text:
PATRIOT ATHLETICS
Pittston Area Senior High School
Band Cheerleading Cross Country Field Hockey Football Golf Soccer Tennis Volleyball
Basketball Swimming Wrestling
CoEd Junior High CoEd Varsity
Girls Junior High Girls Varsity
Boys 7th/8th Boys 8th Boys Freshman Boys Junior High Boys Junior Varsity Boys Varsity
Boys 7th Boys 8th Boys Freshman Boys Junior High Boys Junior Varsity Boys Varsity Girls 7th Girls 8th Girls Freshman Girls Junior High Girls Junior Varsity Girls Varsity
Boys Elementary Boys Junior High Boys Varsity
Boys 7th/8th Boys 8th Boys Junior High Boys Varsity
Boys Junior High Boys Varsity CoEd Junior High CoEd Varsity Girls Junior High Girls Varsity
Boys Junior High (18-19)
Boys 7th/8th
Boys Elementary
Boys 7th/8th (18-19)
CoEd Junior High (18-19)
Girls Junior High Softball
Thursday Apr 2 @ 4:15PM (H)
vs Greater Nanticoke Area Senior High School (Non-League)
Wednesday Apr 8 @ 4:15PM (A)
vs Wilkes-Barre Area – Wolfpack
Tuesday Apr 14 @ 4:15PM (H)
vs Berwick Area High School
(H) 04/02/20 4:15 PM vs Greater Nanticoke Area Senior HS
Non-League Pittston Area Mattei Middle School .
(A) 04/08/20 4:15 PM vs Wilkes-Barre Area – Wolfpack Solomon/Plains .
(H) 04/14/20 4:15 PM vs Berwick Area HS Pittston Area Mattei Middle School .
(H) 04/20/20 4:15 PM vs Wyoming Valley West HS Pittston Area Mattei Middle School .
(H) 04/22/20 4:15 PM vs Dallas School District Pittston Area Mattei Middle School .
(A) 04/24/20 4:15 PM vs Crestwood HS Crestwood H.S. .
(H) 04/28/20 4:15 PM vs Hazleton Area HS Pittston Area Mattei Middle School .
(H) 04/30/20 4:15 PM vs Wilkes-Barre Area – Wolfpack Pittston Area Mattei Middle School .
(A) 05/04/20 4:15 PM vs Berwick Area HS Crispin Field .
(A) 05/08/20 4:15 PM vs Wyoming Valley West HS JE Romanoskey Park .
(A) 05/11/20 4:15 PM vs Dallas School District Dallas M.S. .
(H) 05/13/20 4:15 PM vs Crestwood HS Pittston Area Mattei Middle School .
(A) 05/15/20 4:15 PM vs Hazleton Area HS Hazleton H.S. .
5 Stout Street Yatesville
Pittston, PA 18640
The official website of Pittston Area Senior High Athletics
https://patriotathletics.org
Get key announcements and game updates from the official Pittston Area Senior High School athletic calendar!


Note to staff: I play on my computer and on occasion my tablet, so that may be the reason why my IP address changes when and if it does change. I'm saying this so my account isn't put in jeopardy.
On occasion my online status can be misleading, I log out from time to time to do other things.


Our Eastland Frosted votive candle holders and Richland LED tealights go hand in hand! These frosted glass holders with a thick glass sham provide beauty in your home or event space. Simple, elegant, and affordable make this set a great choice!
The frosted holders come in a sectioned box to protect from damage. Your LED tealights come in a sectioned box as well. Each tealight has a plastic pull tab. Simply pull the plastic out and your battery can become engaged! On-Off switch is on the bottom of the LED and if turned off after each use, you will enjoy hours of battery life! Each LED tealight features a flickering flame!


text:
Disney Partners With OSN For Launch Of Its Disney+ Services In Middle East
Disney+ streaming services from WALT Disney is set to make its debut in the Middle East and North Africa from April 9 in partnership with OSN – the regional pay television and online streaming service provider.
Without disclosing much information about the deal, OSN Chief Executive Patrick Tillieux told the media that a "long-term" exclusive distribution rights agreement has been signed between Disney and the Dubai-headquartered OSN.
17 regional markets, including Egypt, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, will get access to Disney+ original programming, including hit show 'The Mandalorian', on OSN's pay television and online streaming services. The cost of the services gas has been fixed at $9.50 a month.
OSN said this agreement marks the first instance of Disney deciding to distribute the content Disney+ through a third party service provider.
"We currently do not plan to launch Disney+ as a standalone service in the region in the near future," Walt Disney Regional Lead Amit Malhotra said in a statement.
It is expected that the competition between Disney and the likes of Netflix will be increased because of the deal. Netflix already has a sizable presence in the Middle East.
OSN itself has undergone a massive restructuring as it reduced its workforce of 2,300 by about 60 per cent in 2019. The company has annual revenues of about $500 million.
"We have come out of a dark period," Tillieux said.
However, even though OSN is no longer able to use shopping centres for selling and promoting its products because those are closed to prevent spread of the coronavirus , he said that he was confident about the business outlook of the company for this year.
Burt with the spread of the coronavirus pandemic gripping most of the countries of the world and as countries lockdown or issue stay at home orders, people forced to remain confined in their homes have taken to watching online content, That has significantly increased the usage of pay television and online streaming services over the last two weeks across the region, he said.
The lockdown and stay at home orders in many parts of the Middle East because of the coronavirus pandemic means that OSN has been forced to resort to only online platforms and means to promote and market the launch of Disney+ content. The company was forced to its prior plans of engaging in traditional outdoor advertising because very few people are currently getting out of their homes.
"We are pushing heavily on ... digital," Tillieux said.
Kuwait Projects Co., Kuwait's largest listed investment company, is the major shareholder of OSN.
(Source:www.usmews.com)
Thursday, January 14th 2021 - 16:11	The First Foreign Company In China To Fully Own A Payments Business Is PayPal
Thursday, January 14th 2021 - 16:11	Shoppers 'Treat Themselves' During Pandemic-Ridden Christmas Helping Tesco To Report Record Sales

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


The stokvel has long been South Africa's favourite way for a group of people to save and invest. Today the traditional stokvel has gone digital for the first time with Franc, a new app which makes investing simple and affordable for anyone with a smartphone. Franc gives stokvel members access to the money market and an exchange traded fund via their mobile phones.
Franc has no minimum investment amount. You can withdraw or transfer your money anytime without penalty and there are no hidden or complicated fees. Access to Franc is free for the first six months; thereafter the membership fee is R5 per month. But members can get another six months free for every friend they invite who becomes a member in the first free six months. Besides the membership fee, there are no other fees or deductions.
Franc's two investment options were selected because of their credibility and low cost. These include the Allan Gray Money Market Fund, which has returned an average of 7.87% interest* over the past year, and Satrix 40, an exchange traded fund (ETF) recently voted SA's favourite ETF, that tracks the performance of the JSE Top 40 largest companies and grew 66.46% over the last five years, an average compound annual growth rate of 10.67%. By way of comparison, according to MyTreasury, an online investment optimiser which finds the best interest rates for consumers, the next best rate that matches Franc's terms is only 5% interest with a minimum of a R1 000 deposit.
With Franc, FICA is painless. All you need to do is provide your ID number, upload proof of ID and proof of your address, take a selfie and you're done. Because Franc is a stokvel, you need to be invited to join. Sign up by going to franc.app on your phone and Franc will match you with someone you know.
The Franc team comprises eight professionals who have backgrounds in machine learning, software development, smart contracts, compliance, legal, investment and actuarial science.
Franc is available in the Apple App Store and Google Play Store or go to franc.app on your phone.


text:
Accountancy firm Cooper Parry praises entrepreneurial spirit of CDS' new directors
News | November 2020
For regular updates, please visit us at;
Rebel accountancy firm Cooper Parry has published a glowing testimonial to the entrepreneurial spirit of the directors who took over at the helm of CDS in the summer.
Simon Cashmore and Simon Abley have brought to their previous business ventures is anything to go by, the future of CDS looks very rosy indeed!
He and Simon Abley grew their last business, outdoor services specialist TCL Group, 14-fold in the 12 years between acquiring it and selling it to European giant idverde last year.
In an article written for the self-styled 'disruptive, mould breaking' accountancy company as part of its series on entrepreneurs, its relationship partner Peter Sterling heaps praise on CDS' new chairman Simon Cashmore.
"I saw straight away that the entrepreneurial spirit lay deep within his DNA," said Peter, who met Simon C initially in 2006.
"We've always loved working with Simon and his long-time business colleague Simon Abley. They have been all-round 'good guys' to work with!"
He describes Simon Cashmore as a demanding leader with great attention to detail and a passion for driving change.
"Even in 2008 when the financial crash brought the housing market to a grinding halt, Simon and his management team at TCL never lost belief in the business. It came back strongly, and Simon led a number of carefully researched acquisitions to broaden not only the geographical spread of the company but the ranges of services it offered.
"It says a lot for Simon that in many cases the vendors of the businesses acquired remained with the group post-acquisition," he said.
And this model is continuing with CDS, whose co-founders Martin Iliffe and Tony Mikunda remain firmly on the board as shareholding directors, alongside the firm's existing, highly qualified team of engineers and salespeople.
The two Simons are replicating the successful 'buy and build' model they used at TCL Group at CDS. They aim to grow the business organically and buy companies within the wider compliance sector over the next few years to offer a broader range of services to existing customers and expand their geographical reach.
"The recession in 2008 taught us that having a business heavily aligned to a specific sector wasn't sensible. So we set out to find a broader range of clients operating in different markets. We rapidly diversified by buying other complementary services. We became good at buying businesses and dramatically improving their profitability," explained Simon Cashmore.
"We hit on our own little model. We found businesses we thought were doing a genuinely good job for their customers. We then spent a lot of time with the owners to make sure that we were buying businesses with similar values to us so they would integrate well. Then we cross-sold a broad range of services to these new customers," he added.
Having got their feet well and truly under the CDS table the tireless Simons are now proactively looking into ways to augment the service offering there and interested in talking to other owner-managed companies in the fire compliance sector looking for their next move.
CDS (Head Office)
The Old Rectory
46 Leicester Road
Narborough
LE19 2DF
CDS (Midlands)
CDS (South East)-Powerpoint Fire Systems
CDS (South West)-Tann Synchronome
CDS (North)
CDS (North Wales)
For more information To join the team
Our terms and conditions Quality policy Health and safety policy Environmental policy


