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February 2008 Iran
Stopping Iran: Why the Case for Military Action Still Stands
Despite the assessment offered in the most recent National Intelligence Estimate, the Iranian regime continues to pose an existential threat,…
by Norman Podhoretz
Up until a fairly short time ago, scarcely anyone dissented from the assessment offered with "high confidence" by the National Intelligence Estimate [NIE] of 2005 that Iran was "determined to develop nuclear weapons." Correlatively, no one believed the protestations of the mullahs ruling Iran that their nuclear program was designed strictly for peaceful uses.
The reason for this near-universal consensus was that Iran, with its vast reserves of oil and natural gas, had no need for nuclear energy, and that in any case, the very nature of its program contradicted the protestations.
Here is how Time magazine put it as early as March 2003—long before, be it noted, the radical Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had replaced the putatively moderate Mohamed Khatami as president:
On a visit last month to Tehran, International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] director Mohamed ElBaradei announced he had discovered that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich uranium—a key component of advanced nuclear weapons—near Natanz. But diplomatic sources tell Time the plant is much further along than previously revealed. The sources say work on the plant is "extremely advanced" and involves "hundreds" of gas centrifuges ready to produce enriched uranium and "the parts for a thousand others ready to be assembled."
So, too, the Federation of American Scientists about a year later:
It is generally believed that Iran's efforts are focused on uranium enrichment, though there are some indications of work on a parallel plutonium effort. Iran claims it is trying to establish a complete nuclear-fuel cycle to support a civilian energy program, but this same fuel cycle would be applicable to a nuclear-weapons development program. Iran appears to have spread their nuclear activities around a number of sites to reduce the risk of detection or attack.
And just as everyone agreed with the American intelligence community that Iran was "determined to develop nuclear weapons," everyone also agreed with President George W. Bush that it must not be permitted to succeed. Here, the reasons were many and various.
To begin with, Iran was (as certified even by the doves of the State Department) the leading sponsor of terrorism in the world, and it was therefore reasonable to fear that it would transfer nuclear technology to terrorists who would be only too happy to use it against us. Moreover, since Iran evidently aspired to become the hegemon of the Middle East, its drive for a nuclear capability could result (as, according to the New York Times, no fewer than 21 governments in and around the region were warning) in "a grave and destructive nuclear-arms race." This meant a nightmarish increase in the chances of a nuclear war. An even greater increase in those chances would result from the power that nuclear weapons—and the missiles capable of delivering them, which Iran was also developing and/or buying—would give the mullahs to realize their evil dream of (in the words of Ahmadinejad) "wiping Israel off the map."
Nor, as almost everyone also agreed, were the dangers of a nuclear Iran confined to the Middle East. Dedicated as the mullahs clearly were to furthering the transformation of Europe into a continent where Muslim law and practice would more and more prevail, they were bound to use nuclear intimidation and blackmail in pursuit of this goal as well. Beyond that, nuclear weapons would even serve the purposes of a far more ambitious aim: the creation of what Ahmadinejad called "a world without America." Although, to be sure, no one imagined that Iran would acquire the capability to destroy the United States, it was easy to imagine that the United States would be deterred from standing in Iran's way by the fear of triggering a nuclear war.
Running alongside the near-universal consensus on Iran's nuclear intentions was a commensurately broad agreement that the regime could be stopped from realizing those intentions by a judicious combination of carrots and sticks. The carrots, offered through diplomacy, consisted of promises that if Iran were (in the words of the Security Council) to "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA," it would find itself on the receiving end of many benefits. If, however, Iran remained obdurate in refusing to comply with these demands, sticks would come into play in the form of sanctions.
And indeed, in response to continued Iranian defiance, a round of sanctions was approved by the Security Council in December 2006. When these (watered down to buy the support of the Russians and the Chinese) predictably failed to bite, a tougher round was unanimously authorized three months later, in March 2007. When these in turn failed, the United States, realizing that the Russians and the Chinese would veto stronger medicine, unilaterally imposed a new series of economic sanctions—which fared no better than the multilateral measures that had preceded them.
What then to do? President Bush kept declaring that Iran must not be permitted to get the bomb, and he kept warning that the "military option"—by which he meant air strikes, not an invasion on the ground—was still on the table as a last resort. On this issue our Western European allies were divided. To the surprise of many who had ceased thinking of France as an ally because of Jacques Chirac's relentless opposition to the policies of the Bush administration, Nicholas Sarkozy, Chirac's successor as president, echoed Bush's warning in equally unequivocal terms. If, Sarkozy announced, the Iranians pressed on with their nuclear program, the world would be left with a choice between "an Iranian bomb and bombing Iran"—and he left no doubt as to where his own choice would fall. On the other hand, Gordon Brown, who had followed Tony Blair as prime minister of the UK, seemed less willing than Sarkozy to contemplate military action against Iran's nuclear installations, even as a last resort. Like the new chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, Brown remained—or professed to remain—persuaded that more diplomacy and tougher sanctions would eventually work.
This left a great question hanging in the air: when, if ever, would Bush (and/or Sarkozy) conclude that the time had come to resort to the last resort?
Obviously the answer to that question depended on how long it would take for Iran itself to reach the point of no return. According to the NIE of 2005, it was "unlikely . . . that Iran would be able to make a nuclear weapon . . . before early-to-mid next decade"—that is, between 2010 and 2015. If that assessment, offered with "moderate confidence," was correct, Bush would be off the hook, since he would be out of office for two years at the very least by the time the decision on whether or not to order air strikes would have to be made. That being the case, for the remainder of his term he could continue along the carrot-and-stick path, while striving to ratchet up the pressure on Iran with stronger and stronger measures that he could hope against hope might finally do the trick. If he could get these through the Security Council, so much the better; if not, the United States could try to assemble a coalition outside the UN that would be willing to impose really tough sanctions.
Under these circumstances, there would also be enough time to add another arrow to this nonmilitary quiver: a serious program of covert aid to dissident Iranians who dreamed of overthrowing the mullocracy and replacing it with a democratic regime. Those who had been urging Bush to launch such a program, and who were confident that it would succeed, pointed to polls showing great dissatisfaction with the mullocracy among the Iranian young, and to the demonstrations against it that kept breaking out all over the country. They also contended that even if a new democratic regime were to be as intent as the old one on developing nuclear weapons, neither it nor they would pose anything like the same kind of threat.
All well and good. The trouble was this: only by relying on the accuracy of the 2005 NIE would Bush be able in all good conscience to pass on to his successor the decision of whether or when to bomb the Iranian nuclear facilities. But that estimate, as he could hardly help knowing from the CIA's not exactly brilliant track record, might easily be too optimistic.
To start with the most spectacular recent instance, the CIA had failed to anticipate 9/11. It then turned out to be wrong in 2002 about Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction, very likely because it was bending over backward to compensate for having been wrong in exactly the opposite direction in 1991, when at the end of the first Gulf war the IAEA discovered that the Iraqi nuclear program was far more advanced than the CIA had estimated. Regarding that by now notorious lapse, Jeffrey T. Richelson, a leading (and devoutly nonpartisan) authority on the American intelligence community, writes in Spying on the Bomb:
The extent that the United States and its allies underestimated and misunderstood the Iraqi program [before 1991] constituted a "colossal international intelligence failure," according to one Israeli expert. [IAEA's chief weapons inspector] Hans Blix acknowledged "that there was suspicion certainly," but "to see the enormity of it is a shock."
And these were only the most recent cases. Gabriel Schoenfeld, a close student of the intelligence community, offers a partial list of earlier mistakes and failures:
The CIA was established in 1947 in large measure to avoid another surprise attack like the one the U.S. had suffered on December 7, 1941 at Pearl Harbor. But only three years after its founding, the fledgling agency missed the outbreak of the Korean war. It then failed to understand that the Chinese would come to the aid of the North Koreans if American forces crossed the Yalu river. It missed the outbreak of the Suez war in 1956. In September 1962, the CIA issued an NIE which stated that the "Soviets would not introduce offensive missiles in Cuba"; in short order, the USSR did precisely that. In 1968 it failed to foresee the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia. . . . It did not inform Jimmy Carter that the Soviet Union would invade Afghanistan in 1979.
