Going through a divorce is one of the most traumatic, emotional and expensive times in any person's life. It's sometimes hard to know what to do first, where to go for help, and how to put the pieces of life back together as you and your children navigate through the days to your new normal.
If you're divorcing and have children, one of the most important things to understand is, your relationship with your spouse never ends. You both will always be family to your children. One of the ways to put that new normal into play early is through mediation, a process by which you and your spouse come to an agreement about the terms of your divorce. You'll meet with a neutral third party, a mediator, and talk through the issues you need to resolve to move ahead with the divorce.
One of the most powerful and positive things you can create through mediation is a co-parenting agreement. It is a joint, non-binding contract that lays out, ahead of time, how you will parent your children from different households.
If you're preparing to file for divorce, or if your spouse has just dropped the bomb on you that he or she is filing, the first thing you should do is get a handle on the availability, liquidity and titling of all of your accounts. In other words, get your financial ducks in a row to clearly understand where you are financially before proceedings begin.
Your current bank and credit card statements.
Update yourself on any current loans or mortgages you might have.
Income tax returns. Going back five years is a safe bet. And make sure you include property tax returns.
Business financial statements, if you own one either jointly with your spouse or yourself. Get the facts on its net worth, assets, liabilities and cash flow.
Your current income information, including pay stubs, and remember to include one-time or quarterly income sources like rental or lease agreements on property you own, dividends, even lottery winnings since the filing of your last tax return.
When you're divorcing, even if you're years away from retirement, you need to have your eye on the ball when it comes to Social Security. And not just your own benefits. One little-known aspect of divorce is, you may be able to receive a larger Social Security benefit based on your ex-spouse's work record than you would on your own.
You may be eligible to receive up to 50 percent of your ex-spouse's Social Security.
Married for 10 or more years.
If your second spouse dies, you are qualified to collect on his or her benefit if you had been married 10 years.
You must be 62 or older, unless your ex-spouse has died. Then you can collect at age 60.
Filing status. Your marital status on Dec. 31 determines your filing status. If you are considered legally divorced on Dec. 31, you can file as single or head of household. However, if you're in the process of divorce, you may want to file a joint return instead of filing as married filing separately. You'll both get lower taxes if you file jointly. It's one thing that's a win-win for both parties, and an opportunity to cooperate.
Alimony. If your divorce was finalized before 2019, you can deduct alimony payments you make to your ex-spouse. The receiver must pay tax on the income.
Children. If you are filing separately, both of you cannot claim your children as dependents in any given year. If you are the custodial parent (having custody of the children most of the time) it is generally your right to claim them as dependents. However, this is another area that couples may choose to cooperate on, especially if the non-custodial parent is diligently making child support payments.
One important facet involved in the financial side of divorce is the issue of alimony or spousal support. It's a court-ordered payment from the higher-earning spouse to the lower-earning spouse, and is put in place to limit economic disparity and prevent economic hardship.
In the past, most often alimony was paid to ex-wives, who were homemakers, by their wage-earning husbands. But times have changed. Many, if not most, marriages include two wage earners, and the lines have blurred. The higher-earning spouse can be either one, regardless of gender.
Going through a divorce is an emotional, traumatic and even expensive situation. One of the most important parts of the process is each party's financial statement, which is required in all contested and some uncontested divorces.
Your financial statement, or affidavit, is a formal document that goes into your financial details, including income, expenses, assets and debts. Both spouses must fill out this statement and share it with the courts, and with each other. The purpose of this is to give the courts a clear understanding of a divorcing couple's financial situation.
It sounds like a straightforward and even simple process — income, assets, debts — but in reality it is a complicated endeavor. Making it more complicated is the fact that your financial statement is an absolutely vital part of your divorce that helps to determine your divorce settlement agreement. The court will use your financial statement to rule on alimony, division of property, child support and other financial considerations.
As you approach your retirement years, you may think you understand everything about how Social Security works. But the timing of getting that first check can be tricky, especially if you've experienced a spousal death or divorce.
In general, you may start withdrawing your guaranteed payments starting at age 62; however, for each year those withdrawals are postponed through age 70, you will receive an additional 8 percent or so based on inflation. Unmarried widows, widowers and divorcees may receive the greater of their own benefits or half of their late or former spouse's benefits, but either way the amount received will be reduced according to when withdrawals start.
That means the strategy you choose could make a big difference in your income throughout your golden years. As of May, 59.3 million Americans were receiving Social Security benefits, but only 45 million were 65 or older. And a survey this year found a full 74 percent of American women were taking such benefits before age 70.
How will tax reform impact my divorce?
Dividing assets during a divorce is difficult and draining on many levels, but when you're going through it after sweeping changes to the tax code, like there were this year with the passage of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, it gets a lot more complicated.
But, like everything when you're dealing with a divorce, forewarned is forearmed. Here are some of the things that might be impacted by the new tax laws.
The costs of divorce are many. There's the emotional cost of the breakdown of a family, the pain of a failed marriage and the anger that can come with the reasons for the split. Divorce can take a physical toll, too, as the stress of it all wreaks havoc with your sleep, your blood pressure and your immune system.
Regulatory Disclosure: The information on this website has been obtained from sources considered reliable, but its accuracy and completeness are not guaranteed. This website is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation to buy any securities. Gerard Gruber offers Securities and Investment Advisory and Financial Planning service through Geneos Wealth Management, Inc, Member FINRA/SIPC. Investments are not FDIC insured. Investments are not deposits of the financial institution and are not guaranteed by a financial institution. Investments are subject to investment risks including loss of principal amount invested.


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NBS Says Inflation Dropped Despite Increase In Prices
LocalBusinessMarket
By News Editor	 Last updated Dec 16, 2021
The inflation rate in Nigeria fell in November to 15.40 per cent (year-on-year), the lowest since December last year, according to the National Bureau of Statistics.
The NBS, in its Consumer Price Index report on Wednesday, said the inflation rate fell by 0.59 per cent from 15.99 per cent in October.
The drop in headline inflation began in April when it fell to 18.12 per cent from 18.17 per cent in March.
"The percentage change in the average composite CPI for the 12 months period ending November 2021 over the average of the CPI for the previous 12 months period was 16.98 per cent, showing 0.02 per cent point from 16.96 per cent recorded in October 2021," it said.
It said urban inflation rate increased by 15.92 per cent (year-on-year) in November from 15.47 per cent in November 2020, while the rural inflation rate increased by 14.89 per cent in November 2021 from 14.33 per cent in November 2020.
The rural index also rose by 1.04 per cent in November, compared to 0.95 per cent in October.
The NBS disclosed that composite food index rose by 17.21 per cent in November 2020, compared to 18.30 per cent in November 2020.
It noted that the rise in the food index was driven by increases in prices of bread and cereals, fish, food products such as potatoes, yam and other tuber, oil and fats, milk, cheese and eggs and coffee, tea and cocoa.