text:
No press freedom in "Thailand 4.0"
10/06/2017 News	The Isaan Record
MAHA SARAKHAM — Journalists, academics, and observers criticized the government's repression of press freedom in public forum at Mahasarakham University last month. The forum also featured the Swedish Ambassador to Thailand, who pointed out the importance of the right to freedom of expression and voiced concern about the government's "Thailand 4.0" vision.
A public forum co-hosted by the Faculty of Informatics and The Isaan Record on 15 September brought together several academics, journalists, and community organizers to offer their perspectives on freedom of expression and the state of the press.
Sweden's Ambassador to Thailand Staffan Herrström relates the Swedish experience on press freedom and freedom of expression. "Swedish experiences, yes for sure. But the values they are based on are global; they belong to us all," Mr. Herrström says.
Repression in the name of peace and order
Sumet Somkhane, a representative from the Thai Journalists Association committee on press freedom and media reform, said that under the current government the media is free to report only on some topics. Issues deemed as potentially causing "unrest" are subject to restrictive measures. Sensitive issues range from political movements to the defense of community rights.
The government's underlying mindset, Sumet said, is that the best way to govern is by imposing peace and order.
The military junta, officially named the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), has ruled Thailand since it overthrew an elected government in May 2014.
Earlier this year, the NCPO attempted to force all journalists to be licensed by the government. But after a backlash from journalists and media experts, the junta back-pedaled on the measure.
Staffan Herrström, Sweden's Ambassador to Thailand, said in the keynote speech that freedom of expression and press freedom are crucial components in Sweden's constitution and public life. Giving the Swedish populace and media the right to freedom of expression has fostered a space for resolving conflicts.
"Nowadays many countries use conflict as a reason to limit and repress the right to the freedom of expression. But in our experience, freedom of expression isn't thought of as a fuel for conflict, but rather as a tool that can be used to find common solutions."
Sweden was the world's first country to institute a law ensuring freedom of the press in 1766.
Digitalization without freedom
Mr. Herrström, a former journalist, also commented on the NCPO's digitalization project, "Thailand 4.0," in response to a question from the audience. Citing the case of Sweden where innovation is high, Herrström said that successful digitalization needs to go hand in hand with an encouragement for people to "think outside the box." This requires the protection of freedom of expression and press freedom, both online and offline.
"If these freedoms aren't guaranteed, then it would be incompatible with digitalization," remarked the Swedish Ambassador.
Sarinee Achavanuntakul, independent scholar and member of the Thai Netizen network, pointed to social media as a key site where the government tries to harass and interfere. She warned about the dangers of the new Computer Crimes Act, in effect since May 24 this year.
The new Computer Crimes Act sets the terms of punishment for those who distribute information deemed as "affecting national security," establishes a committee for screening digital information, and seeks punishment of service providers, including website owners and online media platforms such as Facebook, Line, and Twitter.
Ms. Sarinee called this law a form of indirect coercion, even if the service provider avoids punishment if they remove prohibited content within a certain time frame. The law forces the users of social media and other online media to censor themselves from sharing useful information out of fear of punishment.
"Besides exerting control through law, the government tries to publish propaganda on social media as well," said Ms. Sarinee, adding that she once received an online message to post about a government policy on her Facebook wall. "They requested that I not be too critical if I were to criticize the government."
Panelists from the session on the state of the press in Thailand. From left to right: Angkana Promraksa (facilitator), Sarinee Achavanuntakul, Burapa Lekluanngarm, Sumet Somkhane, and Chainarong Srettachau
Corporate threats
Chainarong Srettachau, a professor of Community Development in the Faculty of Humanities and Social Studies at Mahasarakham University, argued that the harassment of the media in Thai society has changed from making threats on lives and property of reporters to the deployment of law to silence them.
The method most often used by companies is the so-called Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (SLAPP). SLAPPs are lawsuits intended to silence critics by burdening them with the cost of a legal defense.
The government often resorts to laws such as Article 116, which prohibits inciting the public through speech, books, or other forms of media.
Though cases rarely result in convictions, they are still useful to businesses. Those involved in court are forbidden from giving public comment throughout their trial. This creates a vacuum of accountability, where the media and the public sector are unable continue their work as freely.
"Confronting methods like SLAPP requires that the law be amended to prevent such filings. Otherwise, the media will be silenced, and many problems won't receive scrutiny," claimed Mr. Chainarong.
From Mr. Sumet's observations, about 80 percent of funding for the media in Thailand comes from corporate sources. As the media in Thailand is going through financial troubles, this reliance on certain funders affects press freedom, as the media may choose not to report on certain topics that might affect their sponsors.
This has resulted in big businesses' total power in bargaining and determining how the media operate, said the representative from the Thai Journalists Association.
A Swedish model
Aside from legal measures, the Swedish ambassador detailed the effective regulatory system in Sweden which deals with unethical breaches of the journalistic code.
In Sweden, most of the ethical issues in media are managed within the media sector itself through a self-regulating system of the Press Council. The Council handles complaints from people who take issue with something that has been published by the media. The Council is comprised of journalists, and is headed by an ombudsman. If the council finds a complaint valid, it will force the media outlet in question to publish the council's verdict as a punishment.
The Thai Journalists Association has expressed interest in creating a Thai media council which takes after the Swedish one, remarked Mr. Herrström.
Reporting by Danuchat Boon-aran. Danuchat is a participant of The Isaan Journalism Network Project 2017 organized by The Isaan Record.
Tags: ambassador, freedom of expression, journalism, press freedom, public forum, repression, slapp, Staffan Herrström, Sweden, Thailand 4.0
At Isaan human rights event, Thailand's challenges meet western successes
The parable of the poisoned arrow: Thailand 4.0 edition
Fortify Rights: Dismiss Criminal-Defamation Charges Against Thai PBS and Journalists
Emotions of Resistance: Reflecting on Human Rights in Isaan