Richelson adds a few more examples of hotly debated issues during the cold war that were wrongly resolved, including "the existence of a missile gap, the capabilities of the Soviet SS-9 intercontinental ballistic missile, [and] Soviet compliance with the test-ban and antiballistic missile treaties." This is not to mention perhaps the most notorious case of all: the fiasco, known as the Bay of Pigs, produced by the CIA's wildly misplaced confidence that an invasion of Cuba by the army of exiles it had assembled and trained would set off a popular uprising against the Castro regime.
On Bush's part, then, deep skepticism was warranted concerning the CIA's estimate of how much time we had before Iran reached the point of no return. As we have seen, Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the IAEA, had "discovered" in 2003 that the Iranians were constructing facilities to enrich uranium. Still, as late as April 2007 the same ElBaradei was pooh-poohing the claims made by Ahmadinejad that Iran already had 3,000 centrifuges in operation. A month later, we learn from Richelson, ElBaradei changed his mind after a few spot inspections. "We believe," ElBaradei now said, that the Iranians "pretty much have the knowledge about how to enrich. From now on, it is simply a question of perfecting that knowledge."
We also learn from Richelson that another expert, Matthew Bunn of Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs, interpreted the new information the IAEA came up with in April 2007 as meaning that "whether they're six months or a year away, one can debate. But it's not ten years." This chilling estimate of how little time we had to prevent Iran from getting the bomb was similar to the conclusion reached by several Israeli experts (though the official Israeli estimate put the point of no return in 2009).
Then, in a trice, everything changed. Even as Bush must surely have been wrestling with the question of whether it would be on his watch that the decision on bombing the Iranian nuclear facilities would have to be made, the world was hit with a different kind of bomb. This took the form of an unclassified summary of a new NIE, published early last December. Entitled "Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," this new document was obviously designed to blow up the near-universal consensus that had flowed from the conclusions reached by the intelligence community in its 2005 NIE.1 In brief, whereas the NIE of 2005 had assessed "with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons," the new NIE of 2007 did "not know whether [Iran] currently intends to develop nuclear weapons."
This startling 180-degree turn was arrived at from new intelligence, offered by the new NIE with "high confidence": namely, that "in fall 2003 Tehran halted its nuclear-weapons program." The new NIE was also confident—though only moderately so—that "Tehran had not restarted its nuclear-weapons program as of mid-2007." And in the most sweeping of its new conclusions, it was even "moderately confident" that "the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran's entire nuclear-weapons program."
Whatever else one might say about the new NIE, one point can be made with "high confidence": that by leading with the sensational news that Iran had suspended its nuclear-weapons program in 2003, its authors ensured that their entire document would be interpreted as meaning that there was no longer anything to worry about. Of course, being experienced bureaucrats, they took care to protect themselves from this very accusation. For example, after dropping their own bomb on the fear that Iran was hell-bent on getting the bomb, they immediately added "with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons." But as they must have expected, scarcely anyone paid attention to this caveat. And as they must also have expected, even less attention was paid to another self-protective caveat, which—making doubly sure it would pass unnoticed—they relegated to a footnote appended to the lead sentence about the halt:
For the purposes of this Estimate, by "nuclear-weapons program" we mean Iran's nuclear-weapon design and weaponization work and covert uranium conversion-related and uranium enrichment-related work; we do not mean Iran's declared civil work related to uranium conversion and enrichment.
Since only an expert could grasp the significance of this cunning little masterpiece of incomprehensible jargon, the damage had been done by the time its dishonesty was exposed.
The first such exposure came from John Bolton, who before becoming our ambassador to the UN had served as Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, with a special responsibility for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Donning this hat once again, Bolton charged that the dishonesty of the footnote lay most egregiously in the sharp distinction it drew between military and civilian programs. For, he said,
the enrichment of uranium, which all agree Iran is continuing, is critical to civilian and military uses [emphasis added]. Indeed, it has always been Iran's "civilian" program that posed the main risk of a nuclear "breakout."
Two other experts, Valerie Lincy, the editor of Iranwatch.org, writing in collaboration with Gary Milhollin, the director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, followed up with an explanation of why the halt of 2003 was much less significant than a layman would inevitably be led to think:
[T]he new report defines "nuclear-weapons program" in a ludicrously narrow way: it confines it to enriching uranium at secret sites or working on a nuclear-weapon design. But the halting of its secret enrichment and weapon-design efforts in 2003 proves only that Iran made a tactical move. It suspended work that, if discovered, would unambiguously reveal intent to build a weapon. It has continued other work, crucial to the ability to make a bomb, that it can pass off as having civilian applications.
Thus, as Lincy and Milhollin went on to write, the main point obfuscated by the footnote was that once Iran accumulated a stockpile of the kind of uranium fit for civilian use, it would "in a matter of months" be able "to convert that uranium . . . to weapons grade."
Yet, in spite of these efforts to demonstrate that the new NIE did not prove that Iran had given up its pursuit of nuclear weapons, just about everyone in the world immediately concluded otherwise, and further concluded that this meant the military option was off the table. George Bush may or may not have been planning to order air strikes before leaving office, but now that the justification for doing so had been discredited by his own intelligence agencies, it would be politically impossible for him to go on threatening military action, let alone to take it.
But what about sanctions? In the weeks and months before the new NIE was made public, Bush had been working very hard to get a third and tougher round of sanctions approved by the Security Council. In trying to persuade the Russians and the Chinese to sign on, Bush argued that the failure to enact such sanctions would leave war as the only alternative. Yet if war was now out of the question, and if in any case Iran had for all practical purposes given up its pursuit of nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, what need was there of sanctions?
Anticipating that this objection would be raised, the White House desperately set out to interpret the new NIE as, precisely, offering "grounds for hope that the problem can be solved diplomatically—without the use of force." These words by Stephen Hadley, Bush's National Security Adviser, represented the very first comment on the new NIE to emanate from the White House, and some version of them would be endlessly repeated in the days to come. Joining this campaign of damage control, Sarkozy and Brown issued similar statements, and even Merkel (who had been very reluctant to go along with Bush's push for another round of sanctions) now declared that it was
dangerous and still grounds for great concern that Iran, in the face of the UN Security Council's resolutions, continues to refuse to suspend uranium enrichment. . . . The Iranian president's intolerable agitation against Israel also speaks volumes. . . . It remains a vital interest of the whole world community to prevent a nuclear-armed Iran.
As it happened, Hadley was right about the new NIE, which executed another 180-degree turn—this one, away from the judgment of the 2005 NIE concerning the ineffectiveness of international pressure. Flatly contradicting its "high confidence" in 2005 that Iran was forging ahead "despite its international obligations and international pressure," the new NIE concluded that the nuclear-weapons program had been halted in 2003 "primarily in response to international pressure." This indicated that "Tehran's decisions are guided by a cost-benefit approach rather than a rush to a weapon irrespective of the political, economic, and military costs."
Never mind that no international pressure to speak of was being exerted on Iran in 2003, and that at that point the mullahs were more likely acting out of fear that the Americans, having just invaded Iraq, might come after them next. Never mind, too, that religious and/or ideological passions, which the new NIE pointedly neglected to mention, have over and over again throughout history proved themselves a more powerful driving force than any "cost-benefit approach." Blithely sweeping aside such considerations, the new NIE was confident that just as the carrot-and-stick approach had allegedly sufficed in the past, so it would suffice in the future to "prompt Tehran to extend the current halt to its nuclear-weapons program."
The worldview implicit here has been described by Richelson (mainly with North Korea in mind) as the idea that "moral suasion and sustained bargaining are the proven mechanisms of nuclear restraint." Such a worldview "may be ill-equipped," he observes delicately,
to accept the idea that certain regimes are incorrigible and negotiate only as a stalling tactic until they have attained a nuclear capability against the United States and other nations that might act against their nuclear programs.
True, the new NIE did at least acknowledge that it would not be easy to induce Iran to extend the halt, "given the linkage many within the leadership probably see between nuclear-weapons development and Iran's key national-security and foreign-policy objectives." But it still put its money on a
combination of threats of intensified international scrutiny and pressures, along with opportunities for Iran to achieve its security, prestige, and goals for regional influence in other ways.
