If you're not living under a rock you've heard of homeschooling. And if you're raising kids yourself and looking into your options, you may have heard of unschooling.
Unschooling is based on the idea that children are naturally curious, and if we don't impose a structured curriculum they will seek out things that interest them. With support from their parents, they will learn everything that formal school is supposed to teach, but it will be because they wanted to learn it.
I first read about unschooling while I was trying to decide how I should be eating. I knew that I was overweight, but not so much that I wouldn't be seen in a swimsuit. Assuming I could find one that fit … Hmm, maybe that was a bit of a problem after all.
What really got to me was when my older daughter fell asleep watching TV and I had to carry her upstairs. I realize she's getting bigger, but one flight of stairs carrying a 10-year-old shouldn't leave me that winded. I want to be able to do things with the girls when they're teenagers, and that wasn't going to happen the way things were going.
There's a set of "conventional wisdom" that we all think we're supposed to follow.
It's designed for everyone — which means it's designed for no one in particular.
And it doesn't work all that well.
Don't get me wrong, lots of kids go to school and get a decent education. The same way people go to residential weight-loss clinics — like on the TV show The Biggest Loser — and they lose weight. It's pretty easy to make some kind of progress when you're stuck there with nothing to do but what you're told.
But what happens back in the "real world"? The kids look forward to time off so they can stop learning — because learning is a chore — and the dieters go right back to the way of eating that put them in the clinics to begin with.
What unschooling aims to do is make learning a natural, enjoyable part of normal life. It's not something you do because you have to, you do it because you want to. You enjoy the learning process itself, and you want things that you can only have by going through the process.
That's exactly what undieting is.
When you're "on a diet" you're doing something unnatural. You're eating food you don't like, or not eating food you do like. You tell yourself it's only for a while, just until you get down to your target weight. It's work.
Maybe the biggest problem with dieting is how it makes you look at yourself. When you are always "on a diet", you think of yourself as someone who always "needs to lose weight". It's not something you're doing, it's who you are.
Is that you? Be honest with yourself.
Are you "on a diet" right now?
In three years of writing about food, I've come across plenty of people who eat well, clearly like food, aren't constantly hungry, and are in much better shape than the average person. So I looked at how they eat and why, and figured out what all of them have in common. I put all that together and tried it myself and it works.
That's how I started Undieting. And now that I believe in it, it's time to start telling other people about it.
You'll need to sign up for a free guest membership to read the rest of the series as they come out.
Part 4: Are you steam powered?
1) Obviously I am not being paid by The Biggest Loser for mentioning them.


text:
Constitution and composition of the Board of Management:-
(1) The Board of Management shall be the highest executive body of the University and shall consist of the following members, namely:-
(I) Chairman-
(a) The Vice-chancellor of the University.
(II) Ex-Officio Members-
The Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, Finance Department;
The Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan, Medical Education Department;
The Director of Medical Education, Government of Rajasthan;
The Registrar of the University-Member-Secretary;
Explanation:- Ex-officio members mentioned at (a) to (b) shall include their respective nominees who shall not be below the rank of Deputy Secretary to the Government of Rajasthan.
(III) Nominated Members:-
Two persons nominated by the Vice-chancellor from amongst the Deans of the Faculties for one year;
Two University Professors nominated by the Vice-chancellor for one year;
Two eminent educationists to be nominated by the Chancellor for three years;
Two Principals of affiliated colleges, one from the Government colleges and another from Private colleges, to be nominated by the State Government for one year.
Two members of State Legislature to be nominated by the State Government for three years; and
Two eminent educationists, to be nominated by the State Government for three years.
(IV) Elected Members:-
Two teachers of the Universities or its constituent colleges who have put in not less than seven years teaching experience in any institution of higher education in Rajasthan on 1st January immediately preceding the year in which elections are held, other than the University Professors, Deans, Directors of the Colleges of the University, to be elected by the teachers of the University and of its constituent colleges from amongst themselves for three years.
One third of the members of the Board shall constitute the quorum for meeting.
The Chairman of the Board shall perform such functions and exercise such powers as are provided in this Act or as may be prescribed by the Statutes or Regulations.
The members shall serve without any additional pay but shall be entitled to daily allowance and travelling expenses as may be prescribed.
The minutes of meeting of the Board shall be recorded and maintained by the Member Secretary of the Board.
Duties and functions of the Board:- The duties and functions of the Board shall be as follows:-
To approve and sanction the budget of the University;
To acquire, to dispose of, to hold and to control the property and funds of the University and issue any general or special direction on behalf of the University;
To accept the transfer of any movable or immovable property on behalf of the University;
To administer any funds placed at the disposal of the University for the specific purposes;
To invest money belonging to the University;
To appoint the members of the academic, administrative and other staff of the University in such manner as may be prescribed;
To direct the form and use of the common seal of the University;
To appoint such committees, either standing or temporary as it deems necessary for its proper functioning;
To borrow money for capital improvements and make suitable arrangements for its repayment;
To meet at such times and as often as it deems necessary, provided however, that the regular meeting of the Board shall be held at least once in every three months;
To make Statues, Ordinances and Regulations in the manner prescribed in this Act for smooth functioning of the University; and
To regulate and determine all matters concerning the University in accordance with this Act and the Statutes and to exercise such powers and to discharge such duties as may be conferred or imposed on it by this Act and the Statutes.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Midwest manufacturing crawls back into growth territory in December
Posted: January 2, 2020 11:00 PM
With boosted sales and orders, conditions for manufacturers in Minnesota and eight other central states crawled back into growth territory in December, nudging up confidence levels after a difficult fall season, a closely watched economic report said.
Creighton University's nine-state Mid-America Business Conditions Index rose to 50.6 in December from November's disappointing 48.6, according to data released Thursday. Minnesota's index slipped to 50.7 in December from 50.9 in November.
Any index below 50 signals economic contraction, so supply managers and economists were hoping for an uptick after three months of contraction over a four-month period.
The region – which also incudes Iowa, The Dakotas, Nebraska, Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas and Oklahoma – saw improvements in December sales and new orders. Delivery speeds of raw materials continued to grow but at a slower rate. Employment and export orders continued to show significant economic contraction.
Imports, however, were unchanged from November as supply managers continued to boost purchasing from abroad in anticipation of higher tariffs in the weeks months ahead.
"Surveys over the past several months indicate that the regional manufacturing economy is being negatively impacted by the trade war with China and the global economic slowdown," said Ernie Goss, director of Creighton's Economic Forecasting Group. "This will be a drag on the overall Mid-America economy for the first half of 2020. However, I expect overall regional growth to remain soft but positive for the first half of the year."
Company executives in Minnesota – who will report fourth quarter earnings results later this month – signaled weeks ago that the trade war with China and uncertainty surrounding U.S. trade policies with Mexico and Canada had dramatically impacted their supply chains, pricing and the scheduling and sourcing of raw material orders.
The Institute for Supply Management releases its national manufacturing conditions report on Friday. But it is widely expected to also show pressure surrounding trade issues.
In the last few months, companies such as 3M, Graco, Polaris and others said they increased some products prices to accommodate for extra trade tariff costs. Bill Gray, the president of the flexible plumbing pipe maker Uponor North America in Apple Valley, said during an interview last month that uncertain U.S. trade policies and new threats about U.S. tariffs on Brazil and Argentina-made goods "is really undermining confidence in the (commercial construction) market."
In the December Creighton survey, 43% of supply managers reported that tariffs had resulted in increased prices of supplies purchased by their firms, Goss said.
At the same time, factory purchasing managers noted they are taking advantage of the temporary freeze of new U.S. tariffs that were to go into effect Dec. 15 on $160 billion worth of Chinese-made goods.
With that pause, import orders increased, as did factory owners' confidence levels, Goss said.
"Looking ahead six months, economic optimism, as captured by the December Business Confidence Index, climbed to 57.6 from November's 52.9," Goss said. "Potential January passage of the U.S.-Canada-Mexico trade agreement and Phase I of the trade agreement with China boosted the regional business confidence index for the month."
