When Ellen was only twenty, her parents died within six months of each other. Soon after, her oldest sister, ten years her senior and executor of the estate, sold the family home. Refusing to share the proceeds, she severed contact with Ellen, and because their parents had left Eastern Europe decades earlier when they'd immigrated to Canada, Ellen was, in a very real sense, completely alone.
Ellen ran from the tragedy. She put herself through college. She made a respectable career as an accountant. In her early thirties, Ellen left Canada and took a job in Australia, hoping to find a husband and begin building the home she'd lost. She didn't marry, but by God's grace, she met Jesus and trusted her life to him.
That was ten years ago now.
We sat long after the Christmas dishes had been cleared, and I cupped the broken pieces of Ellen's story in my hand. I tried holding them with hope, believing in the God who binds up and heals, who redeems and restores. I wanted to counsel Ellen to pray with faith and wait expectantly, trusting the goodness of God's intentions towards her. I wanted to forecast that her return to Canada would bring the hoped-for reconciliation with her sister. Maybe even marriage. But I knew the risks of my advice — and the responsibilities attendant to all of Ellen's desires.
If my last essay described the risks of desire (disappointment, self-revelation, abandoned familiarity), today's essay explores the responsibilities of desire. I see in Ellen's story the risks of wanting from God: what if her sister chooses never to renew their relationship? What if Ellen never marries? Will God continue to be good in the midst of those disappointed desires?
I also see in Ellen's story the responsibilities of wanting from God. There is a cooperative role she must play in her desires, and while she's not ultimately in control of her circumstances, neither is she relieved of the responsibility to participate with God.
1. Holy desire obligates us to pray.
In the context of faith, desire must always transition to prayer. Until desire becomes prayer, it's only half-formed, half-developed, and not nearly matured. In the psalms, for example, desires and petitions are used nearly synonymously. "Delight yourself in the LORD, and he will give you the desires of your heart," (Ps. 37:4). "You have given him his heart's desire and have not withheld the request of his lips," (Ps. 21:2). "You open your hand; you satisfy the desire of every living thing," (Ps. 145:16). "He fulfills the desire of those who fear him; he also hears their cry and saves them," (Ps. 145:19). Desire that becomes prayer has been baptized into the waters of faith and is formed by the qualities of trust and surrender.
But prayer isn't easy. In fact, holy desire is least like lobbing requests to God and relieving ourselves of the responsibility to act, to initiate, and to participate meaningfully in the activity of God. Prayer, as we see it in the Scripture, often requires persistent commitment (cf. Luke 18:1-8). It calls for tenacity, for gumption. Prayer (and desire) doesn't exempt us from responsibility. It is its own kind work.
2. Holy desire obligates us to repent.
As we saw yesterday, desire is a self-revealing language. It surfaces what matters most in our lives. It exposes the values driving our choices and commitments. Sometimes, by the grace of God, our heart's affections are fixed upon Christ and his kingdom. Often, they are not.
As we examine our desires, one important responsibility we must carry is the willingness to allow the Holy Scriptures access to our hearts — and repent when sin is revealed. The Word of God, described in Hebrews 4:12, is powerful to penetrate our darkness. It reveals what's hidden. It illuminates intention and motivation. Until we read the Scripture and begin to gain God's vocabulary of holy desire, we will lack the necessary discernment required for desire. Moreover, until the Scriptures and the Spirit of God "circumcise our hearts," we will lack the will of renunciation.
3. Holy desire obligates us to trust.
In this life, there are no guaranteed outcomes, and the Bible is clear that earthly existence is broken and battered as a result of sin. All of creation is in a state of chronic longing and constant groaning (cf. Rom. 8:18-22). Our desires for goodness, for justice, for righteousness — all of which are good and right — won't fully be satisfied before Christ's return. There are disappointments and suffering we should expect in this life, not because God stands idly by when we pray, not because he's always trying to teach us a cosmic lesson, but because we're made for a better world, when Christ returns—and heaven comes to earth.
When we pray and do not receive, our responsibility is surrender and trust. We don't have to pretend away grief. We don't have to defend God. We can even, at times, rail, like Job, against the way life seems to have turned out unfairly. But faith nudges us to a different kind of sight, a faith that is informed by the promises of God. Reassured of God's goodness, wisdom, and sovereign control, we can believe, as Tim Keller writes in his book, Prayer, "God will either give us what we ask or give us what we would have asked if we knew everything he knew."
4. Finally, holy desire obligates us to obey.
Stanley Hauerwas, professor at Duke Divinity School, has said, "When we pray, [God] makes us his prayer for the world." And Tim Keller, in his book, Prayer, advises that when we pray our desires, we must also "ask ourselves what we ourselves might need to do to implement answers to our prayers." Prayer isn't a magical incantation that changes the alignment of the stars. Prayer isn't about getting God to do what we want. And while no one is quite sure how exactly prayer works (although Scripture seems to indicate it effects real change), we can begin to understand that what is often on the heels of prayer is the divine command. Prayer doesn't only make us spectators to the work of God (although there is much to behold and worship about God's involvement in human affairs). Prayer also makes us participants in the work of God. As Eugene Peterson writes in his book, The Jesus Way, "God speaks vocationally; there is work to be done." Peterson describes the occasion of Isaiah being caught up in the celestial vision of God's throne room and argues that this experience (or any other divine encounter) isn't meant as an occasion "of sublimity that abstracts us from the world of work; it is an invitation to enter into what God is doing and intending to get done in the world." Holy desire will move us to pray — and then it will invite us to obey.
In a very real sense, we might all "be careful what we wish for." Desire is like a feral lion, and once sprung from the cage, we confront risks and assume responsibilities. But if Jesus thought it important to ask, "What do you want?" we, too, might engage the exploration of our desires as an important process of our discipleship.
Jen Pollock Michel is the award-winning author of Teach Us to Want and Keeping Place. She writes widely for print and digital publications and travels to speak at churches, conferences, and retreats. Jen holds a BA in French from Wheaton College and an MA in Literature from Northwestern University. She is married to Ryan, and they have five school-age children. Their family attends Grace Toronto Church (Canada). You can follow Jen on Twitter @jenpmichel.
Jen Michel explores the risks and responsibilities of desire in this first post of a two-part series.


Antique tavern clocks have been studied widely and many books have been written. I wish to correct the commonly held view that these clocks started life only as early as C.1720. You may know these antique clocks by another name, they are sometimes called ' Act of Parliament' clocks.
They were later commonly called this as a result of the tax imposed on clocks and watches in July 1797. With the government being short of funds as a result of many years of war, extra ways to increase tax were thought out. The Act imposed a duty of 5 shillings on every clock, 10 shillings of every gold watch and 2s.6d on every silver or other watch. Assessors were sent round to take account of how many clocks you owned above a certain value.
There were certain exemptions to the Act, these included public houses. Alot of these tavern clocks as the name says were housed in public houses. They were exempt from this very unpopular tax. It led to a decline in the clock trade and luckily was repealed after only 9 months of it being in force.
These tavern clocks were usually decorated in lacquer work. They had wooden dials that were made up from usually three sections. They also usually had simple single 5 wheel train movements. The extra wheel in the train generally makes them go for longer than a standard longcase clock, even though they actually have a shorter drop. They usually had brass hands so the time could easily be read against the black painted dial. The earliest dials known were wooden and shaped like a shield. Then later circular dials were introduced and tear drop shapes to the cabinets.
Many books on the subject commonly state the earliest examples of these clocks are from C1720. We have owned for over 10 years, a clock of this form that is pre 1700 in date. It is an amazing tavern clock, it is the only antique clock of this type I have ever seen with an original brass dial, instead of the usual wood form. The antique clock maker is from a family which emigrated to London from Augsburg in Germany. Bushman is a fantastic clock maker and by all accounts the finest clockmaker to come out of Germany! He is mentioned as being on a par with the great Thomas Tompion in some quarters.
If I took a picture of the clock minus the hood it looks like a very early Augsburg table clock. I can see where the idea for the manufacture started. I believe this clock to be one of the first, if not the first, tavern clock. John Bushman is provable in London between 1661 until just after 1692 ( date of death unknown). We do know he came from the Augsburg area, but you can see the influence from the design of the cabinet work on this clock. Bushman was admitted to the Clockmaker's Company in 1662. You can see the huge pull of this Guild which I have talked about previously. The best clockmakers from all over Europe came to London. Everyone wanted to come to London and work in the 17th and 18th centuries. It truly was the centre for clock making in the world at the time.
Many people will ask if this clock has 5 wheel train, how does it have a second hand, a sweep centre seconds hand in this case. The movement has a one to one reversing wheel to enable for it to do this. You can see the amazing engraving to the unusual dial and superb unrestored lacquer work to the case. A very rare collectors clock, for more information please contact me direct.