The Managing Director of Cowry Asset Management Limited, Johnson Chukwu, "When we are seeing a declining inflation rate, it is positive; so we have reasons to say at least the situation is improving – but a double-digit inflation is still quite high."
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redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


What started off as an early morning stroll at seven in the morning quickly turned into an opportunity for outfit shots with dreamy backdrops here at Central Park. I never even knew these corners of the park existed, and truth be told we had actually chanced upon them while on our way to locate the Bethesda Terrace and Fountain. As you might've guessed, we didn't end up reaching our goal because breakfast was more important – and in fact these photos would more than suffice.


Pupil Appraisal Services are an integral part of the Lafayette Parish School System's total instructional program. This department conducts evaluations of students to determine whether they are exceptional and in need of special education services. A comprehensive multi-disciplinary evaluation is completed by qualified examiners including, but not limited to educational diagnosticians, school psychologists, school social workers and speech pathologists certified by the State Department of Education.
Parental participation is essential in any meeting requiring a decision regarding their child in areas of identification and evaluation. Parents are participants throughout the pre-referral process. When an initial evaluation is conducted, informed parental consent is required. At that time parents receive an explanation of their rights concerning evaluation procedures.
An evaluation to determine eligibility for special education services is based on an ongoing comprehensive assessment that results in an in depth, comprehensive report. The systematic process of review, examination, and interpretation of the interventions, test results, interviews, observations, relevant functional and developmental information and eligibility determination are completed within 60 business days from the date the parent gives written consent for an evaluation.


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Venture Capital and Cleantech: The wrong model for energy innovation
Energy Policy 102 (2017) 385–395 Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Energy Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol Venture Ca...
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Corporate venture capital portfolios and firm innovation
Does venture capital really foster innovation?
Venture capital-financed innovation and technological change in the USA
Venture capital for P21
Exchanges of innovation resources inside venture capital portfolios
Trademarks and venture capital valuation
Venture capital: Structure and incentives
The institutionalisation of venture capital
Venture Capital Decision Making
Venture capital, technology and taxes
Energy Policy 102 (2017) 385–395
Energy Policy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/enpol
Venture Capital and Cleantech: The wrong model for energy innovation a,⁎
Benjamin E. Gaddy , Varun Sivaram , Timothy B. Jones , Libby Wayman
Clean Energy Trust, Chicago, IL 60606, USA Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C. 20006, USA TBJ Investments, LLC, Washington, D.C. 20003, USA d General Electric, Boston, MA 02111, USA b c
A R T I C L E I N F O
A BS T RAC T
Keywords: Venture Capital Energy Cleantech
Venture capital (VC) firms spent over $25 billion funding clean energy technology (cleantech) start-ups from 2006 to 2011. Less than half of that capital was returned; as a result, funding has dried up in the cleantech sector. But as the International Energy Agency warns, without new energy technologies, the world cannot costeffectively confront climate change. In this article, we present the most comprehensive account to date of the cleantech VC boom and bust. Our results aggregate hundreds of investments to calculate the risk and return profile of cleantech, and we compare the outcomes with those of medical and software technology investments. Cleantech posed high risks and yielded low returns to VCs. We conclude that among cleantech investments, "deep technology" investments—in companies developing new hardware, materials, chemistries, or manufacturing processes—consumed the most capital and yielded the lowest returns. We propose that broader support from policymakers, corporations, and investors is needed to underpin new innovation pathways for cleantech.
1. Introduction New energy technology will be needed to increase the likelihood of limiting global temperature increases to the 2 °C ceiling and the 1.5 °C goal set by the Paris Agreement of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP21). (Caldeira et al., 2003; Adoption of the Paris Agreement, Tech. rep., United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris (2015). URL:http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/ l09r01.pdfhttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/ l09r01.pdfhttp://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/ l09r01.pdf〉;) New innovations to reduce emissions of CO2 and capture CO2 will be required to avoid the most significant impacts of climate change. (International Energy Agency , Energy Technology Perspectives (Executive Summary), Tech. rep., International Energy Agency (2014). URL:〈doi:10.1787/energy_tech-2014-en〉.) However, new technologies face a so-called "valley of death" between government-supported research and commercialization. (Rorke et al., From invention to innovation: commercialization of new technology by independent and small business inventors., Tech. rep., U.S. Department of Energy, [Washington DC] (1989).; Frank et al., 1996) To bridge this gap, innovators frequently turn to venture capital (VC) investors to finance the early, high-risk stages of commercialization. (Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital Cycle, MIT Press, 2004. URL: 〈https://books.google.com/books?id=yEAcswbX1fEChttps://
⁎
books.google.com/books?Id=yEAcswbX1fEC〉) Over the last decade, VC investment in clean energy technology (cleantech) experienced a boom and bust. From 2004–2008, VC investment in cleantech increased from approximately $1 billion to $5 billion, an average annual growth rate of 47%. (Mills, Global Trends in Clean Energy Investment - Q4 2014, Tech. rep., Bloomberg New Energy Finance, New York (2015). URL:〈https://data.bloomberglp.com/bnef/sites/4/ 2015/01/Q4-investment-fact-pack.pdf〉) (See Fig. 1) But after 2008, funding dropped sharply, and the number of early-stage investments and the funding into those companies has remained low and approximately constant since. However, recent announcements made at the 2015 Paris Climate Change Conference could enable a recovery in funding for cleantech research and development. Twenty countries around the world who have signed on to the Mission Innovation pledge to double public R & D funding for advanced energy by 2020. At the same time, the Breakthrough Energy Coalition—a group of wealthy investors led by Bill Gates—announced that they will invest billions of dollars to commercialize promising new energy innovations. For these efforts to succeed in moving breakthroughs from the lab to widespread deployment, it is vital not to repeat the mistakes from which the cleantech sector is still recovering. This paper aims to first explain why VC investors scaled back their funding and second to offer suggestions for what the set of new actors in the sector might do differently to achieve better investment results.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2016.12.035 Received 6 June 2016; Received in revised form 21 October 2016; Accepted 20 December 2016 0301-4215/ © 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
B.E. Gaddy et al.