Visit the Star Tribune (Minneapolis) at www.startribune.com


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How to Reboot Iphone If It Hangs
Regular iPhone Reboot
Force reboot iPhone
Reboot iPhone 7 and iPhone 7 Plus
Reboot iPhone 8, iPhone 8 Plus, and iPhone X
Other ways to restart your iPhone
IOS devices rarely freeze so seriously that they will need a reboot. However, sometimes this still happens, because no one is safe from errors, including Apple developers.
When such a hang occurs, many users do not know how to solve this problem. Indeed, on the iPhone case there are no buttons for rebooting the device, and a long press on the power button does not give anything.
If you also encountered a similar situation, then we suggest that you familiarize yourself with this article. Here we will consider several methods that can be used to restart a frozen iPhone. This article will be useful for all iPhone models, including iPhone 4, 4s, 5, 5s, 5c, 6, 6s, 7, 8, as well as iPhone X.
If your iPhone began to freeze, but while reacting to your actions, it is best to perform a safe reboot by turning off and then turning on the device. To do this, press the power button, which is located on the top or side of the smartphone, and hold it until the power button appears on the screen.
Read more: How To Take A Screenshot On Iphone X, 8, 7, 6, Se
After that, you just need to move the power button from left to right and the iPhone will turn off.
After turning off the iPhone, wait a few seconds and you can turn it on again. To do this, press the power button again and hold it for a couple of seconds. As a result, the Apple logo should appear on the screen, which means that the iPhone is loading and you need to wait a bit.
If the iPhone is seriously frozen and does not respond to your actions, then you won't be able to restart it by turning it off / on. In such situations, you must use a forced reboot. For most iPhone models, the forced reboot procedure looks the same. To do this, simultaneously hold down the power and Home buttons, and then hold them until the screen goes blank.
Immediately after such a reboot, the Apple logo should appear on the iPhone screen and after a few seconds it should boot. If the download does not start automatically, then you can try to do it manually by briefly pressing the power button.
Read more: Best Video Player For Iphone 7 No Network
This reboot method works on iPhone 4, 4s, 5, 5s, 5c, 6, 6s. If you have an iPhone 7 or newer, then a forced reboot needs to be done differently.
One of the innovations in the iPhone 7 and iPhone 7 Plus has been the rejection of the hardware Home button; instead, these models use a touch button that simulates the feeling of being pressed using the Taptic Engine. In this regard, Apple has changed the way to force a restart of these models.
If you need to restart iPhone 7 or iPhone 7 Plus then follow these steps:
Press and hold the power button on the device.
Without releasing the power button, press the volume down button.
Hold both of these buttons until the Apple logo appears on the screen of the device.
After this procedure, your iPhone 7 should boot normally.
With the release of the iPhone X, which has no Home button at all, the forced reboot procedure has changed again. In order to force restart the iPhone 8, iPhone 8 Plus or iPhone X, you need to follow these steps:
Press and quickly release the volume up button.
Press and quickly release the volume down button.
Press the Power button and hold it until the Apple logo appears.
Read more: How to Delete Telegram Account on iPhone
After this procedure, your iPhone 8 or iPhone X should boot normally.
In addition to the above, there are other ways to restart the iPhone, they can be used in difficult situations, when nothing else helps.
You can restart your iPhone by turning on bold. To do this, open the "Settings", go to the "General. Universal Access" section and enable the option "Bold Font" there.
A reset also results in a network reset. To do this, open "Settings", go to the "Basic. Reset" section and use the "Reset Network Settings" option.
In extreme cases, you can restart the iPhone by discharging its battery to zero and connecting it to charging.
hangsiphonereboot


What do you get when you combine a team of nutritionists from a prominent Children's Hospital with a comedy team? A creative, fun, informative, and interactive program to champion children's health. Quiet Riot and Children's Hospital of the King's Daughters (Norfolk, VA) have teamed up to present Steps to Fitness a 50 minute assembly program combining the hospital's research in Children's Health and the Quiet Riot's theater arts.
This program encourages Students to take charge of their own health & happiness with good nutrition, physical play every day and empowering their self-esteem.


Social networking changes the relationship between footballers and the media as players hit 'the net' off the pitch.
Thanks to the wonders of online social networking, Spain international midfielder Cesc Fabregas 'friended' me last week around the time of his multi-million pound move to Barcelona from Arsenal.
But becoming Facebook pal #4064 of the man listed as Francesc Fabregas Soler on his profile is no guarantee of leisurely chats together over Crema Catalana and Café Cortado in the city's Las Ramblas district.
The reality is that we'll never meet unless our professional paths somehow cross. The closest may have been Arsenal's Asian tour last month, but Fabregas stayed behind in the UK ahead of his impending transfer.
Internet technology and the modern era of sport are sprouting side-by-side.
It means that conventional means of newsgathering, including media conferences and face-to-face interviews, are becoming increasingly redundant.
How else to explain that Arsenal manager Arsene Wenger was still denying that Fabregas was leaving the club at the same time that his new Barcelona teammates were communicating via Twitter that the midfielder was in the vicinity of the Nou Camp Stadium?
The 'tweets' told the real story while Le Professeur was towing the company line in an apparent attempt to stack the final negotiations in favour of the north London club at the eleventh hour.
Twitter was launched only five years ago and has already become a useful tool in tracking the biggest stars of the beautiful game.
And the irony is that some of the least polished professional players have taken to the micro-blogging service that allows posts of up to 140 characters.
It got one-cap England midfielder Joey Barton in trouble when, after tweeting about the apparent lack of ambition from his club, he was granted an immediate transfer by Newcastle and effectively asked to leave.
But after surviving that brouhaha and playing in the Magpies' season-opener against Arsenal, Barton, got himself in more hot water by commenting on his role in the sending-off of Gunners' new boy, Gervinho.
The 28-year-old accused the Ivory Coast international of "cheating" by diving in the box while admitting to his 380,000 followers that he went to ground easily after being slapped in the face by the striker.
That was followed by a heated exchange with Arsenal midfielder Jack Wilshire who accused Barton of being "unprofessional" and "in the wrong".
An ankle injury kept the youngster out of last weekend's match at St James' Park, but in the virtual world, the two rivals had a memorable tussle in the middle of the park.
So often players and coaches speak in clichés and generalisations in official interviews, often dancing around the truth.
The upside of Twitter and Facebook is that we at least have the chance of hearing what they really mean, albeit with questionable grammar.
That's unless someone like a fan puts up a fake profile and pretends to be their idol.
Arsenal's unsettled midfielder Samir Nasri distanced himself this week from comments on what appeared to be his personal Facebook page, saying that he would "certainly leave very soon" with "bitterness and anger in my heart."
So how did Nasri set the record straight? On his Twitter account, of course!
In the old days of the English game, a tweet was something than Stanley Matthews may have heard from the trees at Stoke-on-Trent as he walked to games at the Victoria Ground.
When Bolton's Nat Lofthouse was in his prime, a facebook may have been a fan's compilation of signed player picture cards in a small photo album. 'The net' used to be something that Gordon Banks was protecting in more than 500 league appearances until 1972.
Renowned disciplinarian Sir Alex Ferguson has stopped short of issuing a Twitter ban on his Manchester United squad, but has ordered them not to tweet about specific club matters.
Forbidding the outlet might be seen as an infringement on a player's freedom of speech.
Already, Barton, who served 77 days in prison for assault in 2007, has cleverly used Twitter to paint himself as a street philosopher in pursuit of truth.
He even tweeted to share how he helped police capture an alleged burglar who was breaking into a neighbour's house in the early hours of last Sunday in Jesmond, Newcastle.
CCTV footage from Barton's home helped identify a 25-year-old man.
By the way, Fabregas has yet to update his personal info on his Facebook page.
He still lists his residence as London and his profession as "Midfielder at Arsenal FC".
And our virtual 'social circle' is growing. 'Fab' and I already have two mutual Facebook friends – neither of whom I believe I've met, either.
But in our parallel universe, I'm sure we'll all get together real soon, probably meeting up with Joey Barton and Jack Wishere in a cosy chat-room.
* Jason Dasey (www.jasondasey.com) is an Asia-based international sports broadcaster and host/executive producer of Kopi-O, a new football chat show for Singapore. Twitter: @JasonDasey.


text:
, February 11, 2020
Is Patriarchy Too Big to Fail?