text:
VOL. 132 | NO. 194 | Friday, September 29, 2017
Ford Opens Commission Bid as Lenoir Prepares To Launch Mayoral Bid
Campaign season for local, state and federal offices on the 2018 ballot has started.
On Wednesday, Sept. 27, Memphis City Council member Edmund Ford Jr. kicked off his bid for the Shelby County Commission at the offices of an East Memphis law firm. Meanwhile, Shelby County Trustee David Lenoir rallied supporters in advance of formally kicking off his bid for Shelby County Mayor at a Thursday, Sept. 28, announcement.
Candidates for non-judicial county offices on the ballot, starting with the May 2018 primaries, cannot pull qualifying petitions until Nov. 17.
Ford is running in the Democratic primary for the District 9 commission seat currently held by his cousin Justin Ford, who is term-limited at two terms and cannot seek re-election next year. Edmund Ford is also term-limited and cannot seek re-election to the council in the 2019 city elections.
Memphis Mayor Jim Strickland was among the supporters present as Memphis City Council member Edmund Ford Jr. opened his bid Wednesday, Sept. 27, to win election to the Shelby County Commission. (Daily News/Bill Dries)
"I plan on working hard," Ford told a group of 30 people in a conference room at the Farris Bobango and Branan Law Offices. "Many of you know me and you know that I'm not a virgin to work. You know it is something that has been instilled in me from the beginning."
A member of the Ford family has held a seat on the county commission since 1994 when James Ford was elected to the body, with the exception of an interim appointment of Edith Moore to the commission in 2010 as Joe Ford was appointed interim county mayor. Justin Ford, Joe Ford's son, was elected to the commission later that same year and re-elected in 2014.
A member of the Ford family has held a seat on the Memphis City Council since John Ford, brother of Joe Ford and uncle of Justin Ford and Edmund Ford Jr., was elected to the body in 1971.
Edmund Ford Jr. was introduced by Memphis Mayor Jim Strickland. The two were on opposite sides in the 2015 race for Memphis Mayor with Strickland challenging incumbent Mayor A C Wharton and Ford a vocal backer of Wharton's re-election effort.
"The county commission will benefit greatly from Edmund Ford Jr.," Strickland said.
Should Ford win the commission seat, the council would appoint a replacement for what would be a year and four months left in his city term of office. County elected terms of office start Sept. 1.
"There are a few things that I am working on now that I plan on working on as I go – I call it political matriculation – after I go to the other side," Ford said.
Those projects include a summer jobs program that doubles as career training for more teenagers and young adults as well as more funding, private and/or government, to deal with opioid addiction and a Veteran's Home in Memphis.
Council members who become county commissioners is unusual but not unheard of. James Ford, Shep Wilbun, Michael Hooks Sr. and Bill Gibbons have all done both – Wilbun and Ford from council seats as Edmund Ford is attempting.
City Council member Brent Taylor was appointed to a vacancy on the County Commission.
And going the other way, county commissioner Minerva Johnican was elected to the City Council. Council member Oscar Edmonds served on the Shelby County Quarterly Court, the predecessor to the County Commission, before being elected to the City Council.
Lenoir's announcement Thursday following an event with supporters at the home of Shelby County Schools board member Billy Orgel makes formal his bid for county mayor in the May Republican primary.
Incumbent Republican county mayor Mark Luttrell is term limited. And Lenoir is serving his second and final term as Trustee under county term limits. In the last four years, Lenoir has maintained an aggressive schedule of public appearances as Trustee.
The meetings and other appearances find Lenoir talking about the job of the Trustee and the county's financial position without ever mentioning the coming bid for county mayor. But the appearances have also helped to build Lenoir's name recognition countywide.
That will change with Thursday's announcement with Lenoir overtly campaigning in a Republican primary field that so far includes Shelby County Commissioner Terry Roland and Juvenile Court Clerk Joy Touliatos. Former county commissioner Sidney Chism is the only declared candidates so far in the Democratic primary for county mayor.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


By Walt Whitman. Included in Three Poems are I Sing The Body Electric, Out Of The Cradle Endlessly Rocking, and When Lilacs Last In The Dooryard Bloom'd. The text was handset in Cloister Lightface type, then printed in an iron handpress on paper made by David Carruthers. Abigail Rorer contributed four engravings. Priscilla Spitler bound the edition in quarter-cloth and marbled papers made by Pamela Smith.
12.375" x 8.75", 44 pages, in an edition of sixty copies. $275.00. Out of Print.


Kittens, we've checked in on (and assessed) some of the standout looks on this red carpet, but the fact of the matter is, there simply aren't enough hours in the day to give all these fine folks and their even finer fashion choices the spotlight. Prepare to be bombarded with fabulousness. Also, a little cray.
This would be the cray part.
We certainly don't mind some off-the-beaten-track fashion at an event celebrating cultures and actors who don't normally get this kind of high-level attention from Hollywood, much in the same way the Black Panther cast took their moment to unleash some truly eye-popping lewks on the world. But this is impossible for us to like. The color story is drab and there are simply too many elements to make any sense of the dress. Overdesigned to an extreme level, we're afraid.
It's high-impact and the color looks great on her, but the design of that bodice is extremely unflattering and does weird things to her bust. And the shoes do absolutely nothing for the look.
This is both cray and fabulous at the same time. While we don't love it in the conventional sense, we appreciate it for being a slightly modern take on Chinoiserie styles while also serving as catnip to photographers and fashion writers.
Love the look, even though it's slightly too casual, slightly too tight, and could use an undershirt to complete it.
Gorgeous. We'd have called it flawless but we don't think the bag goes with the look all that well.
So nice to see male stars indulge in some fun and light summer suiting instead of defaulting to business-like hues. Much as we love the shoes, they don't go with the suit.
He looks like a '50s Hollywood male pinup in the Tab Hunter mode, if the actual '50s hadn't been quite so conformist and racist. Our only quibble is that the jacket is a little too snug.
If he did up a couple buttons on his shirt, we might have loved this a bit more. It's a little hard to tell with his hands in his pockets – something you should absolutely NEVER do while wearing a buttoned double-breasted jacket, but we think the jacket might be a little short on him.
Another fairly cute summer suit that could use a little tailoring help and should be buttoned up. It was a theme apparently.
Cute, but the shoes don't go at all.
Tiers and fringe were recurring elements on this red carpet as well. We don't normally love ruffled tiers, but this looks pretty great on her.
Sort of pretty, but that's a really rough color to pull off and the skirt design feels a bit unresolved.


