East small communities of Baha'is have been subjected to official persecution and to vilification by Islamic religious authorities.
12 Report submitted by Abdelfattah Amor, Special Rapporteur to the Fifty Second Commission on Human Rights, Feb. 9, 1996, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/95/Add.2 (hereafter, Amor 1996), para. 56.
13 According to a written appeal submitted to the Supreme Court in March 1996, Mahrami never officially converted to Islam. He simply signed a prepared form that many Baha'is were pressured to sign. His "conversion" was reported in the newspaper without his knowledge. The file number is D/228/74. A copy is on file at Human Rights Watch.
14 Amnesty International, Iran Briefing (AI Index: MDE 13/08/87), London, 1987, p. 2.
15 Revolutionary Courts grew out of the revolutionary structures established in the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the Shah's government. These courts have been extensively used in cases of a political nature and have become notorious for their disregard of international fair trial standards. Their jurisdiction was codified in law in 1983 to include:
Any offense against internal or external security, attempt on the life of political personalities, any offense relating to narcotic drugs and smuggling, murder, massacre, imprisonment, and torture in an attempt to fortify the Pahlavi regime, suppressing the struggles of the Iranian people by giving orders or acting as agent, plundering the public treasury, profiteering and forestalling the market of public commodities.
(A Glimpse of the Judicial System of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Prepared by the Judicial Deputy of the Chief Justice and printed by the Official Gazette Corporation of Iran, undated.)
16 Taken from an unofficial translation of the verdict of the Revolutionary Court of Yazd, in the case of Zabihullah Mahrami, case # 74/2288/D, January 2, 1996, on file at Human Rights Watch.
17 It arranged for a series of meetings to be held in which Mahrami's religious views could be examined. The first of these took place on October 3, 1995, at which Mahrami declared his continuing belief that Baha'u'llah was a prophet. At a second meeting on October 14, 1995, he refused to recant his belief in the Baha'i faith. At a third meeting, on December 19, 1995, he again refused to recant.
18 Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Tahrir al-Vasileh (A Clarification of Questions), Volume 1, p. 118, for a definition of the crime of apostasy. It is worth noting that the incorporation of Revolutionary Courts into a unified national court system brought with it the recognition of many religious judges as qualified judges even though they did not meet formal judicial qualification requirements. Such judges may base their judgments on works of religious exegesis as well as or instead of basing them on the codified law. See The Justice System of the Islamic Republic of Iran (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, May 1993), p. 31.
19 In an interview printed in Salam newspaper, on April 10,1993, Dr. Hossein Mehrpour, a member of the Iranian delegation to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, stated, "In the constitution the inquisition of people about their beliefs is forbidden, and no one can be punished because of his beliefs... the death sentences applied to Khalajabadi and Mithaqi were not because they were Baha'is but because they were spies."
20 The sentence had not been carried out as of the publication of this report.
21 As reported by U.N. Special Representative on Iran, Maurice Copithorne, in his report to the fifty-third session of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the eight Baha'is were Mansur Haddadan and Kamyar Ruhi, arrested in Mashhad, February 29, 1996; Arman Damashqi and Kurush Dhabihi, arrested in Gohardasht in early 1996; Babu'llah Farji, arrested in Qa'im Shahr, October 7, 1996; Nasir Iqaniyan, arrested in Simnan on October 22, 199; Bihnam Rida'i, also arrested in Simnan on October 31, 1996; and Nasir Haqtalab, arrested in Mashhad on October 31, 1996. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Maurice Copithorne, U.N. doc. E/CN.4/1977/63, February 11, 1997 (hereafter Copithorne 1997), para. 53.
22 Amor 1996, para. 63.
23 Ibid. The complete text of this document was published in The Baha'i Question, Iran's Secret Blueprint for the Destruction of a Religious Community (New York: Baha'i International Community, 1993).
