text:
Extinguish a fire underground by means of a portable fire extinguisher
119127 Extinguish a fire underground by means of a portable fire extinguisher
244448 Extinguish a fire by means of a portable fire extinguisher Level 1 NQF Level 01 1
This unit standard will be useful to people who are required to extinguish a fire by means of a portable fire extinguisher.
People credited with this unit standard are able to
Explain the critical factors pertaining to the extinguishing of a fire by means of a portable fire extinguisher
Prepare to extinguish the fire
Extinguish the fire
Explain the critical factors pertaining to the extinguishing of a fire by means of a portable fire extinguisher.
The specified requirements pertaining to the basic principle of operation of the portable fire extinguisher are explained
The significant risks and consequences associated with the workplace hazards pertaining to the extinguishing of a fire by means of a portable fire extinguisher are explained.
Spreading/size of fire
No escape way
Harmful gases
The significant risks and consequences associated with the work-related hazards pertaining to the extinguishing of a fire by means of a portable fire extinguisher are explained.
Working with hazardous chemicals
Handling heavy equipment
Change in direction of air flow
Working in proximity of open flames
The various types of fires that could be encountered are listed and the specified requirements pertaining to the substances required to extinguish each type of fire are explained.
Prepare to extinguish the fire.
The required personal protective equipment is, selected, available on person, operational and used according to specified requirements.
The required fire extinguisher is selected and examined to be ready for operation according to specified requirements.
The area where the fire is to be extinguished is examined for workplace hazards and these hazards are dealt with according to specified requirements.
Inadvertent entry of persons into the affected area is prevented according to specified requirements.
The consequences to safety, health and production if specified requirements are not adhered to whilst preparing to extinguish the fire are explained.
Readiness of fire extinguisher
Preventing inadvertent entry
Extinguish the fire.
The fire is extinguished in accordance with specified requirements
Safe positioning
Operation of the fire extinguisher
Method of extinguishing
Precautions taken to prevent re-ignition of the fire
Work-related hazards are dealt with according to specified requirements
The fire extinguisher is prepared and stored for subsequent use and if defective, it is dealt with according to specified requirements
Consequences to health, safety and production if specified requirements are not adhered to whilst extinguishing the fire are explained.
Preparation and storage of tools and equipment
Communicate effectively, using visual, mathematical and / or language skills in the modes of oral and / or written presentations.
This unit standard has been replaced by unit standard 244448, which is "Extinguish a fire underground by means of a portable fire extinguisher", Level 1, 1 credits.
Relevant Acts: e.g. Mine Health & Safety Act, 1996 (Act no 29/1996), and Minerals Act and Regulations, 1991 (Act no 50/1991).
List of Recorded OH&S Significant risks
All assessments should be conducted in line with the following well documented principles of assessment: appropriateness, fairness, manageability, integration into work or learning, validity, direct, authentic, sufficient, systematic, open and consistent
The following particular issues should be taken into consideration when assessing against this unit standard:
The candidate will be required to be assessed in a simulated, protected environment
Skills-1-Limited in range: A limited number of simple skills are required
Procedures-1-The same sequence or takes place again, with no alternatives
Problem Solving-2-The candidate will only have to apply given solution to known/familiar problems.
Orientation of activities-1-Follows instructions
Application of responsibility-2-Some responsibility for quantity and quality, and possible responsibility for guiding others
Orientation of scope of responsibility-2-Under general supervision and quality control
Average Level: 1,33
Credits Achieved: 12/10 = 1,2
Actual Credits Assigned = 1
Core 49013	 National Certificate: Mining Operations: Underground Hard Rock Level 2 NQF Level 02 Passed the End Date -
2. ANGLO PLATINUM - ENGINEERING SKILLS TRAINING CENTRE
3. BADEN TRAINING AND COMPUTING SERVICES (PTY) LTD
6. EASTERN CROME MINES SAMANCOR