text:
HomeNewsLaunch of common childhood illness guidance handbook
Launch of common childhood illness guidance handbook
on 14 November 2016 .
Local parents, grandparents and carers across mid Essex are now able to seek guidance from a new advice booklet for when their child becomes ill.
The Common Childhood Illnesses and Wellbeing handbook is an extensive and informative guide for anyone who cares for a child aged from birth to 11 years old. It gives advice on how to spot signs of illness and what to do for minor conditions such as coughs and colds, fever, dry skin and rashes, chicken pox, bumps and bruises.
Information on mental health and wellbeing, healthy lifestyles and advice on some more serious conditions like meningitis and sepsis is also covered in the booklet. There's also a handy section on when you should keep your child home from school.
Dr Caroline Dollery, Chair of Mid Essex CCG and a GP in Danbury, said: "When a child falls ill, a lot of parents and carers naturally become very anxious and unsure about what they should do or which health service to access.
"This new guide is an extremely informative and beneficial resource on how to deal with the most common illnesses in young children. It can be used to learn how to care for a child at home, when to call a doctor and when to contact emergency services alongside other useful local information and contacts.
"A lot of hard work and effort has gone into producing the guide but it has been extremely worthwhile and I am sure local parents, grandparents and carers will benefit from it."
A series of free workshops hosted by local GPs and clinicians have also been planned to accompany the launch of the guide which anyone is welcome to attend.
Both the workshops and guide are part of the CCGs wider strategy to reduce unnecessary and inappropriate hospital attendances for pediatric patients allowing the pediatric team to care for and treat those patients that really need to be in A&E.
In 2015/16, the CCG spent more than £1 million in relation to children attending Broomfield Hospital A&E where no investigation was carried out and no treatment was given – just advice and guidance. The projected cost for advice given in A&E could increase this year (2016/17) to £1.8 million.
Click here to download an electronic version of the guide.
Dates and times of workshops
Monday 21st November 2016 Plume Community Academy, Fambridge Road, Maldon, Essex, CM9 6AB 6:00pm to 7:30pm Reserve place
Tuesday 22nd November 2016 Marconi Social Club, Tydemans
off Beehive Lane, Chelmsford,
Essex, CM2 9FH 12:30pm to 2:00pm Reserve place
Tuesday 22nd November 2016 Tabor Academy Panfield Lane, Braintree, Essex, CM7 5XP 6:00pm to 7:30pm Reserve place
Thursday 24th November 2016 Newslands Spring Primary School, Dickens Place, Newslands Spring, Chelmsford, CM1 4UU 6:00pm to 7:30pm Reserve place
Copies of the guide will be given to all new parents supported at Broomfield Hospital (forming part of newborn packs) and are available FREE from all GP practices, community pharmacists and via the healthy schools service.


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CARE commemorates the work of the late Dr. Rutherford, a world leader in research into emotion.
Bringing together world leaders in different research areas to establish new innovations in the understanding of emotion.
Investigating patterns of selective information processing (or cognitive biases) that may underpin mental health problems and resilience, and examining the causal contribution of these biases to anxiety, worry, and adaptive functioning in the face of adversity.
Evaluating recent developments in cognitive bias modification (CBM) techniques to contribute to the emotional well-being of the Australian community.


First of all, let me thank the author of the blog for all the beautiful pictures, music and thoughts expressed here.
My own experience tells me too that the impossible is possible. This idea can stimulate us to achievements which we have never imagined to be within our reach.
We also tend to consider (at least I used to do it) that something terrible which happens every day to thousands of people will never enter our lives – it seems to be impossible! The reality turns out to be different.
On a sunny summer day at the age of 18 I was informed that the person whom I loved most of all in this world had died in a car-crash.
The total unpredictability of it together with all the pain this news brought made me want to die at first, than as some time passed I had just no desire to live, later I learned to love life again. I also learned that death can take anyone anytime, even the one who makes your own life full of sense. I know it sounds not at all optimistic at the beginning of the new year , but it's just the reality.
This reality asks questions like the following: what will I leave to the world if I pass away all of a sudden? Am I kind enough to the people around me whom by a cruel twist of fate I might never see again?


text:
Machine Learning For Medical Imaging (ML4MI) Initiative
Artificial Intelligence in Medical Imaging: Perspective from the International Society for Strategic Studies in Radiology
Speaker: Thomas Grist, MD (UW)
Seminar Title: Artificial Intelligence in Medical Imaging: Perspective from the International Society for Strategic Studies in Radiology
Date: April 27
Time: 4- 5 pm
Location: ME1106
Speaker Bio: Thomas M. Grist, MD, received his undergraduate degree in biomedical engineering from Marquette University in Milwaukee, WI, in 1981, and his doctor of medicine degree from the Medical College of Wisconsin in 1985. He completed his radiology residency at Duke University in Durham, NC. In 1991, he joined the faculty of the Department of Radiology at the University of Wisconsin in Madison, WI. He is currently the John H. Juhl Professor of Radiology, Medical Physics and Biomedical Engineering, at the UW School of Medicine and Public Health.
Since 2005, Grist has served as Chair of the Department of Radiology at the University of Wisconsin School of Medicine and Public Health. During his tenure as Chair, the Department has grown to include 93 Clinical Faculty, 25 Fellows, and 34 Residents. Together with colleagues in Medical Physics and Radiology, Dr. Grist established the Imaging Sciences Center in the Wisconsin Institutes for Medical Research, (WIMR) a nearly 60,000 sq. ft., state-of-the-art facility devoted to the development of imaging technologies and their translation to clinical practice.
Dr. Grist has lectured extensively nationally and internationally. He has authored 4 books, 16 book chapters and over 170 peer-reviewed publications. His research has resulted in 16 patents. He is an active member in many professional organizations including International Society for Magnetic Resonance in Medicine (ISMRM), Radiologic Society of North America (RSNA), American Heart Association, and Society for Computed Body Tomography/MR. He has been honored as a Fellow of the American Heart Association, ISMRM, and American College of Radiology. Dr. Grist served as President of the ISMRM; a 6000 member interdisciplinary organization devoted to the development and application of magnetic resonance imaging in medicine. In 2014, Dr. Grist was appointed to the University of Wisconsin Hospitals and Clinics Public Authority Board of Directors and elected by his peers to serve as Chair of the UW Medical Foundation Council of Chairs.
Professionally, Dr. Grist is interested in the development and application of advanced magnetic resonance imaging techniques for diagnosis and therapy of human disease, primarily for the evaluation of cardiovascular disorders. Personally, Dr. Grist enjoys all forms of cycling, skiing, and dancing, as well as spending time with his wife and five children in the great outdoors.
Recorded Lectures (Radiology Intranet): Mp4 Lecture


text:
'Harry Potter' Fan Natalie Dormer Joining the Magical Universe
WENN/FayesVision
The British actress has been recruited to read the original non-fiction audiobook 'Harry Potter: A History of Magic'.
AceShowbiz - Game of Thrones star Natalie Dormer has landed double duty as a Harry Potter narrator.
The British actress has been recruited to read the original non-fiction audiobook Harry Potter: A History of Magic for Audible and lead a new exhibition and audio tour all about the boy wizard's world at the New York Historical Society.
Dormer joins The Walking Dead's Andrew Lincoln and Fantastic Beasts... star Eddie Redmayne, who have previously narrated Potter projects, and she admits studying up for the new role gave her a new insight into author J.K. Rowling wonderful world.
"I've always adored the Harry Potter books, but it wasn't until I started speaking with the British Library's curators, hearing about the various myths, legends and cultures that have helped shape the wizarding world, that I really began to appreciate the richness and depth of J. K. Rowling's writing," the actress says.
"There are so many wonderful details to explore and A History of Magic unearths some remarkable gems of information that are sure to have listeners awestruck. It's been fun to join the Wizarding World family."
Both new Potter projects will be unveiled to fans on 4 October.
First Photos: 'Fantastic Beasts: The Crimes of Grindelwald' Unveils Cute Baby Niffler
DJ Khaled and More Read Mean Tweets for Hip-Hop Edition - Watch the Sneak Peek
Natalie Dormer Secretly Gives Birth to First Child
Natalie Dormer 'So Ridiculously Proud' of Midwife Sister Amid Coronavirus Pandemic
Natalie Dormer Still Positive About Director Fiance Despite Split


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← Who gets to make the decision?


text:
liibulletin
CHEVRON OIL COMPANY, Petitioner, v. Gaines Ted HUSON.
404 U.S. 97 (92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296)
No. 70—11.
Argued: Oct. 20, 1971.
Decided: Dec. 6, 1971.
opinion, STEWART [HTML]
Respondent was injured in December 1965 while working on petitioner's artificial island drilling rig, located on the Outer Continental Shelf off the Louisiana coast. Allegedly, not until many months later were the injuries discovered to be serious. In January 1968 respondent brought suit for damages against petitioner in federal district court. The District Court, relying on Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969), held that Louisiana's one-year limitation on personal injury actions applied rather than the admiralty laches doctrine, and granted petitioner's motion for summary judgment. Rodrigue had held that state law and not admiralty law applied to fixed structures on the Outer Continental Shelf under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (hereinafter Lands Act), and extended to that area as federal laws the laws of the adjacent State 'to the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent' with federal laws. Respondent argued on appeal that in view of pre-Rodrigue jurisprudence making admiralty law (including the laches doctrine) applicable, it would be unfair to give that decision retrospective effect. The Court of Appeals, not reaching that argument, reversed, holding that Louisiana's 'prescriptive' time limitation, which barred the remedy but did nto extinguish the right to recovery, was not binding outside a Louisiana forum. Consequently, the court concluded that the time limitation was not 'applicable' of its own force and was 'inconsistent' with the admiralty laches doctrine, which though not directly applicable by virtue of Rodrigue was applicable as a matter of federal common law. Held:
1. The Lands Act, as interpreted in Rodrigue, requires that a State's statute of limitations be applied to actions for personal injuries occurring on fixed structures on the Outer Continental Shelf. The fact that the Louisiana law is 'prescriptive' does not make it inapplicable as federal law under the Lands Act, and a federal court may not apply a laches test to preclude application of the state time limitation. Pp. 100—105.
2. The Louisiana one-year statute of limitations should not, however, bar respondent's action here since retroactive application of that statute under Rodrigue would deprive respondent of any remedy at all on the basis of the unforeseeable superseding legal doctrine of that decision. Pp. 105—109.
5 Cir., 430 F.2d 27, affirmed.
Lloyd Cyril Melancon, New Orleans, La., for petitioner.
Samuel C. Gainsburgh, New Orleans, La., for respondent.
Mr. Justice STEWART delivered the opinion of the Court.
The respondent, Gaines Ted Huson, suffered a back injury while working on an artificial island drilling rig owned and operated by the petitioner, Chevron Oil Co., and located on the Outer Continental Shelf off the Gulf Coast of Louisiana. The injury occurred in December 1965. Allegedly, it was not until many months later that the injury was discovered to be a serious one. In January 1968 the respondent brought suit for damages against the petitioner in federal district court. The respondent's delay in suing the petitioner ultimately brought his case to this Court.
The issue presented is whether the respondent's action is time barred and, more particularly, whether state or federal law determines the timeliness of the action. That issue must be resolved under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. (hereinafter 'Lands Act'), which governs injuries occurring on fixed structures on the Outer Continental Shelf. When this lawsuit was initiated, there was a line of federal court decisions interpreting the Lands Act to make general admiralty law, including the equitable doctrine of laches, applicable to personal injury suits such as the respondent's. 1 The petitioner did not question the timeliness of the action as a matter of laches. While pretrial discovery proceedings were still under way, however, this Court announced its decision in Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360. That decision entirely changed the complexion of this case. For it established that the Lands Act does not make admiralty law applicable to actions such as this one. Relying on Rodrigue, the District Court held that Louisiana's one-year limitation on personal injury actions, rather than the admiralty doctrine of laches, must govern this case. It concluded, therefore, that the respondent's action was time barred and granted summary judgment for the petitioner. 2
On appeal, the respondent argued that Rodrigue should not be applied retroactively to bar actions filed before the date of its announcement. 3 But the Court of Appeals declined to reach that question. Instead, it held that the interpretation of the Lands Act in Rodrigue does not compel application of the state statute of limitations or prevent application of the admiralty doctrine of laches. It concluded that the doctrine of laches should have been applied by the District Court and, therefore, reversed that court's judgment and remanded the case for trial. 5 Cir., 430 F.2d 27. We granted certiorari to consider the Court of Appeals' construction of the Lands Act and of Rodrigue. 402 U.S. 942, 91 S.Ct. 1608, 29 L.Ed.2d 109. We hold that the Lands Act, as interpreted in Rodrigue, requires that the state statute of limitations be applied to personal injury actions. We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, however, on the ground that Rodrigue should not be invoked to require application of the Louisiana time limitation retroactively to this case.
* The Lands Act makes the Outer Continental Shelf, including fixed structures thereon, an area of exclusive federal jurisdiction, 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(1). The Act extends the laws of the United States to this area, 43 U.S.C. 1333(a) (1), and provides that the laws of the adjacent State shall also apply '(t)o the extent that they are applicable and not inconsistent' with applicable federal laws, 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2). 4 To the extent that a comprehensive body of federal law is applicable under § 1333(a)(1), state law 'inconsistent' with that law would be inapplicable under § 1333(a)(2).
In Rodrigue, we clarified the scope of application of federal law and state law under § 1333(a)(1) and § 1333(a)(2). By rejecting the view that comprehensive admiralty law remedies apply under § 1333(a)(1), we recognized that there exists a substantial 'gap' in federal law. Thus, state law remedies are not 'inconsistent' with applicable federal law. Accordingly, we held that, in order to provide a remedy for wrongful death, the 'gap' must be filled with the applicable body of state law under § 1333(a)(2).
The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Rodrigue clearly establishes that the remedy for personal injury, as for wrongful death, cannot be derived from admiralty law but must be governed by the law of the adjacent State, Louisiana. But the court held that Louisiana's time limitation on personal injury actions need not be applied with the substantive remedy. It supported this holding by reference to the terms of § 1333(a)(2) that limit the application of state law under the Lands Act. The Louisiana time limitation, the Court of Appeals reasoned, is not 'applicable' of its own force and is 'inconsistent' with the admiralty doctrine of laches. The court held that, despite the holding in Rodrique, the laches doctrine is applicable as a matter of federal common law. We must disagree.
The Court of Appeals did not suggest that state statutes of limitations are per se inapplicable under § 1333(a)(2). Rather, it focused on the peculiar nature of the Louisiana time limitation on personal injury actions found in Art. 3536, La.Civ.Code Ann. Article 3536 provides that personal injury actions shall be 'prescribed' by one year. The Court of Appeals attached muct significance to the fact that Article 3536 'prescribes,' rather than 'perempts,' such actions. Under Louisiana law 'prescription,' unlike 'peremption,' bars the remedy but does not formally extinguish the right to recovery. See Page v. Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 5 Cir., 259 F.2d 420, 422—424; Istre v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 226 So.2d 779, 794—795 (La.App.); Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 335, 65 So.2d 783, 786. This characterization has importance under principles of the conflict of laws. It has been held, as a matter of Louisiana conflicts law, that mere 'prescriptive' time limitations are not binding outside their own forum. See Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. C/B Mr. Kim, 5 Cir., 345 F.2d 45, 50; Kozan v. Comstock, 5 Cir., 270 F.2d 839, 841; Istre v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., supra, 226 So.2d at 795. Reasoning from this principle of conflicts law, the Court of Appeals concluded that the 'prescriptive' limitation is not 'applicable' in a federal court adjudicating a claim under the Lands Act.
We hold, however, that the 'prescriptive' nature of Art. 3536 does not undercut its applicability under the Lands Act. Under § 1333(a)(2) of the Act, '(s)tate law bec(omes) federal law federally enforced.' Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 395 U.S., at 365, 89 S.Ct., at 1842. It was the intent of Congress, expressed in the Senate Committee Report, in the Conference Report, and on the floor of the Senate, that state laws be 'adopted' or 'enacted' as federal law. See id., at 357—358, 89 S.Ct., at 1838. Thus a federal court applying Louisiana law under § 1333(a)(2) of the Lands Act is applying it as federal law—as the law of the federal forum. Since the federal courts is not, then, applying the law of another forum in the usual sense, ordinary conflict of laws principles have no relevance. Article 3536 is 'applicable' in federal court under the Lands Act just as it would be applicable in a Louisiana court. 5
The policies underlying the federal absorption of state law in the Lands Act make this result particularly obvious. As we pointed out in Rodrigue, Congress recognized that 'the Federal Code was never designed to be a complete body of law in and of itself' and thus that a comprehensive body of state law was needed. Id., at 358, 361, 89 S.Ct., at 1838—1840. Congress also recognized that the 'special relationship between the men working on these artificial islands and the adjacent shore to which they commute' favored application of state law with which these men and their attorneys would be familiar. Id., at 365, 89 S.Ct., at 1842; see id., at 363, 89 S.Ct., at 1841. If Congress' goal was to provide a comprehensive and familiar body of law, it would defeat that goal to apply only certain aspects of a state personal injury remedy in federal court. A state time limitation upon a remedy is coordinated with the substance of the remedy and is no less applicable under the Lands Act. 6
The application of Louisiana's Art. 3536 is, of course, subject to the absence of 'inconsistent' and applicable federal law. The Court of Appeals acknowledged that Rodrigue forecloses direct applicability of the 'inconsistent' laches doctrine through admiralty law. But, by applying laches as a matter of federal common law, it sought to reintroduce the doctrine through a back door. 7 This approach subverts the congressional intent documented in Rodrigue, id., at 359—366, 89 S.Ct., at 1839—1842, that admiralty doctrines should not apply under the Lands Act.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals' approach amounts to an inappropriate creation of federal common law. Even when a federal statute creates a wholly federal right but specifies no particular statute of limitations to govern actions under the right, the general rule is to apply the state statute of limitations for analogous types of actions. See International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agr. Implement Workers v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 86 S.Ct. 1107, 16 L.Ed.2d 192; Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 67 S.Ct. 1340, 91 L.Ed. 1602; Campbell v. City of Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 15 S.Ct. 217, 39 L.Ed. 280; Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Provisions, 53 Col.L.Rev. 68 (1953). A special federal statute of limitations is created, as a matter of federal common law, only when the need for uniformity is particularly great or when the nature of the federal right demands a particular sort of statute of limitations. See Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743; McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221, 78 S.Ct. 1201, 2 L.Ed.2d 1272. But, under the Lands Act, there is not even such limited freedom to create a federal statute of limitations, for Congress specified that a comprehensive body of state law should be adopted by the federal courts in the absence of existing federal law. Congress specifically rejected national uniformity and specifically provided for the application of state remedies which demand state, not federal, statutes of limitation. Thus, Congress made clear provision for filling in the 'gaps' in federal law; it did not intend that federal courts fill in those 'gaps' themselves by creating new federal common law. 8
Although we hold that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations must be applied under the Lands Act as interpreted in Rodrigue, we do not blind ourselves to the fact that this is, in relevant respect, a pre-Rodrigue case. The respondent's injury occurred more than three years before the announcement of our decision in Rodrigue. He instituted the present lawsuit more than one year before Rodrigue. Yet, if the Louisiana statute of limitations controls in this case, his action was time barred more than two years before Rodrigue. In these circumstances, we must consider the respondent's argument that the state statute of limitations should be given nonretroactive application under Rodrigue.
In recent years, the nonretroactive application of judicial decisions has been most conspicuously considered in the area of the criminal process. E.g., Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 91 S.Ct. 1160, 28 L.Ed.2d 404; Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 91 S.Ct. 1106, 28 L.Ed.2d 484; Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1048, 22 L.Ed.2d 248; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 14 L.Ed.2d 601. But the problem is by no means limited to that area. The earliest instances of nonretroactivity in the decisions of this Court—more than a century ago—came in cases of nonconstitutional, noncriminal state law. E.g., Gelpcke v. City of Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L.Ed. 520; Havemeyer v. Iowa County, 3 Wall. 294, 18 L.Ed. 38; Railroad Co. v. McClure, 10 Wall. 511, 19 L.Ed. 997. 9 It was in a noncriminal case that we first held that a state court may apply its decisions prospectively. Great Northern R. Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360. And, in the last few decades, we have recognized the doctrine of nonretractivity outside the criminal area many times, in both constitutional and nonconstitutional cases. Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647; Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 89 S.Ct. 817, 22 L.Ed.2d 1; Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 88 S.Ct. 2224, 20 L.Ed.2d 1231; Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 84 S.Ct. 1051, 12 L.Ed.2d 98; England v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 84 S.Ct. 461, 11 L.Ed.2d 440; Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S.Ct. 317, 84 L.Ed. 329.
In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, see e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., supra, 392 U.S., at 496, 88 S.Ct., at 2233, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed, see, e.g., Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, 393 U.S., at 572, 89 S.Ct., at 835. Second, it has been stressed that 'we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.' Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S., at 629, 85 S.Ct., at 1738. Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for '(w)here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity.' Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 395 U.S., at 706, 89 S.Ct., at 1900.
Upon consideration of each of these factors, we conclude that the Louisiana one-year statute of limitations should not be applied retroactively in the present case. Rodrigue was not only a case of first impression in this Court under the Lands Act, but it also effectively overruled a long line of decisions by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit holding that admiralty law, including the doctrine of laches, applies through the Lands Act. See, e.g., Pure Oil Co. v. Snipes, 293 F.2d 60; Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346 F.2d 870; Loffland Bros. Co. v. Roberts, 386 F.2d 540. When the respondent was injured, for the next two years until he instituted his lawsuit, and for the ensuing year of pretrial proceedings, these Court of Appeals decisions represented the law governing his case. It cannot be assumed that he did or could foresee that this consistent interpretation of the Lands Act would be overturned. The most the could do was to rely on the law as it then was. 'We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights.' Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 26, 76 S.Ct. 585, 594, 100 L.Ed. 891 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment).
To told that the respondent's lawsuit is retroactively time barred would be anomalous indeed. A primary purpose underlying the absorption of state law as federal law in the Lands Act was to aid injured employees by affording them comprehensive and familiar remedies. Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., supra, 395 U.S., at 361, 365, 89 S.Ct., at 1840, 1842. Yet retroactive application of the Louisiana statute of limitations to this case would deprive the respondent of any remedy whatsoever on the basis of superseding legal doctrine that was quite unforeseeable. To abruptly terminate this lawsuit that has proceeded through lengthy and, no doubt, costly discovery stages for a year would surely be inimical to the beneficent purpose of the Congress.
It would also produce the most 'substantial inequitable results,' Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 395 U.S., at 706, 89 S.Ct., at 1900, to hold that the respondent 'slept on his rights' at a time when he could not have known the time limitation that the law imposed upon him. In Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, we invoked the doctrine of nonretroactive application to protect property interests of 'cities, bondholders, and others connected with municipal utilities'; and, in Allen v. State Board of Elections, supra, we invoked the doctrine to protect elections held under possibly discriminatory voting laws. Certainly, the respondent's potential redress for his allegedly serious injury—an injury that may significantly undercut his future earning power—is entitled to similar protection. As in England v. State Board of Medical Examiners, supra, nonretroactive application here simply preserves his right to a day in court. 10
Both a devotion to the underlying purpose of the Lands Act's absorption of state law and a weighing of the equities requires nonretroactive application of the state statute of limitations here. Accordingly, although holding that the opinion of the Court of Appeals reflects a misapprehension of Rodrigue, we affirm its judgment remanding this case to the trial court. It is so ordered.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS.
Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360, does not, with all respect, require reversal in this case. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals without reaching the question of the retroactivity of Rodrigue.
Rodrigue, like the present case, arose under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462, 43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq. That Act created a federal cause of action for offshore injuries enforceable in the federal courts, but made state laws applicable. 43 U.S.C. 1333(a)(2).
In Rodrigue, La.Civ.Code Ann., Art. 2315 (1970) was relevant, which provides in part: 'The right to recover all other damages caused by an offense or quasi offense, if the injured person dies, shall survive for a period of one year from the death of the deceased * * *.'
In the present case Art. 3536 of the Code is applicable and it reads: 'The following actions are also prescribed by one year:
'That for injurious words, whether verbal or written, and that for damages caused by animals, or resulting from offenses or quasi offenses.'
The latter limitation is 'prescriptive' only, i.e., that while the Louisiana remedy is barred, the right is not. Under Art. 3536, the limitation runs only to the remedy and would not be applicable in another forum applying the substantive right. Istre v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 226 So.2d 779, 794—799 (La.App.1969). Respondent, therefore, argues that the federal doctrine of laches is the only limitation upon his right of recovery and that it is inapplicable where, as here, there is no prejudice to the defendant and any delay in filing the lawsuit was reasonably excusable. See, e.g., Akers v. State Marine Lines, 5 Cir., 344 F.2d 217.
The Louisiana courts consider the distinction between peremptive and prescriptive limitations important; 1 and by reason of the federal statute, making Louisiana law applicable, federal courts are bound by the distinction. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492. As stated in Rodrigue the federal Act 'supplemented gaps in the federal law with state law through the 'adoption of State law as the law of the United States." 395 U.S., at 357, 89 S.Ct., at 1838.
In Rodrigue—an action for wrongful death—the right is extinguished, if the action for recovery is not brought within a year of the death. Kenney v. Trinidad Corp., 5 Cir., 349 F.2d 832; Mejia v. United States, 5 Cir., 152 F.2d 686. Under Art. 3536 which governs here—Louisiana law holds that it is merely a 'procedural restraint which bars the remedy, but does not extinguish the right.' Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. C/B Mr. Kim, 345 F.2d 45, 50 (CA5 1965). See also Page v. Cameron Iron Works, 259 F.2d 420, 422 (CA5 1958); Jackson v. Continental Southern Lines, 172 F.Supp. 809 (W.D.Ark.1959); Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 65 So.2d 783 (1953); Devoe & Reynolds Co. v. Robinson, 109 So.2d 226 (La.App.1959).
A district court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction in Arkansas, applied these principles of Louisiana law and held properly in my mind—that Art. 3536 did not bar an action filed more than one year after the injury complained of. Jackson v. Continental Southern Lines, supra. See also Page v. Cameron Iron Works, supra. That decision is in perfect harmony with long-established rules of conflict of laws. 2 A different result should not obtain here where federal jurisdiction, 43 U.S.C. 1333, flows from a head other than diversity.
Apart from traditional conflict of laws is, the congressional mandate to apply state laws to these federal causes of action. If we are faithfully to apply the state law of Louisiana we would apply here not the Louisiana peremption rule applied in Rodrigue but the Louisiana prescriptive rule applicable to the instant personal injury case.
Today's decision conflicts with Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 73 S.Ct. 914, 97 L.Ed. 1319, where the District Court was enforcing in admiralty a state cause of action for wrongful death. Although procedural irregularities in the appointment of the administrator would have barred—under the state statute of limitations—an action in state court, we held that federal courts were free to formulate their own procedural rules. If we were to follow Levinson, we would not bind federal courts to state rules of procedure designed to have no application beyond the state forum for which they were created. 3 Cf. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, 356 U.S. 525, 533—539, 78 S.Ct. 893, 898 902, 2 L.Ed.2d 953; Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183, 192, 67 S.Ct. 657, 662, 91 L.Ed. 832; Atkins v. Schmutz Manufacturing Co., 435 F.2d 527 (CA4 1970); Note, 71 Col.L.Rev. 865 (1971).
Today's decision also conflicts with our decision in Richards v. United States, supra. There, the Federal Tort Claims Act referred us to the local law for a rule of decision, just as Rodrigue and the Lands Act do in the present case. We concluded that the Act 'require(d) application of the whole law of the State where the act or omission occurred,' 369 U.S., at 11, 82 S.Ct., at 582, including its conflict of laws decision. 4 If we were to follow Richards and Rodrigue in the present case, we would apply Louisiana's prescriptive rule as it has been construed by Louisiana courts and not use it to bar an action in a different forum.
For in that other forum—here the federal district court Louisiana law allows the federal court, consistently with conflict of laws, to apply a different limitation than Louisiana would apply in her own courts.
In Rodrigue, we said:
'The purpose of the Lands Act was to define a body of law applicable to the seabed, the subsoil, and the fixed structures such as those in question here on the outer Continental Shelf. That this law was to be federal law of the United States, applying state law only as federal law and then only when not inconsistent with applicable federal law, is made clear by the language of the Act.' 395 U.S., at 355 356, 89 S.Ct., at 1837.
We then concluded: 'It is evident from this that federal law is 'exclusive' in its regulation of this area, and that state law is adopted only as surrogate federal law.' Id., at 357, 89 S.Ct., at 1838.
Since the federal court is not a Louisiana forum, 5 the Louisiana law of prescription permits enforcement of this claim after Louisiana's one-year statute has run. 6 Therefore, if we are to be faithful to the federal scheme we must apply Louisiana law; and Louisiana law would not apply Rodrigue in a personal injury case where the suit is not brought in a Louisiana forum.
The Court of Appeals, speaking through our leading admiralty authority, Judge Brown, so held and went on to rule that in harmony with Louisiana's prescriptive rule this personal injury suit was not barred under the laches doctrine familiar to maritime law.
This is not a stale claim and its assertion after the one-year period ran was not prejudicial; no prejudice was indeed pleaded. Cf. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 66 S.Ct. 582, 90 L.Ed. 743.
One who reads this record will be impressed with the grave injustice of applying the Louisiana one-year statute as if it were peremptive, rather than prescriptive. Death comes with a finality lacking in some personal injury cases; and the rigid rule applied in Rodrigue can do no injustice. But personal injuries are often lingering and one may not know for months whether he is partially or permanetly crippled, whether he must be retrained for wholly different work, and so on. In this case it took some months after the injury for respondent (1) to realize that he could not return to his old work, and (2) to discover the kind of work he could do.
If we followed Louisiana law, as Congress directed, we would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reflecting as it does good law and a measure of justice not always allowable when the rigidity of Rodrigue governs a case.
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See infra, at 107.
The decision of the District Court is unreported (E.D.La., Civil Action No. 68—19D).
The respondent has made the same argument to this Court.
The full text of § 1333(a)(1) and § 1333(a)(2) reads:
'(a)(1) The Constitution and laws and civil and political jurisdiction of the United States are extended to the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf and to all artificial islands and fixed structures which may be erected thereon for the purpose of exploring for, developing, removing, and transporting resources therefrom, to the same extend as if the outer Continental Shelf were an area of exclusive Federal jurisdiction located within a State: Provided, however, That mineral leases on the outer Continental Shelf shall be maintained or issued only under the provisions of this subchapter.
'(2) To the extend that they are applicable and not inconsistent with this subchapter or with other Federal laws and regulations of the Secretary now in effect or hereafter adopted, the civil and criminal laws of each adjacent State as of August 7, 1953 are declared to be the law of the United States for that portion of the subsoil and seabed of the outer Continental Shelf, and artificial islands and fixed structures erected thereon, which would be within the area of the State if its boundaries were extended seaward to the outer margin of the outer Continental Shelf, and the President shall determine and publish in the Federal Register such projected lines extending seaward and defining each such area. All of such applicable laws shall be administered and enforced by the appropriate officers and courts of the United States. State taxation laws shall not apply to the outer Continental Shelf.'
This is not to imply that a federal court adjudicating a claim under state law as absorbed in the Lands Act must function as it would in a diversity case. See Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188; Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079; Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651, 73 S.Ct. 914, 916, 97 L.Ed. 1319. We hold only that the state statute of limitations is part of the law to be applied in federal court as it would be part of the law to be applied in a state court.
Here we are not dealing with mere 'housekeeping rules' embodied in state law. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1145, 14 L.Ed.2d 8.
The Court of Appeals justified its creation of federal common law in this instance by suggesting that personal injury actions under the Lands Act are in a 'quasi maritime area which is traditionally imbued with the laches doctrine and which presents a strong federal urge toward uniformity.' 430 F.2d, at 32.
Contrary to the suggestion by Mr. Justice Douglas, our holding today is consonant with Levinson v. Deupree, supra, n. 5. Since Levinson involved a federal court's obligation to adopt state procedural rules in an admiralty action, it has very limited relevance to the instant case, which involves an action under a statute which ousts admiralty law and specifically directs that state law shall be adopted as federal law. Moreover, Levinson held only that state 'procedural niceties relating to amendments of pleadings' need not be applied by federal admiralty courts, and the opinion emphasized that it was not dealing with an important part of the state action, such as a statute of limitations. 345 U.S., at 651—652, 73 S.Ct., at 916. As pointed out above, our holding today does not extend to such state 'housekeeping rules.' See n. 6, supra.
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S.Ct. 585, 7 L.Ed.2d 492, also referred to by Mr. Justice Douglas, held that, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a federal court must apply 'the whole law of the State where the act or omission occurred.' Id., at 11, 82 S.Ct., at 592. Insofar as Richards bears on the present case, it supports our holding that federal courts should not create interstitial federal common law when the Congress has directed that a whole body of state law shall apply.
These cases were decided in the era before Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, supra, n. 5. The first case involving non-retroactive application of state law concerned interpretation of the Mississippi Constitution. Rowan v. Runnels, 5 How. 134, 12 L.Ed. 85.
We do not hold here that Rodrigue, in its entirety, must be applied nonretroactively. Rather, we hold only that state statutes of limitations, applicable under Rodrigue's interpretation of the Lands Act, should not be applied retroactively. Retroactive application of all state substantive remedies under Rodrigue would not work a comparable hardship or be so inconsistent with the purpose of the Lands Act.
Guillory v. Avoyelles R. Co., 104 La. 11, 15, 28 So. 899, 901 (1900):
'When a statute creates a right of action and stipulates the delay within which that right is to be executed, the delay thus fixed is not, properly speaking, one of prescription, but it is one of peremption.
'Statutes of prescription simply bar the remedy. Statutes of peremption destroy the cause of action itself. That is to say, after the limit of time expires the cause of action no longer exists; it is lost.'
G. Stumberg, Principles of Conflict of Laws 146—147 (3d ed. 1963):
'The traditional reaction in Conflict of Laws * * * has been that ordinarily limitation is procedural. This view was taken by the Dutch jurists, and where the question arises out of a general statute, it is the view generally accepted by Anglo-American courts. The result is that in the absence of a statute to the contrary in most jurisdictions, when the claim is based upon foreign facts, even though the foreign period of limitation has not run, the plaintiff may not recover if the time allowed for suit at the forum has expired. Conversely, if the foreign period has expired, suit may nevertheless be brought at the forum if the time specified there has not run.' (Footnotes omitted.)
Accord, Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 603—604 (1934): Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws §§ 142, 143 (1971); 3 J. Beale, Conflict of Laws § 584.1 (1935); B. Currie, Conflict of Laws 232—234, 255 (1963); A. Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws 428—436 (1962); H. Goodrich, Conflict of Laws 267 (4th ed. 1964); Ailes, Limitation of Actions and the Conflict of Laws, 31 Mich.L.Rev. 474 (1933); Comment, The Statute of Limitations and the Conflict of Laws, 28 Yale L.J. 492 (1919).
While still sitting on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Mr. Justice Harlan said:
'In actions where the rights of the parties are grounded upon the law of jurisdictions other than the forum, it is a well-settled conflict-of-laws rule that the forum will apply the foreign substantive law, but will follow its own rules of procedure.' Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 154 (CA2 1955).
Mr. Justice Harlan went on to hold that a Panamanian statute of limitations was not applicable where a Panamanian statutory right was being enforced under the admiralty jurisdiction of the Federal District Court.
The majority supports its limitation on actions by saying that 'we are not dealing with mere 'housekeeping rules' embodied in state law. Cf. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 473, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 1145, 14 L.Ed.2d 8.' Ante, at 103 n. 6. This conclusion, however, is directly contrary to the characterization given the prescriptive limitation by Louisiana courts:
'* * * It is conceded by the five defendants-appellees that had plaintiff filed this suit in the federal court, the doctrine of laches would apply. The cases cited by plaintiff * * * were filed in the federal forum and are distinguished on this basis.
'But plaintiff chose the State forum. Plaintiff may have preferred some procedural advantages afforded in the State court, such as: agreement of only nine of twelve jurors needed; ability to call under cross-examination any employee of a party as opposed to the federal rule wherein the right to call witnesses under cross-examination is limited to executive or top supervisory personnel; no procedural vehicle provided for directed verdict or judgment n.o.v. in State court; or shorter delay in State court between filing petition and trial. Having chosen the State forum, he is bound by State procedural rules. The argument that uniformity requires us to import the Federal procedural law of laches rather than use the Louisiana procedural law of prescription, is unacceptable. If we adopt the federal procedural rule in this instance, it would logically follow that more Louisiana procedural rules will, for the same reason, be abandoned in the future. We hold that our State courts are bound to apply State procedural rules.' Istre v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., supra, 226 So.2d, at 794.
The court then concluded. 'The applicable Louisiana prescription statute, LSA—C.C. Art. 3536, is procedural.' Id., at 794—795.
The majority would limit Richards' reasoning 'that federal courts should not create interstitial federal common law when the Congress has directed that a whole body of state law shall apply.' Ante, at 105 n. 8. It is precisely because we must apply the 'whole body' of state law, however, that we should apply the Louisiana interpretation of that law and not use the prescriptive rule to bar an action in a federal forum. H. Hart & H. Wechsler, The Federal Courts and the Federal System 456—457 (1953).
The majority acknowledges that the federal court still retains its identity as a federal forum when it indicates that it is not to 'function as it would in a diversity case,' ante, at 103 n. 5, and that only certain state rules are adopted, ante, at 103 n. 6.
O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318, 34 S.Ct. 596, 58 L.Ed. 980, does not require a contrary result because there we considered only whether Art. 3536 could be applied to a federal action in a federal court and not how it should be applied. Petitioner conceded that his action was barred if Art. 3536 applied and 'the sole question pressed by counsel and which we (were) called upon to decide (was) the application of the state statute to the conceded (federal) cause of action.' Id., at 321, 34 S.Ct., at 597.
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[![npm version](https://img.shields.io/npm/v/sircus-components-fullembed.svg?style=flat)](https://www.npmjs.com/package/sircus-components-fullembed)

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```css
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## License
Released under the MIT license.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaGithub


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Q: What type of Mounting Bracket is this? Where can I purchase it? HP pavillion p6823w I am in the process of upgrading several internal computer components. There are two small brackets at the bottom of the area where the fan is mounted. I would like to add some antenna ports or a USB port to the back of the case, but a search has yielded no results. I have no idea what this is.

It seems a specific type of bracket is needed, but I have not found anything that even closely resembles this type of bracket. Any help identifying this, or where I might be able to purchase one would be appreciated.
I have attached a picture to the inside of Case - Strange Bracket Mounts Below Case Fan Far Right Corner.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


text:
Eels embrace entertainers tag
Sat 5 Apr 2014, 06:00 AM
It's hard to imagine that a Chris Sandow chip-and-chase on halfway from his side's first set of the game was at the top of Brad Arthur's game-plan against the Broncos but the Eels coach insists that his players will continue to be given the freedom to play what they see.
Rather than trying to constrain Sandow in a set structure as seemed to be the failings of both Stephen Kearney and Ricky Stuart, Arthur has introduced his cheeky and enigmatic No.7 into a team with a strong framework from which it builds. The result has been successive wins against the Panthers and Broncos.
Sandow was back to his electrifying best as the Eels chanced their hand on numerous occasions on Friday night, scoring two of the tries of the season as they opened up a 10-0 lead after 34 minutes and then fighting back late to eventually win 25-18 at Suncorp Stadium.
Will Hopoate's first try for his new club, an eighth to the NRL's leading tryscorer Semi Radradra and a Jarryd Hayne special midway through the second half exemplified the attacking weaponry at Arthur's disposal and, despite some errors, he has no intention of stockpiling it for future use.
"We need to be positive with the footy, we need to back ourselves," Arthur said after his side improved their record to 3-2 after five weeks, a win total that took them 22 weeks to surpass in 2013.
"We've got some skill there so we need to use it; we just need to be smart about how we do it and when we do it.
"At times we put ourselves under pressure – we'd score a try and then didn't complete that set and they'd score straight away. That's where we need to be a little bit smarter about how we do it."
Five-eighth Corey Norman left his former home ground a victor and is excited about the scope the side's playmakers have been given to trust their natural instincts, including his halves partner in Sandow.
"There's just something about me and 'Chritty', we just play well together," Norman told NRL.com. "We work a bit better together and off the field we always talk and we're a bit closer and I think that's coming out on the field as well. At the moment me and Chritty are starting to form a good partnership.
"We've got our plays but Brad's big on that if we see something you just do it and we'll fold back into our structure after that. He's given us a bit of leeway and its coming with a few errors but we're backing our defence and it's good.
"The last couple of weeks it's shown that our attack is starting to grow and we're starting to get some good metres out of our own end and that's from playing good footy."
With his ability to play so late at the line and create space for men out the back such as Sandow, Norman and Jarryd Hayne, lock forward Joseph Paulo provides an integral link between the muscle in the middle and the entertainers on the edge.
Norman describes him as a half stuck in a forward's body but Paulo is relishing his new role and responsibilities in a team he says is still defining their identity.
"You know when Chrissy's at his best is when he's just running across the field showing, taking them on, chip-and-chase on the first set of the game," Paulo said. "Or 'Haynesy' is at the back just running and then you've got guys like Semi [Radradra] and Hoppa (Will Hopoate) who are threats on the edges.
"The big boys are doing their job and I think for us it's just something that Brad's really put in place and we're just trying to find our identity as a team.
"Brad's really given me free rein to make sure I'm pushing the forwards around and pretty much being a link in the middle with the guys on the edges.
"If I can get the forwards in the middle going obviously I'm just lucky to have that skill from when I played five-eighth and just trying to employ that.
"There were a few errors in the first half so I was a bit disappointed but I'm slowly learning my role and balancing running and ball-playing out there.
"We're still working on it but I know we're just really enjoying our footy at this time."


On Saturday night, Dublin's metal scene was rocked to its core. With almost 300 fans in attendance, the atmosphere was one full of support, camaraderie and wanton abandon. Vying for the last two places in the Metal 2 The Masses Ireland Final, the 6 bands knew that this semi was the one that was going to be the closest to call and the hardest to judge of the three.
Tipperary sludgsters Zh0ra kick off the evening and are unperturbed by drawing the opening slot as they proceed to pummel with a bulldozing barrage of monstrous riffage. When they hit their groove it is as if every member is in a world of his own, caught in the spell of his own music that slowly seeps over his fellow band members as they craft an aural primordial soup. Their sound is heavy, complex and beyond comparison in Ireland. Zh0ra embrace their chance tonight and prove why they made it this far.
The upstarts in Call To Arms follow Zh0ra with their own cocky and brash brand of metalcore. I was critical of their previous performance and tonight is a step in the right direction. They seem more focused and the crowd interaction (they have a rabid fan base) is fervent. Dean takes most of the attention and offers the mic on countless occasions to the front row to sing along; most notably on their closing anthem, 'The Core'. Call To Arms improve every time I see them but will have to take it to the next level to succeed at the final.
Jenova are a new band to M2TM this year and the whole showcase is a better place for their presence. Whether it's the visible passion of guitarist Cormac or the maniacal screams of frontman Brian, they have not failed to impress at every stage. Tonight is no exception and they have the venue hopping with their black/deathcore set. In the aftermath Cormac commented "I give Fibbers crowds a bit of flack for being very rigid at times compared to shows down in the country, but tonight the crowd was absolutely INSANE!" – Kinda sums it up perfectly. Well done lads, this was a hell of a first year, I hope you come back next year.
The Devil Wants Her Swagger Back begin the second half of the evening in a fury. These guys are clued in to how to get people pumped. They are broadcasting their set live on Facebook using phones and go-pro cameras. Being interactive to fans is key to building support and tonight the support for TDWHSB is plain to see. The venue is buzzing, the crowd join in a pogo-ing session that punks in the 70's would be proud of. Slipknot is the order of the day with the devils, and they do it well. Another blistering performance. Tonight is more than a showcase of talent, it is a statement from the Irish Metal community.
The penultimate band tonight is Soothsayer from the darkened bowels of Cork. Right now in metal worldwide there is not a band with a lead singer as unique as Líam Hughes. Of the 40+ M2TM shows that I have attended, tonight's performance from Soothsayer is the best 30 minutes I have ever witnessed. From the opening seconds Líam kneels and sways with the music as if possessed. When he rises, the crowd becomes transfixed on his every movement. It is hypnotic, mesmerising and powerful without being overt and ostentatious. The rest of the band lay down a solid wall of doom metal with black metal passages. Their musicianship is fabulous, but all attention returns to the Soothsayer at the front. If anyone reading this article has the opportunity to mention this band to the likes of Lee Dorrian at Rise Above Records; I implore you to do so. Soothsayer, thank you for the chills and the disturbingly beautiful music.
Closing the evening are the wizards from Alpheidae. I've said it before, to be a quality frontman in a metal band, you need to be a narcissistic egomaniac and Calvin Singleton's on stage persona fits the bill perfectly. Tonight, he is wearing a bandage on his wrist but during the set he uses it's unfurling strands as a prop in his performance; notably as a blindfold as he runs blind through the 'City Of Knives'. He finishes the show by introducing the band members in turn and proceeds to stand atop the crowd while delivering his final oration to his worshippers. Alpheidae complete a top notch night with a professional set, filled with technical sorcery.
It's cliché to say all the bands won and that Irish metal was the winner, but it did and it set the bar for the final in a fortnight.
Metal 2 The Masses Finalists, do you accept the challenge laid at your feet?
The crowd vote went to Call To Arms and the judges vote went to Zh0ra.
All bands are encouraged to download and use the photos where needed. Full permission is granted from Steve because that's what this whole M2TM beast is about.


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Home » Television & Web
Shivangi Joshi On Shooting For Yeh Rishta Kya Kehlata Hai Amid COVID-19 Era: "The Situation Was Not Easy…"
She is quite excited to be back in front of the camera and revealed that it was quite overwhelming to meet her co-stars after such a long time.
Shivangi Joshi On Shooting For Yeh Rishta Kya Kehlata Hai Amid COVID-19 Era: "The Situation Was Not Easy…" (Photo credit: Instagram/shivangi joshi)
Actress Shivangi Joshi was in Dehradun before resuming shoot here. She says things are different and scary here.
After a long break due to the coronavirus pandemic, Shivangi began shooting for the show 'Yeh Rishta Kya Kehlata Hai'.
"Things are different and scary here. I just go to the sets, shoot and come back home, maintaining social distancing and other security norms. Guess it will remain like this till things become better here in Mumbai and the world," Shivangi Joshi said.
Breathe: Into The Shadows: Shruti Bapna Opens Up On Playing Homosexual & Kissing Nithya Menen
Emergence: Filmmaker Anand Gandhi Unveils The Poster Of His Next Film, Check Out
In the new episodes, she is seen playing two characters.
"This is the first time I am playing a double role and I am really enjoying it. The experience was thrilling, as depicting two characters, totally opposite of each other requires composition and a clear mindset," Shivangi Joshi said.
"I resumed shoot after three-and-a-half months and gave my first shot, not as Naira but Tina. The situation was not easy and conditions were not normal. There has been a sense of fear in each one of us, it was a difficult one for me too, but I am happy that the results are good and people are liking it and appreciating both the characters," she added.
Shivangi Joshi is quite excited to be back in front of the camera and revealed that it was quite overwhelming to meet her co-stars after such a long time.
She said: "Fantastic is the word. This has been the longest time since I was away from the camera, so right now I am enjoying every minute of it. When I met my co-actors it was like, each one of us had a million things to share and discuss, talk and hug but of course, we could not. Plus limited people were shooting in a protected environment. So, we had to adjust to the new norms of greeting each other."
Shivangi Joshi
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