It was this pronouncement, and a few others like it, that gave Stephen Hadley "grounds for hope that the problem can be solved diplomatically." But that it was a false hope was demonstrated by the NIE itself. For if Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons in order to achieve its "key national-security and foreign-policy objectives," and if those objectives explicitly included (for a start) hegemony in the Middle East and the destruction of the state of Israel, what possible "opportunities" could Tehran be offered to achieve them "in other ways"?
So much for the carrot. As for the stick, it was no longer big enough to matter, what with the threat of military action ruled out, and what with the case for a third round of sanctions undermined by the impression stemming from the NIE's main finding that there was nothing left to worry about. Why worry when it was four years since Iran had done any work toward developing the bomb, when the moratorium remained in effect, and when there was no reason to believe that the program would be resumed in the near future?2
What is more, in continuing to insist that the Iranians must be stopped from developing the bomb and that this could be done by nonmilitary means, the Bush administration and its European allies were lagging behind a new consensus within the American foreign-policy establishment that had already been forming even before the publication of the new NIE. Whereas the old consensus was based on the proposition that (in Senator John McCain's pungent formulation) "the only thing worse than bombing Iran was letting Iran get the bomb," the emerging new consensus held the opposite—that the only thing worse than letting Iran get the bomb was bombing Iran.
What led to this reversal was a gradual loss of faith in the carrot-and-stick approach. As one who had long since rejected this faith and who had been excoriated for my apostasy by more than one member of the foreign-policy elites, I never thought I would live to see the day when these very elites would come to admit that diplomacy and sanctions had been given a fair chance and that they had accomplished nothing but to buy Iran more time.3 The lesson drawn from this new revelation was, however, a different matter.
It was in the course of a public debate with one of the younger members of the foreign-policy establishment that I first chanced upon the change in view. Knowing that he never deviated by so much as an inch from the conventional wisdom of the moment within places like the Council on Foreign Relations and the Brookings Institution, I had expected him to defend the carrot-and-stick approach and to attack me as a warmonger for contending that bombing was the only way to stop the mullahs from getting the bomb. Instead, to my great surprise, he took the position that there was really no need to stop them in the first place, since even if they had the bomb they could be deterred from using it, just as effectively as the Soviets and the Chinese had been deterred during the cold war.
Without saying so in so many words, then, my opponent was acknowledging that diplomacy and sanctions had proved to be a failure, and that there was no point in pursuing them any further. But so as to avoid drawing the logical conclusion—namely, that military action had now become necessary—he simply abandoned the old establishment assumption that Iran must at all costs be prevented from developing nuclear weapons, adopting in its place the complacent idea that we could learn to live with an Iranian bomb.
In response, I argued that deterrence could not be relied upon with a regime ruled by Islamofascist revolutionaries who not only were ready to die for their beliefs but cared less about protecting their people than about the spread of their ideology and their power. If the mullahs got the bomb, I said, it was not they who would be deterred, but we.
So little did any of this shake my opponent that I came away from our debate with the grim realization that the President's continued insistence on the dangers posed by an Iranian bomb would more and more fall on deaf ears—ears that would soon be made even deafer by the new NIE's assurance that Iran was no longer hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons after all. There might be two different ideas competing here—one, that we could live with an Iranian bomb; the other, that there would be no Iranian bomb to live with—but the widespread acceptance of either would not only preclude the military option but would sooner or later put an end even to the effort to stop the mullahs by nonmilitary means.
And yet there remained something else, or rather someone else, to factor into the equation: the perennially "misunderestimated" George W. Bush, a man who knew evil when he saw it and who had the courage and the determination to do battle against it. This was also a man who, far more than most politicians, said what he meant and meant what he said. And what he had said at least twice before was that if we permitted Iran to build a nuclear arsenal, people fifty years from now would look back and wonder how we of this generation could have allowed such a thing to happen, and they would rightly judge us as harshly as we today judge the British and the French for what they did at Munich in 1938. It was because I had found it hard to understand why Bush would put himself so squarely in the dock of history on this issue if he were resigned to an Iran in possession of nuclear weapons, or even of the ability to build them, that I predicted in these pages, and went on predicting elsewhere, that he would not retire from office before resorting to the military option.
But then came the new NIE. To me it seemed obvious that it represented another ambush by an intelligence community that had consistently tried to sabotage Bush's policies through a series of damaging leaks and was now trying to prevent him from ever taking military action against Iran. To others, however, it seemed equally obvious that Bush, far from being ambushed, had welcomed the new NIE precisely because it provided him with a perfect opportunity to begin distancing himself from the military option.4
But I could not for the life of me believe that Bush intended to fly in the face of the solemn promise he had made in his 2002 State of the Union address:
We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, as peril draws closer and closer. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.
To which he had added shortly afterward in a speech at West Point: "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long."
How, I wondered, could Bush not know that in the case of Iran he was running a very great risk of waiting too long? And if he was truly ready to run that risk, why, in a press conference the day after the new NIE came out, did he put himself in the historical dock yet again by repeating what he had said several times before about the judgment that would be passed on this generation in the future if Iran were to acquire a nuclear weapon?
If Iran shows up with a nuclear weapon at some point in time, the world is going to say, what happened to them in 2007? How come they couldn't see the impending danger? What caused them not to understand that a country that once had a weapons program could reconstitute the weapons program? How come they couldn't see that the important first step in developing a weapon is the capacity to be able to enrich uranium? How come they didn't know that with that capacity, that knowledge could be passed on to a covert program? What blinded them to the realities of the world? And it's not going to happen on my watch.
"It's not going to happen on my watch." What else could this mean if not that Bush was preparing to meet "the impending danger" in what he must by now have concluded was the only way it could be averted?
The only alternative that seemed even remotely plausible to me was that he might be fixing to outsource the job to the Israelis. After all, even if, by now, it might have become politically impossible for us to take military action, the Israelis could not afford to sit by while a regime pledged to wipe them off the map was equipping itself with nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them. For unless Iran could be stopped before acquiring a nuclear capability, the Israelis would be faced with only two choices: either strike first, or pray that the fear of retaliation would deter the Iranians from beating them to the punch. Yet a former president of Iran, Hashemi Rafsanjani, had served notice that his country would not be deterred by the fear of retaliation:
If a day comes when the world of Islam is duly equipped with the arms Israel has in its possession, . . . application of an atomic bomb would not leave anything in Israel, but the same thing would just produce damages in the Muslim world.
If this was the view of even a supposed moderate like Rafsanjani, how could the Israelis depend upon the mullahs to refrain from launching a first strike? The answer was that they could not. Bernard Lewis, the leading contemporary authority on the culture of the Islamic world, has explained why:
MAD, mutual assured destruction, [was effective] right through the cold war. Both sides had nuclear weapons. Neither side used them, because both sides knew the other would retaliate in kind. This will not work with a religious fanatic [like Ahmadinejad]. For him, mutual assured destruction is not a deterrent, it is an inducement. We know already that [the mullahs ruling Iran] do not give a damn about killing their own people in great numbers. We have seen it again and again. In the final scenario, and this applies all the more strongly if they kill large numbers of their own people, they are doing them a favor. They are giving them a quick free pass to heaven and all its delights.
Under the aegis of such an attitude, even in the less extreme variant that may have been held by some of Ahmadinejad's colleagues among the regime's rulers, mutual assured destruction would turn into a very weak reed. Understanding that, the Israelis would be presented with an irresistible incentive to preempt—and so, too, would the Iranians. Either way, a nuclear exchange would become inevitable.
What would happen then? In a recently released study, Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies argues that Rafsanjani had it wrong. In the grisly scenario Cordesman draws, tens of millions would indeed die, but Israel—despite the decimation of its civilian population and the destruction of its major cities—would survive, even if just barely, as a functioning society. Not so Iran, and not its "key Arab neighbors," particularly Egypt and Syria, which Cordesman thinks Israel would also have to target in order "to ensure that no other power can capitalize on an Iranian strike." Furthermore, Israel might be driven in desperation to go after the oil wells, refineries, and ports in the Gulf.
"Being contained within the region," writes Martin Walker of UPI in his summary of Cordesman's study, "such a nuclear exchange might not be Armageddon for the human race." To me it seems doubtful that it could be confined to the Middle East. But even if it were, the resulting horrors would still be far greater than even the direst consequences that might follow from bombing Iran before it reaches the point of no return.