text:
FIRE > GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, et al. v. JOSHUA DAVEY
First Amendment Library
GARY LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, et al. v. JOSHUA DAVEY, 540 U.S. 712 (2004)
Argued:
Decided:
Decided by:
Rehnquist Court, 2003
Legal Principle at Issue:
The Washington Constitution provides that no public money shall be appropriated or applied to religious instruction. Following this constitutional command, Washington does not grant college scholarships to otherwise eligible students who are pursuing a degree in theology. Does the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment require the state to fund religious instruction, if it provides college scholarships for secular instruction?
Reversed. Petitioning party received a favorable disposition.
CASE INFO
RESOURCES & COMMENTARY
Advocates for Respondent
Jay A. Sekulow
Advocates for Petitioner
Christine O. Gregoire
Majority Opinion
William Rehnquist John Stevens Sandra O'Connor Anthony Kennedy David Souter Ruth Ginsburg Stephen Breyer
Concurring Opinion
No opinions found
Dissenting Opinion
Antonin Scalia Clarence Thomas
540 U.S. 712 (2004)
LOCKE, GOVERNOR OF WASHINGTON, ET AL.
DAVEY.
Supreme Court of United States.
Argued December 2, 2003.
Decided February 25, 2004.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT.*713 REHNQUIST, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which STEVENS, O'CONNOR, KENNEDY, SOUTER, GINSBURG, and BREYER, JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which THOMAS, J., joined, post, p. 726. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 734.Narda Pierce, Solicitor General of Washington, argued the cause for petitioners. With her on the briefs were Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General, William Berggren Collins, *714 Senior Assistant Attorney General, and Michael J. Shinn, Assistant Attorney General.Jay Alan Sekulow argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Stuart J. Roth, Colby M. May, James M. Henderson, Sr., Walter M. Weber, David A. Cortman, Alan E. Sears, and Benjamin W. Bull.
Solicitor General Olson argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Acosta, Deputy Solicitor General Clement, Gregory G. Garre, David K. Flynn, and Eric W. Treene.[*]
*715 CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
The State of Washington established the Promise Scholarship Program to assist academically gifted students with postsecondary education expenses. In accordance with the State Constitution, students may not use the scholarship at an institution where they are pursuing a degree in devotional theology. We hold that such an exclusion from an otherwise inclusive aid program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
The Washington State Legislature found that "[s]tudents who work hard . . . and successfully complete high school with high academic marks may not have the financial ability to attend college because they cannot obtain financial aid or the financial aid is insufficient." Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28B.119.005 (West Supp. 2004). In 1999, to assist these high-achieving students, the legislature created the *716 Promise Scholarship Program, which provides a scholarship, renewable for one year, to eligible students for postsecondary education expenses. Students may spend their funds on any education-related expense, including room and board. The scholarships are funded through the State's general fund, and their amount varies each year depending on the annual appropriation, which is evenly prorated among the eligible students. Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-050(2) (2003). The scholarship was worth $1,125 for academic year 1999-2000 and $1,542 for 2000-2001.
To be eligible for the scholarship, a student must meet academic, income, and enrollment requirements. A student must graduate from a Washington public or private high school and either graduate in the top 15% of his graduating class, or attain on the first attempt a cumulative score of 1,200 or better on the Scholastic Assessment Test I or a score of 27 or better on the American College Test. §§ 250-80-020(12)(a) to (d). The student's family income must be less than 135% of the State's median. § 250-80-020(12)(e). Finally, the student must enroll "at least half time in an eligible postsecondary institution in the state of Washington," and may not pursue a degree in theology at that institution while receiving the scholarship. §§ 250-80-020(12)(f) to (g); see also Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28B.10.814 (West 1997) ("No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology"). Private institutions, including those religiously affiliated, qualify as "`[e]ligible postsecondary institution[s]'" if they are accredited by a nationally recognized accrediting body. See Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(13). A "degree in theology" is not defined in the statute, but, as both parties concede, the statute simply codifies the State's constitutional prohibition on providing funds to students to pursue degrees that are "devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith." Brief for Petitioners 6; Brief for Respondent 8; see also Wash. Const., Art. I, § 11.
*717 A student who applies for the scholarship and meets the academic and income requirements is notified that he is eligible for the scholarship if he meets the enrollment requirements. E. g., App. 95. Once the student enrolls at an eligible institution, the institution must certify that the student is enrolled at least half time and that the student is not pursuing a degree in devotional theology. The institution, rather than the State, determines whether the student's major is devotional. Id., at 126, 131. If the student meets the enrollment requirements, the scholarship funds are sent to the institution for distribution to the student to pay for tuition or other educational expenses. See Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-060.
Respondent, Joshua Davey, was awarded a Promise Scholarship, and chose to attend Northwest College. Northwest is a private, Christian college affiliated with the Assemblies of God denomination, and is an eligible institution under the Promise Scholarship Program. Davey had "planned for many years to attend a Bible college and to prepare [himself] through that college training for a lifetime of ministry, specifically as a church pastor." App. 40. To that end, when he enrolled in Northwest College, he decided to pursue a double major in pastoral ministries and business management/administration. Id., at 43. There is no dispute that the pastoral ministries degree is devotional and therefore excluded under the Promise Scholarship Program.
At the beginning of the 1999-2000 academic year, Davey met with Northwest's director of financial aid. He learned for the first time at this meeting that he could not use his scholarship to pursue a devotional theology degree. He was informed that to receive the funds appropriated for his use, he must certify in writing that he was not pursuing such a degree at Northwest.[1] He refused to sign the form and did not receive any scholarship funds.
*718 Davey then brought an action under Rev. Stat. § 1979, 42 U. S. C. § 1983, against various state officials (hereinafter State) in the District Court for the Western District of Washington to enjoin the State from refusing to award the scholarship solely because a student is pursuing a devotional theology degree, and for damages. He argued the denial of his scholarship based on his decision to pursue a theology degree violated, inter alia, the Free Exercise, Establishment, and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. After the District Court denied Davey's request for a preliminary injunction, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court rejected Davey's constitutional claims and granted summary judgment in favor of the State.
A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 299 F. 3d 748 (2002). The court concluded that the State had singled out religion for unfavorable treatment and thus under our decision in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993), the State's exclusion of theology majors must be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 299 F. 3d, at 757-758. Finding that the State's own antiestablishment concerns were not compelling, the court declared Washington's Promise Scholarship Program unconstitutional. Id., at 760. We granted certiorari, 538 U. S. 1031 (2003), and now reverse.
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." These two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U. S. 455, 469 (1973) (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)). Yet we have long said that "there is room for play in the joints" between them. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U. S. 664, 669 (1970). In *719 other words, there are some state actions permitted by the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause.
This case involves that "play in the joints" described above. Under our Establishment Clause precedent, the link between government funds and religious training is broken by the independent and private choice of recipients. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U. S. 639, 652 (2002); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U. S. 1, 13-14 (1993); Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481, 487 (1986); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U. S. 388, 399-400 (1983). As such, there is no doubt that the State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional theology, see Witters, supra, at 489, and the State does not contend otherwise. The question before us, however, is whether Washington, pursuant to its own constitution,[2] which has been authoritatively interpreted as prohibiting even indirectly funding religious instruction that will prepare students for the ministry, see Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 112 Wash. 2d 363, 369-370, 771 P. 2d 1119, 1122 (1989) (en banc); cf. Witters v. State Comm'n for the Blind, 102 Wash. 2d 624, 629, 689 P. 2d 53, 56 (1984) (en banc) ("It is not the role of the State to pay for the religious education of future ministers"), rev'd, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), can deny them such funding without violating the Free Exercise Clause.
*720 Davey urges us to answer that question in the negative. He contends that under the rule we enunciated in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, supra, the program is presumptively unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion.[3] We reject his claim of presumptive unconstitutionality, however; to do otherwise would extend the Lukumi line of cases well beyond not only their facts but their reasoning. In Lukumi, the city of Hialeah made it a crime to engage in certain kinds of animal slaughter. We found that the law sought to suppress ritualistic animal sacrifices of the Santeria religion. 508 U. S., at 535. In the present case, the State's disfavor of religion (if it can be called that) is of a far milder kind. It imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite. It does not deny to ministers the right to participate in the political affairs of the community. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978). And it does not require students to choose between their religious beliefs and *721 receiving a government benefit.[4] See ibid.; Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U. S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U. S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U. S. 398 (1963). The State has merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.
JUSTICE SCALIA argues, however, that generally available benefits are part of the "baseline against which burdens on religion are measured." Post, at 726 (dissenting opinion). Because the Promise Scholarship Program funds training for all secular professions, JUSTICE SCALIA contends the State must also fund training for religious professions. See post, at 726-727. But training for religious professions and training for secular professions are not fungible. Training someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor. Indeed, majoring in devotional theology is akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit. See Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church v. Board of Regents, 72 Wash. 2d 912, 919, 436 P. 2d 189, 193 (1967) (en banc) (holding public funds may not be expended for "that category of instruction that resembles worship and manifests a devotion to religion and religious principles in thought, feeling, belief, and conduct"); App. 40 (Davey stating his "religious beliefs [were] the only reason for [him] to seek a college degree"). And the subject of religion is one in which both the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views — in favor of free exercise, but opposed to establishment — that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or professions. That a State would deal differently with religious education for the ministry than with education for other callings is a product of these views, not evidence of hostility toward religion.