fanfare. And, Al Gore released an Academy Award-winning film, An Inconvenient Truth, in 2006 increasing public concern about climate change. Public policy began to reflect this growing interest in climate change and alternative energy. The Energy Policy Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in 2005, created the Investment Tax Credit and the Production Tax Credit—incentives for the deployment of solar, wind, and other renewables. (109th Congress of the United States, Energy Policy Act of 2005 (2005). URL:〈https://www.congress.gov/109/ plaws/publ58/PLAW-109publ58.pdf〉) Later that year, the National Academy of Sciences released the first version of its report Rising Above the Gathering Storm in which it urged Congress to increase funding for energy RDD & D (R & D plus demonstration and deployment). It also proposed the Advanced Research Projects-Energy (ARPA-E), intended as an analogue to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), which was largely responsible for funding early work on the Internet and autonomous vehicles. (National Academy of Sciences, Rising Above the Gathering Storm, National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2005. URL: 〈doi:10.17226/11463. http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11463/risingabove-the-gathering-storm-energizing-and-employing-america-for〉) Congress responded by establishing ARPA-E in 2007 and it was funded two years later. In late 2005, three solar companies went public at valuations greater than 100 million dollars (Q-Cells, SunPower, and Suntech) followed by a billion-dollar initial public offering by U.S. company First Solar in late 2006. Venture capital investors responded by hiring cleantech experts, forming sector-specific funds, and deploying considerable capital in the sector (Fig. 1). After the peak of investment in 2008, VC funding for cleantech fell sharply for early-stage companies, while investors continued to deploy capital into their existing portfolios through 2012. In 2012 alone, fortyfive solar companies closed, filed for bankruptcy, or were sold under unfavorable terms, compared to eleven the year before. Failures like these led to the poor performance of VC portfolios discussed in this paper, resulting in decreased investment in the sector. It is important to note the macroeconomic and policy factors which may affect investment returns independently from of the capability of individual firms. (Gompers et al., What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising? (1998).URL:〈doi:10.2307/2534802. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2534802?origin=crossref & seq=1#page_scan_tab_contentshttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2534802?Origin=crossref & seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents〉; Gompers and Lerner, 2000) Among the macroeconomic trends that were of particular importance for cleantech firms were the financial crisis and credit crunch of 2008, the decline in oil and natural gas prices (attributed to slowing demand as well as increased supply enabled by hydraulic fracturing), and a glut in solar panel manufacturing capacity followed by a subsequent decline in the prices of solar modules. Policy played an equally important role in cleantech. (Haley and Schuler, 2011) During this period, the failed attempts by the U.S. Congress to pass legislation limiting carbon emissions very likely had an effect on investor sentiment. In a later section, we note that a limitation of this study is uncertainty over the importance of exogenous factors in causing underperformance of the cleantech sector from 2006 to 2011. Nevertheless, it is likely that both poor company performance as well as exogenous factors contributed to observed cleantech returns—it therefore is sensible to extract lessons learned from this period to guide future support for the cleantech sector rather than betting that exogenous obstacles to cleantechs success will not recur.
Fig. 1. Venture capital activity in clean energy companies from 2004 to 2014, comparing trends in the total amount invested overall, the amount invested in early-stage (A-round) deals, and the total number of early-stage deals.
We use publicly available financing data of cleantech companies to evaluate how these VC investments performed in comparison with investments in software technology and medical technology. Our results show that early-stage investments in cleantech companies were more likely to fail and returned less capital than comparable investments in software and medical technology. Within the broad sector of cleantech, we demonstrate that investments in cleantech software returned capital to early investors, whereas investments in more fundamental hardware, materials, chemicals, and processes tended to lose money. Our data indicates that venture capital investors responded to the performance of their cleantech investments by reducing the total capital allocated to the sector, and by shifting investments from hardware and materials to cleantech software. We conclude by offering suggestions for how policymakers can better support emerging companies and prepare them for private-sector investment. 2. Background and context 2.1. Overview of the cleantech sector from 2006 to 2011 The cleantech sector gained considerable investor attention in the years before the investment peak of 2008. For the purposes of this study, we define cleantech companies as those which are commercializing clean energy technologies or business models, including those developing, integrating, deploying, or financing new materials, hardware, or software focused on energy generation, storage, distribution, and efficiency. Our analysis does not include other categories of nonenergy "green" companies, including those focused on environmental waste management or non-energy-related water treatment. A number of factors contributed to increased investor appetite for the sector, which rose sharply starting in 2006. Electricity prices in the United States rose 38% between 2002 and 2008, gasoline prices had approximately quadrupled from 1998 to 2008, and financial analysts predicted the price of a barrel of oil would continue rising—for example, Goldman Sachs forecasted a $200 equilibrium price. (Electricity data browser - Average retail price of electricity, Tech. rep., U.S. Energy Information Administration, Washington, D.C. (2016). URL:〈https://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/〉; U.S. Gasoline and Diesel Retail Prices, Tech. rep., U.S. Energy Information Administration, Washington, D.C. (2016).URL:〈https:// www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_gnd_dcus_nus_m.htm〉; Story, An Oracle of Oil Predicts $200-a-Barrel Crude - The New York Times (may 2008). URL:〈http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/21/business/ 21oil.html?_r=0〉) Elon Musk invested in the Series A round of Tesla Motors, an electric car maker, and joined its board in 2004 amid great
2.2. Overview of venture capital investor role and strategy Venture capital investors support risky new technologies by making investments in early-stage companies in exchange for an ownership stake in the company. (Gompers and Lerner, The Venture Capital 386
Cycle, MIT Press, 2004. URL: 〈https://books.google.com/books? id=yEAcswbX1fEChttps://books.google.com/books? Id=yEAcswbX1fEC〉) These investors can play a critical role in bridging the "valley of death" that new companies face when their emerging technology is too advanced to receive public basic research support but not yet mature technically or commercially. (Rorke et al., From invention to innovation: commercialization of new technology by independent and small business inventors., Tech. rep., U.S. Department of Energy, [Washington DC] (1989).) VCs are particularly well suited to support the early stages of this maturation, during the technology and product development phases. Venture capital funds are often structured as 10-year partnerships, where outside investors (the limited partners, or LPs) provide capital to the VC fund (run by the general partners, or GPs) to make high-risk, high-reward investments on their behalf. (KAPLAN and SCHOAR, 2005) The typical fund will invest in a portfolio of 10–20 startups. Investments are typically made over the first 5 years of the life of the fund. Returns from these investments are realized during years 5–10, through an "exit," that is, when a portfolio company is either acquired by another firm or issues it shares on a public market through an initial public offering (IPO). The capital invested by the limited partners is typically illiquid until a portfolio company exits. The 10–20 investments are made with the expectation that only one or two will succeed. Most are expected to fail, and a few investments will break even. From the LP perspective, these one or two successes must be sufficient to make up for the investments in all of the failed companies, in addition to returning a premium for the length and illiquidity of the investment. The venture capital fund (run by GPs) typically is entitled to keep 20% of the proceeds of a sale, but only after the invested capital has been returned. The nature of the venture capital investment strategy implies that the most successful venturebacked businesses will be easily scalable and in high-growth markets in order to provide large payoffs within a short time frame. (Hargadon and Kenney, 2012) Thus, venture capital investors are incentivized to pick companies that have the potential to return 10–100 times the amount invested within three to five years of the investment. Venture capital funds may invest at multiple stages of a company's development, starting with early "seed" rounds, typically $1 million or less, continuing through subsequent rounds (named "A", "B", etc.) typically on the order of $10 million, and in late-stage growth rounds that can raise $10–$100 million or more. The amount invested varies depending on the size of the fund and the needs of the company. Several venture capital firms often invest in a given round as a syndicate to further diversify risk, and a given company may be financed by different funds in each round.
factors that drove success in other sectors but not in cleantech. We evaluate the performance of cleantech venture capital investment over the life of the investment as of January 2015, starting with the Around financing event and concluding when the invested company either closes or returns capital to the investors. Previous analyses of nonsector-specific venture investment have evaluated the performance of investment funds using proprietary data provided by investors in the funds. (Mulcahy et al., We Have Met the Enemy…and He is Us: Lessons from Twenty Years of the Kauffman Foundation'sFoundation's Investments in Venture Capital Funds and the Triumph of Hope Over Experience, SSRN Electronic Journal URL:〈http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract=2053258 doi:10.2139/ssrn.2053258〉.; KAPLAN and SCHOAR, 2005; Ewens et al., 2013; A. Ljungqvist, M. Richardson, The cash flow, return and risk characteristics of private equity (2003). URL:〈https://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/9454.htmlhttps://ideas.repec.org/p/nbr/nberwo/9454.html〉) This study addresses the need for transparent analysis based on publicly available data. Because cleantech investments were made by both sector-targeted funds and generalist funds, we use individual financing events and track the returns to investors. 3.1. Sector analysis We compare the performance of cleantech investments to that of software and medical technology investments. Software companies include those producing enterprise and consumer focused software, web applications, mobile applications, and social media. Medical technology companies include those commercializing pharmaceuticals and medical devices. We have also subdivided the cleantech sector according to the type of innovation the company was commercializing. Categories were selected so that companies with similar capital requirements and length of expected development times could be compared. These five categories were, in order beginning with the most capital intensive and longest development cycle:
Materials, chemicals, or manufacturing processes, Hardware integration, Software or software appliances, Finance and deployment, and Other products or services, including recycling, consulting, and energy efficiency audits.
We placed each cleantech company into only one of five categories based on the most capital-intensive innovation it commercialized during its early stage when it raised VC funding. In the event that a company fell into more than one category, it was classified into the most capital-intensive category. Companies categorized as developing new materials, chemicals, or manufacturing processes included those that used discoveries in materials science or chemical or biological engineering to create new materials or chemicals that could be used to generate, convert, or store energy. Energy generation materials included new collector materials for solar photovoltaics, such as copper-indium-gallium-selenide. Energy storage materials included components of new batteries. For example, novel cathode materials such as nickel-manganese-cobaltoxide for better performance in lithium-ion batteries. The category also includes biofuels companies creating fossil-fuel replacements from plant matter. Finally, the category includes companies developing a new manufacturing process for creating previously-known compounds, such as using algae to create ethanol. Companies that were classified as hardware integrators included those that sold a tangible product, but where that product was manufactured by combining already existing technologies. Companies in this category faced engineering challenges in integrating parts for the first time, but the science and manufacturing behind the
3. Methodology An assessment of the performance of cleantech companies from the perspective of VC investors and relative to companies from other sectors can inform judgments about whether the cleantech sector is well-suited to the VC investment model. To this end, we compiled a database of all early-stage venture capital investments in cleantech as well as in two other technology sectors. Previous studies have discussed the changes in the amount of early-stage cleantech investment during the period of increased investment and just after the retrenchment began; this study is the first one to study the entire boom and bust cycle of early-stage cleantech investments from 2006 to 2011. (Ghosh and Nanda, Venture capital investment in the clean energy sector, Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper (11020).; Marcus et al., 2013) In order to report the performance of those investments, we have selected A-Round investments made during that time period (Fig. 1). This data enabled us to compare the risk and return profiles of cleantech investments against those of other sectors. Moreover, we used the database to isolate commonalities among companies that underperformed as VC investments and to identify 387
traded acquirer's business. Undisclosed exits are often an indication that an investment did not return capital to investors. For these companies, we estimate on average that the exit returned the invested capital to investors, yielding a 1× multiple, and we set our uncertainty bounds at 0× and 2×. Companies that closed or declared bankruptcy are categorized as having failed, and are recorded as having an exit value of $0.0. To separate companies that "succeeded" from companies that "failed," we use a very conservative metric, classifying "successful" companies as those who returned more capital to A-round investors than what they originally invested. Because VC investors have a higher threshold for success, this classification will conservatively classify more companies as successes, our results should slightly overestimate the performance of cleantech investments. Our data shows that ninety percent of companies that received venture capital investment during this period neither exited nor closed. Their status as successes or failures can be difficult to categorize. Some of these companies may be growing steadily and may raise new funds. Other companies may yet exit. Still others will continue to operate for many years without exiting. Companies in this last category are considered failures from the perspective of the investors, who expect a large exit within three to five years. Investors refer to them as the "living dead" or "zombie" companies. (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2003; Bartlett, Fundamentals of Venture Capital, Vol. 17, Madison Books, 1999. URL: 〈https://books.google.com/books?hl=en & lr= & id=8JkReEEiSbAC & pgis=1https://books.google.com/books?Hl=en & lr= & id=8JkReEEiSbAC & pgis=1〉; D.G.G. Smith, Control Over Exit in Venture Capital Relationships, SSRN Electronic Journal URL:〈http:// dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.272231http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=272231〉 〈http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.272231〉.; Ruhnka et al., 1992) Among these companies that have not exited or closed, we separate them into "dead" companies, and "live" companies. Over 80% of the companies that either exit or raise a new round of funding do so within three years of their previous funding round. Therefore, companies that received venture capital investment in the past three years are categorized as "live" companies, and are excluded from the data set, since their fate cannot yet be determined. It is likely that on average, "live" software and medical technology companies would fare approximately as well as companies who received investment earlier and whose fate has been determined. It is possible that because the cleantech sector is newer, recent investments may perform better than the initial cohort of investments. This may be true in particular if current live companies have adapted to changing conditions after the first wave of failures. For instance, they may have different business models or they may have access to support services of local governments, incubators, and accelerators that were not available to the first cohort. Those companies that have neither exited nor raised new funds in the past three years are considered "dead" and we record them as having an exit value of $0. The number of companies remaining in each sector—those that had disclosed fundraising rounds between 2006 and 2011 and are not "live" companies can be found in Table 1.
component technologies was well proven. This category included companies developing electric automobiles, vehicle charging infrastructure, and other transportation equipment. As a result, the technical risks faced by these companies was generally lower than the technical risks of companies in the previous category. However, because of their scale and relative novelty, they were often unable to take advantage of contract manufacturing capacity or established supply chains. One such company, Better Place, hoped to assemble electric cars and electric vehicle charging stations. Companies in the cleantech software category often developed and sold software to electricity consumers (sometimes via the utilities) to help monitor and manage local usage and promote energy savings. Other software providers created products that would help utilities or micro-grid operators automatically manage and control loads on the grid. Companies that sold a packaged combination of software-enabled hardware were categorized as software appliances companies. These differed from purely software companies because they required integrated hardware that is sold by the company, whereas pure software products were sold independently. Furthermore, these differed from the hardware companies described above because the key innovation was contained in the software control system. Companies categorized as finance or deployment firms typically served as project developers for well-test technologies such as solar photovoltaic or wind energy or provided capital to project developers. While project development may be capital intensive, these projects are most often funded by debt, not by equity finance from venture capital. Some companies in this category provided loans for homeowners and commercial customers to install new technology. Finally, other companies, those that did not fit into the previous categories often provided services. These included companies that offered materials recycling services, access to recycling infrastructure, energy audits, or energy efficiency consulting programs. These companies were not dependent on substantial technology risk and tend to be relatively capital efficient. 3.2. Venture capital investment data In order to evaluate the cleantech financing boom that peaked in 2008 and subsequent bust, we evaluate financing rounds that occurred from 2006 to 2011 and exits through the end of 2014. To investigate the performance of individual firms, company-specific financing data for each round of financing was obtained from CrunchBase. (Crunchbase (2015). URL:〈http://www.crunchbase.com〉). Data on the market capitalization of companies during an initial public offering were obtained from NASDAQ. In order to benchmark the performance of the VC investments, returns were compared to historical data from the S & P 500 via the Federal Reserve Bank in St. Louis and Yahoo! Finance. The details of financing events and exits are sometimes unavailable to the public. Our analysis focuses therefore on the set of companies in the CrunchBase database. Changes in round-by-round financing in each industrial sector (software, medical technology, and cleantech) indicates that no systematic differences in the availability or quality of data exists across the three categories. Occasionally, the amounts invested in early funding rounds are not public. We find that undisclosed fundraising events are more common in initial financing rounds and earlier funding years and have become less frequent—these trends are consistent across sectors. Across all the three sectors approximately 23% of startups had disclosed A-rounds. When an A-round financing event was disclosed but the amount of money raised in the round was not available, we approximated the funding by using the median level of all disclosed A-round funding events in that sector, and we set uncertainty bounds at the first and third quartile. Acquisition prices are also not always available, because there is no disclosure requirement unless the acquisition is material to a publicly
Table 1 Financing events in the data set. The table shows the number of companies in the data set in each technology sector, as well as the breakdown of companies with disclosed A-round financing events. Each subsequent row reports the number of "live" companies remaining after we filtered the data set, first to limit our scope to companies that received A-round financing events between 2006–2011, then to companies whose exit outcome is known or reasonably guessed. The details of this filtering process are described in Section 3.2.
All Companies All A-Rounds A-Round 2006–2011 Included in Set
25,635 6033 3064 2169
investment is made. Therefore, the time of the investment is the time between the funding event and the exit. Table 2 evaluates the returns from two hypothetical investments that are identical except for the amount of time between investment and exit. As discussed below, time will affect IRR but not the cash-on-cash multiple.
3.3. Assessment of risk and return in venture capital portfolios When comparing the performance of investments we average the investments in each category in each year in an effort to reduce the effect of the well-known high variability in venture capital returns (Cochrane, 2005). The variability in returns depends upon the amount invested, the exit valuation, the fraction of ownership at time of exit, and duration until exit, as shown by two example investments in Table 2 . An individual VC investor will often make only one or two investments per year; therefore we aggregate all the deals in a given sector in a given year to measure the investor's expected outcomes. Table 3 shows the cleantech investments of 2006 to illustrate our methodology. This approach includes both the best and worst outcomes for investors. Other studies have shown that the best outcomes for venture capital accrue to the top quintile of funds. (Mulcahy et al., We Have Met the Enemy…and He is Us: Lessons from Twenty Years of the Kauffman Foundation'sFoundation's Investments in Venture Capital Funds and the Triumph of Hope Over Experience, SSRN Electronic Journal URL:〈http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2053258 doi:10.2139/ssrn.2053258〉.) Therefore, we have also compared performance for only the best investments in each sector. We evaluate the risk of investment in each of the three sectors by comparing the historical failure rates. For each investment year, we calculate the fraction of companies that failed to reach a successful exit. For instance, in 2006, two of ten cleantech A-round investments returned at least the invested capital to investors (see Table 3). This is recorded as an 80% chance of failure for A-round cleantech investments in that year. Recall that the venture capital investor typically expects an 80–90% failure rate in early rounds. Risks that investors take must be matched by returns from successful investments. There are many ways to evaluate the return of an investment. Because we are interested in comparing the performance across the three sectors, we report the internal rate of return (IRR) and a cash-on-cash multiple (CoC). These metrics are compared for two hypothetical investments in Table 2. The returns to investors depend upon the amount invested (the paid-in-capital) VPIC, the total enterprise value at the time of exit Vexit , the ownership stake at exit fstake , and the elapsed time until returns are realized t . For companies that are acquired, the exit value is simply the sale price. For companies that exit through an IPO, the total exit value used here is the market capitalization based on the price at which the initial shares are offered. It is important to note that there is often a "lockup" period during which early investors and founders cannot liquidate their position (realize a return). This period often lasts 180 days after the IPO. During this period, the publicly traded stock may appreciate or depreciate. The returns distributed to investors depend upon the number of shares they own at the time of exit. This fractional ownership stake depends on the terms of the original financing deal, as well as subsequent investments. The stake an investor takes during a fundraising event varies with each deal, and this stake is usually diluted when new shares are issued in subsequent fundraising rounds. Though there are no fixed ranges, when a company exits an A-round investor may own 5–50% of the company (though <15% is typical). Because the exact ownership stakes are often not disclosed until a company files for an IPO, our calculations model the returns assuming an estimated stake of 12%, with our error bounds set at 8% and 16%. This central value and associated uncertainty bounds were derived from numerous publicly disclosed investments in startups across the three sectors. The effects of ownership stake on IRR and multiple can be seen in Table 2. In our analysis, we discount for time from the perspective of the limited partners.1 The LP typically does not pay in capital until the
3.3.1. Internal rate of return The IRR for a given investment accounts for the time elapsed (t) between the investment and the exit. IRR is the value of the discount rate r at which the net present value of an investment equals zero. IRR can be used by an investor to compare investment alternatives, and indeed is often reported by venture capital funds. (Mulcahy et al., We Have Met the Enemy…and He is Us: Lessons from Twenty Years of the Kauffman Foundation'sFoundation's Investments in Venture Capital Funds and the Triumph of Hope Over Experience, SSRN Electronic Journal URL:〈http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2053258 doi:10.2139/ ssrn.2053258〉.) In general, a higher IRR indicates a better investment, though we note that there are many caveats to using IRR as the only measure of performance and that it may not always lead to a straightforward comparison. (Kelleher and MacCormack, Internal rate of return: A cautionary tale, McKinsey Quarterly. URL:〈http:// www.mckinsey.com/insights/corporate_finance/internal_rate_of_return_a_cautionary_tale〉). For a single investment the IRR, R, is given by the expression:
⎛ Vexitfstake ⎞1/ t R=⎜ ⎟ −1 ⎝ VPIC ⎠
For a portfolio of n investments, R is given by the solution to the equation
∑ n
n n Vexit fstake
(1 + R )t
n . ∑ VPIC n
3.3.2. Cash-on-cash multiple The cash-on-cash multiple (mCoC ) provides a way to compare investments without considering the time of the investment. This metric is also often used by venture capital funds when they report their performance. The multiple is determined according to the expression
mCoC =
Vexit f . VPIC stake
For a portfolio of n investments, the total cash-on-cash return MCoC is determined by a sum of the capital distributed divided by the capital invested, according to
n n ∑n Vexit fstake n ∑n VPIC
3.3.3. Expected multiple for successes We also evaluate each investment year according to the expected return multiple on successful investments. This calculation is identical to the cash-on-cash computation in Eq. (4), except that it is summed across only successful investments.
(footnote continued) fund. These fees are often structured as an annual operation fee of 2% of the committed capital, which may decrease towards the end of the 10-year life of the fund, and 20% of the proceeds of all earnings after the limited partners paid-in-capital has been returned. See, for instance, Ref. (Gompers, 1999).
In this paper we consider the investment returns exclusive of fees collected by the VC
Table 2 Example investments and returns. The distribution, IRR, and cash-on-cash multiple for an investment of $10 million and a $200 million exit are shown as a function of the ownership stake at exit. All dollar values are reported in millions. Investment
8% Stake
12% Stake
VPIC ($)
Vexit ($)
Dist. ($)
IRR (%)
Table 3 2006 cleantech A-round investments. The outcome, distribution, IRR, and cash-on-cash multiple for each investment and for the yearly portfolio of investments are shown. All dollar values are reported in millions. Investment
VPIC
01/18/06 07/01/06 07/31/06 08/01/06 09/18/06 10/12/06 10/16/06 11/1/06 11/1/06 11/10/06
$2.9 $25.0 $15.0 $2.9 $4.0 $20.0 $7.0 $5.2 $8.0 $0.6
Vexit
Closed Bankruptcy Acq. - Undisc
IPO Acq. - Undisc Closed
$82.5 $7.0
21% 0%
Acquired Failure Rate 80%
must at least double the invested capital, the failure rates are higher, and considerably so for cleantech (Fig. 2b). Under this requirement, medical technologies failed least often, whereas software companies failed at a consistent 90–95% rate, in line with VC expectations for early-stage companies. After 2007, cleantech companies failed more than 90% of the time, and notably, in 2008, 2009 and 2011, none of the companies receiving A-round investments surpassed this hurdle.
4. Results 4.1. Cleantech investment risk and reward 4.1.1. Risk for early-stage investors The failure rates of venture capital A-round investments in cleantech, software, and medical technologies, defined as the percentage of companies each year that failed to at least return invested capital (a 1 × return), are shown in Fig. 2a. Cleantech investments were approximately as likely to fail as investments in medical technologies, but compared to those in software companies failed more often and were more variable. Software A-round investments failed approximately 70– 75% of the time, whereas cleantech and medical technology investments often failed more than 75% of the time. When the metric for success is more strict, that is, if a company
4.1.2. Returns by investment sector Fig. 3 shows the returns to investors for A-round investors across the three sectors we considered. The cash-on-cash returns for all successful companies (those that beat the 1 × hurdle rate) for each year of investment are shown in Fig. 3a. In 2006 and 2007, when cleantech companies succeeded, they yielded investor returns at scales comparable with those of other sectors. The peak of cleantech invest-
Fig. 2. Investment failure rate for A-round venture capital investments. For each investment year, the percentage of investments that failed to return 1x capital to investors is shown in part (a), and the percentage that failed to return 2x the capital in part (b). Cleantech investments (green) are compared to software (blue) and medical technologies (red). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 3. Returns to investors by industry sector in A-round investments. Returns are shown as measured by (a) cash-on-cash multiples for successes and (b) internal rate of return for all investments. Cleantech investments (green) are compared with software technology investments (blue) and medical technology investments (red). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
investment year, the cash-on-cash multiples for investments that at least returned invested capital are shown against the risk of loss. Riskier investment portfolios require a higher return to beat other investment scenarios. In this case, the risk and return are compared to a break-even scenario (light gray line), where invested capital is returned dollar-for-dollar, without discounting for time, and a public market benchmark (black line). For our benchmark we use an investment made in the S & P 500 index in January 2006 and held until January 2015. This investment would have yielded a 5.4% annual return. With a few exceptions, investments in each sector tended to cluster together. Software investments offered the highest returns and a risk profile in line with VC expectations. Medical technologies, by contrast, were slightly more risky and had greater variability in risk from year to year, but offered returns in the same range. After 2007, cleantech offered high-risk investments and low returns, with the notable exception of 2010, as discussed in the previous section. We note that across all three sectors, investment bundles in most years failed to beat the public market, and many failed to break even. First, this is a result of the early stage and high risk of investing. VCs will invest more money into the most promising companies in subsequent financing rounds, increasing their ownership stakes and improving overall performance. Second, this analysis includes all companies that received investment, supporting the findings of Mulcahy that only the top venture capital funds yield consistently strong returns. (Mulcahy et al., We Have Met the Enemy…and He is Us: Lessons from Twenty Years of the Kauffman Foundation'sFoundation's Investments in Venture Capital Funds and the Triumph of Hope Over Experience, SSRN Electronic Journal URL:〈http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2053258 doi:10.2139/ssrn.2053258〉.). To evaluate how the cleantech sector would have performed for only the best investors, we have also considered the case where an allknowing investor selected only the best companies, defined as the ten most valuable companies in each sector at the time of exit. As shown in Fig. 5, this risk-free portfolio would have earned an 11.6 × return on software investments. Cleantech investments, which would have returned 8.6 × the original investment, would have outperformed medical technologies, which returned 4.2 ×. However, because the winning medical technology exits were larger than those in cleantech, and because the compensation structure of most VC partnerships rewards bigger exits, the GPs would have earned approximately 20% more by investing in medical technology, even though their LPs would earn less.
