text: <!-- {{Infobox Version|en=Patching the French Intelligence Bill|fr=PJL relatif au renseignement/Analyse du PJL Renseignement}} --> {{Introduction|This wiki page suggests possible amendments to the [http://is.gd/s3W9jT French Intelligence Bill (2015)]. '''It is based on the text presented by the French government on 19 March 2015 and updated with the vote at the French National Assembly and Senate's Law Commission'''}} =INTRODUCTION= The [http://is.gd/s3W9jT Intelligence Bill] introduced before the French Council of Ministers on March, 19th 2015 is presented by its promoters as a text which protects fundamental rights. This technical text would be nothing more than a way to legalise policies and techniques which were up to now common but not regulated, and as such to create better safeguards. Move along, nothing to see here! This public relations strategy is all the more convenient for the government given that since the beginning of Edward Snowden's disclosures regarding the NSA and GCHQ surveillance practices, the French government has chosen to burry its head in the sand. For nearly two years, it has indeed managed to avoid any meaningful debate on the French services' practices, even though some of Snowden documents shed light on the DGSE (French foreign intelligence agency) partnerships with the NSA and the GCHQ. Instead of a transparent democratic debate, French officials have mostly weathered the storm, simply issuing denials without ever saying anything about its own surveillance practices. According to its sponsors, this bill would help render the whole scheme as clean as it gets. For Prime Minister Manuel Valls, the text would even forbid mass surveillance! The underlying message being pushed here is that the French system is being defined in opposition to the American and British models. But the argument doesn't hold once the text is examined in detail. Several provisions are actually directly inspired by the US and British law and the methods used by the NSA and GCHQ. Indeed, the bill legalizes tools of mass surveillance, in particular with automated Internet trafic analysis "black boxes" designed to detect "suspicious behaviour" ([[Amender_le_PJL_Renseignement#Renoncer_aux_dispositifs_de_surveillance_massive_et_pr.C3.A9dictive|art. L. 851-4]]) or provisions on so-called "international surveillance" ([[Amender_le_PJL_Renseignement#Limiter_le_r.C3.A9gime_associ.C3.A9_.C3.A0_la_.C2.AB_surveillance_internationale_.C2.BB_aux_communications_.C3.A9mises_et_re.C3.A7ues_.C3.A0_l.27.C3.A9tranger|art. L. 854-1]]) which will authorize bulk data collection. It also sets loose [[Amender_le_PJL_Renseignement#Abroger_l.27immunit.C3.A9_pour_le_piratage_informatique_hors_des_fronti.C3.A8res|hacking and cyberattacks]] carried beyond French borders, and in this respect also echoes the recent revelations regarding the British, US and Canadian agencies' practices. Finally, despite what its champions claim, the text is in many ways a step backwards in relation to the existing law and practices: for instance, specific and crucial control processes currently carried out by the CNCIS (National Commission for the Control of Security Interceptions) are being dismantled, whereas the field of intervention of intelligence agencies is widely extended. The government is now trying to force this bill through. At the National Assembly Valls-Urvoas tandem ([http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/tribun/fiches_id/331594.asp Jean-Jacques Urvoas] is the Bill's co-author and is also its rapporteur) will enable the government and its majority to join forces during an rushed legislative procedure, while the "post-Charlie" popular mood and the securitarian drift of the opposition conservative party (UMP) will supposedly contribute to stifling the democratic and parliamentary debates. Only a wide-ranging citizen mobilisation, in France and across the world, can make a change. The points raised below highlight the dangers of the bill while pointing at possible amendments. To be acceptable and allow intelligence agencies to do their work while respecting the rule of law, the text must indeed be deeply amended. =SCOPE RESTRICTIONS= '''Evolutions from the French Lower Chamber''' Protection of personal data in the name of privacy. The 1st Article has been amended to precise that the protection of personal data (and thus connection data) is the second part of the right to privacy with correspondence secrecy (as asked by the CNIL). [http://www.nosdeputes.fr/14/amendement/2697/244 Amendements 244] '''Evolution from the Law Commission from the French Upper Chamber''' Removal of the clarification of correspondence secrecy, protection of data...: the expression "privacy in all its form" would include all of that. '''Final version''' 1st article quotes explicitly the protection of personal data and correspondence secrecy as part of the respect of privacy. ==Forbiding massive and predictive surveillance measures (black boxes)== Article L.851-4 provides that the Prime Minister may require that telecom operators and online service providers deploy technical devices (a.k.a black boxes) to detect, via automated means, suspicious patterns of connexion data or online behavior. The Prime Minister could decide, "if a terrorist threat were to be revealed (...) to lift the anonimity of those data". This provision seems to be inspired from the British model, as a similar mechanism was debated as early as 2000 and eventually included in the [http://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/oct/24/qanda RIP Act]'s [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/12 section 12] (in the UK, the issue of "black boxes" would be raised again in 2008, during a [http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/10/07/detica_interception_modernisation/ modernisation plan] criticised for the extravagant expenses it incurred at the time). Such devices aimed at the extensive scanning of online communications at the network or server levels amount to a massive processing of personal data. As such, they are contrary to the jurisprudence established by both EU Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights (see, e.g., [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58497 Amann v. Switzerland], February 16th, 2000, §68). The government's argument that such surveillance relates to raw, anonymous data is completely at odds with technical realities, since "raw" metadata can easily be used to reveal someone's identity. To detect "suspicious behaviors", these black boxes will run algorithms for which no transparency is possible. They are moreover contrary to the French Data Protection Act's [http://www.cnil.fr/index.php?id=301 article 10], which provides that "no decision which produces legal effects in respect of a person may be taken on the sole basis of the automated processing of data." It must therefore be repealed. Among the techniques services are authorised by law to use, we find: * probes (art. L. 851-2) * "black boxes" (art. L. 851-3) * geolocalisation of a person, car or object (art. L. 851-5) * use of IMSI catchers (art. L. 851-6) * interception of communications (art. L. 852-1) * sound and image tapping of private places (art. L. 853-1) * keyloggers (art. L. 853-2) :'''Évolution Assemblée nationale''' Aménagement des procédures entourant l'utilisation des IMSI Catcher : L'amendement 357 porte de 30 à 90 jours le délai permettant aux services de renseignement de discriminer les données collectées au moyen d'un dispositif de proximité. Il tient en cela compte des délais proposés par un amendement précédent et de la législation allemande qui prévoit quant à elle un délai de six mois. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/357.asp Amendement 357] et [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/351.asp Amendement 351] d'Urvoas : Cet amendement a pour objet de rendre applicables aux paroles captées dans un lieu privé le délai de conservation prévu au a) du I de l'article L. 822-2, tel qu'il résulte de l'article 1er, amendé, du présent projet de loi (destruction à l'issue d'une durée de trente jours à compter de la première exploitation et dans un délai maximum de six mois à compter de leur recueil). :'''Évolution Assemblée nationale''' Boites noires à titre expérimental: Avec l'amendement 399, annoncé par Valls en introduction des débats, le dispositif des boîtes noire est institué à titre expérimental pour trois ans et fera l'objet d'une évaluation avant son éventuelle reconduction. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/399.asp Amendement 399] :'''Évolution commission des lois du Sénat''' Aucune évolution significative du dispositif, le principe de surveillance massive et prédictive reste en place. Seule évolution : réduction de la durée d'autorisation, qui passe de 4 à 2 mois. :'''Texte définitif''' Les autorisations sont données pour une durée de 4 mois renouvelables (article 821-4) ==Too wide and too blurry purposes== ==="International commitments"=== The French Government argues that the accomplishment of the international commitments of France calls for the use of intelligence techniques to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If this goal is laudable, it is in a too broad and ill-defined legal category. "International commitments" would allow almost indefinite extension of the reasons for the use of information technology. To respect international law, the law must be amended to ensure that French law mentions specific international obligations (treaties, agreements, conventions) that can justify the use of intelligence gathering techniques. '''Evolution''' No significant changes neither at the National Assembly (lower chamber) nor at the Senate's Law Committee. '''Final text''' Among the objectives, in addition of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, it includes: * "National independence, territorial integrity and national defence" * "The major interests in foreign policy, enforcement of European and international commitments of France and prevention of all forms of foreign interference" * "The major economic, industrial and scientific interests of France" * "Prevention of terrorism" : The French Constitutional Council considered that the 4 finalities give enough safeguards as they call the art. 410-1 of the Penal Code <ref>Art. 410-1 of the Penal Code: "The fundamental interests of the Nation are understood as its current independence, the integrity of its territory, its security, the republican essence of its institutions, the means of its defence and its diplomacy, the safeguard of its population in France and abroad, the balance of its natural environment and the essential elements of its scientific potential and the economic and cultural assets.</ref> == Repealing the "collective violence" public interest== Article L. 811-3. extends the intelligence services' powers to include the "prevention of collective violence likely to cause serious harm to the public peace." The extremely broad wording of this public interest allowing exceptional monitoring techniques poses serious risks of arbitrariness. It could for instance easily be invoked to engage in the surveillance of social movements. Given the serious risks it poses to the most basic political rights, this provision must be deleted. == Repealing the "key scientific and economic interests" public interest == The legalisation of economic and scientific espionage in the country without any judicial oversight results in a disproportionate interference with both the right to privacy and freedom of enterprise. If the information sought after is not directly linked to the fight against industrial espionage, in which case the surveillance can be part of a criminal investigation, then the recourse to exceptional surveillance techniques cannot be justified. Moreover, such an article would allow the implementation of surveillance practices of individuals, groups (including Unions) who would contest the decisions or practices of companies in sensitive areas like the environment or public health. Let's remind ourselves that Art. 7 of the Charter of the Environment, of constitutional value, provides that "everyone has the right to participate in the development of public decisions affecting the environment". :'''Evolution of the Lower Chamber'''Adding the protection of industrial interests of France. :'''Evolution Law Commission of the Upper Chamebr''': withdrawal of industrial interests :'''Final text''': Reintegration of industrial interests to become "major economic, industrial and scientific interests of France" == Limiting by law the number of intelligence agencies== Article L. 811-4 of the bill empowers the government to unilaterally increase the number of executive agencies that fall under the Minister of Defense, the Minister of the Interior as well as the Ministers for the Economy, Budget or Customs and which may use intelligence techniques. In [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/projets/pl2669-ei.asp impact assessment], the government is openly considering to give "certain police services" the broad surveillance powers provided in the bill . However, the scope of the competent authorities in regard to preventive and extra-judicial surveillance should remain limited to the minimum necessary, and the government does not provide any justification for the need to expand the already large number of beneficiary services (DGSE, DSPDs, DRM, DGSI, Tracfin and DNRED). Thus, given the fact that the increase in the number of relevant services acquiring and accessing "intelligence" leads to a greater risk for civil liberties, but also in order to ensure the predictability of the law, the number and nature of the beneficiary services must remain limited and must be subject to the law rather than executive decrees. This provision should be repealed. == Limiting the surveillance of the targets' entourage== Article L 852-1 will authorize the interceptions of the communications made by "individuals close to the person who is the object of the authorisation" when they "are likely to act as an intermediary, voluntary or not, or on their behalf or may provide information pursuant to the end result for which the authorisation was granted." This provision may significantly increase the number of people likely to be monitored in a preventive and extra-judicial framework. It must be clarified to ensure that only those who are known to actually act as a direct and voluntary intermediary or who have a direct link with the ongoing intelligence operation may be affected by this provision. == Forgoing the extension of the time during which metadata may be exploited== The bill extends from three to five years the period during which intelligence agencies can keep hold and make use of traffic metadata. This very long duration is not necessary, and the government had failed to provide any evidence justifying the extension. The three-year period currently applied is already an exception to the regime applicable to other collected data, which must be destroyed after a period of 1 to 12 months. == Limiting the retention period for encrypted data and communications== Article L. 822-2 provides that the time limit for the retention of collected information (one to twelve months depending on the type of information) starts from the moment of their decryption. This provision would allow services to retain data or communications (e.g. e-mails) for everal years before deciphering them and using it. For this reason, it is necessary to limit this period to 30 days during which the data will be stored in an encrypted state, giving the agencies enough time to perform a technical analysis. In addition, the article provides that the metadata attached to the encrypted content is subject to the same retention periods. However, such metadata being "in plaintext" (legible by everyone), the provision allows for an unlimited retention period and is thus an unacceptable infringement on the right to privacy. Here, the retention period prescribed for metadata (3 years) should apply. == Others == '''Evolution Lower House''': Aggravation of penalties for informatics piracy. Amendment added by MP Urvoas. It aims to increase software piracy penalties following the TV5 Monde case. Unfavourable opinion of the government for unrelated information. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/389.asp Amendment 389] This amendment was nevertheless adopted and kept in the final text. =INTERNATIONAL SURVEILLANCE AND UNIVERSAL RIGHTS = == Limiting the "international surveillance" regime to communications transmitted and received abroad == In Article 854-1, the bill defines "international surveillance measures" as communications "sent or received abroad." Now, in the case of the Internet, most of French residents' communications are obviously "made or received abroad", particularly in the US or in other European countries where the largest service providers' servers are located. It is therefore completely misleading to claim that such surveillance is "international", since these provisions will directly and massively impact French citizens and residents. This provision must be interpreted as a crude attempt to circumvent the already very weak protections contained in the bill. What is more, this article actually raises walls of secrecy around the "implementation of surveillance rules" in this field, providing that these rules will be defined in an "unpublished" executive decree. In addition, the text does not bring any protection regarding the authorisation collection, retention, destruction or control procedures relating to these operations, merely referring once again to a (public) decree to be adopted at a later stage. Finally, derogatory rules will apply to the collected data: in a move contradicting France's commitment to universal rights protection, the text allows for special guarantees when the data can be 'linked' to the French national territory, and therefore to French citizens (similar to British [http://legislation.data.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/section/16/data.htm?wrap=tru RIP Act] of 2000). These guarantees, however, come rather short of those applied to "national surveillance", since the retention time for intercepted communications starts from "the date of first use," instead of the date of collection. In sum, the provision will allow the mass collection of communications to or from abroad, which can be stored indefinitely until they are processed, analysed and finally used by the agencies. In fact, the provision seems modelled on [https://www.eff.org/fr/deeplinks/2014/05/way-nsa-uses-section-702-deeply-troubling-heres-why section 702] of the US law FISA, which is at the heart of the controversy surrounding Snowden's revelations. The scope of this provision must therefore necessarily be limited, by stressing that international monitoring only affects communications "issued' ''and'' received" abroad. :: The future of the implementation of the international surveillance remains unclear. Indeed, art. L. 811-2 of the law remains and indicates that specialized services "have missions, in France and abroad, of researching, collecting, exploitation and supplying the Government with information related to geopolitical and strategic issues as well as threats and risks that may affect the life of the Nation." But since all the part on international surveillance of the law is not only not applicable, but declared unconstitutional, we can understand how are implemented the <ref>See on this subject two articles of the Nouvel Obs: the first entitled [http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20150625.OBS1569/exclusif-comment-la-france-ecoute-aussi-le-monde.html "How France is (also) listening to the world"], and the second [http://tempsreel.nouvelobs.com/societe/20150726.OBS3205/info-obs-pourquoi-les-ecoutes-de-la-dgse-sont-illegales-depuis-sept-ans.html "Was the wiretapping conducted by the DGSE for 7 yrs illegal?"]</ ref> current intelligence practices regarding international surveillance which are thus unconstitutional. == Upholding the universality of human rights== As showed by the ongoing Snowden revelations, the NSA and the GHCQ have invoke the foreign element of data collection to violate national laws (in particular through data exchange partnerships) and also significantly violate foreign nationals' rights to privacy. To reverse these trends, France must show its commitment to the universality of rights, in accordance with Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and [http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx article 2] of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly in regards to the right to privacy and communications confidentiality (article 17 of the ICCPR). To do this, the bill must provide that any surveillance measures, even when communications are sent ''and '' received abroad, be subject to the prior control of an independent authority. This legal and ethical position is reinforced by technical considerations: in its [http://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gsavis/15-0291.pdf opinion] on the bill (pdf), ARCEP (the national telecom regulatory agency) points out for example that "in light of the way the bill is drafted, it could be difficult for telecom operators to effectively determine under which regime the international communications sent or received on the national territory fall under" (since even communications sent of received in France can be routed at some point across French borders). == Repealing legal immunity for international hacking operations== France should oppose the ongoing frantic state-sponsored hacking arms race. But the bill's Article 10 aims to ammend the Criminal Code in order to shelter intelligence officers from any criminal proceedings in connection with computer crime as long as it is carried out in the context of their missions "outside the national territory" (this would give them immunity when engaging in the intrusion, capture, destruction of any type of computer systems). With Internet and the transnationalisation of communications, the notion of "national territory" is way too restrictive to ensure an effective protection of rights. In fact, even if one disregards the imperious obligation to offer a universal protection of fundamental rights, it is obvious that many French residents use computer systems located outside their borders to communicate over on the Internet and store their data. Hacking, even when conducted outside the country, must not result in any criminal immunity. The CNCTR (the executive agency which will be created by the bill to replace the CNCIS in controlling intelligence gathering operations) must also be given genuine control over any hacking activity, in France and abroad. = CONTROL & TRANSPARENCY = == Ensuring an effective control by the CNCTR == The CNCTR (French acronym for National Commission for the Control of Intelligence Techniques, which will replace the current CNCIS) must be able to carry out its duties by leveraging sufficient human, material and technical resources. First, its ex ante opinions must be binding for the Prime Minister, who will eventually grant intelligence services the power to engage in surveillance operations. Then the ex post control must be effective. By merely providing an access to centralized records of data and communications kept by the government as well as the possibility for the Prime Minister to transmit all or part of the intelligence agencies inspection services' reports, the bill marks a major step backward compared to the ex post control currently in place. The CNCTR should also be able to audition the agencies' directors or technical managers, have direct and real-time access to collected data and communications, and be able to conduct audits in the agencies' premises (with both scheduled and unexpected visits). Furthermore, the CNCTR must have sufficient human resources to conduct its missions, for example by relying on an investigative team with the appropriate technical and legal expertise. To that end, the CNCTR should directly supervise the Intelligence General Inspection (created in 2014 to control intelligence agencies, and currently attached to the Prime Minister). == Ensuring the collegiality of the CNCTR == In the bill's current form, Article L.821-3 allows the president of the CNTR to give his sole approval to a request from the Prime Minister. If in doubt, he may decide to consult with the rest of the Commission's board (comprised of 8 other members). By contrast, a majority of Commissioners is required to make an appeal in order to terminate an ongoing surveillance operation. Within the CNCTR, authorisation requests should be submitted to each of the commissioners, and the opinion of the committee must be the result of a simple majority of cast votes, respecting the timelines provided for in the bill. The adoption of a recommendation to stop the implementation of an intelligence gathering scheme should happen under the same conditions. When such recommendation is not acted upon, (Article L. 821-6), a qualified majority made up of a third of the commissioners should suffice to refer the case to the Council of State. All commissioners must be in a position to publish their personal opinion on the activities of the Commission in its annual report, in accordance with legitimate state secrets. In addition to collegiality, and to insure that the principle of adversarial proceedings is respected, a position of 'Independent Privacy Advocate' to defend the right to privacy of persons subject to surveillance should be created, as has been debated in the context of the FISA law reform proposals currently [https://www.eff.org/fr/deeplinks/2014/06/38-civil-liberties-and-public-interest-organizations-call-congress-pass-real-nsa discussed] by the US Congress. == Ensuring the collegiality of the CNCTR == In the bill's current form, Article L.821-3 allows the president of the CNTR to give his sole approval to a request from the Prime Minister. If in doubt, he may decide to consult with the rest of the Commission's board (comprised of 8 other members). By contrast, a majority of Commissioners is required to make an appeal in order to terminate an ongoing surveillance operation. Within the CNCTR, authorisation requests should be submitted to each of the commissioners, and the opinion of the committee must be the result of a simple majority of cast votes, respecting the timelines provided for in the bill. The adoption of a recommendation to stop the implementation of an intelligence gathering scheme should happen under the same conditions. When such recommendation is not acted upon, (Article L. 821-6), a qualified majority made up of a third of the commissioners should suffice to refer the case to the Council of State. All commissioners must be in a position to publish their personal opinion on the activities of the Commission in its annual report, in accordance with legitimate state secrets. In addition to collegiality, and to insure that the principle of adversarial proceedings is respected, a position of 'Independent Privacy Advocate' to defend the right to privacy of persons subject to surveillance should be created, as has been debated in the context of the FISA law reform proposals currently [https://www.eff.org/fr/deeplinks/2014/06/38-civil-liberties-and-public-interest-organizations-call-congress-pass-real-nsa discussed] by the US Congress. == Repealing or limiting the "absolute emergency" procedure exempting from prior authorization == The ante post control exerted by the CNCTR before the Prime minister can issue surveillance orders runs the serious risk of being circumvented by the "absolute emergency" procedure provided in the bill, especially since intelligence agencies will have all the means at their disposal to make up for and argue 'absolute emergency'. This provision should be repealed or at least narrowly defined, for instance by limiting the number of times it can be use per year (e.g. only five times a year). ==Forgoing real-time metadata surveillance with no prior control and no time limits == In the name of preventing terrorism, Article L. 851-3 allows for the connection data belonging to persons "previously identified as posing a threat" to be collected in real-time, directly from the operators' networks, with no time constraint. Consequently, this provision authorizes real-time metadata surveillance without any prior control from the CNCTR. such a control must be restored. Additionally, the provision must specify that intelligence agencies cannot directly tap into the operators' networks: the later should instead be the ones transmitting the data, if necessary in real-time (as is currently the case in the Internal Security Code, as amended by the Military Planning Act: Article [http://www.juritravail.com/codes/code-securite-interieure/article/R246-7.html R. 246-7], which states that "the information request laid down in Article L. 246-3 must be fulfilled by the network's operator"). :'''Evolution from the Lower Chamber''': an amendment by the rapporteur points that this collection is subject to an authorization procedure, which was not the case before. It was also specified that the collection of informations and documents provided by the new art. L. 851-2 was done under the control of the Prime Minister and that it was done through the regular procedure (written request justified of the concerned Minister subject to the opinion of CNCTR and not a direct request from the agents). However, the government refused to come back on the principle of direct access for services to the operators network (amendment 23 from MP Tardy: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/ 23.asp). It was denounced in these terms by the CNIL in its opinion report: allows "the massive and direct extraction of data by agents (...) through installing sensors." '''Final text''': the implementation of this intelligence technique is subject to normal authorization procedure. However, permission is given only for two months renewable. The emergency procedure is not applicable. ==Reporting relevant cases to judicial authorities== In the bill, there is no set framework to define when and according to which criteria exceptional and preventive surveillance measures must give way to a full judicial enquiry with its attached safeguards. The judiciary is therefore likely to stay away from investigations into offences revealed by collected information, even when such investigations should in principle be under its sole authority. The law should therefore provide that once the constitutive elements of a crime are identified as part of the collection of intelligence, all necessary and relevant records should be transferred from the administrative authority to the judiciary. The CNCTR should also exert control to ensure that intelligence services transmit all the relevant information to the judiciary as soon as possible. == Bringing guarantees of due process == The bill's Article 4 fails to ensure a fair trial since the use of state secrets during proceedings deeply undermines the rights of the defense (here, the French government draws inspiration from the "Closed-Material-Procedures" established in the UK through the [http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2013/18/contents/enacted/data.htm Justice and Security Act] of 2013, and which are severely criticized in a recent [https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/didier-bigo-sergio-carrera-nicholas-hernanz-amandine-scherrer/britain-and-europea EU Parliament study]). To avoid such pitfalls, the Council of State should be able to declassify documents submitted by the government and for which it deems classification to be inappropriate. Closed-door hearings provided by Article L. 773-4 of the bill also run counter to due process: in cases where the Council deems that classification is [http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/fact-sheets/tshwane-principles-national-security-and-right-information-overview-15-points warranted] and that a contradictory debate between the government and the appellant is therefore not possible, then the government should only be able to provide the written pieces, for instance those submitted to the CNCTR for prior review (this will ensure that applications for authorization are sufficiently accounted for). Finally, it is also necessary to ensure that legal procedures will fast enough to ensure their relevance, considering the time limits for surveillance authorizations and data conservation (which vary depending on the type of data). In this regard, the Council should also be able to issue provisional and protecting injunctions pending the procedure's outcome. Lastly, beyond payment of damages, administrative or criminal sanctions must be provided against persons responsible for surveillance operations found to be illegal. '''Final text:' '' The declassification of documents is only expected in case of a confirmed illegality in the implementation of surveillance techniques and whether this illegality is likely to constitute an offence. However, the Advisory Commission on the secrecy of national defence must give its opinion on the declassification before sending the file to the public prosecutor (Article L. 773-7). == Opening legal challenges to advocacy groups == In Article L. 841-1, the bill provides that those who have the capacity to appeal to a newly-created special section of the [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Council_of_state_%28France%29 Council of State] (French public law supreme court) include only the CNCTR, judicial authorities or "anyone with a direct and personal interest" act. This excludes advocacy organizations, which are often better equipped to defend civil liberties before state authorities, particularly when no surveillance target is known. It is therefore necessary to broaden the appeal capabilities. == Ensuring transparency on situations of illegality == Where the Council of State finds a situation to be illegal, it can just decide to stop the collection and eventually condemn the state to compensate the applicant for the damage, without giving any information about the nature of the state's illegal acts. Similarly, if the Council of State finds a situation to be illegal, the lifting of secrecy invoked for national security grounds is subject to the Advisory Commission for the Secrecy of National Defence. The law should ensure transparency on the illegalities of situations observed, with adapted procedures to protect legitimate state secrets. The law must also allow the sanction of intelligence services who will overstep their rights and implement illegal techniques. Giving a jurisdictional security to intelligence services must not give them a total impunity. :'''Evolution from the Lower Chamber''': Mechanism of internal alert for the administration : the rapporteur has submitted an amendement applying a decision of the French Council of State (lack of protection of the identify of the agent testifying at the CNCTR; the necessity of an anonymous channel [http://www.numerama.com/magazine/32816-le-dispositif-anti-snowden-de-la-loi-renseignement.html article on Numerama]). :'''Final version''' An article 862-2 has been inserted pointing that the agent of intelligence services are criminally liable of their actions in the conditions defined in the penal code <ref>A the 2nd title of the 1st book of the penal code, as the articles 53 to 78-6.</ref>. The agents having committed penal infractions outside the national territory can be sued by the public prosecutor under the relevant minister. == Repealing the criminalization of revelations on surveillance programs == Article 7 revises existing criminal provisions which specifically punish, inter alia, the fact of publicly revealing a program or a given instance of surveillance. Such criminalization prevents disclosures of public interest, including those resulting from journalistic investigations. These provisions must be repealed. == Protecting whistleblowers within intelligence agencies == A procedure must be established to allow whistleblowers to report to the CNCTR or to the special section of the Council of State any practice that violates the legal framework (as proposed by the Council of State in a recent [http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/144000541/index.shtml report] on fundamental rights and the digital sphere). Findings of illegality must lead to end to such illegal practices, which should also be disclosed in a public report, in a way that is appropriate to the activities of the intelligence services. == Protecting individuals and groups subject to professional secrecy == To comply with the European Court of Justice [http://www.laquadrature.net/wiki/Jurisprudence_sur_la_communication_en_ligne#.2B.2BCJUE.2C_8_avril_2014.2C_Digital_Rights_Ireland_Ltd_c.2F_Minister_for_Communications.2C_Ireland Digital Rights case law], French law must provide special protections for the communications of persons subject to professional secrecy, such as journalists (including the protection of the confidentiality of sources) or lawyers. The bill should be amended accordingly. == Ensuring transparency on the means for collecting, analyzing and processing data == To ensure predictability of the legal provisions relating to administrative surveillance, the government must disclose certain aspects of the functioning of its technical apparatus (see § 68 of the [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-87208 Liberty v. United Kingdom] European Court Human Rights ruling, from July, 1st 2000). This requirement is all the more necessary in the French context as the practices in this field have been ongoing in complete illegality for many years. The CNCTR must report on the means and tools used for surveillance by issuing general information on IT equipment, types of algorithms and other tools of technical analysis of the processed data collected by intelligence services, as well as the data exchange partnerships they may have with foreign agencies, in accordance with legitimate state secrets . == Ensuring control of the files of the intelligence services by the CNIL == The government denied the French Data Protection Authority (CNIL) to repeal existing laws that exclude the control of legality of intelligence files