*722 Even though the differently worded Washington Constitution draws a more stringent line than that drawn by the United States Constitution, the interest it seeks to further is scarcely novel. In fact, we can think of few areas in which a State's antiestablishment interests come more into play.[5] Since the founding of our country, there have been popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders, which was one of the hallmarks of an "established" religion.[6] See R. Butts, The American Tradition in Religion and Education 15-17, 19-20, 26-37 (1950); F. Lambert, The Founding Fathers and the Place of Religion in America 188 (2003) ("In defending their religious liberty against overreaching clergy, Americans in all regions found that Radical Whig ideas best framed their argument that state-supported clergy undermined liberty of conscience and should be opposed"); see also J. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, reprinted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 65, 68 (1947) *723 (appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.) (noting the dangers to civil liberties from supporting clergy with public funds).
Most States that sought to avoid an establishment of religion around the time of the founding placed in their constitutions formal prohibitions against using tax funds to support the ministry. E. g., Ga. Const., Art. IV, § 5 (1789), reprinted in 2 Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws 789 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909) (reprinted 1993) ("All persons shall have the free exercise of religion, without being obliged to contribute to the support of any religious profession but their own"); Pa. Const., Art. II (1776), in 5 id., at 3082 ("[N]o man ought or of right can be compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent"); N. J. Const., Art. XVIII (1776), in id., at 2597 (similar); Del. Const., Art. I, § 1 (1792), in 1 id., at 568 (similar); Ky. Const., Art. XII, § 3 (1792), in 3 id., at 1274 (similar); Vt. Const., Ch. I, Art. 3 (1793), in 6 id., at 3762 (similar); Tenn. Const., Art. XI, § 3 (1796), in id., at 3422 (similar); Ohio Const., Art. VIII, § 3 (1802), in 5 id., at 2910 (similar). The plain text of these constitutional provisions prohibited any tax dollars from supporting the clergy. We have found nothing to indicate, as JUSTICE SCALIA contends, post, at 728, n. 1, that these provisions would not have applied so long as the State equally supported other professions or if the amount at stake was de minimis. That early state constitutions saw no problem in explicitly excluding only the ministry from receiving state dollars reinforces our conclusion that religious instruction is of a different ilk.[7]
*724 Far from evincing the hostility toward religion which was manifest in Lukumi, we believe that the entirety of the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long way toward including religion in its benefits.[8] The program permits students to attend pervasively religious schools, so long as they are accredited. As Northwest advertises, its "concept of education is distinctly Christian in the evangelical sense." App. 168. It prepares all of its students, "through instruction, through modeling, [and] through [its] classes, to use . . . the Bible as their guide, as the truth," no matter their chosen *725 profession. Id., at 169. And under the Promise Scholarship Program's current guidelines, students are still eligible to take devotional theology courses.[9] Davey notes all students at Northwest are required to take at least four devotional courses, "Exploring the Bible," "Principles of Spiritual Development," "Evangelism in the Christian Life," and "Christian Doctrine," Brief for Respondent 11, n. 5; see also App. 151, and some students may have additional religious requirements as part of their majors. Brief for Respondent 11, n. 5; see also App. 150-151.
In short, we find neither in the history or text of Article I, § 11, of the Washington Constitution, nor in the operation of the Promise Scholarship Program, anything that suggests animus toward religion.[10] Given the historic and substantial state interest at issue, we therefore cannot conclude that the denial of funding for vocational religious instruction alone is inherently constitutionally suspect.
Without a presumption of unconstitutionality, Davey's claim must fail. The State's interest in not funding the pursuit of devotional degrees is substantial and the exclusion of such funding places a relatively minor burden on Promise Scholars. If any room exists between the two Religion Clauses, it must be here. We need not venture further into this difficult area in order to uphold the Promise Scholarship Program as currently operated by the State of Washington.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore
*726 JUSTICE SCALIA, with whom JUSTICE THOMAS joins, dissenting.
In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520 (1993), the majority opinion held that "[a] law burdening religious practice that is not neutral . . . must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny," id., at 546, and that "the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face," id., at 533. The concurrence of two Justices stated that "[w]hen a law discriminates against religion as such, . . . it automatically will fail strict scrutiny." Id., at 579 (Blackmun, J., joined by O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). And the concurrence of a third Justice endorsed the "noncontroversial principle" that "formal neutrality" is a "necessary conditio[n] for free-exercise constitutionality." Id., at 563 (SOUTER, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). These opinions are irreconcilable with today's decision, which sustains a public benefits program that facially discriminates against religion.
We articulated the principle that governs this case more than 50 years ago in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1 (1947):
"New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation." Id., at 16 (emphasis deleted).
When the State makes a public benefit generally available, that benefit becomes part of the baseline against which burdens on religion are measured; and when the State withholds *727 that benefit from some individuals solely on the basis of religion, it violates the Free Exercise Clause no less than if it had imposed a special tax.
That is precisely what the State of Washington has done here. It has created a generally available public benefit, whose receipt is conditioned only on academic performance, income, and attendance at an accredited school. It has then carved out a solitary course of study for exclusion: theology. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28B.119.010(8) (West Supp. 2004); Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12)(g) (2003). No field of study but religion is singled out for disfavor in this fashion. Davey is not asking for a special benefit to which others are not entitled. Cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U. S. 439, 453 (1988). He seeks only equal treatment — the right to direct his scholarship to his chosen course of study, a right every other Promise Scholar enjoys.
The Court's reference to historical "popular uprisings against procuring taxpayer funds to support church leaders," ante, at 722, is therefore quite misplaced. That history involved not the inclusion of religious ministers in public benefits programs like the one at issue here, but laws that singled them out for financial aid. For example, the Virginia bill at which Madison's Remonstrance was directed provided: "[F]or the support of Christian teachers . . . [a] sum payable for tax on the property within this Commonwealth, is hereby assessed . . . ." A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1784), reprinted in Everson, supra, at 72. Laws supporting the clergy in other States operated in a similar fashion. See S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 131, 169, 270, 295, 304, 386 (1902). One can concede the Framers' hostility to funding the clergy specifically, but that says nothing about whether the clergy had to be excluded from benefits the State made available to all. No one would seriously contend, for example, that the Framers *728 would have barred ministers from using public roads on their way to church.[1]
The Court does not dispute that the Free Exercise Clause places some constraints on public benefits programs, but finds none here, based on a principle of "`play in the joints.'" Ante, at 719. I use the term "principle" loosely, for that is not so much a legal principle as a refusal to apply any principle when faced with competing constitutional directives. There is nothing anomalous about constitutional commands that abut. A municipality hiring public contractors may not discriminate against blacks or in favor of them; it cannot discriminate a little bit each way and then plead "play in the joints" when haled into court. If the Religion Clauses demand neutrality, we must enforce them, in hard cases as well as easy ones.
Even if "play in the joints" were a valid legal principle, surely it would apply only when it was a close call whether complying with one of the Religion Clauses would violate the other. But that is not the case here. It is not just that "the State could, consistent with the Federal Constitution, permit Promise Scholars to pursue a degree in devotional *729 theology." Ante, at 719. The establishment question would not even be close, as is evident from the fact that this Court's decision in Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind, 474 U. S. 481 (1986), was unanimous. Perhaps some formally neutral public benefits programs are so gerrymandered and devoid of plausible secular purpose that they might raise specters of state aid to religion, but an evenhanded Promise Scholarship Program is not among them.
In any case, the State already has all the play in the joints it needs. There are any number of ways it could respect both its unusually sensitive concern for the conscience of its taxpayers and the Federal Free Exercise Clause. It could make the scholarships redeemable only at public universities (where it sets the curriculum), or only for select courses of study. Either option would replace a program that facially discriminates against religion with one that just happens not to subsidize it. The State could also simply abandon the scholarship program altogether. If that seems a dear price to pay for freedom of conscience, it is only because the State has defined that freedom so broadly that it would be offended by a program with such an incidental, indirect religious effect.
What is the nature of the State's asserted interest here? It cannot be protecting the pocketbooks of its citizens; given the tiny fraction of Promise Scholars who would pursue theology degrees, the amount of any citizen's tax bill at stake is de minimis. It cannot be preventing mistaken appearance of endorsement; where a State merely declines to penalize students for selecting a religious major, "[n]o reasonable observer is likely to draw . . . an inference that the State itself is endorsing a religious practice or belief." Id., at 493 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). Nor can Washington's exclusion be defended as a means of assuring that the State will neither favor nor disfavor Davey in his religious calling. Davey will throughout his life contribute to the public fisc through sales taxes on *730 personal purchases, property taxes on his home, and so on; and nothing in the Court's opinion turns on whether Davey winds up a net winner or loser in the State's tax-and-spend scheme.
No, the interest to which the Court defers is not fear of a conceivable Establishment Clause violation, budget constraints, avoidance of endorsement, or substantive neutrality — none of these. It is a pure philosophical preference: the State's opinion that it would violate taxpayers' freedom of conscience not to discriminate against candidates for the ministry. This sort of protection of "freedom of conscience" has no logical limit and can justify the singling out of religion for exclusion from public programs in virtually any context. The Court never says whether it deems this interest compelling (the opinion is devoid of any mention of standard of review) but, self-evidently, it is not.[2]
*731 II
The Court makes no serious attempt to defend the program's neutrality, and instead identifies two features thought to render its discrimination less offensive. The first is the lightness of Davey's burden. The Court offers no authority for approving facial discrimination against religion simply because its material consequences are not severe. I might understand such a test if we were still in the business of reviewing facially neutral laws that merely happen to burden some individual's religious exercise, but we are not. See Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990). Discrimination on the face of a statute is something else. The indignity of being singled out for special burdens on the basis of one's religious calling is so profound that the concrete harm produced can never be dismissed as insubstantial. The Court has not required proof of "substantial" concrete harm with other forms of discrimination, see, e. g., Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493-495 (1954); cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U. S. 190 (1976), and it should not do so here.
Even if there were some threshold quantum-of-harm requirement, surely Davey has satisfied it. The First Amendment, after all, guarantees free exercise of religion, and when the State exacts a financial penalty of almost $3,000 for religious exercise — whether by tax or by forfeiture of an otherwise available benefit — religious practice is anything but free. The Court's only response is that "Promise Scholars may still use their scholarship to pursue a secular degree at a different institution from where they are studying devotional theology." Ante, at 721, n. 4. But part of what makes a Promise Scholarship attractive is that the recipient can apply it to his preferred course of study at his preferred accredited institution. That is part of the "benefit" the State confers. The Court distinguishes our precedents only by swapping the benefit to which Davey was actually entitled (a scholarship for his chosen course of study) with another, less valuable one (a scholarship for any course of study but his chosen *732 one). On such reasoning, any facially discriminatory benefits program can be redeemed simply by redefining what it guarantees.
