The Arabs … are in a double state of decay that boggles the minds even of those who expected a hot summer of post-war decadence … The [Arab] nation will be split between those who dance to the beat of scandal and defeat, and those who blow themselves up in what is turning into a deafening religious ritual.
In their half-century of independence, the Arabs have been defeated time and again by their adversaries. Arab armies knew humiliation in the Nakba (catastrophe) of 1948 and the six-day defeat of 1967. They saw victory snatched from them by Israel in 1973, and they saw the largest standing Arab army put to flight by the United States in 1991. Arabs have hungered for military success. This past March, many of them thought they could smell one.
In the first few days of the war in Iraq, it appeared as though the Iraqis were admirably holding their own against obviously superior U.S. and British forces and might shatter expectations of a rapid Iraqi collapse. Arab observers lavished praise on the Iraqi forces, which would finally redeem Arab honor. It did not matter that a ruthless dictator ruled Iraq. A "steadfast and resisting" dictatorship was far better than a defeated Iraqi democracy, as one Arab commentator put it.
But the euphoria did not last long. The Iraqi forces crumbled, undermined by a lack of resolve and poor fighting spirit. Thanks to their pompous minister of information, Muhammad Sa'id as-Sahhaf, they also became the target of international ridicule. Initial pride turned into despair and shock as the Arabs, like the rest of the world, witnessed the spectacle of relieved Iraqis rejoicing in the overthrow of their leader by a foreign invasion.
And the Arabs, for all their sense of shame, did nothing to prevent this outcome. Some Arab states actually assisted the United States; others did nothing at all. Even the much-vaunted "Arab street" was dumbstruck. There were bigger demonstrations against U.S. war plans in Europe than in the Arab capitals. The Arab media (al-Jazeera, etc.) alone bore the message of Arab solidarity, leading one particularly cynical Arab observer to the wry conclusion that the Arabs were "nothing more than an acoustic phenomenon (zahira sawtiya)."
This essay might have been titled, "The Decline of the Arab World." But referring to the Arab world today seems anachronistic. If the term is intended to suggest that the Arab states are a functioning political collective, it is clearly a misnomer. The Arab world, as such, no longer exists, any more than a Latin American world does. There are not even blocks or axes of certain Arab states arraigned against others, as in the past. The Arab collective has become nothing but a motley assortment of states, each fending for itself, most in cooperation with the United States, a few against it. As Arab diplomats themselves concede, it is doubtful if one can refer to anything such as a collective Arab order. The twenty-two Arab states have very little in common other than their language.
The state of the Arab collective is not a consequence of the defeat of Saddam. Rather it is the ignominious defeat of Saddam that is symptomatic of the Arab condition. The Arabs are in deep crisis, politically, socially, and economically. Most have missed the boat of globalization; they are suffering from a leadership vacuum; and they are in no position to determine the regional agenda. After the U.S.-led war against Iraq, the Arabs are in even deeper disarray and sinking further into what Fouad Ajami described over two decades ago as the "Arab predicament."
The Arabs, for the most part, have no illusions. Arab intellectuals and commentators are the first to recognize the Arab predicament, and it is they who project a mood of profound collective despair. Arab inability to set the region's course is readily confirmed by Arab writers, who openly express the fear that Israel and the United States will now redraw the map of the Middle East. The Arabs, in their own self-image, are even more vulnerable than they were in the midst of World War I, when Britain and France carved up the Middle East in their secret deal of 1916, known as the Sykes-Picot agreement.
The impotence of the Arab League is but one symptom. After the war in Iraq, Arab foreign ministers opted not to convene at all. After all, they had nothing to decide. Muhammad Sid Ahmad, one of Egypt's leading intellectuals, lamented the fact that the Arabs were now absent from the international arena, despite the fact that the Middle East was one of the key regions on the globe.
The "Arab predicament" has only worsened since Ajami coined the phrase. The Arabs now stand at an impasse, with no prospect of exiting it any time soon. How they entered it is a cumulative litany of wrong choices, beginning with the hero of Arabism, Gamal Abdel Nasser.
The Arabs did not always feel themselves so helpless. In the heyday of Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s, Egypt's young and promising charismatic president shared the leadership of the awakening third world and the non-aligned movement with Nehru of India and Tito of Yugoslavia. Nasser appeared on the world stage as an equal with the great leaders of his time, and he set the regional agenda. He put paid to the Western effort to create an anti-Soviet defense pact in the Middle East and precipitated the Suez debacle, coercing the French and the British into accepting his nationalization of the Suez Canal.
As a result, Nasser became the unrivaled leader of the Arab world. For a decade, he spread his messianic vision of Arab unity, Arab socialism, and alliance with the Soviet Union as the panacea for the ills of the Arab world and for the rejuvenation of Arab power. In 1958, he forged a union with Syria, effectively becoming ruler over that country. Nasser's appeal was so magnetic that even the United States seriously considered abandoning its ally Jordan in the face of his onslaught. Washington, like just about everyone else, was convinced that Nasser represented the inevitable wave of the future.
Nasser's position began to come undone in 1961 when the union with Syria broke apart. He slipped further when Egypt became embroiled in a costly civil war in Yemen. But the final blow came in 1967. After six days of warfare with Israel, Nasserism was in tatters. The great promise proved to be no more than an illusion. Since then it has been a steady run downhill for the Arab states.
On the ruins of Nasserism, Islamists offered a supposedly authentic route to modernity, without secularism. But the record of the ayatollahs in Iran, the Islamist-inspired military regime in Sudan, and the Taliban in Afghanistan has been one of repeated failure. (In Iran, where Islamists still rule, the younger generation detests the regime.) The Islamists, an Arab writer observed, offered no realistic policy alternatives other than a totalitarian vision of their own. Indeed, radical Islam, instead of developing into an alternative route to modernity, has degenerated into a movement of fury and revenge. It has produced horrific acts of terrorism, but has failed to alter the balance of power in the Arabs' favor.
In the 1970s, there were those in the Arab world and elsewhere who believed that the oil weapon would become the guarantor of Arab resurgence. It did not. Declining oil prices in the 1980s sent the Arab economies reeling into crisis from which many have yet to recover. Even the Saudis are finding it ever more difficult to maintain their well-greased political system, in which the loyalty of the middle class was bought with favors bestowed by the state.
The critical centers of power in the modern Arab East are spent forces. Cairo, Riyadh, Baghdad, and Damascus are way past their prime.
Egypt. Egypt, as a poor third world state, is increasingly aware of the widening gap between its self-image as a regional leader and its real power to shape the turn of events in the Middle East. Recognizing that poverty and power do not go together, the Egyptians are complaining yet again of the unequal distribution of wealth amongst the Arabs, on the one hand, and urging Egypt's accelerated economic reform and privatization on the other. Egypt's weakness makes it vulnerable to economic competition from neighbors. Thus, for example, Egypt is concerned that, in the new post-Saddam era, it will have to compete with Iraqi exports of natural gas, or that a new regime in Iraq might be convenient to Israel and thus tip the regional scales even further against the Egyptians.
Politically, Egypt acquiesces in the U.S. will. This, too, is a sign of its weakness. In the aftermath of the 1967 defeat, Nasser remained defiant. Under his aegis, the Arab summit in Khartoum adopted its notorious three "nos," refusing to recognize, negotiate, or make peace with Israel. Shortly thereafter, he launched what became known as the "War of Attrition" against the Israeli forces along the Suez Canal. But in this day and age of U.S. hegemony and Arab lethargy, such a provocative mode of action would be unthinkable. Instead, the Egyptians cooperate. Most recently, they were involved in pressuring Arafat to allow the formation of the Mahmud Abbas (Abu Mazen) government. They have similarly done their utmost to convince the Syrians not to provoke the United States. Generally speaking, the name of Egypt's game is acquiescence with the powers that be rather than confrontation.
Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are in a state of constant anxiety, if not panic, paying protection to Islamic extremists and suffering their attacks all the same. Riyadh is also worried about oil prices. Strange as that may sound, it is true, nevertheless, and a sign of the times: rising prices might aggravate an already tense relationship with the United States. Since the exposure of the involvement of Saudi nationals in the attacks of September 11, 2001, American public anger against Saudi Arabia is rife. The Saudis would not even think of launching another oil boycott. Instead they have hired public relations specialists to plead the Saudi case and improve their image through television commercials. Saudi external debt is mounting, and its strategic importance to the United States has declined, now that Washington controls the future of Iraqi oil. The same holds true for Saudi territory for U.S. bases, which are being evacuated.
Iraq. In this overall picture of Arab infirmity, Iraq could have made a difference. Iraq is an extraordinary Arab state, not over-populated, potentially wealthy, and technologically advanced. But Saddam elected to use Iraqi power in futile confrontations with his neighbors, first Iran and then Kuwait. By so doing, he aroused almost the whole world against him. In the 1991 Kuwait war, even the Arab states sided with Washington. The United States intervened to restore the existing regional order, the very order that the Arab states craved.
The more recent Iraqi crisis, however, was very different. The United States invaded Iraq not to save the existing order but to overturn it. Generally speaking, the Arabs, even those who were relieved to see the last of Saddam, were deeply uncomfortable with the thought of the United States bowling over Middle Eastern regimes at will and possibly threatening the territorial integrity of an Arab state. But Washington had its way, and Iraq has become its testing ground for its theories about democracy.
Baghdad was once the capital of the magnificent caliphate empire of the Abbasids and the center of its Arabic-language culture under such illustrious caliphs as al-Mansur (754-75), Harun ar-Rashid (786-809) and al-Ma'mun (813-33). In modern times it was often the counterweight to Egyptian dominance and an alternative "throbbing heart" of Arabism. Until recently Baghdad was home to Saddam's regime, the defiant hope of the radicals. Now the United States plans to turn Baghdad into a beacon, but that prospect is distant, and may even be receding. In the meantime, Iraq is out of play as a force in the Arab world.
Syria. Damascus is more isolated than ever, completely surrounded by countries friendly to, allied with, or even occupied by the United States (Turkey, Israel, Jordan, and Iraq). This comes at a time when the new U.S. doctrine of preemptive war has given rise to a pervasive sense of uncertainty and insecurity in the Arab states in general and in Syria in particular. On what grounds will the United States make its assessments of imminent threat or danger? Who might U.S. forces strike next?
Even though Washington's war in Iraq, some Arabs argue, targeted "the Arabs" as a whole, there was not much they could do about it. They have very few levers of influence on the United States. The United States was not compelled to pay any real price to the Arab states in exchange for their reluctant acquiescence in the military action against the Saddam Hussein regime. Present U.S. initiatives in the Middle East peace process are not a payoff to the Arabs to whom Washington owes very little. They are far more of a response to its own domestic requirements and to the political concerns of its one and only real European ally, Britain. The United States has published the Quartet's new roadmap for a Palestinian solution primarily because President Bush seeks broader success in the Middle East, thus vindicating his decision to go to war. But Washington has no apparent desire, or capability for that matter, to impose the roadmap on the parties.