Seiko Epson Kabushiki Kaisha v. Domain Admin, Whois Privacy Corp.
The Complainant is Seiko Epson Kabushiki Kaisha of Tokyo, Japan, represented by Demys Limited, United Kingdom.
The disputed domain name <help-epson.com> (the "Disputed Domain Name") is registered with Internet Domain Service BS Corp (the "Registrar").
The Complaint was filed with the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center (the "Center") on December 19, 2018. On December 19, 2018, the Center transmitted by email to the Registrar a request for registrar verification in connection with the Disputed Domain Name. On December 21, 2018, the Registrar transmitted by email to the Center its verification response confirming that the Respondent is listed as the registrant and providing the contact details.
The Center appointed Mariya Koval as the sole panelist in this matter on January 29, 2019. The Panel finds that it was properly constituted. The Panel has submitted the Statement of Acceptance and Declaration of Impartiality and Independence, as required by the Center to ensure compliance with the Rules, paragraph 7.
The Complainant is a Japanese electronics company and one of the world's largest manufacturers of computer printers, imaging equipment, including inkjet, dot matrix and laser printers, scanners, desktop computers, business, multimedia and home theatre projectors, large home theatre televisions, robots and industrial automation equipment, and information and imaging related equipment. The Complainant was founded more than 150 years ago and today has sales and marketing sites, service sites, as well as production and R&D sites all over the world.
The Complainant, having a significant online presence, operates a large number of domain names with incorporation of the EPSON Trademark (the "EPSON Trademark"), namely the main global website <global.epson.com> and many others, such as <epson.ru>, <epson.com>, <epson.net>, etc. Through its websites the Complainant sells and promotes its products and services.
According to the WhoIs and the Registrar the Respondent is based in Bahamas, however the website at the Disputed Domain Name resolves to a website indicating a presence in the Russian Federation.
The Complainant has a strong presence in the Russian Federation, having its local subsidiary company where, based upon the information on the website under the Disputed Domain Name, the Respondent is presumably based.
The Disputed Domain Name was registered on April 5, 2018. At the date of this decision, the website under the Disputed Domain Name is inactive. However, as the screenshots of the website associated with the Disputed Domain Name, presented by the Complainant (Annex 6 to the Complaint) witness, on the date of the Complaint's filing the Disputed Domain Name resolved to a commercial website where the printer maintenance and repair services were offered. At the same time, the website under the Disputed Domain Name appeared to be very similar to the Complainant's Russian language website (<epson.ru>) and contained the Complainant's logo at the page's top left.
The Complainant contends that, being one of the world's largest manufacturers of printers and imaging products, it invests great sums every year in advertising and marketing of its brands globally, resulting in high level brands awareness of its products by consumers worldwide. The Complainant notes that it has previously brought a number of complaints under the UDRP in view of constant illegal exploitation of its EPSON Trademark.
The Complainant also contends that the Disputed Domain Name is confusingly similar to the Complainant's EPSON Trademark because the Disputed Domain Name consists of the Complainant's famous EPSON Trademark as a dominant element and it differs from the Complainant's registered Trademark only by adoption of the additional word "help" which, in its turn, is a descriptive term and does nothing for distinguishing the Disputed Domain Name from the Complainant's EPSON Trademark.
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent does not have any rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name in view of there is no evidence that the Respondent has been commonly known by the name "Epson" or "Help Epson" prior to or after the registration of the Disputed Domain Name. The Respondent is not a licensee of the Complainant and has not received any consent or permission from the Complainant to use its marks or names in association with the registration of the Disputed Domain Name.
The Complainant further claims that the Disputed Domain Name has not been used in connection with any legitimate noncommercial or fair use, without intent for commercial gain, in terms of paragraph 4(c)(iii) of the Policy.
The Complainant asserts that the Respondent has made no demonstrable preparations to use the Disputed Domain Name in connection with a bona fide offering of goods and services as the Respondent has no right to assume the Complainant's marks or trading style. The Complainant objects to the appropriation of its famous marks to advertise and promote unrelated third-party repair services.
The Complainant also contends that the Respondent has registered the Disputed Domain Name for the only purpose of disrupting the Complainant's business in view of the Disputed Domain Name is extremely likely to confuse Internet users trying to find the Complainant's official website or a member of its authorized service center and repair network. Such confusion will inevitably occur due to the incorporation of the Complainant's famous mark as the most prominent element of the Disputed Domain Name, the lack of any disclaimer and the misleading use of photographs and imagery in order to give the impression the Respondent is associated with the Complainant.
The Complainant finally asserts that the Respondent employs the fame of the EPSON Trademark to mislead Internet users into visiting its website instead of the Complainant's one and has therefore been registered and used in bad faith in terms of the Policy.
The Complainant is the owner of the EPSON Trademark for almost forty years. Moreover, many previous panels have acknowledged the EPSON Trademark as well-known, see e.g. EPSON Europe BV for and on behalf of Seiko EPSON Corporation v. Andrey Ushakov, WIPO Case No. D2014-0388 ("the Complainant has provided evidence and has thus established the rights of its parent company SEC in the well-known EPSON trademark"); Seiko EPSON Corporation v. deletedvideorecovery, WIPO Case No. D2012-1130 (with the EPSON trade mark being distinctive and well-known).
The Panel finds that the Disputed Domain Name reproduces the Complainant's EPSON Trademark in its entirety with addition of the dictionary word "help", hyphen and and the generic Top-Level Domain ("gTLD") ".com". According to the WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition ("WIPO Overview 3.0"), section 1.8 where the relevant trademark is recognizable within the disputed domain name, the addition of other terms (whether descriptive, geographical, pejorative, meaningless, or otherwise) would not prevent a finding of confusing similarity under the first element. Also, addition of a hyphen is typically irrelevant to the consideration of confusing similarity between a trademark and a domain name. The gTLD ".com" should be disregarded under the confusing similarity test as a standard registration requirement.
In view of the above the Panel concludes that the Disputed Domain Name, completely incorporating the Complainant's highly distinctive EPSON Trademark, is confusingly similar to the Complainant's Trademark and that the Complainant has established the first element under Policy, paragraph 4(a).
The Complainant alleges that the Respondent has no rights with respect to the EPSON Trademark, it is not commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name, it does not use the Disputed Domain Name with any legitimate noncommercial or fair use and nothing suggests that the Respondent owns any trademarks incorporated or similar (identical) to the terms "epson" or "help epson".
The Panel finds that the Complainant has established a prima facie case that the Respondent lacks rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name. The Complainant has used its EPSON Trademark for more than forty years, having been recognized by the consumers all over the world and obtained the notoriety for its EPSON Trademark.
According to the section 2.5.1 of the WIPO Overview 3.0 UDRP, panels have found that domain names identical to a complainant's trademark carry a high risk of implied affiliation. Even where a domain name consists of a trademark plus an additional term (at the second- or top-level), UDRP panels have largely held that such composition cannot constitute fair use if it effectively impersonates or suggests sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark owner. In this case, the Disputed Domain Name contains the Complainant's Trademark in its entirety and addition of the dictionary term "help" only enhances an impression of the Respondent's relation to the Complainant (that is not consistent with the reality), that, correspondingly, cannot constitute fair use of the Disputed Domain Name.
The Panel finds that the Respondent is not affiliated with the Complainant in any way, it has not been ever authorized by the Complainant to use the Complainant's EPSON Trademark. There is no evidence that the Respondent is commonly known by the Disputed Domain Name.
The Respondent did not respond to the Complaint and did not participate in this proceedings, and as a result the Respondent failed to present any evidence and/or explanation which may show any rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name.
Moreover, the website (is inactive now) under the Disputed Domain Name does not contain any information about the Respondent's relationship or connection with the Complainant. Conversely, the presence of the Complainant's EPSON Trademark on the website under the Disputed Domain Name gave an impression that the Respondent's website is an official website of the Complainant in the Russian Federation. This impression was strengthened by the Respondent's contact page where address details were prominently headed "Central EPSON Service Center". The Internet users who seek the Complainant's services could visit the Respondent's website with the confidence that the Respondent is an official representative of the Complainant. Such Respondent's actions cannot in any way be considered as a bona fide offering of goods and services.
In addition, the Respondent is not only offering the Complainant's goods and services (including repair service), but it offers also third party services.
In view of the above, the Panel concludes that the Complainant has satisfied the second requirement that the Respondent has no rights or legitimate interests in the Disputed Domain Name, under paragraph 4(a)(ii) of the Policy.
The Panel finds that the Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name in 2018, which is more than forty years after the Complainant obtained its first EPSON Trademark registrations. At the same time, the Complainant has made long and extensive use of its EPSON trademark and has invested massively in its promotion and its recognition.
The Disputed Domain Name completely reproduces the Complainant's well-known EPSON Trademark. According to the WIPO Overview 3.0, section 3.1.4, panels have consistently found that the mere registration of a domain name that is identical or confusingly similar (particularly domain names comprising typos or incorporating the mark plus a descriptive term) to a famous or widely-known trademark by an unaffiliated entity can by itself create a presumption of bad faith.
Further, taking into account the global notoriety of the Complainant's EPSON Trademark and the use of the Disputed Domain Name, in the Panel's opinion that it is almost impossible that the Respondent was unaware of the Complainant's Trademark at the time of registration of the Disputed Domain Name. By creating a website (which is inactive now) offering the services of the EPSON printers' maintenance, on which the Complainant's logo was placed, the Respondent not only demonstrated the very good knowledge about the Complainant, its activity and its EPSON Trademark, but also showed its endeavor to create strong impression of connection with the Complainant.
The Panel finds it is obvious that the Respondent registered the Disputed Domain Name for the only purpose of operating a website in order to offer the analogous services to the Complainant's services, using the Complainant's EPSON Trademark on it, and to create strong impression that its website is the Complainant's website.
Accordingly, the Panel concludes that the Respondent has intentionally attempted to attract, for commercial gain, Internet users to its website by creating a likelihood of confusion with the Complainant and its EPSON Trademark as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the Respondent's website.
In accordance with the section 3.6 of WIPO Overview of WIPO Panel Views on Selected UDRP Questions, Third Edition ("WIPO Overview 3.0"), where it appears that a respondent employs a privacy or proxy service merely to avoid being notified of a UDRP proceeding filed against it, panels tend to find that this supports an inference of bad faith; a respondent filing a response may refute such inference. As established in many previous decisions, the use of a privacy registration service is not per se an indication of bad faith. However, the manner in which such service is used can in certain circumstances constitute a factor indicating bad faith, see e.g. WhatsApp, Inc. v. Whois Agent, Whois Privacy Protection Service, Inc. / Mohammed Alkalbani, Ops Alkalbani, M. Rashid Alkalbani, WIPO Case No. D2016-2299.In this case the Panel concludes that the use of privacy service combined with another facts, such as the Respondent's use of the Complainant's well-known EPSON Trademark on its website and its aspiration of creating an impression of connection with the Complainant constitutes an inference of bad faith registration and use of the Disputed Domain Name.
Finally, the Respondent did not file any response and did not take any efforts for justification of its actions with respect to the Disputed Domain Name registration and use.
In view of the foregoing, the Panel finds that the Complainant has proven that the Respondent registered and is using the Disputed Domain Names in bad faith. Accordingly, the Panel concludes that the third element has been successfully satisfied.
For the foregoing reasons, in accordance with paragraphs 4(i) of the Policy and 15 of the Rules, the Panel orders that the Disputed Domain Name <help-epson.com> be transferred to the Complainant.


Local Rounds of EBEC are local events where participants from a university compete against each other in different ways and they are part of European BEST Engineering Competition (EBEC), which means the winners of the Local Rounds will be qualified to the National Rounds of EBEC. Find out more about local round of EBEC Chania and how to participate in our competition.
National of EBEC are national engineering competitions which gather the winners of Local Rounds of EBEC and give access to the European final. Find out more about EBEC Greece.
Find out more on how you can participate in our competitions.


The Inventor exporter lets you publish 3D models straight from Inventor to Sketchfab. It uses the DWF format and supports basic material settings.
The plugin should be available in File → Publish to Sketchfab.
Find File → Publish to Sketchfab. If it's not there, check that the InventorToSketchfabAddIn is loaded correctly in the Add-In Manager.
Once your model is loaded, click Publish to Sketchfab, and a dialog box should appear.
Enter a title, description, tags, and your API token, and mark it as Private if necessary.
For more detailed instructions and other information, visit ProtoTech's website or watch the video above.