The other reason the Court thinks this particular facial discrimination less offensive is that the scholarship program was not motivated by animus toward religion. The Court does not explain why the legislature's motive matters, and I fail to see why it should. If a State deprives a citizen of trial by jury or passes an ex post facto law, we do not pause to investigate whether it was actually trying to accomplish the evil the Constitution prohibits. It is sufficient that the citizen's rights have been infringed. "[It does not] matter that a legislature consists entirely of the purehearted, if the law it enacts in fact singles out a religious practice for special burdens." Lukumi, 508 U. S., at 559 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
The Court has not approached other forms of discrimination this way. When we declared racial segregation unconstitutional, we did not ask whether the State had originally adopted the regime, not out of "animus" against blacks, but because of a well-meaning but misguided belief that the races would be better off apart. It was sufficient to note the current effect of segregation on racial minorities. See Brown, supra, at 493-495. Similarly, the Court does not excuse statutes that facially discriminate against women just because they are the vestigial product of a well-intentioned view of women's appropriate social role. See, e. g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U. S. 515, 549-551 (1996); Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525, 552-553 (1923). We do sometimes look to legislative intent to smoke out more subtle instances of discrimination, but we do so as a supplement to the core guarantee of facially equal treatment, not as a replacement for it. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U. S. 541, 546 (1999).
There is no need to rely on analogies, however, because we have rejected the Court's methodology in this very context. *733 In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978), we considered a Tennessee statute that disqualified clergy from participation in the state constitutional convention. That statute, like the one here, was based upon a state constitutional provision — a clause in the 1796 Tennessee Constitution that disqualified clergy from sitting in the legislature. Id., at 621, and n. 1 (plurality opinion). The State defended the statute as an attempt to be faithful to its constitutional separation of church and state, and we accepted that claimed benevolent purpose as bona fide. See id., at 628. Nonetheless, because it did not justify facial discrimination against religion, we invalidated the restriction. Id., at 629.[3]
It may be that Washington's original purpose in excluding the clergy from public benefits was benign, and the same might be true of its purpose in maintaining the exclusion today. But those singled out for disfavor can be forgiven for suspecting more invidious forces at work. Let there be no doubt: This case is about discrimination against a religious minority. Most citizens of this country identify themselves as professing some religious belief, but the State's policy poses no obstacle to practitioners of only a tepid, civic version of faith. Those the statutory exclusion actually affects — those whose belief in their religion is so strong that they dedicate their study and their lives to its ministry — are a far narrower set. One need not delve too far into modern popular culture to perceive a trendy disdain for deep religious conviction. In an era when the Court is so quick to come to the aid of other disfavored groups, see, e. g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620, 635 (1996), its indifference in this case, which involves a form of discrimination to which the Constitution actually speaks, is exceptional.
*734 * * *
Today's holding is limited to training the clergy, but its logic is readily extendible, and there are plenty of directions to go. What next? Will we deny priests and nuns their prescription-drug benefits on the ground that taxpayers' freedom of conscience forbids medicating the clergy at public expense? This may seem fanciful, but recall that France has proposed banning religious attire from schools, invoking interests in secularism no less benign than those the Court embraces today. See Sciolino, Chirac Backs Law to Keep Signs of Faith Out of School, N. Y. Times, Dec. 18, 2003, p. A17, col. 1. When the public's freedom of conscience is invoked to justify denial of equal treatment, benevolent motives shade into indifference and ultimately into repression. Having accepted the justification in this case, the Court is less well equipped to fend it off in the future. I respectfully dissent.
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting.
Because the parties agree that a "degree in theology" means a degree that is "devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith," Brief for Petitioners 6; Brief for Respondent 8, I assume that this is so for purposes of deciding this case. With this understanding, I join JUSTICE SCALIA'S dissenting opinion. I write separately to note that, in my view, the study of theology does not necessarily implicate religious devotion or faith. The contested statute denies Promise Scholarships to students who pursue "a degree in theology." See Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12)(g) (2003) (defining an "`[e]ligible student,'" in part, as one who "[i]s not pursuing a degree in theology"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 28B.10.814 (West 1997) ("No aid shall be awarded to any student who is pursuing a degree in theology"). But the statute itself does not define "theology." And the usual definition of the term "theology" is not limited to devotional studies. "Theology" is defined as "[t]he study of the nature *735 of God and religious truth" and the "rational inquiry into religious questions." American Heritage Dictionary 1794 (4th ed. 2000). See also Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1223 (1991) ("the study of religious faith, practice, and experience" and "the study of God and his relation to the world"). These definitions include the study of theology from a secular perspective as well as from a religious one.
Assuming that the State denies Promise Scholarships only to students who pursue a degree in devotional theology, I believe that JUSTICE SCALIA'S application of our precedents is correct. Because neither party contests the validity of these precedents, I join JUSTICE SCALIA'S dissent.
[*] Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of Vermont et al. by William H. Sorrell, Attorney General of Vermont, and Timothy B. Tomasi, Chief Assistant Attorney General, by Anabelle Rodríguez, Secretary of Justice of Puerto Rico, and by the Attorneys General for their respective jurisdictions as follows: Thomas F. Reilly of Massachusetts, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon of Missouri, Hardy Myers of Oregon, Lawrence E. Long of South Dakota, and Clyde Lemons, Jr., of the Northern Mariana Islands; for the American Civil Liberties Union et al. by Aaron H. Caplan, Steven R. Shapiro, Julie E. Sternberg, Ayesha N. Khan, Elliot M. Mincberg, and Susan L. Sommer; for the American Jewish Congress et al. by Marc D. Stern, K. Hollyn Hollman, Jeffrey Sinensky, Kara Stein, and David Strom; for the Anti-Defamation League et al. by David Lash, Steven M. Freeman, Steven C. Sheinberg, Martin E. Karlinsky, Erwin Chemerinsky, and Frederick M. Lawrence; for the National Education Association by Robert H. Chanin, Andrew D. Roth, and Laurence Gold; and for the National School Boards Association et al. by David H. Remes and Julie Underwood.
Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the State of Alabama by William H. Pryor, Jr., Attorney General of Alabama, Nathan A. Forrester, Solicitor General, and Margaret L. Fleming, Assistant Attorney General; for the State of Florida et al. by Charles J. Crist, Jr., Attorney General of Florida, Christopher M. Kise, Solicitor General, Raquel A. Rodriguez, and Daniel Woodring; for the State of Texas et al. by Greg Abbott, Attorney General of Texas, Barry R. McBee, First Assistant Attorney General, Edward D. Burbach, Deputy Attorney General, Rafael Edward Cruz, Solicitor General, Joseph D. Hughes and Cassandra Robertson, Assistant Solicitors General, Mike Moore, Attorney General of Mississippi, and Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General of Utah; for the Association of Southern Baptist Colleges and Schools et al. by Carter G. Phillips, Gene C. Schaerr, and Nicholas P. Miller; for the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. by Kevin J. Hasson, Roman P. Storzer, and Anthony R. Picarello, Jr.; for the Black Alliance for Educational Options by Samuel Estreicher and Brett M. Schuman; for the Council for Christian Colleges & Universities et al. by Gregory S. Baylor and Thomas C. Berg; for the Fairness Foundation by Kenneth W. Starr, Robert R. Gasaway, and Ashley C. Parrish; for the Institute for Justice et al. by Richard D. Komer, Clint Bolick, and William H. Mellor; for the Landmark Legal Foundation by Richard P. Hutchison and Michael J. O'Neill; for Liberty Counsel by Mathew D. Staver and Rena M. Lindevaldsen; for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs by Nathan Lewin, Dennis Rapps, David Zwiebel, Richard B. Stone, and Nathan J. Diament; for the National Legal Foundation by Barry C. Hodge; for the Solidarity Center for Law and Justice, P. C., by James P. Kelly III; and for Teresa M. Becker by Richard Thompson.
Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Common Good Legal Defense Fund et al. by John G. Stepanovich and Keith A. Fournier; for the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops et al. by Mark E. Chopko and Jeffrey Hunter Moon; and for Robert S. Alley et al. by Steven K. Green.
[1] The State does not require students to certify anything or sign any forms. App. 86, 89.
[2] The relevant provision of the Washington Constitution, Art. I, § 11, states:
"Religious Freedom. Absolute freedom of conscience in all matters of religious sentiment, belief and worship, shall be guaranteed to every individual, and no one shall be molested or disturbed in person or property on account of religion; but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state. No public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment."
[3] Davey, relying on Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U. S. 819 (1995), contends that the Promise Scholarship Program is an unconstitutional viewpoint restriction on speech. But the Promise Scholarship Program is not a forum for speech. The purpose of the Promise Scholarship Program is to assist students from low- and middle-income families with the cost of postsecondary education, not to "`encourage a diversity of views from private speakers.'" United States v. American Library Assn., Inc., 539 U. S. 194, 206 (2003) (plurality opinion) (quoting Rosenberger, supra, at 834). Our cases dealing with speech forums are simply inapplicable. See American Library Assn., supra; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 805 (1985).
Davey also argues that the Equal Protection Clause protects against discrimination on the basis of religion. Because we hold, infra, at 725, that the program is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause, however, we apply rational-basis scrutiny to his equal protection claims. Johnson v. Robison, 415 U. S. 361, 375, n. 14 (1974); see also McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U. S. 618 (1978) (reviewing religious discrimination claim under the Free Exercise Clause). For the reasons stated herein, the program passes such review.
[4] Promise Scholars may still use their scholarship to pursue a secular degree at a different institution from where they are studying devotional theology.
[5] JUSTICE SCALIA notes that the State's "philosophical preference" to protect individual conscience is potentially without limit, see post, at 730; however, the only interest at issue here is the State's interest in not funding the religious training of clergy. Nothing in our opinion suggests that the State may justify any interest that its "philosophical preference" commands.
[6] Perhaps the most famous example of public backlash is the defeat of "A Bill Establishing A Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion" in the Virginia Legislature. The bill sought to assess a tax for "Christian teachers," reprinted in Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U. S. 1, 72, 74 (1947) (supplemental appendix to dissent of Rutledge, J.); see also Rosenberger, supra, at 853 (THOMAS, J., concurring) (purpose of the bill was to support "clergy in the performance of their function of teaching religion"), and was rejected after a public outcry. In its stead, the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty," which was originally written by Thomas Jefferson, was enacted. This bill guaranteed "that no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever." A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 2 Papers of Thomas Jefferson 546 (J. Boyd ed. 1950).