ment activity in 2008, however, signaled the end of good cleantech performance, with the notable exception of 2010. The 2010 cleantech returns are dominated by Nest Labs, a company selling softwareenabled smart thermostats, which was acquired by Google in 2014 for $3.2 billion. The calculated IRR for all companies in each investment year is shown in Fig. 3b. Because the IRR calculation evaluates both successes and failures, the high failure rate of cleantech becomes apparent. Every year after 2006—again with the exception of the 2010 Nest investment—cleantech yielded negative returns (investors lost money) and performed much worse than the other sectors. 4.1.3. Risk and return As discussed in previous sections, the returns to investors when investments succeed must be great enough to overcome the failed investments. The returns must also provide an additional premium for the length of time the capital is illiquid, the high risk, and the fees charged by the VC investor. Fig. 4 compares the risk and return of each investment year across the three different technology sectors. For each
Fig. 4. Risk and return for VC investments in cleantech (green), software (blue), and medical (red). The returns to investors for A-round investments that at least returned invested capital are plotted against the historical failure rate and compared with hypothetical returns in a break-even scenario (light gray line) and from investing in public markets (black line). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Fig. 7. The amount invested (striped bars) and returned (solid bars) to A-round investors in each subcategory of clean energy technologies shows that underperformance was driven by large investments and poor returns by materials and hardware investments.
Processes lost approximately $5 for every $6 invested, yielding a loss of nearly $650 million. Hardware investments performed even more poorly, returning only $30 million on investment of nearly $600 million. Companies commercializing clean energy deployment business models and companies commercializing other clean energy technologies also failed to return invested capital, posting multiple of 0.26× and 0.21×, respectively. The software and software appliance category was the only class of investment that rewarded investors. These investments returned nearly $550 million on investment of just over $150 million, a 3.7× multiple. Without the Nest investment, cleantech software would have yielded lower returns, but it would still have returned more than the invested capital. In part, this may reflect the suitability of the venture capital model for software. Investors responded to the performance of these subsectors by changing their investment strategies. As shown in Fig. 8, investments in materials and hardware have declined over the past decade, and have been replaced by investments in software and software appliances.
Fig. 5. The amount invested by and returned to A-Round investors for an ideal investment portfolio, where A-round investments were made only in the 10 largest exits in each technology sector. The cash-on-cash multiple for each of these portfolios is also shown.
4.1.4. Exit outcomes Fig. 6 compares frequency of both types of exit event—IPO or acquisition—for each sector. In 2010, it was observed that there had been few acquisitions in the sector and there was evidence that VC investors as a class would be less likely to invest when exit opportunities were rare. (Ghosh and Nanda, Venture capital investment in the clean energy sector, Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper (11-020).; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, Financing risk and innovation, Management Science (Forthcoming). (forthcoming).) Our data shows that this trend persisted through the lifetime of those investments. Software companies were the most likely to exit. Cleantech companies were less likely to exit overall, (as was shown in Fig. 2) but were approximately as likely to go public as medical technology companies. Only about 3.8% of cleantech companies were acquired, compared with 6.3% of medical technology companies and 11.9% of software companies.
5. Discussion The cleantech boom-and-bust demonstrated that cleantech investments are poorly suited to the VC investment model for four reasons. First, the investments were illiquid because the development of new materials and hardware takes longer than the 3–5 years VCs expect. (White House, Materials Genome Initiative for Global Competitiveness, Tech. Rep. June, White House (2011). URL:〈http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2011/06/24/materials-genome-initiative-renaissance-american-manufacturing〉) Second, they required significant capital, using hundreds of millions of dollars of VC investment to build and scale factories, in many cases even before the fundamental technology development was complete. (Eilperin, Why the clean tech boom went bust, Wired Magazine, February.) Third, these companies often sold into commodity markets, where margins are thin and the pressure to scale is immense. (Books, Energy Venture Capital Best Practices: Leading Vcs on Spotting Opportunity, Assessing Risk, And Exiting the Investment, Inside the Minds, Aspatore Books, 2006. URL: 〈https://books.google.com/books?id=uhXNPAAACAAJhttps://books.google.com/books?Id=uhXNPAAACAAJ〉; Ghosh and Nanda, Venture capital investment in the clean energy sector, Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper (11020).) Finally, the utilities and large industrial corporations that were seen as likely acquirers of these startups were reluctant to buy risky startups, valuing them based on their profitability rather than their potential for growth. (Ghosh and Nanda, Venture capital investment in the clean energy sector, Harvard Business School Entrepreneurial Management Working Paper (11-020).; Nanda and Rhodes-Kropf, Financing risk and innovation, Management Science (Forthcoming). (forthcoming).) These four factors conspired to make VC cleantech
4.2. Cleantech sub-sector performance The underperfomance of cleantech investments was driven by large investments and poor performance in "deep technology" innovations: Materials, Chemicals, and Processes, and Hardware Integration, as shown in Fig. 7. A-round investments in Materials, Chemicals, and
Fig. 6. The exit outcomes are shown as the percentage of companies receiving A-round in each sector (cleantech, medical technology, and software) that exited through an IPO or acquisition. Cleantech companies exited less often and were less likely to find an acquirer.
