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In this code pattern, we'll demonstrate how to track assets and visualize incoming sensor data from the Watson IoT Platform on a mapping application using Leaflet and ArcGIS.
By completing this code pattern, you'll learn how to track moving assets. A moving asset is any IoT device that can have a GPS module attached to it, such as a shipping truck (or the contents in the shipping truck) or even a wild animal that has been tagged. You'll also learn how to visualize sensor data associated with various connected IoT devices. This sensor data can represent any measurable physical property, such as temperature, sound, air quality, or humidity.
User registers end nodes (IoT devices) by using the mapping UI or an MQTT message. These end nodes represent trackable assets that are capable of publishing location and sensor data.
Express back end subscribes to Watson IoT Platform channel corresponding to one or more end nodes.
The end nodes continuously publish JSON objects that contain location, time, and sensor data to Watson IoT Platform.
Watson IoT Platform persists the data to the Cloudant DB.
Using Leaflet, the mapping UI updates the marker location on map.
Please see detailed instructions in the README.
Learn how to integrate LPWAN networking into a standard wireless network architecture for a large-scale IoT solution.


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Confessions of a Recent Graduate: The Boomerang Blues
Published by Kiandra Brady on February 1, 2020 February 1, 2020
Kiandra Brady
School lasts forever.
At least, that's how it felt when I was stuck in the middle of it. Until one day (16 years later), it was over. With a degree in hand and a wealth of knowledge on MLA format, it was time for me to step into the "real world" and figure out who I would be for the rest of my life.
I felt terrified, unprepared and scared shitless. I didn't know who I was supposed to be for the rest of my life. Time slowly dragged on after graduation, and each passing day reminded me that I was no closer to finding the answers. That expensive ass piece of paper didn't make me feel any less depressed when I couldn't find a full-time job or get out of my parent's house.
And even though it really felt like it, I wasn't alone. We reached out to other recent graduates to understand their feelings after finally walking across that stage.
So whether you've just graduated, you're about to graduate or graduation feels a lifetime away, take a look at their stories and know you're not alone.
Courtesy of Sarah.
Meet Sarah Dempster.
School: University of Georgia, about an hour from home
Major: Economics and International Affairs with a focus on Political Economy
Talk about your time in school.
"I didn't have a plan going into college because I'd been a theatre kid all through high school, but I didn't want to try to pursue a career in performance because it's not a field with a lot of security." Sarah shares that "a student organization I'd been in during college showed me I had an interest in social media. It involved a lot of analytics which I was familiar with from economics. I soon realized I liked the analytics of politics more than the actual policy. Maybe I would work in D.C. doing something, but I was just making it up as I went along."
How'd you feel after graduating?
"There was anxiety of the unknown. I didn't know where I was gonna be after graduating high school, but I knew I would be somewhere that fall. It was an unknown, but it wasn't a scary unknown. With [college graduation], I had no idea what the next step was."
Moving home "I felt like there was a bit of a regression. I felt like I lost some of my independence. It's not that my parents were strict, but sometimes I just wanted to go grocery shopping at 10 p.m. without judgment."
How was the job search?
"For three years, I was in various marketing, advertising and public relations positions. I worked at a big name agency and a boutique PR firm, but I just wasn't able to make it work full-time anywhere. I found myself adrift wondering if I'd wasted the first half of my twenties."
Sarah adds that she "went to networking events and career fairs trying to get internships and connections and finally got a 'big girl job' at an office."
"I went through a lot of anxiety and heartbreak, and the joke's on past Sarah because even though I avoided theatre and chorus in college because it seemed unstable, I ended up in music education now, and that's something I really love."
What's something you'd say to a young person graduating soon?
"Take a deep breath, and don't railroad yourself. Be open to new opportunities and new experiences. If there's something you're passionate about, but you don't think it's the 'right career' because it's not business or whatever, figure out how to make it work. We all get there eventually."
Courtesy of Jah-Mai.
Meet Jah-Mai Davidson.
School: Georgia State and Clark Atlanta, "which is about 38 minutes from home the way that I drive."
Major: Psychology and Sociology
Talk to us about your time in school.
While in school, Jah-Mai stayed in the city on-campus for both his undergraduate and grad school years but came home often.
"I always want to be close to my family. They're a huge support system. Plus I have a lot of friends in Gwinnett County I want to be close to, but forget traffic!"
"I had a full ride to play football at Georgia State, and I graduated early. School hasn't ever really been hard for me. If I needed to study for a test, I would study for a test. School for me has been 'show up, sit in the front, and apply and learn psychology,' so that's what I did."
"My immediate feelings were 'yay I graduated; I don't have to go back to Georgia State,' and it was mostly blissful ignorance. Really what was on my mind was 'now I get to rest.' I didn't have to be an athlete for some point in time in my life." He pauses.
"That was cool for a bit, but the lifestyle of an athlete was someone kicking me in the butt saying 'Okay, now let's do this, now here's your schedule, and you can eat this.' Then real life set in, and it was uncomfortable."
Even his life returning home was uncomfortable. "When I wasn't there, it was really easy for my mom to feed everybody, and I came back and thought ,'Wow. I am literally putting a hindrance on my family by being here' and that sucked."
"Right after graduating, I didn't know what I was going to do. I guess I thought I was just going to get a job somewhere. Sitting at Dillon's, a local sports bar in Gwinnett, I ran into Coach Lee who trained me in high school, and he gave me my first job. Then I worked at a blanket store."
Realizing he still wasn't doing what he wanted to do, Jah-Mai thought about his skills. "I'm really good at football; I have a degree in psychology, so I could be a dope barista, but I… don't want to be a barista." He turned to his religion and asked God what should happen next. That's how he ended up at Clark Atlanta for graduate school.
Jah-Mai says he's just getting started though. "My end goal is to be a psychiatrist, but if God changes it, that's fine. I'm going to celebrate each victory, but there's still more to go."
Jah-Mai has two suggestions.
"Don't be upset if your job isn't in your field. Don't be upset if you're not making as much money as you want in the short term, but don't settle for something that's not what you want. When I tell people I'm going to be a doctor, they say it's great, but it's a lot more school. What is 12 or 15 years of my life compared to the rest of my life? What is that [compared] to being able to do my calling? Life's gonna be what you make it."
"My first college coach, Bill Curry, told me this: 'Get 1 percent better at something every day; it doesn't have to be in every single area, but just get 1 percent better. Whether it's spiritually, physically, emotionally, mentally, socially, do it.' Building like that on yourself compounds tremendously over the days, over the years, over your lifetime."
Courtesy of Makayla.
Meet Makayla Miller.
School: Georgia Southern University, about three hours from home
Major: Multimedia Communications with a Concentration in Journalism
In Statesboro, everything or everyone is "five minutes away from you," so it's easy to be surrounded by people all the time. "Everyone's environment depends on the kind of people you surround yourself with… my environment was straight." While it was easier for her and her friends to see each other in school, they "still make time to see each other" even with a longer commute in Atlanta.
Like one-third of other college students, Makayla shared that she struggled with her mental health while in school. Part of that struggle came from poor time management skills, but recognizing it allowed her to step back and reprioritize. Like Jah-Mai, she sometimes turned to religion.
"I went to church every Sunday and came home to focus on myself." She adds, "junior and senior year I cut down on my social life… to focus on grades; I knew why I was [at school] and that helped my grades." She put "more time into Makayla and less into what other people wanted to do."
Makayla mentions that she chose to go home during long breaks at school. Living at home after graduating "felt different." She adds, "when you're in college, you don't have to answer to anyone." Because of the freedom and independence she'd developed in college, living under someone else's roof "can make you feel like you're in high school again." She stressed that it was nice to be around family again, and that she's "also grateful" for the ability to live at home and save money because everyone doesn't have that same option.
How's the job search?
Makayla is figuring it out. Through some family connections, she gets closer to finding a job in her industry every day. While her students loans were definitely "not worth it," Makayla believes that her degree was worth it because of "the people I met, the visions I had and the experiences I had."
"My field is very out there. If you're not consistent or persistent, you're gonna fall by the wayside." She adds, "If you know your work ethic, you know the work you put in and the work you can produce, you've gotta keep at it."
Courtesy of Austin.
Meet Austin Madison.
School: Longwood University, about three hours from home.
Major: Communications
"My school was weird, but…" he hesitates, "it was the good kind of weird."
He had an eclectic group of friends who watched YouTube videos and hung out in dorm rooms. "I changed my major a handful of times until it was almost time to graduate, and I sort of landed on communications."
Austin admits that he "was fine" after graduating. Although he didn't have a job lined up, he had part-time work and was able to live with his parents. His parents gently nudging him to start paying rent at home was a part of his motivation for leaving the house.
"I had some concern about my degree being useless since I was only finding opportunities to do direct marketing or B2B sales. You know who does direct marketing?" He asks as he takes a turn interviewing me, "the guys outside of Sam's Club asking you if you want to sign up for cable subscriptions."
While he was interviewing for "what turned out to be another scammy direct sales position, [he] dropped off [his] resume at a production company [he] wanted to work for in person."
That company hired him and gave him the chance to move to New York.
"Learn a skill. Make yourself invaluable. Pick up something you can do anywhere like waiting tables or slinging coffee. Don't let time pass without doing something."
According to the CDC, more than four million kids are diagnosed with anxiety. With numbers like that only growing, we need to stop having conversations about what life is "supposed to" look like after graduating and have more about what it actually looks like.
It's about time we stopped punishing young people for not being on the same timeline our parents were on. We are by no means our parents, and there are things our parents loved we've kicked to the curb.
In a 2019 study, TD's Ameritrade found that nearly half of millennial and Gen Z students end up moving back home after college and many are staying closer to home during school.
One of the most ironic things witnessed after graduation is applying for jobs in your field, only for them to tell you they require 10 years of experience. How are we, as college graduates, to gain experience if we cannot get our foot in the doors?
It can be so discouraging at times to know you are qualified, have a degree, fill out hundreds of job applications only to receive rejection letters.
Reading stories like Sarah's, Jah-Mai's, Makayla's and Austin's could relieve some frustrations about not figuring it out.
The best kept secret is that no one has it all figured out.
Live your life anyway.
Tags: collegecollege graddepressionfinding a jobgraduationjobskiandra bradylostmoving homerecent gradunemployed
Kiandra Brady obsesses over behavior. Understanding every reason why people think, say and do what they do is her life's mission. She studied psychology at the University of Georgia, where her appreciation for craft beer was second only to her love of people-watching.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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W Rumunii
 Durnești – gmina w okręgu Botoszany
 Durnești – wieś w okręgu Botoszany, w gminie Santa Mare
 Durnești – wieś w okręgu Botoszany, w gminie Ungureni
 Durnești – wieś w okręgu Botoszany, w gminie Durnești