European concern for the Arab states and seemingly pro-Arab European policies are the consequences of Arab weakness, not Arab power or influence. Some on the left of the British Labor party have third-world sympathies that tend to be far more favorable to the Arabs in general, and to the Palestinians in particular, than to the first-world Israelis and their occupation. This holds true for other Europeans, too. But above and beyond the compassion is the hovering Damocles' sword of Arab emigration to Europe. The Europeans, as noted in a recent article by George Papandreou and Chris Patten, seem to be convinced that if only the Palestinian-Israeli issue were put to rest, "the full potential of cooperation in the Mediterranean region" could be achieved. Arab countries would be able to forge ahead towards economic reform and eventual prosperity. Such development would, in turn, reduce the demographic pressure of the Middle East on Europe. The Europeans are tilting in the Arabs' favor not because of oil power or the strength of Arab markets but because of the wretched state of many Arab societies and the impact emigration from there might have on the ethnic fabric of Europe in the generations ahead.
Arab decline has enhanced the regional stature of the non-Arab Middle Eastern states: Israel, Turkey, and Iran. Israel, because of its military power, economic viability, and technological prowess, is the only Middle Eastern state in the globalized league of Western affluent democracies. Turkey, a former imperial power, has an enormous land mass and is a populous, militarily powerful, geopolitically vital, Westernizing state, with considerable economic potential. Iran, somewhat less Westernized, has many of Turkey's geopolitical attributes as a regional power in addition to oil wealth and a certain influence among Arab Shi'ites who are bidding for power in their countries.
The routing of Saddam's regime in Iraq has crushed the traditional Sunni center of power for the first time in the country's history, elevating the Shi'ites, the majority in Iraq, to a position of unprecedented prominence. This does not mean Iranian control of Iraq or even a desire by the Iraqi Shi'ites to be governed by Iran. But it does give the Iranians a say in Iraq the likes of which they have not had before. In the Persian Gulf, Iran is the only regional power of consequence. Iraq is out for the count, and the Saudis are a broken reed. Iran's influence in Lebanon has also increased, through a more assertive and self-assured Hizbullah, ever since Syria's grip on Lebanon began to loosen under the uncertain, untrained, and indecisive hand of Bashar al-Assad. Iran's new stature was given symbolic recognition in mid-May 2003 when President Muhammad Khatami made the first visit to Lebanon by an Iranian president since the 1979 Islamic revolution.
Some Arabs are talking of modernizing the Arab League while President Bush is pushing a plan calling for a Middle Eastern free trade zone. Nothing may come of these notions, but both envisage the inclusion of Iran and Turkey in new regional associations. It is worthy of note that after the war in Iraq, in late April 2003, it was not the Arab League that convened but a forum of Iraq's neighbors, including Turkey and Iran, to discuss the new situation. Along with Turkey and Iran were Iraq's Arab neighbors (including Egypt, in a gesture of respect), but these are all clear indications of the rising fortunes of the non-Arabs as regional players at the expense of the receding Arab collective.
In the annals of the modern Arab state, June 1967 is a crucial watershed. The humiliating defeat that Israel dealt the Arabs was more than just a military setback. The outcome of the war signified the bankruptcy of the world of ideas that Nasser represented at the core of which was his messianic message of pan-Arabism. The erosion of pan-Arabism enhanced the legitimacy of the individual Arab territorial states and the acceptance of the regional state order. Arab politics became more pragmatic and less ideological as the Arab states and their ruling elites all sought to secure their state interests in the naked and unapologetic pursuit of their raison d'état.
So devoted was Nasser to the cause of Arabism that during his reign even Egypt's name was sacrificed: Egypt became one half of the United Arab Republic (UAR), which united Syria and Egypt, and Egypt remained the UAR even after Syria's secession in 1961. Only after Nasser's death in 1970 did his successor, Anwar Sadat, restore Egyptian primacy by renaming the country the Arab Republic of Egypt (in Arabic, Jumhuriyat Misr al-'Arabiya—note Misr first and Arab second). This was not a semantic exercise but the fundamental reorientation of Egypt's foreign policy to an "Egypt first" mindset, at the expense of Egypt's commitment to the overall Arab cause. It was this shift that paved the way first to a limited war against Israel and then to peace, all in the name of the Egyptian state interest—not ideology, whether pan-Arab, socialist, or otherwise.
Just as "Egypt first" became an acceptable political orientation, so could the Palestinians follow suit in the unabashed promotion of Palestinianness. They embarked on the pursuit of a separate peace and then launched their own war against Israel without consulting their Arab brethren. Their brethren, in turn, left the Palestinians to stew in their own juice without so much as batting an eyelash. In this new atmosphere of particularism, the Jordanians can espouse a "Jordan first" (al-Urdunn awwalan) policy and wage a domestic public relations campaign under this slogan with no need to explain and apologize. Such behavior would have been unimaginable in the Zeitgeist of the 1950s or early 1960s. It would have been automatically denounced by the guardians of pan-Arabism as "separatist" (infisali), "regionalist" (iqlimi), or downright treason, and an abandonment of the Arab cause.
But even the territorial state may be in some difficulty as primordial allegiances eat at its fabric. Iraq under the Baath is a case in point. Since 1968, Baathist Iraq followed the regionalist trend just like all the other Arab states. Despite the ruling party's professed pan-Arab ideology, Iraqi nationalism predominated at home with a dash of populist Islam thrown in for good measure. Arabism had failed to unite Sunnis, Shi'ites (who always suspected Arabism as a guise for Sunni dominance), and Kurds (who are not Arabs), all lumped together by British colonial fiat into what Elie Kedourie called the Iraqi "make-believe kingdom." The regime, in inventing an imaginary Iraqi identity, sought to revive the ancient heritage (turath) of pre-Islamic Mesopotamia (Babylon) and instructed Saddam's servile intellectuals to produce folklore, theatre, art, and literature accordingly. The regime set an example. It established a new mouthpiece, the daily Babil (Babylon), symbolically akin to the Egyptian Al-Ahram (the pyramids), evoking the country's pre-Islamic past. This was meant to offset the regime's republican, revolutionary, pan-Arab credentials as represented by titles of older newspapers like Ath-Thawra (the revolution) and Al-Jumhuriyya (the republic).
This Iraqi identity, however, was very artificial, especially as compared to Egyptianism. Egyptianism preceded Arabism by a few decades. In Egypt, the so-called Pharaonic trend of Egyptian identity was prominent immediately after independence in the 1920s and actively promoted by the country's most impressive liberal Westernizing elite. Egyptian identity was not imposed from above as a manipulative afterthought by a ruthless dictator after decades of failed Arabism as was the case in Iraq. Moreover, Egypt is a homogenous society with a strong sense of continuity since time immemorial as the people of the Nile Valley and is not the heterogeneous hodgepodge of Iraq. Even so, the Pharaonic trend did not last and was soon to succumb to Arabism, superseded after the 1967 debacle by the Egypto-Islamic mix of the present.
The triangular power structure of the Iraqi state—composed of the party, the army, and the domestic intelligence services—collapsed like a house of cards under the U.S.-led onslaught. The rapid disintegration of the regime revealed the enormous discrepancy between the power of the modern Arab authoritarian state to pulverize its own civil society and its concurrent incapacity to defend itself against severe external pressure. The Iraqi state, faced with American power, broke like glass under a hammer. Yet despite the searing hatred among most Iraqis of the Baath reign of terror, there is no remnant of civil society on which to begin the building of an acceptable substitute to the ancien régime. As an Arab commentator noted, since independence, the Arabs have failed to build viable nation-states. Instead they established police states that exploited every resource to protect their regimes from the peoples they governed. In this they succeeded, but they remain incapable of defending themselves against external threats.
Indeed, nation-states—whose claims on the identity of their inhabitants trump all other identities—have yet to take root in the Arab Middle East. But as already noted, there is an elite interest in the preservation of the regional state system and in the promotion of a loyalty to the territorial state. Moreover, certain other groups have similarly acquired an interest in the existing state order. Thus, the Shi'ites in Iraq, and their brethren in Lebanon, have a vested interest in the preservation of their respective states, rather than seeing them subsumed in an Arab or Sunni Islamic union. Even an Iranian Shi'ite take-over of Iraq, for that matter, would most probably be seen as very disadvantageous to Iraqi Shi'ite sectarian interests. The same kind of interests could be associated with the Druze and the Alawis of Syria. Still, despite the commitment to and political self-interest in the territorial state, it has not become the focus of emotional identity. It has not evolved into the civic religion that supersedes other loyalties—whether sub-national, supra-national, primordial, religious, sectarian, ethnic, or tribal.
But this is where Jenkins got it wrong. For the great majority of Iraqis, the contents of the National Museum are not the crown jewels of their collective memory. For the Sunnis, it would be the memories of the glorious Abbasid caliphate and for the Shi'ites, their holy shrines of Najaf (the tomb of Ali), Karbala (the tomb of Hussein), and Kazimayn (the tombs of the seventh imam, Musa al-Kazim, and the eleventh, al-Hasan al-'Askari). These are the historical cradles of their suffering and their faith—not the kings of Assyria or the artifacts of Babylon. The massive outpouring of Shi'ite faith in Karbala—disallowed under Saddam—immediately after the U.S. occupation of Iraq, on the occasion of the commemoration of the fortieth day of the anniversary of the death of Imam Hussein, was as good an indication as any of the real cultural components of Iraqi collective memory.
Religious, ethnic, and tribal heritages are the crown jewels of collective memory, and these were left untouched. No one probably even considered the idea of looting the mosques at the holy shrines or anywhere else for that matter. One can easily imagine the punishment that would have been meted out to any such prospective looter by the clerics and their flock. (And when Iraqis did return some of the looted treasures of the National Museum, it was in response to appeals from their religious leaders.) After the disintegration of the regime, the primordial identities have clearly emerged supreme as religion and tribe prove to be more natural collective sanctuaries than territorial nationalism.
Not all Arab states are the same in this respect, and one should be cautious about sweeping generalizations. Thus, Egyptian identity is certainly more solid than Iraqi identity. But Jordan and the Palestinians are more problematic. Much is said of the Jordanian-Palestinian cleavage in Jordan. But perhaps this dichotomy has been overstated, considering that Jordanians have more in common with Palestinians culturally and historically than current tensions may reveal. After all, the great majority of them are Sunni Muslims, and the minority who are not are, for the most part, Orthodox Christians. For Muslims and Christians alike, Arabic is their mother tongue. Jordanians and Palestinians mix socially and marry each other all the time—Muslims with Muslims and Christians with Christians. The religious fault line is crossed far less frequently than the secular, national Jordanian-Palestinian one. Territorial nationalism, Jordanian and Palestinian, is sincere and very real but is still a skin-deep modern-day veneer in comparison with the historical depth of religious, ethnic, and tribal identities that have their roots in the seventh century and in some cases even well before then.
The aftermath of the Iraq war, then, represents another instance of the self-centered Arab state acting in its own interests. But Iraq's situation has also shown the fragility of loyalties to the state, and the persistence of corrosive primordial allegiances. These loyalties are yet another source of dissent and weakness.
As for the Palestinian question, like so many other regional matters, it should be seen through the lens of historical evolution from 1967 until the present—that is, from the zenith of Palestinian national revival through the fida'i (armed resistance) movement of the late 1960s to the trough of today. For the Palestinians—defeated, devastated economically, and with no Arab hinterland to back them—it is almost the Nakba revisited.