24 Ibid., para. 64.
25 Case of Faramarz Irani-nejad, docket no. 33719/m/62.
26 The U.N. special representative describes a case from September 1995 in Yazd in which an application for succession rights to a deceased's property was refused on the grounds that the deceased as well as the husband and children were Baha'is. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran, prepared by the Special Representative of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. Maurice Copithorne, U.N. doc. E/CN.4/1996/59, March 21, 1996 (hereafter Copithorne 1996), para. 72.
27 Copithorne 1997, para.55.
30 For example, Special Rapporteur Amor reported, "The judiciary would never respond positively to complaints lodged by Baha'is. The courts, presupposing the Baha'is to be involved in espionage activities, would infer that the Baha'is had no recognized rights." Amor 1996, para. 67. The Baha'i International Community U.S.A. chapter in Washington, D.C. maintains records on hundreds of cases illustrating discrimination against Baha'is, involving such measures as property seizure, suspension of official pensions, orders to repay pensions, and exclusion from universities and professions. Several such cases have been detailed in reports by U.N. representatives since the inception of the mandate in 1984.
31 Bishop H.B. Dehqani-Tafti, The Hard Awakening (New York: The Seabury Press, 1981). Bishop Dehqani-Tafti was the head of the Episcopal Church in Iran. His son Bahman was fatally shot in the street in May 1980. The perpetrators were never identified. He and his wife had escaped an attempt on their lives in October 1979.
32 Bishop Hovsepian Mehr made this statement in a news release embargoed for December 13, 1995. This statement was circulated in English by Middle East Concern, P.O. Box 295, Macomb, Illinois, 61455.
33 Human Rights Watch interview with Farahnaz Anami, Evin Prison, Tehran, January 1996.
34 Human Rights Watch requested permission to send an observer to this trial but did not receive a reply.
36 Ibid., para.117.
37 Days before his death, Bishop Hovsepian Mehr wrote to a fellow priest in the west, in Kermanshah: "Converts have been beaten and hanged upside down for many hours and beaten with thick wires for hours, so much so that they had broken the arm of a young believer in Christ."
38 Press release, "Western Missionary Released from Prison in Iran," March 21, 1997. Iranian Christians International, Colorado Springs, CO.
42 For example, two Iranian Assyrian Christians interviewed in Germany in January 1997 complained of restrictions on the community's ability to print its own translation of the bible in Assyrian, and being forced to rely on an official government translation. They also complained of interference in the functioning of private Assyrian schools.
43 Resalat, January 8, 1997, quoted in Anti-Defamation League, World Jewish Congress, Anti-Semitism Worldwide 1996/7 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1997), p. 208.
44 Sunni Muslims constitute the vast majority of the world's Muslim population. The schism between Shi'a and Sunnis dates to a dispute over the succession of leadership in the early years of Islam, in AD 656. The Shi'a took their name, meaning partisans, from their support for Ali, the Prophet's first cousin, who was defeated by Muawiya, a general who assumed leadership of the Caliphate although he was not a blood relative of the prophet.
45 "Iranians told about atrocities against religious minorities," Iran Press Service, London, Feb. 11, 1997.
46 Shahrzad Mojab and Amir Hassanpour, The Politics of Nationality and Ethnic Diversity in Rahnema & Behdad, Iran After the Revolution, Crisis of an Islamic State (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996, hereafter Mojab & Hassanpour), p. 237.
47 Human Rights Watch interview with Sunni Kurdish activist, Berlin, Germany, February 1997.
48 For example, a Reuters report on December 5, 1996, " Riots hit western Iran city, police colonel killed," described several people killed and many arrested in Kermanshah as well as riots in the town of Paveh, sixty-five miles to the northwest.
49 Copithorne 1997, Annex 1, para. 10.
50 Sunni activists interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Europe in January 1997 claimed that Mollah Rabi'i had been killed by the authorities because he had preached sermons denouncing the popular religious television serial screened in the month of Ramadhan which was allegedly derogatory toward Sunni Muslims.