[7] The amici contend that Washington's Constitution was born of religious bigotry because it contains a so-called "Blaine Amendment," which has been linked with anti-Catholicism. See Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 23, n. 5; Brief for Becket Fund for Religious Liberty et al. as Amici Curiae; see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U. S. 793, 828 (2000) (plurality opinion). As the State notes and Davey does not dispute, however, the provision in question is not a Blaine Amendment. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5; see Reply Brief for Petitioners 6-7. The enabling Act of 1889, which authorized the drafting of the Washington Constitution, required the state constitution to include a provision "for the establishment and maintenance of systems of public schools, which shall be . . . free from sectarian control." Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 4, ¶ Fourth, 25 Stat. 676. This provision was included in Article IX, § 4, of the Washington Constitution ("All schools maintained or supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from sectarian control or influence"), and is not at issue in this case. Neither Davey nor amici have established a credible connection between the Blaine Amendment and Article I, § 11, the relevant constitutional provision. Accordingly, the Blaine Amendment's history is simply not before us.
[8] Washington has also been solicitous in ensuring that its constitution is not hostile toward religion, see State ex rel. Gallwey v. Grimm, 146 Wash. 2d 445, 470, 48 P. 3d 274, 286 (2002) (en banc) ("[I]t was never the intention that our constitution should be construed in any manner indicating any hostility toward religion" (internal quotation marks omitted)), and at least in some respects, its constitution provides greater protection of religious liberties than the Free Exercise Clause, see First Covenant Church of Seattle v. Seattle, 120 Wash. 2d 203, 223-229, 840 P. 2d 174, 186-188 (1992) (en banc) (rejecting standard in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U. S. 872 (1990), in favor of more protective rule); Munns v. Martin, 131 Wash. 2d 192, 201, 930 P. 2d 318, 322 (1997) (en banc) (holding a city ordinance that imposed controls on demolition of historic structures inapplicable to the Catholic Church's plan to demolish an old school building and build a new pastoral center because the facilities are intimately associated with the church's religious mission). We have found nothing in Washington's overall approach that indicates it "single[s] out" anyone "for special burdens on the basis of . . . religious calling," as JUSTICE SCALIA contends, post, at 731.
[9] The State notes that it is an open question whether the Washington Constitution prohibits nontheology majors from taking devotional theology courses. At this point, however, the Program guidelines only exclude students who are pursuing a theology degree. Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12)(g) (2003).
[10] Although we have sometimes characterized the Establishment Clause as prohibiting the State from "disapprov[ing] of a particular religion or of religion in general," Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U. S. 520, 532 (1993) (citing cases), for the reasons noted supra, the State has not impermissibly done so here.
[1] Equally misplaced is the Court's reliance on founding-era state constitutional provisions that prohibited the use of tax funds to support the ministry. Ante, at 723. There is no doubt what these provisions were directed against: measures of the sort discussed earlier in text, singling out the clergy for public support. See supra, at 727. The Court offers no historical support for the proposition that they were meant to exclude clergymen from general benefits available to all citizens. In choosing to interpret them in that fashion, the Court needlessly gives them a meaning that not only is contrary to our Religion Clause jurisprudence, but has no logical stopping-point short of the absurd. No State with such a constitutional provision has, so far as I know, ever prohibited the hiring of public employees who use their salary to conduct ministries, or excluded ministers from generally available disability or unemployment benefits. Since the Court cannot identify any instance in which these provisions were applied in such a discriminatory fashion, its appeal to their "plain text," ante, at 723, adds nothing whatever to the "plain text" of Washington's own Constitution.
[2] The Court argues that those pursuing theology majors are not comparable to other Promise Scholars because "training for religious professions and training for secular professions are not fungible." Ante, at 721. That may well be, but all it proves is that the State has a rational basis for treating religion differently. If that is all the Court requires, its holding is contrary not only to precedent, see supra, at 726, but to common sense. If religious discrimination required only a rational basis, the Free Exercise Clause would impose no constraints other than those the Constitution already imposes on all government action. The question is not whether theology majors are different, but whether the differences are substantial enough to justify a discriminatory financial penalty that the State inflicts on no other major. Plainly they are not.
Equally unpersuasive is the Court's argument that the State may discriminate against theology majors in distributing public benefits because the Establishment Clause and its state counterparts are themselves discriminatory. See ante, at 721, 723. The Court's premise is true at some level of abstraction — the Establishment Clause discriminates against religion by singling it out as the one thing a State may not establish. All this proves is that a State has a compelling interest in not committing actual Establishment Clause violations. Cf. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U. S. 263, 271 (1981). We have never inferred from this principle that a State has a constitutionally sufficient interest in discriminating against religion in whatever other context it pleases, so long as it claims some connection, however attenuated, to establishment concerns.
[3] McDaniel had no opinion for the Court, but nothing in the separate opinions suggests disagreement over the issues relevant here. Cf. 435 U. S., at 636, n. 9 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (noting dispute over statute's purpose but deeming it irrelevant).
SUSAN TAVE ZELMAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF OHIO, et al. v. DORIS SIMMONS-HARRIS et al., 536 U.S. 639 (2002)
Related Sub-Topic:
Government Aid to Religious Schools
GUY MITCHELL, et al. v. MARY L. HELMS, et al., 530 U.S. 793 (2000)
RACHEL AGOSTINI, et al. v. BETTY-LOUISE FELTON et al., 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
LARRY ZOBREST, ET UX., et al. v. CATALINA FOOTHILLS SCHOOL DISTRICT, 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
WITTERS v. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF SERVICES FOR THE BLIND, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
SCHOOL DISTRICT OF THE CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS et al. v. BALL et al., 473 U.S. 373 (1985)
Lower Court Ruling:
Overruled (in part)
AGUILAR et al. v. FELTON et al., 473 U.S. 402 (1985)
MUELLER et al. v. ALLEN et al., 463 U.S. 388 (1983)
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY et al. v. REGAN, COMPTROLLER OF NEW YORK, et al., 444 U.S. 646 (1980)
NEW YORK v. CATHEDRAL ACADEMY, 434 U.S. 125 (1977)
WOLMAN et al. v. WALTER et al., 433 U.S. 229 (1977)
ROEMER et al. v. BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF MARYLAND et al., 426 U.S. 736 (1976)
MEEK et al. v. PITTENGER, SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, et al., 421 U.S. 349 (1975)
WHEELER et al. v. BARRERA et al., 417 U.S. 402 (1974)
LEVITT, COMPTROLLER OF NEW YORK, et al. v. COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION & RELIGIOUS LIBERTY et al., 413 U.S. 472 (1973)
HUNT v. MCNAIR, GOVERNOR OF SOUTH CAROLINA, et al., 413 U.S. 734 (1973)
SLOAN, TREASURER OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al. v. LEMON et al., 413 U.S. 825 (1973)
COMMITTEE FOR PUBLIC EDUCATION & RELIGIOUS LIBERTY et al. v. NYQUIST, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION OF NEW YORK, et al., 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
LEMON et al. v. KURTZMAN, SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION OF PENNSYLVANIA, et al., 411 U.S. 192 (1973)
TILTON et al. v. RICHARDSON, SECRETARY OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, et al., 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 et al. v. ALLEN, COMMISSIONER OF EDUCATION OF NEW YORK, et al., 392 U.S. 236 (1968)
John E. Ferguson Jr., "Locke v. Davey (2004 )," First Amendment Encyclopedia.
Topics: Freedom of Religion,	Government Aid to Religious Schools
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The Downlink • Oct 09, 2020
How to stop microbes from hitching a ride to space
Space Snapshot
The Planetary Society's crowdfunded LightSail 2 spacecraft took this selfie of its solar sails with Earth in the background. You can see Cuba and the Bahamas with their gorgeous tropical waters, and in the upper-left of the image you can see the Moon, a tiny brownish dot.
You love space, now take action
This weekly newsletter is your toolkit to learn more about space, share information with your friends and family, and take direct action to support exploration. Anyone can subscribe at planetary.org/connect to receive it as a weekly email.
Fact Worth Sharing
It's not easy being clean. NASA clean rooms have their own microbiomes of super-hardy species that withstand rigorous disinfection procedures. Living bacteria have even been scraped off the outside of the International Space Station.
Mission Briefings
NASA has for the first time used artificial intelligence to find a new crater on Mars. The crater appeared sometime between March 2010 and May 2012, according to its sudden appearance in images (pictured) captured by the agency's Mars Reconnaissance Orbiter. Image credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech/University of Arizona.
NASA's James Webb Space Telescope has completed all environmental tests to ensure it can survive its ride to space next year. The observatory will now undergo one last mirror and sunshade deployment before shipping to South America for launch.
China released an interplanetary selfie of the Tianwen-1 spacecraft, captured by a small camera-equipped probe it jettisoned. Tianwen-1 will arrive at Mars in February along with NASA's Perseverance Rover and the UAE's Hope orbiter.
The European Space Agency's next Mars mission has a launch date of 20 September 2022. The mission, which missed its original 2020 launch window, must now wait for the next window when Mars and Earth are optimally aligned.
Astronauts used the robotic arm on the International Space Station to capture a Cygnus spacecraft carrying 4 tons of supplies. The ship is named after Kalpana Chawla, the first woman of Indian descent to fly in space, who died in 2003 aboard Space Shuttle Columbia.
From The Planetary Society
It's important (and tricky) to keep microbes from accidentally spreading around the solar system. Every time a spacecraft is sent to another planet, it has to be sterilized to keep microorganisms from coming along for the ride. When we start sending humans to Mars, things will get even more complicated. This week's Planetary Radio brings you to the recent Humans to Mars summit, where host Mat Kaplan moderated a panel about planetary protection, the fascinating and challenging effort to keep microbes where they belong. Pictured: A team of engineers and technicians installing sample tubes into the belly of NASA's Perseverance rover, taking every precaution not to contaminate them with Earthly microbes.
How might the U.S. election affect space policy? In the latest Planetary Radio: Space Policy Edition Jeff Foust, senior staff writer for SpaceNews, joins our chief advocate Casey Dreier to discuss the space policy of a possible Joe Biden administration, and what if anything could change at NASA if President Trump is reelected.
Check out Jupiter and Saturn in the early evening sky in the west. On 13 October Mars will be in opposition, meaning that it is on the opposite side of the Earth from the Sun and very bright in the night sky. In the pre-dawn sky, Venus shines very brightly in the east.
Wow of the Week
Some things never go out of style. This vintage space image from 1975 shows one of NASA's Viking landers being prepared for dry heat sterilization, a method that remains the gold standard for planetary protection measures today. The two Viking landers performed the first biological experiments looking for signs of life on the Red Planet, so it was critically important that they not be contaminated with microbial life from Earth.
Do you have a suggestion for the Wow of the Week? We're looking for space-related art, music, gadgets, quotes, fashion, burning questions, brief sci-fi passages, or anything else that will make our readers go "Wow!" Send us your idea by replying to any Downlink email or writing to [email protected], and please let us know if you're a Planetary Society member.
Read more: Planetary Radio, Planetary Radio Space Policy Edition, The Downlink, Worlds, The Mars system, Mars, Planetary Society, Planetary Society solar sails, LightSail, LightSail 2, Space topics, Search for Life
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text:
Q: ASP.NET Core 2 migration error. No executable found matching command "dotnet-ef" When I want to add a migration to my project I got the following error:

dotnet : No executable found matching command "dotnet-ef"

For resolving this I add the following package but I still get the same error.
Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design(2.0.0)
Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools.DotNet(2.0.0)

I found some solution but these are based on .net-core-1 and in .net-core-2 we don't have project.json file.
update:
Here is my .csproj file:
<Project Sdk="Microsoft.NET.Sdk">
<PropertyGroup>
<TargetFramework>netcoreapp2.0</TargetFramework>
</PropertyGroup>

<ItemGroup>
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.AspNetCore.Hosting" Version="2.0.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore" Version="2.0.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Design" Version="2.0.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.InMemory" Version="2.0.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools" Version="2.0.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.SqlServer" Version="2.0.0" />
<PackageReference Include="Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.Json" Version="2.0.0" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
    <DotNetCliToolReference Include="Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools.DotNet" Version="2.0.0" />
</ItemGroup>
<ItemGroup>
<Reference Include="Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration">
      <HintPath>C:\Program Files\dotnet\sdk\NuGetFallbackFolder\microsoft.extensions.configuration\2.0.0\lib\netstandard2.0\Microsoft.Extensions.Configuration.dll</HintPath>
   </Reference>
</ItemGroup>

</Project>

A:
Link to thread
Above worked for me after many hrs trying many other thread answers. Simply cd'ing to folder containing csproj file in package console manager was all it took. dotnet ef commands all work fine then.

A: In order to get dotnet ef to work, you need to add a DotNetCliToolReference element to the .csproj, as follows:
<DotNetCliToolReference Include="Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools.DotNet" Version="2.0.0" />

This needs to live inside an ItemGroup, something like:
<ItemGroup>
    <DotNetCliToolReference Include="Microsoft.EntityFrameworkCore.Tools.DotNet" Version="2.0.0" />
</ItemGroup>

You'll also need to make sure you run dotnet ef from the same location as the .csproj file.

A: I know some of you will come to this question for the [No executable found matching command "dotnet-"] part of the title. In my case it was:
No executable found matching command "dotnet-My"

And.... it turns out my app name was "My App". Make sure your assembly name has no spaces in it. I changed it to "MyApp" and it loaded correctly.

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U.S. Navy Sailors aboard the guided-missile destroyer USS Chung-Hoon (DDG 93) recently completed training for maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden during the month of December.
Chung-Hoon's latest round of drills was a combined forces effort. U.S. Coast Guardsmen and U.S. Army Soldiers came aboard as instructors to help teach new techniques and tactics.
The instructors agreed that the different military branches need to be able to connect to and rely on each other in global areas of operations, no matter where.
Bland added that he was happy with the effort shown by Chung-Hoon's maritime security team.
The training involved everything from boarding a vessel to close-quarters combat and survival.
Members of Chung-Hoon's maritime operations team said that the training had been very helpful in making them get better.


Last week I woke up in the middle of the night with terrible lower back pain. I was eventually able to go back to sleep but didn't sleep well. When I awoke the next morning I still had the back pain. It was worse than any back pain I have ever had before.
I had a doctors appointment already scheduled for the following day so I decided to just grin and bear it until the next day. It was a miserable day and when I got home I was talking to Tawneey and she suggested I take a hot bath. Thant sounded like a terrific idea to me so I did just that.
I sunk into that wonderfully relaxing water and closed my eyes and let it all just wash away. I relaxed so much that I was unaware of the pain. I was so peaceful and warm. It was glorious.
Then I heard a faint voice trying to get my attention. I ignored it for a little bit but then it sounded like it was pleading. I opened my eyes but saw no one. I thought maybe I was hearing voices from outside but that wasn't it. Then I heard the voice again.
If I didn't know better I would have thought I was losing my mind, but this new path I am on is teaching me to be open to just about anything, so I decided to just go with it.
I began to really pay attention this time and before I knew it I was having a conversation with a spirit. This spirit was telling me some very specific things and asking for my help. I was pretty excited at this new development.
I tried to communicate as best I could and let the spirit know that I am totally new to this and she was very patient with me. Things were moving along very nicely and then I heard another voice, and then another, and then another. Before I knew it there were six voices clamoring for my attention.
They all began arguing with each other and yelling trying to get my attention. I was not very happy about this turn of events. My relaxing bath was turning into something that didn't resemble relaxation at all.
My head was starting to hurt and I was starting to lose my control. One thing I learned from this experience is that I still need to do some work on how to deal with the surprises associated with this new path.
I tried politely explaining that I couldn't hear or understand them all because they were yelling over each other. I tried telling them I was new to this. I tried a lot of things, but they just kept at it.
At this point I was getting angry. My head was still hurting and I was starting to get nauseous. I just wasn't prepared for this kind of thing. I didn't know what to do. Nothing I tried would get them to be quiet or go away. I was no longer being nice to them, but they didn't seem to care. They were all too busy arguing with each other.
Eventually I crawled into bed to try to sleep but the constant noise and ache in my head just wouldn't allow it. I was about at the end my rope when I finally just decided to stop fighting them. I just didn't have the energy anymore so I gave in.
Within a few seconds of me giving in, everything went silent. I couldn't believe it. I still have so much to learn about this new path I am on and this was a new lesson.
Don't fight it. Allow it to happen and flow through you.
Of course earlier in the night I did email Giselle, who emailed back with terrific words of wisdom and advice. Sometimes I wonder if Giselle gets annoyed with basically having to tell me the same things over and over again. Breathe, relax with it, let it all flow.
Just before this happened I had told Giselle that I wanted to learn how to enter the Spiritual Realm and be able to communicate with the Spirits. I guess I need to be more specific about my wants and desires.
While I want to be able to communicate with the Spirits, I want to do it on my time frame and in my own way. I never wanted to be bombarded without warning. I guess I need to learn how to properly deal with uninvited intrusions. I'm adding that to the long list of things I hope to learn from Giselle.
By the way, when I woke up the next morning, I did not have even a trace of back pain. I really feel the back pain was here just to get me into the bath so I could get relaxed enough to hear the spirits.
I guess the Universe believes I am ready even if I am not so sure about that. I am just trying to take this all in and learn what I can. I guess I need these experiences to show me what lessons I need to work on.
Looking back now I can say I am glad it happened exactly as it happened. If it had been a walk in the park then I wouldn't know what it is that I need to work on.
I have not had anymore visitors since then, but I really think that in my normal day to day living I am just not allowing myself to be relaxed enough to hear. I am calling that a survival method for now. Someday, when I am wiser about all of this, these instinctive survival methods will no longer be needed but right now in the infancy stage of this new path, I am grateful to have them.