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


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Home > Debate > 2022 - Ukraine > From borderlands to bloodlands
From borderlands to bloodlands
Thursday 23 April 2015, by Tatiana Zhurzhenko
With Russia's annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in eastern Ukraine, the era of post-Soviet tolerance of blurred identities and multiple loyalties has ended. Borderlands have once again turned into bloodlands.
Since the armed conflict in Donbas between the Kyiv government and pro-Russian separatists, the common discourse about "two Ukraines" separated by history and values looks like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Scepticism about the viability of Ukraine as a nation-state, shared by so many observers inside and outside the country, now appears well-founded. Yet the concentration of the conflict in Donbas and the decline of pro-Russian separatism in other regions in eastern and southern Ukraine also raises the question: what has happened to the East-West divide, and is Donbas all that is left of the "East" today?
In 2002 Transit published Mykola Riabchuk's article "Ukraine: One state, two countries" which was followed by a comment addressing the discourse of two Ukraines in a critical way. [1] I argued that a schematic juxtaposition of a pro-European, Ukrainian speaking West and a still-Soviet, Russified East is highly ideological, that some elements of the Soviet legacy still hold Ukraine together rather than separate it, and that the Russian language and culture can be a legitimate part of Ukrainian national identity.
I also argued that the "other Ukraine", i.e. the East, had no distinctive voice and that it lacked the symbolic resources necessary to construct its own version of a modern national identity. In subsequent years I returned repeatedly to these arguments in connection with my research on transformations, discourses and identities in the Ukrainian-Russian borderlands. Today, like many Ukrainian intellectuals, I ask how the country could have ended up in such a disastrous situation. What did we overlook? Why didn't we notice the obvious vulnerability of Ukraine's integrity? More worryingly still: did we ourselves contribute to the conflict with ideas and interpretations whose destructive potential has only now been revealed?
The Ukrainian historian and public intellectual Andriy Portnov recently criticized the popular discourse of "othering", in which Donbas is "orientalized" and turned into a negative archetype offering easy answers to questions of responsibility and guilt. [2] Certainly, one danger of the current war is that it has encouraged the creation of "enemies" and "collaborators". Yet it has also cleared the intellectual atmosphere and put the debate on Ukrainian identity back to zero. Journalists, academics and writers from eastern Ukraine, many of them Russian speaking but Ukrainian patriots, have had a refreshing effect on the public discourse. Recent events have proved that there is no such entity as "the East" or "the South-East". In facing the separatist threat and Russian aggression, Dnipropetrovsk, Odessa, Kharkiv and other big and small cities have rediscovered their "Ukrainianness" and are manifesting it in various ways. We don't know if Donetsk and Luhansk will remain part of Ukraine. Whether they do or not, the future of Ukraine as a nation is today being decided in the East.
In this article I shall reconsider some of my arguments from 2002 in light of the dramatic events that have meanwhile taken place in the Ukrainian-Russian borderlands. My questions are: why did the East of the country remain largely indifferent to the Euromaidan in Kyiv? What role did the legacy of Soviet modernization play in eastern Ukraine? How did the political and military crisis affect the traditional ambiguity of borderland identities? Why has the idea of Russkiy mir (Russian world), which was marginal in the 1990s, become so appealing in eastern Ukraine in 2014? Lastly, could Donbas be reintegrated into Ukraine if the pro-Russian separatists were defeated?
1. Ukraine's eastern borderlands: The end of ambiguity
Contemporary cultural studies likes the concept of "borderlands" because it seems to fit our complex, interrelated and dynamic world and provides an alternative to the homogenizing logic of nationalism and the related ideal of mono-ethnicity. In recent decades, borderlands have been re-construed as contact zones, as systems of communication and as social networks. As geopolitically amorphous zones "in between", they generate hybrid identities and create political, economic and cultural practices that combine different, often mutually exclusive values. Moreover, borderlands are associated with multiculturalism, cultural authenticity and cosmopolitanism. Yet from the nation-building perspective, their ambiguity is nothing to be celebrated. Mixed and overlapping identities and multiple loyalties pose a challenge to the nationalizing agenda and potentially threaten the integrity of a nation-state.
These two approaches clashed over eastern Ukraine, a former Soviet heartland and since 1991 a new borderland. From the perspective of some Kyiv and Lviv intellectuals the Russian speaking population of eastern Ukraine – which voted for the Communists and for oligarchic parties and was indifferent and even hostile to the national idea – were post-Soviet "creoles" lacking Ukrainian identity. They appeared the main cause of Ukraine's troubled transition from communism, as they still mentally lived in the Soviet empire. "Soviet", industrialized Donbas was often viewed as the antipode of an "authentic", European Ukraine; Kharkiv's cultural ambiguity in particular was perceived as dangerous openness to Russia. From this perspective, Ukraine's eastern borderlands represented the weakness of national identity and a threat to the project of a truly independent Ukraine.
At the same time, the local political and intellectual elites of eastern Ukraine, above all in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk, reinvented their regions as borderlands, first of all in order to justify the close cultural ties and economic cross-border cooperation with Russia. Stressing cultural diversity, bilingualism and the de-politicization of ethnicity, the concept of borderlands also helped legitimize the lack of a strong national identity. The Kharkiv region, historically "Sloboda Ukraine" (seventeenth and eighteenth centuries), was re-narrated as a zone of joint Ukrainian and Russian colonization, characterized by an absence of ethnic conflict and peaceful co-existence between the two languages and cultures. Similarly, references to Soviet internationalism and the preference of class over ethnic identity served to construe Donbas as a "special case" that escaped the logic of the nationalizing state. The rejection of ethnic categorization and the emphasis on local identity was a typical reaction to what was perceived as the "nationalism" of Kyiv and western Ukraine. This defensive borderlands discourse was linked to the trauma of the disintegration of the Soviet Union. It evoked an undifferentiated, common cultural space with a local population that valued blurred or hybrid Ukrainian-Russian, eastern-Slavic, Orthodox or residual Soviet identities.
One can still debate whether it was the weakness of national identity in the East that paved the way to pro-Russian separatism and armed conflict, or whether the cause lies in the Ukrainian national idea was not sufficiently inclusive and failed to accommodate the eastern borderlands. The fact is that, with the annexation of Crimea and the military conflict in the East, the era of post-Soviet ambiguity and tolerance of blurred identities and multiple loyalties has ended. Borderlands have again turned into "bloodlands" (Timothy Snyder) and one can only guess what new constellations will emerge from this crisis.
Twelve years ago I wrote:
The Russian speaking Ukrainians and the Russians in eastern Ukraine are politically loyal to the Ukrainian state, but many of them do neither want to accept the imposition of a Ukrainian cultural identity based on ethnic/linguistic criteria combined with anti-Russian resentments, nor the opposition of a 'European Ukraine' to an 'Asiatic Russia'. [3]
In light of current events, every part of this sentence must be reconsidered. In fact, the loyalty of the Russian-speaking population to the Ukrainian state had never been tried. With the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the "Russian spring" inspired by Moscow, this brutal test has now come – not only for conscripts to the Ukrainian army, volunteers to the National Guard and those who care for wounded soldiers and refugees, but also for those who voted for the Donetsk and Luhansk "people's republics" and who raised arms against the Kyiv government. The majority opted for the Ukrainian state – some driven by considerations of safety and fear of violence, others inspired by a new sense of patriotism, by the pain of national humiliation and by solidarity with those fighting for the nation's territorial integrity. However, there were also those who did – and still do – sympathize with the separatists and with Russia. Some were seduced by promises of higher salaries and pensions, others rediscovered their Russian identity and had never felt at home in the Ukrainian state anyway. One of the difficult questions we will be confronted with after the war is how to live together again in one state.
At the same time, the Russian aggression has done what previous Ukrainian presidents from Kravchuk to Yanukovych had failed to achieve – catalyse the creation of a political nation. Ukrainian identity, which for so long had been associated with ethnicity, language and historical memory, suddenly has become territorial and political and thus inclusive for Russian speakers and Russians, as well as for Ukrainian citizens with other ethnic origins. A good example are the Crimean Tatars, who remained largely loyal to Kyiv after the Russian occupation of Crimea and are now perceived and celebrated as "true" Ukrainians. Moreover, cultural affiliation to the eastern neighbour felt by many Russian-speaking Ukrainians does not rule out anti-Russian sentiments. For the Russian-speaking urban middle class, along with small and medium-sized business owners and the intellectual elites in the East, Russia's antidemocratic tendencies, its self-isolation and its growing hostility to the West make it easier to identify with a (potentially) European Ukraine. However, there are still many for whom Russia is attractive: those who share anti-western attitudes, appreciate Putin's "strong hand" and are nostalgic for Russia's military glory. These people mainly belong to older generations and typically have lower levels of education. Yet the ugly face of pro-Russian separatism, the everyday terror and the anomy it has brought to Donbas, have had a sobering effect on many potential Russophiles. The Russian aggression, associated with the collective humiliation of the territorial loss of Crimea, has become a factor of national consolidation. According to several opinion polls conducted in March 2014, the overwhelming majority of Ukrainian citizens (85 per cent) rejected the annexation of Crimea; even in the East, only 24 per cent approved of Russia's actions on the peninsula. [4]
Perhaps even more important than the shift in the public mood is the emergence of an active pro-Ukrainian minority in big Russian-speaking cities such as Odessa, Dnipropetrovsk and Kharkiv. Former Euromaidan activists remain the motor of democratic change. Some have entered local government, others have created strong networks and grassroots groups that support the Ukrainian army, nurse the wounded and help refugees. Rather than focusing obsessively on language and historical memory, as was the case after the Orange Revolution, these groups are concentrating on the very practical issues of public safety, control of local authorities and humanitarian work. The Ukrainian identity they are performing is political and civic rather than ethnic and cultural. One indicator of this shift is that Ukrainian cultural symbols such as the vyshyvanka – the traditional embroidered shirt – have lost their ethnic particularity and become political symbols of resistance and national pride.
2. Upon the ruins of Soviet modernity
The Maidan 2013/14 has been widely interpreted as a delayed attempt to complete the de-Sovietization of Ukraine and to catch up with the 1989 revolutions in eastern and central Europe. Demands for the lustration of the ruling elite and the banning of the Communist Party reflect the popular view that almost all the problems facing Ukraine are connected to the Soviet legacy. Although most of the remaining Lenin monuments were destroyed as the Euromaidan rolled over the country, in the East – notably in Kharkiv, Luhansk, Donetsk as well as dozens of small towns in Donbas – they were not only left standing but received a new lease of life as sites of pro-Russian mobilization and symbols of discontent with the Kyiv government. However, is the clash of values and ideologies in Ukraine really about a final farewell to the remnants of the Soviet system?
Twelve years ago, opposing the thesis of the backwardness and inferiority of the eastern part of the "two Ukraines", I argued that Ukraine had inherited both the industrial, communicational and cultural infrastructure of a modern nation as well as a framework of collective identity from the Soviet era and that this heritage is not necessary something negative. At that time, I also believed that eastern Ukraine, with its industrial and academic potential, human resources and modern urban culture, was a vital part of Ukraine's European project. Eastern Ukrainian cities referred proudly to the legacy of Soviet urbanization and the Ukrainian modernism of the 1920s and early-1930s. Built in 1928, Kharkiv's Derzhprom (in Russian Gosprom) – the former House of State Industry – was one of the first skyscrapers in the early Soviet Union and is still a landmark and a symbol of the city, which likes to present itself as the "first capital of Ukraine" (1919-1934). In Donbas, industrial culture and the working-class ethos formed in the Soviet era was a source of collective pride and a cornerstone of local identity.
Today, more than two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I am no longer so optimistic. Modernizing Soviet modernity is an almost impossible task, as the epic failure of Dmitri Medvedev's programme for Russian modernization demonstrates.