On the show trials of Trump and Weinstein
The screaming twenties have barely drawn breath, and already we've been wallowing through the show-trials of white capitalist male supremacy's largest and most untouchable adult sons: Donald Trump and Harvey Weinstein. The similarities are more than circumstantial. Both are rich, powerful men outraged at being held to account for even a fraction of the crimes they've been accused of. Both have allegedly enjoyed a full curriculum of moral corruption, from rape and sexual assault to blackmail and intimidation to the use of foreign powers to undermine their enemies and lube their way to hectic impunity. And both spent many, many years grooming allies. Weinstein and Trump bet heavily on creating complicity—so much complicity that the institutions they occupied cannot hold them to account without damning themselves by association. Both of them bet on being too big to fail.
In Trump's case, he won the bet. The doomed attempt to impeach the president drew to its inevitable end last week, as Washington and the world were forced to acknowledge that, as California Rep. Adam Schiff put it, Trump "has compromised our elections, and he will do so again. You will not change him. You cannot constrain him. He is who he is." Directly addressing any remaining Republicans in the Senate chamber with an inch of backbone, Schiff insisted that "you are decent. He is not who you are."
The appeal came too late. In fact, the greatest threat that liberalism poses to the survival of the species is its relentless strategic assumption that "decent people" in full possession of the facts will do the right thing. Nobody, after all, is more anxious to win the war than those who already know they've lost the moral argument.
Presidents don't go on trial alone. Politics is always in the dock beside them, fidgeting and trying to explain how on earth this was allowed to happen. This time, Trump's defenders didn't even try to pretend he didn't conspire with foreign interests to help his own re-election campaign. "The question is not whether the president did it," said Tennessee Republican Lamar Alexander, primly explaining why he was voting to let the Hog Emperor off the hook, "but whether the United States Senate or the American people should decide what to do about what he did." And what the Senate decided to do is nothing at all, as trembling Republican excuses for statesmen cowered before the Reality Crimelord's demands to wrap up the whole thing without witness testimony. Only Mitt Romney dared to break ranks and vote "guilty." Thinking back to when that guy was the enemy, the ultimate subject of liberal derision, rather than the one Senator prepared to act from the center of his faith at the risk of Republican shunning brings on a sense of moral vertigo—a sudden understanding of how Trump has tossed a brick right through the Overton window of American political norms.
The root of the word "privilege" is "private law"—you get to rewrite the rules to suit yourself, or flagrantly ignore them. Where systems of privilege are robust, corruption, abuse, and sexual violence are not aberrations. They are enforcing mechanisms.Trump and Weinstein considered themselves untouchable, were treated as untouchable, and the ability to assault young women with impunity wasn't just a side perk. Abuse, including sexual abuse, was and remains the core of how power operates in industries and institutions built on complicity. The test of power is always how much you can get away with it. For men like Trump, getting away with it is their personal brand, their special sauce. He appeals to a caucus of bitter moral cowards whose dearest wish is to be allowed to get away with it, too.
Trump and Weinstein considered themselves untouchable, were treated as untouchable, and the ability to assault young women with impunity wasn't just a side perk.
Harvey Weinstein got away with it for years. Allegedly. Right now, as the trial is still in progress, I am legally obliged to say that Harvey Weinstein has not been found guilty of any of the more than eighty allegations of rape and sexual assault that have been made public, much less the two that are currently being litigated in New York state. Yet. I am morally obliged, however, to point out that the way in which Harvey Weinstein has not been found guilty of eighty counts of rape and sexual assault is not the same as the way you and I have not been found guilty of eighty counts of rape and sexual assault. "Innocent until proven guilty" is a legal principle, not a moral standard. Especially not when assuming his innocence so often requires us to assume her guilt, and hers, and hers, and hers. I am not a judge. I am not a juror. I don't have the power to put a human being in a cage for the rest of his life, so I'm allowed to say what I actually think. I'm allowed to say it's unlikely that hundreds of witnesses and teams of prize-winning investigative reporters are wrong. I think he did it. And so does almost everyone in his industry. And so do you.
Most of us know he did it, and that matters. Weinstein's predilection for pouncing on young starlets in hotel rooms and crushing their careers if they dared to complain was an open secret in the international film industry. "Everybody fucking knew." That's the way Weinstein's one-time protege Scott Rosenberg put it. Everyone knew what Weinstein was up to, and almost everyone chose not to know what they knew, chose to look away. Because acknowledging the scale of the wrongdoing, acknowledging what everyone knew, would have required action. It would require the bystander either to actively do something about it, or to actively do nothing, to allow it all to keep happening, the rapes and the violence and the silencing, the casual destruction of young lives by lumbering sociopaths who get off on hurting people and getting away with it.
Sometimes saying what everyone knows is an act of civil disobedience. When one person names her rapist, knowing the cost, knowing that she is likely to be punished again for the crimes committed against her, that is an act of defiance. When a hundred or a thousand or ten thousand women break ranks to speak out against structural violence, that is a revolution. The #MeToo movement was women realizing, collectively, that the cost of silence was higher than the cost of speaking up. It is no accident that the #MeToo movement came on the heels of Trump riding his flaming reckless clown car of white male resentment into the White House. Trump, who has also been accused of sexual misconduct, including rape and assault, by at least twenty women, has as much to do with the #MeToo movement as Weinstein.
As Weinstein's victims tearfully recount their experiences in front of a New York jury, the #MeToo movement is on trial as well, the movement that began with Weinstein and mushroomed into a global wave of civil disobedience in response to a failure of justice, a failure of due process. The justice system has failed to protect women from male violence just as the democratic system has failed to protect citizens from unscrupulous grasping oligarchs who get off grabbing government power by the pussy and getting away with it. The system has failed to do what nice white liberals expected it would, hoped it would—it failed to be reasonable or "decent." The truth currently dawning like the morning after a war is that the system was always designed to smooth the path to power for men with enough wealth and guile to grab it. Unfortunately, the system was also designed on the basis that nobody would get carried away and do anything really, really stupid, like elect a deranged thug with the critical faculties of a rabid rottweiler barking at its own reflection and the self-control to match. Nobody would do anything that stupid. What could possibly go wrong?
The question of the day is whether the mechanisms of democracy are in any way capable of controlling men like this, smug nationalist autocrats entirely unburdened by conscience. And the answer to that question is, no, not at all. These show-trials are a test of whether these things can be settled in a civil manner, a test of democratic strength and of social decency. America has so far failed the test, just like Hollywood has for so long failed the test, for the same reasons: overconfidence, laziness, not bothering to study their history or anticipate difficult, uncomfortable questions. Questions like "how much humanity is the average whey-faced political invertebrate prepared to sacrifice for his own career?" Questions like "is patriarchy too big to fail?"
Men like this, unscrupulous oligarchs who mouth the language of the good old days while setting fire to the future are counting on general nostalgia for a past where women and people of color knew their place.
That's the question I've kept coming back to, over these years of political consensus contorting itself into torturous knots to contain truths it can no longer bury. Watching what's happening in culture right now, it's hard not to feel the same cognitive dissonance as so many of us did watching the world economy collapse in 2008. Try thinking back to the desperate retrenchment of that autumn, the rolling news sweaty with red-eyed once-and-future kings of international finance explaining that while, yes, they had extravagantly shat the bed and many millions of people were about to suffer horribly, there was no conceivable alternative: we had to bail them out, or else. It was phrased as economic common sense. It felt, and continues to feel, like a mugging, and more than ten years later, there's no pretense anymore. Civic society is now openly held hostage to white male pride, with belligerent tyrants daring us to come at them and see what happens. And for anyone who still believes that decent people can settle this among themselves, for anyone who is clinging with all ten fingers to comfortable complicity, here's the bad news: we can never go back.
Even if Trump wins his second term, even if a hundred Harvey Weinsteins walk away from justice, we are not going back to the way it was before, pretending not to see, giving the benefit of the doubt, making excuses for abusers because it's less frightening to hew to the flimsy belief that these men didn't know what they were doing than it is to admit, say, that the world's biggest superpower would rather elect a rapist than a woman.