In the worst case of this latter scenario, Iran would retaliate by increasing the trouble it is already making for us in Iraq and by attacking Israel with missiles armed with non-nuclear warheads but possibly containing biological and/or chemical weapons. There would also be a vast increase in the price of oil, with catastrophic consequences for every economy in the world, very much including our own. And there would be a deafening outcry from one end of the earth to the other against the inescapable civilian casualties. Yet, bad as all this would be, it does not begin to compare with the gruesome consequences of a nuclear exchange between Israel and Iran, even if those consequences were to be far less extensive than Cordesman anticipates.
Which is to say that, as between bombing Iran to prevent it from getting the bomb and letting Iran get the bomb, there is simply no contest.
But this still does not answer the question of who should do the bombing. Tempting as it must be for George Bush to sit back and let the Israelis do the job, there are considerations that should give him pause. One is that no matter what he would say, the whole world would regard the Israelis as a surrogate for the United States, and we would become as much the target of the ensuing recriminations both at home and abroad as we would if we had done the job ourselves.
To make matters worse, the indications are that it would be very hard for the Israeli air force, superb though it is, to pull the mission off. Thus, an analysis by two members of the Security Studies Program at MIT concluded that while "the Israeli air force now possesses the capability to destroy even well-hardened targets in Iran with some degree of confidence," the problem is that for the mission to succeed, all of the many contingencies involved would have to go right. Hence an Israeli attempt could end with the worst of all possible outcomes: retaliatory measures by the Iranians even as their nuclear program remained unscathed. We, on the other hand, would have a much bigger margin of error and a much better chance of setting their program back by a minimum of five or ten years and at best wiping it out altogether.
The upshot is that if Iran is to be prevented from becoming a nuclear power, it is the United States that will have to do the preventing, to do it by means of a bombing campaign, and (because "If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long") to do it soon.
When I first predicted a year or so ago that Bush would bomb Iran's nuclear facilities once he had played out the futile diplomatic string, the obstacles that stood in his way were great but they did not strike me as insurmountable. Now, thanks in large part to the new NIE, they have grown so formidable that I can only stick by my prediction with what the NIE itself would describe as "low-to-moderate confidence." For Bush is right about the resemblance between 2008 and 1938. In 1938, as Winston Churchill later said, Hitler could still have been stopped at a relatively low price and many millions of lives could have been saved if England and France had not deceived themselves about the realities of their situation. Mutatis mutandis, it is the same in 2008, when Iran can still be stopped from getting the bomb and even more millions of lives can be saved—but only provided that we summon up the courage to see what is staring us in the face and then act on what we see.
Unless we do, the forces that are blindly working to ensure that Iran will get the bomb are likely to prevail even against the clear-sighted determination of George W. Bush, just as the forces of appeasement did against Churchill in 1938. In which case, we had all better pray that there will be enough time for the next President to discharge the responsibility that Bush will have been forced to pass on, and that this successor will also have the clarity and the courage to discharge it. If not—God help us all—the stage will have been set for the outbreak of a nuclear war that will become as inescapable then as it is avoidable now.
1 Among the principal authors of the new NIE, an editorial in the Wall Street Journal reported, were "three former State Department officials with previous reputations as 'hyper-partisan anti-Bush officials,' according to an intelligence source." Even without knowing this, a careful reader of the new NIE summary could easily tell that it had been written by opponents of the military option who, moreover, were not so sure that Iran was all that dangerous.
2 It is worth noting that a number of Israeli experts—including Ephraim Halevy, the former (and very dovish) director of the Mossad—were convinced that the halt had lasted only about two years, that the program had been resumed, probably in 2005, and that it was still up and running.
3 That negotiation was merely a tactic used by Iran to buy time was not idle speculation. As we learn from Richelson: "Iranian nuclear negotiator Hassan Rouhani told his nation's Supreme Cultural Revolution Council in September 2005 that Iran, in dealing with the IAEA, had agreed to suspend activities only in areas where it was not experiencing technical problems, and that the Isfahan uranium-conversion facility was completed while negotiating with the [European Union]. Rouhan informed the council that 'while we were talking with the Europeans in Tehran, we were installing equipment in parts of the facility. . . . [B]y creating a calm environment, we were able to complete the work.'"
4 A typically conspiratorial version of this view, circulating through the Middle East, holds that Bush actually arranged for the new NIE, as a cover for capitulating to Iran. Evidently acting on this interpretation, the Sunni regimes (including Saudi Arabia and Egypt) that were expected by Condoleezza Rice to form a coalition against Shiite Iran once the U.S. got the "peace process" going between Israel and the Palestinians (hence the meeting she arranged at Annapolis) have instead been scrambling in various ways to come to terms with Tehran. As Gerald Steinberg of the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs pointed out: "Within two weeks following publication of the NIE report, . . . Egypt moved to improve relations with Iran." What was even more extraordinary, "Saudi Arabia welcomed Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Mecca." The effects of the NIE were also manifest in China, which "signed a major contract on energy development and supply with Iran," as well as in Russia, which, after stalling on a long-promised delivery, "quickly dispatched two shipments of nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear reactor."
Norman Podhoretz is former editor-in-chief of Commentary.
The Coup Against Democracy That Wasn't
by Ray Takeyh
by Joshua Muravchik
Ending Iran's Fictions
by Jonathan Schanzer


text:
CHN: Overwhelming Minimum Wage Victory In The House
The Fair Minimum Wage Act of 2007, H.R. 2, resoundingly passed the House with 82 Republicans joining all 233 Democrats in voting "yes." The bill would raise the federal minimum wage from $5.15 to $5.85 an hour beginning on the 60th day after the date it is signed into law. One year later it would be increased to $6.55 an hour and 12 months after that it would increase to $7.25 an hour. This final phase-in would occur in 2009. It was passed as a 'clean' bill containing no tax cuts or other provisions.
Congress has not raised the federal minimum wage for 10 years, the longest period since the first federal minimum wage was passed in 1938. The wage is not indexed for inflation so its buying power has eroded by one-fifth of its value since the last increase in 1997 and now stands at a 52-year low. According to the Economic Policy Institute, about 4 percent of the workforce, about 5.6 million workers, who earn less than $7.25 an hour will be directly affected. Another 7 million might benefit through so-called 'spillover' effects. Of the workers mostly directly affected, 71 percent are adults, 61 percent are women, 43 percent work full-time and another 36 percent work 20-34 hours per week.
Despite the hundreds of billions of dollars in tax cuts for businesses and upper income groups over the last 10 years and additional tens of billions targeted to small businesses, Republicans have tried to make the case that businesses who hire low-wage workers should receive another round of tax cuts to offset the negative impact of an increase in the minimum wage. Breaks for business are not the norm; the only other time tax cuts were added to the minimum wage bill was the last time it passed in 1996. The House rule governing consideration of H.R. 2 disallowed attempts by Republicans to offer any of these so-called 'sweeteners'.
Next week the Senate will consider S. 2, a bill initially identical to H.R. 2. Because the bill will likely be filibustered, it will require 60 votes for passage rather than a simple majority. In order to assure passage Republican and Democratic leaders are negotiating to add tax breaks for business to the bill. They are expected to add to S. 2 the 5-year $8.3 billion tax cut package agreed to by the Senate Finance Committee. It includes extension of the Work Opportunity Tax Credit of employers who hire certain low-income workers, reduction in depreciation time for capital improvements businesses make, an increase in the amount of deductions for new business investments that can be made annually, and an increase in the size of businesses that can use a simplified cash method of accounting for tax purposes. The Finance Committee has identified offsets to pay for the tax package, mostly by reducing existing tax breaks for business.
Also, in order to break the impasse on a stalled ethics bill this week, Senate Democratic leaders have agreed to allow Republicans a vote on a version of the line-item veto in an amendment to the minimum wage bill. Advocates have long sought to extricate the minimum wage from other controversial proposals; they are concerned that if such an amendment were to become law, it would shift too much power from the legislative to the administrative branch of government. (For more information on the line-item veto, see http://www.cbpp.org/1-10-07bud-fact.htm) Other amendments could also be offered that would, for example, erode fair labor standards. All of these amendments would require 60 votes to pass in the Senate.