Quick-Step Floors will look to Giro d'Italia maglia ciclamino Elia Viviani for stage wins at the Vuelta a España and the Italian will be supported by Danish Champion Michael Mørkøv and Fabio Sabatini, two of the best and most respected lead-out men in the peloton.
"Elia has had a tremendous season and will be our card on the stages that could come down to a bunch sprint, where Michael and Fabio make for a strong lead-out train, as they have done with success so many other times this year," said Quick-Step Floors sports director Rik van Slycke.
In 2017, Enric Mas caught everyone's attention at his home Grand Tour not only with his third place in Sagunto, but also with a composed ride on the mighty Angliru, one of cycling's most brutal climbs. This year, he built on those results, landing his first pro victory, as well as two top 10 overall results at World Tour level, in Vuelta al Pais Vasco and Tour de Suisse. Together with neo-pro Kasper Asgreen and Laurens De Plus, he will be one of the three young riders which Quick-Step Floors will field at the Vuelta.


text:
THE BUG May 28, 2021 Australia, Australian politics, Politics
Friends avoid negative publicity
WORLD OF ENTERTAINMENT: It's been revealed that the much-awaited reunion special of popular 1990s US TV sitcom Friends was shot entirely in black and white.
"We figured that in the Black Lives Matter era we were taking a huge risk reviving a show whose ensemble cast consist exclusively of white, entitled, self-absorbed, middle-class arseholes," a production staff member said.
"So we thought we might be able to escape criticism if we filmed the show in black-and-white, hoping nobody will notice.
"But then we realised the cast's white faces would still show up as white.
"So in the end we just reversed the negative of the film (main picture) and bingo! Problem solved," the insider said.
POLITICS: Prime Minister Scott Morrison has defended his decision to drastically scale down Australia's diplomatic presence in Afghanistan including closing its embassy and offering a limited fly-in/fly-out service by staff of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
The decision has drawn criticism in light of Australia's investment of lives, resources, and money in Afghanistan since it joined the US-led invasion of the country 20 years ago in the wake of terrorists attacks on US soil.
"I strongly deny that my government has panicked and is 'running away' from Afghanistan or that we are abandoning the Afghan capital before a renewed internal war breaks out and the nation returns to the lawlessness that was its hallmark before we joined the US invasion.
"That's not a factor in my thinking. I just believe we can do without an embassy in Kaboom," Mr Morrison said.
SPORT: With the fresh seven-day COVID-19 lockdown in Victoria throwing into grave doubt the first rugby league State of Origin match at the Melbourne Cricket Ground on June 10, fierce fighting has broken out between Queensland and NSW over who should host the match seeing one of them should have fucking well hosted it in the first place.
Posted in Australia, Australian politics, Politics and tagged Afghanistan, Black Lives Matter, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, DFAT, Entertainment, Friends, Kabul, Melbourne Cricket Ground, Prime Minister Scott Morrison, rugby league, Scott Morrison, State of Origin, television, television production, USA. Bookmark the permalink.
UK PM rejects attack
Albanese launches poll slogans


Mr. Vape USA E-liquid brings three mouthwatering flavors to the table. Pursuit of Happiness - a blueberry & pomegranate salt water taffy. Liberty - a strawberry shortcake drizzled with caramel. Life - Passionfruit, guava and orange. All three vape flavors only $16.99 each.