Fig. 8. The proportion of investment activity (a) and investment amounts (b) in each cleantech subsector from 2004 to 2014. Investment in companies commercializing new materials (dark green) and hardware (light green) has decreased and largely been replaced by investments in software (dark gray). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
renewed interest, however, has not been sufficiently allocated to companies developing breakthrough energy technologies. By evaluating the publicly available data on investment and returns during this period, we were able to compare the performance of the cleantech sector to the software and medical technology sectors. Our results provide several possible explanations for the change in investor behavior. Our research is an early investigation in this space and subject to limitations which can provide a basis for ongoing discovery and future research. First, our study is based on publicly available financing data for private companies. Because these companies and their investors are rarely obligated to report details of financing, it can be difficult to estimate the extent to which data is not included in the set. Our analysis indicates that there is no systematic difference between the level of data accuracy and completeness between the three sectors compared (cleantech, software, and medical technology) but future research combining additional public or private data sets may provide additional useful analysis. Second, our data set includes exits through the end of 2014, and our study focuses only on the investment returns for investments made from 2006 to 2011. Our results show that through 2014, investor behavior changed to favor investment in software and softwareappliance over materials, chemicals, and hardware. It would be valuable for future research to evaluate whether this trend continued in 2015 and 2016. Further, this change in investor behavior may have lead to better (or worse) investment results for investments made after 2011. Third, there is an inherent limitation to separating external market effects from the nature of the investments themselves. These external factors, highlighted in Section 2.1, included the credit crunch and financial turbulence of 2008 and a glut of solar panels made in china. (Zhang et al., 2014) We do not attempt to predict what the returns may have been if these events had not occurred. Future research using case studies of successful and unsuccessful firms may be able to separate the effects of these external events from internal limitations to the venture capital funding model. Finally, we note that this study is limited to evaluating companies that raised venture capital. There are numerous other funding sources for early-stage companies and some of these may be more suitable for capital-intensive and slow-growing cleantech companies. Future research on the prevalence of alternative and emerging financing models
investments an expensive experiment, where hundreds of millions of dollars were needed before the success of the company could be determined. Based on our results, the recent VC capital flight away from cleantech hardware and materials companies is rational and unlikely to reverse, because alternative sectors are more lucrative to VCs. Unlike medical and software technology sectors, cleantech may require a more diverse set of actors and innovation models. To succeed, future cleantech start-ups will need to seek a broader set of funding sources than just VC, and should wait longer before raising VC money. In the interim, they can reduce capital expenditures by using shared or leased resources at universities, research institutes, or incubators. And they can leverage federal and state grants to advance technology development before raising substantial funding and starting the countdown to investor return expectations. Still, these start-ups cannot improve their prospects alone; large companies will have to play a crucial role in innovation and commercialization, as they do in other sectors. Established software and medical companies are more willing to acquire risky startups, and they are willing to set the price as a multiple of the startups' growth, whereas the likely cleantech acquirers—utilities and industrial corporations— tend to be more risk-averse and value startups based on profits instead of growth. Unless corporate behavior in the cleantech sector shifts to resemble that in other sectors, cleantech start-ups will lack lucrative exits. Finally, in addition to corporations, other non-VC investors will need to invest in cleantech innovation in order to enable different results from the bleak performance over the past decade. In particular, investors with substantial capital to allocate and longer time horizons to realize returns could match up much better with the return profile of a diversified portfolio of cleantech start-ups. Such investors could include pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices, and other institutional investors, as well as philanthropies, foundations, and other charitable organizations. 6. Limitations and further research Our research provides context to the cleantech boom and bust from 2006 to 2011 when venture capital investment in the sector grew and subsequently contracted. In the years since, there has been some recovery of private funding support for early-stage companies. This 393
capital that will not require returns for a decade or more. They also plan to attract follow-on capital from institutional investors. The public sector and academic institutions can assist these investors by providing independent, third-party technical evaluations. The investors will need to work closely with the regional and national networks of laboratories, incubators, and accelerators to help support their investments through the phases of technology and business development over the course of several years.
for these companies would enhance the body of knowledge in this emerging area of research. 7. Conclusion and policy implications Our analysis of the publicly available data shows that early-stage investment in clean energy technologies from 2006 to 2011 underperformed compared to investments in other sectors. The set of investments in clean energy technologies studied here were riskier than investments in other sectors and offered lower returns. Cleantech companies were less likely to be acquired or exit through an IPO. Over 90% of cleantech A-round investment failed to return substantial capital to investors each year after 2007. When cleantech investments did succeed, the returns were lower than investments in other sectors as measured by both cash-on-cash multiples and IRR. These successes failed to compensate for the increased risk in the sector. Even when considering only the best investments— those with the largest exits—VC investors would prefer to invest in software and medical technologies before cleantech. Cleantech underperformance was driven by the poor performance of investments in deep technology innovations. In particular, A-round investments in new materials, chemicals, and processes, along with investments in hardware integration companies, lost nearly $1.25 billion. Investor behavior responded to this underperformance by shifting cleantech investments to software and software appliances, which are both less capital-intensive and offer greater opportunities for growth. Commercializing new clean energy innovations will require support from the public sector that can then attract investment from large corporations and patient investors. To provide this support, the United States and 19 other nations should fulfill their Mission Innovation pledge to double support for advanced energy R & D. These governments should also increase support for commercialization of this research through networks of incubators and accelerators. Public policy provides a lever to encourage participation in cleantech innovation, both from corporations and from institutional investors. First, policymakers should increase support to start-ups and private investors to provide an alternative to VC funding. The Department of Energy can do this by increasing funding for the Small Business Innovation Research and Small Business Investment Company programs and supporting the expansion of private and nonprofit cleantech incubators and accelerators. Second, the federal government should further expand access to federal research institutes through programs like the Department of Energy's Small Business Vouchers. Third, to encourage corporations to participate in cleantech innovation, the federal government should incentivize regional partnerships between large corporations, startups, and incubators, and offer favorable technology transfer terms from the national laboratories. Fourth, the government should continue to develop a national manufacturing program by continuing to fund the National Network of Manufacturing Institutes that start-ups and large companies alike can access to improve manufacturing techniques en route to new technology commercialization. Finally, the Department of Energy should support entrepreneurship at the national laboratories by building on the success of the Cyclotron Road program currently hosted at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and now expanded to Argonne and Oak Ridge National Laboratories. If fulfilled, these policy recommendations can support the right environment to attract a diverse mix of players to invest in innovation. They would also enable entrepreneurs to develop their technologies, for example by using shared public resources, without requiring VC funding. Finally, these recommendations could dovetail with recent announcements from the private sector, notably the Breakthrough Energy Coalition's commitment to support clean energy innovation. This Coalition has pledged to identify promising start-ups and technologies in which to invest multiple billions of dollars of "patient"
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Report "Venture Capital and Cleantech: The wrong model for energy innovation"


Published in Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference on Magnetism and Magnetic Materials, Volume 29, May 1, 1976, pages 510-511.
The definitive version is available at https://doi.org/10.1063/1.30420.
Small (≤1 mg) single crystals of γ-Co(pyr)2Cl2 have been grown and measurements of magnetic moment vs applied field H and temperature have been made for 0≤H≤54 kG and 1.25 K≤T≤4.2 K. At 1.25 K, metamagnetic transitions are observed along the a-axis at ~700 G; along the b-axis at both ~800 and ~1500 G; and along the c-axis at ~4 kG. The low field susceptibilities show a maximum at T≃3.4 K for each orientation. Magnetic saturation is not achieved at 54 kG; about 2.5 µB is achieved along the a*- or b-axes, whereas a lower moment is achieved along the c-axis, Along the b-axis, the low field moment change is 1/2 the higher field moment change, suggesting a six-sublattice magnetic structure.


Mag. Elisabeth Spauwen-Micka, born 1948, is a sociologist and after a career as a university lecturer worked as a director at the institution. Afterwards director of a psychiatric hospital. Beside her humanitarian activities abroad she is an active painter.
Univ.Prof.Dr. Paul Spauwen, born 1947, is a physician and was full professor for reconstructive surgery, specialised for the treatment of congenital malformations and functional dysfunctions of the hand. He has been involved in surgical projects in Bangladesh for ten years and recently also in Indonesia.
Dr. Hans-Jürgen Schindler, born 1944, is a jurist and was head of international human resource management in a multi-national oil company. Since his retirement he has been working world-wide as a tour-guide. During and after his professional career he has been involved in humanitarian projects in Albania, Pakistan, Yemen and Indonesia.