51 Baluchi activists, interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Europe in January 1997, provided the names of some of these prisoners, including Moulavi Abdullah Qohestani, Moulavi Abdolghani, Sheikh Jamy, Ahmed Hossiny, Abdolraqi Shirani, Javanshir Davoody, Abdol Baqy Qataly, and Abdol Raouf Sokhry.
52 Al-Sharq al-Awsat, February 2, 1996.
53 Molavi Abdel Aziz was elected as a member of the constituent assembly charged with approving the draft constitution of the Islamic Republic in 1979. When it was proposed that Shi'a Islam should be the state religion, he resigned from the assembly.
54 Human Rights Watch interview with Sunni activists, Europe, January 1997.


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What Does Okra Taste Like? Ultimate Okra Taste Guide
Written by itsfoodtastic in Fruits & Vegetables
And you wonder why you've never been a fan of okra (a.k.a. ladies' fingers in English)? Soggy leaves, slimy skin, and weird, bitter flavors are just some of the things you're likely to encounter once you dive into the okra pool. But don't let that scare you! With a little bit of knowledge and a lot of effort, you can master the art of eating okra. In this article, we'll discuss everything you need to know about okra to get you started. From its taste and aroma profile to culinary uses and nutrition, we'll cover it all.
What Is Okra?
Okra is a vegetable that belongs to the same family as hibiscus, cotton, and sorrel (Mallow family). It has been part of human diets for more than 5000 years, with evidence of okra seeds found in Egyptian tombs dating back to 2000 B.C. Today, it's a common ingredient in many cuisines around the world, including Indian, West African, and Caribbean.
Okra is a popular ingredient in Indian curries and Southern fried chicken. It's also used in soups, stews, and salads due to its ability to thicken liquids without any fat or starch additives. This vegetable can be eaten raw as well as cooked, although cooking tends to bring out its natural flavor more than raw consumption does.
Okra pods have a distinct appearance—they have ridged and spiny surfaces reminiscent of pine cones (hence the name "ladies' fingers"). They come in different sizes, with some varieties reaching up to 3 feet long! They also vary greatly in color, from yellowish-green to pale green to white.
Okra Flavor Profile – What Does Okra Taste Like?
So, okra, what does it taste like? Okra vegetable taste is somewhere between bitter and sweet with grassy, earthy, and nutty notes and a slightly unpleasant flavor that most people find off-putting. Okra flavor depends on how it's cooked: if you cook it for too long, it can become slimy and have a rubbery texture. Okra pods have a pleasant, crunchy texture.
What does raw okra taste like? The taste of raw okra is somewhat bitter, slightly tangy, and a little bit sweet. Okra has a slimy texture that takes some getting used to. On the other hand, cooked okra has a much softer texture than raw okra, which makes it more palatable and easier to eat. It also tastes sweeter due to the caramelization effect when cooked over high heat.
What does fried okra taste like? Fried okra is often described as having a green bean-like taste and a nice crunchy texture. Many people also describe it as having an earthy, nutty flavor similar to artichokes. Fried okra can also have a slightly bitter taste that is not necessarily unpleasant.
What does pickled okra taste like? Pickled okra has a nice crunchy and juicy texture and a mild, slightly sweet flavor with nutty and earthy undertones. Pickled okra is a popular addition to many Asian dishes, and it goes great with fried chicken.
Does Okra Taste Bitter?
Okra does have slight bitter undertones that are balanced by sweet and nutty hints. Ripe okra should not have a pronounced bitter or sour taste. However, it can have slight earthy and grassy notes.
Okra pods are edible green or yellow fruits with slimy seeds inside them. The texture of okra pods ranges from firm and crisp to soft and sticky depending on their stage of ripeness when harvested. They have a mild aroma and subtle taste that's somewhere between bitter and sweet.
See also: What Does Squirrel Taste Like? Are Squirrels Good Tasting?
Why Is Okra Slimy?
Okra's slimy texture is a result of its mucilaginous (thick, gluey, sticky) gel-like nature. This characteristic is one of the main reasons why okra is known as "the goop." It's this same property that allows it to absorb some of the water that you add to your dish. The gelatinous nature of okra is also responsible for binding other ingredients together, such as spices and other vegetables.