text:
Justia › US Law › Case Law › Wisconsin Case Law › Wisconsin Supreme Court Decisions › 1974 › Slawek v. Stroh
Receive free daily summaries of new opinions from the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Subscribe
Slawek v. Stroh
62 Wis. 2d 295 (1974)
215 N.W.2d 9
SLAWEK, Appellant, v. STROH and others, Respondents.
No. 313.
Supreme Court of Wisconsin.
Argued October 30, 1973.
Decided February 25, 1974.
*301 For the appellant there was a brief by Wheeler, Van Sickle, Day & Anderson of Madison, and oral argument by Norman C. Anderson.
For the adult respondent Crysta Stroh there was a brief by Tinkham, Smith, Bliss & Patterson of Wausau, and oral argument by Richard P. Tinkham.
*302 For the infant respondent Crysta Stroh there was a brief and oral argument by her guardian ad litem Jerome P. Tlusty of Schofield.
BEILFUSS, J.
The issues presented both as to procedure and substantive law are quite complex. We turn first to the demurrer of the minor-defendant to the plaintiff-appellant's complaint "upon the grounds that the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for a declaratory judgment."
The complaint, as paraphrased in the plaintiff-appellant's brief, is as follows:
"It is alleged in the complaint that the appellant is a physician actively practicing his profession in the city of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; that the appellant is presently married and resides with his wife and three children in the city of Philadelphia; that the appellant is the father of the infant respondent, Crysta Stroh, who was born out of wedlock at Camden, New Jersey, on or about December 29, 1971; that the mother of the infant respondent is the adult respondent, Crysta Stroh; that they reside together in the city of Medford, Taylor county, Wisconsin; that the appellant and the adult respondent, Crysta Stroh, are not now and never have been married to each other; that no judicial determination of the paternity of the infant respondent Crysta Stroh has ever been made; that appellant requested that the district attorney of Taylor county, Wisconsin, commence paternity proceedings pursuant to sec. 52.24, Wisconsin Statutes, but that said district attorney specifically declined to initiate such proceedings; that the adult respondent Crysta Stroh refuses to permit the appellant to have any contact or visitation with the infant respondent; that, on information and belief, the adult respondent Crysta Stroh is not able to support the infant respondent without assistance; that the appellant is financially responsible and capable of providing for the care, custody, support, and maintenance of the infant respondent and is a fit and proper person to have the care, custody, and control of the infant respondent; that *303 it is in the best interests of the infant respondent to have a determination of paternity and a determination of the rights and duties of appellant and of the adult respondent Crysta Stroh with respect to the child; that a declaratory judgment action is proper under the circumstances; and that the respondent Robert L. Brandner is made a party defendant pursuant to sec. 269.56 (11), Wisconsin Statutes, because of his official interest, as the district attorney of Taylor county, Wisconsin, in all paternity actions in Taylor county under Chapter 52, Wisconsin Statutes."
Two recent cases, among others, Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 92 Sup. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551, and State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826,[2] in effect, recognized that fathers, including putative fathers, do have the right to establish they are a natural parent and, as such, have some parental rights and duties.
Admittedly, both Stanley and Lewis can be distinguished from this case upon their facts. In Stanley, the mother of three illegitimate children died and the state took custody of the children who were living with the father. An Illinois statute, which prohibited him from asserting parental rights and a right to custody, was held unconstitutional. Lewis was an adoption proceeding where the putative father was not given notice nor hearing prior to adoption.
In the second Lewis Case, in interpreting Stanley, we stated at pages 4 and 5:
"... In Stanley, the supreme court decided two things: (1) That the denial of a natural father's parental *304 rights to a child born out of wedlock based on mere illegitimacy violated his constitutional right to equal protection of the laws, and (2) that the termination of a natural father's parental rights to a child born out of wedlock without actual notice to him, if he was known, or constructive notice, if unknown, and without giving him the right to be heard on the termination of his rights denied him due process of law."
In this case, therefore, we conclude that the plaintiff-appellant, as a putative father of an illegitimate child, does have the constitutional right to establish, if he can, his natural parentage, to assert parental rights, and a legal forum with due process procedures to establish these rights.
In Wisconsin, the only specific statutory procedure for establishing the parentage of illegitimate children and making provision for their care, custody and maintenance appears in ch. 52, Stats. The chapter deals with the broad problem of the support of dependents and is so titled. Sec. 52.21, and those sections immediately following, provide for the procedures in paternity proceedings. These sections do not contemplate nor provide for procedures for the commencement of a paternity action by the putative father. The action is to be commenced by the complaint of the mother[3] or by the district attorney if he believes the child is or is likely to become a public charge and believes it is in the best interests of the child to do so.
In this case the mother has not and probably will not make a complaint under the paternity statutory provisions. The complaint here alleges that the district attorney has been requested to commence a paternity action under the statute but that he declines to do so. The plaintiff-appellant commenced this action for declaratory relief under sec. 269.56, Stats., and prays for a judgment which declares he is the father of the minor child in *305 question and for a determination of his rights and duties as to the care, custody, maintenance and visitation of the minor child.
The guardian ad litem of the minor child, by demurrer, asserts that the facts alleged in the complaint do not entitle the plaintiff-appellant to declaratory relief primarily because the judgment if rendered, it is argued, will not terminate the controversy.
It has been suggested that a proper procedure is by way of a writ of mandamus to require the district attorney to commence a paternity action. Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act. Cartwright v. Sharpe (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 494, 162 N.W.2d 5. It is apparent from a consideration of all the issues raised in this case that it is primarily a dispute and conflict between the putative father and the mother as to questions of custody and visitation of the minor child. The duty of the district attorney is to prevent the minor child from being or becoming dependent upon the public for its care, support and maintenance. The pleadings here do not compel a belief that there has been a violation or refusal to perform a clear duty on the part of the district attorney so as to warrant a writ of mandamus.
At oral argument, a remedy by way of a writ of habeas corpus was also discussed. Habeas corpus can be utilized to determine questions of right to custody of a minor child,[4] but habeas corpus proceedings, too, are not well-designed for continued jurisdiction to meet the changing circumstances in questions of custody, visitation and care of a minor child.
Because the rights asserted by the plaintiff-appellant are of the kind that are constitutionally recognized, some procedures and some forum must be provided for him to assert and litigate these rights.
*306 The Declaratory Judgments Act, sec. 269.56 (1), Stats., provides that courts of record have this "... power to declare rights, status and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed...." Under this broad language certainly the question of whether the plaintiff-appellant is the natural father of the minor child could be determined.[5]
This court has on many occasions stated requisites for a declaratory judgment. They are: (1) A justiciable controversy must exist, (2) it must be ripe for determination, (3) it must be between persons whose interests are adverse, and (4) it must involve a legally protectible interest in the plaintiff.[6] From our examination of the facts as set forth in the complaint we believe all four of these conditions exist.
A common ground for refusing to hear a declaratory judgment action is that the judgment will not terminate the controversy. American Medical Services, Inc. v. Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Asso., supra. A declaratory judgment here will terminate the controversy as to whether the plaintiff-appellant is the natural father of the minor. It can also declare the rights as to custody, visitation, care and maintenance as the facts appear at the time of the hearing. It will terminate the controversy as the facts exist at that time and this determination will be final unless there is a subsequent change of the facts and circumstances.
Obviously, we are well aware that the facts and circumstances frequently do change in custody cases and that questions of care, custody and visitation are subject to continuing jurisdiction. In this aspect the controversy is not necessarily terminated. However, the Declaratory *307 Judgments Act provides in sec. 269.56 (8), Stats.,[7] that: "Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper...."
While declaratory relief in custody matters may be somewhat cumbersome insofar as continuing jurisdiction is concerned, the statutory authority given to the court is adequate and we believe is probably the best remedy available under existing statutory procedures.
Sec. 269.56 (6), Stats., provides that the court in the exercise of its discretion can refuse to grant a declaratory judgment where the judgment will not terminate the uncertainty or the controversy. We have discussed above the question of termination of the controversy. In any event, the trial court did not sustain the demurrer to the complaint upon an exercise of discretion on this ground. The demurrer was sustained and the complaint dismissed because the trial court was of the opinion that it appeared from the complaint that the plaintiff came into a court of equity with "unclean hands" and asked for affirmative equitable relief, and that under ancient rule he should not be afforded relief because of his own wrongdoing.
The "clean-hands" maxim should be applied with some restraint.[8] The adulterous conduct of the plaintiff-appellant may well be relevant evidence in other phases of this litigation, but in view of the recognition of the constitutionally protected rights of a parent as set forth in Stanley and Lewis, supra, the maxim cannot be invoked *308 to prevent the plaintiff from trying to establish those rights.
It is our opinion that the trial court was in error in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint and in entering judgment dismissing the complaint. The order and judgment are reversed and the matter remanded for trial with the right of the guardian ad litem to serve and file an answer within twenty days after remittitur.
Upon remand it would seem, on proper motion, that the trial court could grant judgment on the pleadings as to that phase of the action which requests a determination of parentage. The plaintiff-appellant has alleged he is the natural father of the minor child, the mother, by her answer, has admitted he is, and the minor, by her guardian ad litem in her counterclaim, has alleged he is.
The plaintiff-appellant has demurred to the affirmative defense set forth in the answer by the defendant-mother upon the ground the facts stated in the answer do not constitute a defense.
The affirmative defense, in substance, alleges that the minor-defendant is not and is not likely to become a public charge, that the mother is employed, in good health, well-educated and capable of caring for herself and the child. Proof of these allegations is very material and relevant to the standard the court must apply, namely, the best interests of the child, and must be considered by the court together with the other evidence. While proof of these allegations does not necessarily bar any right of the plaintiff, they are important and well-pleaded.
The demurrer to the affirmative defense was properly overruled and the order should be affirmed.
The first counterclaim of the defendant-mother alleges facts and relationships which sound in (1) fraud, deceit and misrepresentation, (2) breach of promise, (3) seduction, and (4) assault and battery. No motion has been made to separate the causes of action, to make more *309 definite and certain, nor to strike any parts thereof. The plaintiff-appellant's demurrer is basically upon two grounds: (1) That the counterclaim does not state facts sufficient to constitute a counterclaim, and (2) the counterclaim is barred upon the one-year statute of limitations (sec. 893.22 (2) in actions for seduction.[9]
The allegations of the defendant-mother's first counterclaim are in substance as follows: During the first three months of their association plaintiff-appellant told her he was not married, loved her, wanted to marry her and wanted to visit her parents in Marinette, Wisconsin, to discuss marriage. She believed his statements and because of this had sexual relations with him. By accident she found out he was married, living with his wife and had three children. The plaintiff then told her he was not in love with his wife, that they had separated and divorce was being instituted, and that as soon as he was divorced he would marry her. All of these statements were false and made for the purpose of inducing her to have sexual relations with him. As a result of these relations a son was born in 1969 and has been adopted by third persons. She again became pregnant in 1970, and in August of 1970 suffered a miscarriage "by reason of manipulations and injections given to this defendant by the plaintiff upon false representations that they would not harm the unborn baby when, in fact and truth, they were the direct cause of and induced said miscarriage and abortion." The minor child in this action was born because of the false representations which led to the relationship between them. She also alleges that all the plaintiff's representations to her were false and fraudulent and that he has not and never intended to separate *310 from his wife, and that these representations were made for the purpose of seducing her. She has had two illegitimate children and a miscarriage and abortion, and suffered an assault and battery solely because of his false representations, and suffered pain, both mental and physical, and has been held up to public ridicule and shame. The sexual relations took place in Pennsylvania and New Jersy and she has lived with her parents in Wisconsin since the birth of the minor child in this action.
The alleged causes of action based upon fraud resulting in breach of promise, seduction and assault and battery are not stated separately and the facts are commingled. However, in the absence of a proper motion, if any cause of action is stated the demurrer must be overruled. Further, under the familiar rule the complaint must be liberally construed in favor of the pleader to determine if any cause of action is stated.
The trial court properly recognized that actions for breach of promise to marry have been abolished in Wisconsin by secs. 248.01 and 248.02, Stats.[10] Therefore, no award of damages for breach of contract to marry can be made or sustained.
A cause of action for seduction has not been abolished and in the absence of a statute defining it, as is the case in Wisconsin, we must look to the common law. Seduction is: "The act of seducing. Act of man enticing woman to have unlawful intercourse with him by means of persuasion, solicitation, promises, bribes, or other means without employment of force."[11] A cause of action for breach of promise to marry need not be predicated upon *311 unlawful sexual intercourse; a cause of action for seduction must betherein lies one of the significant differences.[12]
At common law, actions for seduction were for damages for the loss of services based upon the relationship of master and servant. The one bringing the action must have been entitled to and have lost the services of the woman seduced. The legislature has not extended the right nor defined seduction so as to permit the seduced person to assert a cause of action on her own behalf.
The Wisconsin Constitution, art. I, sec. 9, provides in part:
"Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs which he may receive in his person, property, or character; ..."
Seduction is a common law and not a statutorily controlled action in Wisconsin. To extend the right of recovery to the woman seduced does not create a new cause of action insofar as the seducer is concernedhis conduct is reprehensible and he should respond in damages whether it be to parent or the woman herself. This is especially true at this stage of our social development when it is no longer realistic to think of the services and wages of a woman belonging to her husband or parents with the same inflexibility as we did one hundred years ago.
A fear is that if a recovery for seduction is allowed it will thwart the purposes of the legislature in outlawing breach of promise actions. We think not. A breach of promise to marry is in the nature of a contract and seduction is definitely a tort. Further, if the right of a woman to recover damages for her own injury is limited to those cases where the seduction is induced by false or *312 fraudulent representations, the danger of permitting recovery for breach of promise with the evils attendant in many breach of promise cases is eliminated. We therefore hold a woman may recover damages for her seduction where the act or acts of seduction are induced by false or fraudulent representations.[13] Her burden of proof as to the fraud or fraudulent representation is by evidence that is clear and convincing. If this right of recovery is to be further expanded it will have to await subsequent cases or legislative action. We conclude, therefore, the defendant-mother does state a cause of action for seduction in her first counterclaim.
Two hurdles remain, however, before the order overruling the demurrer can be affirmedconflict of laws and statute of limitations.
From the allegations in the counterclaim, the acts of seduction occurred in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Does the law of the forum state, Wisconsin, or the law of the state where the acts took place apply?
New Jersey, by legislative action, abolished the action to recover money damages for seduction in 1935 See Title 2A:23, New Jersey Stats. Anno.). Pennsylvania has no statutory right to recover for seduction and the common law does not allow her to recover.
"... She is a partaker of the crime, and cannot come into court to obtain satisfaction for a supposed injury to which she was consenting.
". . .
". . . A woman is not seduced against her consent, however basely it be obtained; and the maxim volenti non fit injuria is applicable to her as to a husband, whose consent to his own dishonor bars his action for criminal conversation...." Oleszefski v. Taylor (Pa. 1907), 19 Dist. Rep. 145, 147.
In Wilcox v. Wilcox (1965), 26 Wis. 2d 617, 633-635, 133 N.W.2d 408, this court rejected the lex loci rule in *313 conflicts of law or choice of law problems and adopted the grouping of significant contacts. We said there, at page 634:
"... We start with the premise that if the forum state is concerned it will not favor the application of a rule of law repugnant of its own policies, and that the law of the forum should presumptively apply unless it becomes clear the nonforum contacts are of the greater significance...."
In this case, the law of New Jersey and Pennsylvania is repugnant to our rule of law as just announced. The plaintiff started his action here, the defendant-mother lives here and, although of lesser significance, the minor-defendant lives here. Wisconsin has a primary interest in the welfare of its citizens. The plaintiff is a resident of Pennsylvania and a recovery against him does not offend the law of New Jersey, nor does the fact that a recovery against him might offend the law of Pennsylvania outweigh the interests that Wisconsin has. We conclude the principal contacts and the interests of Wisconsin are centered here and the law of Wisconsin is the better choice and applies.
Having determined the Wisconsin law is the better choice, the Wisconsin statute of limitations applies. The plaintiff contends sec. 893.22 (2), Stats., which provides that an action for seduction must be commenced within one year after the cause of action has accrued prevents a recovery. The plaintiff further contends the statute began to run from the time of the first act of seduction. We believe the better rule is that the cause of action accrues and the statute begins to run from the last act of seduction because it was, as alleged, a consistent and continuous course of conduct on the part of the plaintiff. The defendant alleges these acts of seduction continued until December 29, 1971. The counterclaim was served on May 19, 1972, well within the one-year period. In any event, *314 causes of action based upon fraud or deceit have a six year statute of limitations, sec. 893.19 (5), and assault and battery two years, sec. 893.21 (2).
The plaintiff-appellant also contends the cause of action for assault and battery for the miscarriage must fail because the defendant-mother does not allege an intention to injure and that she consented to the acts.
The defendant-mother alleged the plaintiff was and is a doctor and falsely represented to her that the manipulations and injections which he gave her would not harm the child she was carrying and that she believed and relied upon these false representations and that a miscarriage occurred. Fraud vitiates consent. From the allegations of the complaint it can readily be inferred that the plaintiff-doctor knew that the injections and the manipulations would cause a miscarriage and that he so intended. The demurrer to the first counterclaim was properly overruled.
The second counterclaim of the defendant-mother alleges in substance that the plaintiff-appellant, by his intentional physical acts in repeatedly telephoning her and her family at all hours of the day and night, interrupting their sleep and other activities, that by wild and false ruses, stories and use of false names, he has repeatedly tried to see her and associate with her despite her repeated refusal to talk with him or see him, that by these actions he invaded her privacy in her home and in public and private and before her parents and friends, and that these acts caused her great mental anguish, suffering and humiliation and that she has been held up to ridicule, shame, contempt and embarrassment in public and private and before other persons.
The plaintiff contends that in Wisconsin a cause of action for invasion of privacy is not recognized and cites Judevine v. Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co. (1936), 222 Wis. 512, 269 N.W. 295, and Yoeckel v. Samonig (1956), 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925.
*315 As a generalization, Wisconsin does not recognize a cause of action for invasion of privacy; however, an exception was recognized in Alsteen v. Gehl (1963), 21 Wis. 2d 349, 124 N.W.2d 312, where we stated at pages 356, 357:
"We now conclude that a person may recover damages for severe emotional stress alone, if such psychological condition is the result of the extreme and outrageous conduct of another and if such course of conduct was undertaken by the defendant for the purpose of inflicting psychological harm upon the injured person."
The court then elaborated on the requirements for recovery, saying at pages 359-361:
"... Four factors must be established for an injured plaintiff to recover:
"(1) The plaintiff must show that the defendant's conduct was intentional; that is to say, the defendant behaved as he did for the purpose of causing emotional distress for the plaintiff.