There's no regaining that special type of innocence peculiar to those of us who grew up trusting institutions to act rationally and in the public interest, trusting that once injustice was seen to be done, it would be remedied. America can never return to a time before it acquitted a president for crimes he clearly committed in pursuit of power he should never have been permitted to have. Western culture can never return to a time before Harvey Weinstein went to trial, before influential abusers in every industry were named and shamed. And men like this, unscrupulous oligarchs who mouth the language of the good old days while setting fire to the future are counting on general nostalgia for a past where women and people of color knew their place, and understood their duties, and understood that our final duty was to bury the evidence of white male shame. They are counting on a general yearning for a time when we understood the duty to hide the bruises, to cover up the corruption, to bury the damage deep in our bodies so powerful men and those who trail in their wake could continue to think of themselves as decent. As innocent.
The laws have long been in place and the evidence easy to summon to send men like Trump and Weinstein to jail. What was lacking was the political will to enforce those laws. Men like Weinstein and Trump have figured out, you see, that if you just drive a throbbing golden juggernaut of white male confidence right through the rules, nine times out of ten people will look the other way—not because they like you, but because they like things to be orderly and comfortable.
Most people want to believe in the idea of a just world. They want to believe that the consent of the governed still matters, so they try to give it in retrospect. Because for most people, these are crimes so enormous they undermine our sense of safety, crimes so big they can't be allowed to be crimes at all. And that's a kind of innocence we can no longer afford. It's happening all over the world, wherever swollen strongmen swindle their way into power. It's happening in India, in Britain, in Brazil. And wherever it's happening, the center ground, people who believe in the "decency" of the system, are clinging to the swinging basket of institutional checks and balances, holding their breath as the ground disappears and the air gets thinner, wondering if it's too late to let go.
Laurie Penny is a journalist and screenwriter from London. She has contributed to The Guardian, The New Statesman, the New York Times, Time Magazine and many more. She is the author of six books, the latest of which, Bitch Doctrine, was published by Bloomsbury in 2017.
The Never-ending Story
Anne Elizabeth Moore
The Lying Game
Who Keeps Us Safe?
Maia Hibbett


text:
Nazareth football falls in state finals
Roadrunners unable to defend state title
December 3rd, 2019 5:19 PM
Nazareth JJ McCarthy (No. 2) said after the loss that his team will be back at state a year from now (Ian McLeod/Contributor).
Contributing Reporter
Nazareth Academy showed everyone this season that they could compete with the very best, but on a windy, rainy night in DeKalb, something had to give in a battle between two undefeated teams.
The Roadrunners (13-1) were defeated by Mt. Carmel (14-0), 37-13, Saturday in the 7A state championship game at Huskie Stadium. Down 14-7 with 4:33 to play in the first half, junior quarterback JJ McCarthy connected with senior running back Derrick Strongs Jr. for a 62-yard touchdown pass to keep the game within one point after a missed point after.
The Roadrunner defense kept the Caravan offense in check to start the second half, holding them to a field goal to stay within 10 with 8:13 to go in the third quarter, and to an unsuccessful field goal attempt on their next possession.
"Our defense played out of this world," McCarthy said. "They gave us the stops we needed, and our offense needed to execute more."
Nazareth couldn't hold on in the fourth quarter, as Mt. Carmel junior quarterback Justin Lynch rushed for two touchdowns in the last six minutes to seal their victory. Lynch finished with five rushing touchdowns on the night.
McCarthy went 8-for-25 with 116 yards passing, while sophomore wide receiver Tyler Morris nabbed three catches for 24 yards. Strongs finished with 24 yards on six carries to go with two receptions for 66 yards. On defense, senior linebacker Marcus Griffin led the team with 11 tackles, while senior linebacker Riley Theobald tallied seven.
"It was tough stopping [Mt. Carmel's] running game," Griffin said. "We stopped them when we needed to, but overall things didn't go our way."
Nazareth opened the scoring in the game with an explosive 65-yard interception return by freshman defensive back Kaleb Miller with 9:18 left to play in the first quarter.
"I could tell that our team was a little down, so I wanted to be the spark," Miller said. "I baited the quarterback a little bit and just ran up and took it home. I really give props to our line on that one. They put a lot of pressure on [Lynch] and he had to get rid of it quick."
Mt. Carmel head coach Jordan Lynch knew that the Roadrunners, who have played in the state title game in five of the last six seasons and won three, would not be an easy foe by any means.
"We knew coming into this game that Nazareth would be a tough opponent," said Lynch. "They won state last year, they came in with an undefeated record, and we knew we would have our hands full. [Head coach Tim] Racki does a great job over there."
McCarthy knows that this team can bounce back next year, as they will be returning eight starters on offense.
"The things we're going to do next year are going to be scary, I can tell you that," said McCarthy. "Next year is going to be tremendous. We're going to have a lot of up and coming freshman and sophomores and a lot of players coming back, and it's going to be huge. We're going to push all summer and be ready."
"We got better every week this season, and we're still going on track," he added. "There's just 364 days until we come back here in this spot, and it's going to be a different outcome."
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Home latest news Death toll rises to 318 in Indonesia earthquake
Death toll rises to 318 in Indonesia earthquake
Jakarta. The death toll continues to rise in the earthquake that hit Indonesia's West Java province. A senior official of Indonesia's disaster agency said on Saturday that the death toll from the earthquake in the country had risen to 318, while 14 others were still missing. According to reports, a 5.6-magnitude earthquake struck Indonesia's West Java province on Monday.
According to the report of the news agency Xinhua, Fajr Satyawan, deputy of emergency response of the National Disaster Management and Mitigation Agency, told during the press conference that eight more bodies have been recovered during the search operation on Saturday, after which the death toll has increased to 318. Gone
He further informed that Siangjur district is also among the most affected areas by the earthquake. In this district, 7,729 people have been injured, while 58,049 houses have been destroyed and 73,693 people have been shifted to other places. At the same time, Joshua Banjarnahor, spokesman for the search and rescue office of West Java province, said during the press conference that the search operation is being hampered due to the rain.
The Meteorological Department says that there is a possibility of rain in Sianjur district within the next three days.
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Home > Opinions > People v. Vargas
Citation 59 Cal.4th 635, 328 P.3d 1020, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 277, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7786, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9070
People v. Vargas
Filed 7/10/14
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Ct.App. 2/8 B231338
DARLENE A. VARGAS,
Defendant and Appellant.
Super. Ct. No. KA085541
We consider in this case whether two prior convictions arising out of a
single act against a single victim can constitute two strikes under the Three Strikes
law. We conclude they cannot.
The consequences in this state of repeated criminal conduct changed
dramatically in 1994. First the Legislature,1 and then the electorate,2 introduced
into this state's jurisprudence what is now known collectively as the Three Strikes
law. Under that law, if a defendant reoffends after having suffered a first
qualifying felony conviction, a doubled sentence is mandatory. If, after having
suffered two qualifying felony convictions, an offender commits a third qualifying
See Penal Code section 667, subdivisions (b)–(i). All statutory references
are to the Penal Code.
Section 1170.12 was enacted as part of Proposition 184 in 1994.
felony, the Three Strikes law presumes he or she is incorrigible and requires a life
sentence. ―Sentence enhancement based on recidivism flows from the premise
that the defendant's current criminal conduct is more serious because he or she
previously was found to have committed criminal conduct and did not thereafter
reform.‖ (People v. Nguyen (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1007, 1024.) The typical third-
strike situation thus involves a criminal offender who commits a qualifying felony
after having been afforded two previous chances to reform his or her antisocial
behavior, hence the law's descriptive baseball-related phrase, ― ‗Three Strikes and
You're Out.' ‖ (People v. Hazelton (1996) 14 Cal.4th 101, 104.)
Despite this paradigm, situations have occurred that have challenged the
assumption that an offender has had two prior opportunities to reform. For
example, in a case in which an offender's two previous qualifying felony
convictions were for crimes so closely connected in their commission that they
were tried in the same proceeding, we held that such convictions can nevertheless
constitute two separate strikes because the Three Strikes law does not require that
prior convictions, to qualify as strikes, be brought and tried separately. (People v.
Fuhrman (1997) 16 Cal.4th 930.) Similarly, in a case in which the offender's
previous two crimes could not be separately punished at the time they were
adjudicated because they were committed during the same course of conduct
(§ 654), we held such close factual and temporal connection did not prevent the
trial court from later treating the two convictions as separate strikes when the
accused reoffended. (People v. Benson (1998) 18 Cal.4th 24 (Benson).)