If you want to reduce sliminess, put okra in a pot with cold water (2-3 l and 1-2 tbsp. of lemon juice) and let it sit for an hour or overnight if possible.
Okra Substitutes – What Does Okra Taste Similar To?
Okra has a flavor similar to lettuce and celery but with a slightly sweeter taste. The flavor is milder than, say, tomatoes or cucumbers. When it comes to textures, okra is softer than both lettuce and celery. If you're wondering what to substitute for okra in recipes, the following are some of the common substitutes you can use:
Carrots are a good substitute for okra in salads because they have a similar shape and texture. They're also very high in vitamins A and C, which means they're great for your health!
Zucchini is another vegetable that tastes similar to okra. It has a milder flavor compared to its cousin, but it can still be used in cooking.
Green beans can be used as an alternative if you want your dish to have a stronger flavor profile. They give dishes like soups or stews more of that umami taste.
Spinach is a great substitute for okra in dishes like salads and casseroles. It has a similar texture to okra, which makes it easier to cook with.
There are many other vegetables that can be used as alternatives to okra in recipes. Other options include tomatoes, cucumbers, peppers, and squash. However, zucchini and green beans are by far the best okra substitutes in recipes.
Cooking Okra – How Is Okra Used?
Okra can be eaten raw or cooked. It's often prepared in stews, soups, and curries to replace meat as a thickening agent and flavor enhancer. Okra can also be stir fried with other vegetables and spices to make a dish called bharta, which is typically prepared with the okra pods sliced into rounds, which produces a texture similar to eggplants.
Okra can also be pickled or preserved by drying. In West Africa, dried okra pods are used to make dawadawa, a spicy condiment that's used as a flavoring or topping for soups, meat dishes, and bread. In the Caribbean, okra is often added to fish soup. In Haiti, okra is often served with rice and corn, and in Japan, okra is fried in tempura and served with soy sauce. In the USA, it is common to deep-fry breaded okra as well as to pickle okra. In Brazil, okra is traditionally stewed with chicken and tomatoes.
Okra is usually cooked in stews and soups because the vegetable's mild flavor blends well with other ingredients. It also cooks quickly, so if you are making a dish that involves cooking okra, don't cook it for too long because the vegetable will become mushy or too soft if cooked for too long.
Do not cook okra in copper and cast iron cookware as they will discolor the vegetable and make it taste metallic.
How Do You Eat Okra?
What do you use okra for? Okra can be stir-fried, stewed, roasted, or baked. It can also be eaten raw or pickled. In India and Pakistan, it's used as an ingredient in curry powders. Okra is sold fresh, frozen, and canned. In the United States, most okra is grown in the South, particularly around Louisiana and Texas.
Okra has a mild flavor, so you don't need to add much seasoning to it. If you want to add some flavor, okra goes best with coriander, oregano, and curry powder. It's often cooked with rice or other grain dishes, such as curry or stew. It can also be eaten raw as a snack or used in salads and dips. You can also use okra in baked goods such as muffins and pies.
See also: What Does Pimms Taste Like? Is Pimms Sweet?
Because of its high water content, okra requires longer cooking times than most vegetables. Many recipes call for soaking the vegetable before cooking it (it's best to soak in cold water overnight), which allows the okra to cook evenly and become tender.
What goes well with okra? Okra goes well with meat (beef, lamb, pork, veal), poultry (chicken, duck, turkey), seafood (shrimp, cod), and other vegetables (tomatoes, zucchini, eggplant, cucumber, lettuce, onion), parsley, rice, pasta, couscous. Okra also goes well with spices, including coriander, turmeric, and curry powder.
If you do not have much time to cook, check out this simple and delicious okra and tomato salad recipe:
Okra and Tomato Salad
1 pound fresh okra (1/2-inch pieces), washed
2 medium tomatoes (about 1 pound), washed and diced
1 small red onion (about 4 ounces), thinly sliced
2 cloves garlic (2 teaspoons), minced
1/4 cup parsley flakes
black pepper (optional)
Cut the stems off the okra so they don't get too tough when cooked. Then cut each piece into thirds or quarters lengthwise.