under the personal data protection legal framework. The DPA states in its [http://www.cnil.fr/linstitution/actualite/article/article/publication-de-lavis-sur-le-projet-de-loi-relatif-au-renseignement/ opinion] on the bill that such control "is a fundamental requirement to establish the legitimacy of these files in the rights and freedoms of citizens." The bill should be amended to allow the CNIL to exercise such control, in a manner appropriate to the activities of the intelligence services, and in cooperation with the CNCTR. = Main amendments on the Surveillance Bill = == Lower Chamber session == * Internal alert mechanism for the administration: the rapporteur submitted an amendment that applies a proposal from the Council of State (lack of protection for the identity of the agent testifying at the CNCTR ; need for an anonymous channel [http://www.numerama.com/magazine/32816-le-dispositif-anti-snowden-de-la-loi-renseignement.html article on Numerama]). * Protection of personal data in the name of privacy. The 1st Article has been amended to precise that the protection of personal data (and thus connection data) is the second part of the right to privacy with correspondence secrecy (as asked by the CNIL). [http://www.nosdeputes.fr/14/amendement/2697/244 Amendements 244] * Distinction between absolute emergency and operational emergency: amendment of the government on this system already prepared in commission, which makes a distinction between absolute emergency and operational emergency (the government considers that only the operational emergency must allow a chief of service to authorise the implementation of a surveillance technique without the need of advice of the CNCTR, nor the authorisation of the Prime Minister). In case of absolute emergency (linked with the impossibility for the committee to give a ruling in the given time or an technical impossibility), the authorisation of the Prime Minister remains necessary. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/381.asp Amendement 381] * Exclusion of some profession from emergency procedures: Amendment 410 of the government: if emergency procedure, no penetration or home monitoring of a "sensitive profession" (judge, lawyer, journalist and parliamentary) without prior notice to the CNCTR. Moreover, another government amendment provide that the transcripts of the collected data will be transmitted to the CNCTR, while in normal times it is to the CNCTR to ask for consultation. It will particularly ensure "necessary and proportionate nature to the violations of correspondence secrecy of the exercise of the professional activities" (note: surprising that such controls do not appear proportionality for ordinary citizens). [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/410.asp Amendment 410] * Aggravation of penalties for electronic/software piracy. Amendment submitted by MP Urvoas. It aims to increase electronic/software piracy penalties following the TV5 Monde case. Unfavorable opinion of the government for being unrelated to Intelligence. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/389.asp Amendment 389] * Aménagement des procédures entourant l'utilisation des IMSI Catcher: L'amendement 357 porte de 30 à 90 jours le délai permettant aux services de renseignement de discriminer les données collectées au moyen d'un dispositif de proximité. Il tient en cela compte des délais proposés par un amendement précédent et de la législation allemande qui prévoit quant à elle un délai de six mois. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/357.asp Amendement 357] et [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/351.asp Amendement 351] d'Urvoas : Cet amendement a pour objet de rendre applicables aux paroles captées dans un lieu privé le délai de conservation prévu au a) du I de l'article L. 822-2, tel qu'il résulte de l'article 1er, amendé, du présent projet de loi (destruction à l'issue d'une durée de trente jours à compter de la première exploitation et dans un délai maximum de six mois à compter de leur recueil). * Surveillance the environment: The bill provided that people likely to play an intermediary role, even if unintentional, could be subjects to security interceptions. A very large number of people could now be suspected of being involuntary intermediaries. Given the damage to privacy done by security interceptions, an amendment was adopted to clarify the concept and to limit the permissions when there are "serious reasons to believe" that a person plays a role of intermediary, even if unintentional. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/44.asp Amendment 44] * International surveillance: Data retention periods attached to the national territory run from the date of collection and not the first exploitation (this had been submitted to the French Council of State for opinion). http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/48.asp + possibility for CNCTR to refer to the Council of State if there are irregularities. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/197.asp Amendment 197] * Abrogation de l'immunité pénale des agents à l'étranger : L'amendement 207 adopté prévoit que le ministre de tutelle sera consulté préalablement par le procureur de la République avant toute poursuite concernant des infractions pénales commises à l'étranger par des agents des services, comme c'est le cas pour les militaires en temps de paix. Il s'agit donc d'une garantie supplémentaire pour les agents concernés, mais qui ne fait pas obstacle à l'exercice de poursuites. C'est un progrès pour les agents, même s'il faudra probablement travailler à nouveau sur le sujet à l'avenir. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/207.asp Amendement 207] * Boites noires à titre expérimental: Avec l'amendement 399, annoncé par Valls en introduction des débats, le dispositif des boîtes noire est institué à titre expérimental pour trois ans et fera l'objet d'une évaluation avant son éventuelle reconduction. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/399.asp Amendement 399] * Composition de la CNCTR élargie : Après de longs débats, le gouvernement et les députés sont tombés d'accord sur la composition de la CNCTR: il y aura donc 13 membres au sein de la CNCTR (et non 9 comme dans le projet de loi ou 5 comme le suggérait le Conseil d'État) : ** Trois Députés ** Trois Sénateurs ** Trois magistrats du Conseil d'État ** Trois magistrats de la Cour de Cassation ** le représentant désigné par l'ARCEP (sous réserve, attente de copie de l'amendement) ==Commission des Lois de l'Assemblée nationale == * Amendements sur le champ de la surveillance. Suppression de "violences collectives" pour " La prévention des atteintes à la forme républicaine des institutions, des violences collectives de nature à porter atteinte à la sécurité nationale ou de la reconstitution ou d'actions tendant au maintiens dissous". Supression de l'adjectif essentiel pour les intérêts économiques et scientifiques (demandé par Bajolet, directeur de la DGSE). * Encadrement du recueil des métadonnées sur sollicitation du réseau : un amendement d'Urvoas souligne que ce recueil fait l'objet d'une procédure d'autorisation, ce qui n'étais pas le cas avant. Elle a également précisé que le recueil d'informations et de documents prévu au nouvel article L. 851-2 s'effectuait sous le contrôle du Premier ministre et qu'il empruntait le processus ordinaire d'autorisation (demande écrite et motivée du ministre concernée soumise à l'avis de la CNCTR et non demande directe des agents auprès de cette dernière). En revanche, le gouvernement a refusé en séance de revenir sur le principe d'un accès direct des services au réseau des opérateurs [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/23.asp amendement 23] de Tardy : ), dénoncé en ces termes par la CNIL dans son avis : permet « l'aspiration massive et directe des données par les agents (…), par l'intermédiaire de la pose de sondes. » * Centralisation des données et renseignements collectés : Plusieurs amendements renforcent le rôle de centralisation du Premier ministre et du Groupement interministériel de contrôle (GIC), placé auprès de lui. Cette centralisation, dont l'absence était critiquée par Delarue, constitue la garantie d'un contrôle effectif pour la CNCTR. En séance est adopté l'amendment 189, qui vise à ce que les modalités de centralisation des interceptions ne soient définies qu'après avis de CNCTR. [http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/amendements/2697/AN/189.asp Amendement 189] * Collégialité de la CNCTR renforcée: Possibilité pour deux membres de la CNCTR de convoquer une réunion de la commission s'ils sont en désaccord avec l'avis rendu par le président ou par le membre magistrat. Cela renforce la collégialité, condition nécessaire à l'indépendance et à l'effectivité du contrôle selon la Cour européenne des droits de l'Homme. * Moyens humains et financiers de la CNCTR assurés: La commission des Lois a complété l'article L. 832-4 du code de la sécurité intérieure afin de préciser que la CNCTR dispose des moyens humains et techniques nécessaires à l'exercice de sa mission ainsi que des crédits correspondants dans les conditions fixées par la loi de finances, à l'instar d'autres autorités administratives indépendantes (Jean-Marie Delarue estime nécessaire d'augmenter les effectifs de l'autorité administrative indépendante de cinq à vingt-cinq équivalents temps plein après la réforme). * Procédure d'urgence absolue encadrée : En cas d'urgence liée à une menace imminente ou à l'impossibilité de mettre en œuvre la technique ultérieurement, le chef