If 1967 was one critical turning point, the war in Lebanon in 1982 was another. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which had been expelled from Jordan in 1971, lost its last autonomous base of operations in Lebanon in 1982. This was a severe setback, forcing the PLO onto a course of gradual decline. The center of gravity of Palestinian politics shifted from the Palestinian diaspora into the West Bank and Gaza, which began to emerge as the effective core of Palestinian political action. This process came to fruition in the intifada that erupted in 1987 when the people of the West Bank and Gaza led the Palestinian struggle against Israel for the first time. The PLO watched from the sidelines, fearing for its hitherto unchallenged primacy in Palestinian affairs, yet reaping the international political rewards from the struggle of their brethren against the Israelis. But in the early 1990s, the intifada was running out of steam and other simultaneous developments in the international and regional arenas placed the PLO under extreme pressure.
The Cold War came to an end with the disintegration of the Soviet Union; massive Jewish emigration from the former Soviet Union threatened to tip the demographic scales in the West Bank and Gaza in Israel's favor; and the United States defeated Iraq in the 1991 Kuwait war. With the initiation of the Madrid process in October 1991, the PLO deeply feared marginalization as the Palestinian question was negotiated in the corridors of international diplomacy in an era of Palestinian and Arab weakness. Yasir Arafat, under the impression that time was working against him and in desperate need of an entrance ticket into the center of gravity of Palestinian politics in the West Bank and Gaza, decided to accept the Oslo accords in 1993. But by the end of the 1990s, the wheels of fortune had seemingly turned again, and Arafat's perceptions of time altered accordingly.
Arafat was now in control of the Palestinian core. Soviet immigration to Israel hardly affected the demographic balance between Jews and Arabs in the West Bank and Gaza where almost all Soviet Jews chose not to settle. Moreover, Soviet immigration hardly affected the overall balance between Jews and Arabs in the entire area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan River, other than postponing the eventual Palestinian majority there by only a few years. By the late 1990s, Iraq appeared to be on the verge of regaining acceptance not only into the community of Arab states but by ever-growing segments of the international community. Saddam defied the United States with apparent impunity and emboldened the radicals across the board. In the summer of 2000, Israel withdrew unilaterally from Lebanon, giving the impression that affluent Israel was tiring. Arafat lost his sense of urgency for a deal with Israel and acquiesced in the use of force to coerce Israel to accept conditions more favorable to the Palestinians, particularly on matters relating to Jerusalem and refugees.
The use of force was a catastrophic mistake, the worst the Palestinians have made since 1948. With the Arabs in disarray, Israel effectively crushed the Palestinian armed intifada. There can be little doubt in the minds of many Palestinians and most Israelis that the Palestinian effort to coerce Israel to accept the unacceptable has come to a dead end. Israeli society has proved to be more resilient than the Palestinians—and many Israelis, too—would have thought. The Palestinian effort to break the Israeli spirit through terror has failed. The Arabs have let the Palestinians down again. If the Palestinians believed momentarily that their war with Israel would draw the Arabs into the fray, they were mistaken. Even financial aid was but a pittance. Lastly, the Palestinians desperately sought to draw the international community in on their behalf. This did not materialize either. Arafat's terrorist war has discredited him in the eyes of the international community. And though it is true that the vision of President Bush and the Quartet includes an independent Palestinian state, what the Palestinians wanted was not to be included in the international community's vision but for their own vision to be imposed on Israel. That is hardly likely. In sum, then, not one of the major Palestinian war aims has been fully attained. That is the definition of failure.
Arafat, by leading the Palestinians in the present war, lost any residue of credibility he may still have had with the Israelis. His position is reminiscent of the predicament of the first leader of the Palestinian national movement, Hajj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem. Husseini's collaboration with the Nazis in World War II cost him his international legitimacy. He then made matters infinitely worse by leading his people headlong into their 1948 disaster. Arafat has done pretty much the same. The Palestinian war against Israel has resulted in massive Israeli retaliation that has crippled the Palestinian Authority (PA), disrupted the Palestinian population's daily life, and devastated their economy. Moreover, the war has also led to the constant rise in the popularity of Hamas at the expense of Fatah. And the Palestinian modus operandi of suicide bombings has earned their struggle unprecedented international opprobrium. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have condemned the bombings as crimes against humanity. These organizations regularly condemn Israel, but their condemnation of Palestinian actions is a novelty.
The appointment of Abu Mazen (Mahmud Abbas) as the PA's "prime minister" has been heralded as a major step toward Palestinian political reform and the long-awaited diminution of Arafat's political supremacy. The pressure on Arafat to stand aside came not only from Israel, the United States, and other members of the Quartet, but from within the young guard of his own Fatah movement. For quite some time there had been rumblings of disaffection with Arafat's handling of affairs and his virtual loss of control. The Israelis, the Americans, and the Quartet members probably would have preferred a change of the guard in generational terms. After all, one of the most serious disadvantages of dealing with Arafat is the symbolic and substantive significance of his belonging, in the deepest historical and emotional sense, to the 1948 refugee generation. Arafat is driven by the obsession of rectifying what Palestinians of all persuasions see as the historical injustice of 1948, above and beyond independent statehood.
Israelis would prefer to see "insiders," i.e., people from the West Bank and Gaza, in the saddle, rather than the arch-representatives of the "outsider" refugee constituency. Israel has no real solution for the Palestinian refugee diaspora that would satisfy Palestinian national aspirations. Israel could, however, accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza and would therefore much prefer to negotiate with credible representatives of this insider constituency.
But Abu Mazen is neither an insider nor a member of the young guard. He is Arafat's veteran deputy and, in his late sixties, is one of the PLO's old guard. Abu Mazen, born in Safad in the mid-1930s, is (like Arafat) a representative of the diaspora refugee constituency. Abu Mazen is one of the founding members of Fatah, who has also served for many years on the PLO executive committee. Moreover, the procedure of approval of the prime minister, first by the PLO central council and only subsequently by the legislative council of the PA, is highly significant. This deliberately calculated procedure is also of symbolic and substantive importance. It maintains the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of all Palestinians wherever they may be and as the supreme source of political authority of the Palestinian people, insiders and outsiders alike. In contrast, the PA's legislative council speaks only for the West Bank and Gaza. This is a way of saying that not only the West Bank and Gaza are on the table but the entire cause of historical Palestine.
On the other hand, Abu Mazen's rise to prominence represents positive change, too. He was one of the few PLO officials who were involved in the secret talks that led to the Oslo accords, and despite his origins, he appears to be a firm believer in the need for a settlement with Israel. Perhaps most importantly in terms of the more recent past, Abu Mazen went on record to an audience of his own people in Gaza in November 2002, with a courageous and scathing critique of the Palestinians' political conduct in the two years of the latest "militarized" intifada. "What have we achieved?" he asked. The Palestinians were well on their way to statehood, and now after two years, they were left with "the total destruction" of all they had built. Instead of drawing Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon to the negotiating table where the Palestinians might have cornered him, they resorted to the use of armed force where the Israelis had the upper hand, not only over the Palestinians but also over the Arabs as a whole. The Palestinian Authority was in desperate need of reform and a "redirection of [its] path," he concluded.
These were the words of a sober realist, the likes of whom the Palestinians desperately need to extricate themselves from their sorry predicament. And while Abu Mazen does not have an independent power base, he has the firm support of key figures in the Fatah new guard who have had their own differences with Arafat. With allies like these, Abu Mazen could also serve as the bridge between the new and the old guards and between insiders and outsiders.
But Arafat was coerced into this move by a combination of domestic and foreign forces, and he is fighting tooth and nail to preserve his own flagging authority. Arafat is a tenacious, experienced, and crafty political operator. He is not likely to succumb to those who wish to hasten his denouement without seemingly endless maneuvers and manipulations of mental attrition, deliberately calculated to exasperate all contenders and external meddlers alike. Furthermore, he has considerable popular support. There is widespread opposition to the appointment of a prime minister, coming as it does in the wake of external pressure. Hamas is not happy with Abu Mazen's appointment or with what he has done with it so far, especially his relatively conciliatory remarks at the Aqaba summit in early June 2003. After all, he presently stands for everything they flatly oppose.
So long as Arafat is not incapacitated, it will be very difficult to sideline the wily old "Mr. Palestine." Abu Mazen, therefore, has not emerged as a serious leadership rival to the historical Palestinian leader. His appointment is not the end of Arafat by any means. Even if it spells the beginning of the end, it will still be quite a while before Israel can discuss the end of conflict with a reliable Palestinian leadership.
In the meantime, however, the Palestinian war has lost its psychological momentum and the Arab hinterland (Iraq) has been defeated as well. As in 1948, the Palestinians in particular and the Arabs in general are staring at failure. This is why the Palestinians have accepted a cease-fire of sorts that may stop the war, save face, and allow them to catch their breath and regroup. The emerging reality presents an opportunity for a new dynamic of negotiation. But there is also the danger that, for the radicals, this is no more than a breather. While the likes of Abu Mazen are convinced that the Palestinians have lost, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and segments of Fatah, too, are in a state of denial.
Like Usama bin Ladin, they represent the rage and the desire for revenge of a civilization in retreat. Their rebellion against the bleak vision of the future cannot change the world they live in. The ritual of death and destruction can offer momentary satisfaction of the need for retribution, but the focus on the compensations of the next world will do nothing to alter their predicament in this one.
Asher Susser is director and senior research fellow of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. This essay is based on a lecture delivered in May 2003 to analysts at the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
 Al-Ahram Weekly (Cairo), May 22-28, 2003.
 Sultan al-Khattab, in ar-Ra'y (Amman), Mar. 28, 2003.
 Majid Kayyali, in al-Bayan (Dubai), Apr. 10, 2003.
 Al-Ahram Weekly, Apr. 24-30; May 15-21, 2003.
 'Isam Ikrimawi, in al-Quds al-'arabi (London), Apr. 11, 2003.
 Eliyahu Kanovsky, "Oil: Who's Really over a Barrel?" Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2003, pp. 58, 60.
 George Papandreou and Chris Patten, "Sharing the Benefits of EU Enlargement," Kathimerini (Athens), May 26, 2003.
 Elie Kedourie, "The Kingdom of Iraq: A Retrospect," in Elie Kedourie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies, new ed. (Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England for Brandeis University Press, 1984), p. 278.
 Ikrimawi, in al-Quds al-'arabi, Apr. 11, 2003.
 The Times (London), May 2, 2003.
 Al-Hayat (London), Nov. 26, 2002.
Related Topics: Middle East patterns, Middle East politics | Asher Susser | Fall 2003 MEQ receive the latest by email: subscribe to the free mef mailing list This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete and accurate information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL.