"(2) In addition to being intentional, the defendant's conduct must be extreme and outrageous. The average member of the community must regard the defendant's conduct in relation to the plaintiff, as being a complete denial of the plaintiff's dignity as a person. The requirement that the conduct be extreme and outrageous reflects our concern with the difficulties surrounding proof of the existence of severe emotional harm, and proof of a causal relationship between the injury and the defendant's conduct. If the conduct is gross and extreme it is more probable that the plaintiff did, in fact, suffer the emotional distress alleged. Moreover, the requirement of extreme and outrageous conduct as a condition of recovery will avoid litigation `in the field of bad manners, where relatively minor annoyances had better be dealt with by instruments of social control other than the law.'
"(3) The plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant's conduct was a cause-in-fact of his injury. The mere fact that a person may have had some pre-existing susceptibility to emotional distress does not necessarily preclude liability. A person who bullies another who is emotionally vulnerable shall be deemed liable for intensifying *316 a pre-existing condition of psychological stress. However, a defendant will have the opportunity to demonstrate that the plaintiff's disabling emotional condition would have been present even in the absence of the defendant's intervening conduct. If the defendant should successfully make this demonstration, he would establish that this conduct was not a cause-in-fact of the injury, hence there would be no liability.
"(4) The plaintiff must demonstrate that he suffered an extreme disabling emotional response to the defendant's conduct. The severity of the injury is not only relevant to the amount of recovery, but is a necessary element to any recovery. The plaintiff must demonstrate that he was unable to function in his other relationships because of the emotional distress caused by defendant's conduct. Temporary discomfort cannot be the basis of recovery."
We believe the facts alleged by the defendant-mother are sufficient to constitute a cause of action as described in Alsteen and that the trial court properly overruled the demurrer to the second counterclaim.
The infant minor, by her guardian ad litem, by way of counterclaim, has alleged a cause of action which can be referred to as "wrongful birth" or "wrongful life" for lack of a better description.
He alleges, in the minor's behalf, that the plaintiff-appellant is her father and induced her mother to have sexual relations upon the fraudulent promise that he would marry her, knowing his promise was false because he was already married and was married at the time of her birth, that the plaintiff-appellant knew or should have known that his acts would cause the birth of a child and cause such child mental pain and anguish, and that because she was born an adulterine bastard she does suffer mental pain and anguish and is subject to public humiliation and embarrassment.
As far as our research has permitted, we have been unable to find that a cause of action for wrongful birth has ever been recognized.
*317 In Zepeda v. Zepeda (1963), 41 Ill. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849, the Illinois Court of Appeals considered a complaint that is almost identical to the facts alleged here. The court there recognized a tort may have been committed but affirmed an order sustaining the demurrer upon what might be called "public policy grounds."
The court stated at pages 259, 260 and 262:
"Recognition of the plaintiff's claim means creation of a new tort: a cause of action for wrongful life. The legal implications of such a tort are vast, the social impact could be staggering. If the new litigation were confined just to illegitimates it would be formidable. In 1960 there were 224,330 illegitimate births in the United States, 14,262 in Illinois and 10,182 in Chicago. Vital Statistics of the United States 1960, Vol. 1, secs. 1, 2 (1962)....
"It is not the suits of illegitimates which give us concern, great in numbers as these may be. What does disturb us is the nature of the new action and the related suits which would be encouraged. Encouragement would extend to all others born into the world under conditions they might regard as adverse. One might seek damages for being born of a certain color, another because of race; one for being born with a hereditary disease, another for inheriting unfortunate family characteristics; one for being born into a large and destitute family, another because a parent has an unsavory reputation.
"We have decided to affirm the dismissal of the complaint. We do this, despite our designation of the wrong committed herein as a tort, because of our belief that lawmaking, while inherent in the judicial process, should not be indulged in where the result could be as sweeping as here. The interest of society is so involved, the action needed to redress the tort could be so far-reaching, that the policy of the State should be declared by the representatives of the people."
While this court is probably not powerless to recognize this tort as a valid cause of action by virtue of art. I, sec. 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution (set forth above), we believe, as the Illinois court did, that the creation and recognition of a cause of action for wrongful birth would *318 have vast social ramifications and the creation of such a cause of action is the type of public policy decision that should be made by the people of this state or their elected legislative representatives. The plaintiff-appellant's demurrer to the minor-defendant's first counterclaim should be sustained.
A final comment is in order. When this case is remanded and the necessary proceedings are completed so that the case is ready for trial, we believe the trial court should order separate trials pursuant to secs. 270.07 and 270.08, Stats. On the issues of visitation, support and maintenance, the parties are not entitled to a jury trial. The guardian ad litem, however, should appear to represent and protect the interests of the minor child. The parties are entitled to a jury trial as to the issues raised by the counterclaims of the defendant-mother and it should be afforded to them unless waived.
By the Court.The order sustaining the minor-defendant's demurrer to the complaint and the judgment dismissing the complaint are reversed; the order overruling the plaintiff's demurrer to the adult defendant's affirmative defense is affirmed; the order overruling the plaintiff's demurrer to the adult-defendant's first and second counterclaims is affirmed; the order overruling the plaintiff's demurrer to minor-defendant's first counterclaim is reversed; judgment should be entered dismissing the minor's counterclaims; and the case is remanded for further proceedings. No costs to be taxed.
HALLOWS, C. J. (concurring).
The trip referred to in the dissent has been even longer along the mainline than stated. This court in the first Lewis Case[1] in which this author dissented held to the traditional view that a father *319 of a child born out of wedlock had no natural parental rights. That trip was down a sidetrack because Stanley[2] took the position of the dissent and sent Lewis back for reconsideration. The court then had to reverse itself and then in the second Lewis Case[3] under the mandate of Stanley recognized the natural rights of a father to a child born out of wedlock and undertook to provide a due process procedure for putative fathers to establish those rights. This case goes no further than Lewis.
No amount of discussion can dilute the holding of Stanley. While it might be hard for some people to accept, its holding cannot be eroded by constant criticism.
A decision is to be interpreted in the light of facts which form its background. I can see no implication in this case or in Lewis why a rapist should have rights as a natural father. In Lewis, Stanley,and in this case there was consent to the intercourse. The parties were willing to become parents or at least take the chancenot so in a rape. When a rape issue is presented to this court, it will be appropriate for this court to then decide the case, and not now intimate what it is going to hold. I reject both the trip and the flavor of the dissent.
ROBERT W. HANSEN, J. (dissenting).
From its interpretation of Stanley[1] to its holding in Lewis[2] the majority here travels further to hold that "... a putative father of an illegitimate child, does have the constitutional right to establish, if he can, his natural parentage, *320 to assert parental rights, and a legal forum with due process procedures to establish these rights." Under this unconditional holding, it is difficult to see why a rapist would not be entitled to a declaratory judgment enforcing his rights as the natural father of a child born to the victim of the rape as a result of the rape. In any event, from Stanley to Lewis to Slawek has been quite a trip.
In Stanley, where a mother had died and the state sought to take the three children from the custody of their father on the "single fact that he and the dead mother had not been married," the United States Supreme Court set aside the state's action, holding that fathers of children born out of wedlock are entitled to "... a hearing on their fitness before their children are removed from their custody...."[3] (Emphasis supplied.) In Stanley, the high court began its opinion by noting that "Joan Stanley lived with Peter Stanley intermittently for 18 years, during which time they had three children. When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children...."[4]
In Lewis,[5] where the father of a child born out of wedlock sought to set aside both termination of parental rights proceedings and a completed adoption, this court, in a four-to-three decision, went beyond the facts and holding of Stanley[6] to hold that in this state a natural *321 father's parental rights could not be terminated "... without actual notice to him, if he was known, or constructive notice, if unknown, and without giving him the right to be heard ...."[7] While Lewis did not involve the removal of a child from a natural father having actual custody, both Lewis and Stanley dealt with protections given natural fathers of illegitimate children against state action changing custody or terminating rights. Neither Stanley nor Lewis go beyond the area of assuring notice and hearing before, as in Stanley, the child can be taken from the father or, as in the majority holding of Lewis, termination of parental rights of such father can be lawfully terminated. Neither Stanley nor Lewis deal with the right of a father, whose paternity of an illegitimate child is in fact not contested, to seek custody and visitation rights of the child he sired out of wedlock.
In Slawek, the case before us, the putative father of a child born out of wedlock seeks, via declaratory relief, what the majority opinion describes as "... a judgment which declares he is the father of the minor child in question and for a determination of his rights and duties as to the care, custody, maintenance and visitation of the minor child." The majority holds that the natural father of an illegitimate child has a constitutional right thus (1) "to establish, if he can, his natural parentage," and (2) "to assert parental rights," identified in the opinion as including "care, custody, maintenance and visitation of the minor child." Nowhere in the opinion is it even suggested that his right either to establish parentage or to assert parental privileges is subordinate to the rights of the child involved. Yet, in Stanley, even as to the limited right of a natural father to notice and hearing before children can be taken from his actual custody, the United States Supreme Court so limited the right involved, *322 holding: "The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection...."[8] (Emphasis supplied.) The best interest of the child is such powerful countervailing interest. The rights of a natural father do not exist in a vacuum. They coexist, and are subordinate to the rights of the child involved. In this state, by statute, as to a natural father's claim to custody, a court "shall never give the custody of the child" to the natural father "unless the welfare of such child will be promoted thereby."[9]
The writer concludes that Stanley, by conditioning protection of the rights of a natural father upon the absence of "a powerful countervailing interest," strengthened the Wisconsin public policy of placing first and foremost concern for the welfare of the child involved in cases involving custody and parental rights. As to custody placement and related matters, our cases have so held.[10] As to paternity proceedings involving fathers of illegitimate children, our statutes so provide.[11] It is where the *323 protection and welfare of the child involved are served thereby that there is the need for a forum and a procedure to establish the fact of parentage and provisions for determination of parental rights and duties. It is primarily on behalf of the child that there is need to establish paternity, provide for maintenance and support by the father and determine custody and visitation disputes.
The writer finds the paternity proceedings statutes (secs. 52.21 to 52.45, Stats.) to be appropriate and available for the judicial determination of parentage and parental rights as to children born out of wedlock. The majority views these statutory provisions as available only (1) where the mother of the illegitimate child initiates the action;[12] and (2) where the child born out of wedlock is likely to be a public charge.[13] However, it is also provided that "... all such proceedings shall be commenced in the name of the state on the relation of the complainant, or on relation of the child if the complainant is dead, or insane, or does not prosecute...."[14] A first, quick reading of this provision for commencing proceedings on behalf of the child might suggest the literalistic construction that "complainant," as here used, means one who signs a complaint. But three absurd results flow from such interpretation: (1) Only if the mother died after signing the complaint could an action be started on behalf of the child for maintenance; (2) only if the mother became insane after signing the complaint could paternity of the natural child of an insane mother be established; and (3) the "does not prosecute" reference would be no more than a restatement of another specific statutory provision, to wit, sec. 52.23, Stats. The writer would read "complainant" as referring to the *324 mother of the child born out of wedlock, rather than only a mother who signs a complaint. The construction of the statute directing initiating proceedings on behalf of the mother who is dead, insane or who fails to prosecute is supported by the preceding sentence in the same section, providing: "Sections 52.21 to 52.45 shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate the protection and welfare of the child involved in any proceedings hereunder."
In the case before us, the putative father of the child born out of wedlock initially requested the district attorney to commence paternity proceedings with the putative father named as defendant. The district attorney declined to do so. Unless he had reason to believe that instituting such interests would not be in the best interests of the minor child, the writer would hold that the district attorney had a clear duty to commence such proceedings where the mother failed to prosecute, exactly as he would have if the mother had died in childbirth or had been adjudged insane. Generally speaking, prosecutorial discretion "approaches the quasi-judicial."[15] However, here the district attorney is statutorily directed to commence paternity proceedings on behalf of the child where its mother elects not to prosecute. The authority conferred is subject to the legislative direction that accompanies it. The statutory mandate is to "effectuate the protection and welfare of the child involved."[16] The prescribed prosecutorial duty, deriving from both mandate and authority, is for the district attorney to institute paternity proceedings on behalf of the child, in the *325 name of the state, where the mother does not prosecute. Mandamus does lie to compel public officers to perform their prescribed statutory duties.[17] Where the district attorney refused to institute paternity proceedings at the putative father's request, the indicated recourse of such father was, by writ of mandamus, to insist upon the performance of the duty prescribed by statute.
While a comparison between alternative ways of proceeding to establish parentage and assert parental rights ought not be required, with proceeding under sec. 52.45, Stats., found adequate and available, the writer would add that he considers declaratory relief neither appropriate nor available here. Declaratory relief in this state is granted only where granting such relief will terminate the controversy.[18] As to the matters of care, custody, *326 maintenance and visitation, it is impossible to hold that a declaratory judgment will finally determine the controversy. Court orders for care, custody, maintenance and visitation privileges are inherently interim in nature, subject to modification and revision in view of changed circumstances of the parents or changed needs of the child. This court rejects declaratory relief where granting a declaratory judgment predictably could only result in requests for supplementary remedies.[19] The majority opinion rejects habeas corpus, often utilized to resolve questions of right to custody of a minor child,[20] because "... habeas corpus proceedings, too, are not well designed for continued jurisdiction to meet the changing circumstances in questions of custody, visitation and care of a minor child." Declaratory judgments are neither well-designed, nor up to now, have they been made available as to controversies they cannot with finality terminate.[21]
The writer would affirm the action of the trial court in sustaining the demurrer of the minor-defendant, entered *327 by the child's guardian ad litem, and would affirm the trial court judgment dismissing the complaint of the plaintiff.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice LEO B. HANLEY joins in this dissent.
[2] Our original opinion in State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56, declaring the father of an illegitimate child did not have parental rights was reversed and remanded for reconsideration in light of Stanley, supra, and Rothstein v. Lutheran Social Services (1972), 405 U.S. 1051, 92 Sup. Ct. 1488, 31 L. Ed. 2d 786.
[3] Secs. 52.22, 52.25, Stats.
[4] 39 C. J. S., Habeas Corpus, p. 568, sec. 41.
[5] 26 C. J. S., Declaratory Judgments, p. 115, sec. 37.
[6] American Medical Services, Inc. v. Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Asso. (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 198, 203, 188 N.W.2d 529, and cases cited therein.
[7] "SUPPLEMENTAL RELIEF. Further relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The application therefore shall be by petition to a court having jurisdiction to grant the relief. If the application be deemed sufficient, the court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party whose rights have been adjudicated by the declaratory judgment or decree, to show cause why further relief should not be granted forthwith."
[8] Jewell v. United Fire & Casualty Co. (1964), 25 Wis. 2d 509, 131 N.W.2d 276.
[9] A third ground is set forth in the demurrer in connection with the assertion of no cause of action to the effect that the defendantmother has no legal capacity to maintain the same because she was a party to the acts alleged. This ground has not been pursued or argued.
[10] Insofar as any conflicts of law problem is involved, both New Jersey (Title 2A:23-1 and 2 of New Jersey's Statutes Annotated) and Pennsylvania (Title 48, ch. 4, sec. 171 of Purdon's Penna. Statutes Annotated) have abolished causes of action for breach of contract to marry.
[11] Black's, Law Dictionary (4th ed.), p. 1523.
[12] Wendt v. Lentz (1929), 197 Wis. 569, 222 N.W. 798; 79 C. J. S., Seduction, p. 956, sec. 3.
[13] 43 Marquette Law Rev. (1959-1960), 341, 356.
[1] State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56.
[2] Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 92 Sup. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551.
[3] State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services (1973), 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826.
[3] Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at pages 646, 647, 658.
[4] Id. at page 646.
[6] Id. at pages 13-21, dissenting opinion, stating: "... In Stanley, the three children lived with their father and mother for eighteen years in what some states would recognize as an entirely legal common-law marriage. Their home was the only home the three children ever knew, and their father never denied the fact of his paternity and never refused to accept the responsibilities of his fatherhood.
"That cannot be said of the petitioner here...."
[7] Id. at pages 4, 5.
[8] Stanley v. Illinois, supra, at page 651.
[9] Sec. 52.21, Stats., Paternity proceedings, jurisdiction, orders, providing: "(2) ... provided that the court shall never give the custody of the child to the defendant [the natural father] unless the welfare of such child will be promoted thereby...."
[10] See: Welker v. Welker (1964), 24 Wis. 2d 570, 578, 129 N.W.2d 134, stating: "... The polestar remains the welfare of the child...." See also: Wendland v. Wendland (1965), 29 Wis. 2d 145, 157, 138 N.W.2d 185, holding that children, in disputes as to their custody, "... are not to be buffeted around as mere chattels... but rather are to be treated as interested and affected parties whose welfare should be the prime concern of the court in its custody determination."
[11] Sec. 52.45, Stats.: "Construction of sections 52.21 to 52.45. Sections 52.21 to 52.45 [Note: the paternity proceedings statutes] shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate the protection and welfare of the child involved in any proceedings hereunder...."
[12] Sec. 52.22, Stats.
[15] State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon (1969), 42 Wis. 2d 368, 378, 166 N.W.2d 255. Citing and quoting at pages 379, 380, State v. Coubal (1946), 248 Wis. 247, 21 N.W.2d 381, at page 257, holding: "... There is, however, no basis for holding that his duties in representing the state are not subordinate to legislative direction as to the cases in which he shall proceed."
[16] Sec. 52.45, Stats. The same paragraph (p.853) also points out that there is authority to a stronger effect and that is `that a court may not grant declaratory relief unless it is convinced that its judgement will end the litigation and fix the rights of the parties.'"
[17] State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, supra, at pages 379, 380, holding: "The district attorney's function, in general, is of a discretionary type, the performance of which is not compellable in mandamus...
"Yet, where the legislature has spoken and directed the performance of duties under particular facts, the district attorney is obligated to comply with the legislative mandate....
"While it is thus apparent that the district attorney is invested with great discretion and in the usual case can manage his office free from the overseership of the courts or the legislature, it is equally clear that the legislature may, if it desires, spell out the limits of the district attorney's discretion and can define the situations that will compel him to act in the performance of his legislatively prescribed duties."
[18] Pension Management, Inc. v. DuRose (1973), 58 Wis. 2d 122, 132, 205 N.W.2d 553, stating: "The final question on this appeal is whether or not a declaratory judgment in this action would terminate the controversy. Sec. 269.56 (6), Stats., grants a trial court discretion to deny an application for declaratory relief `where such judgment or decree, if rendered or entered, would not terminate the uncertainty or controversy....'" Citing and quoting Outagamie County v. Smith (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 24, 37, 155 N.W.2d 639, stating: "22 Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgments, p. 852, sec. 13, points out that a declaration of rights `should not be rendered if it will not finally settle an actual controversy....'
[19] Outagamie County v. Smith, supra, at page 38: "We conclude that any declaration of rights that might result from the defendants' complaint for declaratory judgment could only result in a request for supplementary remedies which this court would refuse to grant. Accordingly, a declaration of rights against either the state administrative bodies concerned or the individuals could not have the effect of terminating the controversy...."
[20] See: 39 C. J. S., Habeas Corpus, p. 568, sec. 41.
[21] American Medical Services, Inc. v. Mutual Federal Savings & Loan Asso. (1971), 52 Wis. 2d 198, 204, 188 N.W.2d 529, holding: "... We think the declaratory judgment action cannot be used on the facts presented.
"In this case a declaration of plaintiff's rights would not terminate the controversy...."
of Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions.


