Whether the holding of Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985), that "a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings" applies when the initial failure to give Miranda warnings was intentional.
This case presents the question whether a police officer's intentional failure to give Miranda warnings before obtaining a voluntary incriminating statement from a suspect precludes the introduction into evidence of a second statement made after Miranda warnings. The United States has a substantial interest in the question presented. First, the United States has an interest in introducing into evidence warned incriminating statements that are reliable evidence of guilt, regardless of whether individual federal agents or state officers may have deliberately withheld Miranda warnings in their initial questioning of the defendant. See United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 125 (2002); United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000). Second, the United States has an interest in introducing into evidence warned incriminating statements without becoming embroiled in collateral litigation over the mental state of particular federal or state agents who did not administer Miranda warnings in their initial questioning of the defendant.
Finally, the question presented in this case is related to the questions presented in two pending cases in which the United States is a party in this Court, United States v. Patane, No. 02-1183, and Fellers v. United States, No. 02-6320. Patane presents the question whether a failure to give a suspect the warnings prescribed by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), requires the suppression of physical evidence derived from the suspect's unwarned but voluntary statement. Fellers presents the question whether a second warned statement should be suppressed when a first statement was assertedly taken in violation of the rule in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
Respondent was convicted of second-degree murder for her role in the death of Donald Rector. She was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed her conviction and sentence, State v. Seibert, No. 23729, 2002 WL 114804 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2002), but a divided Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, Pet. App. A1-A21.
1.	Respondent Patrice Seibert lived with her five sons in a mobile home in Rolla, Missouri. Pet. App. A2. Donald Rector, a 17-year-old with a mental disorder, also lived with respondent. Ibid. On February 12, 1997, respondent's 12-year-old son Jonathan, who had a severe case of cerebral palsy, died in his sleep. Ibid. Respondent did not report his death because she feared that, since Jonathan had bedsores, she would be accused of neglecting him. Ibid. That same day, in respondent's presence, two of respondent's teen-aged sons and two of her sons' friends discussed a plan to set fire to respondent's mobile home in order to cover up Jonathan's death. Ibid. The group decided that Donald Rector should be in the mobile home and die during the fire so that it would not appear that Jonathan had been left alone. Ibid. Respondent's oldest son Darian and his friend Derrick were to set the fire. Ibid.
With Darian present, Derrick set the fire. Pet. App. A2. Before doing so, Derrick hit Donald, who was having a seizure and convulsing on the floor in the mobile home. Ibid. Donald died of asphyxiation during the fire. Id. at A3. Respondent was not present when the fire was set. Ibid.
Five days later, Richard Hanrahan, a Rolla Police Officer, arranged for St. Louis County Officer Kevin Clinton to arrest respondent at a hospital where her son Darian was being treated for burns that he had suffered during the fire. Pet. App. A3. Hanrahan instructed Clinton not to give respondent the warnings specified by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Pet. App. A3. At approximately 3 a.m., Clinton woke up respondent and transported her to a police station, where Officer Hanrahan was waiting for her. Ibid. Officer Hanrahan decided to leave respondent alone in a small interview room for 15-20 minutes to "give her a little time to think about the situation." Ibid. After that interval, and without administering Miranda warnings, Hanrahan began to question respondent about her role in Donald's death. Ibid. Hanrahan questioned respondent for approximately 30-40 minutes. Ibid. During that period, Hanrahan squeezed respondent's arm gently and repeated several times "Donald was also to die in his sleep." Ibid.; 5 Trial Tr. 937. His questioning did not involve threats, promises, or physical coercion. Seibert, 2002 WL 114804, at *4. Respondent eventually admitted that she knew Donald was to die during the fire. Pet. App. A3. After respondent made that admission, Officer Hanrahan gave respondent a 20-minute break for coffee and a cigarette. Ibid.
Hanrahan returned to question respondent again, and this time he recorded the conversation on tape. Pet. App. A3. Before resuming his questioning, Hanrahan administered Miranda warnings to respondent. Ibid. Respondent orally expressed her understanding of each of her Miranda rights and documented that understanding by initialing and signing a waiver form. Id. at A10 & n.4. After obtaining respondent's waiver, Officer Hanrahan began the second round of questioning by reminding respondent that they had previously discussed what had happened on February 12, 1997. Id. at A3. In response to a question about what was to happen to Donald during the fire, respondent stated that Donald was supposed to be taken out of the trailer. Id. at A4. That statement prompted Officer Hanrahan to say "didn't you tell me that he was supposed to die in his sleep?" Id. at A5. Respondent then admitted that Donald was supposed to die in his sleep. Ibid.
Respondent was charged with first-degree murder for her role in Donald's death. Seibert, 2002 WL 114804, at *2. Respondent sought to exclude both her unwarned and warned statements from the trial. At a pre-trial suppression hearing, Officer Hanrahan testified that he intentionally decided not to give Miranda warnings with the hope that he could obtain an admission of guilt which he could elicit again after providing the prescribed warnings. Pet. App. A4; 2/10/00 Hr'g Tr. 30-38. Officer Hanrahan further testified that he had received training from an institute that promoted that two-stage interview technique and that his current police department subscribed to that training program. Pet. App. A4. The trial court suppressed respondent's unwarned confession, but refused to suppress respondent's warned confession. Seibert, 2002 WL 114804, at *5. After a jury trial, respondent was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. Pet. App. A1-A2.
2.	The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, 2002 WL 114804, holding that the trial court had not erred in admitting respondent's warned confession. Id. at *5. Relying on Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), the court held that Officer Hanrahan's withholding of Miranda warnings before obtaining respondent's first confession did not taint respondent's subsequent warned confession. 2002 WL 114804, at *5-*7. The court explained that under Elstad, where an officer withholds Miranda warnings before obtaining a first statement but gives Miranda warnings before obtaining a second statement, the second statement is admissible, provided that it is voluntarily made. Id. at *5. The court rejected respondent's effort to distinguish Elstad on the ground that Officer Hanrahan deliberately withheld Miranda warnings before obtaining the first statement. The court explained that Elstad's holding did not depend on this Court's evaluation of the officer's state of mind. Instead, the court stated, Elstad turned on this Court's conclusion that a failure to give Miranda warnings is not a constitutional violation and therefore does not trigger "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. Elstad also turned, the court said, on the conclusion that the psychological impact on the suspect of having "let the cat out of the bag" does not make a second confession that was preceded by Miranda warnings involuntary. Ibid. The Missouri Court of Appeals reasoned that there is no "logical distinction" between an intentional and an inadvertent failure to give Miranda warnings, because in both cases the impact on the suspect is exactly the same. Id. at *7.
In a motion for rehearing or transfer to the Supreme Court of Missouri, respondent argued that Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), had made clear that Miranda is a constitutionally based decision, and had thereby undermined Elstad's holding that a failure to give Miranda warnings does not trigger the application of the "fruits of the poisonous tree" doctrine. 2002 WL 114804, at *9. The court of appeals rejected petitioner's argument and denied the motion. The court explained that Dickerson had given "tacit approval" to Elstad's holding that "unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." Ibid. (quoting Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441).
3.	The Supreme Court of Missouri granted respondent's motion to transfer and reversed. Pet. App. A1-A14. The court recognized that Elstad had held that a failure to give Miranda warnings before obtaining a first confession does not automatically taint a subsequent warned confession. Id. at A6-A7. The court distinguished Elstad, however, on the ground that Elstad did not involve an intentional decision not to give Miranda warnings. Id. at A12. The court viewed an intentional failure to give Miranda warnings as an improper tactic designed to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will. Id. at A9. On that basis, the court concluded that where warnings are intentionally withheld, only factors such as a lapse in time, a change in place, or a change in questioner can ensure that the second confession is voluntary; a recitation of Miranda warnings by itself is insufficient. Id. at A10-A11. Finding that Officer Hanrahan had withheld Miranda warnings intentionally when he first questioned respondent and that he had questioned respondent a second time within 20 minutes of the first confession in the same place, the court concluded that Hanrahan's "recitation of Miranda warnings" could not "resurrect the opportunity to obtain a voluntary waiver." Id. at A11. "To hold otherwise," the court concluded, "would encourage future Miranda violations" and sanction an "end run" around Miranda. Id. at A12.
Three judges dissented. They concluded that the majority had failed to follow this Court's binding holding in Elstad that uncoercive questioning without Miranda warnings does not taint a second warned and voluntary confession. Pet. App. A15-A26.
In Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), this Court held that when officers obtain a voluntary statement from a suspect without having administered Miranda warnings, and later obtain a second statement after having administered Miranda warnings, the second statement is admissible if it was knowing and voluntary. The Court rejected the proposition that the second statement must be suppressed as the fruit of the poisonous tree. It also rejected the view that the suspect, having let the "cat out of the bag" in the first statement, is disabled from making a knowing and voluntary second confession absent a passage of time or a break in the chain of events.
The holding of Elstad was approved by this Court in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Dickerson reaffirmed Miranda and confirmed that it is a constitutional rule, but also made clear that Elstad's refusal to apply the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis to unwarned questioning "simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." 530 U.S. at 441. The Court's decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003), refusing to allow a damages action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for questioning without Miranda warnings, also supports the conclusion that there is no completed violation of the Constitution, and thus no basis for fruits analysis, simply because the police obtain a statement without having administered Miranda warnings. Both of those cases thus support the continued validity of Elstad.
The rationale of Elstad does not admit of an exception for cases in which a police officer's failure to administer Miranda warnings was intentional. First, Elstad's conclusion that unwarned interrogation does not violate the Fifth Amendment, and thus does not support application of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine, is equally applicable whether the unwarned questioning was intentional or inadvertent. A failure to give Miranda warnings establishes only a presumption of compulsion; it does not mean that the statements were actually coerced. Interrogation without Miranda warnings also does not complete a constitutional violation; a completed violation can occur only when the unwarned statements are admitted at trial. Accordingly, the reasons why unwarned questioning, by itself, does not violate the Constitution are equally applicable whether the officer's failure to provide warnings was inadvertent or intentional.
Second, Elstad concluded that a suspect's provision of a first unwarned statement does not compromise his ability to make a knowing and voluntary decision to speak once he has been given Miranda warnings. That reasoning also applies whether the officer's failure to provide warnings was inadvertent or intentional. Unwarned questioning has the same effect on a suspect whether the officer's failure to warn was deliberate or the result of an oversight. And whatever the officer's motives in the initial questioning, the Miranda warnings provide the suspect with the information needed to make a voluntary decision to speak in response to later questioning.
In declining to apply Elstad, the Missouri Supreme Court relied largely on a deterrence rationale. It concluded that permitting the admission of voluntary warned statements, following intentional interrogation without warnings, would encourage officers to circumvent Miranda. That concern is unfounded. The Constitution does not forbid unwarned questioning, and courts should therefore not frame exclusionary rules to deter it. Miranda fully serves its purpose of protecting against the risk that a possibly coerced statement might be admitted at trial when unwarned statements are excluded from the government's case in chief.