Most agree that there will be an increase in the minimum wage signed into law but the process will likely not be smooth in the Senate. Ultimately, a House and Senate Conference Committee will work out differences in the bills.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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text:
A guest book review: Stafford's Shaking the System
My thanks to the kind folk at IVP for a review copy of Tim Stafford's Shaking the System: What I Learned from the Great American Reform Movements (and may I voice a special "hurray" to IVP at the moment - they must be doing something right to get this kind of criticism). I feel privileged to have Stephanie write a book review for Chrisendom as she is one of these extremely talented people - artist, writer, intellectual - yea, one of them. But try not to hold it against her too much, cos she is also a very dear friend of this Tilling household! So without further ado, let me hand over to her.
Shaking the System Review
Ordinary Activism
When writer Flannery O'Connor was asked whether she thought the Iowa Writers' Workshop discouraged young writers, she answered "Not enough of them." Tim Stafford's stance toward young would-be activists in his Shaking the System has something of the spirit of her remark, though his is a gentle voice. This book will not produce a new wave of gleaming-eyed idealists: It says too much about the realities of actual activist work, about the grind of the long haul, about failure, about glory that never happens.
I've been a gleaming-eyed idealist, and when I found that brightness and hope and Big Ideas had, roughly, zero impact on injustice, that in fact the work of changing the world is slow, often painful, slow, disheartening, and slow, my Big Ideas fizzled, and I began to dislike activism. If I couldn't make everything better now, if I couldn't, in fact, save the world, then why bother?
Stafford's answer is, because there is truth. This is where he begins: If you want to be an activist, make sure you are on the side of truth. Remember that truth often. His next chapter is on resistance: what to do when no one gives a shit about truth (he doesn't put it that way). Expect this, he says.
From there he moves to pressure tactics, which involve the ethical, responsible use of power. The term "institutional sin," he says, is confusing: "People, not institutions or systems, are sinners." And yet, there is "web that binds people to injustice. It is not enough to simply present the truth and change people's hearts, one by one. Activists must change laws, institutions, habits and customs, for these bind people's dark hearts together into a formidable fortress. Activists must shake the system." In the U. S. abolitionist movement, he goes on to argue, it was finally "only the carnage of the Civil War" that accomplished change. Triumphalism is entirely absent from this book, as is a sense of activists as Knights in Shining Armor battling the forces of darkness. Instead there is a longsuffering familiarity with sorrow and with failure, with good coming about through devastating violence.
There is also personal honesty; Stafford first won my trust when he listed his own roles as an activist, early in the book. The list includes spending four years in Africa with his wife, helping to start a magazine for young people; it also includes writing letters to Congress, and helping to preserve a green space near his home. Stafford is not Wilberforce, and this makes me trust him, because I am not Wilberforce either. But Stafford has avoided the trap into which I've often fallen, of refusing to take any action if I can't be Wilberforce. Stafford's book is Christian in arriving at truth by paradox. On one hand, he points out that activism is harder, slower, more daunting work than I'd been willing to admit; on the other, he points the way toward starting small, with the activist equivalent of loaves and fishes—of giving what I have.
Stephanie Gehring
At 1/28/2010 4:19 PM, Robin Parry said...
Thanks Stephanie
That was a surprisingly inspiring review. Perhaps because it resonated with me.
At 1/31/2010 11:03 PM, Mike said...
I'm confused. Are you saying it is a good thing that people think that IVP is putting social activism ahead of the gospel?


text:
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Canon 915, one of the canons in the 1983 Code of Canon Law of the Latin Church of the Catholic Church, forbids the administration of Holy Communion to those upon whom the penalty of excommunication or interdict has been imposed or declared or who obstinately persist in manifest grave sin:
Those who have been excommunicated or interdicted after the imposition or declaration of the penalty and others obstinately persevering in manifest grave sin are not to be admitted to holy communion.[1]
The corresponding canon in the Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, which binds members of the Eastern Catholic Churches, reads, "The publicly unworthy are to be kept from the reception of the Divine Eucharist".[2][3]
Reception of Holy Communion
In general, Catholics who approach for Holy Communion have the right to receive the Eucharist, unless the law provides to the contrary, and canon 915 is just such an exception to the general norm.[4] Anyone aware of having committed a grave sin is obliged to refrain from receiving Communion without first obtaining absolution in the sacrament of Reconciliation.[5][6] In addition, canon 1331 §1 of the Code of Canon Law forbids an excommunicated person, even one who has incurred a latae sententiae (automatic) excommunication, from receiving Holy Communion or any other of the sacraments of the Catholic Church, except for Reconciliation, to be reconciled to the Church.[7] Also forbidden to receive the sacraments is anyone who has been interdicted.[8] These rules concern a person who is considering whether to receive Holy Communion, and in this way differ from the rule of canon 915, which concerns instead a person who administers the sacrament to others.
Canon 915 is immediately followed by canon 916, which concerns the minister of the Eucharist (priest or bishop) in case that it celebrates a Mass and the recipient of Holy Communion: "A person who is conscious of grave sin is not to celebrate Mass or receive the body of the Lord without previous sacramental confession unless there is a grave reason and there is no opportunity to confess; in this case the person is to remember the obligation to make an act of perfect contrition which includes the resolution of confessing as soon as possible."[9]
Administration of Holy Communion
The general rule of canon law is that "sacred ministers cannot deny the sacraments to those who seek them at appropriate times, are properly disposed, and are not prohibited by law from receiving them";[10] and "any baptized person not prohibited by law can and must be admitted to holy communion".[11] Canon 915 not only permits the ministers to deny Holy Communion to certain classes of people, but actually obliges them to deny it to those classes of people.[12]
Classes of people to whom Communion is to be denied under canon 915
Those under imposed or declared excommunication or interdict
Any excommunication or interdict obliges the person involved to refrain from receiving Holy Communion, but a minister is obliged to deny Holy Communion only to those on whom an ecclesiastical superior or tribunal has publicly imposed the censure or declared that it has in fact been incurred. Canon 915 thus does not apply in cases of undeclared latae sententiae (automatic) excommunication, such as that incurred, according to canon 1398,[13] by someone who actually procures an abortion. While someone in this situation should not receive Communion until the excommunication is lifted, a priest may not on the grounds of the automatic excommunication refuse to administer the sacrament even if he knows of its existence.[5]
Those who persist in manifest grave sin
It can be more difficult[5] to determine whether in a particular case all four elements referred to are simultaneously present:
a sin,
which is grave,
which is manifest,
and which is obstinately persevered in.
The action must be a sin in the eyes of the Church, not merely something distasteful or irritating; personal guilt on the part of the person concerned is not required.[14][15][16][17]
The sinful action must be "seriously disruptive of ecclesiastical or moral order".[14]
To be manifest, the sin must be known to a large part of the community, a condition more easily met in a rural village than in an anonymous urban parish. Knowledge by the priest alone, in particular through the sacrament of confession, is not a justifying cause for denying Holy Communion.[5] Public withholding of the Eucharist for little-known sins, even grave sins, is not permitted under canon law.[14]
Neither an attitude of defiance nor a prior warning are required to determine the existence of obstinate persistence in manifest grave sin.[18]
Divorced and remarried Catholics
The Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts issued on 24 June 2000 a declaration on the application of canon 915 of the Code of Canon Law to divorced Catholics who have civilly remarried. Even if such people, while being unable for serious reasons, such as the upbringing of children, to separate, live in full continence, their publicly known objective situation as divorced and remarried Catholics excludes them from receiving Eucharistic Communion. Public denial of Communion must be avoided and so the reasons for exclusion must be explained to them, but if such precautionary measures fail to obtain the desired effect or are impossible, Communion is not to be given to them.[19]
However, in September 2016, Pope Francis declared the apostolic exhortation Amoris laetitia to be a teaching of the "authentic magisterium", and agreed with the interpretation of Argentine bishops that "in certain circumstances, a person who is divorced and remarried and is living in an active sexual partnership might not be responsible or culpable for the mortal sin of adultery, 'particularly when a person judges that he would fall into a subsequent fault by damaging the children of the new union.' In this sense, 'Amoris Laetitia opens up the possibility of access to the sacraments of Reconciliation and the Eucharist'."[20]
Issues of dispute
Politicians consistently promoting permissive abortion or euthanasia laws
A memorandum of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on "Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion", signed by its Prefect Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger and published in July 2004, declared that, if a Catholic politician's formal cooperation in "the grave sin of abortion or euthanasia" becomes manifest by "consistently campaigning and voting for permissive abortion and euthanasia laws", the politician's pastor is obliged to instruct the politician about the Church's teaching and inform him that he should not present himself for Holy Communion as long as the objective situation of sin (regardless of whether subjective guilt exists or is absent) persists, warning him that, if he does present himself in those circumstances, he will be refused. As in the case of divorced and remarried Catholics, if these precautionary measures fail to obtain the desired effect or are impossible, "and the person in question, with obstinate persistence, still presents himself to receive the Holy Eucharist, 'the minister of Holy Communion must refuse to distribute it'".[21]
This ruling of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith was cited in an article by Cardinal Raymond Leo Burke, Prefect of the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura in Periodica de re canonica, vol. 96 (2007), which listed precedents for it in the writings of the Church Fathers and theologians, in both older and more recent canon law and in ritual texts.[2]
The ruling spoke of the obligations of the politician's pastor. With regard to the obligations of the diocesan bishop, the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops declared in 2004: "The question has been raised as to whether the denial of Holy Communion to some Catholics in political life is necessary because of their public support for abortion on demand. Given the wide range of circumstances involved in arriving at a prudential judgment on a matter of this seriousness, we recognize that such decisions rest with the individual bishop in accord with the established canonical and pastoral principles. Bishops can legitimately make different judgments on the most prudent course of pastoral action. ... The polarizing tendencies of election-year politics can lead to circumstances in which Catholic teaching and sacramental practice can be misused for political ends. Respect for the Holy Eucharist, in particular, demands that it be received worthily and that it be seen as the source for our common mission in the world."
Cardinal Donald Wuerl of Washington has declared his opposition to such political use, with the Washington Post's Melinda Henneberger describing "Communion wielded as a weapon": in Wuerl's view, which he attributes also to the great majority of bishops in the United States and elsewhere, canon 915 "was never intended to be used this way", that is, to bring politicians to repentance.[22]
The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith commented on the United States bishops' 2004 document: "The statement is very much in harmony with the general principles 'Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion, sent as a fraternal service - to clarify the doctrine of the Church on this specific issue - in order to assist the American Bishops in their related discussion and determinations'."[2]
In an article written before publication of the 2004 memorandum of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith and the statement by the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, canonist John P. Beal had argued that canon 915 did not apply to pro-choice Catholic politicians.[23]
Pope Francis reaffirmed the Catholic doctrine that politicians who encourage abortion and euthanasia shouldn't take communion, in the Aparecida Document, in March 2013: "We hope that legislators [and] heads of government... will defend and protect [the dignity of human life] from the abominable crimes of abortion and euthanasia; that is their responsibility... We must adhere to "eucharistic coherence", that is, be conscious that they cannot receive Holy Communion and at the same time act with deeds or words against the commandments, particularly when abortion, euthanasia, and other grave crimes against life and family are encouraged. This responsibility weighs particularly over legislators, heads of governments, and health professionals."[24]
Other cases in which canon law mandates denial of access to Communion
Exclusion by canon law from access to Communion is not limited to the cases mentioned in canon 915. Canon 916 excludes from communion all those conscious of mortal sin who have not received sacramental absolution.[25] Canon 842 §1 declares: "A person who has not received baptism cannot be admitted validly to the other sacraments."[26]
It is also deemed appropriate to consider denying Communion "where someone is trying to use the Eucharist to make a political statement",[27] and Communion has been refused to activists of the Rainbow Sash Movement on the grounds that it has never been acceptable to use the reception of Communion as a manifest act of protest.[5][28][29]
Cases where Holy Communion has been denied to recipients
In 2019, Holy Communion was denied to Joe Biden due to his public stance regarding abortion (although Biden is a regular communicant and has received in a great variety of places), and to a woman in the Diocese of Grand Rapids who had contracted a same-sex civil marriage.[30][31][32][33][34] Catholic commentators debated whether the denial of Holy Communion was appropriate in these cases.[30][35][32][36] The Diocese of Grand Rapids issued a statement supporting the decision of its priest.[37]
Parallel Anglican norm
The Book of Common Prayer requires the minister of Holy Communion to forbid access to "an open and notorious evil liver", until he publicly declare his repentance and amend his life.[38]
Eucharist (Catholic Church)
Canon law (Catholic Church)
Catholic Church and politics in the United States
^ Canon 915 in the English translation of the Canon Law Society of America
^ a b c Raymond Burke, "Canon 915: The discipline regarding the denial of Holy Communion to those obstinately persevering in manifest grave sin" in Periodica de re canonica, vol. 96 (2007), p,. 3-58
^ Code of Canons of the Eastern Churches, canon 712
^ Vere & Trueman, Surprised by Canon Law [Vol. 1], pg. 98
^ a b c d e "Edward McNamara, "Denying Communion to Someone"". Archived from the original on 2013-01-13. Retrieved .
^ Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1385
^ Code of Canon Law, canon 1331 §1 Archived March 29, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
^ Code of Canon Law, canon 1332 Archived March 29, 2008, at the Wayback Machine
^ Code of Canon Law, canon 916
^ Code of Canon Law, canon 843 §1
^ "Disregarding the divinely-rooted Canon 915 portends serious consequences for the Church and her faithful". In the Light of the Law. 2017-10-09. Retrieved .
^ Code of Canon Law, canon 1398
^ a b c Edward Peters, "Withholding of Holy Communion by Extraordinary Minister" in 2008 Roman Replies and CLSA Advisory Opinions 80-83
^ Joseph Ratzinger, "Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion: General Principles", 6
^ Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church concerning the Reception of Holy Communion by the Divorced and Remarried Members of the Faithful (14 September 1994)
^ Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, Declaration concerning the Admission to Holy Communion of Faithful Who Are Divorced and Remarried, 2 a
^ Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, Declaration concerning the Admission to Holy Communion of Faithful Who Are Divorced and Remarried, 2 b
^ Pontifical Council for Legislative Texts, Declaration concerning the admission to Holy Communion of faithful who are divorced and remarried
^ "Pope Francis's Controversial Step on Communion for the Divorced and Remarried". National Review. 2017-12-12. Retrieved .
^ Worthiness to Receive Holy Communion: General Principles
^ Henneberger, Melinda (11 May 2009). "Wuerl: Why I Won't Deny Pelosi Communion". Politics Daily.
^ John P. Beal, "Holy Communion and Unholy Politics" in America, 21 June 2004
^ On Giving Communion to Pro-abortion Politicians, Crisis Magazine, 10 December 2014
^ CIC 1983, c. 916.
^ A Statement from the Washington Archdiocese
^ Catholic News Agency, "Rainbow Sash group denied Communion at St. Paul Cathedral", 16 May 2005
^ Denis Coday, "Pre-emptive strike in Rainbow Sash clash" in National Catholic Reporter, 28 May 2009
^ a b Hirschauer, John (2019-10-30). "Should Biden Have Been Denied the Eucharist?". National Review. Retrieved .
^ Keane, James (2019-10-30). "Explainer: When can someone be denied the Eucharist?". America Magazine. Retrieved .
^ a b Flowers, Christine M. (2019-12-08). "Catholic priest had every right to deny Joe Biden communion over abortion views | Christine Flowers". The Philadelphia Inquirer. Retrieved .
^ Feuerherd, Peter (2019-10-31). "Pastor's denial of Eucharist to Biden stirs up recurring debate". National Catholic Reporter. Retrieved .
^ Kuruvilla, Carol (2019-12-03). "Michigan Catholic Priest Refuses To Offer Communion To Married Lesbian Judge". HuffPost. Retrieved .
^ Longenecker, Dwight (2019-12-02). "Answering Fr. James Martin's distortions about the lesbian judge and Communion". www.catholicworldreport.com. Retrieved .
^ Pope, Charles (2019-12-05). "U.S. Bishops Must Clear Up This Communion Confusion". National Catholic Register. Retrieved .
^ Haider, Monica (2019-01-12). "Catholic diocese denies gay Michigan judge communion". CNN. Retrieved .
^ The Order for the Administration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion
Code of Canon Law (CIC). Vatican Publishing House. 1983.
Vere, Pete, & Michael Trueman, Surprised by Canon Law: 150 Questions Catholics Ask About Canon Law (Cincinnati, Ohio: St. Anthony Messenger Press, 2004).
Canon_915


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The 2016 AT&T Analyst Summit – Thoughts and Feedback from Frost & Sullivan
Thoughts on the 2016 AT&T Industry Analyst Summit from Dilip Sarangan, Industry Principal for IoT at Frost & Sullivan. The event was held between October 5-7, 2016 in Dallas, TX.
https://digitaltransformation.frost.com/expert-insights/viewpoints/2016-t-analyst-summit-thoughts-and-feedback-frost-sullivan/
So Why Does Customer Service Stink?
The prevailing wisdom is that providing an excellent Customer Experience is vital for companies' success and growth. But there are all too many reports about poor customer service. Why is there a disconnect? The blog presents several theories. Readers are…
the 2015 inContact Consumer Research Study revealed that 70 https://digitaltransformation.frost.com/expert-insights/viewpoints/so-why-does-customer-service-stink/
New ICMI/LiveOps Report, Facebook Messenger Raises Questions on Contact Center Value
A new, disquieting, but refreshingly honest, and yet unsurprising International Customer Management Institute (ICMI)/ LiveOps report calls into question the underlying value of having contact centers to support the Customer Experience.
ocial media. The Millennials who are now the consumer and business buyer mainstream are already th https://digitaltransformation.frost.com/expert-insights/viewpoints/new-icmiliveops-report-facebook-messenger-raises-questions-contact-center-value/
"Customer Experience" Honored More in the Breach Than in Reality?
Focusing on the "Customer Experience" should be obvious to companies, but it is honored more in the breach, including by vendors, for several reasons.
https://digitaltransformation.frost.com/expert-insights/viewpoints/customer-experience-honored-more-breach-reality/
IBM and Fluid Join to Provide an Innovative Shopping Experience
IBM is partnering with Fluid, Inc. to change the shape of the consumer shopping experience.
Inc. to change the shape of the consumer shopping experience. The companies are honin… is an app that allows consumers to ask specific and detailed questions just https://digitaltransformation.frost.com/expert-insights/viewpoints/ibm-and-fluid-join-provide-innovative-shopping-experience/
GM, Toyota, and Target: Easier to do "The Wrong Thing" on Safety and Security?
Why do companies find it easier to cover up mistakes rather than preventing then, detecting them early on, and taking action, and taking full responsibility, and are extreme measures needed to break this behavior pattern?
costly cycle of disastrous events in which consumers pay for https://digitaltransformation.frost.com/expert-insights/viewpoints/gm-toyota-and-target-easier-do-wrong-thing-safety-and-security/
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This "Contribution to HR Community" Award recognises JobStreet.com for revolutionizing recruitment and touching the lives of millions of people.
JobStreet.com simply overturned the old time-consuming, elaborate and expensive recruitment process. The advent of online recruitment revolutionized by JobStreet.com, through very carefully planned processes, has enabled employers to reach, attract and hire qualified job-seekers in a very cost effective and timely manner. It has brought the employers and jobseekers together through its comprehensive suite of services available online. This is a vertically deep and horizontally well-spread innovation with multiple benefits. It is an unparallel achievement in the recruitment sector.
Among its notable recent awards include Top 30 Brands in Malaysia's Most Valuable Brands (MMVB) Awards (2009, 2008), The Malaysia International Trade Industry (MITI) Industry Excellence Awards (2009, 2007), KPMG/The Edge Shareholder Value Awards (2008, 2007, and 2006) and Deloitte Technology Fast 500 Asia Pacific (2008).
Over the years, JobStreet.com has grown by leaps and bounds and today it is a leading regional provider of online recruitment services. It has not only helped hundreds of recruiters but also many more job seekers, thus touching the lives of many in different ways that eventually contributes to the HR Community and global business.
The Asia HRD Congress 2011 Awards Committee is delighted to honour JobStreet.com for its contribution to online recruitment.


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War Crimes Research Office
Summer Law Program in The Hague
Patricia Viseur Sellers, Esq.
Ms. Sellers is an international criminal lawyer. She is the Special Advisor for Gender for the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. Ms. Sellers is a Visiting Fellow at Kellogg College of the University of Oxford where she teaches international criminal law and human rights law. She is a Practicing Professor at London School of Economics and a Senior Research Fellow at the Human Rights Center of the University of California, Berkeley. She was the Legal Advisor for Gender, Acting Head of the Legal Advisory Section and a prosecutor at the Yugoslav (ICTY) Tribunal from 1994-2007 and the Legal Advisor for Gender at the Rwanda Tribunal (ICTR) from 1995-1999. She developed the legal strategies and was a member of the trial teams of Akayesu, Furundzija, and Kunarac. These landmark decisions remain the pre-imminent legal standards for the interpretation of sexual violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, torture and enslavement.
Ms. Sellers advises governments, international institutions and civil society organisations on international criminal law and humanitarian law. Her expertise focuses on the strategic investigation and prosecution of sexual violence. As such, she has been a Special Legal Consultant to UNWomen, to the Gender and Women's Rights Division of the United Nation's High Commissioner for Human Rights and to the Secretary's General's Special Representative to Children in Armed Conflict. In 2012, she was a member of an expert panel to review the UN Office of Internal Oversight that has initial investigative jurisdiction over UN Peacekeepers. She has testified as an expert witness before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the cases of J. v. Peru, Favela Nova Brasilia v. Brazil and Albarracín v. Ecuador. She was a sworn expert witness before the Spanish national courts on issues of genocide and before the Colombia courts in two criminal cases concerning sexual violence related to the armed conflict.
Ms. Sellers has lectured extensively on humanitarian and international criminal law. She is the author of numerous articles, most recently, 'Missing in Action: The International Crime of the Slave Trade'. She is featured in the Discovery Channel series, "Why We Hate," produced by Steven Spielberg and in the acclaimed documentary film 'The Uncondemned'. She served as a story consultant to WNET-13/WIDE ANGLE, on the PBS series, Women, War and Peace and as an advisor on 'The Prosecutors,' a documentary film by ARTWOKS productions.
Ms. Sellers is the recipient of the prestigious Prominent Women in International Law Award by the American Society of International Law. She holds an Honorary Doctorate in Law from the City University of New York, as well as an Honorary Fellow for Lifetime Achievement from the Law School of the University of Pennsylvania, her alma mater. Ms. Sellers has also been awarded the National Bar Association's Ron Brown International Lawyer Prize and the Global Center for Justice's inaugural Janet Benshoof Global Justice Award.
Connect with the War Crimes Research Office


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HomeArticlesThe Management of Savagery – Book Review
May 15, 2019 Articles, Commentary, Reviews
The Management of Savagery, by Max Blumenthal. (Photo: Book Cover)
By Jim Miles
(The Management of Savagery – How America's National Security State Fueled the Rise of al-Qaeda, ISIS, and Donald Trump. Max Blumenthal. Verso, London/New York, 2019.)
Even though the ending is known, Max Blumenthal's book The Management of Savagery draws the reader through an intriguing tale of media management, political management, financial management all with the goal of achieving the management of savagery. The title derives from a 2004 al-Qaeda document of the same title which advises "jihadist groups to exploit the chaos that resulted from the destabilization of previously stable states."
The savagery is to eliminate all opposition and as per the author Abu Baker Naji, "If we succeed in the management of savagery, that stage will be a bridge to the Islamic state…." In a sense, these sentiments reflect the neoconservative agenda to destabilize and fragment the Middle East in order to "manage" the petrodollar, oil resources, and to allow Israel to "manage" the region as the neocon outpost of civilization.
The story starts in Afghanistan, the first war in the series of managed wars by the U.S. hoping to trap the Soviet Union in its own Vietnam. It is a mix of CIA, ISI (Pakistan's intelligence service), a variety of warlords, arms merchants, the Pakistan army, and the newly created Taliban. It follows swiftly through areas suffering the fallout from these activities – Bosnia, Yugoslavia, Chechnya.
