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Perception and the Mind
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Don'T Go Chasing Waterfalls: Motion Aftereffects and the Dynamic Snapshot Theory of Temporal Experience.Camden Alexander McKenna - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):825-845.details
The philosophical investigation of perceptual illusions can generate fruitful insights in the study of subjective time consciousness. However, the way illusions are interpreted is often controversial. Recently, proponents of the so-called dynamic snapshot theory have appealed to the Waterfall Illusion, a kind of motion aftereffect, to support a particular view of temporal consciousness according to which experience is structured as a series of instantaneous snapshots with dynamic qualities. This dynamism is meant to account for familiar features of the phenomenology of (...) time, such as succession, continuity, and change. Previous theories have typically appealed to a subjective present occupying an interval of time; that is, a "specious present." I argue, through analysis of motion aftereffect illusions and the rare condition of akinetopsia, i.e. motion-blindness, that the Waterfall Illusion fails to support the dynamic snapshot theory as intended. Furthermore, I suggest that future theories of subjective time should see temporal phenomenology as the result of non-localised processes closely tied to the mechanism underlying consciousness generally. (shrink)
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Constructing the Objective World From Subjective Perceptions.Philip Davies - manuscriptdetails
Starting from two propositions, 1. The observer is part of reality and 2. Observers are independent of each other, we develop an approach to Hume's problem of scepticism. We show that despite all knowledge coming through subjective perceptions we can nevertheless construct objective or transitive knowledge through relationships between entities, rather than the entities themselves. We posited that some phenomena of the real world are transitive and some are not. Transitive phenomena are transferable between observers without change and are thus (...) independent of observation. Transitive phenomena are relative quantities. Relative quantities are observational invariants and form the building blocks of our objective world. We show objective knowledge is developed from relative quantities whereas subjective knowledge is rooted in absolute quantities. The recognition that transitive quantities are invariants of observation gives them an independence from which we can construct an objective world. (shrink)
The Perception of Relations.Alon Hafri & Chaz Firestone - 2021 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 25 (6):475-492.details
The world contains not only objects and features (red apples, glass bowls, wooden tables), but also relations holding between them (apples contained in bowls, bowls supported by tables). Representations of these relations are often developmentally precocious and linguistically privileged; but how does the mind extract them in the first place? Although relations themselves cast no light onto our eyes, a growing body of work suggests that even very sophisticated relations display key signatures of automatic visual processing. Across physical, eventive, and (...) social domains, relations such as SUPPORT, FIT, CAUSE, CHASE, and even SOCIALLY INTERACT are extracted rapidly, are impossible to ignore, and influence other perceptual processes. Sophisticated and structured relations are not only judged and understood, but also seen — revealing surprisingly rich content in visual perception itself. (shrink)
Two Irreducible Classes of Emotional Experiences: Affective Imaginings and Affective Perceptions.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - European Journal of Philosophy.details
A view of prominence in the philosophy of emotion is that emotional experiences are not self-standing intentional experiences. Instead, they inherit the intentional content they have from their cognitive bases. One implication is that emotions whose intentional contents differ in terms of the modal and temporal properties of the relevant particular object – because the intentional contents on which they are based differ in these respects – nonetheless need not differ qua emotion-type. This leads to the same-emotional attitude, different content (...) claim: It is possible to have the same emotional attitude towards a range of (different) contents, as provided by different cognitive bases. This paper argues that this claim is mistaken. By appealing to the specific case of imagination, the same emotional-attitude, different content claim is challenged. Drawing on phenomenological observations made by Jean-Paul Sartre, supplemented with independently plausible considerations, I argue we should recognise a distinct class of emotion-types, which I call affective imaginings. Affective imaginings contrast with emotional experiences whose cognitive bases are sense-perceptual experiences (affective perceptions). The contrast turns on the way the different contents across these cases modifies the attitudinal character of the emotional experience, motivating the positing of two irreducible classes of emotional experiences. (shrink)
Through the Eyes of the Expert: Evaluating Holistic Processing in Architects Through Gaze-Contingent Viewing.Spencer Ivy, Taren Rohovit, Mark Lavelle, Lace Padilla, Jeanine Stefanucci, Dustin Stokes & Trafton Drew - 2021 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 1:1-9.details
Studies in the psychology of visual expertise have tended to focus on a limited set of expert domains, such as radiology and athletics. Conclusions drawn from these data indicate that experts use parafoveal vision to process images holistically. In this study, we examined a novel, as-of-yet-unstudied class of visual experts—architects—expecting similar results. However, the results indicate that architects, though visual experts, may not employ the holistic processing strategy observed in their previously studied counterparts. Participants (n = 48, 24 architects, 24 (...) naïve) were asked to find targets in chest radiographs and perspective images. All images were presented in both gaze-contingent and normal viewing conditions. Consistent with a holistic processing model, we expected two results: (1) architects would display a greater difference in saccadic amplitude between the gaze- contingent and normal conditions, and (2) architects would spend less time per search than an undergraduate control group. We found that the architects were more accurate in the perspectival task, but they took more time and displayed a lower difference in saccadic amplitude than the controls. Our research indicates a disjunctive conclusion. Either architects are simply different kinds of visual experts than those previously studied, or we have generated a task that employs visual expertise without holistic processing. Our data suggest a healthy skepticism for across-the-board inferences collected from a single domain of expertise to the nature of visual expertise generally. More work is needed to determine whether holism is a feature of all visual expertise. (shrink)
Is Predictive Processing a Theory of Perceptual Consciousness?Tomas Marvan & Marek Havlík - 2021 - New Ideas in Psychology 61 (21).details
Predictive Processing theory, hotly debated in neuroscience, psychology and philosophy, promises to explain a number of perceptual and cognitive phenomena in a simple and elegant manner. In some of its versions, the theory is ambitiously advertised as a new theory of conscious perception. The task of this paper is to assess whether this claim is realistic. We will be arguing that the Predictive Processing theory cannot explain the transition from unconscious to conscious perception in its proprietary terms. The explanations offer (...) by PP theorists mostly concern the preconditions of conscious perception, leaving the genuine material substrate of consciousness untouched. (shrink)
The Conscious Life - the Dream We Live In.Tudor Cosmin Ciocan - 2017 - Dialogo 3 (2):65-71.details
It is most likely for anyone to ask himself at least once if it would be possible to live in a dream? Questioning the fabric of "reality" we live in consciously was one of the main doubts man ever had. It is so likely for us to answer positive to it due to so many factors; starting from the many and various facets of reality each individual envision the world, from the enormous differences we all have while perceiving and defining (...) the reality, etc. That is why, at the conscious level, life seems almost like a dream in a dream, always hoping to wake up from the negative, unwanted version of it. That is why my assertion here, based on latest theories on consciousness and AI, aim to say that we live in between reality and dream, being "conscious" of ourselves, but not really wanting to be "aware" of what is really going on with us. (shrink)
The Theory of a Multilayered Reality. Being Real or Being Thought as Real.Tudor Cosmin Ciocan - 2016 - Dialogo 3 (1):145-159.details
The experiments of quantum physics indicate that an electron will change its behavior/ reality depending on whether or not the electron is being observed as if the particle is aware that it is being observed. The reality thus is presumed to be, or only to be thought of as a scenario that can be altered, changed, or imagined differently depending on the observer or the screenwriter. Our historical development made us think that the reality has as many facets as we (...) want it to have, and none is more real than the other, as long there is a self-conscious being aware of it even if it has more accuracy or it stands on more evidence or arguments each proponent can bring into it. Therefore, a world full of unseen creatures that moves and determines a child's life is not less authentic than one full of invisible particles making the world running and moving for a scientist. Each has its proofs, trials, ways of probation, so it is entirely entitled to be considered 'real.' However, what happens when concurrent theories over the same circumstance pronounce several valid testimonies? Do we have to pronounce either their validity based on the evidence brought by their proponents or should we consider only one of them? On what grounds can we make either these selections? It would be wrong to say that the reality is, in fact, the construct of a multitude of layers, each with different consistency and evidence, each real and provable, therefore each entitled to be called 'reality'? Hence, consciousness can change reality just by being aware of it. In this context, we will also take into account the story of creation and see how it fits in this context. (shrink)
Coupling to Variant Information: An Ecological Account of Comparative Mental Imagery Generation.Matthew Sims - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):899-916.details
Action-based theories of cognition place primary emphasis upon the role that agent-environment coupling plays in the emergence of psychological states. Prima facie, mental imagery seems to present a problem for some of these theories because it is understood to be stimulus-absent and thus thought to be decoupled from the environment. However, mental imagery is much more multifaceted than this "naïve" view suggests. Focusing on a particular kind of imagery, comparative mental imagery generation, this paper demonstrates that although such imagery is (...) stimulus-absent, it is also stimulus-sensitive. Exhibiting stimulus-sensitivity is sufficient for a process to qualify as coupled to the environment. The notion of variant coupling is explicated as the coupling of a cognizer's perceptual system to variant environmental information. By demarcating the categories of stimulus-absent and stimulus-sensitive cognition, and variant and invariant coupling, this paper expands the conceptual apparatus of action-based theories, suggesting not only a way to address the problem that comparative mental imagery generation presents, but perhaps a way to account for other forms of imagery too. (shrink)
Another Look at Mode Intentionalism.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-28.details
A central claim in contemporary philosophy of mind is that the phenomenal character of experience is entirely determined by its content. In this paper, I consider an alternative I call Mode Intentionalism. According to this view, phenomenal character outruns content. It does so because the intentional mode contributes to the phenomenal character of the experience. Here I assess phenomenal contrast arguments in support of this view. I argue that the phenomenal contrast cases appealed to allow for interpretations which do not (...) require positing intentional modes as phenomenologically manifest aspects of experience. (shrink)
On the Possibility of Hallucinations.Farid Masrour - 2020 - Mind 129 (515):737-768.details
Many take the possibility of hallucinations to imply that a relationalist account, according to which perceptual experiences are constituted by direct relations to ordinary mind-independent objects, is false. The common reaction among relationalists is to adopt a disjunctivist view that denies that hallucinations have the same nature as perceptual experiences. This paper proposes a non-disjunctivist response to the argument from hallucination by arguing that the alleged empirical and a priori evidence in support of the possibility of hallucinations is inconclusive. A (...) corollary upshot of the article is that whether hallucinations are possible or not is still an open empirical question. (shrink)
Do We See Facts?Alfredo Vernazzani - 2020 - Mind and Language.details
Philosophers of perception frequently assume that we see actual states of affairs, or facts. Call this claim factualism. In his book, William Fish suggests that factualism is supported by phenomenological observation as well as by experimental studies on multiple object tracking and dynamic feature-object integration. In this paper, I examine the alleged evidence for factualism, focusing mainly on object detection and tracking. I argue that there is no scientific evidence for factualism. This conclusion has implications for studies on the phenomenology (...) and epistemology of visual perception. (shrink)
On Perception and Ontology in the Context of Subjectivity and Modern Physics.Piotr Witas - details
I argue that our direct experience and some physical facts do not go well with an understanding of perception as a mechanism producing a representation of a ''truly'' outer world. Instead, it is much more coherent to treat what is traditionally considered an image in this context as a closed structure equipped in its own ontology, replacing the ''truly'' outer one from the point of view of an agent possessing it. In such a framework, the notion of existence is taken (...) to be defined by consciousness in a way similar to qualia, making it subjective on the one hand, and reducing it to a tool on the other. This implies, in turn, that we need a form of mind-brain dualism; the best we can do in such circumstances about explaining consciousness as an epistemic device - a role intuitively imposing itself in a variety of situations - is to embed it in an abstract ontology merely serving the purpose of a ''true'' reality with the help of the mind-brain link. Obviously, the approach favors subjectivity as a foundation in the ontological sense. Objectivity is considered here only as a suitably understood product from an ''observer's'' point of view, although a functional and useful one. The paper is addressed to readers with interest in both the mind-body problem and ontological foundations of present-day physics, specifically quantum theory. The main conclusion can be absorbed without the quantum part, although it is a bit less convincing then. (shrink)
Folk Core Beliefs About Color.Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Ann Schmidtke - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):849-869.details
Johnston famously argued that the colors are, more or less inclusively speaking, dispositions to cause color experiences by arguing that this view best accommodates his five proposed core beliefs about color. Since then, Campbell, Kalderon, Gert, Benbaji, and others, have all engaged with at least some of Johnston's proposed core beliefs in one way or another. Which propositions are core beliefs is ultimately an empirical matter. We investigate whether Johnston's proposed core beliefs are, in fact, believed by assessing the agreement/disagreement (...) of non-philosophers with them. Two experiments are run each with large sample sizes, the second designed to address criticisms of the first. We find that non-philosophers mostly agree with the proposed core beliefs, but that they agree with some more than others. (shrink)
Perceptual Capacities.Susanna Schellenberg - 2019 - In Dena Shottenkirk & Steven Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition, and Aesthetics. London: Routledge. pp. 137 - 169.details
Despite their importance in the history of philosophy and in particular in the work of Aristotle and Kant, mental capacities have been neglected in recent philosophical work. By contrast, the notion of a capacity is deeply entrenched in psychology and the brain sciences. Driven by the idea that a cognitive system has the capacity it does in virtue of its internal components and their organization, it is standard to appeal to capacities in cognitive psychology. The main benefit of invoking capacities (...) in an account of the mind is that it allows for an elegant counterfactual analysis of mental states: it allows us to analyze mental states on three distinct yet interrelated levels. A first level of analysis pertains to the function of mental capacities. A second level of analysis pertains to the mental capacities employed, irrespective of the context in which they are employed. A third level of analysis pertains to the mental capacities employed, taking into account the context in which they are employed. This paper develops an account of perceptual capacities. This account involves an analysis of their function, their individuation and possession conditions, the relation between perceptual capacities and their employment, as well as their informational and neural base conditions. (shrink)
Enactivism, Other Minds, and Mental Disorders.Joel Krueger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 1):365-389.details
Although enactive approaches to cognition vary in terms of their character and scope, all endorse several core claims. The first is that cognition is tied to action. The second is that cognition is composed of more than just in-the-head processes; cognitive activities are externalized via features of our embodiment and in our ecological dealings with the people and things around us. I appeal to these two enactive claims to consider a view called "direct social perception" : the idea that we (...) can sometimes perceive features of other minds directly in the character of their embodiment and environmental interactions. I argue that if DSP is true, we can probably also perceive certain features of mental disorders as well. I draw upon the developmental psychologist Daniel Stern's notion of "forms of vitality"—largely overlooked in these debates—to develop this idea, and I use autism as a case study. I argue further that an enactive approach to DSP can clarify some ways we play a regulative role in shaping the temporal and phenomenal character of the disorder in question, and it may therefore have practical significance for both the clinical and therapeutic encounter. (shrink)
Does Phenomenal Consciousness Overflow Attention? An Argument From Feature-Integration.Joshua Myers - 2017 - Florida Philosophical Review 17 (1):28-44.details
In the past two decades a number of arguments have been given in favor of the possibility of phenomenal consciousness without attentional access, otherwise known as phenomenal overflow. This paper will show that the empirical data commonly cited in support of this thesis is, at best, ambiguous between two equally plausible interpretations, one of which does not posit phenomenology beyond attention. Next, after citing evidence for the feature-integration theory of attention, this paper will give an account of the relationship between (...) consciousness and attention that accounts for both the empirical data and our phenomenological intuitions without positing phenomenal consciousness beyond attention. Having undercut the motivations for accepting phenomenal overflow along with having given reasons to think that phenomenal overflow does not occur, I end with the tentative conclusion that attention is a necessary condition for phenomenal consciousness. -/- . (shrink)
SEARLE, John : Seeing Things as They Are: A Theory of Perception. New York: Oxford University Press. [REVIEW]Alberto Luis López - 2017 - Daimon: Revista Internacional de Filosofía 71:216-222.details
Review of Searl's book Seeing Things as They are.
Das 'eigentlich schwierige Problem' phänomenaler Wahrnehmung.Dieter Wandschneider - 2015 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 69 (4):550-568.details
The center of this investigation is the 'real hard problem' of phenomenal perception (Chalmers), i.e. of the qualitative kind of perception presenting the subject with forms, colors, smell, pleasurable or negative feelings etc.; the problem of Human consciousness, however, will explicitly not be treated. The 'explanatory gap' (Levine) complained by the philosophy of mind, that is to say the failure of all attempts to supply a neuronal explanation of experiences, is emergence-theoretically treated: Systems own properties and laws different from their (...) components; so the emergence concept shows promise also for the explanatory potential with respect to neuronal systems. Here the phenomenal character of perception is explained from the systemic co-action of perception and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson's anomal monism. Qualitative feelings, as is further shown, are not to be understood as needless 'epiphenomena', but as a necessary completion of per-ception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception. (shrink)
Realism, Relativism, Adverbialism: How Different Are They? Comments on Mazviita Chirimuuta's Outside Color.Mohan Matthen - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (1):236-243.details
Mazviita Chirimuuta proposes a new "adverbialist" ontology of color. I argue that ontological disputes in the philosophy of color are uniformly terminological. Chirimuuta's proposal too is a terminological variant on others, though it has some hortatory value in directing attention to aspects of color science that have hitherto been neglected. On a side note, I also take issue with Chirimuuta's laudatory take on early modern theories of color.
Representationalism and the Sensorimotor Theory.D. Silverman - 2016 - Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):282-284.details
Open peer commentary on the article "Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World" by Michael Beaton. Upshot: In light of the construal of sensorimotor theory offered by the target article, this commentary examines the role the theory should admit for internal representation.
Internismo Sem Intelectualismo E Sem Reflexividade.Eros Moreira De Carvalho - 2014 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 55 (129):153-172.details
In his book, "Perception as a Capacity for Knowledge" (2011), John McDowell advocates that the warrant provided by perception is infallible. For such, it is necessary to understand the role reason plays in the constitution of genuine perceptual states. Based on reason, we situate these states in the logical space of reasoning. So, we not only make the perceptual state into an episode of knowledge, but we also acquire knowledge of how we arrived to that knowledge. McDowell argues that this (...) condition for knowledge - the possession of the capacity to situate a perceptual state in the logical space of reasoning - does not commit him to intellectualism. In this paper, I defend that McDowell's internalism is not entirely exempt from intellectualism, and that internalism is more reasonable not only without intellectualism, but also without reflexivity. (shrink)
"Things Unreasonably Compulsory": A Peircean Challenge to a Humean Theory of Perception, Particularly With Respect to Perceiving Necessary Truths.Catherine Legg - 2014 - Cognitio 15 (1):89-112.details
Much mainstream analytic epistemology is built around a sceptical treatment of modality which descends from Hume. The roots of this scepticism are argued to lie in Hume's (nominalist) theory of perception, which is excavated, studied and compared with the very different (realist) theory of perception developed by Peirce. It is argued that Peirce's theory not only enables a considerably more nuanced and effective epistemology, it also (unlike Hume's theory) does justice to what happens when we appreciate a proof in mathematics.
Perceiving Intentions.Joelle Proust - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Clarendon Press.details
This paper defends the view that knowledge about one's own intentions can be gained in part through perception, although not through introspection. The various kinds of misperception of one's intentions are discussed. The latter distinction is applied to the analysis of schizophrenic patients' delusion of control.
What We See.Fred Dretske - 2010 - In Bence Nanay (ed.), Perceiving the World. Oxford University Press. pp. 54.details
Philosophy/Psychology Collaboration (Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning: Question Five).Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez - manuscriptdetails
This is an excerpt from a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012. This excerpt explores the question: How can philosophers and psychologists most fruitfully collaborate?
Cognitive Penetration? (Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning: Question Four).Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez - manuscriptdetails
This is an excerpt from a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012. This excerpt explores the question: What counts as cognitive penetration?
Multimodal Associations (Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning: Question Two).Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez - manuscriptdetails
This is an excerpt from a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012. This excerpt explores the question: What are the origins of multimodal associations?
Perceptual Learning and Development (Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning: Question One).Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez - manuscriptdetails
This is an excerpt from a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012. This excerpt explores the question: How should we demarcate perceptual learning from perceptual development?
Report on the Network for Sensory Research Toronto Workshop on Perceptual Learning.Kevin Connolly, John Donaldson, David M. Gray, Emily McWilliams, Sofia Ortiz-Hinojosa & David Suarez - manuscriptdetails
This report highlights and explores five questions which arose from the workshop on perceptual learning and perceptual recognition at the University of Toronto, Mississauga on May 10th and 11th, 2012: 1. How should we demarcate perceptual learning from perceptual development? 2. What are the origins of multimodal associations? 3. Does our representation of time provide an amodal framework for multi-sensory integration? 4. What counts as cognitive penetration? 5. How can philosophers and psychologists most fruitfully collaborate?
Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems. [REVIEW]Mirko Farina - 2011 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 32 (4).details
Perception, Action, and Consciousness: Sensorimotor Dynamics and Two Visual Systems is a state-of-the-art collection whose main goal is to explore, from an interdisciplinary perspective, the relationship between action and perception. A second goal of the volume is to investigate how perception and action interact specifically in the production of phenomenal awareness. In presenting and contrasting the major perspectives on the field, this volume marks a good sign of the progress being made on the nature of phenomenally conscious visual experience. By (...) combining theoretical and empirical approaches it also contributes to the debate in key domains of the cognitive sciences .The book contains a useful editorial introduction written by the Editors and six sections further divided into fifteen chapters. In the first part of this review I briefly summarize the content of each section. Having offered an outline of the volume, I then turn my attention to the main theme of the collection, which is the dichotomy between action-oriented theories of perception and the two visual systems hypothesis and look at the dialectic underlying this debate. (shrink)
Perception and Thought
Perceptual Attribution and Perceptual Reference.Jake Quilty-Dunn & E. J. Green - forthcoming - Wiley-Online-Library: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
Perceptual representations pick out individuals and attribute properties to them. This paper considers the role of perceptual attribution in determining or guiding perceptual reference to objects. We consider three extant models of the relation between perceptual attribution and perceptual reference–all attribution guides reference, no attribution guides reference, or a privileged subset of attributions guides reference–and argue that empirical evidence undermines all three. We then defend a flexible-attributives model, on which the range of perceptual attributives used to guide reference shifts adaptively (...) with context. This model underscores the remarkable and dynamic intelligence of our perceptual capacities. We elucidate implications of the model for the boundary between perception and propositional thought. (shrink)
The Perception/Cognition Distinction.Anders Nes, Kristoffer Sundberg & Sebastian Watzl - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 1:1-31.details
The difference between perception and cognition seems introspectively obvious in many cases. Perceiving and thinking have also been assigned quite different roles, in epistemology, in theories of reference and of mental content, in philosophy of psychology, and elsewhere. Yet what is the nature of the distinction? In what way, or ways, do perception and cognition differ? The paper reviews recent work on these questions. Four main respects in which perception and cognition have been held to differ are discussed. First, their (...) phenomenal character, such as the often-remarked vivacity or immediacy of perception. Second, the way in which they represent the world, e.g. the non-propositional nature of the contents, or non-discursive character of the vehicles, that have been held to characterise perceptual representation. Third, their place in cognitive architecture, i.e., roughly, in the information-flow of the mind, such as their alleged (non-)modularity. Fourth, their mind-world relations, e.g. the way in which perceptions seem to be tightly causally linked with distal or proximal stimuli. Against this background, we distinguish some main options for an account of the perception/cognition distinction, in particular concerning whether there is one, several, or no interesting and principled distinction(s) to be drawn here. (shrink)
The Integrity of Motivated Vision: A Reply to Gilchrist, 2020.Kent Harber, Jeanine Stefanucci & Dustin Stokes - forthcoming - Perception.details
In the September 2020 edition of Perception, Alan Gilchrist published an editorial entitled "The Integrity of Vision" (Gilchrist, 2020). In it, Gilchrist critiques motivated perception research. His main points are as follows: (1) Motivated perception is compromised by experimental demand: Results do not actually show motivated perception but instead reflect subjects' desires to comply with inferred predictions. (2) Motivated perception studies use designs that make predictions obvious to subjects. These transparent designs conspire with experimental demand to yield confirmatory but compromised (...) results. (3) Motivated perception research lacks guiding theory and cannot explain what appear to be contradictory results. (4) Motivated perception presents an unsupportable assault upon the impermeability of perception. The present commentary responds to these four assertions. (shrink)
Thinking and Perceiving: On the Malleability of the Mind.Dustin Stokes - 2021 - London: Routledge.details
[File is the introduction to the forthcoming monograph] -/- Abstract to monograph -/- How and whether thinking affects perceiving is a deeply important question. Of course it is of scientific interest: to understand the human mind is to understand how we best distinguish its processes, how those processes interact, and what this implies for how and what we may know about the world. And so in the philosopher's terms, this book is one on both mental architecture and the epistemology of (...) perception. But there is a more human interest. How we make contact with the world, and with one another, is of the most basic of importance. We can make both sensory contact and cognitive contact with the world. The first is traditionally supposed to be determined by the biological nature of our sensory systems, while the second is at least partly determined by us, what we have learned, our experiences, and so on. The most basic claim of the book is that this is mistaken and importantly so. Our sensory contact with the world can also change and in a way that is importantly affected by the cognitive contact that we have, or have had, with the world. Thinking does not just affect perceiving, thinking improves perceiving. If this is true, it changes not only how we should theorize the mind, it changes how we should understand, as individuals, our place in and contact with the world. (shrink)
Is Iconic Memory Iconic?Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):660-682.details
Short‐term memory in vision is typically thought to divide into at least two memory stores: a short, fragile, high‐capacity store known as iconic memory, and a longer, durable, capacity‐limited store known as visual working memory (VWM). This paper argues that iconic memory stores icons, i.e., image‐like perceptual representations. The iconicity of iconic memory has significant consequences for understanding consciousness, nonconceptual content, and the perception–cognition border. Steven Gross and Jonathan Flombaum have recently challenged the division between iconic memory and VWM by (...) arguing against the idea of capacity limits in favor of a flexible resource‐based model of short‐term memory. I argue that, while VWM capacity is probably governed by flexible resources rather than a sharp limit, the two memory stores should still be distinguished by their representational formats. Iconic memory stores icons, while VWM stores discursive (i.e., language‐like) representations. I conclude by arguing that this format‐based distinction between memory stores entails that prominent views about consciousness and the perception–cognition border will likely have to be revised. (shrink)
Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.details
Perceptual systems respond to proximal stimuli by forming mental representations of distal stimuli. A central goal for the philosophy of perception is to characterize the representations delivered by perceptual systems. It may be that all perceptual representations are in some way proprietarily perceptual and differ from the representational format of thought (Dretske 1981; Carey 2009; Burge 2010; Block ms.). Or it may instead be that perception and cognition always trade in the same code (Prinz 2002; Pylyshyn 2003). This paper rejects (...) both approaches in favor of perceptual pluralism, the thesis that perception delivers a multiplicity of representational formats, some proprietary and some shared with cognition. The argument for perceptual pluralism marshals a wide array of empirical evidence in favor of iconic (i.e., image-like, analog) representations in perception as well as discursive (i.e., language-like, digital) perceptual object representations. (shrink)
Sporting Embodiments: Sports Studies and the (Continuing) Promise of Phenomenology.Jacquelyn Allen-Collinson - 2017 - In M. Giardina & M. Donnelly (eds.), Physical Culture, Ethnography and the Body: Theory, Method and Praxis. Abingdon, UK:details
Whilst in recent years sports studies have addressed the calls 'to bring the body back in' to theorisations of sport and physical activity, the 'promise of phenomenology' remains largely under-realised with regard to sporting embodiment. Relatively few accounts are grounded in the 'flesh' of the lived sporting body, and phenomenology offers a powerful framework for such analysis. A wide-ranging, multi-stranded, and interpretatively contested perspective, phenomenology in general has been taken up and utilised in very different ways within different disciplinary fields. (...) The purpose of this article is to consider some selected phenomenological threads, key qualities of the phenomenological method, and the potential for existentialist phenomenology in particular to contribute fresh perspectives to the sociological study of embodiment in sport and exercise. It offers one way to convey the 'essences', corporeal immediacy and textured sensuosity of the lived sporting body. The use of Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA) is also critically addressed. (shrink)
A Puzzle About Seeing for Representationalism.James Openshaw & Assaf Weksler - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2625-2646.details
When characterizing the content of a subject's perceptual experience, does their seeing an object entail that their visual experience represents it as being a certain way? If it does, are they thereby in a position to have perceptually-based thoughts about it? On one hand, representationalists are under pressure to answer these questions in the affirmative. On the other hand, it seems they cannot. This paper presents a puzzle to illustrate this tension within orthodox representationalism. We identify several interesting morals which (...) may be drawn in response, each of which teaches us something interesting and important about perceptual experience and its interface with cognition and related phenomena. (shrink)
Revisão de 'Seeing Things as They Are: a Theory of Perception' (Vendo as Coisas como são: uma Teoria da Percepção) (2015) (revisão revisada 2019).Michael Richard Starks - 2020 - In Entendendo as Conexões entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política, Economia, História e Literatura - Artigos e Avaliações 2006-2019. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 56-92.details
Como tantas vezes na filosofia, o título não só estabelece a linha de batalha, mas expõe os preconceitos e erros do autor, pois se podemos ou não entender o jogo de linguagem 'Ver as coisas como elas são' e se é possível ter uma "teoria filosófica" de percepção" (que é Pode ser sobre como a linguagem da percepção funciona), ao contrário de uma científica, que é uma teoria sobre como o cérebro funciona, são exatamente os problemas. Este é o Searle (...) Classic, excelente e provavelmente pelo menos tão bom quanto qualquer um pode produzir, mas sem uma compreensão completa das ideias fundamentais do Wittgenstein posterior e sem entender os dois sistemas-quadro de pensamento, que poderia ter feito brilhante. Como em seu trabalho anterior, Searle evita em grande parte a ciência, mas há lapsos frequentes e não entende que problemas são sempre sobre jogos de idiomas, uma falha que ele compartilha com quase todos. Depois de fornecer uma estrutura composta por uma Mesa de Intencionalidade baseada nos dois sistemas de pensamento e pensamento e pesquisa de decisões, faço uma análise detalhada do livro. Aqueles que querem uma estrutura completa até o momento para o comportamento humano do ponto de vista moderno de dois sistemas podem consultar meus livros Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2ª ed (2019), Suicide Pela Democracy 4ª ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections Between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics and Economics (2020) e Illusions Utopias Suicidas no Século 21 6ª ed (2020), Observações sobre Impossibilidade, Incompletude, Paraconsistência, Indecidabilidade, Aleatoriedade, Computação, Paradoxo e Incerteza em Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock e Yanofsky (2019) e outros. (shrink)
Mental Structures.Kevin J. Lande - 2020 - Noûs.details
An ongoing philosophical discussion concerns how various types of mental states fall within broad representational genera—for example, whether perceptual states are "iconic" or "sentential," "analog" or "digital," and so on. Here, I examine the grounds for making much more specific claims about how mental states are structured from constituent parts. For example, the state I am in when I perceive the shape of a mountain ridge may have as constituent parts my representations of the shapes of each peak and saddle (...) of the ridge. More specific structural claims of this sort are a guide to how mental states fall within broader representational kinds. Moreover, these claims have significant implications of their own about semantic, functional, and epistemic features of our mental lives. But what are the conditions on a mental state's having one type of constituent structure rather than another? Drawing on explanatory strategies in vision science, I argue that, other things being equal, the constituent structure of a mental state determines what I call its distributional properties—namely, how mental states of that type can, cannot, or must co‐occur with other mental states in a given system. Distributional properties depend critically on and are informative about the underlying structures of mental states, they abstract in important ways from aspects of how mental states are processed, and they can yield significant insights into the variegation of psychological capacities. (shrink)
Perceptual Skills.Dustin Stokes & Bence Nanay - 2020 - In Ellen Fridland & Carlotta Pavese (eds.), Routledge Handbook on Skill and Expertise. London: Routledge.details
This chapter has four parts. I distinguishes some types of perceptual skills and highlights their importance in everyday perception. II identifies a well-studied class of perceptual skills: cases of perceptual expertise. III discusses a less studied possible instance of perceptual skill: picture perception. Finally, IV outlines some important mechanisms underlying perceptual skills, with special emphasis on attention and mental imagery.
The Role of Experience in Demonstrative Thought.Michael Barkasi - 2019 - Mind and Language 34 (5):648-666.details
Attention plays a role in demonstrative thought: It sets the targets. Visual experience also plays a role. I argue here that it makes visual information available for use in the voluntary control of focal attention. To do so I use both introspection and neurophysiological evidence from projections between areas of attentional control and neural correlates of consciousness. Campbell and Smithies also identify roles for experience, but they further argue that only experience can play those roles. In contrast, I argue that (...) experience is not the only way in which visual information could be accessed for the voluntary control of attention. (shrink)
Understanding Evans.Rick Grush - manuscriptdetails
This paper is largely exegetical/interpretive. My goal is to demonstrate that some criticisms that have been leveled against the program Gareth Evans constructs in The Varieties of Reference (Evans 1980, henceforth VR) misfire because they are based on misunderstandings of Evans' position. First I will be discussing three criticisms raised by Tyler Burge (Burge, 2010). The first has to do with Evans' arguments to the effect that a causal connection between a belief and an object is insufficient for that belief (...) to be about that object. A key part of Evans' argument is to carefully distinguish considerations relevant to the semantics of language from considerations relevant to the semantics (so to speak) of thought or belief (to make the subsequent discussion easier, I will henceforth use 'thought' as a blanket term for the relevant mental states, including belief). I will argue that Burge's criticisms depend on largely not taking account of Evans' distinctions. Second, Burge criticizes Evans' account of 'informational content' taking it to be inconsistent. I will show that the inconsistency Burge finds depends entirely on a misreading of the doctrine. Finally, Burge takes Evans to task for a perceived over-intellectualization in a key aspect of his doctrine. Burge incorrectly reads Evans as requiring that the subject holding a belief be engaged in certain overly intellectual endeavors, when in fact Evans is only attributing these endeavors to theorists of such a subject. Next, I turn to two criticisms leveled by John Campbell (Campbell, 1999). I will argue that Campbell's criticisms are based on misunderstandings – though they do hit at deeper elements of Evans' doctrine. First, Campbell reads Evans' account of demonstrative thought as requiring that the subject's information link to an object allows her to directly locate that object in space. Campbell constructs a case in which one tomato (a) is, because of an angled mirror, incorrectly seen as being at a location that happens to be occupied by an identical tomato (b). Campbell claims that Evans' doctrines require us to conclude that the subject cannot have a demonstrative thought about the seen tomato (a), though it seems intuitively that such a subject would be able to have a demonstrative thought about that tomato, despite its location is inaccurately seen. I show that Evans' position in fact allows that the subject can have a demonstrative thought about the causal-source tomato in this case because his account does not require that the location of demonstratively identified objects be immediately accurately assessed. What is crucial is that the subject have the ability to accurately discover the location. Second, Campbell criticizes Evans' notion of a fundamental level of thought. I show that this criticism hinges on view of the nature and role of the fundamental level of thought that mischaracterizes Evans' treatment of the notion. (shrink)
Phenomenal Intentionality and the Perception/Cognition Divide.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York: Routledge. pp. 167-183.details
One of Brian Loar's most central contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind is the notion of phenomenal intentionality: a kind of intentional directedness fully grounded in phenomenal character. Proponents of phenomenal intentionality typically also endorse the idea of cognitive phenomenology: a sui generis phenomenal character of cognitive states such as thoughts and judgments that grounds these states' intentional directedness. This combination creates a challenge, though: namely, how to account for the manifest phenomenological difference between perception and cognition. In this paper, (...) I argue that there is in fact no obvious account of this difference. I consider three main approaches: in terms of high-level vs. low-level contents, of conceptual vs. nonconceptual content, and of propositional vs. objectual content. After arguing against each, I conclude by considering the phenomenal-intentionalist's options moving forward. (shrink)
The Mind and the Physical World: A Psychologist's Exploration of Modern Physical Theory.Douglas Michael Snyder - 1995 - Los Angeles, USA: Tailor Press.details
The mind of man is central to the structure and functioning of the physical world. Modern physical theory indicates that the mind stands in a relationship of equals to the physical world. Both are fundamental, neither can be reduced to the other, and both require each other for their full understanding. This thesis is at odds with the view of the universe found in Newtonian mechanics as well as the generally held view among contemporary physicists of modern physical theory. Since (...) the Renaissance, man has come to understand a great deal about the physical world, and he has gained significant control over it. This increased power over the physical world has occurred hand in hand with the assumption that the structure and functioning of the physical world is essentially independent from his cognitive functioning. According to this assumption, if man's cognitive capacity did not exist, the functioning of the physical world would not be fundamentally altered. This last statement is not in fact correct, and modern physical theory, and even fundamentals underlying Newtonian mechanics, provide evidence to attest to this. Nonetheless, contemporary physicists for the most part do not see that the relationship of human cognition to the physical world is radically altered in their own modern theory, theory that is supported by a great deal of empirical data. Instead, attempting to preserve the thesis that the structure and functioning of the physical world is independent of the mind while on a practical level relying on modern theory that contradicts this thesis, physicists have placed themselves in the position of wondering at times exactly what is the nature of the physical world at the same time they obtain experimental results concerning the physical world that can only be labeled astonishing in their precision and the scope of their implications. Modern physical theory consists of three main components: 1) the special and general theories of relativity; 2) quantum mechanics; and 3) statistical mechanics. There are very successful theories that have been developed on the basis of these three bedrock areas. An example of one is quantum electrodynamics. But these theories owe their conceptual foundation to the three components mentioned. The basic issues at the core of these three components also are expressed in these later theories. In addition, there are new unresolved issues of a fundamental nature concerning the conceptual integrity of these later theories that do not apply to quantum mechanics, relativity theory, and statistical mechanics. Quantum mechanics and relativity theory are areas I have written about for over twelve years. The nature of statistical mechanics has also been of interest to me during this time. But when I took a serious look in 1993 at Tolman's (1938) The Principles of Statistical Mechanics, it became clear that the mind is linked to the physical world in statistical mechanics, a relationship I had found earlier in both relativity theory and quantum mechanics. It was after reading Tolman's justification of the method of statistical mechanics in the original that I decided to write this book. When I found that the three components of modern physical theory all pointed to the same relationship between mind and the physical world, it became clear that the fundamental isolation of the mind from the physical world that has characterized our experience since the development of Newtonian mechanics is unfounded. Based on empirically supported principles of modern physical theory, I determined that the appropriate assumption for one's experience, that the mind is linked to the physical world, could be stated with confidence. The impact of this change in assumption concerning the relationship of man to the cosmos in modern physical theory will find its way into our everyday experience. It will perhaps have no greater effect than in reducing the sense of isolation of man from the world that has characterized modern existence. (shrink)
Is Perception Cognitively Penetrable? A Philosophically Satisfying and Empirically Testable Reframing.Gary Lupyan, Dustin Stokes, Fiona Macpherson, Rasha Abdel Rahman & Robert Goldstone - 2013 - Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society 1:91-2.details
The question of whether perception can be penetrated by cognition is in the limelight again. The reason this question keeps coming up is that there is so much at stake: Is it possible to have theory-neutral observation? Is it possible to study perception without recourse to expectations, context, and beliefs? What are the boundaries between perception, memory, and inference (and do they even exist)? Are findings from neuroscience that paint a picture of perception as an inherently bidirectional and interactive process (...) relevant for understanding the relationship between cognition and perception? We have assembled a group of philosophers and psychologists who have been considering the thesis of cognitive (im)penetrability in light of these questions (Abdel Rahman & Sommer, 2008; Goldstone, Landy, & Brunel, 2011; Lupyan, Thompson-Schill, & Swingley, 2010; Macpherson, 2012; Stokes, 2011). Rather than rehashing previous arguments which appear, in retrospect, to have been somewhat ill-posed (Pylyshyn, 1999), this symposium will present a thesis of cognitive (im)penetrability that is at once philosophically satisfying, empirically testable, and relevant to the questions that cognitive scientists find most interesting. (shrink)
Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):303-318.details
One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of attention. So, while a phenomenon might initially look like one where, say, a perceiver's beliefs are influencing her visual experience, another interpretation is that because the perceiver believes and desires as she does, she consequently shifts her spatial attention so as to change what she senses visually. But, the sceptic will urge, this is an entirely familiar phenomenon, and it hardly (...) involves some special or theoretically important cognitive effect on sensory perception. Even supposing that the sceptic is correct about cases that are accurately described in this way, the rejoinder oversimplifies the possible roles that attention may play in mediating cognition and perception. This paper aims to identify these different roles, and by emphasis on empirical research on feature-based and object-based attention. What emerges is a plausible and well- evidenced mental schema that describes attention -mediated cognitive penetration. At the very least, the burden of proof is shifted to the sceptic, as he then must show that there are no mental phenomena involving attention in the more nuanced ways described here. One additional benefit of this analysis is that it illuminates various features of attention and its relation to both cognition and phenomenal consciousness. Therefore the analysis should be of interest to a broad range of theorists of the mind, and not just those invested in the cognitive penetration debate. (shrink)
The Perception/Cognition Divide: One More Time, with Feeling.Uriah Kriegel - 2019 - In Christoph Limbeck-Lilienau & Friedrich Stadler (eds.), The Philosophy of Perception. Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter. pp. 149-170.details
Traditional accounts of the perception/cognition divide tend to draw it in terms of subpersonal psychological processes, processes into which the subject has no first-person insight. Whatever betides such accounts, there seems to also be some first-personally accessible difference between perception and thought. At least in normal circumstances, naïve subjects can typically tell apart their perceptual states from their cognitive or intellectual ones. What are such subjects picking up on when they do so? This paper is an inconclusive search for an (...) answer. At its end, I conclude, without joy, that we may have to simply accept the perception/cognition distinction as a primitive and inexplicable bright line within the sphere of conscious phenomena. (shrink)
Thought About Properties: Why the Perceptual Case is Basic.Dominic Alford-Duguid - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):221-242.details
This paper defends a version of the old empiricist claim that to think about unobservable physical properties a subject must be able to think perception-based thoughts about observable properties. The central argument builds upon foundations laid down by G. E. M. Anscombe and P. F. Strawson. It bridges the gap separating these foundations and the target claim by exploiting a neglected connection between thought about properties and our grasp of causation. This way of bridging the gap promises to introduce substantive (...) constraints on right accounts of perception and perception-based thought. (shrink)


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Over the summer, I had the pleasure of working with the folks at Nifty Things in Traverse City as they were revamping their website. We were able to sprinkle a little magic and take their great products up a notch as they floated through the store into a shopping bag. I don't usually take on commercial shoots, but this one sparked my interest and ended up being a lot of fun.


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The name Angelia is a girl's name of Spanish origin. Angelia and discussed in our forums with posts like "This or That?------------girls!".
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This is somewhere between Angela, which can seem plain and a little dated, and Angelina or Angelica, which sometimes seem a little too much. It's actually really pretty, and highly usable.


Two of the top fears of most people are dying and giving a speech. In fact, there is so much fear of public speaking, you might think that people regularly die while giving speeches. Fortunately, that is not the case. Here are some tips that will help you overcome your fears and give a great speech.
Be prepared. Know what you are going to say. Prepare an outline of your main points and put them on index cards or a sheet of paper. Don't write out your whole speech and read it. There is nothing that will put an audience to sleep faster.
Write your own introduction. Don't rely on the person who will introduce you to come up with a good introduction. Write it yourself. Your introduction should include your credentials and other important points from your bio. Also include a call to action for the audience, such as the fact that you will be selling and autographing your book after the presentation, or a reason for them to visit your web site. Print out the introduction, double-spaced in large type, so it is easy to read. Send it before the event to the person who will introduce you, and take two copies with you on the day of the speech. Your introduction will get your speech off to a good start.
Dress comfortably. If your clothes are too tight, too short or riding up your . . . uh, you don't want to dress in a way that will interfere with movement or breathing.
Check out the room. Arrive a little early so you can become familiar with the layout of the room. Where will you stand while you speak? Is there a microphone? How will the audience be seated? If you are using equipment, such as a projector, try it out to make sure everything is working properly.
Get to know the audience. As audience members arrive, introduce yourself and chat with them. It will reduce your nervousness later. After all, you won't be speaking to a bunch of nameless strangers, you will be speaking to Jeff, Laura, Steve, Diane, and all the other nice people you shook hands with earlier.
Breathe. When you first step up to the podium, take a deep breath then start speaking. If you find yourself speaking too quickly, or inserting fillers such as uh, um, like, you know, slow down and take another breath before you continue.
Remember that the audience is on your side. They came to hear what you have to say. They are spending their time (and perhaps money) to be there, and they are predisposed to like you. Don't assume they are waiting for you to fail. They aren't.
With practice, you can become a confident, polished speaker. Take advantage of opportunities to hone your skills. Join Toastmasters or other organizations that give you the chance to speak in a supportive environment. After you survive your first speeches, you may find yourself looking forward to speaking and even enjoying it. Really.
Copyright Cathy Stucker. As the Idea Lady, Cathy Stucker can help you attract customers and make yourself famous with ideas to market yourself as an expert. Get free tips, articles and more at http://www.IdeaLady.com/.
Erica Tanti explains how you can face your public speaking fears and communicate more efficiently for the more effective development success.
Inspired by a panic attack in rhetoric class at the U of Iowa, Speeko co-founder Nico Aguilar is using technology to help others speak better.
While only a small number of people actually enjoy public speaking, it is possible to master and even excel at it, in spite of your fear.
I love the Disney movie The Kid with Bruce Willis. In it he plays a stressed-out, high-power image consultant.
Whether you want to be a part time, full time or BIG time speaker you must speak, speak, speak. At first, deliver 25-30 minute free talks to service clubs and community organizations.
What is worse than wearing a tuxedo to an event when everyone else is attending in shorts?I have said the same thing over and over again: before you attend the event, get to know the audience. If the audience is not right for you, you may attend, but it is unlikely that you will gain any new business.


Hi, finally OnePlus launched OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom for OnePlus 3. This is a OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom based OxygenOS 3.5.5 and here is an easy and safe tutorial for install OnePlus 3 OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom.
This is a OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom. This is an Android 6.0 marshmallow based update.
Added audio tuner and Added background app freezing mechanism.
Redesign of accent color and the clock UI.
Updated Google security patch for November.
Fixed dial pad crashes and black screen issue when exiting games in horizontal orientation.
Step 1: Download and extract OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom. zip and ADB and Fastboot Tool files. After then copy OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom. zip file into ADB and Fastboot Tool folder. After then press and hold shift key in the keyboard and right click in the extracted Fast boot tool folder and select "Open command window here". See in this image.
Step 4: Now connect your OnePlus 3 Smartphone with PC via USB cable and type adb sideload File Name.zip (OnePlus3Oxygen_16_OTA_009_all_1611161152_86fe98f7ebf24259.zip) in the command window then press enter key. Don't interrupt this process, it might to take 4-6 minutes. your phone will reboot automatically.
After install OnePlus 3 OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom, you can root your phone because root allows you to use a maximum of your phone without any restrictions. After root you will install custom apps, Rom and custom setting in your phone. But first read Root Advantage and Disadvantage by this article then follow this guide to root OnePlus 3.
I hope you like this New update OnePlus 3 OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom installation guide from which you will be able to easily install OnePlus 3 OxygenOS Open Beta 7 Rom without any extra efforts. If feel any problem in this guide then please use comment box. Thanks to all.
How can I flash back to the official version?


Here's where you can watch the last 10 episodes from start-to-finish, stem-to-stern, in all their Excel goodness. Put your glasses on and take your shoes off. Rick, Jordan and I hope that you'll enjoy the fun, learn something, and enjoy being part of the Excel community.
For all of the Excel TV full episodes, check them out at our YouTube channel.


i3 provides all documents and correspondence electronically.
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How best to deal with endorsements and endorsements/change requests.
In order to bind a risk with i3 we require instructions in writing.
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Going to MWLUG 2014? You need to buy these guys a beer as well….
He's the guy you really need to thank for this event – without his dedication and enthusiasm, the most significant User Group meeting in North American this year would surely not happen.
Yeah I know I have rattled on about this before but it holds as true today as it does any other day before.
1) really? You need a list?? Shame on you….
3) Dave pays for this amazing service out of his personal pocket. By my reckoning $40 a month for 3+ years is well over $1000 dollars. A $5 beer is the LEAST you can do to repay him.
4) Dave refuses to take contributions – if it would make a difference I would do a kickstarter, but he'd refuse.
5) NotesIn9 is the largest repository of videos and tutorials, created by the largest number of different contributors in the IBM ICS community.
If he refuses to let you buy one, buy it anyway and put it in front of him. He's going to be there for four nights so just do it.
Buy the man a beer – you owe him and it would be rude not to!!!
The line starts behind me……..join it !
Although not directly related to the purpose of the presentation I am going to demonstrate how to use an Angular.js chart directive to bind to the application service data and create dynamic charting within the application.
The following jQuery code makes it work. The getHelp function shows/hides the help based on the boolean in the function.
What I found though was that when I used Select2 the field attribute was not being picked up. This is because Select2 creates it own DOM elements to display the field and the original field attributes are not transferred to this new DOM structure.
So I needed to come up with a way of accessing the original element from the select2. This turned out to be very simple – select2 emits an event on focus and blur called select2-focus and select2-blur. The event target gives me direct access to the original field the select2 is representing.
Using this simple modification to the delegation code I was able to access the help_fieldName to pass to the help Function. The image below shows the console.log, highlighting the underlying DOM element.
Within my demo application I wanted to know when the table was finished loading. The problem is in Angular that there is no "I am finished with the template load" event. The reason is due to the asynchronous nature of the Angular code.
I wanted to load the table and then take an action on it. To do this I added a directive to the "repeat control" within my template for loading people.
The following example was completely plagiarized from this article – respect !
Well that is a little simple….
Yes it is but it serves to demonstrate the concept. The best part is that there are lots of people who are writing plug and play Directives for Angular – just like jQuery plugins. If I could be bothered I might even do some blog posts on useful Directives…..But is a good resource for looking at some available directives.
There are multiple directives for using jQuery plugins within an angular construct – this is very helpful for data binding. There are also multiple directives which are independent of jQuery and are stand along "Angular" plugins for want of a better term.
Just wanted to show a work in progress – screenshots of what I am working on for MWLUG2014. Part of the presentation is showing how to make your Angular applications portable.
My sample app will be the one I created as part of the Angular in XPages series.
With only 4 lines of HTML and zero XPages dependency.
Make sure you plan to stick around to the end – I am not on until 3pm on Friday !!!
Within Angular there are these programmatic entities called services – and if you read around Angular programming practices (Follow @ToddMotto – http://toddmotto.com/opinionated-angular-js-styleguide-for-teams/) you will find (as I have) that adding application logic within Controllers is generally frowned upon.
From a maintainability perspective, as well as logical code layout perspective, having functional logic within the controller is akin to writing a 1000 line LotusScript agent – not optimal !!
Now I know you are looking at this and saying to yourself – hang on you just copied and pasted all the code and actually made it longer and more complicated – and that would be very perceptive of you – but (and I had to make this leap to believe it myself), it is better.
My example application only really has one purpose – manage people. In a more complex application a separation of logic into like components would make sense. By using the service I have separated all my "do stuff with people" out into a people Service. When I built the next part of the application – to do with buildings for example I would create a buildings Service and manage all my building logic there.
Let the controller do it's job and bind the data to the View and keep your logic out of the controller and into Services.


In Little, director Tina Gordon presents a deeply contrived, narratively flawed and criminally mirthless high concept comedy about a female tech boss who is transformed into her younger self when the pressures of being an adult become too much to handle.
Starring Regina Hall, Issa Rae and Marsai Martin (the child actor from the TV show Black-ish), Little first made the headlines when it was revealed that Martin, who came up with the idea for the film after watching Penny Marshall's Big, was to become the youngest ever executive producer for a studio film aged only 13.
Jordan Sanders (Hall) is a ball-breaker. She is smart, tough and runs her tech company with such tyranny that she could make The Devil Wears Prada's Miranda Priestly look like a pussycat in comparison. Taking most of her frustrations on long-suffering assistant April (Rae), Jordan's perfectly curated lifestyle of designer clothes and easy hookups starts to fall apart when she wakes up looking like her pre-teen self (Martin) after an encounter with a young girl who does magic. Hilarity (not much of it to be completely honest) ensues when Jordan is ordered by child services to go back to school, while April takes her place at the company in the hope of winning a new contract with a major app firm.
Disappointingly, Little falls at the first hurdle by failing to capitalise on such a great high concept idea. Opting for a rather pedestrian storyline and a series of skit-like set-ups we've seen countless times before, the film appears to be a mishmash of half-baked ideas which never quite come to fruition, and in the end we are left as baffled as its protagonists appear to be throughout.
Gordon and co-writer Tracy Oliver (Girls Trip) miss opportunity after opportunity to step out of their comfort zone by offering a storyline by numbers. In a completely baffling sequence which sees young Jordan and April eating at a high end restaurant, the action is suddenly interrupted by an impromptu singing session which seems so oddly put together that it could literally belong to any other film.
For all its messiness and tedium, one thing nobody can deny is that Marsai Martin is the real star of the show. She comes across as smart, funny and in the end you'll find yourself wishing you were watching her in a different movie.
Overall, Little brings almost nothing of value to the current trend of role reversal remakes. It is as shoddily executed and as disappointingly mundane as one might have expected. A mess of a movie saved by one single performance. Marsai Martin is the real deal.


text:
Council approves raises for city workers
By Jeff Harrison
Midwest City employees will soon see a little extra in their paychecks.
The city council approved a 3-percent cost of living raise for all municipal employees during last Tuesday night's council meeting. The raise will be given to all full and part time employees as well as police and firefighters, which are represented by labor unions.
City manager Tim Lyon said the city was able to provide the raises because of strong revenues, primary sales and use tax collections. The contracts with the police and firefighters included a 3-percent raise if the city's sales and use tax collections increased by 4.25 percent from the previous year. Lyon said based on the June report, the city's sales and use taxes are about 4.75 percent higher than the previous year.
Lyon and other city leaders expressed gratitude for all city employees.
"I appreciate all of our staff," said Sean Reed, city councilman. "Whether uniformed or not, they all deserve this raise."
The cost of living adjustment will be effective July 1.
In other items, the city council approved:
• A zoning request at 9925 SE 15th Street. The request will allow the owner of the 7-Eleven to expand the existing store and add another tenant.
• A lot split for a vacant residential lot at 329 King Ave., including a waiver for required street and sidewalks. The owner plans to divide the 4.55-acre property into two parcels for single family development. City councilmembers discussed a precedent of granting waivers for street and sidewalks on properties that do not connect to existing streets and sidewalks. They approved the request but agreed to explore options in the future.
• A special use permit to allow a new restaurant, 6805 SE 15th St., to serve alcoholic beverages. Paden Weatherford, a Carl Albert alumni, plans to open Bad Nonna's, an Italian restaurant, in the vacant City Bites building. Weatherford said he hopes to have the restaurant open in late July or early August.
• A preliminary plat of the Pieper Addition at 2750 Hand Road. The applicant plans to divide the property into two parcels for single family development.
• A final plat of Oakes Crossing at 10225 E. Reno Ave. The applicant plans to subdivide the property into six individual parcels for single family residential development.
• A request to close a public easement at 1103 S. Air Depot Blvd. The ordinance was needed to accommodate a request to expand O'Reilly Auto Parts Store at 1109 S. Air Depot Blvd.

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