text:
The Princeton Public Library and Princeton Historical Society are very pleased to announce the completion of our historic newspaper digitization project! Our local newspapers dating from 1879 to 1993 are now available online for anyone to look at, putting historical and genealogical data within easy reach of the public.
Click here to access them: https://archives.winnefox.org
The newspaper scans are hosted on Winnefox Library System servers, and are also be linked to the Historical Society's future website.
Princeton had six newspapers over the years. The digitized scans include editions from:
- Green Lake County Democrat 1879-1885
- Princeton Republic 1867-1937
- Princeton Republic-Star 1905-1906
- Princeton Star 1902-1905
- Princeton Times 1935-1937
- Princeton Times-Republic 1937-1993
Users are able to search all of these at once, or only one, or whichever they choose. The newspapers can be easily searched by name, keyword, and date (or date range). A short instructional presentation about how to use the database will be given at the Princeton Public Library on Monday, December 12th at 1pm and again at 6pm. Attendees will be shown the best methods for searching, quirks of searching including OCI errors, and interesting articles and headlines.
To celebrate this achievement, anyone who wishes can request a free photocopy of a historic front page of the Princeton newspaper published on their birthday (or the closest date to it). Please contact the Princeton Public Library at ptplstaff@princetonpublib.org or 920-295-6777 to request your printout.
This project took over a year to complete, and cost about seventeen thousand dollars. 98,563 individual microfilm images had to be scanned, cleaned up, coded, uploaded to a library system server, and made searchable. This process involved the technical efforts of the Princeton Public Library staff, the Crowley Company of Frederick, Maryland, NMT Partners of Onalaska, Wisconsin, DC Johnson of Ripon, Wisconsin, and Keetra Baker of the Winnefox Library System.
The digitization was made possible with contributions from the Princeton Historical Society, the Princeton Public Library, the Caestecker (Green Lake) Library's Tom Gnewuch Memorial Fund, the Wisconsin Humanities Endowment, and the Winnefox Library System.


text:
"Love Kills" is a song by Freddie Mercury, and his first song released as a solo artist, though the other members of Queen appeared on the song - initially uncredited.

Written by Mercury and Giorgio Moroder, it was originally used in Moroder's 1984 restoration and edit of Fritz Lang's 1927 silent film Metropolis, as part of the film's new soundtrack. In 1985, the film was nominated at the 5th Golden Raspberry Awards for Worst Musical Score, and the song itself was nominated for Worst Original Song. Nevertheless, the single reached number ten on the UK Singles Chart.

Officially, the single has only ever been credited to Freddie Mercury, despite it being a collaboration with Moroder. In 2000, the liner notes of the Freddie Mercury boxset The Solo Collection confirmed that Brian May and Roger Taylor contributed guitar and drums to the track, and many years later, the 2019 compilation Never Boring confirmed that the fourth member of Queen, John Deacon also performed on the song, contributing additional guitar parts. There has been no confirmation as to why the track was released credited solely to Mercury and not as a Queen single, but the band's contract with EMI Records worldwide (and Capital Records in the USA) may have contributed to this, as the Metropolis soundtrack was released on CBS Records, who would go on to sign Freddie as a solo artist for the 1985 album Mr. Bad Guy.

The song was never performed live in any concert or event. Queen + Adam Lambert performed the song live for the very first time on the North American leg of their tour in 2014 as a ballad. That version was later reworked by Brian May & Roger Taylor with the original vocals by Mercury for the album Queen Forever in 2014.

A remix of "Love Kills" was also used for the closing credits of the 1993 film Loaded Weapon 1. This version was the Richard Wolf Mix as found on the compilation album The Great Pretender. In 2009, a cover version by English synthpop singer Little Boots was included on her extended plays Little Boots and Illuminations.

The B-side, "Rotwang's Party (Robot Dance)" was written and performed by Moroder. Although used in his rendition of Metropolis, it was not included in the film's soundtrack album.

Track listings

Personnel
Freddie Mercury – vocals, synthesizers
Reinhold Mack – synthesizers, programming
Giorgio Moroder – synthesizers, programming
Brian May - lead guitar
John Deacon - additional guitar
Roger Taylor - percussion

Queen version

A previously unreleased ballad version of the song was reworked by Brian May and Roger Taylor for the compilation Queen Forever. The Queen version is a stripped-down ballad version, while Mercury's version is a high energy track. "Love Kills" was considered for inclusion on the occasion of Queen's eleventh studio album The Works, but was not used.

Personnel
Freddie Mercury – lead vocals
Giorgio Moroder - keyboard
Brian May – guitars, keyboards,  bass guitar
Roger Taylor – drums
John Deacon – additional guitars

Remixes
 "Love Kills (Wolf remix)" was found in a promotional CD issued only in the United States in 1992.
 "Love Kills (Pixel '82 remix)" and "Love Kills (More Oder Rework by The Glimmers)" can both be found in the UK double-CD release of the 2006 compilation album Lover of Life, Singer of Songs: The Very Best of Freddie Mercury Solo
 Several remixes of the track are found in the 2006 Love Kills (remix) singles released in various European countries, with different track lists:
 "Love Kills (Sunshine People Radio remix)"
 "Love Kills (Star Rider remix)"
 "Love Kills (Rank 1 Radio remix)"
 "Love Kills (Sunshine People Club remix)"

Charts

Sunshine People Remix 2006 version

References

1984 debut singles
1984 songs
CBS Records singles
Virgin EMI Records singles
Freddie Mercury songs
Little Boots songs
Song recordings produced by Giorgio Moroder
Song recordings produced by Reinhold Mack
Songs written for films
Songs written by Freddie Mercury
Songs written by Giorgio Moroder
Works based on Metropolis (1927 film)

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


A-CLASSIC: THE SPORTIVE SIDE FIRST. THE OFFICIAL BIRTH OF THE U.A.C.C.
"With the approval of the request for affiliation by the Italian Sailing Federation (FIV) decided during the last federal council it was officially recognized the newborn Unione A-Classica Catamarani (UACC), class association that gathers inside all owners of catamarans Class A-Classic .
The catamaran A-Classic is a rethink, with a box rule more restrictive, of the already known Class A, a boat that it has had over the years a remarkable expansion in the world thanks to a very open regulation and therefore to large differences between boats and materials, which could develop without restriction except for the measures of the boat, the sail area and weight.
Just the opening of this regulation has led in recent years to a revolution inside the class, still in progress, which will bring with good chances the A-Class to become in a short time a class of boats full foiling.
decided to create and develop this new class of catamarans A-Classic, with the ultimate goal to put at the center of the competition the sailors and give due weight to boats that, because of the continuous changes are raising its prices exponentially making it more effective the financial aspect than the sailing skills.
The main new feature of the A-Classic Box rule is indeed the categorically elimination of the possibility to create and race with boats that allow the flight, are in fact prohibited appendages that allow the foiling, this because according to the vision of the founding members the foiling , as spectacular and fun, will take away from the races some of the most exciting features, as the tactics and strategy, focusing sailors in the difficult conduction of the boats.
However, the changes introduced by U.A.C.C. Are not limited to the boats, some big news will be introduced also in the races, both on land and at sea, there are going to be shorter and fought races (average duration 35 minutes), the discards will start from the fourth race and can be raced up to four regattas per day. Also it is expressly written in the class rules that will be organized the races, in compliance with the safety standards, in close proximity to beaches or installations that allow to follow the racing to the public, thanks to the involvement of speakers and djs commenting the race live and involving the public.
from the beginning, not only from Italy, in fact, from its birth in December 2014 already includes nearly 50 members, among them there are some big and well-known names in the world of catamarans and sailing, as the two-time Olympic in Tornado Francesco Marcolini, the Italian team member at the 2003 Little America's Cup Teo Di Battista, former Tornado and Nacra 17 sailor Vincenzo Sorrentino, the two-time bronze at the European university Championship Riccardo Mellina Gottardo and many other sailors who now will have the chance to race on equal terms with each other, in fact, from now on even older boats can compete and, if well conducted, beat newer boats, which over the years will be able to maintain competitiveness and price, thanks to this, and to the closure of its box rule the U.A.C.C. Aims to attract in its races younger sailors or enthusiasts of monotypes and one-design that will finally find a catamaran that meets their tastes and habits.
The U.A.C.C. is already very active on the internet with its own site (www.a-classic.com) and Facebook (UACC Union A-Classical Catamarans) and Twitter (AclassicUacc) pages on which the members and fans can always stay up to date on news and activities.