text:
Q: How to hide Wordpress upgrade message in Admin Panel? How do we hide upgrade now message in admin panel for wordpress 2.9.2 ? is there's any ? i use
add_action( 'init', create_function( '$a', "remove_action( 'init', 'wp_version_check' );" ), 2 );
  add_filter( 'pre_option_update_core', create_function( '$a', "return null;" ) );

but it seem it's not working.

A: Run an upgrade. The message will go away.

A: This is the code that worked for me:

add_action('admin_menu','bhhidenag');
function bhhidenag()
{
   remove_action( 'admin_notices', 'update_nag', 3 );
}

You can read more about it in the blog-entry where I found this:
http://www.websitesecrets101.com/how-to-hide-wordpresss-update-now-notification

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
gm.me.uk Playing with the sand at the side of the road
Currently Digesting
I would love to tell you what I think of every anime series I'm watching right now. Really, I would. But first of all, I doubt you'd be the least bit interested, and second of all, there's only 24 hours in a day, and because I'm at uni, 18 of them are often consigned to this thing called "work." But enough complaining. I thought I would quickly go over some thoughts rattling around my head about some of the other series I'm currently watching.
This isn't an exhaustive list, of course, just the shows that I'm most interested in, and would like to share. You'll probably see a second part to this list soon.
Allison & Lillia
I know that this is a fairly recent series, but because of whatever magical technique the people at Madhouse use, this anime has the feel of something that's a classic. As far as I can tell, the story tells us about the the fight between Roxche and Sous-Beil over who came first. It sounds like a stupid thing to fight over when you put it down in words, but I'm sure there have been actual wars over the very same topic.
I really like this series so far. The characters are spot on - Allison is a go-getting fighter pilot who leaps before she looks, but always manages to lovably escape unharmed, dragging her childhood friend Wil along with her. The chemistry that Allison and Wil have is something that's very hard to manufacture in an anime series, but you can really feel it here. I'm very much looking forward to seeing the rest of this.
Bamboo Blade
Hmm. How can I describe Bamboo Blade? It's a fun series, what with all of its characters being slightly demented in one way or another. Some of its comic moments so far have been inspired, even though you couldn't really classify it as a comedy. It's about a high school kendo club and it's lack of members, no thanks to the apathetic and malmourished coach. But you certainly wouldn't call it a sports anime as such. It's got many more good things going for it than that.
For one, the characters, as I mentioned, are all very unique and likeable in their own ways. While there are a few stereotypes present as always, the producers do throw a bit extra in when they reveal the stereotypically "kawaii" Miya is deep down a blood-thirsty misanthrope who thinks hitting people is fun. It's points like this that make Bamboo Blade hard to ignore. Certainly one to keep watching.
Hidamari Sketch x 365
Slice of life is an anime genre that is aimed at a relatively narrow selection of anime fans that like shows that have no plot. A niche within a niche, if you will. Luckily, I love the stream of consciousness, character-driven shows that slice of life provides so often. One of these is Hidamari Sketch, an anime detailing the daily lives of four high-school art students living in a small apartment block called Hidamari Apartments. The beauty of the series is its simplicity, as well as its characters. Yuno, Miyako, Sae and Hiro are all endearing in their own way, and their chemistry as a group is also hard to better.
This new series continues in the vein of the first, being completely unchronological in its episode ordering. There are small ties that let you know where you are in the year, but apart from that, the focus is completely on the characters. It's hard to put into words what I really like about Hidamari Sketch. The atmosphere it generates is a friendly one, and it makes you feel good. Simple as that.
Kaiba
First impressions are not everything with Kaiba. If that were the case, you would think you were watching CBeebies or something. Get past the Astro Boy-esque animation, and watch it for what it is. The initial plot introduces a world where people can swap bodies at will, erase and create memories and basically live forever. Any other anime would portray this world as a beautiful utopia, but Kaiba strives to find the worst of it. It makes the show interesting as hell. We see stories of corruption, lust, greed, betrayl and grief, all while Kaiba travels in whatever body he can, with no memories, searching for someone on the one human relic he has left.
There was an episode I recently seen, called "Chroniko," that I just thought was one of the most emotive and brilliant episodes an an anime I had ever seen. I won't spoil it, I'll just tell you that it's an emotional rollercoaster. After initial worries about the series, I can now clearly say that I'll be following this right to the end.
Japan 2017 Redux: Day 9 "Beef bowl 420 (yen)" 06 May 2021
Japan 2017 Redux: Day 8 "Going home club" 05 May 2021
Japan 2017 Redux: Day 7 "No Halation" 04 May 2021
© 2022 . All rights reserved. Archive gerjomarty gerjomarty [email protected]

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


text:
Preliminary survey shows gap between GTA claimants within minor injury guideline (MIG) and non-GTA claimants in MIG
April 29, 2011	by Canadian Underwriter
Ontario's 2010 auto reforms appear to be funnelling injured claimants into the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG), but there is still a divide between those claimants in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA) and those outside of the GTA, said Lynn Anderson, Aviva Canada's vice president of health care services.
Anderson offered an insurer's perspective at The LMH Group's Before the MIG Hits the Fan seminar in Toronto on Apr. 29.
Anderson said Aviva Canada is one of six companies taking part in a survey conducted by Insurance Bureau of Canada to measure the success of the 2010 auto reforms in controlling the escalating costs of accident benefits in Ontario.
The survey results are still very preliminary, Anderson said, but there were some positive signs.
"The survey is based on the kinds of forms that have been submitted, and we know that the actual forms and what's on those forms are not necessarily good indicators of what's going on or what the outcomes will be," she said.
Of the 508 claimants Aviva is following, 69% of the injuries are within the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG), she said. But 33% of those were put into the MIG through the use of an independent exam, representing an additional cost to the insurer.
There is still a divide in the number of Greater Toronto Area (GTA) claimants landing in the MIG, and those outside of the GTA, she noted.
"Eighty-two per cent of non-GTA claimants began in the MIG," Anderson said. "Unfortunately though, there is tension pulling the other way. We're seeing 54% of the claimants on OCF-23s (Pre-Approved Treatment Confirmation Forms), when the target for FSCO was 60%."
Within the GTA, only 57% of claimants begin treatment in the MIG and 38% of those are on an OCF-23, Anderson said.
"So, with some encouragement and advisement from our advisors we're managing to get some of those GTA claimants into the MIG"
FSCO updates auto insurance health claim forms
FSCO issues ruling on minor injury guideline in disputed auto claim
FSCO introduces new HCAI guidelines to help insurers reconcile health care invoices
Ontario Minor Injury Guideline a limit but not exclusion to Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule: Court


text:
SubTopic Employee onboarding
Tech Accelerator Guide to building an effective employee experience strategy
Digital employee experience a new focus of HR-IT partnership
Generational change forced companies to repave the on-ramps to the digital workplace and improve the employee experience. COVID-19 changed the emphasis, but the goals are the same.
Tony Kontzer
Greg Beltzer is looking down the barrel of a distinctly 21st-century problem: nurturing the digital employee experience in a time of great generational and technological change without disrupting tried-and-true business models.
As head of technology for the U.S. wealth management unit of Royal Bank of Canada, Beltzer supports a business that has historically thrived on in-person interactions. And with a staff of 2,100 financial advisors whose average age is in the late 50s, that personal attention is beloved.
But everything about how RBC Wealth Management goes about its business has been changing. And it's not just because the COVID-19 pandemic has forced the company's advisors out of the office, off of airplanes and into their homes. It's also because the evolving profile of incoming employees, who are younger and more tech-savvy than ever, has forced the company to look hard at how it works.
And one thing has become abundantly clear: not having the tech tools that new employees expect can be a competitive disadvantage.
"I'm not Google, and I can't match them in the area of digital experience," said Beltzer, who supports 5,000 employees in total. "But that's the bar I'm being compared against."
Guide to building an effective employee experience strategy
Many paths on quest to build an employee experience platform
The 7 most impactful employee experience apps
15 essential employee engagement survey questions
Download this entire guide for FREE now!
Dion Hinchcliffe
In fact, workers' perception of the digital workplace tools they're given is the number one factor in getting them to engage effectively with technology, said Dion Hinchcliffe, vice president and principal analyst at Constellation Research.
Also important is a feeling of autonomy among workers that they can use the tools they feel are best for the job, Hinchcliffe said. This is what led to the rise of shadow IT, which he said has grown from just 10% of IT resources to 55% in the past two decades. The goal is no longer to stop shadow IT, but rather to establish security safeguards around it.
That said, forward-looking organizations are looking to take what they've learned from empowering customers and apply it to create a more organized and optimized digital employee experience, much to the excitement of HR decision-makers and the IT teams that support them.
"They're really scratching their heads and wondering, 'Where do we go?' Hinchcliffe said. "We have this moment -- for once, the focus is on the employee experience."
Application creep led to digital overload
The emergent need for organizations to address the digital employee experience has been an outgrowth of a natural process, Hinchcliffe said. Over time, IT has given employees applications to handle important tasks such as customer management and order processing, but as the number of applications mushroomed, employees found themselves surrounded by technology.
"You have this much more sophisticated, more complex work environment," Hinchcliffe said.
Art Mazor
Statistics suggest the moment for action was overdue. Art Mazor, principal and global HR transformation practice leader at Deloitte, said 30% of workers estimate they're losing a day of productivity every week spent combing through irrelevant messages and content. What's more, according to a study Mazor cited, the "Sierra-Cedar 2018-2019 HR Systems Survey," the number of systems that knowledge workers access daily has grown from eight to 11 just in the last three years.
Such unwieldy complexity has left companies with little choice but to guide employees to the right tools, help them get the most out of those tools and, perhaps most importantly, monitor how those tools are used so they can be tweaked when necessary. The ultimate goal is a frictionless digital employee experience.
"With the increased collaboration between humans and technology, there's a massive recognition across business leaders and HR leaders alike that an investment in new skills is required," Mazor said.
DAP jumpstarts digital employee experience
As a result, the digital employee experience has become a natural offshoot of digital transformation efforts. RBC Wealth Management just happens to be one of the companies that's been knee-deep in that process, having spent the past two years overhauling the technology its advisors and clients use.
Beltzer said it's been an exciting transition for the company that has also asked a lot of advisors who'd been using legacy technology for decades and were comfortable with it. As a result, he's also turned to a digital adoption platform (DAP) called WalkMe to help get employees acclimated.
"I knew that we needed to be proactive around organizational change management, and we had to review our approach to training," Beltzer said. "We needed more than the traditional approaches, and we needed actual technology to help with that transition."
While RBC Wealth Management was slowly getting used to the new tools and advisors continued with their in-person emphasis, COVID-19 arrived and turned the company's model on its head. Suddenly, instead of nearly every advisor being on the road and meeting with clients, they were all suddenly working remotely and having to navigate the world of virtual meetings.
Make no mistake, though: Beltzer considers the company lucky to have done so much digital transformation work before the pandemic hit. It essentially turned what had been a slow-and-steady adoption curve into a fire drill of sorts -- not just for the advisors and other staff, but for the trainers who normally taught them in person.
"It wasn't about scrambling to try to put technology in place behind an eight ball. It was more, how do we get employees trained?" Beltzer said. "We were forced to use those tools and be a little more creative about how we did that."
The WalkMe platform proved to be critical, and the company started squeezing more out of it. It hired a person to create additional content in the form of scenarios and walk-throughs, such as how to initiate an email campaign. Beltzer said WalkMe literally does what its name implies: Walks users through applications, using arrows to point at where to click.
The company also started conducting regular training webinars on topics such as how to set up a video conference, create a virtual wealth plan using the internal planning tool or get a client signed up for online access.
"It was actually more efficient for the trainer, instead of traveling to branches. They could do three or four of those a day and still have a life," Beltzer said. "I'm hoping it's a cultural change."
While Beltzer has no idea what to expect in a world that seems to change drastically every day, he knows a good thing when he sees it. And whether it was planned or not, the changes he's seeing are resulting in more -- and better -- use of the digital tools he's put in place. And the more RBC Wealth Management's clients use them, the more value his employees will see in them.
"At the end of the day, client behavior will define advisor behavior," Beltzer said.
Along those lines, WalkMe also has given Beltzer powerful tracking tools. He knows what people are clicking on and when they're struggling with an application. If one scenario requires an abnormal amount of clicks, it probably means something needs to be tweaked.
Having a DAP behind the employee experience has supercharged a digital onboarding tool in development that was fast-tracked when COVID-19 hit. Despite the rush to launch it, the tool -- which is the first RBC Wealth Management has rolled out 100% digitally -- is already having a big impact by streamlining both the advisors' and clients' experiences.
WalkMe will figure prominently again in September, when the company introduces its first digital scheduling tool. But Beltzer knows that he risks introducing digital fatigue if he throws too much at his employees, and that the business model he supports can never be all digital. It's all about striking the right balance.
What's most important is that the company has plenty of evidence that it's on the right track.
"Something is working in a very tumultuous time," he said. "It's one thing to say you're going to do it. We've done it now. We've shown it can be successful. Let's continue."
Expert advice for improving digital employee experience
Based on suggestions from the experts, here are eight tips that will increase the odds of success for a digital employee experience effort.
Give employees the right tools and allow them to pick those tools where appropriate. Providing the wrong tools or curtailing employees' autonomy are likely to backfire.
Excise digital friction wherever you find it. Identify the places where employees must exert unnecessary effort when working with technology or data.
Balance technology with people and processes. It's an age-old IT truism, but digital employee experience efforts that focus exclusively on the digital can only accomplish so much.
Consider a digital adoption platform to smooth the process. In-person training and online tutorials can't keep up with the pace of work. DAPs embed the learning process in each tool.
Get on top of change management and stakeholder expectations. A common pitfall of digital employee experience efforts is companies putting in a DAP and thinking that's all they have to do. Communication and management of expectations are essential to success.
Develop a culture of enablement in IT and of digital dexterity in the larger employee population. One way is to create new roles, such as enablement agents and team champions.
Establish adoption metrics. Identify areas where workers need help, set a baseline and monitor how far your company is able to move the needle.
Finally, measure success. There are three ways to do this: observing and tracking utilization rates, assessing skill levels and surveying employees about digital attitudes and aptitudes. It's best to focus on causative impacts that can be verified and put less stock in ones that only show correlation.
Dig Deeper on Employee onboarding software
Microsoft slow to fulfill request for more Teams channel control
By: Maxim Tamarov
Digital adoption platforms can improve employee experience
By: Tony Kontzer
How to address a Microsoft Teams telephony integration
By: Katherine Finnell
IT must prep for the rise of the hybrid team
By: Mike Gleason
The Digital Experience Defines the Employee Experience –Citrix
Delivering Next-Generation Employee Experiences with the Citrix Workspace ... –Citrix
Deploying a Digital Workspace? Three Critical Capabilities to Look For –Citrix
Digital adoption platforms can improve employee ... – SearchHRSoftware
BlackBerry enters digital workspace market – SearchEnterpriseDesktop
US Gov't Usage Data: Win10 Grabbing Marketshare from ... – SearchEnterpriseDesktop


text:
Q: Finding contours of inner holes for images with multiple outer contours We have multiple contours. Some are positive and some are negative (holes). Here is the code i'm using
def get_corners(grid: np.ndarray, show=False):

    corners = set()
    hole_corners = set()