The instant case presents a more extreme situation: Defendant's two prior
felony convictions—one for robbery and one for carjacking—were not only tried
in the same proceeding and committed during the same course of criminal
conduct, they were based on the same act, committed at the same time, against the
same victim. As we explain, because neither the electorate (§ 1170.12) nor the
Legislature (§ 667, subds. (b)–(i)) could have intended that both such prior
convictions would qualify as separate strikes under the Three Strikes law, treating
them as separate strikes is inconsistent with the spirit of the Three Strikes law, and
the trial court should have dismissed one of them and sentenced defendant as if
she had only one, not two, qualifying strike convictions.
A. The Present Crimes
The facts of the present crimes have no bearing on the legal issue we
resolve in this case and so may be stated briefly. Petitioner Darlene Vargas and
codefendant Oscar Velasquez illegally entered the Claremont home of victims
Lynn Burrows and William Alves and stole various items, including a suitcase and
a trash can. Defendants were detained while prowling near another home in the
same neighborhood; police found them in possession of both burglary tools and
items taken from the Burrows/Alves home. A witness later identified Velasquez
and Vargas as the man and woman she saw walking near the victims' home with
the suitcase and trash can.
Vargas was charged and convicted of first degree burglary (§ 459), grand
theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), and conspiracy to commit grand theft (§ 182, subd. (a)(1)).
In addition, the court sustained allegations that she had suffered a prior serious
felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)), as well as two strikes within the meaning of
the Three Strikes law: a 1999 conviction for carjacking (§ 215) and another for
robbery (§ 211). Because her three present crimes (burglary, grand theft,
conspiracy) were qualifying felonies under the version of the Three Strikes law
applicable at the time,3 all three felonies were potentially subject to enhancement
by her two alleged strikes, rendering her vulnerable to three consecutive terms of
25 years to life, or an aggregate prison term of 75 years to life. She moved to
dismiss the carjacking strike as to all counts. The trial court granted the motion in
part, dismissing the carjacking strike conviction as to the grand theft and
conspiracy counts, but declining to dismiss the remaining conviction for burglary.
B. Appeal and Resentencing
Defendant appealed and also filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
The Court of Appeal denied relief on appeal but granted the habeas corpus petition
in part, finding Vargas's defense counsel had been constitutionally ineffective for
failing to place before the trial court the transcript of the preliminary hearing in the
1999 case. Because the preliminary hearing transcript demonstrated Vargas's
carjacking and robbery convictions were based on the same act of taking the
victim's car by force, the appellate court concluded that ―a different outcome was
reasonably probable had the trial court known that a single act was involved [in
1999], . . . .‖ Accordingly, it directed the trial court to conduct a new sentencing
hearing after considering these additional facts.
On remand, the trial court denied defendant's motion to dismiss one of the
1999 prior convictions. It noted that under our decision in Benson, supra, 18
Neither grand theft nor conspiracy to commit grand theft would now
qualify for Three Strikes treatment under the version of the law as amended by the
Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012, approved by the electorate as Proposition 36 on
November 6, 2012.
Because defendant's burglary was of a home, it constitutes burglary in the
first degree and is thus a ―serious felony‖ pursuant to section 1192.7, subdivision
(c)(18). (See People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 768.) Accordingly, defendant
is not entitled to have her Three Strikes sentence for burglary recalled under the
terms of the new law. (See § 1170.126, subd. (b).)
Cal.4th 24, ―the central focus is not on the single act[,] . . . , it's on the defendant's
status as a repeat felon‖ and observed, further, that defendant had received a
benefit in 1999 when she was allowed to plead to a negotiated plea of only three
years in prison for two serious felonies. Considering the totality of the
circumstances, the trial court concluded defendant fell ―squarely within the spirit
of [Three] Strikes.‖
On appeal from the resentencing, defendant contended the trial court erred
by declining to strike one of her prior convictions and sentence her as a two-strike
offender. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion and affirmed. We
granted review.
The issue we decide today is whether the trial court should have dismissed
one of defendant's two prior felony convictions, alleged as strikes under the Three
Strikes law, where both convictions were based on the same act. The question has
two potential aspects: First, when faced with two prior strike convictions based on
the same act, is the trial court required to dismiss one of them? Second, assuming
the sentencing court retains discretion to dismiss a strike or not, did the trial court
here, on the facts of this case, abuse its discretion by declining to dismiss one of
defendant's two strikes? Because we find the first question dispositive, we need
not continue and discuss whether the trial court abused its discretion.
B. Analysis
Given the intent of both the Legislature and the drafters of the initiative
version of the Three Strikes law to punish repeat criminal offenders severely, to
drastically curtail a sentencing court's ability to reduce the severity of a sentence
by eliminating alternatives to prison incarceration, and to limit an offender's
ability to reduce his or her sentence by earning credits, a question arose soon after
enactment of the parallel Three Strikes schemes whether a trial court retained its
traditional authority under section 1385 to dismiss an enhancement ―in furtherance
of justice.‖4 We settled the issue in People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13
Cal.4th 497, 529–530 (Romero), where we concluded ―that section 1385[,
subdivision] (a) does permit a court acting on its own motion to strike prior felony
conviction allegations in cases brought under the Three Strikes law.‖
Accordingly, the trial court below had the power under the law to grant
defendant's motion and dismiss one of her two strike convictions.
In order to guide the lower courts when ruling on such motions to dismiss,
People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161, explained that when facing a
motion to dismiss a strike allegation, the trial court ―must consider whether, in
light of the nature and circumstances of [the defendant's] present felonies and
prior serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of [the
defendant's] background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be deemed
outside the scheme's spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be treated as
though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.‖ (Italics added.) We quoted this language with approval in People v.
Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377, and further explained that ―[b]ecause the
circumstances must be ‗extraordinary . . . by which a career criminal can be
deemed to fall outside the spirit of the very scheme within which he squarely falls
Section 1385, subdivision (a), states: ―The judge or magistrate may, either
of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, and
in furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed. The reasons for the
dismissal must be set forth in an order entered upon the minutes. No dismissal
shall be made for any cause which would be ground of demurrer to the accusatory
pleading.‖
once he commits a strike as part of a long and continuous criminal record, the
continuation of which the law was meant to attack' [citation], the circumstances
where no reasonable people could disagree that the criminal falls outside the spirit
of the three strikes scheme must be even more extraordinary.‖ (Id. at p. 378.)
That a case would be extraordinary in which an offender with two prior
qualifying convictions would fall outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law does
not mean such cases do not exist. We must decide whether defendant's case falls
into this rare category, that is, where the facts—here, that defendant's two strikes
were based on the same act—demonstrate that no reasonable person would
disagree that defendant fell outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. This court
faced a related issue in Benson, supra, 18 Cal.4th 24, where the defendant had two
prior strike convictions based on a single incident: after returning his neighbor's
vacuum cleaner, which he had borrowed, he returned to her apartment ostensibly
to retrieve his keys, whereupon he grabbed her, forced her to the floor, and
eventually stabbed her multiple times. Based on this incident, he was convicted of
residential burglary (§ 459) and assault with the intent to commit murder (former
§ 217). Because these two felonies were based on the same course of conduct, the
trial court stayed one of the defendant's two prior convictions pursuant to section
654,5 which expressly prohibits separate punishment for two crimes based on the
same act, but has been interpreted to also preclude multiple punishment for two or
more crimes occurring within the same course of conduct pursuant to a single
intent. (See Neal v. State of California (1960) 55 Cal.2d 11, 19.)
Section 654, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part: ―An act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different provisions of law shall
be punished under the provision that provides for the longest potential term of
imprisonment, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more
than one provision.‖
When the Benson defendant reoffended 15 years later, his new crime was
charged as his third strike under the Three Strikes law. He argued that because
punishment had been stayed for one of his prior convictions, he had only one
qualifying prior conviction under the Three Strikes law. This court disagreed,
explaining that the prefatory phrase ―[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law,‖ as used in both the initiative and legislative versions of the Three Strikes
law, meant that the statutory definition of a qualifying strike conviction was
exclusive. Therefore, because the Three Strikes law states specifically that a ―stay
of execution of sentence‖ does not disqualify a conviction from being a strike, a
stay under section 654 did not affect whether a felony conviction qualified under
the Three Strikes law. (Benson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 28–31.) Thus, ―the
language of section 1170.12, subdivision (b)(1), unequivocally establishes that the
electorate intended to qualify as separate strikes each prior conviction that a
defendant incurred relating to the commission of a serious or violent felony,
notwithstanding the circumstance that the trial court, in the earlier proceeding,
may have stayed sentence on one or more of the serious or violent felonies under
compulsion of the provisions of section 654.‖ (Benson, supra, at p. 31.)