Of course, de-industrialization is a global trend and not something peculiar to the post-Soviet space. In developed countries, old industrial regions also suffer from structural problems – think of Detroit or the Ruhr valley in Germany. Reviving these regions requires investment, creativity and political will. However, in the case of eastern Ukraine, post-Soviet privatization and the local version of neo-liberal economics that went with it generally failed to bring a solution: on the contrary, the complex problems facing these regions were exacerbated. Rather than being modernized, the industrial assets and facilities inherited from the Soviet era were exploited to their limit. Post-Soviet capitalism in eastern Ukraine was a symbiosis of "red directors" and criminal clans; trade unions and institutionalized workers' movements were largely absent. [5] Today, those lucky enough to have a job work on temporary contracts and are entirely at the mercy of the management. Many small, mono-industrial towns – especially in Donbas – have become depopulated; people have either left to work in Russia, joined smuggler gangs or turned to small-scale subsistence agriculture. The urban infrastructure is obsolete and local mayors are considered successful when they provide some cosmetic improvements to city centres. The European football championship of 2012 left behind a few stadiums and hotels in Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv and Lviv, but had nothing like the impact on the economy promised by the Yanukovych government.
The Ukrainian variant of post-Soviet capitalism corresponds to a specific type of political system rooted in eastern Ukraine. Donbas in particular lacked political diversity and competition, and it provided the model that the regional elites tried to impose on the entire country. The political monopoly of the Party of Regions, which represented the interests of a single oligarchic clan, prevented the emergence of political alternatives. As the strongest political holding company in the country, the Party of Regions could afford to ignore the electorate and to disregard ideology. As the Ukrainian political scientists Oleksandr Fisun and Oleksiy Krysenko have argued, this model laid a time bomb under the Ukrainian state, as elections turned into formal procedures for legitimizing an unfair and opaque system of power. [6] Social mobility was blocked and the population was employed at outdated, Soviet-era enterprises heavily subsidized out of the state budget. Unlike in other regions, there were almost no alternative elites in Donbas, which explains why local Euromaidans were marginal and why the anti-Kyiv protests that started in spring 2014 mainly attracted the losers of the post-Soviet transition. Similar tendencies could be observed elsewhere in the East of the country, for example in Kharkiv, where the governor Mykhailo Dobkin and mayor Hennadiy Kernes monopolized the political resources and took control of all financial flows, both public and private.
The Party of Regions, which claimed to represent Russian speaking eastern Ukraine, reflected the anti-democratic, anti-liberal political culture of their electorate which was interested less in representation than in protection. Paternalism – from food packages handed out to pensioners before elections to promises of protection from the "fascist threat" coming from western Ukraine – was the cornerstone of the Party of Regions' apolitical politics. Its bosses tried to ignore the Euromaidan protests and hired people – usually public service employees – to demonstrate in support of the Yanukovych government. Criminal bully-boys were used to harass Euromaidan activists and beat up protesters on the streets. Known as titushki, these former sportsmen were often informally affiliated to the police and used as body guards and thug squads in local business wars, once again revealing the mafia background of parts of the local political elite.
Donbas turned out to be an extreme case. Yet many other eastern and southern Ukrainian cities – their frustrated populations still suffering from the economic consequences of the Soviet collapse, their business and political milieus controlled by Donetsk "overseers" planted in the local police and security services – provided the social and political basis for a Ukrainian Vendée. Hence, it is not the remnants of Soviet modernity that prevents the Europeanization of Ukraine but a monstrous neoplasm that has grown upon its ruins. That is why the aggressive anti-Soviet rhetoric of many Euromaidan activists misses the target. For them, the Lenin monuments are markers of a Soviet identity that has survived in the economically depressed industrial enclaves of the Ukrainian East. But what is currently confronting the Kyiv government has little to do with Soviet ideology and values; instead, it represents a phenomenon referred to by the Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov ten years ago as "negative identity" [7] which operates primarily with the category of the "enemy". From the perspective of pro-Russian protesters, this is the "Banderists" and "nationalists" from Kyiv and western Ukraine, who want to destroy "our monuments" and steal "our past". The Lenin monuments thus have become a site and symbol of pro-Russian mobilization – "empty signifiers" that carry no ideological value but mark local identity as being "anti-Kyiv".
3. Collective memory and political culture
The popular discourse of "two Ukraines" assumes that the East and the West have different cultural identities based on distinctive historical memories and different, often mutually exclusive values. The East, so it goes, has no tradition of a Ukrainian nationalist movement, its population, unlike that of the West, has internalized Soviet identity and supressed the collective trauma of the Holodomor. What especially divides the East and West, according to this discourse, is the respective collective memories of World War II and the irreconcilable narratives of heroism and suffering. Indeed, while western Ukraine honours the heroes of the UPA, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which fought for an independent Ukraine against both Hitler and Stalin, eastern Ukraine shares with the Russia the heroic narrative of the Great Patriotic war.
Twelve years ago, to me and many others this discourse seemed potentially dangerous and threatening to Ukrainian integrity. However nobody had a premonition of how its results would finally materialize. History was exploited politically, particularly during the presidential campaign of 2004 and the Orange revolution. Both camps operated a detrimental identity politics that essentialized the East-West division of the country and turned it into a political weapon. Old clichés about "nationalist" Galicia and the "fascist threat" were re-heated and pitted against the stereotypes propagated by the other side about "rootless", "criminal" Donbas. This memory war poisoned the public discourse for years.
The Party of Regions, which had strengthened its position in the East and the South in the local elections of 2006, continued to label its opponents as "fascist" and to present itself as an "anti-fascist" force. The local identity politics pursued by the Party of Regions in their electoral fortresses of Donetsk and Luhansk drew on a mixed repertoire of neo-Soviet symbols and narratives (such as the Great Patriotic War) and conservative Russian Orthodox values. It evoked the ethos of a hardworking people who "feed the rest of Ukraine" and a legacy of Russian language and culture that allegedly needing "protection from the Ukrainian nationalists".
The election of Viktor Yanukovych as president in 2010 barely altered the situation. Because he had little to offer western and central Ukraine and had no coherent identity politics at the national level, he continued to concentrate on his clientele in eastern Ukraine. Hence, the identity of Donbas continued to be defined against the "alien" cultural and political values of western Ukraine.
The war of identities that for years had been smouldering beneath the surface finally erupted in the winter of 2013/14, when the Euromaidan provided a new source for eastern phobias about radical Ukrainian nationalism. Yet beyond this highly ideological East-West dichotomy, which draws on World War II and the Soviet Union's battle against Nazi Germany, there are other memories that actually matter more and explain better mass attitudes to the Euromaidan in the East. Both individual and collective, these are memories of perestroika and the disintegration of the Soviet Union. The latter is remembered in the East not as a new beginning (the birth of an independent Ukraine) but as a rupture of the existing order, as an economic collapse and painful split with Russia. In eastern Ukrainian cities, where the Russian market matters a great deal for many big companies and small enterprises, fears of economic collapse resonated with the memories of the recession of the 1990s. As the violent confrontation in Kyiv escalated, parallels were evoked with Russia's constitutional crisis of 1993, when the political stand-off between president Yeltsyn and the parliament ended with street-fighting and the parliament building being stormed by the army. Despite national independence, many people in eastern and southern Ukraine experienced these events as part of their own history. Other, more recent memories of the Orange Revolution and Yushchenko's presidency also played a role in how the Euromaidan protests were perceived. Many eastern Ukrainians associate this period with the failure of local "Orange" politicians to fight corruption and carry out reforms, seeing it as a time of shrill and fruitless political conflict and endless intrigue. The relative stability that accompanied the consolidation of the Party of Regions was in fact welcomed by a "silent majority" in the East. Yet, while hundreds of pages have been written on the dividing memories of World War II in Ukraine, no research has so far been done on the collective memory of the recent past and its impact on local political culture and cultural identity.
Part of the political culture in eastern Ukraine is the conspiratorial mind-set that is also typical of post-Soviet Russia. Conspiracy theories attribute the collapse of the Soviet system to the secret operations of the CIA, western governments and the world Jewry. Similarly, the Orange Revolution was widely perceived as a western plot aimed against Russia and its geopolitical interests. Nine years on, the Euromaidan protests fell neatly into the same interpretative scheme. Widely disseminated by the Russian media in Ukraine, it affected the attitude of eastern Ukrainians to the events in Kyiv. Even those who refused to believe that the Euromaidan was the product of a US conspiracy found it difficult to accept that the protests came from below, rather than being orchestrated by powerful and clandestine actors. Behind this attitude was not just mistrust in public politics, but a firm conviction that action, whether individual or collective, cannot change anything. As the example of Kharkiv demonstrates this mixture of resignation and cynicism was cultivated by local political elites.
The last mass protests in Kharkiv were in the Summer of 2010, when citizens took to the streets against the privatization of the Gorky Park. It was the last sign of resistance to the hegemony of the Party of Regions, which was subsequently consolidated by the election of Hennadiy Kernes as mayor. During the time that opposition leader Yulia Tymoshenko was imprisoned in a local hospital, the inhabitants of Kharkiv learned to perceive politics as a never ending show. Every day, a group of ardent Tymoshenko supporters, accompanied by teams of bored journalists, gathered outside the court and the hospital in which their heroine was detained, in order to stage the latest episode of the soap opera named Julia. When the governor and the mayor of Kharkiv flew to Moscow at the end of February 2014, a call went out to hurry to the city zoo with food, since the animals were supposedly starving to death on account of the empty city coffers. It seems that sympathy for animals compensated for lack of confidence in politicians and solidarity between citizens.
4. Exporting the "Russkiy mir"
The discourse of "two Ukraines" always found an echo on the pro-Russian side of the political spectrum and was shared and amplified by numerous politicians and journalists in Russia itself. In my commentary of 2002, I cited a Ukrainian politician who had argued that Ukraine essentially belongs to the "Slavic-Orthodox civilization" and therefore has a natural commitment to Russian cultural values, while Ukrainian nationalism, especially in its most radical and traditionally anti-Russian, Galician form, serves as a tool of the West to destroy this civilization. At the time, this view seemed politically marginal and not really dangerous; apart for the Ukrainian Communist Party, which remained openly nostalgic for the Soviet Union, no serious political force in Ukraine supported re-unification with Russia. The state of the Russian economy was no less dire than the Ukrainian one, while the war in Chechnya and the series of terrorist attacks in Russian cities made Ukrainians appreciate the peace and relative stability at home. In the 1990s, Russia's ruling elites had other worries than Ukrainian independence. Humiliated by defeat in the Cold War, proponents of Russian messianism remained marginal, while Russian nationalists, despite some of them having fought in Abkhazia, Transdniestria and Yugoslavia, had little influence on mainstream politics in Russia.
The Orange Revolution and Moscow's failure to ensure the victory of the pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanukovych radically changed Moscow's perspective on Ukraine. The revolution was seen as a western coup aimed at undermining Russia's influence in its legitimate sphere of geopolitical interest. The pro-western Ukrainian elites were perceived as "traitors" of Slavic-Orthodox civilization, and associations were evoked with the Ukrainian national heroes Ivan Mazepa and Stepan Bandera, both of whom had turned against the Russian / Soviet state. Russian media presented the Orange government in Kyiv as a direct heir to the "Banderists", the Ukrainian nationalists who had "shot Soviet soldiers in the back". Moscow thus drew on old patterns of Soviet propaganda about Ukrainian nationalism and the black and white narrative of the "Great Patriotic War". The aim was to discredit pro-western Ukrainian elites as archaic nationalists and to present even moderate and democratic Ukrainian nationalism as "fascism" threatening Russians and Russian speakers living in Ukraine. As one can see, the rhetoric of the Kremlin was more or less congruent with the identity politics of the Party of Regions.