Heat the oil in a skillet over medium heat. Add the okra and cook, occasionally stirring, until the okra is browned, 8 to 10 minutes.
Add the tomatoes and onion and continue to cook until the tomatoes start to soften about 5 minutes.
Add the garlic and cook for a minute.
Stir in the vinegar, parsley flakes, lemon juice, salt, and pepper (if desired).
Cook for 2-3 minutes or until heated through. Serve immediately.
Okra Nutrition Value and Health Benefits
Okra has tons of health benefits! Okra is good for weight loss as it is low in calories (only 31 calories per 100 grams) and contains vitamins A, B, and K as well as ascorbic and folic acid. Okra fights asthma, facilitates digestion, and prevents bloating. Okra is also good for your bones and joints. Okra seeds contain 40% of oil, which slows down aging and fights wrinkles.
Okra has a high protein content, which makes it an ideal food for vegans and vegetarians. It's also rich in vitamins C, A, B1, B2, B3 (thiamine), and niacin, as well as folate, potassium, magnesium, iron, calcium, phosphorus, and zinc.
Okra promotes the secondary absorption of fluid, removes toxins and excess cholesterol from the body, and cleanses it of excess bile. Okra is also effective at preventing diabetes and cataracts. Regular consumption of okra also improves blood plasma and prevents cancer.
Okra is also used in the beauty industry. It is often added to shampoos and hair conditioners to make hair soft and give them a healthy shine. You can make a homemade hair mask with okra – just boil okra until it releases the slime, take the okra out and add a few drops of lemon juice and rinse your hair with it. No wonder why Cleopatra loved eating and using okra on her hair so much!
See also: What Does Vegemite Taste Like? What Is Vegemite Similar To?
Okra has a taste that's very much like that of cucumber and green beans. The mild, cucumber-like taste makes okra an ideal ingredient for vegetable pickles and marinades. Okra is commonly served raw in salads and cooked in stews or curries. You can also use it in baked goods such as muffins and cakes.
Okra has always been considered a healthy food because it's high in fiber and low in calories. It also contains plenty of antioxidants (vitamin E and beta-carotene). But what most people don't know is that okra can be used to lower blood pressure and cholesterol levels. If you want to try new veggies and get some of those vitamins, okra is your best go-to!
Okra Taste FAQ
What does okra soup taste like?
Okra soup has a pronounced sweet and grassy flavor with slight undertones of bitterness and earthiness. Okra soup has a delicate texture and is usually served in the Southern United States, the Caribbean, and Latin America. It's not uncommon to find okra soup with a hint of curry or chili powder.
What does okra smell like?
Okra has a sweet smell and flavor, which is often described as grassy, musky, and earthy. Okra's smell is similar to that of other vegetables like zucchini, asparagus, and eggplant. If okra smells pungent, sour, or "rotten," it has gone bad and needs to be thrown away.
Can you eat okra raw?
You can eat okra raw – you can eat okra as is as a snack or add it to salads. Raw okra is amazing – it is juicy and crunchy with pronounced grassy and nutty hints. If you want the okra to be soft and mild, it needs to be cooked (boiled, fried, steamed, or added to soups).
What the main dish goes with okra?
Okra goes especially well with rice and couscous, but it can also be prepared with pasta, bulgur, and mashed potatoes. Okra goes well with meat, poultry, and seafood, so the choice is huge, whether you want to enjoy okra with pork chop, beef bbq, or fried shrimp.
What is okra similar to?
Okra's unique sliminess and mild, grassy, and bitter-sweet flavor are similar to that of zucchini, green beans, and eggplants.
Does okra taste like zucchini (courgette)?
Okra has a milder flavor with a hint of sweetness, while zucchini has a more bitter taste. This bitter taste is attributed to glucosinolates in zucchini which help it ward off pests and diseases.