Benson also rejected the defendant's argument that permitting a conviction
for which punishment was stayed to qualify as a strike would lead to ― ‗dramatic
and harsh results' ‖ (Benson, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 35), explaining that ―[i]n the
absence of any constitutional infirmity, . . . we are not at liberty to alter the
intended effect of a statute on such grounds.‖ (Id. at p. 36.) But as if presaging
the current case, Benson continued: ―It is worth noting . . . that our decision in
Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497, affirms that a trial court retains discretion in such
cases to strike one or more prior felony convictions under section 1385 if the trial
court properly concludes that the interests of justice support such action.‖ (Ibid.)
The court expounded on this point in an accompanying footnote, adding:
―Because the proper exercise of a trial court's discretion under section 1385
necessarily relates to the circumstances of a particular defendant's current and past
criminal conduct, we need not and do not determine whether there are some
circumstances in which two prior felony convictions are so closely connected—for
example, when multiple convictions arise out of a single act by the defendant as
distinguished from multiple acts committed in an indivisible course of conduct—
that a trial court would abuse its discretion under section 1385 if it failed to strike
one of the priors.‖ (Benson, supra, p. 36, fn. 8, italics added.)
Thus, although Benson concerned only whether a conviction for which
punishment was stayed qualified as a strike under the Three Strikes law, the
opinion nonetheless suggests that a trial court should dismiss one of two prior
strike convictions if they were based on the same act. We echoed this sentiment a
few years later in People v. Sanchez (2001) 24 Cal.4th 983 (Sanchez),6
underscoring Benson's recognition that where two prior crimes are based on the
same act, such a close connection might require a sentencing court to strike one of
them pursuant to its authority under section 1385. (Sanchez, supra, at p. 993.)
The bench and bar took notice. (See, e.g., Menaster & Ricciardulli, 3
Strikes Manual (July 2009 supp.) p. 12 [referring to Benson's ―Famous
Footnote 8‖].) The first published appellate decision to address the issue was
People v. Burgos (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1209 (Burgos). In Burgos, the jury
convicted the defendant of two qualifying felonies and found he had suffered two
strike convictions: one for attempted robbery and one for attempted carjacking,
both in April 1999. The defendant moved to dismiss one of his strike convictions
on the ground that they were based on the same act of forcibly attempting to take
Sanchez was overruled on an unrelated point in People v. Reed (2006) 38
Cal.4th 1224, 1228.
the victim's car. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced him under the
Three Strikes law to consecutive sentences of 25 years to life in prison for his two
current felonies.
On appeal, the defendant argued the trial court should have dismissed one
of his two strike convictions. The Burgos court, relying on Benson, supra, 18
Cal.4th 24, and Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th 983, agreed. Burgos explained that the
defendant's prior felony convictions were, in Benson's language, ― ‗so closely
connected,' having arisen from the same single act, that the failure to strike one of
them must be deemed an abuse of discretion.‖ (Burgos, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1216.) Burgos noted further that (1) the carjacking statute specifically
precludes double punishment for both carjacking and robbery based on the same
act (§ 215, subd. (c)); (2) the defendant's criminal history was not particularly
severe or extensive, and his current offenses were not ―the worst of crimes‖
(Burgos, supra, at p. 1216); and (3) the defendant's maximum two-strike
sentence—20 years in prison—was itself quite severe (ibid.). Based on all these
factors, the Burgos court concluded the trial court erred in failing to dismiss one of
the strikes.
Five years later, the issue again arose in People v. Scott (2009) 179
Cal.App.4th 920 (Scott). In Scott, a jury convicted the defendant of two
felonies—possession by a prisoner of a sharp instrument and simple assault
(§§ 4502, subd. (a), 240) 7—and found two strike allegations true. He moved to
Although many types of assaultive crimes qualify for treatment under the
Three Strikes law, simple assault not involving deadly weapons, great bodily
injury, or specific victims such as peace officers or firefighters, does not. The
defendant in Scott was thus found to have committed only one felony that
qualified under the Three Strikes law: possession by a prisoner of a sharp
instrument (§ 4502, subd. (a)).
dismiss one of his two prior strike convictions claiming, as here, that his prior
convictions (for robbery and carjacking) arose from the same act of forcibly taking
the victim's car. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced him to 25 years
to life in prison. On appeal, the Scott court declined to follow Burgos, finding the
basis of its holding ―difficult to discern. It can reasonably be read to state that in
such cases one strike must be stricken, or that the connection between the two
strikes is but one factor a trial court must consider in conducting a traditional
Romero analysis.‖ (Scott, supra, at p. 923, citing Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497.)
After noting the confusion engendered by this lack of clarity, the Scott court
concluded that ―the ‗same act' circumstances posed by robbery and carjacking
cases provide a factor for a trial court to consider, but do not mandate striking a
strike.‖ (Scott, supra, at p. 931.) Because the trial court had applied that line of
reasoning and did not abuse its discretion, the Scott court affirmed the judgment.
The Court of Appeal in the instant case followed Scott.
The Scott court reasonably characterized the rationale in Burgos as unclear,
for if a trial court must always dismiss one of two strikes when they are based on
the same act, then the other considerations discussed by Burgos (such as the
offender's past criminal record, and the length and adequacy of a possible two-
strike sentence), would be irrelevant to the analysis. But although Scott references
Benson's ―Famous Footnote 8‖ and its endorsement in Sanchez (Scott, supra, 179
Cal.App.4th at pp. 927–928), it rejected the footnote's clear import, concluding
that the circumstance a robbery and carjacking arose out of the same act is only
one factor for a trial court to consider, not a reason categorically to dismiss a strike
(id. at p. 931).
Benson and Sanchez necessarily spoke of the ―same act‖ issue
hypothetically, as in neither case was the defendant before the court facing two
separate strikes from two prior convictions based on a single criminal act. Indeed,
in Sanchez, no question of prior convictions was presented at all: The defendant
was presently convicted of both murder and gross vehicular manslaughter while
intoxicated and argued that in a hypothetical future prosecution, ―he still could be
subject to enhanced punishment under the ‗Three Strikes' law [citation], because
he could be treated as having two strikes on the basis of the two convictions.‖
(Sanchez, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 993.)
In the instant case the issue is not hypothetical. Defendant was convicted in
1999 of two different crimes (robbery and carjacking) that were based on her
commission of the same act (forcibly taking the victim's car), and the trial court
used both convictions to sentence her to the ultimate three-strike term of 25 years
to life in prison. Faced for the first time with the exact situation mentioned in
Benson's ―Famous Footnote 8‖ (Menaster & Ricciardulli, 3 Strikes Manual, supra,
at p. 12), and later endorsed in Sanchez, we adhere to the views expressed in those
cases and hold that, on these facts, the trial court was required to dismiss one of
defendant's two prior strike convictions.
We reach this conclusion because, as Benson and Sanchez recognized, the
trial court's failure in these circumstances to dismiss one of defendant's two prior
strike convictions, and instead to treat her as a third-strike offender, was
inconsistent with the intent underlying both the legislative and initiative versions
of the Three Strikes law. (See People v. Garcia (2001) 25 Cal.4th 744, 756–757
[― ‗As with any other statute, our task in construing a provision of the Three
Strikes law ―is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent.‖ ' ‖].)
The initiative version of the Three Strikes law came into being when 1994's
Proposition 184 was passed by the voters. As the ballot argument in favor of that
initiative explained: ―Here's how it works: [¶] Strike One: One serious/violent
felony serves as a first strike toward a stiffer prison term. [¶] Strike Two: second
felony conviction with one prior serious/violent felony, DOUBLES the base
sentence for the conviction. Any additional enhancements under existing law,
including those for prior convictions, are then added. [¶] Strike Three: A third
felony conviction, with two serious/violent prior felonies, TRIPLES the base
sentence or imposes 25 years to life, whichever is greater.‖ (Ballot Pamp., Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 8, 1994), argument in favor of Prop. 184, p. 36 (Ballot Pamphlet); see
generally, Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 528 [ballot arguments of Three Strikes
initiative is evidence of voters' intent].)