After the Orange Revolution, Moscow increased its support for pro-Russian groups and organizations in Ukraine, especially those who actively opposed the pro-western course of the Ukrainian government and defended the rights of Russian speakers against "Ukrainization". Protests in support of the Russian language, against NATO and against the glorification of Bandera and the UPA were organized along with the vandalization of "nationalist" monuments. The aim was not so much to impress the local public and the Ukrainian authorities as to create media events that gave the impression of strong opposition to Yushchenko's politics in Ukrainian society. United by an "anti-Orange" agenda, various actors – ranging from pro-Russian political parties (the Communists and Natalia Vitrenko's populist Progressive Socialist Party) to Soviet veterans' associations, Russian Cossacks and Orthodox brotherhoods – created a heterogeneous yet active, even aggressive milieu. In 2014, this became the breeding ground for pro-Russian separatism.
Denying Ukraine its distinctive national identity, Russia suggested alternative identities instead. They were largely based on the concept of Russkiy mir (Russian world), which during the 2000s advanced rapidly from being a marginal intellectual discourse to a new state ideology supported by the Russian authorities and the Russian Orthodox Church. [8] Russkiy mir is an ambiguous and open concept that initially signified "Russia" beyond its state borders, but that later became a synonym for the construct of an Russian-Orthodox-Slavic civilization. Broadly speaking, Russkiy mir refers to a supranational community united by Russian culture and language, by historical memory and traditional values, by the Orthodox faith and loyalty to the Russian state (which includes the Russian Empire as well as the USSR). Depending on the context, Russkiy mir has various connotations, ranging from the neutral ethno-cultural to the imperial and explicitly revanchist. In the interpretation of the Russian Orthodox Church, which is prominently represented in the Russian media, the three eastern Slavic nations – Russia, Ukraine and Belarus – constitute the core of Russkiy mir, with a spiritual and cultural fundament going back to prince Vladimir's baptism of Kyiv in 988. Ukraine (with the exception of Greek Catholic Galicia) is thus represented as part of a thousand year-old Russian civilization. These ties allegedly run far deeper than any recent, "artificial" construction of national identity. The Russian Orthodox Church is not the only institution spreading the ideology of Russkiy mir beyond Russia's borders. Another one is the Russkiy Mir Foundation which is a state sponsored organization created in 2007 by the Russian foreign ministry and ministry of culture. It has branches in several Ukrainian cities, mainly in the East and South and actively cooperates with Russian language schools. Formally focusing its activities on the support of Russian language and culture, the foundation also promotes the Russian narrative of imperial history and Russia's interpretation of World War II. Similarly, Russian universities and institutions of higher education have branches in Ukraine (mostly in Crimea) that promote Russian ideas and cultural values. Not least, Russian cultural products (especially works of popular literature, films and television serials) dominate the Ukrainian market and serve to export Russian imperial history and Russian patriotism, to glorify the Russian and Soviet army and security services, and to excite anti-westernism.
After the annexation of Crimea, many commentators noted a new tone in the official Russian rhetoric. Appealing to Ukrainian citizens of ethnic Russian origin, Vladimir Putin legitimized his actions on the grounds that it had been necessary to protect his "compatriots while simply ignoring the new Kyiv government. Russkiy mir was thus reduced to ethnic Russian nationalism that bluntly equates Russians and Russian-speakers and denies the very existence of Ukraine – at least to the east of Dnieper. To re-identify this "other Ukraine", Russian media at first used the geographic designation "Yugo-Vostok" (south-East), which was still Kyiv-centred. Later, the much more powerful, geo-historical concept Novorossiya was coined which reduces several Ukrainian oblasts (Donetsk, Luhansk, Odessa, Mykolaiv, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv) to an "historical" region attributed to Russia. [9] Far from harmless territorial branding, the creators of the concept of Novorossiya intend to constitute a new (geo)political reality. [10] Meanwhile, some sort of alternative nation-building is underway, including the foundation of formal state structures. A "Donetsk People's Republic" has been proclaimed along with a "Luhansk People's Republic", while other "republics", for example in Odessa and Kharkiv, may emerge any time. These entities cherish their own collective mythology, their heroes and martyrs (mainly invented by Russian media), and even have their own national mission: anti-fascism.
5. Revolution, war and peace
Have the Euromaidan protests deepened the old division between East and West, or have they helped consolidate the Ukrainian nation? The pro-Yanukovych media presented the protests in Ukraine as a radical nationalist movement with its mass basis in western Ukraine. While radical nationalism was certainly present on the Maidan, the overwhelming majority protested under a democratic banner – for a pro-European Ukraine and against government corruption, police violence, unconstitutional restrictions of human rights and media freedom. These forces were also reflected at the symbolic level: while controversial nationalist symbols such as Stepan Bandera and the red and black flag of the OUN-UPA [11] were certainly present on the Maidan, pro-European symbolism (especially during the first stage of the protests) and Cossack tradition (the Maidan as reincarnation of the Zaporozhian Cossack Sich) dominated. [12] According to a survey conducted by the Demokratychni Initsiatyvy Foundation in December 2013, while western Ukraine was most strongly represented on the Kyiv Maidan (51.8 per cent during the mass rallies and 42.4 per cent among the permanent protesters), central Ukraine (30.9 per cent and 34.4 per cent) and eastern and southern Ukraine (17.3 per cent and 23.2 per cent) were also present. [13] Moreover, in the final stage of the mass revolt against the Yanukovych government, demonstrations also took place in cities in the East and South. The Lviv historian Vasyl Rasevych suggested that the time had come when destructive identity politics drawing on irreconcilable historical memories were ready to be replaced by a unifying narrative: "The Revolution of Dignity and the war for a sovereign independent Ukraine – this is already common Ukrainian history, the history of an emerging political nation, the history of the victory of Ukrainian civil society." [14]
However, this new unifying narrative of a victorious revolution against a corrupt authoritarian regime came too late for Crimea. There, the scarecrow of Ukrainian radical nationalism, in the form of the Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector), revived fears of ethnic violence and Ukrainization among the Russian speaking population. The collapse of the ancien régime and some first unfortunate steps of the new Kyiv government (such as repealing the 2012 law giving Russian the status of a regional language, a decision that was immediately revoked) seemed to confirm these fears. These mistakes were exploited by Russia in a well-prepared operation that ended with the sweeping annexation of Crimea, despite the protests of the pro-Ukrainian minority and the Crimean Tatars.
In the East and the South of the country, the power shift brought different developments. In Donetsk and Luhansk, the local bosses of the Party of Regions encouraged mass protests against Kyiv, which they used as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the new government. In Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Odessa and Kharkiv, former counter-elites and opportunists from the Party of Regions managed to stabilize the situation. What helped to keep the aggressive pro-Russian minority at bay was not so much support by the pro-Ukrainian part of the local population as the common effort of the local elites to prevent the collapse of the state institutions, to secure the loyalty of the police and security services, and to demonstrate determination and responsibility. A new alliance of local business, civil society and former counter-elites emerged around the basic agenda of providing peace, stability and security – an agenda that has turned out to be de facto pro-Ukrainian. Especially telling is the case of Dnipropetrovsk, where the local oligarch Ihor Kolomoyskiy used his financial and organizational resources not only to prevent a pro-Russian separatist coup along the lines of Donetsk and Luhansk, but also to help active pro-Ukrainian forces. In this way, an industrial, Soviet-type city that until recently voted for the Party of Regions has become a bastion of civic Ukrainian nationalism. [15] In Kharkiv, now a frontline city, the local Euromaidan transformed into a grassroots network of volunteer groups supporting the poorly equipped Ukrainian army and caring for wounded soldiers and the flood of refugees from Donbas. In Odessa, which is only slowly recovering from the violent clashes of 2 May that cost dozens of lives, the new authorities and civic activists have initiated a public investigation and a reconciliation process intended to heal the city's trauma. [16]
One can say, then, that the "East" or "South-East" in the old sense no longer exists. The dramatic developments of spring 2014 have demonstrated that collective identities are situational and contextual and can rapidly change, especially under conditions of territorial secession, external aggression and military conflict.
The ongoing war in Donbas will have profound and long-term consequences for the region. While the armed conflict has certainly deepened anti-Ukrainian hostilities in some parts of the local population, it has taught other parts to appreciate security, stability and strong state institutions. If the Kyiv government and its army and police force prove to be a guarantee of security for the population, the first step along the long road of re-integrating Donbas into Ukraine may have been made.
However, armed conflict has also perpetuated the "othering" of Donbas in public discourse. [17] While Russia is a driving force behind the separatist movement, a significant portion of the local population actively or passively has supported the Donetsk and Luhansk "republics", at least at the beginning. While Ukrainian liberals continue to discuss how to win over the local population to the national project and to inculcate Ukrainian identity, nationalists cultivate social hatred and even consider mass cleansing. Tens of thousands of refugees have flooded Ukrainian cities, while hundreds of Donbas men continue to fight against the Ukrainian army. In this strange war, there is no front line: civilians holding out in the conflict zone are either separatist sympathizers or their hostages, depending on your point of view. Hundreds of them have already been killed or wounded; thousands have lost their property. One way to cope with the horrible reality of war is to blame the victims: they are paying the price for their pro-Russian sympathies. And many families in western and central Ukraine do not understand why their sons and husbands should die for Donbas, when it does not even consider itself part of Ukraine. Yet the war has already imprinted Donbas on the imaginary national map, with local toponyms such as Sloviansk, Krasnyi Luch or Torez now familiar to the whole country. Donbas has become the land where Ukrainian independence, democracy and the future of the nation are being defended, and therefore, from now on, Donbas is Ukraine. [18]
from-borderlands-to-bloodlands_a3889.pdf (PDF - 424.3 kb)
Extraction PDF [->article3889]
[1] See Transit: Europäische Revue 23 (2002): 172-88 and 196-202. Republished in Eurozine: l
[2] Andriy Portnov, "The Ukraine and its 'far East': On Galician reductionism and its genealogy" (in Ukrainian), in: Historians in UA, 1 August 2014;
[3] Loc. Cit. (fn. 1), 201
[4] Source: Tyzhden, 31 March 2014, tyzhden.ua/News/106351
[5] Cf. Kerstin Zimmer, Machteliten im ukrainischen Donbass: Bedingungen und Konsequenzen der Transformation einer alten Industrieregion, Münster 2006.
[6] Oleksandr Fisun, Oleksiy Krysenko, "Causes of destabilization in South and Eastern regions of Ukraine", 29 April 2014; www.kennan.kiev.ua/Analytics/140429...
[7] Cf. Lev Gudkov, Negative Identity (in Russian), Moscow 2004
[8] For more on the ideology of Russkiy Mir in relation to Ukraine see: Yablons'kyi et al., "Ukraine and the Russkiy Mir project: Analitychna dopovid", Kyiv: National Institute of Strategic Studies, 2014; Wilfried Jilge, "Die Ukraine aus Sicht der 'Russkij Mir'", www.bpb.de/internationales/europa/r...
[9] The borders of historical Noworossija do not coincide with this newly invented concept, however
[10] Maria Snegovaya, "Creating a new political reality", in: Vedomosti, 19 May 2014;
[11] OUN: Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. The faction of the OUN led by Stepan Bandera organized the first partisan units that were combined in February 1943 to form the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA)
[12] Wilfried Jilge, "Geschichtspolitik auf dem Majdan: Politische Emanzipation und nationale Selbstvergewisserung", in: Zerreißprobe Ukraine: Konflikt, Krise, Krieg, eds. Manfred Sapper and Volker Weichsel, Osteuropa, nos. 5-6 (2014): 239-58
[13] Cf.
[14] Vasyl Rasevych, "New heroes and a new common history" (in Ukrainian), zaxid.net
[15] Cf. Andriy Portnov, "Dnipropetrovsk: Where Ukraine starts from", gefter.ru, 27 June 2014;
[16] See Tanya Richardson, "Odessa's two big differences (and a few small ones): Life after the Maidan and 2 May",
[17] Andriy Portnov, "Ukraine and its 'Far East': On Galician reductionism and its genealogy",
[18] Stanislav Kmet, "The Ukrainization of Donbas" 8 September 2014, durdom.in.ua/ru/main/article/articl...
Social Movement (Ukraine): Looking back at 2022
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Tatiana Zhurzhenko
is a political scientist at the University of Vienna and Research Director at the Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna. She is the guest editor of the Eurozine focal point Politics of border making and (cross-) border identities and one of the editors of Russia in global dialogue. Her most recent book is Borderlands into Bordered Lands: Geopolitics of Identity in Post-Soviet Ukraine, Stuttgart 2010.