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Omyacolor S.A. v. Recep Tanisman - Emko Emaye A.S.
Case No.�D2005-0520
The Complainant is Omyacolor S.A., Saint Germain la Ville, France, represented by Cabinet Breese-Derambure-Majerowicz, Paris, France.
The Respondent is Recep Tanisman - Emko Emaye A.S., Istanbul, Turkey.
The disputed domain name <robercolor.com> is registered with iHoldings.com Inc. d/b/a DotRegistrar.com.
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the�"Center") on May�13,�2005. On May�17,�2005, the Center transmitted by email to iHoldings.com Inc. d/b/a DotRegistrar.com a request for registrar verification in connection with the domain name at issue. On May�23,�2005, iHoldings.com Inc. d/b/a DotRegistrar.com transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details. The Center verified that the Complaint satisfied the formal requirements of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the�"Policy"), the Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the�"Rules"), and the WIPO Supplemental Rules for Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (the�"Supplemental�Rules").
In accordance with the Rules, paragraphs�2(a) and 4(a), the Center formally notified the Respondent of the Complaint, and the proceedings commenced on May�30,�2005. In accordance with the Rules, paragraph�5(a), the due date for Response was June�19,�2005. The Respondent did not submit any response. Accordingly, the Center notified the Respondent's default on June�29,�2005.
The Center appointed Peter�G.�Nitter as the Sole Panelist in this matter on July�29,�2005. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph�7.
It is noted that Omyacolor holds the following trademark:
- French trademark ROBERCOLOR No.�1 430 314, filed on October�13,�1977, in class�16 (Appendix A, Enc. No.�11A to 11 Dbis);
- International trademark ROBECOLOR No.�435 294, registered on January�25,�1978, in class 16 (Appendix A, Enc. No.�12A to 12Dbis);
These trademarks represent only a part of the portfolio of ROBERCOLOR trademarks held by the Complainant in numerous countries.
The disputed domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark or service mark in which the Complainant has rights
The domain name <robercolor.com> identically reproduces the above-mentioned trademarks belonging to the Complainant.
Registering this domain name therefore created a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the Respondent's website to which users of the disputed domain name are redirected.
The Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in registering the domain name, nor in operating a website with this domain name
The owner of the domain name <robercolor.com> has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the names ROBERCOLOR, neither trademark, nor company name.
In particular, the status of former distributor of the products manufactured by the Complainant confers no mandate, instruction nor authorization to register a domain name and does not confer upon the said distributor any right or legitimacy to register a domain name including the term 'robercolor' in its own right.
The Respondent has indisputably acted in bad faith both in registering the domain name and in using it
The Respondent is a former distributor of the Complainant's products in Turkey, and is still a distributor of the mother company, F.I.L.A., of the Complainant.
The Respondent could not therefore have been unaware of the existence of the aforesaid trademarks belonging to the Complainant. It should also be made clear that the reputation of Complainant is based, in particular, on ROBERCOLOR writing chalk in France and abroad.
By registering the disputed domain name, the Respondent thus sought to profit from the renown enjoyed by the Complainant in the field of writing chalk.
Furthermore, registration of this domain name by a competing company has had the effect of depriving the Complainant of the ability to use their trademarks on the Internet.
The disputed domain name automatically redirects users to the Respondent's website, which presents, in particular, the OMYACOLOR products.
It is the Respondent's intention to disturb the business activities of the Complainant and to attract directly to its website the Complainant's clients by creating confusion with Complainant's trademark ROBERCOLOR.
This is clearly a demonstration of bad faith on the part of the Respondent.
- The disputed domain name constitutes infringement by identical reproduction of the earlier trademarks listed above belonging to the Complainant;
- The Respondent has no rights of legitimate interests to register this domain name;
- The Respondent registered this domain name with the aim of both profitting from the Complainant's renown in the field of writing chalk and damaging it by creating confusion for the Complainant's clients with Omyacolor's ROBERCOLOR products.
Remedies requested
The Complainant requests that the Panel issue a decision that the disputed domain name <robercolor.com> be transferred to Complainant.