    # Filter using contour hierarchy
    cnts, hierarchy = cv.findContours(grid, cv.RETR_TREE, cv.CHAIN_APPROX_SIMPLE)[-2:]

    hierarchy = hierarchy[0]
    for component in zip(cnts, hierarchy):
        currentContour = component[0]
        currentHierarchy = component[1]
        # x,y,w,h = cv.boundingRect(currentContour)
        # Has hole which means it is IN
        if currentHierarchy[2] < 0:
            for corner in currentContour[:, 0, :]:
                corner_coords = tuple(corner.tolist())
                hole_corners.add(corner_coords)
            # cv.putText(image, 'IN', (x,y-10), cv.FONT_HERSHEY_SIMPLEX, 0.7, (36,255,12), 2)
        # No child which means it is OUT
        elif currentHierarchy[3] < 0:
            for corner in currentContour[:, 0, :]:
                corner_coords = tuple(corner.tolist())
                corners.add(corner_coords)

the problem with it is that, when there is more than one positive contour, it doesn't work as expected. every positive contour > 1 gets counted as a hole. here is it displayed.

*

*Red: positive contours

*Green: negatives/holes

As you can see its not working as expected.
all counted as holes

one counted correctly, rest mostly incorrectly

image with contours labelled correctly (ignore corner color here)

Another failure case with islands with no child being counted as holes
 hierarchy for this: [[ 1 -1 -1 -1]
 [ 3  0  2 -1]
 [-1 -1 -1  1]
 [-1  1 -1 -1]]

A: Figured it out. using RETR_CCOMP and checking for currentHierarchy[3] worked for me. Corners is a set with all corners of the outer contours, hole_corners is a set with all corners of the inner, or hole contours.
(cnts, hierarchy) = cv.findContours(grid,mode=cv.RETR_CCOMP, method=cv.CHAIN_APPROX_TC89_KCOS)

corners = set()
hole_corners = set()

# Filter using contour hierarchy

hierarchy = hierarchy[0]
for component in zip(cnts, hierarchy):
    currentContour = component[0]
    currentHierarchy = component[1]
    (hnext, hprev, hchild, hparent) = currentHierarchy

    if hparent < 0:
        # Has no parent, which means it is not a hole
        for corner in currentContour[:, 0, :]:
            corner_coords = tuple(corner.tolist())
            corners.add(corner_coords)
    else:
        # Has a parent, which means it is a hole
        for corner in currentContour[:, 0, :]:
            corner_coords = tuple(corner.tolist())
            hole_corners.add(corner_coords)


The Big Journey is now available in audio from New Life Radio HERE. These audio recordings are in MP3 format. They're a simplified version of the sixteen PDF pamphlets available on our home page. There are thirty talks, each between 15-20 minutes long. So by listening to just one short talk each day, you could take a journey through the whole Bible in just one month.
I really enjoyed your series on New Life Radio and am planning to listen to them again!
Do you have them in file format that I could access via email? I don't always have access to a browser so this would be really useful!
It's great to hear from you, and glad you're finding the audio series helpful. The files are in MP3 format and can be downloaded to your 'phone or computer for offline use. You can right click on the 'download' button to the right of each audio message title, then click on 'Save link as…'. A dialog box appears. At this point, you may want to select another directory to save the files to. Then click on 'save' at the bottom right of the dialog box to download the MP3. If for some reason this doesn't work as expected, please let me know. I could alternatively try emailing the files to you, but they are rather large.
Hope that you and Lecia and family are all well.


SANTA FE – The executive director of the New Mexico History Museum has been let go.
Andrew Wulf, who held the position since 2015 and set off a handful of cultural controversies during his tenure, served his last day as head of the museum on Friday. The museum includes the historic Palace of the Governors on the Santa Fe Plaza.
Some of Wulf's calls as director that drew criticism included removing devils from their decadeslong roles as the villains in Santa Fe's annual Las Posadas procession, a traditional Christmas season re-enactment of the Holy Family's search for shelter before Jesus' birth; an attempt to keep organizers of the Fiesta de Santa Fe from nailing wooden Hispanic family crests on the Palace's exterior, as had been done for years; and failure to include a local Hispanic speaker in a public forum over the contentious issues surrounding the Fiesta and the Entrada, the pageant that re-enacts the Spaniards' return to Santa Fe 12 years after the Pueblo Revolt of 1680.
Debra Garcia y Griego, secretary-designate of the state Department of Cultural Affairs, said Monday that the department is looking to go in a "different direction with the history museum." She declined to elaborate further.
Reached by phone, Wulf said his dismissal came as a surprise, but that he knew it was a possibility given the change in gubernatorial administrations. He was hired under then-Gov. Susana Martinez.
"We leave on good terms, off to a brighter future, and it was an honor to be at the helm of what I think is the best regional history museum in the world," Wulf said.
Garcia y Griego, formerly head of the Santa Fe Arts Commission, who recently was appointed to head Cultural Affairs by Gov. Michelle Lujan Grisham, said the Museum of New Mexico Board of Regents – which oversees all state government museums – will be putting together a search committee to advertise for Wulf's successor and select finalists.
Wulf came to the New Mexico History Museum after serving as supervisory museum curator at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum in California. He'd also previously worked at Los Angeles' Skirball Museum and Cultural Center, the University of Southern California's Fisher Museum of Art and Special Collections, and London's Victoria and Albert Museum.
He said he's proud of the museum team's work opening up "new dialogue and new conversations" about New Mexico history during his tenure, specifically mentioning programs on lowriders, crypto-Judaism and New Mexico's Native American cultures.
Some of Wulf's decisions during his tenure were later reversed. For example, his 2017 decision to swap out Las Posadas' devils with innkeepers was reversed after one performance. The devils were back in December 2018.
Wulf said the rooftop devils, who are always booed vigorously by crowds on the Plaza as they reject Mary and Joseph's requests for shelter, were not part of traditional Hispanic Las Posadas pageants elsewhere. But they had always been the bad guys at the Santa Fe event, which grew out of a neighborhood version of Las Posadas, since the History Museum took it over in the 1980s.
Last year, then-DCA Secretary Veronica Gonzales directed the department to allow the Fiesta Council to hang family coats of arms at the Palace after Wulf in a letter asked for an end to the tradition due to "cumulative damage" to the 400-year-old building. Fiesta leaders said the colorful crests were actually nailed into pieces of lumber temporarily attached to Palace beams with screws.
Asked if the controversies played a role in his dismissal, Garcia y Griego said she "really can't speak to them." Wulf said he doesn't know if they had an impact. "I would hope not because there's a much larger picture than those two incidents," he said.
A symposium Wulf organized in 2017 on Fiesta and the Entrada, which had become the focus of Native American protests, didn't include a presenter who was Hispanic. Wulf said at the time that Hispanic historians had passed when asked to speak.
The Entrada was ended last year after negotiations that included Fiesta leaders, pueblo officials and the hierarchy of the Catholic church.
Wulf said he plans to remain working in the museum field. Asked if he'll stay in New Mexico, "We'll see," he said.
For the time being, Garcia y Griego will direct the New Mexico History Museum.


While I do want to encourage med students to enter Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation (PM&R), at the same time, it's very hard to answer dozens of emails that basically ask me the same questions over and over. I generally postpone answering the email then feel guilty then end up either answering it a week or two later or forgetting about it entirely.
So I've decided to create this FAQ to address the questions I most commonly get asked. Before emailing me a question, please check out this FAQ.
Are my grades/scores good enough to match in PM&R?
Can I match in PM&R as an IMG?
Maybe not in the top programs, but yes.
What can I do to make myself a better candidate?
The best thing you can do to make yourself a stronger candidate is to do an elective at a program you are interested in. And if during that rotation, you can prove yourself to be non-annoying, you have an excellent shot at matching there.
How should I prepare for my PM&R elective?
Is PM&R a DO-friendly field?
What is a day in the life of a physiatrist like?
This question is impossible to answer, because different physiatrists may have vastly different jobs. Some do only outpatient, some only inpatient, and some do a mix of the two. Some do lots of procedures (Botox, fluoroscopic steroid injections, EMGs) and some do no procedures. So there's really no typical "day in the life" of a physiatrist.
Is PM&R a good field if I want to have a balance of work and family?
They don't call it Plenty of Money & Relaxation for nothing. In residency, you generally have a lighter call schedule than in fields like medicine but heavier than, say, dermatology. Since physiatrists focus on function and pain management, it's less likely that you'll need to rush in on the weekend or in the middle of the night to deal with an emergency. However, some physiatrists work in private practice and have very busy schedules. If you work alone, you may need to make yourself available to your patients at all times. So while physiatrists generally have good lifestyles compared to other fields, it's no guarantee.
Can you tell me more about __________ Residency Program?
Probably not. I really only know about my own program and I'd rather not say what that is. If you want more info about a program, you can check Freida, SDN, or Scutwork. Asking a question on the PM&R board on SDN can probably give you far better answers than I can, to be honest.
How should I know? Do an elective and decide for yourself.
That's a very broad question, as you can refer patients to physiatrists for pain management, EMGs, or musculoskeletal issues. I assume though that you're talking about something more on the rehab end? For example, a stroke patient?
If you have a patient with a stroke who has residual deficits that are limiting their function in some way, this may be a good candidate for referral. For example, if they have muscle spasms or pain on their affected side, or perhaps you feel they might be able to walk better. The physiatrist may be able to recommend medications, perform injections (like Botox or cortisone), or recommend orthotics or other equipment that could optimize their functional ability. Same deal with any injury that affects function in some way. And I think any patient with an old spinal cord injury should definitely be seeing a physiatrist because they have a lot of very unique issues that can turn serious quickly if not well managed.
Do you recommend research for residencies? How important do you perceive this is?
What is the difference between a physiatrist and a physical therapist?
Thanks for your information. I'm a 3rd med student who is looking in PM&R. How did you find the residency years were on your relationship with your partner? I'm getting married at the end of 4th year, and worry that it may be a tough 1st year of marriage!
I am a 3rd year medical student ranked in the middle of the class (pretty much 50% percentile in my class) and am trying to understand how to increase my exposure to PM&R now that I've only just found out about it. I have the option of doing an elective in PM&R, but only after I've completed my neurology clerkship, which is at the end of my 3rd year. Is the start of 4th year too late to be exploring PM&R for the first time? Is there another way for me to get some exposure aside from shadowing?
PM&R is not PT, because we are medical doctors and focus on the medical aspects of what will help someone function and hopefully feel better including meds, PT, OT and speech therapy, orthotics and prosthetics, equipment, adaptive technology, and education/attitude adjustment. We coordinate a big picture based on the medical diagnosis, and may make or help make the diagnosis too.
And no, of course it's not too late to do your elective as a fourth year. Doing neurology first is a great idea, because some of what we do really IS sort of applied neurology and doing a good neuro exam as well as an ortho/MSK exam is key to understanding your patients and doing good work for them in PM&R, IMHO.
And as far as marriage...I got married before medical school and found that to be much easier than dating. They have duty hour restrictions that should give you more spouse time than I ever had in residency too. My husband would laugh long and hard if anyone tried to tell him PM&R was a great "lifestyle" specialty, but then I gravitated toward inpatient work, peds, academics, and now I am getting more into neuromuscular disease. Nevertheless, we just celebrated our 40th, and I hope you get there someday as well.