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California community colleges must do more to help students avoid remedial courses
MICHAEL BURKE
Los Angeles City College
A majority of California's community colleges are not yet fully implementing a law meant to help students enroll in transfer-level classes without first taking remedial classes, the community college system's Board of Governors learned Tuesday.
At those colleges, which include at least 79 of the system's 115 degree-granting colleges, many students are not entering and completing transfer-level classes in English and math within a year — a key goal of the law.
Aisha Lowe, the community college system's vice chancellor of educational services and support, told the board of governors during a meeting Tuesday that those colleges will be asked to submit plans this fall detailing how they will achieve full implementation by fall 2022. The system's 116th college, Calbright College, is online-only and not affected by the law because it doesn't offer degrees.
Advocacy groups, including the nonprofit law firm Public Advocates and the California Acceleration Project, an organization advocating for the elimination of remedial classes, have called on the chancellor's office to toughen the regulations in a way that would put more of a burden on colleges to enroll students in transfer-level courses, which are classes for which students receive credit toward a bachelor's degree.
Jetaun Stevens, an attorney with Public Advocates, said there is a "statewide problem" of colleges enrolling too many students in remedial classes, especially in math.
The law, passed in 2017, says colleges can't require students to take remedial classes unless they are deemed "highly unlikely to succeed" in transfer-level classes. The adoption of the law followed research showing that students placed in remedial classes rarely completed community college, while other research showed that those students could have passed transfer-level courses if they had been able to enroll.
Under AB 705, students can also access academic support by simultaneously enrolling in what's called a co-requisite course for extra help.
The issue is important in California because the state's community colleges enroll 2 million students, with many of them seeking to transfer. If students are forced to take non-credit remedial classes, it is often a significant barrier to completing their associate degree, transferring and earning a bachelor's degree, studies have found.
The chancellor's office also plans to review and perhaps revise regulations governing the law, including possibly toughening the restrictions to make it harder for colleges to enroll students in remedial courses.
While the state's community colleges are governed by locally elected boards of trustees, the statewide chancellor's office can establish regulations governing how the local districts implement AB 705.
Lowe said Tuesday that maximizing the number of students who enroll in those transfer-level classes "is best for students and ultimately best for our colleges."
"And so we're going to lean into this work and ask our colleges to have the necessary conversations they need to have locally to get to full implementation," she added.
Since the law was passed, significant progress has been made across the system. Last year, research from the Public Policy Institute of California revealed that, as of fall 2019, the share of students passing transfer-level math and English classes had more than doubled since 2015.
Still, advocates and leaders in the community college system have stressed that full implementation remains a distant goal.
Not there yet
Lowe said Tuesday that, in December, the chancellor's office asked all 115 degree-granting community colleges to submit data on student access to transfer-level classes, which are also referred to as gateway courses.
Specifically, the chancellor's office requested data for students who entered college with low high school grade-point averages. The focus was on those students, Lowe said, because colleges could deem them unlikely to succeed in transfer-level classes. The colleges were asked to report data for several subsets of students, such as science, technology, engineering and math students seeking to transfer. Out of the 115 colleges, seven of them did not enroll any students in remedial classes. Lowe said those colleges are considered to be fully implementing the law.
The remaining colleges were listed as not implementing the law or reporting data with too small of sample sizes.
"What these results show us is that enrolling in pre-gateway courses is not the best option and does not maximize a student entering and completing the gateway courses in one year," Lowe said.
The chancellor's office plans to send memos to each of the 115 colleges. The seven colleges that are fully implementing the law will be asked to share more about their methods. Twenty-nine colleges with sample sizes that were too small will be asked to examine more data. And the remaining 79 will be required to submit a plan explaining how they will get to full implementation by fall 2022, Lowe said.
Students not told of options
Keishaun Turner, a student at Cosumnes River College in Sacramento, has been stuck in remedial math classes for two years.
In spring 2019, Turner enrolled in intermediate algebra, a remedial math class, but struggled and didn't complete it. AB 705 then took full effect in fall 2019. At that point, Turner should have been informed of his right to enroll in a transfer-level class, such as pre-calculus or statistics, said Stevens, the attorney with Public Advocates.
Turner said that never happened in his case.
Courtesy of Public Advoctaes
Keishaun Turner
"None of my counselors ever mentioned AB 705. So I didn't even know that was an option I had. If I knew about the law, I would've told them to put me in pre-calculus," he said in an interview. Pre-calculus is a transfer-level class. If he needed extra support, Turner also could have enrolled in a co-requisite class while taking pre-calculus.
Last month, Public Advocates singled out Cosumnes River College and its district, the Los Rios Community College District, which includes that college and three others. In a letter Stevens wrote to the college, the firm alleged that the college is placing too many students in remedial math classes and isn't informing students of their right to enroll in transfer-level courses.
At the college, just 32% of first-time math students completed transfer-level math in fall 2019, according to the firm.
In the letter, Stevens said that none of the district's orientation or advisement materials mention AB 705 or students' right to enroll in transfer-level classes.
The district's college catalogs also "inadequately describe students' rights under AB 705," the law firm alleged. AB 705 requires that colleges include information about a student's course options "in the college catalog, in orientation and advisement materials, on the college's website, and in any written communication by counseling services."
In a statement to EdSource, a spokesman for the Los Rios district said that while the district maintains it is "clearly in compliance with AB 705," it is working to do better.
"We can and will improve upon our current practices and are actively engaged in robust conversations in our district and colleges on strategies to build upon our initial success," said Gabe Ross, the Los Rios spokesman.
Data published this spring by the Public Policy Institute of California reiterates that there are still too many students who are not enrolled in the courses needed to transfer to four-year universities.
At about two dozen colleges, 65% or fewer first-time math students were enrolled in transfer-level courses in fall 2019, according to PPIC. At some colleges, that rate was as low as 42%.
The PPIC data also shows that there is significant variation from one college to the next, even when it comes to nearby colleges. For example, at Coastline College in Orange County, 61% of first-time math students took a transfer-level class in fall 2019, while at Orange Coast College, just 4 miles away, the rate was 92%.
"We know that we're in a much better place than we were prior to AB 705. There have been pretty dramatic improvements," said Olga Rodriguez, a senior research fellow at PPIC. "But it really varies across the state."
Lowe said the chancellor's office will ask the compliant colleges how they managed to do it.
"What were the conversations they had among the leadership on their campus or the conversations they had among their faculty? So, really delving into the practices that those colleges have been able to implement so that we can identify models, templates and best practices," Lowe said.
The chancellor's office also plans to review the regulations that govern AB 705 with an eye toward recommending changes. The board of governors approved those regulations in 2019 and could update them if needed.
Public Advocates, the law firm, has requested several amendments to the regulations. For example, the firm has requested that the board change a line that says colleges shall not "authorize placement" of students in remedial courses. The firm wants it instead to say that colleges shall not "authorize the enrollment" of those students in remedial classes.
The seemingly small change could make a big difference, Stevens said, because students like Turner are not necessarily placed in remedial classes but end up enrolling in them because they aren't aware of options. Under this change, the burden would be placed on the colleges to make sure students enroll in transfer-level classes.
"That would close a big loophole," Stevens said.
John Hetts, who oversees data and research for the community college system, said during Tuesday's meeting that some colleges that are succeeding in implementing the law have found a way to direct more students to transfer-level classes.
Those colleges advise all students to take transfer-level courses and if a student wants to take a remedial class, that student must fill out a form saying the student is taking the class against the college's advice, Hetts said.
"I think that kind of system is one that would maintain the choice of students for those who really want to take a slower pathway, but not allow it to happen as a default," Hetts said.
College ReadinessCommunity CollegesCollege & CareersPostsecondary SuccessAB 705California Community Colleges Chancellor's OfficeCommunity CollegesRemedial education