Even if deterrence of unwarned questioning were a proper goal, there are already adequate incentives in place for officers to give Miranda warnings at the outset of custodial interrogation. The exclusion of unwarned statements from the government's case in chief provides a strong incentive to give Miranda warnings. An additional incentive flows from the fact that questioning without warnings increases the risk that any statements the suspect makes will be found involuntary, thus jeopardizing the admission of any later confession. In contrast, if the officer furnishes Miranda warnings initially, there are few cases in which a defendant who speaks will be able to show that he did so involuntarily.
On the other side of the scales, the exclusion of a voluntary and warned confession deprives society of highly relevant and probative evidence, thus undermining the truthseeking function of a criminal trial and risking the acquittal of a guilty defendant. That cost outweighs any marginal deterrent effect. The Missouri Supreme Court's rule would also require courts to make difficult inquiries into the motives of particular officers who failed initially to give Miranda warnings. And a rule that sought to deter questioning without warnings overlooks that officers might appropriately question a suspect, without administering warnings, in some situations-such as when it might help locate a kidnapping victim, or thwart a terrorist attack. Officers should not have to hesitate before seeking such information because of the concern that the failure to give warnings at the outset might jeopardize the admission of a later warned and voluntary confession.
Finally, the Missouri Supreme Court's holding is not justified by Elstad's limitation of its rule to cases involving neither actual coercion nor "circumstances that are calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise free will." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. The quoted language in Elstad is another way of referring to police conduct that renders a confession involuntary. The central distinction drawn in Elstad is between practices that vitiate the voluntariness of a confession and the mere failure to provide the warnings specified by Miranda. When a first confession is rendered involuntary by coercive police conduct, this Court has considered factors such as a lapse in time and a break in events to determine whether a second, warned statement is voluntary. But Elstad holds that such an analysis is not required when the first statement is simply unwarned. Creation of a new category of police practices-such as the intentional failure to give warnings-that falls short of coercion yet still may taint the voluntariness of a second statement, is not justified by Fifth Amendment principles. And the concern of the Missouri Supreme Court that an unwarned first confession lets the "cat out of the bag," and thereby vitiates the suspect's ability to make a knowing and voluntary waiver after receiving Miranda warnings, was rejected in Elstad itself. A defendant may make a knowing and voluntary decision to speak after receiving Miranda warnings; the officer's prior intentional elicitation of unwarned but voluntary statements does not invalidate that choice.
The Missouri Supreme Court held that where an officer intentionally withholds Miranda warnings before obtaining a confession, that action, by itself, means that only factors such as a lapse in time, a change in place, or a change in questioner can ensure that a subsequent warned confession is voluntary. Pet. App. A10-A11. That holding conflicts with this Court's decision in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985), and constitutes an unjustifiable extension of this Court's decision in Miranda.
In Elstad, two police officers went to Elstad's house with a warrant for his arrest for burglary. Inside the living room, one officer asked Elstad whether he knew why the police had come to talk to him. Elstad admitted that he was at the scene of the burglary. Approximately one hour later, at police headquarters, an officer advised Elstad of his Miranda rights for the first time. Elstad waived his rights and confessed his involvement in the burglary. The trial court admitted Elstad's second confession into evidence, and Elstad was convicted. This Court found no error in the admission of the second confession, holding that a police officer's initial failure to administer Miranda warnings does not, without more, taint a subsequent warned confession. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 300-301.
In reaching that conclusion, the Court first rejected application of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. Under that doctrine, a confession that is a product of a Fourth Amendment violation is excluded from the defendant's trial, unless intervening events break the causal link between the illegal conduct and the confession so that the confession is sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306. The Court reasoned that the predicate for application of fruits analysis is a "constitutional violation," id. at 305, and "a simple failure to administer Miranda warnings is not in itself a violation of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 306 n.1 The Court explained that while "[f]ailure to administer Miranda warnings creates a presumption of compulsion" that is "irrebuttable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief," it "does not mean that the statements received have actually been coerced" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 307, 310. Accordingly, "the Miranda presumption * * * does not require that the statements and their fruits be discarded as inherently tainted." Id. at 307. Because a failure to administer Miranda warnings is not itself a constitutional violation, the Court concluded, where police obtain an unwarned confession, the admissibility of a subsequent confession does not depend on whether it is the fruit of the first, but on whether it is "knowingly and voluntarily made." Id. at 309.
The Court next rejected the Oregon state court's view that where police obtain an unwarned confession, only a lapse of time and change of place are sufficient to ensure that the suspect's waiver of rights and giving of a second statement were voluntary. The Court noted that when a prior confession is actually coerced, those factors are relevant in determining whether "that coercion has carried over into the second confession." 470 U.S. at 310. The Court concluded, however, that where the first confession is unwarned but voluntary, the situation is different. "In these circumstances, a careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible. The warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the suspect's choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an act of free will." Id. at 310-311 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court noted that the Oregon state court's contrary conclusion was based on its view that, without a sufficient lapse of time, the psychological impact of having "let the cat out of the bag" renders the waiver and second statement involuntary. Id. at 311. The Court rejected that analysis, holding that the psychological impact of having confessed once lacks significance under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 311-314.
In Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), the Court endorsed Elstad's holding that a failure to administer Miranda warnings does not trigger "fruit of the poisonous tree" analysis. The Court explained that Elstad's refusal to apply fruits analysis "simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 441.
Dickerson's approval of Elstad is fully consistent with its holding that Miranda is a constitutional decision. The constitutional rule of Miranda that Dickerson reaffirmed is not that the failure to give Miranda warnings itself violates the Constitution, but that "unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution's case in chief." 530 U.S. at 443-444. As the Dickerson Court explained, "we need not go further than Miranda to decide this case. In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk of overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, * * * a risk that the Court found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in chief to prove guilt." Id. at 442. Accordingly, Miranda set forth "guidelines" for the "admissibility in evidence of any statement given during custodial interrogation." Id. at 435.
This Court's recent decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 123 S. Ct. 1994 (2003), confirms that the conduct of custodial interrogation without administering Miranda warnings is not itself a constitutional violation, and therefore does not trigger fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis. There, the Court held that a failure to administer Miranda warnings does not subject an officer to civil liability under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The four-Justice plurality opinion concluded that because Miranda establishes an "exclusionary rule" that is "prophylactic" and that is designed to prevent "the admission into evidence in criminal case[s] of confessions obtained through coercive custodial questioning," a "failure to read Miranda warnings * * * d[oes] not violate [a suspect's] constitutional rights." 123 S. Ct. at 2004 (plurality opinion). Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed with the plurality that "failure to give a Miranda warning does not, without more, establish a completed violation when the unwarned interrogation ensues." Id. at 2013. Instead, Miranda "mandates a rule of exclusion," and "[t]he exclusion of unwarned statements, when not within an exception, is a complete and sufficient remedy." Ibid.
Thus, Elstad's holdings remain valid. When an officer fails to administer Miranda warnings before obtaining a confession, the admissibility of a subsequent warned confession does not depend on fruits analysis, but on whether the subsequent statement is knowing and voluntary. 470 U.S. at 304-309. Once Miranda warnings are given, "the suspect's choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an act of free will." Id. at 311 (internal quotation marks omitted). A lapse of time and change of place are not necessary to ensure that the subsequent statement is voluntary. Id. at 311-312.
The Missouri Supreme Court concluded that a different analysis applies when an officer deliberately withholds Miranda warnings before obtaining a confession. In that situation, the court concluded, an administration of Miranda warnings does not provide a sufficient guarantee that a subsequent statement is voluntary. Instead, only factors such as a lapse in time, a change in place, or a change in questioner can provide such a guarantee. Pet. App. A9-A11.
The reasoning of Elstad provides no support for the exception that the Missouri Supreme Court created. Although the opinion in Elstad referred to the officer's failure to give Miranda warnings in that case as an "oversight," 470 U.S. at 316, the officer's mental state was not critical to the Court's rationales. Instead, the rationales on which Elstad relied were that the initial taking of an unwarned, but voluntary, statement is not a constitutional violation, and that the suspect's giving of a voluntary statement in unwarned questioning does not taint the voluntariness of a second, warned statement. There is no logical distinction in those rationales between an intentional failure to give Miranda warnings and an oversight.
First, an intentional failure to deliver Miranda warnings, like an inadvertent one, is not itself a constitutional violation. The Fifth Amendment prohibits the admission of "compelled," or coerced, self-incrimination, and a failure to give Miranda warnings "does not constitute coercion." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 306-307 n.1. Instead, the failure to warn creates only a limited presumption of coercion in the government's case in chief. Id. at 306-307. In addition, under Miranda, a constitutional violation occurs only when an unwarned statement is admitted into evidence in the government's case in chief. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442, 444. The failure to give warnings, whether deliberate or inadvertent, does not itself complete a constitutional violation. Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2004 (plurality opinion); id. at 2013 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Elstad reasoned that a constitutional violation is a necessary predicate for application of fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis. 470 U.S. at 305-306. Because a failure to give Miranda warnings is not itself a constitutional violation, that aspect of Elstad's rationale applies equally whether the failure to warn is intentional or inadvertent.
Second, Elstad reasoned that, when the police obtain an unwarned but voluntary statement and then administer Miranda warnings, the warnings themselves provide the suspect with the necessary information to make a voluntary and intelligent determination whether to waive the privilege and speak. 470 U.S. at 311. The suspect's prior giving of an unwarned statement does not compromise his ability to waive his rights and make a subsequent voluntary statement. Id. at 312. The same reasoning applies whether the initial failure to give warnings was inadvertent or intentional. A suspect is affected by the methods that an officer uses to interrogate him, not by the officer's subjective mental state. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 423 (1986) ("[W]hether intentional or inadvertent, the state of mind of the police is irrelevant to the question of the intelligence and voluntariness of respondent's election to abandon his rights."); cf. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323-325 (1994) (per curiam) (in determining whether a suspect is "in custody," subjective and undisclosed views of the officers are not relevant). If two officers interrogate a suspect, and one intentionally withholds Miranda warnings while the other does so through an oversight, the impact on the suspect will be exactly the same. Furthermore, in both cases, a subsequent administration of Miranda warnings will have precisely the same effect. "The warning conveys the relevant information and thereafter the suspect's choice whether to exercise his privilege to remain silent should ordinarily be viewed as an act of free will." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-311 (internal quotation marks omitted). There is therefore no basis for the Missouri Supreme Court's conclusion that an intentional withholding of Miranda warnings taints the voluntariness of a subsequent warned confession, even though withholding Miranda warnings through oversight does not.