The Respondent did not reply to the Complainant's contentions.
The disputed domain name is <robercolor.com>.
The Complainant has the rights to several ROBERCOLOR trademarks, hereunder:
- French trademark ROBERCOLOR No.�1 430 314, filed on October�13,�1977, in class�16;
- International trademark ROBERCOLOR No.�435 294, registered on January�25,�1978, in class�16.
The suffix ".com" does not distinguish the domain name at issue from Complainant's marks.
The Panel finds that the disputed domain name is identical to Complainant's ROBERCOLOR marks.
The Panel has considered Complainant's allegation that the Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name at issue. Since Respondent is in default, these allegations have not been contested, and the Panel finds it unlikely that Respondent could be in a position to claim any rights in the domain name at issue.
The Panel has taken under consideration that Respondent was a distributor of Complainant when the disputed domain name was registered by Respondent. However, according to Complainant, the right to sell products and to use the trademark ROBERCOLOR, did not include the right to register the disputed domain name <robercolor.com>. This is not disputed by Respondent.
In the Panel's opinion, a distributor may not register a domain name identical to the principal's trademark, unless the principal has given his explicit prior consent. The Panel finds that no such consent was given by Complainant. Furthermore, Respondent has used the domain name to present products bearing the Respondent's own trademarks. This fact distinguishes the case from the facts of the Oki Data case (Oki Data Americas, Inc.v. ASD, Inc., WIPO Case No. D2001-0903).
The Panel finds that the circumstances mentioned and evidenced by Complainant establish a prima facie showing that Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in respect of the domain name at issue.
The Panel has considered Complainant's assertions and evidence with regard to Respondent's registration and use of the domain name in bad faith. By not submitting a response, Respondent has failed to invoke any circumstances that could demonstrate that it did not register and use the domain name in bad faith.
Respondent has registered a domain name that is identical to the trademark of Complainant, which is of a distinctive and complex character. The Respondent also had a business relationship with Complainant prior to its registration of the contested domain name. The Panel thus finds that the ROBERCOLOR trademark was known to the Respondent when registering the domain name at issue.
As the Panel has concluded under paragraph�B above, the Respondent does not have any legitimate rights or interests in using the domain name at issue.
It is also clear that Respondent, by registering the disputed domain name, has prevented Complainant from reflecting its ROBERCOLOR mark in the ".com" domain.
The Panel also find that Respondent used the disputed domain name to market and/or to sell products bearing the trademarks of Respondent. This finding is based on the Complainant's letter to Respondent's lawyer, dated June�7,�2004, where Complainant stated that Respondent has presented on the website "www.robercolor.com" not only Complainant's products, but also Respondent's own goods bearing the trademark EMKO EMAYE.
The Panel finds that Respondent, by registering and using the disputed domain name, has intentionally attempted to profit from the Complainant's ROBERCOLOR marks when marketing and/or selling products with the Respondent's own trademarks.
Given the nature of the domain name, the absence of any bona fide use of it since it's registration, and the previous business relationship between the parties, the Panel concludes that the domain name was registered and used in bad faith.
For all the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs�4(i) of the Policy and 15�of the Rules, the Panel orders that the domain name, <robercolor.com> be transferred to the Complainant.
Peter G. Nitter
Dated: August�15,�2005


text:
Mistrzostwa Świata FIBT 1955 odbyły się w dniu 1 lutego 1955 w szwajcarskiej miejscowości Sankt Moritz, gdzie rozegrano konkurencję męskich dwójek i czwórek bobslejowych.

Dwójki
 Data: 1 lutego 1955

Czwórki
 Data: 1 lutego 1955

Tabela medalowa

Przypisy

Bibliografia
 Wyniki mistrzostw świata w bobslejach w sezonie 1954/1955

1955 w sportach zimowych
Mistrzostwa świata w bobslejach i skeletonie
1955 w Europie
Sport w Szwajcarii
Szwajcaria w XX wieku

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