Given this information, the voting public would reasonably have
understood the ―Three Strikes‖ baseball metaphor to mean that a person would
have three chances—three swings of the bat, if you will—before the harshest
penalty could be imposed. The public also would have understood that no one can
be called for two strikes on just one swing. Permitting the trial court below to
treat defendant's 1999 robbery and carjacking convictions as separate strikes—
despite the fact they were based on a single criminal act—would do just that, and
thus contravene the voter's clear understanding of how the Three Strikes law was
intended to work. Given the obvious twinning of the language used in the
legislative version of the Three Strikes law, we discern no different intent with that
version of the law.
We have explained that when ruling on a defendant's Romero motion
(Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th 497), trial courts should consider, among other things,
the nature and circumstances of the prior convictions and whether the defendant
falls outside the spirit of the Three Strikes law. (See People v. Carmony, supra,
33 Cal.4th at p. 377; People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 161.) In this case,
the nature and circumstances of defendant's convictions show she committed just
one criminal act, not two. Nevertheless, the Attorney General argues that the
―electorate may deem offenders who have simultaneously violated more than one
criminal statute to pose a qualitatively higher risk to public safety than those who
have not. This is because such offenders invade more than one societal interest
that the Legislature has designated for distinct protection by the enactment of more
than one statute.‖ We would agree had the offender committed more than one act,
whether separately or during a continuous course of conduct, as in Benson, supra,
18 Cal.4th 24. As we stated in Benson, ―the electorate and the Legislature
rationally could—and did—conclude that a person who committed additional
violence in the course of a prior serious felony (e.g., shooting or pistol-whipping a
victim during a robbery, or assaulting a victim during a burglary) should be treated
more harshly than an individual who committed the same initial felony, but whose
criminal conduct did not include such additional violence.‖ (Id. at p. 35.) But
where, as here, an offender committed but a single act, we disagree she poses a
greater risk to society merely because the Legislature has chosen to criminalize the
act in different ways. The Legislature is free to criminalize an act in multiple
ways, but that it has done so does not of itself make an offender more
blameworthy, or more dangerous, within the meaning of the Three Strikes law.8
Similarly, logic demonstrates that defendant falls outside the spirit of the
Three Strikes law. In requiring severe punishment the Three Strikes law
responded to a belief that prior law contained too many loopholes favoring
criminals, and that judges exercised too much discretion in reducing an offender's
overall punishment. When these loopholes and discretion were added together,
the perception was that serious and violent criminals who committed multiple
Although the Three Strikes law provides that it applies ―[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of law‖ (§§ 667, subd. (c), 1170.12, subd. (a)), and we have
interpreted that phrase broadly to effectuate the intent to the law, to interpret this
catchall phrase so broadly as to permit the artificial inflation of the number of
qualifying strikes in this case from one to two is unjustified. To do so would
essentially recognize no limit at all to the ―[n]otwithstanding any other provision
of law‖ proviso.
crimes were allowed to escape their just desserts. (Ballot Pamp., supra, rebuttal to
argument against Prop. 184, p. 37 [―soft-on-crime judges, politicians, defense
lawyers and probation officers care more about violent felons than they do
victims. They spend all of their time looking for loopholes to get rapists, child
molesters and murderers out on probation, early parole, or off the hook
altogether.‖]) Defendant falls outside of these concerns because the law prescribes
the just desserts of a two-strike offender should be a doubled sentence, not a
tripled, or a 25-years-to-life, term. Unlike those rightfully subject to a third-strike
sentence, defendant has had only two swings of the bat. Under these
circumstances, the law directs that she should have her sentence doubled, itself a
serious penalty, as well as suffer all the other attendant Three Strike law
disabilities imposed on her. (For example, offenders subject to the law have
reduced opportunities for earning conduct credit or obtaining diversion for drug
addiction, two options that seem particularly relevant to someone in defendant's
circumstances.) Treating her more harshly than that—i.e., as a third-strike
offender—when she has committed but one prior qualifying act, upsets this tiered
penalty structure, skipping the second step.
Although not dispositive here, were more evidence needed to demonstrate
the Legislature intended the forcible theft of a victim's car cannot be considered
two different crimes, we need look no further than the actual terms of the
carjacking statute itself. Section 215, subdivision (c), provides that a person can
be charged with both robbery and carjacking based on the same incident, but no
defendant may be punished for both crimes if based on the ―same act.‖9 This
Section 215, subdivision (c), states: ―This section shall not be construed to
supersede or affect Section 211. A person may be charged with a violation of this
section and Section 211. However, no defendant may be punished under this
(footnote continued on next page)
prohibition on doubling punishment is not uncommon (see, e.g., § 496, subd. (a)
[―no person may be convicted [of] both [receiving stolen property] and of the theft
of the same property‖]), and reflects the Legislature's assessment of the relative
moral blameworthiness and danger to society of such offenders.
That Benson placed primary emphasis on the fact of each conviction, and
not on the number of opportunities an offender had to reform, does not change the
analysis. Benson admittedly reasoned that ― ‗the Legislature and the voters
through the initiative process clearly intended that each conviction for a serious or
violent felony counts as a prior conviction for sentencing purposes under the Three
Strikes law, even where the convictions were based upon conduct against a single
victim committed at the same time with a single intent, and where pursuant to
section 654 the defendant was punished for only a single crime.' ‖ (Benson,
supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 30, italics added.) But as noted, Benson involved multiple
criminal acts (albeit committed in a single course of conduct) and not, as here,
multiple criminal convictions stemming from the commission of a single act.
Benson itself recognized this distinction in its ―Famous Footnote 8‖ (Menaster &
Ricciardulli, 3 Strikes Manual, supra, at p. 12), by observing that where multiple
convictions stem from the same act, they may be so closely connected that treating
them as separate strikes would be contrary to the spirit of the Three Strikes law.
Although Benson focused on the mere existence of prior convictions, its analysis
must be read with this footnote in mind.
(footnote continued from previous page)
section and Section 211 for the same act which constitutes a violation of both this
section and Section 211.‖
The Attorney General argues the terms of the Three Strikes law itself
suggest the Legislature (and the framers of the initiative version of the law)
considered the effect of two crimes stemming from one act, at least as it affects
current convictions, suggesting both of defendant's prior convictions can be
separate strikes. Thus, section 1170.12, subdivision (a)(6), provides, ―If there is a
current conviction for more than one felony count not committed on the same
occasion, and not arising from the same set of operative facts, the court shall
sentence the defendant consecutively on each count pursuant to this section.‖
Section 667, subdivision (c)(6), says the same thing. The negative implication of
this provision is that if two or more crimes are committed on the same occasion,
and arise from the same set of facts, the trial court need not sentence the counts
consecutively. The Attorney General argues that because the Legislature
addressed the ―same act‖ circumstance in the context of current convictions, but
included no similar language addressing prior convictions, we should presume the
omission of parallel language by the Legislature and, presumably, the electorate,
was intentional and purposeful. (See California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v.
City of Los Angeles (1995) 11 Cal.4th 342, 349 [― ‗We must assume that the
Legislature knew how to create an exception if it wished to do so' ‖].) This
suggested inference of legislative intent, leaping from how courts should consider
current crimes to how courts should view prior convictions, is too weak to
overcome the plain meaning of the Three Strikes scheme that one may not commit
but two criminal acts (here, forcibly taking a victim's car in 1999, burglarizing a
house in 2008) yet be assessed three strikes. Indeed, we might also observe the
Legislature knows how to impose a life term on fewer than three convictions, but
has not done so here. (See § 667.61 [One Strike law for certain sex offenders].)
We conclude this is one of the extraordinary cases (People v. Carmony,
supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378) in which the nature and circumstances of defendant's
prior strike convictions demonstrate the trial court was required to dismiss one of
them because failure to do so would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Three
Strikes law. Accordingly, the judgment is vacated and the case ordered remanded
to the trial court for resentencing, consistent with the views expressed above.10
WERDEGAR, J.