In "The dawn of the forever war" – pre 9/11 – CIA collusion with the Taliban was "swept away" – allowing a "close-knit band of neoconservatives to build the case of a full-scale military confrontation with Iraq." The CIA's long-standing "sordid history of collusion with jihadist elements" created "colossal failures of judgment…."
The push behind the U.S.' attitude came from the neoconservatives – Wolfowitz, Feith, Perle, Kagan, Kristol et al – whose essays "A Clean Break" and "Project for a New American Century" outlined the case for a "benevolent global hegemony," but it would require a long "process of transformation….like a New Pearl Harbour."
On the other side, al-Qaeda's strategy was essentially the same, Brzezinski's "Afghan trap" in reverse, a "strategy to trigger a series of American interventions and bleed an overstretched empire." For both sides, 9/11 was the critical factor.
After 9/11 the world was polarized, "with us or against us." It became a religious war, a civilizational war, and a sectarian war. From there the story continues its winding, twisting, convoluted path through Afghanistan again, into Iraq, and increasingly with its blowback effects into the U.S. and its allies, in particular, Great Britain.
One of the blowback results from this were the refugees/migrants suddenly flooding over into Europe. Domestically in the U.S. Islamophobia was nurtured by Stephen Bannon and other "monomaniacal" and "trash-talking" Islamophobes. The stage was set for the rise of right-wing populist forces,"counter-jihadists", establishing a "comfortable, mutually reinforcing symbiosis that relied on a constantly escalating sense of antagonism."
Much of the story concerns the most recent war, the war in Syria. It is at the extreme end of convoluted affairs with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other Gulf states supporting al-Qaeda/ al-Nusra/ISIS in its various formations. The U.S. and its NATO allies while pretending to be against the savagery of ISIS and its related groups, provided military and training assistance along with its Middle East surrogate Israel. Israel created what was essentially a safe zone around the Golan Heights, helping ISIS with supplies, medical and military support.
Turkey played a double game, supporting ISIS, countering Kurdish forces and interests, controlling to some degree the mass movement of refugees from the fighting. Lebanon played a passive role providing a protective international air space for Israeli and NATO air incursions while unwillingly harboring ISIS forces on the Syrian border. Iran provided military and logistic support to Syria, broadening its influence in the "Shia crescent".
And then along came Russia, a longtime Syrian ally that proved the lies about U.S. interests in defeating the jihadists. Once the U.S. recognized its waning influence, Russia's role took on its old familiar place within U.S. mainstream media as the bad guy. The "moderate rebels", who never really existed, and the supposedly humanitarian White Helmets who assisted ISIS became the good guys in western media.
Blumenthal manages to weave his way through all these storylines, highlighting the manner in which the chaos of savagery was not truly controllable. The main U.S. domestic result of these long wars, the media rants, Islamophobia, worked out to the advantage of the neoconservative agenda.
"With the strange and sudden transformation of the democrats into a paranoid war party, a quiet neoconservative campaign set into motion a decade before was being realized."
Hearkening back to the post-Soviet 1990s, "the goal was clear: to encircle the largest and most militarily powerful nation in Eurasia and gradually transform it into a toothless, economically dependent vassal of the United States." U.S. actions, the "shock doctrine" imposed by the "Harvard boys", "should have stood alongside some of most titanic crimes of the twentieth century."
After years of slow understated resurgence, Russia re-entered the global political scene via Georgia, Libya, Ukraine and on into Syria.
The Democratic party has positioned itself now on the side of the neocon Warhawks, and as the Syrian war settled into a simmering aftermath, the old Cold War Russia haters dominated supposedly liberal thinkers, stoked by the ultimate blowback from all the military and political muckraking – the election of Donald Trump.
With Trump painted as Putin's puppet, with both sides calling out "fake news", with the national security state under the influence of John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, "the reality of America's waning influence on the world stage" is obvious.
"In the face of their own failure, America's national security elites had successfully engineered a new Cold War, wagering that the reignited conflict would preserve their management savagery….As the dust cleared from two decades of regime change campaigns a new cast of evil-doers was coming into focus."
Most people know the superficialities of this history, mainly the mainstream media broadcasts of the U.S./NATO/western obfuscation, omissions, and contrivances around events. Max Blumenthal's The Management of Savagery clearly exposes the many twists, turns, and convolutions of the various actors.
In spite of its complexity, this book is a fascinating read into the many aspects of how the initial setup of support for the Afghan mujahideen has morphed into today's Russophobic, Islamophobic, right-wing security state, with the savagery expressed more and more domestically while it is still pushed into foreign countries. It needs to be on everyone's bookshelf in order to understand the roots and pathways of our current global situation.
– Jim Miles is a Canadian educator and a regular contributor/columnist of opinion pieces and book reviews to Palestine Chronicles. His interest in this topic stems originally from an environmental perspective, which encompasses the militarization and economic subjugation of the global community and its commodification by corporate governance and by the American government.
Max Blumenthal
50 Palestinians Injured as Protesters in Gaza Mark Nakba Day
Missing the Point about Peace
Palestinian Intelligence Delegation in D.C. to Hold Talks with CIA
September 4, 2018 Blog, News
US website AXIOS has quoted Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas as saying that a Palestinian intelligence and security delegation led by Maj. Gen. Majid Faraj, Head of the Palestinian General Intelligence Service (PGIS), has visited Washington […]
UNSC: No Credible Peace Plan for Palestinian Issue
There is no "credible" peace plan for the conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, the President of the United Nations Security Council, Olof Skoog, warned yesterday. The Swedish envoy, who is the current rotating president of the […]
Russia Refuses to Move Embassy to Jerusalem
February 8, 2019 Blog, News
Russia has refused to move its embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, despite previously recognizing the west of the city as Israel's capital. The announcement was made yesterday by Russia's Ambassador to Israel, Anatoly Viktorov, […]
Laur says:
very good pointed


Fall is hands down my favorite season in terms of fashion. There are always great sweaters, coats, boots and fur pieces which are some of the best fashion items to own and wear. I am delighted that Chicago has been hit with the first chills of Fall so early this year. In my opinion, the weather has been absolutely perfect the last few days. I have taken the opportunity to wear my outerwear vests this week. Most people find vests tricky to wear, but they are ideal for the in-between weather we are facing.
Last year fur vests were all the rage and they are still huge this season. I find the best way to wear them is with a sweater, turtleneck or blouse. I tend to keep this look simple with a clean pair of jeans and heels. I also like to pair a fur vest with a long sleeve dress or tunic. The fur vest is always the main focus so it is best to keep everything else basic in order to create the ideal look. Leather vests are also appearing more and more in collections like Marni. Many of the cropped styles make great toppers over dresses and can be worn in a more formal way.
For those who are not into leather or fur, there is always a sporty vest. Moncler makes some of the best ones. There was also a very cool vest from Thakoon this season with a little peplum at the waist. This style vest will look great when paired with sweaters and jeans although you can throw on a sneaker in this case. Another option is to wear the vest over a hoodie (leave the hood out) It is comfortable and adds to the sporty element of the look. You can throw this style vest over practically anything! Grab it for a walk to the gym or trip to the grocery store. It will keep you warm and make your jeans/sweats look much better – you never know who you are going to run into!


One of my favorite sandwiches is a BLT, so this recipe for a BLT Salad is one of my favorites–especially using fresh, homegrown tomatoes. This salad takes the traditional idea of a bacon, lettuce, and tomato sandwich and adds a unique twist: The flavors of avocado and green onions, making it taste AMAZING! Parmesan cheese would be great on this too.
TIP: To lighten this up a bit, we used turkey bacon and 2% milk in the dressing.
Combine salad ingredients, except croutons, and toss gently.
Whisk dressing ingredients together and sprinkle with salt and pepper to taste.
Top salad with dressing, add croutons at the very end.
TIP:No buttermilk? Add 2 teaspoons lemon juice or white vinegar to 2/3 cup milk. Let sit 15 minutes.
I had a BLT salad at a little restaurant in Galena Ill. It was soooooo good really, I would almost make the 3 hour trip just for that, it was loaded with bacon. This sounds so good right now, maybe its the baby, lol. But really who doesn't love bacon? Thanks for the recipe.
I am going to try the homemade croutons soon. I just bought a bag, just my luck, lol. Thank you for the receipe.