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Julien Fanthou, aussi connu sous le pseudonyme de Patachtouille est un chanteur, danseur et artiste de cabaret français, né en 1976

Biographie
Après sa formation au CNR de Montpellier puis à la Schola Cantorum, il entame une carrière de chanteur d'opéra. Il collabore avec Opéra éclaté et est dirigé par des metteurs en scène tels que Michel Fau, Olivier Desbordes, Éric Perez ou Juan Kruz Díaz de Garaio Esnaola et chante ainsi sous les baguettes de Dominique Trottein, Joël Suhubiette, Jacques Mercier et Serguey Svoysky.

En 2008, il reçoit le premier prix d'excellence de la Fondation Bellan et une mention très bien au master 2 « Art du récital » consacré au répertoire du Lied et de la mélodie sous la direction de Brigitte François-Sappey à la Sorbonne (mémoire intitulé Spectre et fantasmes).

En 2015, il danse Numéros macabres et Revue macabre, une création chorégraphique d'Aurélien Richard. Il chante régulièrement dans la Compagnie lyrique les Monts du Reuil

Il fait son entrée au cabaret Madame Arthur sous le nom de créature de Patachtouille. Aux côtés d'artistes comme Monsieur K, Luc Bruyère, Charly Voodoo, Corinne, L'Oiseau joli ou Tony Blanquette, il propose des reprises de chansons en français, d'époque ou plus modernes, interprétées au piano-voix et à l'accordéon souvent mis en scène ou accompagné par des artistes divers comme Olivier Py, François Chaignaud ou encore Pierre Richard.

Parallèlement, il s'investit dans des projets plus personnels, comme Le Goujon Folichon, spectacle musical co-écrit avec Caroline Loeb crée 2014, dans lequel il est accompagné par Gérald Elliott.

En 2019, il fait une apparition dans le film de Cédric Le Gallo et Maxime Govare, Les Crevettes pailletées.

En 2021, il est invité au Festival d'Avignon dans le cadre des Sujets à Vifs, il y crée Plastic Platon en duo avec Juglair.

Spectacles

Chanteur
 2021 : Cabaret canaille, conception Julien Fanthou, Cirque-Théâtre d'Elbeuf
 2021 : Plastic Platon, conception Julien Fanthou et Juglair, Festival d'Avignon et tournée
 2021 : Le Cabarêve des Établissements Félix Tampon, mise en scène Alain Reynaud
 2021 : Madame ose Bashung, conception Sébastien Vion, Le Divan du Monde
 2020 : Le Cabaret chantant - Les Ets Félix Tampon, mise en scène Alain Reynaud
 2019 : Madame Arthur titille les Rita Mitsouko, mise en scène Ingrid Astier et Pierre Richard, Le Divan du Monde

 2018 : Goujon folichon, mise en scène de Caroline Loeb, tournée
 2018 : Suivez le guide, mise en scène Alain Reynaud et Eric Louis, Festival d'Alba-la-Romaine

 2018 : Patachtouille à draps ouverts, conception Julien Fanthou, Le Divan du Monde
 2018 : Les Établissements Félix Tampon, Festival d'Alba-la-Romaine
 2018 : Au cabaret des Poilus !, d'après Charles Péguy, direction musicale Hélène Clerc-Murgier, Pauline Warnier, Compagnie lyrique les Monts du Reuil, mise en scène de Constance Larrieu
 2015 : Le Soldat magicien, direction musicale Hélène Clerc-Murgier, Pauline Warnier, Compagnie lyrique les Monts du Reuil,mise en scène Juan Kruz Díaz de Garaio Esnaola
 2015 : Raoul Barbe-Bleue, direction musicale Hélène Clerc-Murgier, Pauline Warnier, Compagnie lyrique les Monts du Reuil,mise en scène Juan Kruz Díaz de Garaio Esnaola
 2014 : Le Docteur Sangrado, direction musicale Hélène Clerc-Murgier, Pauline Warnier, Compagnie lyrique les Monts du Reuil,mise en scène Juan Kruz Díaz de Garaio Esnaola
 2014 : Le Mariage secret, mise en scène Nathalie Spinosi
 2013 : Don Juan de Mozart, mise en scène d'Éric Perez
 2012 : La Flûte enchantée de Mozart, mise en scène d'Éric Perez
 2011 : Rigoletto de Giuseppe Verdi mise en scène de Michel Fau

Danseur
 2015 : Revue macabre d'Aurélien Richard
 2015 : Numéros macabres d'Aurélien Richard

Filmographie
 2019 : Les Crevettes pailletées de Cédric Le Gallo et Maxime Govare

Notes et références

Chanteur français du XXIe siècle
Date de naissance non renseignée (XXe siècle)

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Proyecto Primavera Programs offer quality Alcohol and or Drug treatment for diverse populations at a low cost. Medi-Cal is accepted. The length of treatment is based on the participant's need. Most of our services are provided in English, Spanish and Vietnamese. Our multicultural staff is certified by the Department of Alcohol and Drug Services of Santa Clara County, CAADAC and CADDTP.
Free parking is available and is within walking distance of VTA bus route numbers 26 and 73.
If you need immediate medical care go to an Urgent Care Clinic, or if you think you are having a medical or psychiatric emergency CALL 911 or go to the nearest emergency room.


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Zhangye (cinese: 张掖; pinyin: Zhāngyè) è una città-prefettura della Cina nella provincia del Gansu, al confine con la Mongolia Interna a nord e Qinghai a sud.

Storia
Zhangye si trova al centro del Corridoio di Hexi. La zona è stata la frontiera per gran parte della storia della Cina, costituendo un passaggio naturale verso la porzione dell'Asia centrale dell'impero. In realtà, il nome Zhangye (letteralmente "per estendere il braccio") è l'abbreviazione di 张国臂掖,以通西域 (letteralmente: "per estendere il braccio del paese, attraverso il Reame occidentale"). Durante la dinastia degli Han occidentali, gli eserciti cinesi sono stati spesso impegnati contro la Xiongnu in questo settore. La città fu parte della dinastia Xia occidentale dal 1098, fino a quando Kublai Khan la conquistò nel 1227. Si dice che il temibile imperatore mongolo Kublai Khan sia nato nel tempio di Dafosi, il quale inoltre è il luogo in cui custodito il più lungo Buddha reclinato in legno in Cina. La città si trova anche in una sezione importante della via della seta, conosciuta come la "porta del grande ovest"

La città era precedentemente nota come Ganzhou (甘州), nome mantenuto sia nella regione sede del distretto di Ganzhou e il Gan della provincia di Gansu. Nel libro Il Milione, Marco Polo riferisce di aver trascorso un anno in una città chiamata Ca(n)picion, che è stato identificata con Ganzhou (Zhangye).

Geografia e clima
Zhangye si trova nella provincia occidentale di Gansu. A nord confina con la Mongolia Interna e a sud con il Qinghai. Si estende su un'area di 42.000 km² ed è attraversata da numerosi corsi d'acqua, fra cui il principale è l'HeiHe. È caratterizzata da abbondante insolazione e terreno fertile, facendone un importante centro agricolo per Gansu e per tutta la Cina.

Fonte: Weather China

Situata nel villaggio Nantaizi della città di Nijiaying, nella contea di Linzhe della provincia di Gansu, vi è il Danxia cinese, una serie di catene montuose con strati di arenaria rossastra. Poiché questo tipo di geomorfologia petromorfica unica si trova solo in Cina, queste forme di paesaggio sono state inclusi nella lista dei siti Patrimonio Mondiale dell'Umanità alla 34ª riunione del Comitato del Patrimonio Mondiale del 1º agosto 2010.

Suddivisione amministrativa
Zhangye ha 1 distretto urbano, 4 contee, 1 provincia autonoma, 97 città e 977 villaggi.

Società

Evoluzione demografica
Zhangye ha una popolazione totale di 1.199.515 abitanti, di cui solo 260.000 residenti urbani. Ci sono 26 minoranze etniche diverse dalla Han rappresentate, tra cui molti Hui, Yugur e tibetani.

Infrastrutture e trasporti

Zhangye è servita dalle autostrade nazionali cinesi G30 Expressway, 227 e 312 .

La stazione ferroviaria di Zhangye si trova lungo la linea ferroviaria Lanzhou-Xinjiang ed è situata a nord est della città. Una stazione ferroviaria ad alta velocità è in costruzione sul lato sud ovest della città e sarà chiamata "Stazione di Zhangye Sud" sulla ferrovia ad alta velocità Lanzhou-Urumqi .

L'aeroporto di Zhangye Ganzhou, un aeroporto misto civile-militare, è stato inaugurato nell'ottobre 2011, con voli per Lanzhou e Xi'an.

Economia
Il PIL dell'anno 2002 è stato pari a 7.566 milioni di RMB, con quasi il 9% di crescita rispetto all'anno precedente. il reddito annuo urbano era 5960 RMB, con il 10,4% di crescita rispetto all'anno precedente e il reddito rurale era 3092 RMB, in crescita del 5%.

Sport

Zhangye ospita le gare del campionato cinese di Rally (CRC) dal 2011, su un circuito appositamente costruito attraverso i deserti a nord e a sud della città. L'evento attira regolarmente oltre 100 partecipanti, tra cui piloti stranieri internazionali.

Voci correlate
Danxia cinese
Parco geologico nazionale di Zhangye Danxia
Via della seta
Kublai Khan
Marco Polo

Altri progetti

Collegamenti esterni

Centri abitati del Gansu
Suddivisioni del Gansu
Città-prefetture


text:
Scholarships & Endowments
College Prayer
UG Admission
Arabic Study Centre
College Bus Service
Cooperative Store
Food Point
Forum for Democracy and Social Justice (FDSJ)
History and Heritage Museum
Indoor Stadium
Ladies Hostel
NAM Centre for Research & Local Development
Career and Counseling Cell
College Rules
English Literary Club
Entrepreneurship Development Club
Malayalam Club
Nature Club
PG Forum
Students Grievance and Redressal Cell
Women's Forum
Yoga Club
SSR Documents
N.A.M College Kallikkandy
N.A.M is an aided institution affiliated to Kannur University, which is named after Jb. N.A.Mammu Haji, famous philanthropist and Ex-MLA of Peringalam constituency. It is accredited with B Grade by National Assessment and Accreditation Council (NAAC).
Oriental Languages
The Department of History, one of the first three departments started in the college in 1995, is a resourceful center for historical studies.
Certificate Course
The Department of English has been an integral part of the college since its inception in 1995.
The Department of Computer Science was established in 1995 with the specific mission of imparting high-quality computer education to young generation.
Department of Polymer Chemistry, established in 1999, offers courses in Chemistry and Polymer Chemistry with complementary elective courses in Mathematics and Computer Science.
Department of Mathematics started in 1995 as a supporting department for Computer Science.
The Department of Commerce was started in 1995. Initially the department offered B. Com degree with Travel and Tourism as optional course.
The BBA programme was started in self-financing mode in 2015 and it functioned under the Department of Commerce till March 2017 with the strength of 41 students.
About Central Library
Previous Question Papers
Activities at English Department
1. Activity Report 2021-22
1. ONLINE LECTURE SERIES ON "CULTURAL STUDIES"
1. WORKSHOP ON RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT
2. WORKSHOP ON LITERARY THEORY
The Department Magazine titled Bricolage was released on July 21 by the principal of the college.
NATIONAL TEACHERS DAY CELEBRATION
ASSOCIATION INAUGURATION
BA. English Association ENGLORA was inaugurated on 12th December 2018 by Dr.ArunLal- HOD of Mokeri Government College. The key note address of the function was on An Introduction to Literary Theory.
An open debate on the topic Menstruation And Human Rights organised on 18th January 2019.The event was moderated by Dr.Madhusoodanan (HOD of the Physical Education department of the College).
Students from the English department – Husna Abdullah (A Cultural Study On Perumal Murukan's OnePart Women) and Mizna Sherin(Language and Society), participated and presented papers in the National Undergraduate Colloquium on literature conducted by the Department of English, Pazhassi Raja NSS College, Mattannur.
A work shop was conducted by the Department of English on the topic Research Methodology and Project Management on 13th December 2018. The programme was done under the leadership of Mr. Dhanesh a research scholar at Kannur University.
English association was inaugurated by Dr CP Satheesh,Associate Professor,SN College Kannur1-. Dec11 2017 Subject- Career prospects for students of Literature
ONE DAY ORIENTATION PROGRAM
The invited guest of the function was Dr Ifthikar Muhammed (Assistant professor -Central University of Kerala). His keynote address was on the topic "How to Approach English Literature"on 29th September 2017
ONE DAY WORKSHOP
As part of academic innovation, a one-day workshop on Creative writing in English was conducted. The programme was facilitated by Mr. M Noushad -assistant professor, MBL media school, Calicut.
ENGLORA, literary club of English Department, NAM college Kallikandy,released a department Magazine for the year 2018-19-'Zeitgeist'on 12 June 2019.
JUVANILE JUSTICE COURT VISIT
NAM College Kallikkandy
Kannur, Kerala 670693
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text:
Comedy Night at the Zoo
special events, not just for kids, fundraisers
There's nothing funny about extinction, which is why the Portland chapter of the American Association of Zookeepers is hosting the Oregon Zoo's second annual comedy night Saturday, Nov. 1, 2014 as a fundraiser to directly support the Audubon Society of Portland and Tanzania-based Ruaha Carnivore Project.
Oregon Zoo comedy night - hosted by Daria from 105.1 The Buzz - will be held from 6 p.m. to 10 p.m. in the Cascade Ballroom and will include hors d'oeuvres and adult refreshments, a silent and live auction and performances by comedians Alex Falcone and Bri Pruett.
Alex Falcone is a stand-up comedian living in Portland, OR where he writes for the The Portland Mercury and the public radio show Live Wire! Radio. He's the creator and host of the live talk show Late Night Action w/ Alex Falcone and the surprisingly popular podcast Read it and Weep, in which people pay him to suffer through bad books and movies.
Bri Pruett is a stand-up comic and improviser from Portland, Oregon. She's appeared at the Bridgetown Comedy Festival and the All Jane No Dick comedy festival. For 6 years she's been a part of Action/Adventure Theater, a non-profit independent theater and black box venue in Southeast Portland. Willamette Week named her one of the Funniest 5 Comedians in Portland.
The AAZK is a nonprofit, volunteer organization made up of professional zoo keepers and other interested persons dedicated to professional animal care and conservation.
PURCHASE OREGON ZOO COMEDY NIGHT TICKETS HERE
Audubon Society of PortlandRuaha Carnivore Project


Was Jesus Christ really the son of God? It's probably one of the most heated debates in all of history. On one side, the devout Christians believe strongly in the son of God, and on the other side, the staunch atheists say it's a made up tale and they'll tell you that evolution explains how we came about.
Joseph Atwill, a biblical scholar, is getting attention with his theory that he will present this weekend in London. He says Christianity was a sophisticated government propaganda exercise used to pacify the subjects of the Roman Empire, and was invented as a system of mind control to enslave the poor.
At the center of Atwill's theory is the similarities between the Bible and the 'War of the Jews' by Josephus -- the only surviving first-person historical account of first-century Judea.
He says, "What seems to have eluded many scholars is that the sequence of events and locations of Jesus ministry are more or less the same as the sequence of events and locations of the military campaign of Emperor Titus Flavius as described by Josephus."
While some people agree with Atwill, there are plenty of others who don't. Kyle Beshears wrote an article in the Christian Post outlining six reasons Atwill's theory is incorrect. Beshears says, "Atwill sees parallels where parallels don't exist. He gathers a small pile of questionable evidence and heralds it as a mountain of condemnation for Christianity."
Does anyone know with absolute certainty that Jesus was the son of the God, much less even existed? I attended a Lutheran Church regularly until I was 17 years old. I studied to be confirmed for three years. I've read dozens of books detailing all the major religions, interviewed hundreds of people on this subject, from the faithful to the new atheists. I've shared the stage with some of the biggest televangelists in the world, and for the past 24 months, I've watched hundreds of hours of video footage from some of the greatest minds in America discussing and debating whether or not God exists. From Christian apologetic Dr. William Lane Craig to evolutionary biologist Richard Dawkins, I've read it all, including the Bible a number of times.
After investing all of this time and energy searching for an answer to whether or not God exists, here my conclusion: I don't know. I don't know if there's a God, but here's the thing: neither do you. And neither do William Lane Craig, Sam Harris, Billy Graham, or Richard Dawkins and Joseph Atwill. And neither does the Pope, who after you remove the robe and skull cap, is just a man. No one knows for sure what happens when you die, and if they tell you they do, hang on to your wallet because the pitch is coming.
Once a person is educated enough to explain the basic tenets of both evolution and creationism, he or she is capable of making an intelligent, emotion-free decision based on the evidence. Unfortunately, this is not going to happen anytime soon. To find the answer that you truly believe in, I would encourage you to do your research. Don't listen to what your family members or your friends say, and don't listen to what your pastor says, either. Pick up the bible, read it from cover to cover and take notes on key points that stand out to you.


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