de service peut autoriser, *de manière exceptionnelle*, la technique. Il en informe sans délai la CNCTR et le Premier ministre, lequel peut suspendre immédiatement la technique. Le chef de service doit, dans un délai de 24 heures, motiver sa décision auprès de la CNCTR qui, si elle l'estime nécessaire, peut saisir le Conseil d'État afin de suspendre la technique et faire condamner l'État. Le recours à l'urgence est interdit pour pénétrer dans un domicile ou pour surveiller un journaliste, un avocat ou un parlementaire. Le nombre de recours à la procédure d'urgence sera précisé dans le rapport annuel de la CNCTR. * Accès permanent de la CNCTR aux relevés, données collectées, transcriptions : Les renseignements ne peuvent être collectés, transcrits ou extraits à d'autres fins que celles fixées par la loi. Ces opérations sont soumises au contrôle de la CNCTR. Si la CNCTR estime que la collecte, la transcription, l'extraction, la conservation ou la destruction des renseignements est effectuée en méconnaissance des dispositions légales, elle adresse des recommandations et, le cas échéant, saisit le Conseil d'État. L'exploitation des renseignements collectés est donc encadrée et contrôlée. En amont de la surveillance, la CNCTR recevra toutes les « demandes d'autorisation » faites par les ministres de tutelle des services et non seulement l'autorisation délivrée par le Premier ministre, ce qui lui permettra de mieux suivre les demandes d'autorisations et lui donnera plus de temps pour rendre ses avis. * Contrôle permanent sur les algorithmes: La CNCTR contrôle l'algorithme en permanence, est informée de toute modification apportée à celui-ci et peut saisir le Conseil d'État en cas d'irrégularité. * Saisine facilitée du Conseil d'État pour la CNCTR : Si la CNCTR est en désaccord avec le Premier ministre, elle émet des recommandations. Si ses avis ou les recommandations ne sont pas suivis d'effets, elle peut alors, à la majorité simple de ses membres (et non plus absolue), saisir le Conseil d'État afin de suspendre la technique et faire condamner l'État. La capacité de saisine du Conseil d'État par la CNCTR a été élargie sur plusieurs points dans le texte (conditions de conservation des renseignements, utilisation de l'algorithme, en cas d'irrégularité d'emploi de la captation de données). Lorsqu'une intrusion dans un lieu privé à usage d'habitation ou dans un système de traitement automatisé de données est en cause et qu'un avis défavorable ou une recommandation n'est pas suivie par le Premier ministre, deux membres suffisent. ==Commission des Lois du Sénat == * Suppression de la mention du secret des correspondances, de la protection des données personnelles et de l'inviolabilité du domicile car il est considéré que cela entre implicitement dans le champ du respect de la vie privée * Ajout d'une précision sur les attributions des services spécialisés qui doivent s'inscrire dans le respect du partage de compétences de la police judiciaire. * Le concept « d'intérêts publics » est remplacé par celui « d'intérêts fondamentaux de la Nation », plus restrictif. * Refus de supprimer "les intérêts majeurs de la politique étrangère et la prévention de toute forme d'ingérence étrangère" ainsi que "des violences collectives de nature à porter atteinte à la sécurité nationale" des champs d'application de la loi. En revanche, les intérêts *essentiels* (et non plus majeurs) de la politique étrangère devront être invoqués. De même les intérêts économiques et scientifiques *essentiels* de la France remplacent les intérêts *majeurs*. * L'exécution des engagements européens et internationaux de la France fera aussi partie des champs d'application. Cette formulation remplace "la prévention de la prolifération des armes de destruction massive" qui entre dans le champ des engagements de la France. C'est un retour à la formulation initiale du gouvernement. * Les Sénateurs sont revenus à la formulation initiale du projet de loi concernant la "prévention a) des atteintes à la forme républicaine des institutions, b) des actions tendant au maintien ou à la reconstitution de groupements dissous (...) et c) des violences collectives de nature à porter gravement atteinte à la paix publique". La paix publique est un concept beaucoup trop large qui avait été remplacé par "sécurité nationale". N'importe quel mouvement ou manifestion d'opposition pourrait être considéré comme portant atteinte à la paix publique. Un amendement avait été déposé pour supprimer cette partie sur "les violences collectives", mais a été rejeté. * Suppression des services du ministère de la Justice de la liste des services pouvant faire appel aux techniques de renseignement. L'Assemblée nationale avait inséré le ministère de la Justice en accord avec le gouvernement mais contre l'avis du ministère concerné. Il est en revanche toujours prévu, selon des modalités définies par décret, que les techniques de renseignement puissent être mise en oeuvre dans les établissements pénitentiaires, ainsi qu'un échange d'information entre l'administration pénitentiaire et les services de renseignement. * L'identification des personnes pouvant faire l'objet d'une surveillance est un peu restreinte par rapport au texte de l'Assemblée nationale qui autorisait une désignation de ces personnes et leurs véhicules par des descriptions caractéristiques. En outre, seules les personnes de l'entourage pouvant fournir des informations relatives à la finalité poursuivie peuvent désormais faire l'objet d'une surveillance. * CNCTR : Composition réduite de 13 à 9 membres (2 députés + 2 sénateurs + 2 membres du Conseil d'Etat + 2 membres de la Cour de Cassation + 1 personne nommée par l'ARCEP). Une formation restreinte est ajoutée, et comprend le président, le membre nommé par l'ARCEP, les deux membres du Conseil d'Etat et les deux magistrats de la Cour de Cassation. Les avis peuvent être rendus soit par le président, soit par l'un des quatre membres issus du Conseil d'Etat et de la Cour de Cassation. Cependant, pour les questions "nouvelles ou sérieuses", la formation restreinte (minimum 3 membres présents) ou plénière (minimum 6 membres présents) doivent délibérer et décider à la majorité des membres présents. Une réunion en formation plénière est prévue au moins une fois tous les deux mois pour discuter des avis rendus. Cette nouvelle configuration a l'avantage de réduire autant que possible les délibérations qui pourraient noyer la CNCTR, tout en faisant un point régulier et en mettant en place une sorte de "jurisprudence". * Tous les amendements visant à rendre conformes (et donc contraignants) les avis de la CNCTR ont été rejetés. La CNCTR conserve donc un avis non contraignant. * Les demandes de renouvellement de mise en oeuvre de techniques de renseignement doivent désormais exposer les raisons pour lesquelles le renouvellement est demandé (et non plus uniquement les raisons de la mise en oeuvre des techniques de renseignement). * Un délit d'entrave à la CNCTR a été inséré pour les cas suivants : a) refus de communiquer à la CNCTR les documents et renseignements sollicités, ou destruction desdits documents b) modification des renseignements et transcriptions collectés c) soit en s'opposant à l'accès d'informations classées secret défense utiles à l'exercice de sa fonction. * Plusieurs amendements adoptés pour réduire les durées de conservation des données de connexion (30j pour correspondances et captations sonores, 6 mois pour les autres renseignements, 3 ans pour les données de connexion). En outre, les durées sont calculées à partir de la date de recueil du renseignement et non sa date d'exploitation. *Concernant les "boîtes noires" quelques petites modifications ont été apportées : d'une part la durée d'autorisation passe de 4 mois renouvelables à deux mois renouvelables. Il est aussi indiqué que la CNCTR aura un accès direct et permanent aux traitements, informations et données recueillies. La nouvelle formulation tente de circonscrire un peu le traitement qui ne devra pas "recueillir d'autres données que celles qui répondent à leurs paramètres de conception et sans permettre l'identification des personnes auxquelles les informations ou documents se rapportent". Cependant, cela reste trop large et trop flou. == Notes et références == <references /> {{Loi_Renseignement/Bandeau}}


text:
Doma Named One of Inc. Magazine's 2021 Best Workplaces
By John Rich
SAN FRANCISCO–(BUSINESS WIRE)–Doma, a leading force for disruptive change in the real estate industry, has been named to Inc. magazine's annual list of the Best Workplaces for 2021. The list features companies that have created exceptional workplaces, as determined by employees through a comprehensive assessment of culture, growth opportunity, and benefits. Today's recognition comes on the heels of Doma entering into a business combination agreement in March 2021 with Capitol Investment Corp. V (NYSE: CAP, CAP WS and CAP.U) ("Capitol"), a publicly traded special purpose acquisition company.
Doma is a technology company focused on creating a vastly more simple, efficient, and affordable closing experience for current and prospective homeowners, lenders, title agents and real estate professionals. Founded in 2016, Doma uses proprietary machine intelligence technology, that is being trained on 30 years of historical data, to remove the friction and frustration from the residential real estate closing process. Its Doma Intelligence platform now covers approximately 76 percent of the United States based on gross written premium, providing time and cost savings for lenders, real estate professionals, title agents, and homeowners.
"At Doma, we're proud to foster a workplace culture that brings people together in the pursuit of innovation, community, and our mission," said Doma CEO Max Simkoff. "The challenges experienced in 2020 highlighted the strength and engagement of our team members, each of whom shares a commitment to our vision and our core values. We are collectively transforming an industry and working to tirelessly champion our customers' interests."
Collecting data from thousands of submissions, Inc. singled out 429 honorees this year. Each nominated company took part in an employee survey, conducted by a third party, on topics including management effectiveness, perks, and fostering employee growth. The organization's benefits were also audited to determine the company's overall score and ranking.
"The definition of a positive workplace has changed drastically over the past year," says Inc. magazine editor-in-chief Scott Omelianuk. "Stocked fridges and nap pods were no longer perks many companies could rely on once work went remote. So this year's list is even more important as it reveals organizations that continue to enrich the lives of its employees amid a pandemic."
The list will hit newsstands May 18 in the May/June 2021 issue of Inc. and will be highlighted as part of a prominent Inc.com feature.
Doma (formerly States Title Holding, Inc.) is architecting the future of real estate transactions. The company uses machine intelligence and its patented technology solutions to transform residential real estate, making closings instant and affordable. Doma and its family of brands – States Title, North American Title Company (NATC) and North American Title Insurance Company (NATIC) – offer solutions for lenders, real estate agents, title agents, and homeowners that make closings vastly more simple and efficient, reducing cost and increasing customer satisfaction. Doma's clients include some of the largest bank and non-bank lenders in the United States. In March 2021, Doma announced plans to become publicly-traded via a merger with Capitol Investment Corp. V (NYSE: CAP, CAP WS and CAP.U). To learn more visit doma.com or statestitle.com.
About Capitol Investment Corp. V
Capitol Investment Corp. V is a $345 million public investment vehicle with the mission to invest in and help build an industry-leading public company that will aim to deliver long-term value to shareholders. Capitol is led by Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Mark D. Ein, and President and Chief Financial Officer, L. Dyson Dryden. The Capitol team has raised $1.5 billion in five SPACs since 2007 and closed four SPAC mergers. Capitol's securities are listed on the New York Stock Exchange under the ticker symbols CAP, CAP WS and CAP.U.
About Inc. Media
The world's most trusted business-media brand, Inc. offers entrepreneurs the knowledge, tools, connections, and community to build great companies. Its award-winning multi platform content reaches more than 50 million people each month across a variety of channels including websites, newsletters, social media, podcasts, and print. Its prestigious Inc. 5000 list, produced every year since 1982, analyzes company data to recognize the fastest-growing privately held businesses in the United States. The global recognition that comes with inclusion in the 5000 gives the founders of the best businesses an opportunity to engage with an exclusive community of their peers, and the credibility that helps them drive sales and recruit talent. The associated Inc. 5000 Conference is part of a highly acclaimed portfolio of bespoke events produced by Inc. For more information, visit www.inc.com.
About Quantum Workplace
Quantum Workplace, based in Omaha, Nebraska, is an HR technology company that serves organizations through employee-engagement surveys, action-planning tools, exit surveys, peer-to-peer recognition, performance evaluations, goal tracking, and leadership assessment. For more information, visit QuantumWorkplace.com.
This press release relates to a proposed transaction between Doma and Capitol. This press release does not constitute an offer to sell or exchange, or the solicitation of an offer to buy or exchange, any securities, nor shall there be any sale of securities in any jurisdiction in which such offer, sale or exchange would be unlawful prior to registration or qualification under the securities laws of any such jurisdiction. No offering of securities shall be made except by means of a prospectus meeting the requirements of Section 10 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. Capitol has filed a registration statement on Form S-4 with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (the "SEC"), which includes a document that serves as a prospectus and proxy statement of Capitol, referred to as a proxy statement/prospectus. A proxy statement/prospectus will be sent to all Capitol stockholders. Capitol also will file other documents regarding the proposed transaction with the SEC. Before making any voting decision, investors and security holders of Capitol are urged to read the registration statement, the proxy statement/prospectus and all other relevant documents filed or that will be filed with the SEC in connection with the proposed transaction as they become available because they will contain important information about the proposed transaction.
Investors and security holders may obtain free copies of the registration statement, the proxy statement/prospectus and all other relevant documents filed or that will be filed with the SEC by Capitol through the website maintained by the SEC at www.sec.gov.
The documents filed by Capitol with the SEC also may be obtained free of charge at Capitol's website at https://www.capinvestment.com/ or upon written request to 1300 17th Street North, Suite 820, Arlington, Virginia 22209.
Participants in Solicitation
Capitol and Doma and their respective directors and executive officers may be deemed to be participants in the solicitation of proxies from Capitol's stockholders in connection with the proposed transaction. A list of the names of such directors and executive officers and information regarding their interests in the business combination is contained in the proxy statement/prospectus. You may obtain free copies of these documents as described in the preceding paragraph.
Forward-Looking Statements Legend
This press release includes "forward-looking statements" within the meaning of the "safe harbor" provisions of the United States Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. Forward-looking statements may be identified by the use of words such as "estimate," "plan," "project," "forecast," "intend," "will," "expect," "anticipate," "believe," "seek," "target" or other similar expressions that predict or indicate future events or trends or that are not statements of historical matters. These forward-looking statements include, but are not limited to, statements regarding estimates and forecasts of financial and performance metrics, projections of market opportunity, total addressable market (TAM), market share and competition and potential benefits of the transactions described herein, and expectations related to the terms and timing of the transactions described herein. These statements are based on various assumptions, whether or not identified in this press release, and on the current expectations of Doma's and Capitol's management and are not predictions of actual performance. These forward-looking statements are provided for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to serve as, and must not be relied on by any investor as, a guarantee, an assurance, a prediction or a definitive statement of fact or probability. Actual events and circumstances are difficult or impossible to predict, will differ from assumptions and are beyond the control of Doma and Capitol.
These forward-looking statements are subject to a number of risks and uncertainties, including changes in business, market, financial, political and legal conditions; the inability of the parties to successfully or timely consummate the transactions described herein; failure to realize the anticipated benefits of the transactions described herein; risks relating to the uncertainty of the projected financial information with respect to Doma; future global, regional or local economic, political, market and social conditions, including due to the COVID-19 pandemic; the development, effects and enforcement of laws and regulations, including with respect to the title insurance industry; Doma's ability to manage its future growth or to develop or acquire enhancements to its platform; the effects of competition on Doma's future business; the outcome of any potential litigation, government and regulatory proceedings, investigations and inquiries; and those other factors included in Capitol's final prospectus relating to its initial public offering dated December 1, 2020 (File No. 333-249297) and the registration statement on Form S-4 (File No. 333-254470) filed with the SEC under the heading "Risk Factors," and other documents Capitol filed, or will file, with the SEC.
If any of these risks materialize or Doma's or Capitol's assumptions prove incorrect, actual results could differ materially from the results implied by these forward-looking statements. There may be additional risks that neither Doma nor Capitol presently know or that Doma or Capitol currently believe are immaterial that could also cause actual results to differ from those contained in the forward-looking statements. In addition, forward-looking statements reflect Doma's and Capitol's expectations, plans or forecasts of future events and views as of the date of this press release. Doma and Capitol anticipate that subsequent events and developments will cause Doma's and Capitol's assessments to change. However, while Doma and Capitol may elect to update these forward-looking statements at some point in the future, Doma and Capitol specifically disclaim any obligation to do so, except as required by law. These forward-looking statements should not be relied upon as representing Doma's and Capitol's assessments as of any date subsequent to the date of this press release. Accordingly, undue reliance should not be placed upon the forward-looking statements.
Doma Expands National Footprint; Brings Instant Home Closing to Key Markets
Doma's machine intelligence powered title and escrow solutions bring more efficient real estate transactions to Massachusetts, South Carolina and Wisconsin.
Doma, a Leading Force for Disruptive Change in the Residential Real Estate Industry, Announces Plans to Become Publicly-Traded via Merger with Capitol Investment Corp. V
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Logline: Ratri-an untold story of a girl is a dilemma between love and life. It's a complete romantic flick between two strangers. But the love between then can't be expressed. It simply happens.
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Okay! This one is my most favorite game. Very favorite. I like Ninjas. Download free arcade game – Shinobi.
Shinobi is an arcade game, developed and published by Sega. Shinobi is about a ninja named Joe Musashi who has to stop a criminal organization called "Zeed" who are kidnapping the children of the Oboro clan. Through five missions of increasing difficulty, Musashi must make his way to Zeed's headquarters and free all the hostages before confronting Zeed's leaders known as "Ring of Five", which are formidable enemies on their own. "Ring of Five" are the bosses at the end of each level. Below is the list of them.
Ken Oh – A gigantic samurai-like wizard who can throw fireballs.
Black Turtle – A leader who is piloting or aboard an attack helicopter.
Mandara – A Hinduistic guru who is, in fact, cyborg (probably a brain residing in a wall-covering machine).
Lobster – A large samurai with a V-shaped symbol on his head who wields a sword.
Masked Ninja – The main leader of Zeed and the last boss, he is a powerful ninja with vast magical and physical powers.
The five missions in the game are each three or four stages long. Anywhere from 2-9 hostages are being held in each stage; Joe must rescue all of them before he is allowed to finish the stage. The last stage in each mission has no hostages, but instead features a powerful boss character whom Joe must defeat. After completing each of the first four missions the player is taken to a bonus stage, where he can earn an extra life if he is able to kill all of the ninjas jumping towards him. Completing the fifth mission ends the game. Also, once the fifth mission begins, continues are no longer allowed; the player has to finish the game with however many lives he has left at that point. If the player earns a place on the high score board, the number of credits it took him to get that score is displayed along with his score.
Joe's standard weapons are an unlimited supply of throwing stars, along with punches and kicks when attacking at close range. One hostage per stage gives him a power-up. When powered-up, his throwing stars are replaced by a gun that fires large, explosive bullets, and his close-range attack becomes a katana slash. Joe can also perform "ninja magic," which may be used only once per stage and kills (or damages, in the case of bosses) all enemies on the screen.
At the end of each stage, the player receives score bonuses based on performance. Completing the stage without using ninja magic earns the player a 5,000 point bonus (except during mission five), and completing the stage without using any throwing stars or bullets (just punches, kicks, sword slashes, and/or ninja magic) earns the player a 20,000 point bonus (including in the final mission). The player has three minutes to complete each stage; remaining time at the end of the stage is also converted to bonus points and added to the player's score. Expert Shinobi players often challenged themselves to see how many stages they could pass with both the "no stars" and "no ninja magic" bonuses. It is possible to beat the game on one quarter in this way with a final score of over 700,000 points; the final score for someone who completes the game on one quarter without trying for those bonuses would be in the neighborhood of 250,000 points. It is also possible for the player to manipulate the points received for rescuing each hostage based on his/her current score. A player will receive 1,000 points for a hostage if the hundreds digit of their score is 0,1 or 2. A player receives 500 points for a hostage if the hundreds digit of their score is 3,4,5, or 6. Players receive 200 points if the hundreds digit of their score is 7,8 or 9. The hostage that grants a power-up does not give a points bonus.
The bosses on missions 1 through 4 can be defeated without shooting or throwing stars, granting the player the 20,000 points bonus for each. It is very difficult to do this on bosses 2-4, but with patience, it can be done.
The boss on mission 5 (Masked Ninja) can also be defeated exclusively with close range attacks but no points bonus beyond the standard time bonus/end of game bonus is awarded.
@Lucky: Alright, open the mame32 > options > default options > advanced > In Resolution > Size > Select resolution for the game. That's it.
hi, its been a long tme since i left any comments here i just wanna ask how can i adjust screen size since i dont wanna play it in full screen any help pleaseeeeee.
@naveed: Hmm, NFS 2 SE will run sometimes and sometimes not. Thats just weird problem with that. I know this for sure though that if you install a fresh copy of Windows, it will surely run. I know this is funny.
please tell me briefly about this problem.
i want to play carrier air wing.


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PCBC Migrates to San Diego, CA June 5-6, 2013
With the housing market enjoying its first warming cycle since 2007, PCBC, the industry's most celebrated event, is following suit. Held annually in San Francisco from its inception in 1959 until 2012, PCBC will move to the San Diego Convention Center for its 2013 event, June 5-6. The shift marks the beginning of an alternating year rotation between the two cities.
Bonded Builders Warranty Group is joining in on the move and will be at Booth #5H in Hall F throughought the show.
The move was celebrated throughout San Diego's business community, as civic leaders cheered the arrival of one of the largest and longest-tenured housing events in the nation. Award-winning sportscaster and longtime San Diegan Dick Enberg was among the city's luminaries to extend a warm welcome.
"Were pleased that PCBC has chosen this year to join us in Americas finest city," Enberg said.
Highlights of this years event include keynotes by two of the most influential business thinkers of our time: economic, demographic and technological trend-watcher Richard Florida, bestselling author of The Rise of the Creative Class and Who's Your City? along with bestselling author Daniel Pink, whose latest book, To Sell Is Human, is No. 1 on the New York Times business hardcover list — while his previous book, Drive, remains near the top of the business paperback list.
The exhibit floor is already sold out — another sign that the housing industry has bounced back. The floor will also be home once again to the Key Buyers Club, a program that facilitates private meetings between exhibitors and purchasing teams from the largest homebuilders in America
Registration and housing for PCBC 2013 are now open and can be accessed at www.pcbc.com. The conference has also created a video celebrating its new San Diego locale: www.youtube.com/watch?v=zS3EsznGon0.


Heads up, gamers: StarCraft II is going free-to-play, publisher Blizzard announced today at Blizzcon. The Co-op Commanders Raynor, Kerrigan, andArtanis will remain completely free, meaning that you can keep leveling them to your heart's content.
Earlier this year, Blizzard released a remastered version of the original StarCraft with HD visuals and improved online features.
F2P commanders can earn access the Ranked mode after earning 10 daily "First Win of the Day".
Players who already bought StarCraft II: Wings of Liberty but did not buy Heart of the Swarm will get the expansion for free instead. Users just need to log-in to Battle.net between November 8 and December 8 to claim it. The first installment, Wings of Liberty, shipped in July 2010 and focuses on Earth's human exiles called the Terrans. "It was very important to us that this be accomplished in a way that feels good to our current player base and also attractive to new players or lapsed players who haven't played since Wings of Liberty".
Happy to see StarCraft II go free-to-play? The multiplayer mode will enable gamers from around the world to compete against each other.
Morten said that StarCraft 2's legacy of being an esport was another factor, and making the game free-to-play would make the game accessible to new competitors.
Gamers will be able to play the entire campaign of StarCraft II: Wings of Liberty for free once November 14 hits.
You can also purchase any of the campaigns or a seasonal War Chest to gain immediate access to ranked play if you desire.
Those looking to continue the StarCraft II story will be able to purchase Heart of the Swarm, Legacy of the Void, and Nova Covert Ops, individually or together as part of a Campaign Collection in the Blizzard Shop. Players who already own all three campaign packs will receive a special thank you in the form of an exclusive Ghost skin plus three new portraits.