text:
HomeNewsNewsTennisAustralia
Chubb renews Tennis Australia sponsorship deal
2022 Australian Open. (Photo by Darrian Traynor/Getty Images).
Chubb has agreed a three-year renewal with Tennis Australia, the organiser of the Australian Open tennis Grand Slam.
The extension sees the property and casualty insurance company continue as the Official Insurance Partner of the tournament up to and including the 2025 event.
Tennis Australia
Barty named 'chief of inspiration' as part of Optus tie-up
ATP renews Emirates deal, Tennis Australia teams up with CUB brewery
The Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP) has extended its sponsorship deal with Dubai-based airline Emirates
China Tennis Open secures three-year Fila sponsorship deal
Sportswear brand Fila has become the official sportswear brand for the China Tennis Open, after signing a three-year sponsorship deal running from 2019 to 2021
Kelvin Tan, Asia Editor
Rado on time with LTA sponsorship deal
Rado has agreed a three-year deal with the Lawn Tennis Association (LTA) to become an official sponsor of the governing body of British tennis, as well as the official timekeeper of the Aegon Championships, Aegon Classic and Aegon International events.
German tennis body signs Erima deal
Sportswear company Erima has agreed a deal to become an official partner of the DTB, the governing body of tennis in Germany.


text:
Uehara Injury Could Cause Some Shuffles In Sox Bullpen
(USAToday Sports)
In the ninth inning of last night's win over the Giants, Koji Uehara grabbed his right side/shoulder area after a strikeout. One pitch later, he was out of the game—with a 'right pectoral strain'. These are just the type of injuries that—while sounding minor—can wreck havoc on an athlete. They are painful and sometimes very slow to heal. Of course, with the track record of the Red Sox medical "team" over the years, this could turn out very bad for Boston. If Koji is lost for any significant amount of time, it will require some serious role-shuffling in the bullpen. With Craig Kimbrel out for at least five more weeks (and most likely even longer), Koji had been a vision of his old self in the closer role (five straight saves before last night). Newly-acquired Brad Ziegler can certainly step in (18 saves for the D'Backs this year), but that vacates a key set-up spot. While Junichi Tazawa could return from his injury as soon as Friday, it's by no means certain that he can just step in and be immediately effective. One "wild card' in all of this is Joe Kelly—who has been other-worldly out of the Pawtucket bullpen. Kelly can still get it up there close to 100 MPH and might just find new value in a relief role. Stay tuned!