1.	The Missouri Supreme Court based its decision in large part on a deterrence rationale. It perceived a need to deter the police practice of seeking an unwarned confession as a means of obtaining a subsequent warned confession. In the court's view, allowing the subsequent warned confession to be admitted into evidence in such circumstances "would encourage future Miranda violations" and sanction an "end run" around Miranda. Pet. App. A12.
Because the Constitution does not forbid the taking of unwarned statements, however, there is no warrant for a court to attempt to deter that practice. Miranda's purposes are fully achieved when an unwarned confession is excluded from the government's case in chief. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318 ("the dictates of Miranda and the goals of the Fifth Amendment proscription against use of compelled testimony are fully satisfied * * * by barring use of the unwarned statement in the case in chief"); Chavez, 123 S. Ct. at 2013 (Kennedy, J.) ("The exclusion of unwarned statements, when not within an exception, is a complete and sufficient remedy."). The admission of a subsequent statement that has been preceded by Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights, and that is otherwise knowing and voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment, manifests compliance with Miranda, not an "end run" around it.
Miranda itself does contain language that purports to establish rules for the conduct of the police. E.g., 384 U.S. at 473-474. Some of this Court's later cases contain similar descriptions of the Miranda procedures, see, e.g., Moran, 475 U.S. at 420 ("Miranda imposed on the police an obligation to follow certain procedures in their dealings with the accused."), and speak of assessing whether particular applications of the Miranda exclusionary rule would deter departures from those procedures, see, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 447-448 (1974). But this Court's understanding of Miranda has evolved, and the rule's purpose, as properly understood, is to guard against the risk that the courts will erroneously admit a coerced confession; it is not to regulate out-of-court conduct by the police. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 442, 443-444; see also Chavez, supra. Accordingly, the taking of unwarned statements need not be deterred.
2.	Even if deterring the police from failing to give Miranda warnings were a valid objective, the Missouri Supreme Court's rule would not be justified. Police officers already have incentives to give Miranda warnings, and the Missouri Supreme Court's rule would impose unjustified costs on the administration of justice. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (noting that suppressing a voluntary, warned statement that follows an unwarned statement would come "at a high cost to legitimate law enforcement activity, while adding little desirable protection to the individual's interest in not being compelled to testify against himself").
Whatever additional deterrent effect could be achieved through the Missouri Supreme Court's rule cannot justify its costs to the administration of justice. "Admissions of guilt are more than merely desirable; they are essential to society's compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the law." Moran, 475 U.S. at 426 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Confessions that are made after Miranda warnings and that are found to be voluntary within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment are highly probative and reliable evidence of guilt. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) ("[T]he defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him."). Excluding such confessions interferes with the truthseeking function of criminal trials and runs a serious risk of permitting guilty defendants to go free. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312 (loss of "highly probative evidence of a voluntary confession" is a "high cost to legitimate law enforcement"); see also McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 (1991) (the "ready ability to obtain uncoerced confessions is not an evil but an unmitigated good"); United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187 (1977) ("far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable").
The Missouri Supreme Court's rule would also introduce an additional layer of litigation, fraught with the possibility for error, about the officer's intent. A court would have to probe the thought processes of police officers to decide whether they deliberately withheld warnings in order to facilitate a subsequent warned confession or whether they failed to give warnings for some other reason.
For example, Miranda applies only when the suspect is in custody, Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) (per curiam); when the officer engages in interrogation, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980); and when there is not a public safety justification for the questioning, New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1983). Each of those conditions for application of Miranda can raise difficult issues. Under this Court's cases, however, an objective standard is used to determine whether the requirements for application of Miranda have been met, which eases judicial administration of Miranda and provides workable guidance to police. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 323-325 ("Our decisions make clear that the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by * * * the interrogating officers."); Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 ("term 'interrogation' under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police * * * that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response" without regard to "the underlying intent of the police"); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 656 (the application of the public safety exception does not depend "on post hoc findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation of the arresting officer"). The Missouri Supreme Court's rule would require a far more difficult and less reliable inquiry into whether officers genuinely believed that one or more of the predicates for Miranda warnings was not present, or whether they instead intended an "end run" around Miranda. Analysis would be further complicated by the likelihood that officers who fail to give Miranda warnings often do so for a mix of reasons.
This Court's decision in Elstad illustrates the difficulty of an inquiry into an officer's subjective motivation for failing to give Miranda warnings. There, the Court could only speculate that the officer who failed to give Miranda warnings in that case may have been uncertain whether the suspect was in custody or may have been reluctant to initiate an alarming police procedure before a different officer spoke to the suspect's mother. 470 U.S. at 315-316. Devoting judicial resources to the resolution of such difficult motive-based inquiries would needlessly complicate judicial decisions about the admissibility of confessions.
The Missouri Supreme Court's intent-based rule would have yet another undesirable effect. There can be entirely appropriate reasons for questioning someone without administering Miranda warnings. For example, when an officer seeks information in connection with a terrorism plot, or an officer seeks information to end an ongoing criminal activity such as kidnapping, officers may appropriately find it desirable to question a suspect without giving Miranda warnings. If an officer's subjective intent to omit Miranda warn-ings were deemed sufficient to taint a later warned confession, officers might be deterred from conducting such inquiries for fear of jeopardizing the admissibility of a later warned confession.
In seeking to justify an intent-based exception to the Elstad rule, the Missouri Supreme Court quoted in part (Pet. App. A9) Elstad's description of its rule as applying where a failure to administer warnings is "unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will." Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309. The Missouri Supreme Court regarded an officer's intentional failure to give Miranda warnings as a circumstance that is calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his free will within the meaning of Elstad, making Elstad's general rule inapplicable. Ibid. The Missouri Supreme Court also quoted in part (Pet. App. A12) language from Elstad excepting from its rule cases where officers use "deliberately coercive or improper tactics" in eliciting the first confession, Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, and concluded that an intentional failure to give warnings is an "improper tactic." In context, however, the references to "circumstances that are calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise free will" and "improper" tactics are simply alternative ways of describing police practices that undermine voluntariness under the traditional due process inquiry. Because an intentional failure to give Miranda warnings does not by itself make a confession involuntary in the due process sense, Elstad provides no support for treating intentional failures to give Miranda warnings differently from inadvertent ones.
Several considerations support the conclusion that Elstad recognized an exception to its rule only for cases where police practices undermine voluntariness under a traditional due process analysis. First, that reading conforms to the Elstad Court's description of its holding: "We hold today that a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoercive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings." 470 U.S. at 318 (emphasis added). Second, throughout the opinion, the Elstad Court used disjunctive phrases similar to those above to describe the kind of circumstances that would render a confession involuntary under traditional due process analysis. 470 U.S. at 312 ("physical violence or other deliberate means calculated to break the suspect's will"); id. at 317 ("inherently coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due process that render the initial admission involuntary"). Third, that reading is consistent with the basic distinction Elstad drew between the analysis that applies when a first confession is actually coerced and the analysis that applies when a first confession is simply unwarned. Id. at 309-310. In the former situation, factors such as lapse of time and change of place are relevant in deciding whether a subsequent confession is voluntary. In the latter context, the delivery of Miranda warnings is an adequate antidote for what made the initial statement inadmissible. Ibid.
Accordingly, as two courts of appeals have concluded, there is no warrant for attributing to Elstad an intent to create an exception to its rule for cases where the officer's initial failure to administer Miranda warnings was deliberate. See United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1036-1037 (9th Cir. 2001) (en banc) ("the most persuasive reading of the 'improper tactics' passage is that the Court simply meant to connect such police conduct to the potential involuntariness of the unwarned statements."), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 125 (2002); United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir. 2000) ("If we read Elstad as a coherent whole, it follows that 'deliberately coercive or improper tactics' are not two distinct categories, * * * but simply alternative descriptions of the type of police conduct that may render a suspect's initial, unwarned statement involuntary."). The Missouri Supreme Court erred in seeking to derive from Elstad such an exception.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Missouri should be reversed.
1 Neither the Federal Bureau of Investigation nor the Drug Enforcement Agency has a practice of deliberately withholding Miranda warnings during initial custodial interrogation. According to FBI policy, "[p]rior to custodial interrogation, an accused is entitled to be warned of the right to remain silent and the right to an attorney at this critical stage of the criminal prosecution." FBI, Legal Handbook For Special Agents § 7-3.1 (1994). The Drug Enforcement Administration Agents Manual similarly provides that "[p]rior to interviewing any defendant, he/she must be advised of his/her constitutional rights." DEA Agents Manual § 6641.32 (2002).
2	The Missouri Supreme Court did not suggest that the Miranda warnings themselves were deficient, or that the police were required to supply any additional warnings to ensure that respondent's decision to waive her rights was knowing and voluntary. Any such suggestion would conflict with Elstad, where this Court rejected the view that an additional warning was required to ensure that Elstad's waiver of his rights was fully informed. 470 U.S. at 316. The Court reasoned that a requirement of an additional warning that the suspect's prior unwarned statement could not be used against him "is neither practicable nor constitutionally necessary." Ibid. See also Moran, 475 U.S. at 424-427 (declining to add to Miranda by requiring an additional warning that an attorney is seeking to contact the suspect).
3	In Elstad, the Court noted that the "officers did not exploit the unwarned admission to pressure respondent into waiving his right to remain silent." 470 U.S. at 316. Similarly, in this case, Officer Hanrahan did not use respondent's unwarned statement to pressure her into waiving her right to remain silent. After respondent received Miranda warnings, she voluntarily waived her right to remain silent, and answered Officer Hanrahan's questions about the fire that resulted in Donald Rector's death, of her own free will. Nor did Officer Hanrahan engage in coercive tactics that undermined the voluntariness of respondent's subsequent warned statements. In response to one of Officer Hanrahan's questions, respondent asserted that Donald was to be taken out of the trailer. At that point, Officer Hanrahan referred to respondent's earlier unwarned acknowledgement that Donald was to die in the fire. Respondent then admitted that Donald was to die in the fire. Pet. App. A4-A5. Officer Hanrahan's use of respondent's unwarned but voluntary admission that Donald was to die in the fire to question the truthfulness of respondent's assertion that Donald was to be taken out of the fire was entirely legitimate, cf. Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-226 (voluntary but unwarned statement may be used for impeachment), and did not impair the voluntariness of respondent's warned admission.