I looked into the applications of the Extend tool in Grasshopper. It is found under Curve in the toolbar and under the subcategory Util. The Extend tool in Grasshopper is an easy way to adjust the length of a curve. By uploading the extend parameter a user can lengthen numerically the start or finish of a curve. This can be helpful when the user needs to manually manipulate this aspect of a line.


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Questions, comments, concerns, requests, or anything else you'd like to share?


Released this summer, God in My Everything, by Canadian author Ken Shigematsu, is a down-to-earth book that expresses how spiritual formation is more than just solitude and quiet reflection. Spiritual formation happens in the everyday, so that even a busy life can be fertile ground for Christian growth.
In an age of self-help and quick fixes, God in My Everything encourages readers to walk the old paths of the Jesus tradition – prayer, fasting, hospitality, and witness. I found this book especially compelling because of the way Shigematsu's writing exudes grace. For once, the spiritual disciplines seem accessible and not overly burdensome. Reading the book did not trigger feelings of guilt (for not doing enough) but inspired me to invite God to enter parts of my life I hadn't seriously considered letting him enter before.
I was not aware of the 'rule of life' concept previously, a view of daily life drawn from the monastic tradition, but am glad Shigematsu has dusted off this forgotten treasure of Christian history and demonstrated its immense contemporary relevance. Many of us live disjointed and distracted lives; a rule of life helps us allow God to integrate these threads back together.
Through poignant insights, memorable anecdotes, and a hybrid Japanese / Canadian perspective, Shigematsu provides a unique perspective on aspects of life rarely discussed in discipleship literature – play, Sabbath, family life. Reading this book reawakened my desire to live deeply in a superficial age.
Order God in My Everything from READ ON Books at a discounted price: $13.99 including shipping. To order, stop by the store or contact us at books@readon.ca or (416) 620-2934.


text:
Zuhair Murad () (born in July 1971) is a Lebanese fashion designer. He was born in 1971 in Ras Baalbek, Lebanon.

Biography
Zuhair Murad was born to a Melkite Catholic family in Ras Baalbek. Shortly after high school, Murad moved to Paris, where he obtained his degree in fashion.

In 1999, Murad made his first appearance on the catwalks of Rome with a collection that led to his participation in the Italian calendar. In 1995, Murad opened his third head shop in Beirut. His lines encompass haute couture, ready-to-wear and accessories. Two boutiques (including showrooms) have been opened; the first in Beirut on Charles Helou Avenue and the second on rue François I in Paris. He also has a showroom in Milan on the Via Borgogna.

Celebrities like Adele, Marion Cotillard, Taylor Swift, Carrie Underwood, Ivana Trump, Cheryl Fernandez-Versini, Beyoncé Knowles, Jennifer Lopez, Kellie Pickler, Najwa Karam, Shakira, Katy Perry, Christina Applegate, Vanessa Williams, Ana Ortiz, have worn his creations. He has also dressed the likes of Najwa Karam in her video clips "Lashhad Hobbak" and "MaFi Noum". Priyanka Chopra wore a white embellished strapless gown by Zuhair Murad at her maiden Oscars in 2016. Miley Cyrus was seen wearing one of his creations at the Academy Awards, and Christina Aguilera and Jennifer Lopez wore his creations at the 2011 Golden Globe Awards. He also designed Miss France Chloé Mortaud's dress for Miss Universe 2009 and 5 dresses for the final of Miss France 2010. Florence Welch was seen wearing one of his creations during the Brits awards; a silver silk dress with gold and silver beaded designs.

Nina Dobrev, Christina Aguilera, Wanda Sykes and singer Jewel were seen wearing Zuhair Murad dresses at the 2010 Emmy Awards. Kerry Washington wore one of his gowns at the 2011 Emmy Awards. Princess al-Taweel of Saudi Arabia wore his creation when she attended the wedding of Prince William and Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge.

Blake Lively was also wearing a Zuhair Murad dress from his Spring 2012 Couture collection at the worldwide premier of her movie "SAVAGES" at Westwood Village. She had also previously been seen in a Zuhair Murad dress in a season 4 episode of Gossip Girl entitled 'Juliet doesn't live here anymore. Kristen Stewart wore a Zuhair Murad dress at the 2012 Toronto Film Festival for a screening of her 2012 film, On the Road and also at the premiere in Los Angeles of her film, The Twilight Saga: Breaking Dawn – Part 2.

French actress Marion Cotillard wore a floral Zuhair Murad dress from his Fall 2012 collection at the 2013 Critics' Choice Awards.

References

External links

Official website

1971 births
Living people
Lebanese fashion designers
Artists from Beirut
Fashion designers from Paris
Lebanese Melkite Greek Catholics


Gretchen Fox's Dock is a featured location in Emmet Otter's Jug-Band Christmas. The dock, owned by Gretchen Fox and her husband Harrison, is the perfect place for Alice Otter to drop off Gretchen's laundry. Frustrated Alice even suggests that Gretchen fall off the dock.
The area next to the dock is a favorite fishing spot of Will Possum.


If you take a look at online casinos nowadays, you will see that they are mostly competing in which one offers the biggest and best bonuses to its players. Welcome bonuses, reload bonuses and others are among the best marketing tools they have, so they make good use of it. Different bonus types come with different terms, conditions and requirements which you'd better understand to avoid unpleasant surprises while you play. Let's see.
We all know them and like them – these are the bonuses a casino offers its players without the need of making any deposits, to be able to test drive the casino itself without the need to risk your own money. But make no mistake, there is no such thing as free money. These no deposit bonuses have their share of applicable terms and conditions.
First of all, the amount you get as a no deposit bonus is play money, meaning that it can't be cashed out. Usually the amount is only available for a limited time – a few days tops – after which it is removed from your account, leaving you with a part of the winnings generated using it. The money you are left with is usually play money as well until you make a real money deposit and complete a second set of play-through requirements.
– list of banned games – sometimes the casino specifies that by playing on any other game than the ones in the list of allowed games can void the bonus and all winnings generated using it.
– max cash-out limit – this is not present in all casinos, but where it is, it specifies how much of the winnings generated by using the bonus funds can be cashed out (usually 10x the original deposit amount).
These comp points – complementary points generated by spending real money at casino games – are also a form of bonus. The points gathered by a player can be converted into cash or real life prizes (depending on the casino) which usually don't have any further requirements attached to them. Still, it's wise to read the terms applying to them, too, to avoid any surprises.
Casino bonuses can look diverse, but usually fit into the above three categories. Be sure to know the difference.


Dog Whistler is an unique Android application which allows you to take control and teach your dog new tricks as you produce dog whistle. This application can be activated by choosing a frequency by pushing the slider as soon you see on the left or the right side and this will change the frequency for you and the range of frequency accepted is 80 Hz to 20,000 Hz too good for animals like dogs and cats. This application will tweak your dog to specific hearing range and your dog is brought training according to that.
Various modes of manual, continuous and Timer are available as the continuous mode will play the music continuously until you stop it and the timer will play the sound for particular interval of time.
To activate whistle you need to push the whistle in the center of the screen and this will initiate the sound frequency which you have choosen previously.
After when you have select the desired frequency you need to hold one of the dog bone preset button on your screen until you feel the vibration. This will set a new frequency for you.
This application at iOS App Store has around 9 million unique downloads and this application finally arrives on the popular and currently trending Android Play Store available for download free.
Dog Whistler application can be easily downloaded from Android Apps Labs for free. To download it directly on to your mobile phone, you need to visit the Android Apps Labs page listing of Dog Whistler application from your phone's browser and then click on Install to automatically proceed with the installation.
While go through the Dog Whistler, we can easily say that this is not a perfectly developed application for the use on Android, we expect more good results in the coming version updates.
Nice app to train a dog.
Yes, really a good app.


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