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Susan Wagner sweeps boys and girls Island PSAL Track titles
By Jason Paderon
Susan Wagner proved that they're class of the Island in the PSAL, winning both the boys and the girls borough championships in convincing fashion Saturday at Icahn Stadium.
Christopher Adekoya starred on the day, scoring 30 of the Falcons' 266.30 points, taking first in the long jump (19-8 ¼), the 200-meter dash (23.16 seconds) and the 100 (11.33 seconds).
Gallery: 2019 Staten Island PSAL Championships
The 800 saw one of the more exciting finishes as freshman Michael Rodriguez-King held off a hard-charging Caleb Rojas of MSIT for the title by a thousandth of a second — Rodriguez-King at 2:00.80, Rojas at 2:00.81. It was breakthrough performance for the senior Rojas whose previous best was 2:04.72.
MSIT took second place overall with 241.20 points led by Brandon Marks who fell just short of triple gold, settling for second in the discus (114-7) after winning both the shot put (41-8) and the javelin (132-5).
Casey Weiler also tallied 20 points, taking both the triple jump (37-7 ½) and the pole vault (12-6).
In the 110-hurdles, senior Tim Sary hit his new personal best time of 16.83 to take down the title. Sary was also the winner in the high jump, with a clearance of 5-10.
Port Richmond, the Island's top 4x100 team, won easily in 43.75 seconds, well ahead of second-place Wagner (47.07). Their 43.44 from earlier this year is currently tops in the PSAL and No. 15 in the state.
On the girls' side, Katie Altieri was her usual, brilliant self, earning wins individually in both the 3,000 (11:09.09) and the 1,500 (4:57.33) as well as taking gold as part of Susan Wagner's 4x800 relay (10:14.22).
In the 800, Victoria Morrongiello eked by CSI/McCown's Lydia Zheng in the waning moments for the win in 2:22.63. Zheng would finish in 2:23.64.
Curtis took second overall in team scoring with 146 points, behind triple gold-medalist Kortney Brown, the winner in the 100-meter dash, (12.75), the 200 (26.35), and the anchor of the Warriors' 4x100 (50.51).
CSIM's Chloe Haylock, bolstered her team to third place with 116 points, by adding the 100-meter gold (17.93 seconds) to her pentathlon championship from earlier in the week (1723 points).
MSIT's Cassidy Williams took win in the 400, coming in at 1:00.54, outlasting CSIM's Zheng (2nd, 1:01.08) and Curtis' Mariame Aghailas (3rd, 1:01.39) in a close race.
https://admin.wagnerhigh.net/apps/news/admin_...


text:
Indian institute of mind dynamics
21st Century Memory Technologist Award 2013 Conferred on Dr. D. Krishnamurthy on Saturday, 2nd February 2013, at "The Institution of Engineers (India)", Tamil Nadu State Centre, Chennai. He receives the above prestigious award from the hands of Shri. Justice Mohan.S, Hon'ble Former Chief Justice of Supreme Court of India, Former Governor of Karnataka, Dr. D. Vishwanathan, Vice Chancellor, Anna University, Chennai.
Dr. Krishna receives "Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam Excellence Award 2017" from the hands of Dr. konijeti Rosaiah, Hon'ble Former CM of Andra Pradesh & Governor of Tamil Nadu.
Dr. Krishna receives "Bharat Jyothi Award 2017" from Hon'ble Former Union Minister M.V. Rajashekaran
Pooja Krishna receives the prestigious "Rashtra Pratibha Puraskar 2012" from the hands of Col. (Retd.) D. Pradeep Kumar, Shri M.V. Rajasekharan, Hon'ble Former Union Minister of State for Planning , Govt. Of India, Dr. V.B.Soni, Former Diplomat & Ambassador, Govt. of India on 25.11.2012
Dr. D. Krishnamurthy receives the prestigious "Priyadarshini Indira Gandhi Award 2012" from the hands of Shri M.V. Rajasekharan, Hon'ble former Union Minister of State for Planning, Govt. of India, Smt. Bimba Raikar, Hon'ble EX-MP, General Secretary, KPCC, Smt. Rani Sathish, Hon'ble Former Minister for Kannada & Culture, Govt. of Karnataka on 18.11.2012
Dr. D. Krishnamurthy engaged in conversation with Hon'ble former Union Minister Shri M.V. Rajasekharan.
Dr. D. Krishnamurthy receives the prestigious "Rajiv Gandhi Excellence Award 2012" from the hands of Shri. Syed Sibtey Razi, Governor of Assam, Shri. Bhishma Narain Singh, Former Governor Of Tamil Nadu along with additional charge of Pondicherry and Andman Nicobar Island, Shri. Dr.G.V.G. KRISHNAMURTHY, FORMER ELECTION COMMISSIONER OF INDIA on 29th August, 2012 at New Delhi
Pooja Krishna, a recepient of Prestigious Young Achiever of India Award 2012
Pooja Krishna, Proud Recepient of "WOMAN OF THE YEAR AWARD – 2013" from the hands of Dr. K. Rosaiah, His Excellency Governor of Tamilnadu on, 31st October 2013 at Hyderabad.
Tamil Sangham has honored with "Life Time Achievement Award" to Dr. D. Krishnamurthy PhD and this prestigious award was shared by his daughter Pooja Krishna
The above prestigious award is conferred on Dr. D. Krishnamurthy PhD by Tamil Sangham and Alumni of Corporation School, Taskar Town, BANGALORE on 7th April, 2013
Memory Technonologist Dr. D. Krishnamurthy with World Memory Guru Tony Buzan
Memory Technonologist Dr. D. Krishnamurthy With World's Success Guru Jackcan Field
Number Queen Pooja Krishna with World's Memory Guru Tony Buzan
Dr. D. Krishnamurthy receives the prestigious "21st Century Mind and Memory Training Excellance Award 2012" from the hands of Shri H.E. Mr. Waven William, High Commissioner of Seychelles, Shri. Haripal Rawat, Secretary, Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee, Shri Harish Rawat, Union Ministerof State & Parliamentary Affairs, Major Ved Prakash, Chairman of Ex-Servicemen Department (A.I.C.C.) on 20th April 2012 at New Delhi
Dr. D Krishnamurthy PhD has been honored the above prestigious award for his Innovations from the hands of Hon'ble Chief Minister of Pondichery Sri. N Rangaswamy on 05.09.2014
Father and Daughter together brought proud to the Nation.
Gold-Star Award for Excellence in Mind Technology 2013 Dr. D. Krishnamurthy PhD receives the above prestigious award from the hands of Shri. P. Ramakrishnam Raju, Hon'ble Retd. Justice of High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Shri. A.R. Chauhan, Pro - Vice Chancellor, Indus International University, Himachal Pradesh, Dr. Khaja M. Shahid, Pro - Vice Chancellor, Maulana University, Andhra Pradesh on 23rd June 2013 at HYDERABAD
Dr. D. Krishnamurthy PhD is seen along with IIMD's Achievers Dr. Rashmi B.J and Mr. Uday Kumar
GLORY OF INDIA AWARD 2013<br> Dr. D Krishnamurthy PhD has been honored the above prestigious award for his meritorious achievements from the hands of Dr. Premnath, Former Assistant Director General, Food & Agriculture Organization of United Nations, Shri M V Rajashekharan, Hon'ble former Union Minister of State for Planning and Dr. P Selvie Das, Educationist and Hon'ble former M.P (Rajya Sabha) at Bangalore on 15.12.2013
Dr. D. Krishnamurthy PhD., Proud Recepient of "MAN OF THE YEAR AWARD – 2013" from the hands of Dr. K. Rosaiah, His Excellency Governor of Tamilnadu, on 31st October 2013 at Hyderabad.
Dr. D. Krishnamurthy receives the prestigious "Mother Teresa Excellence Award 2012" from the hands of Col. (Retd.) D. Pradeep Kumar, Shri M.V. Rajasekharan, Hon'ble Former Union Minister of State for Planning , Govt. Of India, Dr. V.B.Soni, Former Diplomat & Ambassador, Govt. of India on 25.11.2012
48-49, SGS ARCADE, 50 FEET ROAD,
NEAR-NIRMALA STORE BUS STOP,
HANUMANTHNAGAR, BENGALURU, KARNATAKA 560050
Karnataka State, India
drkrishna@iimd.co.in
www.iimd.co.in


The Islamic Community of Salinas will be celebrating Eid Al Adha this Thursday, Sept. 24th. Takbeer at the masjid will begin at 8:00 am, and salah will be held at 8:30 am insha'Allah.
Following the Eid prayers, there will be a light breakfast at the masjid.
We have also arranged an Eid celebration on Thursday from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. at Shorewood Park (940 N Main St., Salinas, CA 93901). We will a BBQ lunch and there will be jumpers for children.


text:
HD 217107 (6 G. Piscium) és un estel groc subgegant situat a uns 65 anys llum de la Terra a la constel·lació dels Peixos. La seva massa és bastant similar a la del Sol, malgrat que és força més vell. S'han descobert dos planetes que giren al seu voltant: un és molt proper i completa una òrbita cada set dies, mentre que l'altre és molt més distant i tarda vuit anys a completar-la.

Distància, edat i massa
HD 217107 és força proper al Sol: el satèl·lit astromètric Gaia en mesurà la paral·laxi en 49,8170 mil·liarcsegons, que corresponen a una distància de 65,47 anys llum. Té una magnitud aparent de 6,17; per tant, es troba just al límit de visibilitat a ull nu en condicions favorables.

Les observacions espectroscòpiques mostren que és de tipus espectral G7 o G8, la qual cosa significa que la seva temperatura és d'uns 5.000 K. Té una massa molt similar a la del Sol, malgrat que s'estima que té uns 7.700 milions d'anys (el Sol en té 4.600) i es creu que està començant a evolucionar fora de la seqüència principal, ja que ha consumit quasi tot l'hidrogen del nucli en reaccions de fusió nuclear.

Sistema planetari
Un estudi de la velocitat radial de HD 217107 dut a terme el 1998 va revelar que el seu moviment al llarg de la línia visible variava al llarg d'un cicle de període de 7,1 dies. El període i l'amplitud d'aquesta variació indicaven que era causat per un planeta en òrbita al voltant de l'estel, d'una massa mínima un xic més gran que la de Júpiter. Aquest planeta fou designat com a HD 217107 b.

Mentre que la majoria de planetes de períodes orbitals inferiors als 10 dies tenen òrbites quasi circulars (e=0), HD 217107 b té una òrbita una mica excèntrica (e=0,13); els seus descobridors hipotetitzaren que podria ser a causa de la influència gravitatòria d'un segon planeta situat a una distància de diverses unitats astronòmiques (UA). La confirmació de l'existència del segon planeta tingué lloc el 2005, quan observacions a llarg termini de variacions de la velocitat radial de l'estel revelaren una variació del període d'uns vuit anys, causada per un planeta de massa almenys el doble de la de Júpiter i amb una òrbita molt excèntrica de semieix major d'unes 4,3 UA. Aquest segon planeta fou designat HD 217107 c.

Referències

Enllaços externs

Estrelles
Constel·lació dels Peixos
Articles bons de física
Traduccions que són articles bons


In a continued winter of hopeful news, a fifth North Atlantic right whale calf was confirmed this week off Sebastian Inlet and whale sightings were reported Friday off Ormond-by-the-Sea and Melbourne Beach.
"We're just keeping our fingers crossed that we haave a healthy season here," said Jim Hain, senior scientist and program coordinator for the Marineland Right Whale Project.
Whale No. 2503, seen off Daytona Beach Shores on Tuesday, was spotted again about noon on Friday off Ormond Beach, said Hain, as he and Marineland volunteers watched the whale and her calf off the beach near Highbridge Road. "We've been tracking her as she very gradually moves north."
On the same day she and her calf were thrilling residents and visitors off Daytona Beach Shores, a park ranger at Sebastian Inlet State Park, Ed Perry, managed to get photos of a new mother and her calf, marking the fifth calf documented this season. That whale, Catalog No. 3717 is "at least 8 years old and this is her first known calf," said Katie Jackson, a wildlife biologist with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission.
The critically endangered whales migrate to this region in the winter from the waters off Maine and Nova Scotia to give birth, but the number of calves has plummeted in recent years prompting fears about the future of the right whale. Last year no calves were seen.
"It's certainly encouraging that we're up to five calves at this point," said Clay George, a wildlife biologist on the Georgia Department of Natural Resources right whale team. "However, for the population to resume growing, they need to be having about 20 calves."
Biologists estimate the right whale population at about 411. Over the past two years, there have been three times more deaths than births, thanks to entanglements in fishing gear and other human-related causes. There hasn't been a season with 20 calves since 2013.
Three mother-calf teams were seen this week, including the one off the Brevard coast on Tuesday and again on Friday off Melbourne Beach. The third mother-calf pair was seen Tuesday about five miles east of Amelia Island. Researchers think the smooth waters this week helped volunteers and researchers spot the whales.
Researchers have been heartened by the new calves, including biologists with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's Fisheries division, who were out for a few weeks early in the season because of the federal shutdown.
"We are really excited about this recent siting of a right whale mom-calf pair," stated Barb Zoodsma, the right whale recovery program coordinator for NOAA Fisheries in the southeast. "After not seeing any calves last year, we are really encouraged."
On Friday afternoon, the whale research team with Florida's wildlife commission headed out to try to get a DNA sample from the calf. On Tuesday, George, with Georgia's wildlife agency, was on a team able to get close enough to the calf and its mother off Amelia Island to get a DNA sample from that calf.
Researchers with both state wildlife agencies have been collecting genetic samples from calves for nearly 20 years now, after taking up the work previously done by the New England Aquarium. The aquarium samples the whales when they're on the summer feeding grounds off New England and Nova Scotia.
Grabbing a genetic sample reveals whether the calves are male or female, helps match the calf to a mother and helps researchers identify the calf later, said George. While researchers can individually identify adult right whales by the white patches on their heads called callosities, the babies aren't identifiable until they're a couple of years old.
If they know which mother gave birth to the calf, they can infer who the father was, George said. "They've got a family tree they've been able to develop for many of the right whales," he said. The information also is useful for the models researchers have developed to assess the whale population.
The researchers use a cross bow attached to a bolt, tipped by a round piece of foam and a small biopsy punch.Most of the time the whales don't even react to giving up a skin sample, he said. "They're so big that shooting the bolt at them doesn't pay any danger to them."
At birth, a calf weighs two tons and is 15 feet long. He said the calf they sampled on Tuesday showed no reaction.
The samples are stored and shipped off once a year to a university in Canada that processes the samples.
On Thursday, the government of Canada released a number of measures it intends to take this year to protect the right whales and prevent deaths from vessel strikes and entanglement in fishing gear. After a deadly year in 2017, when 15 whales died, no whale deaths were reported in Canada last year.
In a news release, Canadian officials said they worked with fishermen, environmental groups and others to refine the measures used last year. They include mandatory speed restrictions for large vessels in the western gulf of St. Lawrence and adjustments to area closures for the snow crab and lobster fisheries to focus on the area where 90 percent of the right whale sightings were reported last year in the region.
To report a whale sighting, call 888-979-4253 (888-97-WHALE), the North Atlantic right whale hotline with the Marine Resources Council.


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Hawks confirm investigation into Sexwale's fraud claims
23 April 2021, 6:40 PM |
Mercedes Besent | @SABCNews
Tokyo Sexwale claims that the money was held in private accounts at the Reserve Bank and was unlawfully transferred into six accounts of commercial banks and individuals.
Image: SABC-News
The Hawks say it's too early to speculate on the names of suspects implicated in allegations of fraud or theft of the so-called Heritage Fund.
Hawks confirmed that an investigation is under way after ANC veteran Tokyo Sexwale claimed that the money held in the so-called 'White Spiritual Boy Trust Fund' had been stolen.
He claims that the money was held in private accounts at the Reserve Bank and was unlawfully transferred into six accounts of commercial banks and individuals.
Hawks Spokesperson, Katlego Mogale, says, "The Directorate of Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI) can confirm that a case of fraud, alternatively theft, was opened with regards to the so-called Heritage Fund as reported by the complainant. It is too early in the investigation to speculate as to who the role players are and it is not the norm of the DPCI to reveal name of suspects or persons of interest before allegations are properly investigated and such suspects have been court."
Sexwale held a media briefing on Thursday to clarify his claims that the money held in the White Spiritual Boy Trust Fund was stolen.
The businessman alleges that the fund was meant to help drive infrastructure development programmes on the continent and across all Indian Ocean Island States.
Below is Tokyo Sexwale's full briefing:
He told the media that the fund was also meant to boost COVID-19 relief grants from R350 to R2 700 a month in South Africa. Sexwale also says the fund is based in Singapore and is owned by a Chinese investor called Chuck Leong.
According to Sexwale, he was joined by Godwin Webb as a joint mandate holder of the fund. The Reserve Bank and Treasury have denied the claims. They say Sexwale was scammed.
But, the Freedom Front Plus (FF-Plus) leader, Pieter Groenewald, says the response by Treasury and the Reserve Bank is not good enough.
"Allegations by Tokyo Sexwale about the existence of a Heritage Fund and the fact that that some of that money has been stolen must be seen in a serious light. A charge has been laid at the police according to certain newspapers. And the Freedom Front Plus wants to see that there is a thorough investigation. There mere fact that the Treasury and the Reserve Bank denies the existence of such fund is not sufficient. We must get all the facts. And the fact that a charge has been laid against Cyril Ramaphosa makes it more serious. And therefore, Ramaphosa to come clean about this matter and there must be a sufficient and effective investigation so that the public of South Africa know exactly what the real facts are," says Groenewald.
Sexwale says he again wrote to Finance Minister Tito Mboweni to follow up. TS Presents copies of letters. "Who is scamming who"? He asks. He says he also again wrote to presidency #sabcnews pic.twitter.com/JJ5rY24sSZ
— Glory Sefako-Musi (@glorysefako) April 22, 2021
Congress of the People (COPE) says the allegations made by Sexwale are extremely serious.
COPE Spokesperson Dennis Bloem, says, "COPE expects that Sexwale must lay criminal charges of corruption and fraud against the Reserve Bank and all the people that he mentioned at his press conference – former President Zuma, President Ramaphosa, Minister of Finance Tito Mboweni, Director General of Treasury Dondo Mogojane and Reserve Bank Governor Lesetja Kganyago.
If Sexwale is not laying those charges the Congress of the People will go to a police station and lay this fraud and corruption charges against these people. We believe it will be very reckless and irresponsible of Sexwale to make these serious allegations against these people and not go to the police to investigate this crime."
Mogale has confirmed that the matter is being investigated.
The allegations come in the same year when the Reserve Bank will celebrate its centenary in June.
Tags: HawksGautengJohannesburgANCTokyo Sexwale
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