WE CONCUR:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.
BAXTER, J.
CHIN, J.
CORRIGAN, J.
LIU, J.
O'ROURKE, J.*
To the extent People v. Scott, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th 920, is inconsistent
with this decision, it is disapproved.
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District,
Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
See next page for addresses and telephone numbers for counsel who argued in Supreme Court.
Name of Opinion People v. Vargas
Unpublished Opinion
Original Appeal
Original Proceeding
Review Granted XXX 206 Cal.App.4th 971
Rehearing Granted
Opinion No.
Date Filed: July 10, 2014
Judge: Bruce F. Marrs
Counsel:
Melanie K. Dorian, under appointment by the Supreme Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters,
Assistant Attorney General, Taylor Nguyen, David Zarmi, Lawrence M. Daniels, Noah P. Hill and Kimara
A. Aarons, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Counsel who argued in Supreme Court (not intended for publication with opinion):
Melanie K. Dorian
Kimara A. Aarons
Deputy Attorney General
300 South Spring Street, Suite 1702
Petition for review after the Court of Appeal affirmed a judgment of conviction of criminal offenses. This case includes the following issues: (1) Was the trial court required to dismiss one of defendant's two prior convictions under the three strikes law, when they arose from the same prior incident and were based on the same act? (2) If dismissal of one prior conviction was not mandatory, did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss one?
Date: Citation: Docket Number:
Thu, 07/10/2014 59 Cal.4th 635, 328 P.3d 1020, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 277, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7786, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9070 S203744
Opinion Authors
Opinion Justice Kathryn M. Werdegar
Brief Downloads
S203744-App-Errata-Req-Jud-Notice-04.03.13.pdf (103996 bytes) - Appellant's Errata Request for Judicial Notice
S203744-App-Opening-Brief-Merits-12.05.12.pdf (1568252 bytes) - Appellant's Opening Brief on the Merits
S203744-App-Opp-04.03.13.pdf (1177443 bytes) - Appellant's Partial Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Judicial Notice; Appellant's Motion for Judicial Notice
S203744-App-Pet-Rev-07.06.12.pdf (2631689 bytes) - Appellant's Petition for Review
S203744-App-Reply-Brief-Merits-04.02.13.pdf (1976650 bytes) - Appellant's Reply Brief on the Merits
S203744-App-Req-Jud-Notice-04.03.13.pdf (211096 bytes) - Appellant's Partial Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Judicial Notice
S203744-Resp-Answer-Brief-Merits-03.07.13.pdf (1939761 bytes) - Respondent's Answer Brief on the Merits
S203744-Resp-Req-Jud-Notice-03.07.13.pdf (14745789 bytes) - Respondent's Motion for Judicial Notice
If you'd like to submit a brief document to be included for this opinion, please submit an e-mail to the SCOCAL website
Annotated by Lucia Roibal
1) Facts
Defendant Darlene Vargas illegally entered a home and stole various items. She was charged and convicted of first degree burglary, grand theft, and conspiracy to commit grand theft. The court found that she had also previously suffered a prior serious felony conviction as well as two strikes under the Three Strikes Law. These past strikes included one strike for a 1999 conviction for carjacking, and another strike for a robbery conviction, which arose from the same 1999 incident. Because the three crimes (burglary, grand theft, conspiracy) were qualifying felonies under the Three Strikes Law, each crime was potentially subject to enhancement by her two alleged strikes, leaving her with a possible sentence of three consecutive terms of 25 years to life. She moved to dismiss the carjacking as to all counts. The court dismissed the carjacking as to the grand theft and conspiracy count, but not for the remaining conviction for burglary.
2) Procedural History
Defendant appealed and filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Court of Appeal denied relief, but partially granted the petition for habeas corpus, finding ineffective representation by her defense counsel for failing to give the trial court a transcript of the preliminary hearing from the 1999 case. That transcript showed that the carjacking and robbery convictions, which had resulted in two strikes, were based on the same act of taking a car by force. The court directed the trial court to conduct a new sentencing hearing.
On remand, the trial court denied Vargas' motion to dismiss one of the 1999 prior convictions.
On appeal from the resentencing, Vargas argued that the trial court should have agreed to strike one of the convictions and sentence her as a two-strike offender. The Court of Appeal found no abuse of discretion, however, and affirmed the denial.
The California Supreme Court granted review.
3) Issues
a) Was the trial court required to dismiss one of the defendant's two prior convictions under the Three Strikes Law, when both convictions arose from the same prior incident and were based on the same act?
b) If dismissal of one prior conviction was not mandatory, did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to dismiss one?
4) Holding
Yes, the trial court was required to dismiss one of the defendant's two prior convictions under the Three Strikes Law, when the convictions arose from the same prior incident and were based on the same act. Because the first question was dispositive, the court did not discuss the second issue.
5) Concurrence
There was no concurring opinion, although the following justices concurred in the majority opinion:
CANTIL-SAKAUYE, C. J.; BAXTER, J.; CHIN, J.; CORRIGAN, J.; LIU, J.; O'ROURKE, J.
6) Analysis
The court began by describing the Three Strikes law, California Penal Code Sections 667, 1170.12, under which a life sentence is mandatory if the defendant re-offends and commits a third qualifying felony, mirroring the baseball-related phrase "three strikes and you're out." The intent of the Three Strikes law was to punish repeat criminal offenders severely. Nonetheless, the court noted that, under People v. Superior Court (Romero), 13 Cal. 4th 497 (1996), the trial court below had the power to grant Vargas' motion and to dismiss one of her two strike convictions. In determining whether to dismiss a prior strike, the test focused on whether the defendant was "deemed outside the scheme's spirit," and should therefore be treated as if he or she had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent felonies. Such cases where a court could strike a prior conviction were extraordinary.
However, a prior case, People v. Benson, 18 Cal.4th 24 (1998), suggested that a trial court should dismiss one of two prior strike convictions if they were based on the same act. Nonetheless, in People v. Scott, 179 Cal.App.4th 920 (2009), the Court of Appeal concluded that while the "same act" circumstances posed by robbery and carjacking cases provided a factor for a trial court to consider, they did not mandate striking a strike.
Contrary to the result in the Scott case, the court noted that failure to dismiss one of the two prior strike convictions, both of which were based on Vargas' commission of the same act (forcibly taking the victim's car), was inconsistent with the intent underlying both the legislative and initiative versions of the Three Strikes Law. The "Three Strikes" baseball metaphor meant that a person would have three chances—three swings of the bat—before the harshest penalty could be imposed. Furthermore, the public would have understood that no one could be called for two strikes on just one swing. Permitting a trial court to treat the 1999 robbery and carjacking convictions, which resulted out of a single act, as separate strikes, would be the same as calling two strikes for one swing. Thus the Scott case had been wrongly decided.
The court also distinguished this case from others, including one where a person committed additional violence in the course of a prior serious felony, and one where a defendant committed multiple criminal acts in a single course of conduct. Here, there was one act that resulted in multiple convictions. The court thus found that the nature and circumstances of the defendant's prior strike convictions demonstrated that the trial court was required to dismiss one of them because failure to do so would be inconsistent with the spirit of the Three Strikes Law.
7) Tags
Three Strikes, prior strike, sentencing, Cal. Penal Code § 654, Cal. Penal Code § 1170.12, legislative history, Proposition 184, abuse of discretion, discretion, carjacking, robbery, same act, repeat offender, criminal law, mandatory sentence, life sentence, qualifying conviction
Annotation by Lucia Roibal, Stanford Law School Class of 2015.
Related Media Multiple Convictions from One Act Count as One Strike (C14), Maura Dolan
'Three Strikes' Law: California High Court Eases Implementation of Doubling Criminal Sentences, Robert Abel
State Supreme Court Retools Three-Strikes Law to be More Like Baseball, Ken Broder
Download the original court documents for this case:
SCOCAL, People v. Vargas , 59 Cal.4th 635, 328 P.3d 1020, 174 Cal.Rptr.3d 277, 14 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 7786, 2014 Daily Journal D.A.R. 9070 available at: (https://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/people-v-vargas-34337) (last visited Wednesday February 1, 2023).


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