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# 58 of 669 Aged Cares in New Zealand.
Eversley Rest Home and Village is located in Mahora, Hastings and offers Geriatric, Dementia care, Rest home care aged care in a 46 bed facility.
× Have you visited this facility? Help others who are looking for a place by posting a review on Eversley Rest Home and Village or review a different facility now.
eileen687Eversley Rest Home and VillageRest Home very good.
In my opinion this is the best resthome in Hastings! Keep up the good work!
Lovely character home, friendly staff.
Wonderful outgoing and caring manager.
Happy environment. Clean and tidy. Patients happy.
1. Staffing levels too low. 2. Not enough supervision. 3. Could be more activities. 4. Need own bus for outings.
Increase staff levels & buy a bus.
Always short staffed due to poor wages.


Tools to help Calm You anywhere, anytime. | Good NRG , It's your place to be a better you!
One of the MOST powerful Mantras for me lately has been "Everything is always working out for me" I write this on paper, backwards, then I place it in front of a mirror or on my dash board so it "Reflects" back to me. Take a deep breath in, ( cont to 6 slowly( now release even slower, counting to 8, hold, and release.
Do this 7 times really focusing on the OUT breath….. after you do this notice how calm and relaxed you FEEL. If, for any reason you STILL do not feel calm and relaxed, repeat. This is calming your Parasympathetic nervous system, the flight or fight part of the brain that was utilized back in the day when we were out in the elements, forging for food, attacked by whatever, it served it"s purpose.
Today it still runs, ( mostly unconsciously and releases Cortisol and Adrenaline which creates stress and weight gain. Who can relate?
This entry was posted in Uncategorized and tagged #Goodnrg #Heart #Love #Selfcare #Ascension #Meditate #Presence #Mindfull #Unity #Silence #Laughter #Fun #FindTheGoodstuff #GoGeneral, #Universal #SelfLove #Listen #Source on June 27, 2018 by Cynthia Sebastian.


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Quotable: A Preview of Monday's SHRM 2019 Annual Conference and Exposition Speakers
ALEXANDRIA, Va. — Concurrent and mega sessions at SHRM's 2019 Annual Conference & Exposition fall into nine tracks that delve into today's workplace issues. We asked speakers to share a highlight from their upcoming sessions.
Speaking on Monday, June 24, 2019
"If something expensive isn't valued, it can be disregarded. HR must compete with consumer marketing for an employee's attention. Most HR departments fail at a key function – communicating the value of an employee's total compensation. If something isn't valued properly, it has no value and is not an engagement or retention tool." – Karl Ahlrichs, consultant, Gregory & Appel, who is speaking on "What Next? Communicating Complex HR Subjects to Employees with Short Attention Spans"
"If handled correctly, not only does conflict not have to be destructive … it can actually be constructive. By employing great communication skills with an effective conflict resolution strategy, you can lead your team to better performance and produce maximum results." – Randy Anderson, productivity improvement specialist, E3 Professional Trainers, "20 Strategies for Resolving Conflict Quickly and Effectively"
"In the era of hyper-collaboration, agile is an important work process taking hold across organizations, and HR has a critical role in leading and shaping a positive, holistic work experience in support of agile business outcomes." – Laurent Bernard, VP, global talent management, and Tracy Brower, principal, Applied Research + Consulting, Steelcase, "Making Work Agile: HR's Role in Empowering Agile Success"
"With so much going on at the DOL on the regulatory front, it's critical for employers to make sure that their payroll policies and practices, as well as their time and attendances policies and practices, are getting the attention they need. A good audit can greatly reduce liability. In other words, 'An ounce of prevention is worth many, many pounds of litigation exposure.'" – Robert Boonin, member, Dykema, "Wage and Hour Compliance: A DOL Update and Ways to Avoid Overtime Liability Landmines"
"Having the courage to step up and share a tough message in a way that maximizes candor and minimizes defensiveness is necessary to foster healthy dialogue and build strong relationships. Discover how to say the right thing, to the right person, at the right time, for the right reason and in the right way." – Tracy Butz, CSP, Owner, Think Impact Solutions, MEGA SESSION: "Candid Conversations that Drives Results"
"A strong organizational culture can clearly differentiate a business from its competitors. Companies that align culture with business have 58% more growth and 72% more profitability. Firsthand experience has taught me how culture and business strategy go hand in hand, and I look forward to sharing how culture is a key enabler of the business." – Amy Cappellanti-Wolf, chief human resources officer, Symantec, "Developing A High-Performance Culture That Enables Your Company To Grow and Thrive"
"You change the present whenever you think about the future: understand trends and be prepared for the years to come." – Alfredo Castro, president MOT Training and Development, "World Café: Global HR Trends"
"Loneliness is deadly for us and for business success. For companies intent on leveraging their full array of talent, curing workplace loneliness through an organizational culture of connection is a strategic priority." – Stuart Chittenden, founder and principal, Squishtalks, "Workplace Loneliness is Killing Us"
"We keep hearing that artificial intelligence will hinder the ability for employers to be more diverse and inclusive. The truth is that AI can make work more human, not less if we approach it the right way." – Ben Eubanks, principal analyst, Lighthouse Research, "The Critical Skills an HR Leader Needs in the Artificial Intelligence Era"
"Life's experiences will either make you bitter or better, stronger or weaker." – Steve Gilliland, speaker and author, Steve Gilliland, Inc., "Hide Your Goat™: Strategies to Stay Positive When Negativity Surrounds You"
"Show appreciation for your team today. Validate their contributions and consistent work with a genuine word of praise. Your bottom line will thank you. #appreciation #thankyou #rewardsandrecognition #employeeengagement" – Caron Greaves, managing director, Choice HR Limited, "Employee Engagement — The Art of Valuing Employees"
"Being strategic from a compliance standpoint means looking at and understanding the big picture of organizational risk. It's important for HR Departments of One (DOOs) to know their organization's risk tolerance and to assess federal and state (and some smaller municipalities) compliance requirements. Conducting regular internal audits can help assess risk, correct errors and ensure compliance. DOOs should also think about training managers on compliance issues, too. Compliance isn't solely HR's responsibility. We're all in this together." – Amanda Haddaway, Managing Director, HR Answerbox, "The Strategic HR Department of One: Act Like a CHRO to Improve Your Organization"
"Collaboration, communication, conflict management and emotional intelligence are keys to a bully-proof culture. In work cultures lacking these skills, conflict escalates and fear spreads, creating paralysis and dysfunction across the organization." – Shawn Hayashi, CEO and founder, executive coach and high-performance teams consultant, The Professional Development Group, "How to Create a Bully-Proof Organization"
"Learn research-based methods to detect deception in investigations and job interviews." – Michael Johnson, CEO, Clear Law Institute, LLC, "Detecting Lies and Deception: Practical Skills for HR Professionals"
"The June 2016 EEOC Task Force Report on Sexual Harassment Prevention Training suggested that the most common form of training — delivered online, with a focus on liability and risk management — does very little to prevent gender-based abusive conduct. This session will provide practical guidance on crafting a dynamic prevention and response training curriculum that meaningfully challenges business-as-usual workplace stereotypes of gender and power." – Glenn Kraemer, co-managing partner, Hirschfeld Kraemer LLP, "Shaping Hearts, Minds and Corporate Cultures: Effective Prevention Training in the #MeToo Era"
"If you sponsor a benefits plan, it is most likely governed by both the ACA and ERISA. Failing to do it right can lead to very expensive penalties." – Gary Kushner, president and CEO of Kushner & Company, "ACA and ERISA Compliance: 11 Steps to Avoid (or Survive) a DOL Audit"
"HR teams all have an immense amount of data that, when organized, used and presented strategically, can show the direct impact HR is having on the company bottom line. Speaking in the language of the C-level, in the form of metrics and charts, will give HR the edge it needs to secure support for new initiatives, as well as show how its efforts are contributing to the firm's success." – David Lewis, president and CEO, OperationsInc, "Translating HR to Net Profit - Showing the C-Suite the Real Bottom Line Impact of HR at Your Firm"
"It is said that opportunity does not knock twice. Let's prove it wrong by providing a second chance to the marginalized section of the society." –Ranjan Mahpatra, CHRO, Indian Oil Corporation, "Transforming Lives – Second Chance for Women: An Indian Oil Case Study"
"With the advent of high deductible health plans, the role of health savings accounts to help plan, prepare for and ultimately fund health expenses has become critical for employers and employees. Every day we find out new features hidden in these accounts that can be used to the best advantage of participants." – Robert Massa, managing director, Qualified Plan Advisors, LLC, "How Can HSAs Boost Retirement Plans"
"Discover new ways of thinking and ideas that have been implemented in a variety of organizations that are helping companies to achieve a competitive advantage by changing the way that they approach people and talent." – Jennifer McClure, CEO, Unbridled Talent, LLC & DisruptHR LLC, "Disrupt HR! It's Time To DisruptHR And Approach It In A Whole New Way"
"Organizations' key performance indicators are always in measurable terms. When it comes to most employees' performance, KPIs are either not measurable or measure activities rather than outcomes and results. Understand the mechanism of aligning employees' KPIs with organizations' KPIs." – Zahid Mubarik, CEO, HR Metrics, "Result-Based KPIs: Demonstrating Your Impact to Bottom-Line Results"
"Anything is possible when people are inspired, and there is a direct connection between an inspired culture and business success. Culture unites not just recruitment, retention and employee engagement, but also customer satisfaction, innovation and overall performance." – Christopher Mullen, director, Strategy Advisory, Kronos Incorporated, "Work Inspired: How to Build an Organization Where Everyone Loves to Work"
"Compassion is the best business strategy and practice in traumatic situations, which in turn unleashes the ultimate performance, production and profits for the organization" – Lisa Murfield, human resources manager, Hill Ward Henderson, "Employee Trauma: What Happened in Vegas Didn't Stay in Vegas"
"It's time for a new perspective. Leading is about influence, not position. This is a call to action for all HR professionals to rise up to the influence challenge by positively impacting others inside and outside of their organizations." – Kimberly Nash, owner, THriv, "Things Would Be Different If I Were in Charge: Learning to Lead at any Level."
"Strategic foresight is quickly becoming a necessary skill for the 21st century. Creating an organization of future thinkers is not magic. It can be done through a structured organizational strategy and culture change process." – Richard Ramsey, vice president, HR, Walt Disney International, "It's Not Magic: You Too Can Create a Culture of Futures Thinkers"
"In the world of learning, a growth mindset is a belief that human abilities are not fixed, but instead are developable over time. Research in social psychology has shown that this mindset can make people more likely to improve after setbacks and view change as an exciting challenge, rather than a demotivating threat. On the organizational level, this can translate to greater employee engagement, better teamwork and the ability to adapt in the face of uncertainty."
– David Rock, co-founder and CEO, NeuroLeadership Institute, "Become a Growth Mindset Organization"
"It's not just the peak performer who gets attention, it's also the one who has the courage and confidence to effectively and strategically communicate their value." – S. Renee Smith, "Defining and Communicating Your Personal Brand to Increase Your Visibility, Credibility and Career Opportunities"
"A growing trend in performance is companies moving to more frequent performance conversations rather than the standard annual one-time-per-year conversation. Some companies have even adopted ratingless performance review processes." – Jeremy Spake, principal consultant, Cornerstone OnDemand, "Emerging Trends in Performance Management and Compensation"
"Strategic foresight should be viewed as the operating system of the 21st century organization, running in the background of leadership development, strategic decision making and innovation efforts. Disney is proof positive that creating a culture of future thinking results in game-changing innovation, revenue-generating futures intelligence and a transformative organizational culture that is equipped to harness the company's rapidly changing environment." – Frank Spencer, founder and creative director, Kedge, LLC, "It's Not Magic: You Too Can Create a Culture of Futures Thinkers"
"Technology can be overwhelming for an overburdened HR department (especially a Department of One.) But helping your department and company grow and thrive is possible by leveraging technology, even if you have a small or non-existent team." – Tracie Sponenberg, senior vice president, human resources, The Granite Group, "How to Transform Your HR Department Through Technology, Even If Your HR Department is Just You!"
"Do I say gay or homosexual? What does transgender mean? How do I handle the bathroom issue at work? Navigating the legal and practical landscapes for LGBTQ+ inclusion can be tricky for many employers."— Tara Taylor, education and outreach director, Maryland Commission on Civil Rights, "LGBTQ+ Knowledge for the HR Professional: Awareness, Etiquette & Best Practices"
"Myth: Change is hard. Reality: Change is only hard for the unready." – Cy Wakeman, president, Cy Wakeman, Inc., "Business Readiness: "Ensuring Our Teams Are Ready for What's Next"
"As the administration promised, 2018 was a record year for ICE enforcement actions, which increased by roughly 400% over 2017. This session covers trends in immigration enforcement, the cost of immigration violations and the common mistakes employers make, putting their companies at risk." – Becki Young, founding partner, Hammond Young Immigration Law, "I-9 and E-Verification Compliance: What is new and how can you protect your business"
For additional information, visit http://annual.shrm.org.
Media: For more information or to request an interview at the 2019 SHRM Annual Conference & Exposition, contact Kate Kennedy of SHRM Media Affairs at 703-535-6260 and Kate.kennedy@shrm.org, Vanessa Hill at 703-535-6072 and Vanessa.Hill@shrm.org, or Cooper Nye at 703-535-6447 and Cooper.Nye@shrm.org.
About the Society for Human Resource Management
SHRM, the Society for Human Resource Management, creates better workplaces where employers and employees thrive together. As the voice of all things work, workers and the workplace, SHRM is the foremost expert, convener and thought leader on issues impacting today's evolving workplaces. With 300,000+ HR and business executive members in 165 counties, SHRM impacts the lives of more than 115 million workers and families globally. Learn more at SHRM.org and on Twitter @SHRM.
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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L'altisolepide (gen. Altisolepis) è un pesce osseo estinto, appartenente ai peltopleuriformi. Visse nel Triassico medio (Anisico - Ladinico, circa 244 - 241 milioni di anni fa) e i suoi resti fossili sono stati ritrovati in Europa e in Asia.

Descrizione
Questo pesce era di dimensioni medio-piccole, e non doveva superare i 20 centimetri di lunghezza. Possedeva due file di scaglie molto alte lungo i fianchi; quella dorsale era costituita da elementi che divenivano via via meno alte verso la coda, mentre quella ventrale era costituita da scaglie che si abbassavano drasticamente nella zona tra le pinne pelviche e la pinna anale. La mascella era caratterizzata da una parte posteriore che si espandeva posteroventralmente fino a coprire la mandibola. Erano presenti denti acuminati, anche nella parte posteriore della mascella. Il preopercolo era dotato di una regione ventrale triangolare e di una regione dorsale stretta. Vi era un singolo osso suborbitale e alcune piccole ossa sopraorbitali. La pinna caudale era più o meno simmetrica, con meno di 10 raggi epassiali; i lepidotrichi delle pinne anale e dorsale erano dotati di un segmento prossimale molto lungo, e non erano presenti fulcri marginali.

Classificazione
Altisolepis è un membro dei peltopleuriformi, un gruppo forse parafiletico comprendente numerosi pesci di piccole-medie dimensioni tipici del Triassico e dotati di scaglie sui fianchi particolarmente alte.

Il genere Altisolepis venne istituito da Mutter e Herzog nel 2004, per accogliere due specie precedentemente descritte da Toni Burgin nel 1992 e attribuite al genere Peltoperleidus; queste specie (Altisolepis bellipinnis e A. elongignathus) sono note per alcuni esemplari provenienti dal giacimento di Besano - Monte San Giorgio, al confine tra Svizzera e Italia, e risalgono al Triassico medio. Nel 2014 è stata descritta la specie A. sinensis, proveniente dal Triassico medio (Anisico, formazione Guanling) della Cina meridionale, nella contea di Luoping nella provincia di Yunnan.

Bibliografia
T. Bürgin. 1992. Basal ray-finned fishes (Osteichthyes; Actinopterygii) from the Middle Triassic of Monte San Giorgio (Canton Tessin, Switzerland). Schweizerische Paläontologische Abhandlungen 114:1-164
R. J. Mutter and A. Herzog. 2004. A New Genus of Triassic Actinopterygian with an Evaluation of Deepened Flank Scales in Fusiform Fossil Fishes. Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology 24(4):794-801
Z. Y. Sun, C. Lombardo, A. Tintori and D. Y. Jiang. 2015. A new species of Altisolepis (Peltopleuriformes, Actinopterygii) from the Middle Triassic of southern China. Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology 35:e909819

Peltopleuriformi

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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Dead Island: Riptide (X360)
Dead Island: Riptide
First-Person Action Role Playing
Dead Island: Riptide Review
This one will leave players of the first feeling a little cheated and a lot let down, as the game fails to significantly improve upon the previous experience with Dead Island.
By Naomi Brown ( Jun 5, 2013 )
View our ratings guide
Gruesome zombie deaths, blood and gore galore, ability to import characters from the first with skills intact, updated inventory system, more carrying capacity.
Rehashed environments from the first game, no real improvements in game play, underuse of old zombies, overuse of some new zombies, environments purposefully made difficult to navigate, glitches in cooperative play, zombies seemed slightly overpowered, new missions seemed like a lot of the same old story.
Dead Island: Riptide feels like a game of contradictions. Alternately entertaining yet frustrating, it left me feeling quite a bit cheated as far as a sequel to Dead Island went. All the familiar characters are back, in addition to a brand new one, yet there aren't any spectacularly interesting changes or additions to any of them. And the new environments in Dead Island are enthralling at first, then they give way to disappointment as they start to look strangely familiar. A lackluster side quest system just adds to the disappointment to the game as a whole.
As the game opens you're introduced to the same enemies as in the first game, the fast moving and utterly dangerous zombies that populated the original island. As you progress in the game, you are introduced to some new types of zombies to make the players life more challenging. Unfortunately, I found the new zombies to be less challenging and more annoying or strangely enough, barely present. One of the new types of zombie, the Bombardier, was only around in a few select areas. They were an actual genuine threat and I barely saw anything of them. The same with the Wrestler, an intimidating new zombie that's a huge lumbering mass of flesh and player beat down.
And the old intimidating zombies from the first game are hardly to be seen either; threats like the Butcher are barely around because the game relies upon randomly generating them. In my play through the game I encountered perhaps four of them. I felt a little cheated at not seeing more of them, as well as more of the other original zombies. It seemed as if they'd been thrown over for the newer zombies. While not necessarily a bad thing to see more of the new zombies, it becomes a problem when the perfectly good old ones are replaced by inferior models. Case in point: the Screamer. In theory it's a sound concept, a screeching zombie that incapacitates a player who gets too close with its supersonic yell. The problem with her is that she's not content to wait for the player and ambush them. She actively rushes at the player, releasing her screech and incapacitating the player while simultaneously beating the ever living crap out of them. Dealing with her is not fun in the slightest. The balance of tough zombies in the game is missing, eliminating a lot of genuine challenge and replacing it with sheer frustration.
Adding that to the areas of never ending Infected spawns and you have a recipe for disaster. Instead of being genuinely challenged or frightened for your own survival, you end up feeling frustrated and annoyed as you rush through an area, seeking to just finish it before you get killed, either by being swarmed or by the zombies who throw weapons with pinpoint accuracy and decimate your health with one successful hit.
The rest of the gameplay for Riptide is pretty standard fare; explore the island, complete side missions and progress through the story. Many could argue that the side missions are just as important as the main story, adding depth and extending playtime. The side missions run the gamut from helping to save people, finding out information about missing loved ones and running around like a jackass to pick up items that NPC's want you to foolishly risk your neck to retrieve. The side missions in the first game were pretty much along the same lines, however they were handled in a slightly more manageable fashion. Side missions in the game could be completed while handling the main missions and the layout of the island was very conducive to exploring.
In Riptide, it seems as if the island was specifically made to frustrate the player. There are only two main maps, making the island smaller than the first, which is upsetting to start off with. Then the maps are constructed in a way that makes travel frustrating and difficult. The first map features a lot of waterways that need to be traveled by boat to make them go by in any reasonable amount of time. They were put into the game specifically to give the player more of the Drowned zombies to deal with. But once again, they're not challenging, they are annoying to deal with. Any player not steering the boat can actually swing a weapon while sitting in it, but actually hitting anything coming at you is next to impossible. The entire ride is spent fending off the Drowned as they constantly grab you, trying to pull you out of the boat. And because the boat is loud, it attracts other zombies as well, meaning that you pretty much always have a group to fight off when you exit on the shore.
The second main map is a large city in which many of the side missions are completed. Portions of the city are underwater, up ladders and around blocked passageways (some partially electrocuted), making travel difficult. Dead Island tries to mitigate some of the travel problems by giving the player quick travel locations that they can warp around the island with. In the first game they were smartly placed, adding another layer of strategy when trying to decide how to navigate the island. In the entire second half of Riptide, all of the warp locations are specifically placed in the upper half of the map, preventing the player from using them to warp to any locations in the middle or lower half of the map. This means that every quest that takes you into those areas involves a trek through most of the city, past the hordes of repetitious and annoying zombies. At a certain point in the game, I was totally convinced that the boatload of money I had was specifically meant to be a buffer against constantly dying, as losing money is the only real penalty to dying in the game.
The environment for the game was a major let down as well, with the new setting starting off as rather exciting and deteriorating from there. At first, the new main island is very beautiful. It's a lush tropical environment with lovely plants, beautiful views and interesting pathways through tunnels and caves. The game even adds a new dimension to travel by allowing the player to traverse the environment, climbing up and down vines to navigate. The weather system and day/night cycles that were added in helped make everything seem even more realistic. However, once you progress too far into the game, the new gives way to the very familiar old. Many of the interior locations used in Riptide were rehashed versions of areas from the first Dead Island. In fact, one of the later locations is almost an exact repeat, with a few added extra decorations. I wasn't entirely convinced until I turned on my copy of the first game and went to the hospital area in the prison. Lo and behold, it was the exact same area being used in Riptide. I even saw the same blue funnel on the exact same desk in the exact same area in both games.
I'm aware that creating new assets for a game can be a pain, but lifting entire environments and just slightly re skinning them seems like a giant rip-off, especially when the second game is listed at the same price as a brand new game. Sadly, even the actual new areas got repeated over and over again. One of the games new 'features' were Dead Zone areas where the player could go to defeat boss monsters and collect weapons and weapon modifications to make their existing weapons more deadly. There were four layouts that kept being used repeatedly for these areas, meaning that once you'd gone into that layout once, you knew where all the nooks and crannies were. After a while they got boring and annoying.
Granted, there were weapon modifications in all of them, meaning that if you wanted to be able to make better weapons, it was to your best interest to explore them all. But the game screws the player over once again, saving many of the best weapon modifications and blueprints for later stages in the game. By the time I received the modification to make one of the better explosives in the game (by going through a story area), it was so late in the game that it really wasn't worth my time or effort to go use the modification. Normally I would still have tried to use it, expecting that bigger and better would be useful for the final fight. But by playing the game normally and progressing at a steady rate, I was so beefy that I completely blew through the final boss with no difficulty. It was very sad and anticlimactic.
Coupling all of these difficulties with game glitches and we have an experience that was less than stellar. For example, let's talk about really nice explosives. There is a bomb in the game that blows the heads off most regular zombies in the game. Very nice bomb, very useful for groups and a great way to clear some space. It was designed to be used in game with massive hordes of zombies, yet in an online cooperative game, the bomb proved to be too much for the system to handle. Multiple times when using that particular bomb, my cooperative players' game would freeze. As a matter of fact, whenever too many zombies got on the screen it gave our online game a lot of trouble. We all know that less is sometimes more; maybe more difficult (i.e. special zombies) and less of the hordes would have been better suited for the game, especially considering the types of firepower given to the player this time around. Even in my single player game, it seemed to have a lot of trouble whenever too many zombies got on the screen and I used an uber bomb or other weapon.
And in a game that works best cooperatively, I expect it to actually work when playing cooperatively. I expect that both players can use their weapons to maximum efficiency without having to worry about massive lag caused by programming choices. I expect to be seeing the same thing on the screen as my cooperative player and to not have a zombie alive on one person's screen and not even present on the others. I also expect that item drops will be present on both screens and that one player won't have to pick it up and then trade it with the other player because it miraculously decided to only show up on one screen. And when both players save the game in a safe location then restart, I fully expect that both players will spawn into the safe location. Not one person spawning into the safe area and another player being dumped into the middle of a combat zone, which is exactly what happened on several occasions. It's a little jarring to exit the game next to a shop and then restart it to be stuck in an area with a bunch of zombies trying to rip my character's insides out.
The name of this game should be Dead Island: Big Disappointment. It failed to deliver anything significantly new or exciting. The new elements that were introduced were lacking and the game itself felt like a complete rehash of the old, even down to the environments and layouts of some of the interiors. I didn't get a new interesting experience or learn anything earth shattering about the setting. As a matter of fact, the ending of the game completely throws away the characters in one of the most frustrating ways I've ever seen in a game. This felt like an interim game; something to finish dealing with the characters from the first simply so that they could move on to thinking of characters for a new game. I was not impressed or pleased with how the ending of the game went and I would caution anyone playing to be prepared to be underwhelmed by the entire experience.
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Unfortunately, Naomi Brown still misses her Atari, badly. And the original Genesis given away by her evil hunchbacked, beer guzzling stepfather with the harelip and wandering eye. But knowing that those happy times are long gone, Naomi consoles herself with realizing that there's no way she'd ever get to play her lovely, mind screwing survival horror on an Atari. Or blow zombies heads off in such beautifully rendered bloody tones on the Genesis. So while the glory days of Centipede and Aladdin are long gone, she's still got her Fatal Frame and L4D to keep her company.
About this Review
The primary platform in which our evaluation was conducted for the basis of this review is the Xbox 360 version of the game.


Ways in which Online Merchants can Prevent Credit Card Fraud!
With the growth of the worldwide web and internet users, online shopping, due to its varied benefits has become a norm of the day. While online merchants are reaping its benefits, they surely are facing a major hurdle with 'chargebacks' and other losses, due to the increasing occurrences of Credit Card frauds!
Even after a Credit Card processor or registration service approves an order, the merchant should perform additional checks at his/ her end as fraudulent orders are sometimes approved. Online merchants need to develop safeguards to prevent fraud and thereby reduce their losses.
Checking on the domain name (provided in the email address after '@') for various parameters can be very useful. In case the domain is newly registered or is about to expire, then chances of it being made to undertake fraudulent activities are usually considered high, as per cyber security statistics. In such cases, investigating further would be recommended.
Manually checking the domain can also help to know if it's legitimate. A website that doesn't exist or is under construction should raise suspicions too.
Registrant name in the Whois Record could be an important point of verification for fraud. Mark discrepancies by comparing the name of the person who has placed the order with the Registrant name. Also, if the Registrant name in the record is incomplete like Mr. Bond (no first name) or seems like a fake name like James Bond (yes, very classy), these could be parameters that could raise red flags and require looking into.
If the address of the registered domain is in a high-risk country, the merchant should be cautious. High-risk countries include developing nations like Indonesia, Malaysia, Benin, Nigeria, Pakistan, Israel, Egypt, and Eastern European countries. In the case of such orders, especially if they are high-cost orders, only after verifying the authenticity of the order, should merchants get into processing them.
If the billing/ shipping address and the domain registered address are in different countries or differ vastly or even a registered address which may seem fake like 123 Centre Street, then there can be chances of nefarious activity, which should raise red flags.
With Reverse Whois search, a query can be made on the Registrant and all the domains owned with their details can be retrieved. If these domain details don't match up or seem bogus, then merchants should probe further in such cases.
Online merchant should develop various rules suiting their unique business model to determine cases that they would like to be flagged; eg. Billing and shipping address should not be more than 1000 miles apart in general, there are higher chances of fraud in electronics, gifting items should not have same billing and shipping address in general, etc.
Also, they should have a policy of not shipping any order until the orders are verified by their additional checks. A confirmatory email of the order should be sent, explaining additional checks are being performed to reduce fraudulent orders.
Calling the customer directly to verify if the order has been placed. Usually, fraudsters will refrain from giving their real number.
Calling the Credit Card processor to verify details. In case there is still an iota of doubt, details of the Card issuing bank can be gotten by providing your basic details as verification. You can then call the issuing bank and confirm with them. You can also ask the card issuing bank to make a courtesy call to the customer to verify the charge.
These steps may take some time and cost a little bit of money to the merchant, but in return it increases the merchant's profits by reducing fraud loss, improving operation efficiency and increasing revenue.


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India All India 30 Jun 2021 Candidates can opt out of CA exams if they, family members suffer from COVID-19: SC
India, All India
Candidates can opt out of CA exams if they, family members suffer from COVID-19: SC
Published : Jun 30, 2021, 4:00 pm IST
Updated : Jun 30, 2021, 4:00 pm IST
ICAI had told the apex court that it is the most conducive time to hold CA exams as COVID-19 spread is now at a substantially low level
Such candidate will be permitted to appear for the next examination for both old and new syllabus, the bench said. (Representational Photo: PTI)
New Delhi: Observing that the scheme provided by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) is not enough, the Supreme Court Wednesday permitted candidates scheduled to appear for the upcoming CA exams to opt out if they or their family members have suffered from COVID-19.
A three-judge bench of Justices A M Khanwilkar, Dinesh Maheshwari and Aniruddha Bose also made it clear that a candidate need not produce RT-PCR (real-time reverse transcription-polymerase chain reaction) test if medical certificate issued by registered medical practitioners for his family members is produced along with request for opting out.
"A candidate who has suffered COVID-19 personally or any of his family members, so certified by a registered medical practitioner, as a result of which he is unable to appear for exam, or disabled from preparing for the exam, is entitled to exercise the option of opting out. It will not be considered as an attempt. Such candidate will be permitted to appear for the next examination for both old and new syllabus," the bench said.
With regard to candidates affected by lockdown during the relevant period of exam, the apex court said as per ICAI scheme, such candidate will be allowed to opt-out and will not be treated as an attempt and such candidate will be allowed to appear in the next examination.
"As regards the logistical arrangements, both infrastructural and human resources-wise, the ICAI shall ensure that there is strict adherence to the SOP notified by the competent authority, including the Disaster Management Authority.
" It is also clarified if any candidate who is attempting exam gets COVID-19 during exam, he will be allowed to opt out and it will not be treated as an attempt. They can give the exam in the next year. He may be permitted to appear in backup exams as per the rules," the bench said.
The top court also said that in case of last minute change of examination centres, it disapproves the suggestion of ICAI that if it's in the same city, the candidate will not be allowed to opt out.
"We direct that candidate should be allowed to opt out and it will not be treated us an attempt. Such candidate can appear in backup when situation is conducive," it said.
Senior advocate Meenakshi Arora, who was appearing for one of the petitioners, said that some serious issues have not been addressed in the note filed by the ICAI and it is not in line with what the apex court had observed.
Arora referred to the issue of RT-PCR report and said candidates, who have to travel to different places to appear in the exam, may have suffered from COVID-19 earlier but he or she has not recovered fully.
The apex court was hearing a batch of pleas seeking different reliefs including an opt-out option for the candidates, postponement of the exam, and increase in number of centres this year.
During the earlier hearing conducted through video-conferencing, the bench observed there are instances where the RT-PCR test may be negative but the person shows symptoms of COVID.
The ICAI has recently said that opt-out option will be provided in case the examinee himself or herself or his family members (residing in the same premises) are infected with COVID-19.
The bench had said that RT-PCR report should not be the parameter and there has to be a competent authority having medical experience which can issue certificate to the candidates looking at COVID or COVID related issues.
ICAI had on Monday told the apex court that it is the most conducive time to hold CA exams as COVID-19 spread is now at a substantially low level, offering an opportune moment for chartered accountants to further their professional career.
It had said that the present COVID situation in the country is similar to when this court had allowed ICAI to hold examinations in November, 2020 and there is no reason to believe that it will not take adequate precautions.
Tags: institute of chartered accountants of india, covid-19, ca exams
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The northernmost of all Pteroglossus, Collared Aracari ranges from central Veracruz, Mexico south through northern Venezuela and western Ecuador. It is a medium-sized frugivore, found in a variety of wooded habitats including wet lowland primary forest, second growth, forest patches, and plantations of coffee, cacao and fruits, generally below 1000 meters. Collared Aracaris customarily travel in groups of 3 - 10 individuals in the subcanopy and canopy. When flying between fruiting trees or calling they are easily detected, but they can be overlooked when quietly feeding or at the nest.


I'm not an Amos hater but at those #s, I let him walk. I suspect games over replacement is negligible in this case and you can't keep everyone. This is where your GMs and coaches keep you a perennial contender by not missing a beat when it becomes necessary to turn over some non key pieces so that you can afford to pay those key pieces. I'd rather have Bush and Mack than Amos and any other guy not paid like Mack.
Considering what the Bears had been through for years at the safety position before they acquired Amos and Jackson, not so sure about that. It all depends on who you match Eddie Jackson up with.
Seems that Pace is better at it. 2 starters in 3 years, one top rated. Maybe 3 in 3 if Bush pans out.
7/season is the floor for Amos now.
windy when will you release a new mock without hunt now that hes a brown?
It will change the draft as well.
I think the Ried deal also confirms that Amos is like 90% out the door.


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Block TV / Internet Access Until A Specific Time / Goal – Kids will love that one (not)?
Lights come on (and off) as you move about the house or office or arrive home?
Create "Mockupation" scenarios that make it look like the house is occupied (when it's not – holidays anyone)?
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June 15, 2015 (ADDIS ABABA) – South Sudan's former vice president, Riek Machar, turned leader of the armed opposition faction of the ruling Sudan Peoples' Liberation Movement (SPLM-IO), has met the president of the United Republic of Tanzania, Jakaya Kikwete, over the ongoing reunification process of three factions of the ruling party in the young country.
The two leaders met on Monday on the sidelines of the African Union (AU) summit of heads of state and government in Johannesburg, South Africa.
Rebel leader's spokesman said the meeting centered on how best the Arusha intraparty dialogue on reunification could be complementing the Addis Ababa comprehensive peace process to end the civil war in South Sudan.
"The two leaders discussed how best to approach the Arusha SPLM intraparty dialogue as a complementary to the IGAD comprehensive peace process," Machar's spokesman, James Gatdet Dak, told Sudan Tribune when contacted on Monday.
He said the SPLM-IO leadership was committed to the intraparty dialogue which was addressing the root causes of the current crisis in the country in the context of the ruling party.
"You know the current national crisis started as a political crisis within the SPLM party before it developed national. If the rival party leaders can address those causes and accept SPLM transformation, reforms and leadership succession, I think they can also accept similar reforms on governance at the IGAD process," he said.
Dak stressed that the Arusha reunification process would address democracy within the disintegrated ruling party including structural, organizational and leadership issues which caused the crisis.
He however said the process was not a substitute to the IGAD peace process and should not be misinterpreted to mean "mere reinstatement" of SPLM leaders previously dismissed "unconstitutionally" by president Salva Kiir following the crisis.
The rebel leader's spokesman commended the Arusha roadmap agreement signed in January this year, describing it as a positive guiding document in resolving outstanding issues within the party.
"Our leadership believes that addressing the root causes of the conflict through the intraparty dialogue would positively reflect on the IGAD peace process," he said.
But, he added, an intraparty agreement would not be an end in itself, ruling out what he said were misinterpretations by people who thought the rebel leadership would return to Juba if an agreement was struck by the SPLM factions.
Full implementation of a reunification agreement, he further stressed, was dependent on a final peace agreement in Addis Ababa that will resolve on all outstanding issues such as on governance and security arrangements and reforms outside the party's jurisdiction.
President Kikwete's ruling party of the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has since last year been mediating between the SPLM in government (SPLM-IG) led by president Salva Kiir, SPLM-IO led by former vice president, Riek Machar and former detainees (FDs) led by former party's secretary general, Pagan Amum in trying to reunify their ranks and file.
Observers say the process is expected to be complementing to the IGAD peace process to end the 18-month long civil war in the country.


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Q: What is the purpose of CultureInfo.CurrentCulture? what is  CultureInfo.CurrentCulture in c#  , actually unable to find the answer , why we use it , for what purpose , please explain in easy words
Please Explain in easy words ! Why we use this . On the other hand , if i donot use this , results are still same . So why what is the purpose of this ?

A: You can think of CultureInfo as a collection of settings for a particular geographical region.
A CultureInfo object specifies how a piece of information is rendered for a particular culture. It contains settings for writing directions and other related settings, dates formatting, calender, currency etc.
With CultureInfo.CurrentCulture the culture context for the current thread is given. This is used by functions like ToString() to define the string format of a DateTime value, when no explict culture is provided as a function parameter.

A: CultureInfo contains information on how to deal with data representation in different countries.
As for example date format (in my country it's DD/MM/YYYY, in the US it's MM-DD-YYYY) or floating point number representation (3,14 vs 3.14).

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaStackExchange


The arrival of fantastic, good news. Success and great public acclaim gained through hard work and effort. Hopefulness, and satisfaction in what has been achieved. The surmounting of obstacles through tact and diplomacy rather than use of force. Victory and triumph.
The Six of Wands appears when you have been working hard toward a goal, and success is finally within reach. The recognition you have sought so long is yours. Now you can receive the acclaim, honor and reward that you deserve. If you do not feel close to victory now, know that it is on its way provided you are doing all you can to make it happen. The victory of this card does not have to involve beating someone else. You can triumph over yourself, the environment, or the odds.
The Six of Wands also represents a healthy self-esteem. Feeling good about your accomplishments is an important part of success, but too much pride can lead to arrogance and self-inflation. When you see this card, check that you are not feeling superior to others. It is easy to forget that individual achievement is not really individual at all. Our talents begin in the Divine, develop with the love and support of others, and only in the end express through us.
How can we indulge in excess pride? In The Purgatorio Dante considers pride the first and greatest sin that must be overcome by souls reaching toward heaven.
When the Six of Wands appears, enjoy your triumph, feel good about yourself, but remember Dante's words: "O gifted men, vainglorious for first place, how short a time the laurel crown stays green A breath of wind is all there is to fame here upon earth: it blows this way and that, and when it changes quarter it changes name".