This is a brief discussion on Hajj – its virtues, benefits and a little about its rulings.
He sallallaahu 'alayhi wa sallam only delayed it for one year, yet they say it may be delayed indefinitely!
He sallallaahu 'alayhi wa sallam wanted to (first) purify the House (i.e., the Ka'bah) of the polytheists and those who performed Hajj naked.
He was busy with the delegations which had started to come to Madeenah one after another to announce their (conversion to) Islaam.
It must be paid for with legal earnings.
One should keep away from evil, sin and unjust disputes during it.
One should observe all its rituals according to the Sunnah.
One should not show off by doing Hajj – it should be purely and done sincerely for the sake of Allaah.
One should not follow it with acts of disobedience and sin.
Allaah says which means, "That they may witness (i.e., attend) benefits for themselves…" (Al-Hajj: 28) The benefits of Hajj are both worldly and religious (spiritual). With regards to the religious benefits, the one who goes for Hajj, earns the pleasure of his Lord and comes back with all his sins forgiven. He also earns immense reward, which he cannot earn in any other place; one prayer in Al-Masjid al-Haraam (i.e., the Sacred Mosque in Makkah), for instance, is equal to a hundred thousand prayers elsewhere, and Tawaaf (circumambulation of the Ka'bah) and Sa'i (pacing between Safa and Marwah) cannot be done anywhere else. Other benefits include meeting other Muslims and discussing their circumstances, meeting scholars and learning from them and asking them about one's problems. Whereas the worldly benefits include trade and business, as well as other kinds of earnings that have to do with Hajj.
When a person travels to perform the rites of Hajj, he is reminded of his journey to Allaah and the Hereafter. When he travels, he leaves behind his dear friends, wife, children and homeland, and the journey to the Hereafter is similar.
Traveling is a kind of torment and the same is true of the journey to the Hereafter, only (that it will be) much greater in scale. Ahead of man there is (the stage of) his passing away, death, the grave, the gathering, the accounting, the scales and As-Siraat (a bridge that will be laid across Hellfire, for people to pass over on the Day of Judgment), followed by either Paradise or Hell. The blessed one will be the one whom Allaah saves.
When the pilgrim puts on the two garments of his Ihraam (the state of a pilgrim in which he performs Hajj and 'Umrah, and during which he is prohibited from certain acts that are lawful otherwise), he cannot help but be reminded of the shroud in which he will be wrapped (after he dies). This prompts him to give up disobedience and misdeeds. Just as he gives up his regular clothing (for Hajj), likewise he has to give up sins. Just as he has put on two clean, white garments, he has to make his heart clean and white (pure), and guard his senses, (so they remain) clean and pure, uncontaminated by the stains of sins and disobedience.
By ceasing to do Haraam (forbidden) things while in a state of Ihraam and keeping himself busy with the Talbiyah (a prayer recited by pilgrims going to Makkah) and Dhikr (remembrance of Allaah), the pilgrim gives himself a good idea about how a Muslim should be. In this way, he trains himself to give up some things which, in principle, are Halaal (allowed), but Allaah has forbidden them for him at this time (during his Ihraam); so, how can he violate the commands of Allaah and commit forbidden deeds, at all times and in all places?
When the pilgrim does Tawaaf, he is reminded of his father Ibraaheem, peace be upon him, who built the House so it would be a place of resort for mankind and a safe haven, and that he called them to perform pilgrimage to this House. Moreover, our Prophet Muhammad sallallaahu 'alayhi wa sallam also called humanity to perform pilgrimage to this House, to which Moosa, Yoonus and 'Eesaa, peace be upon them, also came for the same purpose. This House was a symbol and a meeting place for these Prophets; how could it be otherwise for Allaah had commanded Ibraaheem, peace be upon him, to build and venerate it?
When he does the Sa'ie (running between Safa and Marwah), he is reminded of the trial that afflicted Haajar, the mother of Ismaa'eel and the wife of Al-Khaleel (i.e., Ibraaheem, peace be upon him); (he remembers) how she ran back and forth between Safa and Marwah, searching for water which would save her from what she was suffering, and especially so she could give her little son, Ismaa'eel, peace be upon him, water to drink. Since this woman was patient in the face of this adversity and turned to her Lord, this teaches the man that doing this is better and more appropriate. When a man remembers the struggle and patience of this woman, it makes it easier for him to bear his own problems and a woman, who is of the same gender (as Haajar), will also find her problems easier to put up with.
The standing in 'Arafah reminds the pilgrim of the throngs of people on the Day of Gathering. If the pilgrim is tired due to being in a crowd of thousands, how will it be to stand amongst the hordes of barefoot, naked, uncircumcised people, for fifty thousand years?
When he throws the pebbles at the Jamaraat (the three small stone-built pillars in Mina), the Muslim trains himself to obey Allaah unquestioningly, even if he does not understand the reason and wisdom behind this act, and cannot make the connection between rulings and their purpose; this is a manifestation of complete submission to Allaah.
Once the pilgrim comes out of the state of Ihraam that he was in and things that had been forbidden to him become permissible again, he is thus taught about the consequences of patience and that after hardship comes ease. The one who responds to the call of Allaah will have joy and happiness, and this delight cannot be felt by anyone except those who have tasted the sweetness of obedience, such as the joy felt by one who fasts upon breaking his fast or by the one who prays during the last part of the night, after he has finished praying.
After he concludes performing all the rituals of Hajj as they were prescribed by Allaah and in the manner that He loves, the pilgrim has hope that his Lord will forgive all his sins, as the Prophet sallallaahu 'alayhi wa sallam promised in the Hadeeth: "Whoever does Hajj for the sake of Allaah and does not have sexual relations (with his wife), nor commits a sin or disputes unjustly during the Hajj, will come back (free from all sins) like the day his mother gave birth to him." (Bukhaari & Muslim) This encourages him to start a new page in his life, free of evil deeds.


text:
The 1973 Rice Owls football team was an American football team that represented Rice University in the Southwest Conference during the 1973 NCAA Division I football season. In their second year under head coach Al Conover, the team compiled a 5–6 record.

Schedule

Personnel

Season summary

at Texas

References

Rice
Rice Owls football seasons
Rice Owls football

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia