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Nationalities Papers
Alexander J. Motyl: The social construction of social construction: implications for theories of nationalism and identity formation
Christian Axboe Nielsen: The goalposts of transition: football as a metaphor for Serbia's long journey to the rule of law
Elisabeth Sieca-Kozlowski: Russian military patriotic education: a control tool against the arbitrariness of veterans
Ilona Klímová-Alexander: The development and institutionalization of Romani representation and administration. Part 3c: religious, governmental, and non-governmental institutions (1945–1970)
Jack Bielasiak: The paradox of Solidarity's legacy: contested values in Poland's transitional politics
Monica Ciobanu: Communist regimes, legitimacy and the transition to democracy in Eastern Europe
Olga Cara: Lives on the border: language and culture in the lives of ethnic Russian women in Baltinava, Latvia
V.P. (Chip) Gagnon Jr: Yugoslavia in 1989 and after
Annika Frieberg: Transnational spaces in national places: early activists in Polish–West German relations
Brent Hierman: What use was the election to us? Clientelism and political trust amongst ethnic Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan
Dalibor Mišina: "Spit and Sing, My Yugoslavia": New Partisans, social critique and Bosnian poetics of the patriotic
Helge Blakkisrud and Shahnoza Nozimova: History writing and nation building in post-independence Tajikistan
Pieter Troch: Yugoslavism between the world wars: indecisive nation building
Yonca Köksal: Transnational networks and kin states: the Turkish minority in Bulgaria, 1878–1940
Aurélie Biard: The religious factor in the reification of "neo-ethnic" identities in Kyrgyzstan
Daniel Esparza: National identity and the Other: imagining the EU from the Czech Lands
Jaime Lluch: How nationalism evolves: explaining the establishment of new varieties of nationalism within the national movements of Quebec and Catalonia (1976–2005)
Jennie L. Schulze: Estonia caught between East and West: EU conditionality, Russia's activism and minority integration
Tabish Shah: Securitized identities and less secure western multi-ethnic states: a critical geopolitics of the East–West discourse – Turkey and beyond
Debate: Gagnon, "Yugoslavia in 1989 and after"
Ewa Ochman: Soviet war memorials and the re-construction of national and local identities in post-communist Poland
Harry C. Merritt: The colony of the colonized. The Duchy of Courland's Tobago colony and contemporary Latvian national identity
Ieva Zake & Graham Gormley: Integration or separation? Nationality groups in the US and the Republican Party's ethnic politics, 1960s–1980s
Robert L. Ivie & Timothy William Waters: Discursive democracy and the challenge of state building in divided societies: reckoning with symbolic capital in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Taro Tsurumi: "Neither angels, nor demons, but humans": anti-essentialism and its ideological moments among the Russian Zionist intelligentsia
Alexander J. Motyl: Why is the "KGB Bar" possible? Binary morality and its consequences
Lena Surzhko-Harned: Liberal nationalism, nationalist liberalization, and democracy: the cases of post-Soviet Estonia and Ukraine
Ov Cristian Norocel: Romania is a family and it needs a strict father: conceptual metaphors at work in radical right populist discourses
Paul Brykczynski: Prince Adam Czartoryski as a liminal figure in the development of modern nationalism in Eastern Europe at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
Richard Sakwa: The revenge of the Caucasus: Chechenization and the dual state in Russia
Ulrike Ziemer: Tackling tensions and ambivalences: Armenian girls' diasporic identities in Russia
Issue 6: Special Issue: Twenty-five-years of A-B-C: Miroslav Hroch's impact on nationalism studies
Farhan Siddiqi: Nation-formation and national movement(s) in Pakistan: a critical estimation of Hroch's stage theory
Alexander Maxwell: Twenty-five years of A-B-C: Miroslav Hroch's impact on nationalism studies
Alexander Maxwell: Typologies and phases in nationalism studies: Hroch's A-B-C schema as a basis for comparative terminology
Henio Hoyo: Transplant or graft? Hroch and the Mexican patriotic movements
Ian Appleby: Uninvited guests in the communal apartment: nation-formation processes among unrecognized Soviet nationalities
Miroslav Hroch: Comments
Nelly Bekus: Nationalism and socialism: "Phase D" in the Belarusian nation-building
Oana Sînziana Păltineanu: Miroslav Hroch's model of small nation-formation and Begriffsgeschichte
Alexander J. Motyl: The paradoxes of Paul Robert Magocsi: the case for Rusyns and the logical necessity of Ukrainians
Anastas Vangeli: Nation-building ancient Macedonian style: the origins and the effects of the so-called antiquization in Macedonia
Andrea Chandler: Nationalism and social welfare in the post-Soviet context
Dominique Arel: The scholar, historian, and public advocate: the contributions of Paul Robert Magocsi to our understanding of Ukraine and Central Europe
Florentina Andreescu: The changing face of the Other in Romanian films
George G. Grabowicz: "The Magocsi Problem" (Problema Magochoho): a preliminary deconstruction and contextualization
James Ker-Lindsay: Not such a 'sui generis' case after all: assessing the ICJ opinion on Kosovo
Nathan Light: Genealogy, history, nation
Paul Robert Magocsi: Concluding observations on the symposium
Serhii Plokhy: Between history and nation: Paul Robert Magocsi and the rewriting of Ukrainian history
Taras Kuzio: A multi-vectored scholar for a multi-vectored era: Paul Robert Magocsi
Cristian Cercel: The relationship between religious and national identity in the case of Transylvanian Saxons (1933-1944)
Jure Gašparič: The country at a standstill: Yugoslavia and Slovene politics in the 1930s
Kiril Feferman: Nazi Germany and the Karaites in 1938-1944: between racial theory and Realpolitik
Marcela Veselkova; Julius Horvath: National identity and money: Czech and Slovak Lands 1918-2008
Mika Aaltola: Agile small state agency: heuristic plays and flexible national identity markers in Finnish foreign policy
Monica Ciobanu: Rewriting and remembering Romanian communism: some controversial issues
Timofey Agarin: Civil society versus nationalizing state? Advocacy of minority rights in the post-socialist Baltic states
Aleksandr Burakovskiy: Holocaust remembrance in Ukraine: memorialization of the Jewish tragedy at Babi Yar
Benedict E. DeDominicis: The Bulgarian ethnic model: post-1989 Bulgarian ethnic conflict resolution
Dennis Gratz: Elitocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina and its impact on the contemporary understanding of the crime of genocide
Henry Abramson: Conclusion: Ukrainians, Jews and the Holocaust
John-Paul Himka: Debates in Ukraine over nationalist involvement in the Holocaust, 2004-2008
Marco Carynnyk: Foes of our rebirth: Ukrainian nationalist discussions about Jews, 1929-1947
Martin Müller: Market meets nationalism: making entrepreneurial state subjects in post-Soviet Russia
Renee L. Buhr; Victor Shadurski; Steven Hoffman: Belarus: an emerging civic nation?
Nationalities Blog
comments & analysis on nationalism and ethnic conflict. blog of the association for the study of nationalities
Harris Mylonas: The Challenges of Nation-Building in the Syrian Arab Republic
By Harris Mylonas
(POMEPS Briefing) Syria's ongoing existential conflict is arguably related to its nation-building trajectory starting in the beginning of the twentieth century. What can theories of nation-building and state formation tell us about the origins of conflict as well as future of the Syrian state?
I have recently argued that the way a nation-state treats a non-core group within its own borders is determined largely by whether the state's foreign policy is revisionist or cleaves to the international status quo, and whether it is allied or in rivalry with that group's external patrons. However, as I admit in the book, my argument does not travel to all states at all times. In particular, it should apply to countries that 1) are driven from a homogenizing imperative, 2) have non-assimilated segments of the population and no caste system in place, 3) have the capacity to directly rule the population, and 4) have a ruling political elite representing a core group with a clear "national type". In what follows, I explore how my work illuminates some of the challenges of nation-building in the Syrian case.
Arguably, the Syrian government has not been motivated by a homogenizing imperative. In The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities, I suggest that the main reason that leaders adopt the "nation-building option" is the reality, or anticipation, of other powers manipulating non-core groups in their state to undermine their stability or annex parts of their territory. This process is particularly conspicuous in situations where the ruling elites perceive their borders to be challenged. While this process worked in Tilly's account of Europe[1] and fits the pattern I narrate in the interwar Balkans, it does not seem to fit so much the story in Syria. Following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and after a brief interlude of direct rule by Ibrahim in the mid-19th century, the territories of contemporary Syria were divided up by decree through a series of treaties. Syria was under the French Mandate since 1920 and after a tumultuous history gained independence in 1946. As it is often the case, colonial powers had to rely on local elites coming from specific groups for political and economic control. Syria was no exception and the role of the Alawis and Christian minorities was vital for the French from the beginning of their Mandate. As Wendt and Barnett put it,
"Lacking political legitimacy, the colonial state's power was always underwritten by the actual or threatened use of force. Significant military resources were typically not available from the centre, however, and since mass mobilization was not viable for an army of occupation, colonial states tended to militarize coopted groups or ethnic minorities. A similar process occurred in colonial bureaucracies, which were staffed by persons with a vested interest in upholding the authority of an alien state. The character of colonial military and bureaucratic development, in other words, was shaped by the security needs of foreign actors and their domestic clients rather than of the mass population." [2]
As a result of this legacy, as well as the geopolitical situation in the region, this system of choosing a loyal local ethnic group and ruling the rest of the population through it–that has its roots to the French colonial period–was perpetuated. The various military coups following independence until Hafez al-Assad consolidated his rule on the country in 1970 solidified this outcome. The legitimating principle of the Assad regime has not been state-level nationalism. In fact, repression and a carefully constructed network of informants were the basis for legitimacy in Syria for the past four decades—if not longer. To complement this apparatus Lisa Wedeen revealed a cult that the Assad regime—father and son—designed which operated as a disciplinary device. [3] For decades citizens acted as if they revered their leader. "The cult works to enforce obedience, induce complicity, isolate Syrians from one another, and set guidelines for public speech and behavior" as Wedeen put it in 1999.[4]
Another set of conditions for my argument to be applicable is that part of the population has not yet been successfully assimilated and there is no "caste structure" in place since in caste systems assimilation is by definition impossible.[5] Syria is definitely a heterogenous society, but the heterogeneity is more pronounced depending on which cleavage dimension is salient at each historical moment. In terms of ethnicity, about 90% of the population was Arab before the civil war—including about 500,000 Palestinians and up to 1.3 million Iraqi refugees—while there were about 9% Kurds and smaller groups of Armenians, Circassians, and Turkomans. In terms of religion, based on 2005 estimates 74% of the population were Sunni Muslims, Alawis were about 12%, Druze 3%, while there are also some small numbers of other Muslim sects, Christians 10%, about 200 Jews, and Yazidis.[6] Finally, in terms of mother tongue we find the vast majority speaking Arabic, and then Kurdish, Armenian, Aramaic, and Circassian being used by the respective non-core groups. Moreover, although this was not a caste system the mode of rule was definitely blocking social mobility and especially political clout for non-Alawis and their close allies and informants. The rule of the Alawi controlled Baath party coupled with the state of emergency that had been in force since 1963 had decisively alienated the Arab Sunni majority. But following the Arab Spring and coupled with past violence, inequalities, and repression that many reportedly felt in Syria, resistance against the regime grew and by now it has turned into a multiparty civil war. The opposition is fragmented but defections from the Assad side have also been plentiful. The lack of any national cohesion is apparent.
Nation-building cannot be pursued by a failed state that cannot directly rule its population. Assad's regime clearly did not suffer from this problem. Syria was far from a failed state. In fact, it is a state with high literacy rates– 88% for males and 74%for females. But even if Syrian ruling elites faced the pressures I described above and had the capacity to do so, they would have had a hard time to nation-build. For nation-building to occur, the ruling political elites of the state must represent a core group that is well defined and has a clear criterion of inclusion—a " national type" in what Eric Hobsbawm called the age of nationalism. In Syria, the closest thing we can find to a constitutive story in Assad's Syria has to do with a Pan-Arab identity. Particularly, a version of baathist ideology that combines a supranational form of nationalism that calls for the unity of Arabs with anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism and secular socialism.[7] Arab nationalism, a form of unification nationalism,[8] was vital in the struggle for independence—a by-product of British machinations against the Ottoman Empire—as well as the decolonization movement against the French. Thus, the state-level type of nationalism that dominated Europe, did not manage to emerge in much of the Arab Middle East, since such a unification was opposed by multiple great and regional powers. The short experiment of the United Arab Republic that brought Egypt and Syria together in a union between 1958 and 1961 was stillborn but characteristic of the supranational character of the constitutive story that motivated Syrian leadership. Given this configuration, it is really hard to identify a Syrian constitutive story and this is reflected in the school curriculum that primarily emphasizes anti-Zionist ideas, Pan-Arab ideas, and ironically, Sunni Islam.[9] Thus, while linguistically and ethnically there could be an overwhelming majority constructed–that of Arabs and Arabic–if one had to decide what constitutes the core group in Assad's Syria, they would most likely suggest that it is the Alawis – together with other minorities – in the exclusion of the Sunni Arab majority.
Despite the well-known arguments that territory is becoming increasingly less important in our globalized world, myriad of territorial disputes, dozens of border changes and the long list of "nations without a state," or "stateless nations," point to a more sobering picture. For the past couple of years, several external state and non-state actors are aligning themselves with internal factions or non-core groups in Syria. However, the most powerful regional states Turkey, Iran, and Israel – all non-Arab– are unable to dominate Syria through these local alliances. The USA can be an arbiter of the conflict by intervening with Sunni, which would please Turkey and the Gulf states along with Sunni populations in Syria, Jordan, Palestine, and Egypt—each for different reasons. Alternatively, if Iran prevails, Alawis in Syria, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shia minorities in the Gulf States, and the Shia majority of Iraq would rejoice. But a more cynical point of view, one perhaps best summarized by Ed Luttwak,[10] suggests that the USA—and even Israel —should allow this war to go on since it is in their strategic benefit for the factions to fight each other thus preventing the emergence of a strong and unified Arab state, or a victorious Iran. A note of caution flows from my work in the Balkans. Shifting alliances in the context of the current multiparty civil war with ample external backing, coupled with the rapid changes in control over territory already have lead and will continue to lead to repeated instances of violent exclusionary policies, since non-core groups that are perceived as enemy-backed, or collaborating with the enemy, are going to be targeted by the respective sides of the conflict.
A version of this essay was first published atThe Political Science of Syria's War, POMEPS Briefing #22, on December 18, 2013.
[1] Tilly, Charles (ed.). 1975. The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press; Tilly, Charles. 1990. Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1990. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell. Tilly, Charles and Wim P. Blockmans (eds.). 1994. Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, AD 1000 to 1800. Boulder: Westview Press.
[2] Wendt, Alexander and Michael Barnett. 1993. "Dependent State Formation and Third World Militarization",Review of International Studies 19: 321-47, p. 331.
[3] Whitman, Elizabeth. "Stalemate in Syria," The Nation, April 23, 2012.
[4] Wedeen, Lisa. 1999. Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
[5] They involve an "ideology of inferiority for the subordinate groups" and thus an almost fixed ethnic structure that is perceived as natural. For more on hierarchical systems, see Horowitz, Donald. 1985. Ethnic Groups in Conflict. University of California Press, pp. 21–32.
[6] http://www.state.gov/outofdate/bgn/syria/85051.htm
[7] It is characteristic that both in 1982 when the regime violently crushed the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion in Hama and in mid-March 2011 following the brutal response of the regime to the protests in Daraa, the conflict was attributed to Zionists and Americans intervening in Syrian internal affairs using fifth columns as agents of Western imperialism. See Wedeen 1999 and Seale, Patrick. "The Syrian Time Bomb Forget Libya", Foreign Policy, March 28, 2011.
[8] Hechter, Michael. 2000. Containing Nationalism. Oxford University Press.
[9] Landis, Joshua M. 2003. "Islamic Education in Syria: Undoing Secularism," presented at the conference onConstructs of Inclusion and Exclusion: Religion and Identity Formation in Middle Eastern School Curricula, Watson Institute for International Studies, Brown University.
[10] Luttwak, Edward. "In Syria, America Loses if Either Side Wins," The New York Times, August 24, 2013.
Harris Mylonas: Wither Nation-Building?
In my book, The Politics of Nation-Building, I explore the reasons behind a state's choice to assimilate, accommodate, or exclude ethnic groups within its territory.[1] I develop a theory that focuses on the international politics of nation-building arguing that a state's nation-building policies toward non-core groups — any aggregation of individuals perceived as an unassimilated ethnic group by the ruling elite of a state — are influenced by both its foreign policy goals and its relations with the external patrons of these groups. Through a detailed study of the interwar Balkans, I conclude that the way a state treats a non-core group within its own borders is determined largely by whether the state's foreign policy is revisionist or cleaves to the international status quo, and whether it is allied or in rivalry with that group's external patrons. However, as I admit in the book, this argument does not travel to states where the ruling elites are not motivated by a homogenizing imperative.
Some places in the world are run by core groups consisting of apparent minimum winning coalitions,[2] others by elites that go at great lengths to establish national states.[3] Why do some countries have leaders that try to make the national and the political unit overlap and others that opt to rule with a minimum winning coalition? One argument suggests that maybe the degree of diversity prevents the nation-building path in some cases, other arguments focus on the pattern of spread of nationalist ideology and/or the prevalence of competing ideologies such as communism, yet others put forth the importance of war-making and imitation of successful military tactics as a mechanism that accounts for the spread of nationalism and the nation-state system.[4] In The Politics of Nation-Building I build on some of these and suggest that the main reason that leaders adopt the nation-building option is the reality, or anticipation, of other powers using non-core groups in their state to undermine their stability or even annex parts of their territory.
The European story is well known and so are the interactions between the Russians and the Europeans. Tilly's argument that war made the modern national state may be correct but it is also based on an understood reality: borders were constantly changing during the centuries that modern European states developed.[5] But the Westphalian principles have been adhered to more in some parts of the world than others.[6] Border fixity did not only vary tremendously over time but it also significantly varied crossnationally across the globe.[7] For example, following the Treaty of Berlin in the end of the 19th century the borders of Africa "froze" after the decision of the Great Powers.[8] This led to a completely different incentive structure for both ruling elites and counterhegemonic elites in countries with "fixed borders". Beyond the case of Africa, however, we can point to other places with similar levels of border fixity that resulted from different geopolitical configurations, such as Latin America—the back yard of the USA—or the Middle East, where the colonial powers also left their mark on the demarcation of borderlines.[9]
Overall, areas that were part of a geopolitical configuration that guaranteed border fixity had less of an incentive to pursue nation-building policies. Within these cases the only countries that I would expect to see nation-building policies emerging involve cases where an external power (major power, regional power, neighboring state, diaspora group and so forth) attempted to cultivate a fifth column within their territorial boundaries. Moreover, it would not be surprising if this phenomenon of external backing of non-core groups would be less pronounced in regions where border fixity was perceived to be really high. However, this 'equilibrium' becomes more or less sustainable based on the structure of the international system and the ability—real and/or perceived—of regional actors to defy these geopolitical configurations I described above.
The crucial question today is: What is the future of border fixity in today's world? More importantly, what is the perception of the relevant actors across the world with respect to this question? The list of border changes is longer than we want to admit. One just needs to cite former Yugoslavia and USSR;[10] but more recently we find cases beyond the traditional spaces where nation-building has already made its mark like Sudan.[11]Discussion of border changes has also emerged in the case of Iraq, Mali, and even Syria. It remains to be seen if any such plans will materialize. Granted the list of cases could have been much longer if nationalist principles were to be fully operative but this is not a satisfactory answer. Even if we only get a few dozen of the hundreds of border changes we would get based on nationalist principles, the reverberations will be felt globally. Moreover, such a situation would further push the spread of nationalism, encourage external involvement, and boost nation-building projects across these areas. We are already observing manifestations of this dynamic, but more border changes would certainly intensify it. This in turn will have the direst consequences for the well being of ethnic groups that are perceived as having ties with external powers that are perceived as enemies by core elites. Shi'as in various Sunni dominated states in the Middle East are a case in point.
What can be done? The International community can impact perceptions of border fixity by either investing resources in upholding the norm of territorial sovereignty or by promoting regional integration schemes around the globe that would indirectly guarantee existing borders and, according to The Politics of Nation-Building, would also lead to accommodationist policies. However, neither of the two solutions is sufficient without important investments in economic and political development.
The article was published at e-IR on May 8, 2013 | © e-International Relations (e-IR)
Harris Mylonas got his Ph.D. at Yale University in 2008 and then joined the Political Science department at George Washington University as an Assistant Professor in the fall of 2009. He was also an Academy Scholar at the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies in 2008-2009 and 2011-2012 academic years.
[1] Harris Mylonas, The Politics of Nation-Building: Making Co-Nationals, Refugees, and Minorities. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012.
[2] William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, "Political Institutions, Policy Choice and the Survival of Leaders," British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 32, No. 4 (Oct., 2002), pp. 559-590; Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce; Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson and James D. Morrow. The Logic of Political Survival. The MIT Press, 2003.
[3] Eugen Weber. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870-1914. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976; Ernest Gellner. Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983; Smith, Anthony. 1986. "State-Making and Nation-Building," in John Hall (ed.), States in History. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 228–263; Rogers Smith. Stories of Peoplehood: The Politics and Morals of Political Memberships. Cambridge University Press, 2003; Keith Darden and Anna Maria Grzymała-Busse. "The Great Divide: Literacy, Nationalism, and the Communist Collapse," World Politics – Volume 59, Number 1 (2006): 83-115.
[4] Connor, Walker. The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1984; Barry Posen. "Nationalism, the Mass Army and Military Power," International Security, 18, 2 (1993): 80-124; Andreas Wimmer. Waves of War: Nationalism, State Formation and Ethnic Exclusion in the Modern World. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.
[5] Charles Tilly (ed.). The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975; Charles Tilly.Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1990. Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990. Charles Tilly and Wim P. Blockmans (eds.). Cities and the Rise of States in. Europe, AD 1000 to 1800. Boulder: Westview Press, 1994.
[6] Leo Gross. "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948," The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Jan., 1948), pp. 20-41.
[7] Boaz Atzili. Good Fences, Bad Neighbors: Border Fixity and International Conflict. Chicago, IL: University Of Chicago Press, 2012.
[8] Förster, Stig, Wolfgang J. Mommsen, and Ronald Edward Robinson. Bismarck, Europe, and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885 and the Onset of Partition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
[9] Livingstone, Grace. America's backyard: the United States and Latin America from the Monroe Doctrine to the War on Terror. London; New York: Zed Books, 2009.
[10] Rogers Brubaker. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; Ronald Grigor Suny. The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Stanford University Press, 1993.
[11] Andrew Natsios. Sudan, South Sudan, and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know. Oxford University Press, 2012.
Tags Nation-Building
Categories Africa, Balkans, Eurasia, Middle East, Nationalism, Self-Determination, State-building
Keith Darden and Harris Mylonas: The Promethean Dilemma in Third-Party Nation-Building
The killing of the US Ambassador last week in Benghazi and the recent wave of attacks on NATO personnel by uniformed Afghan police and military highlight the perils of international efforts to build states and societies on foreign soil. Why is it that the people we arm and assist keep on turning those weapons against us?
The New York Times, CBSnews, Washington Post, all reported on Sept 17, 2012 that the number of NATO personnel killed in Afghanistan by uniformed Afghan military and police is already at 51 this year, up from a total of 35 for all of last year. Approximately one in six of the NATO soldiers killed in Afghanistan this year were killed by our local allies and trainees. And this only counts those who killed while in uniform. The attrition and desertion rate from the Afghan National Army and police forces is exceptionally high and many have joined the ranks of the Taliban. If we consider the number of allied personnel killed by soldiers and police who have been armed and trained by coalition forces, the number is certainly much higher.
The US has wisely put the training of the Afghan Local Police (ALP) on hold for a month until it can improve procedures for vetting its recruits, but the problem runs much deeper.
In a symposium published recently in Ethnopolitics we debated the merits of international state-building efforts. Our main lesson: There is more to state-building than simply expanding the ranks of the army and police. Expanding the army and police may be state-building, but it might just as easily be insurgency-building if it is not preceded by systematic efforts to build loyalty and to carefully select recruits. If you are unsure of the loyalties of the recruits who you are training, it's best not to train them at all.
Here is the link to our piece, which was followed by some responses (Erin Jenne, Fotini Christia,Gordon Bardos, David Siroky & Yoav Gortzak) and our reply to their thoughtful comments.
Keith Darden and Harris Mylonas. This post first appeared on The Monkey Cage (September 20, 2012).
Categories Nationalism, State-building
Stefan Wolff: Building a democratic state for the new Libya. A task list
By Florian Bieber
Building democratic states is a complex and challenging task at the best of times. After violent conflict this task is additionally complicated by the fact that peace needs to be secured, institutions need to be comprehensively reformed, if not built from scratch, civil society and political culture need to be reinvigorated, and economies need to be put back on a path to sustainable growth. All these tasks are urgent and success (and failure) across the state-building agenda mutually reinforcing.
Sustainable peace, democracy and prosperity depend crucially on choosing the right institutions, but these institutions cannot flourish unless there is security. For Libya, this means first and foremost putting an end to the current violence resulting from the resistance that the old regime is still offering. It also means ensuring that law and order are restored quickly, weapons collected, rebels demobilised and reintegrated. Given the brevity of the revolution, the latter should be relatively easy to accomplish without leaving the new transitional government defenceless. In the medium-term, a proper security sector reform needs to occur, establishing full democratic control over all armed and other security forces.
As the new government assumes responsibility for running the country, a functioning system of law and order needs to be established, including mechanisms to investigate and prosecute crimes committed by the Gaddafi regime and to ensure that justice is also accessible to those who came to harm during the revolution, regardless of who the perpetrators were. This will require a carefully balanced approach that is neither equivalent to wholesale criminalisation of former members and supporters of the regime nor offers a blanket amnesty for past crimes. As the National Transitional Council has already made clear, justice needs to enable reconciliation.
A stable, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Libya can only be built with international support, especially in the short-term. This will require financial and technical assistance, especially when it comes to rebuilding the economy, formulate a sound economic and fiscal policy, restore sources of government revenue, and avoid long-term dependency on international aid. A secure environment and international assistance are crucial factors to rebuild public finances, create a climate in which economic growth can be fostered, and gradually enable states recovering from conflict to become less aid-dependent and provide a range of public services that, in turn, will contribute to greater legitimacy of their institutional framework. Libya's hydrocarbon wealth should make this task easier, but here, too, pitfalls exist. As the haggling over Iraq's oil and gas law has demonstrated, managing resource wealth and sharing it fairly are demanding tasks that require balancing local, national, and international individual, state and corporate interests.
State-building also requires nation-building, or more precisely establishing a vibrant civil society and a political and media culture that can sustain peace and democracy by promoting cooperation and trust between different segments of society. This process can be facilitated by international actors, but it needs to be organic and bottom-up if it is to succeed. It is important that political institutions are built with the input from all local and civil society actors, that institutions are built which enable civil society and media to develop and to shape the nature of the state that is being built in the long-term as well. The legitimacy of the state that now emerges in post-Gaddafi Libya will crucially depend on the ability of institutions to facilitate the growth of civil society and truly free and independent media.
In the short-term, and beyond, however, the most crucial link is that between security and legitimacy. Any post-conflict state's capacity to provide security for its citizens determines its legitimacy. Vice versa the legitimacy the state has (in terms of elections, the participation of key stakeholders and elites in decision-making) conditions the degree to which security is seen by citizens as protecting them rather than a new regime. The new government will need to consider carefully its options: ensuring a broad-based transitional government, preparing elections in which all political actors committed to a political, democratic process can participate, and containing those forces within the country that are set to disrupt this process. This is unlikely to be a smooth process, but nonetheless one which can succeed if all actors agree to a set of basic principles of political conduct, enshrine them in institutions, and remain united against anyone violating this consensus.
Building a secure and stable, democratic and prosperous Libya will not be easy or quick to accomplish. If local leaders realise this, and make an effort to explain the complexity and length of the task ahead to their constituents, if the international community musters the resources, stamina, and enthusiasm to support Libya on its difficult road ahead, and if the institutions being built now establish inclusive, transparent and accountable government, Libya might well turn into a case of successful democratic state-building.
Stefan Wolff is Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham, England, UK. His website is www.stefanwolff.com.
Tags Libya
Categories Africa, Middle East, State-building
Stefan Wolff: Three questions on Libya and one on the region
(1) If Gaddafi supporters in/outside the regime did not fight, where are they and what are their plans?
Resistance collapsed relatively quickly on the road to, and in, Tripoli, but that does not mean that the regime as a whole and across the country has been comprehensively defeated. The rebels clearly have the upper hand now and momentum is on their side, but there is a danger of setbacks. Looking at the most recent, and most traumatic, transitions of a similar kind, in both Iraq and Afghanistan regime loyalists of varying kinds resurfaced. In Iraq, they were partly defeated and partly co-opted after a very violent civil war drawing in significant foreign forces; in Afghanistan this process is still far from resolved. Both cases also demonstrate that al-Qaeda and its upshots are very adept at exploiting the instability that usually follows violent regime collapse, if only to establish (temporary) alliances of convenience to further their own agenda.
(2) How united are the rebel forces and who is in overall command?
Rebel forces have advanced on Tripoli from three sides—this does not only reflect geographical divisions. United by the will to oust Gaddafi, it is not clear how much of a common vision for a new Libya there is among the diverse rebel forces, how much they trust each other, and the extent to which the transitional council is recognised widely inside Libya (as opposed to internationally) as the new legitimate government. Rebel unity is not about an identical political agenda shared by all, but about a basic agreement on ground rules. This needs to include a commitment to an inclusive political process, to institutions for a transitional period before elections, and to respect for the rule of law rather than wanton retribution on former members and supporters of the Gaddafi regime. Some thought also needs to be given on how to deal with those who are unable or unwilling to sign up to such basic principles. The rebel leadership needs to manage this transitional period carefully, they need to accept the principle of inclusive government, and step back from maximalist demands. This will also require managing the expectations of their own constituencies and respecting the need for their allies in the movement to do the same. If this can be achieved, it will lay a significant foundation for a new political culture in Libya.
(3) Who will lead the international post-conflict reconstruction effort in support of a new Libya?
So far only vague statements have emerged about learning the lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan, about existing preparations, about the need for the UN and the contact group to lead, and about NATO willing to continue protecting civilians. This does not amount to a coherent and coordinated strategy even for the short term when the foundations will be laid for the new Libya that will emerge. The nature, level, and sustainability of a civilian international effort in the aftermath of the fighting in Libya will be important for the country itself, but no less impactful for the region as a whole. Making a success of Libya's revolution will primarily depend on Libyans, but also on the kind of support they receive internationally. In many a country, internationally-led post-war reconstruction has not completely failed, but it has not had a stellar record of achieving sustainable peace, development and democracy either. The lessons are there, ready to be learned—as are, unfortunately, the mistakes to be repeated. International support is not only a Western 'business'. Libya's neighbours (and that includes the European Union) and the Arab world as a whole will want, and need, to play a role, as will China and Russia. Overall UN leadership is likely to provide legitimacy, but not necessarily effectiveness. While a joint UN-EU-AU-Arab-League mission is conceivable, it is important to bear in mind that the multi-organisational effort in Kosovo headed by the UN and involving the European Union, NATO and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe offered more problems than solutions.
(4) What do developments in Libya mean for the Arab Spring and the Middle East more broadly?
While Libya has commanded much media attention over the past 2-3 days, it is not the only country experiencing significant upheaval. In Syria, the regime appears to be firmly in control—unsurprisingly given the lack of a similarly well-organized and armed opposition and the absence of NATO military support. Yet it is not clear how sustainable Assad's rule is especially if Saudi Arabia and Turkey increase pressure. A transition here might still be possible, although probably in the form of a more gradual, negotiated process. In Yemen, President Saleh has been out of the country for more than a month, but the opposition is deeply divided and has very different aims. The Houthi rebellion in the North and the secessionist movement in the South precede the democratic opposition by years, al-Qaeda has a very strong base in the country now, but, despite its alliance with the southern secessionists, shares otherwise very little with the forces confronting the Saleh regime. A regime collapse here is unlikely to usher in either democracy or stability in this strategically important country. At the same time and in the shadow cast by the events in Libya, there has been a significant escalation in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—Israeli approval of expanded settlements, Palestinian attacks in Eilat and Israeli counter-attacks, the latter also leading to the killing of several Egyptian border guards and a consequential deterioration of relations between Egypt (another Arab Spring country) and Israel. In the run-up to a Palestinian push to achieve UN recognition as a non-state member at the General Assembly in September, this is hardly helpful, albeit not utterly surprising as the sides stake out their positions.
Tags Democratization, Ghaddafi, Libya
Categories Africa, Middle East
Sherrill Stroschein: Bilateral Mobilizations, Vigilantes, and RiotWombles
The ongoing events in London and other cities in the UK have forced those of us who research mobilizations to re-examine some of our generally-held ideas. One refrain that seems to be increasingly deployed by politicians regards that of simple "criminality." This is a comforting and quick explanation that, absorbed easily, might help someone sleep better at night, reassured also with their own law-abiding nature. As such, it serves a useful function, but will likely be less useful as a basis for policies to address the complexity of what has just happened.
A second line of thought invokes race, an explanation that easily resonates with those with origins or training in the US – a country that exhibits a very high level of racial categorization in its politics. At first glance, the notion of race could make sense to an analyst given the shooting that sparked the riots. But it quickly became clear in the scale of events that this was about much more. A look at the photos of looters in the newspaper quite plainly reveals that there are no clear patterns of race, and there are plenty of shots of "whites" robbing stores and "non-white" store owners trying to defend them. The television news has been using the word "youths" to describe the looter demographic. While not a usual social science category, the photos show that this is a pretty good approximation of who they are. While the US has high racial categorization, the UK has a high degree of cleavage on a generational basis. The word "yob," or boy spelled backwards, is a UK word to indicate a young man who gets into trouble. This is a concept that is relatively stronger in the UK than in other European countries.
A quite fruitful line of thought is developing around the psychology of those engaged in the violence and looting, exploring in particular the imperative of commercialism that seems to drive some of the actions. These ideas comprise a sophisticated turn on some of the socio-psychological ideas in mobilization theory, forcing us to think carefully about basing economic stability on the requirement of consumerism. Journalists on the streets are also probing these "why" questions in interviewing those involved. This has produced a series of quotes and video or radio clips that are disturbing for many reasons, one being a lack of a truly coherent explanation. This kind of frustrating set of answers by participants to the "why" question is not unique – it seems to crop up in a diverse array of riot studies, ranging from Bangladesh and India to Tulsa. That does not mean that participants should not be asked why they engaged; simply that their answers may not produce the information that we want for a policy-informing explanation.
What kind of information can we reliably draw from riots? One thing we do know is what people do. A focus on observables can tell us a great deal about mobilizations even if we have a hard time getting inside the heads of rioters. For example, actions do not happen in a vacuum. They are followed by reactions. This is no less the case for the UK events, where some social mobilizations have started to emerge in response to the events of the past few days. A focus on politicians alone would miss these mobilizations. Some of these counter-mobilizations include individuals who decided to band together to protect their shops or neighborhoods in light of what was perceived as a low police response in London's Monday events. In East London, Turkish shop owners mobilized to protect their stores. In Southall, a group of Sikh men mobilized to protect a Sikh temple. In Enfield, a group of 300 men gathered to form a "vigilante" group to protect their neighborhood against looters' potential return. These gatherings prompted a worried police department to warn that violence could increase with such groups to counter looters. While the diversity of these counter-mobilizations is obvious (and should serve as additional caution against a race reading of events), the Enfield vigilante group is mentioned by some as potentially leaning towards a racial response. A racial reading of the riots is likely to become a political project for various actors to construe for their own political benefit (watch this space).
Our theoretical abilities to understand the dynamics of bilateral mobilizations such as these are remarkably weak. One reason for this is that social movement theories developed primarily to explain protest against states and state repression. Social movement theories are thus useful to examine conditions of mobilization against a repressive state, and as such they have produced some interesting insights when applied to varied authoritarian settings such as Eastern Europe in 1989 and the recent Arab Spring. Some analysts apply these insights to democratic contexts, while others view this practice as politically motivated. Wherever one stands on this issue, one thing is certain: social movements insights fall down if the state is largely absent in events. It is simply a fact that there just weren't enough police to contain the hundreds of violent looters in some of these events, thus the state was largely absent as an actor in some of them. Moreover, social movement theory has not really considered the potential of mal-intentioned masses. But this is the combination that produced the ugly scenes in London on Monday night and in other cities on Tuesday.
This is where bilateral mobilization comes in. Those of us working on ethnic politics and nationalism have noticed that groups don't tend to simply accept the domination of another. As stated by one Manchester man protecting his shop, "Rather than goin' hiding lettin' them take everything we're gonna stand up and fight. What [else are] ya gonna do?" In a study of mobilization events involving Hungarians and Romanians in Romania, I found that a pattern of emulative mobilization is quite common. Similar to the London events on Monday, the politics of ethnic tensions between masses may not involve the state. They thus take on certain characteristics that can be missed by social movement theory, such as emulative mobilizations across groups as a general dynamic. In their focus on the state, social movements theories don't strongly consider what can happen if groups might mobilize against each other. Where states, armies or police do get involved, the dynamics are quite different. But in bilateral mobilizations with a low state presence, what one finds is the following pattern: one group mobilizes, invoking grievances, and then the other group responds with an emulative mobilization. The pattern of joint mobilizations can easily spiral unless it is ended with either a jointly-recognized involvement by the state or brokerage and negotiation between respected elites of each group.
What can these emulative dynamics tell us about the London riots? Well, there is a very real danger that without a continued police presence, vigilantes might clash with perceived or real looters. While the outcome of such clashes would be less violent in the UK than in a country in which gun ownership is less controlled, spirals remain a real possibility. This potential is augmented by the fact that right-wing parties such as the BNP are intent on making as much political hay out of the riots and looting as they can, and some of the current government rhetoric is feeding into this discourse. Interpreting the situation is one thing, while admittedly addressing the problem is harder. Unlike an ethnic riot, it is not clear that there are any leaders for the rioters with which negotiations could take place. It is possible that "community leaders" could become proxies for such brokers, but this presents a problem for which hopefully those engaged in UK politics might have some creative ideas. What will not be helpful is identifying a platitude instead of a real explanation, just because it is easier to seem to address.
Fortunately, there is one crucial difference between bilateral ethnic mobilizations and the UK events. In addition to the groups of men mobilizing to protect their neighborhoods, there is an entirely different kind of responsive mobilization that has emerged as well: a broad-based cleanup effort. Cleverly called the RiotWombles, their loose name refers to a children's TV series about creatures on Wimbledon Common that pick up objects left by messy human beings. Within the last 24 hours, hundreds of people have shown up in various neighborhoods as part of this effort, hoisting brooms in the air as a symbol of tidiness, and well, frankly, also of strength. The presence of hundreds of broom-wielders in some of these areas should serve as a likely deterrent to would-be looters, in contrast to Monday's empty streets – illustrating one of the logics of bilateral mobilzations. One hopes that it is the RiotWombles, rather than the vigilantes, that might remain the most visible form of counter-mobilization.
Sherrill Stroschein is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) in Politics at the Department of Political Science, School of Public Policy University College London
Tags London, Mobilization, Riots, Social Movements, UK
Categories Western Europe
Stefan Wolff: Libya—Planning for the Day after
Winning a war and winning the peace afterwards are two different things. Banal as this may sound, the track record of international efforts at peace building would suggest that even such a banality is worth repeating over and over in the hope that one day success rather than failure becomes the rule, and that the violence and instability that have been (and are) characteristic of Afghanistan and Iraq, Somalia and Kosovo, Cote d'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo does not remain the hallmark of post-war reconstruction. Yet, even though the balance sheet of internationalised peace and state building is less than stellar it offers important lessons—lessons that become ever more relevant as the conflict in Libya seems to edge towards some sort of negotiated settlement.
Assuming that Gaddafi will exit from a position of relative strength with core elements of his regime still largely intact, one issue is how to handle the transition of power in such a way that real and sustainable change occurs. For a transitional period, this will almost certainly mean continued participation of Gaddafi 'loyalists' in governing institutions. They must not be allowed to bloc change, nor must they be deprived of the opportunity to embrace it. The whole-sale dismissal of Saddam Hussein's army in post-war Iraq serves as a warning of the dire consequences of such a move.
Legitimate and inclusive governing institutions, rightly emphasised as key to stability in the UK government's recent Building Stability Overseas Strategy, can be achieved through free and fair elections. However, early elections after civil wars are not only likely to deepen divisions and to polarise and radicalise societies, they are often also flawed because they take place before there is anything akin to a functioning civil society, free media, and institutions that make the electoral process work—from electoral commissions to political parties and a judicial system respected and capable of resolving disputes before and after elections. Elections cannot and should not be delayed forever and a day, but scheduled too soon, they are likely to do more harm than good.
Yet the challenges are unlikely to stop there. Gaddafi's exit from power is likely to trigger some sort of a succession struggle. This will weaken regime camp, but it will equally increase instability and make it more difficult to maintain whatever fractious consensus on a transitional, post-Gaddafi period might emerge over the coming weeks (or months). Equally, the opposition movement, loosely held together in the Libyan Interim National Council will soon come to realise that apart from their desire to get rid of Gaddafi and his regime there is little that unites them in terms of substantive policies. The current anti-Gaddafi consensus is sure to give way quickly to internal struggles for power and positions. While it would be foolish to speculate about how violent potential in-fighting will be among regime loyalists and the opposition, neither bodes well for post-Gaddafi stability in Libya.
Another recurring issue in many post-war situations has to do with transitional justice. Already there are signs, albeit few, of extra-judicial retribution on the rebel side. Revenge attacks are common once the tables have turned, and history is littered with incidents of spontaneous and systematic reprisals—killings, torture, rape, and expulsions are phenomena that are all too common to be ignored. Not only do they cause immediate human suffering but they also contribute to instability further down the line, creating an environment for social and political divisions to consolidate and for hatreds to deepen. A stable political, let alone inclusive democratic process in such situations is difficult at best. Even where proper judicial processes are in place—in country or in international institutions—it is difficult for members and supporters of a former regime not to see them as 'victor's justice'. This is not to say that serious crimes should go unpunished but that a balance needs to be struck between dealing with the past and building a sustainable future. The former Yugoslavia, South Africa, and Rwanda, to name just a few recent examples, have all approached this issue differently, and their successes and failures offer some food for thought.
At the core of these issues lies the question of institution building in the post-Gaddafi era. This will be a complex undertaking, involving reforms of existing institutions and the establishment of new ones, as well as a whole host of staffing decisions. Such institutions will have to be representative of the diversity of Libya. They will derive their legitimacy in part from the degree to which they are representative, but equally from their ability to deliver security, justice, prosperity, and democracy.
Libya will face profound challenges on the day after Gaddafi is gone, challenges that will not be easy or quick to address. But as the signs increase that this day may be nearing, now is the time to think about the post-Gaddafi era and how the knowledge and understanding that has accumulated on how to deal with post-war situations can be put to good use. Even though Libya does not lend itself to an international UN or AU-led model of international administration, this does not mean that the international community has no role to play. Helping Libyans to build institutions and institutional capacity will be the most valuable contribution that the international community can make in assisting that country to avoid the mistakes made elsewhere and build the foundations of a democratic society.
Tags Libya, State-Building


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Deezer Downloader to MP3: How to Record Music with ID3 Tags (2022)
Deezer is an online music streaming platform that is widely supported to any devices and platform. You may use this platform on MacOS or Windows, Xbox one, Smart TV, and many more. With its over 43 million licensed tracks available on its music library, you'll surely want to hang out and bring your music vibe here everyday.
Some devices, however, may not support FLAC. It can also take up a lot of space on your hard disk because it uses uncompressed song files. The fact that MP3 is widely compatible with most devices is one of the reasons why most users opt to do Deezer downloader to mp3. You will never be able to download Deezer music to MP3 without the assistance of a song downloader.
The free trial version allows you to record one song at a time and record it for one minute.
You can get an unlimited subscription by simply clicking the link below and downloading your music.
ZEUS Free Download for Windows 7 / 8 / 10
Fortunately, ZEUS MUSIC record function can help you convert Deezer to mp3 android. MP3 is compatible with so many devices, it makes streaming and sharing a breeze. Users can choose from a variety of music file types, including WMA, FLAC, and WAV, in addition to MP3. This software also allows for the recording of voice overlay.
How to Record Deezer Music to MP3
Step 1: Set the Format to MP3
To ensure recording is in MP3 format, open the software then click the "Music" tab. Click the "Record" button and immediately click the "Format" icon at the bottom left of the software. Choose the MP3 format to set the recording format.
Step 2: Prepare Music for Recording
Hover your mouse cursor to your PC browser and search for the Deezer site. Then, search for the music you want to be recorded. Once found, load the video a little bit to ensure smooth recording.
Step 3: Get ready for your Deezer Download Playlist to MP3 to be Recorded
Then, to record your music, simply return to the ZEUS MUSIC and click the "Record" button.
Then, head back to the site and click the "Play" button of the music you wish to record. Once done, kindly go back to the software and click the "Stop" button to end the recording. You may also "Pause" the recording if necessary.
Step 4: Enjoy listening to your Deezer Music
Your file will be added right away to your recorded list. The music will then try to identify the music you recorded, once identified, it will rename it automatically based on its original track. You may right-click the recorded file for more options.
The user can look up the ten most popular songs in his nation, make playlists, utilize the search tool, or even request an alphabetical listing of artists, songs, or albums. You can transfer your Deezer downloader to MP3 with no storage restriction and add them to your playlists. They are not searchable and only the person who sent them can listen to them or include them into his playlists.
If you need to convert Deezer to MP3 online, ZEUS MUSIC is happy to help. It has noteworthy features and, thanks to its search engine, it is simple to browse for music. Their download capabilities can be used to download music from Pandora, Beatport, and other music streaming services. Other features include ID3 tag identifiers, CD burners, editors, and converters, which allow you to complete more tasks.

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaCommonCrawl


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Emirates ID Card Status
emirates id status check Two methods available, First Process is with New ICA Website Portal and Second Method.
About Us And Contact us
emirates identity authority
Emirates info
Select Selection hide
1 What is emirates identity authority?
1.1 Services of the Emirates Identity Authority
1.2 Renewal of the Emirates ID for citizens
1.3 Request for exemption from late fines
What is emirates identity authority?
The emirates identity authority is an independent federal body, established by Federal Decree-Law No. (2) of 2004, which conferred on it all the powers required to implement and develop the population registry and ID card program project in the United Arab Emirates.
The emirates identity authority was established on 15 Shaaban 1425 AH corresponding to September 29, 2004 AD, which based its legislation on the text of the constitution, laws, and federal decrees related to the ministries 'competencies, minister's powers, nationality laws, passports, entry, and residence of foreigners, laws governing the registration of births and deaths, the regulation of labor relations and the decrees related to the General Authority for Information and Civil Service in the federal government To the UAE.
The founding decree stipulated that the emirates identity authority is a federal government entity that enjoys legal personality and has an independent budget and undertakes the task of registering population data and issuing identity cards so that it is entitled to:
• Recording the personal data of all residents in the country and saving them on electronic databases in coordination with the competent authorities
• Record vital population statistics data and link it with personal data
• Issuing identity cards containing the unified number, readable data, and data stored on an electronic chip to be dealt with by all parties
• Providing identification and confirmation services for individuals to federal and local government agencies and any other bodies, and determining the means to be followed in this, according to the executive regulations
• The right to request the necessary data and information that serve the objectives of the authority from the competent authorities in the state
Services of the Emirates Identity Authority
As mentioned earlier, the tasks of immigration and passports in addition to the tasks of residence and foreigners' affairs have become among the powers of the Federal Authority, which are represented in:
Recording the personal data of all residents of the country and registering it in electronic databases in coordination with the competent authorities.
Issuance of national identity cards.Emirates ID Card Status
Identity renewal and data update.Renew the Emirates ID card
Inquiries about Emirates ID and application status.
Providing identification and verification services for individuals to the concerned authorities.
Determine the general policies for nationality affairs, passports, and the entry or residence of foreigners in the UAE.
Issuing, renewing, or withdrawing regular and temporary passports.
Arrest and deport foreigners and issue visas or permissions to deport foreigners in accordance with the law.
Determine fees related to nationality affairs, passports, entry, and residence of foreigners.
The Emirates Identity Authority provides services to individuals and institutions, and is keen to provide services for people of determination and the elderly to meet their needs, and among its most prominent services to individuals:
Data update request.
Issuance of the Emirates ID card.
Issuance of a passport.
Extract the abstract of a constraint.
Renewal of the Emirates ID for citizens
Renewing the Emirates ID card for citizens, and once it expires, is mandatory for all ages and groups, as the Emirates ID Authority provides several channels to complete its services, which are:
Happiness Service Centers
Emirates Identity Center website
Smart application
Printing offices
The Emirates Identity Authority has also set renewal service fees, as follows:
AED 100: Fees for issuing a card, valid for 5 years.
AED 200: Fees for issuing a card, valid for 10 years.
AED 40: a service fee.
AED 150: an urgent service fee.
AED 30: Typing Office Fee.
Here are the total fees required to renew the ID card according to the service delivery channel:
o 290 AED (100 + 40 + 150): Fees for issuing a card valid for 5 years.
o 390 UAE dirhams (200 + 40 + 150): Fees for issuing a card, valid for 10 years.
Smart application / electronic form system
140 AED (100 + 40): Fees for issuing a card, valid for 5 years.
o 240 UAE dirhams (200 + 40): fees for issuing a card, valid for 10 years.
o 170 UAE dirhams (100 + 40 + 30): Fees for issuing a card valid for 5 years.
o 270 AED (200 + 40 + 30): Fees for issuing a card valid for 10 years.
Request for exemption from late fines
A fine is levied on those who are late in submitting an ID card renewal application if the delay period exceeds 30 days after its expiration date, as 20 dirhams are due for each day of delay, with a maximum of one thousand dirhams. Applying for the exemption service provided by the authority.
Conditions for applying for a late fine exemption
An individual who left the country more than 3 months ago and whose ID card expired after the date of departure.
Everyone whose card has expired after being deported by an administrative decision or a court ruling, or whose passport is seized pending lawsuits or because of passport renewal.
A person with a contagious disease, a clinically incapacitated person, or a person with total or partial disability.
A resident whose residency has expired while he is outside the country and his ID card has also expired after the date of departure
Category of diplomatic missions and consuls in embassies and consulates Senior citizens (70 years and over).
Category of persons subject to social security and their sponsored persons
Delay caused by an error in the authority's systems.
The Emirates Identity Authority allows inquiries about the status of the application for individuals through its official website, and through it, you can inquire about the details of renewing the Emirates ID for both citizens of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and for expatriates residing in the country. Please visit Our Website Emiratesidstatuscheck for, such as the General Administration of Residency and Foreigners Affairs (Abu Dhabi Passports), the guide of Dubai courts, details of the UAE labor law for the private sector, and many other diverse topics. For any inquiries or suggestions, please contact us through the comments space at the bottom of the page.
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It is 2017! Another New Year! This year is a milestone as I am now 30. I am still young, but not Generation Z young.
My 20s are now behind me. I actually shared a moment of self-reflection about my 20s here.
An online business gives me the freedom to live such a life. Although, the expat life has its pros and cons like anything else. I would be happy to highlight all of the pros and cons as an expat, but the specific topic deserves its own article.


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Caleb Plant dominates Jose Uzcategui to capture the IBF super middleweight world championship
Jan 13, 2019 By Bob Velin
"Sweethands" lived up to his moniker, not only winning a 168-pound title—but turning in a star-making performance in Los Angeles.
Uzcategui vs Plant - Watch Video Highlights | January 13, 2019
His nickname is "Sweethands," and now the boxing world knows why.
Caleb Plant's fists were sweeter than sugar on Sunday night. In his first shot at a world title, Plant put on a brilliant display of boxing against power-punching champion Jose Uzcategui, winning a unanimous decision and his first world title in the main event of PBC on FS1 at the Microsoft Theater in Los Angeles.
Plant, not known for his punching power, knocked Uzcategui down twice, in the second and fourth rounds, with lightning-quick left hooks each time.
The 26-year-old will take his newly minted IBF super middleweight title and still perfect record (18-0, 10 KOs) back to Tennessee.
Judges Max DeLuca and Zachary Young both scored the fight 116-110, while Lou Moret scored it 115-111. Plant had said this week that all he wanted to hear was "And the new . . ." and that's exactly what he heard when ring announcer Ray Flores read the decision.
Upon hearing those words, Plant, blood dripping from a cut outside his right eye that occurred in the third round, dropped to his knees, his lifelong dream finally realized.
"I've worked my whole lifetime for this, 17 years straight," Plant said, tears flowing. "I buried my daughter in the process of trying to get this belt. I promised her that I would become world champion and bring her this title, and that's exactly what I'm going to go back to Tennessee and do.
"Nashville, stand up," he shouted in reference to his hometown.
Plant lost his 19-month-old daughter, Alia, in 2015 to a rare disease. He has been fighting for her ever since. Uzcategui, 28, also lost a 3-year-old daughter several years ago from a heart defect. Both fighters have drawn inspiration from their misfortune.
This fight was originally scheduled for last August, but Plant broke his left hand during training camp, pushing the date back. He showed no ill-effects on this night.
Plant moved beautifully early on, beating Uzcategui to the punch and scoring with a strong jab. Uzcategui missed often, as Plant ducked and feinted and slipped punches while landing to the head and body—looking almost Floyd Mayweather-like in the process. It's no coincidence that Plant, who now resides in Las Vegas, has spent much time at the Mayweather Boxing Club.
A counter left hook in the middle of an exchange dropped an off-balance Uzcategui down in the second—only the third time in his career. He rose, seemingly unhurt, and continued to stalk the challenger, who peppered him in the process.
Early in the fourth, a bad cut opened over Plant's right eye. The American showed grit, fighting through it although it times it appeared to impair his vision. Energized by seeing blood, Uzcategui began letting his hands go.
Midway through the stanza, they traded hooks. Both landed; Plant's punch was significantly harder, driving Uzcategui across the ring and to the mat. This time, when he rose, his legs appeared unsteady. However, Plant didn't press his advantage, sticking to his game plan of a smart, outside fight.
Plant continued to pile up the points as the fight progressed. He landed an assortment of shots to the head and body, leading and countering—almost at will. And his defense was sublime.
Uzcategui was game but flummoxed. He rebounded in the ninth, rocking Plant with a short right uppercut on the inside. The challenger wisely clinched to survive the follow-up onslaught.
After losing the tenth, Plant bounced back in the eleventh, showing skill in close quarters and beating Uzcategui to the punch at a distance.
After the final bell, Plant jumped on the ropes, raising both arms in history. He had finally realized his dream.
Brandon Figueroa passes tough test, stopping Moises Flores in three rounds
Brandon Figueroa made a bold statement Sunday night, punishing Moises Flores with a flurry of body shots, as the 22-year-old Texan remained undefeated and moved closer to a title shot with a third-round knockout of Moises Flores, a former title challenger.
Figueroa (18-0, 13 KOs), "The Heartbreaker," came out aggressively and never gave Flores much of a chance to even fight back, pounding away at the Mexican's body with powerful shots that made him wince. Flores went down twice, the second time on a left hook that took whatever steam he had left out of him. Referee Jack Reiss had seen enough and stopped it at 1:25 of the third round of the scheduled 12-round junior featherweight bout.
Asked what his message would be to WBA junior featherweight champion Daniel Roman, he said, "I am really strong. I came in at 110 percent and did my job. I am most definitely ready for a title shot. I'm going to go back home and start training and I'm ready for it."
Figueroa is the younger brother of former champion Omar Figueroa Jr.
Joey Spencer keeps KO streak perfect
Sensational teenage prospect Joey Spencer sent 39-year-old challenger Brandon Harder down to one knee three times en route to a second-round TKO. This was his sixth win in as many fights. All have ended in knockouts.
Spencer, 18, the Premier Boxing Champions' 2018 Prospect of the Year, countered the awkward style of Harder, a former cop and fireman, by essentially standing in the middle of the ring and pot-shotting his opponent, who spent most of his less than two rounds keeping his distance from Spencer. After Harder took a knee for the third time, and second time in the second round, referee Jack Reiss stopped it at 1:27 of the round.
Spencer is ready to step up the competition.
"The goal is to move to six rounds next, that's in the plans and I think that's going to happen. I look forward to it."
Guillermo Rigondeaux KOs Giovanni Delgado in PBC debut
Former champion and pound-for-pound contender Guillermo Rigondeaux, fighting for the first time in 13 months and for the first time with Ronnie Shields as his trainer, wasted little time in handling Giovanni Delgado. Rigondeaux dropped the Mexican with a powerful overhand left at the end of the first round and that was all she wrote. Referee Jack Reiss counted Delgado out at the bell.
Rigondeaux, a Cuban and former super bantamweight champion coming off his only career loss in December 2017 to Vasily Lomachenko, found Delgado a much easier target. He improved to 18-1 with 12 KOs, hardly breaking a sweat in stopping Delgado, who has lost his last four fights by knockout. His record fell to 16-9.
Pure. Domination.
Ahmed Elbiali puts on a show and gets the 3rd Round KO. pic.twitter.com/PwqWLIID1z
— FOX Sports: PBC (@PBConFOX) January 14, 2019
Ahmed Elbiali knocks veteran Allen Green down three times en route to TKO victory
Ahmed Elbiali's power punches were too much for veteran Allen Green, as the Egyptian-born light-heavyweight fighting out of Miami pummeled Green for nearly three rounds, finally stopping the 39-year-old, who had little stomach to continue the punishment Albiali was dishing out.
Green (33-6) went down in the first round as Albiali attacked the body and took a knee in the second round. By the third round, Green was holding on for dear life, before an overhand right finished him at 1:43 of the round.
"I was easier than I thought it was going to be," said Elbiali. "Losing to Pascal the way I did, it messes with you mentally. I was trying to stay on my A-game. Stay focused and thankfully it showed. My game plan clicked really well. I have been sparring with Caleb (Plant) and other great guys. That keeps you sharp and alert. I would love to win a world title and be the first Egyptian win a world championship."
For a complete look at Uzcategui vs Plant, check out our fight page.
Uzcategui vs Plant
Caleb Plant
Brandon Figueroa
Joey Spencer
Ahmed Elbiali
Dec 29, 2022 / Caleb Plant, Plant vs Dirrell
In a battle of former super middleweight champions, "Sweethands" Plant delivers a brilliant one-punch KO win and reminds the 168-pound division that he remains one of the very elite.
Oct 16, 2022 / Wilder vs Helenius, Plant vs Dirrell, Sanchez vs Negron, Russell vs Rodriguez, Deontay Wilder, Robert Helenius, Caleb Plant, Anthony Dirrell, Gary Antonio Russell, Emmanuel Rodriguez, Frank Sanchez, Carlos Negron
BombZquad! Wilder Torches Helenius in One Round
The former long-time heavyweight champion scores another frightening first round KO in front of a raucous crowd at Brooklyn's Barclays Center in the main event of the FOX Sports PBC Pay-Per-View.
Sep 05, 2022 / Spencer vs Salgado, Aleem vs Plan, Joey Spencer, Kevin Salgado, Ra'eese Aleem, Charles Martin
Joey Spencer, Ra'eese Aleem Shine On The Big Stage
Spencer proves he's a force in the 154-pound division as he cruises past Kevin Salgado on FOX while super bantam Aleem moves one step closer to a world title with a dominant win over Mike Plania on FS1.


Adam Duvall's two-run single capped a three-run rally in the seventh inning and lifted the Cincinnati Reds to a 6-5 win over the host Atlanta Braves on Wednesday at SunTrust Park.
The Reds mounted the comeback against left-hander Sam Freeman (2-4) and scored all three runs with two outs. Scooter Gennett drove in the first run with a single and Duvall, after Dan Winkler replaced Freeman, put Cincinnati ahead with a two-run single to right field.
The winning pitcher was Jackson Stephens (2-0), who struck out two in 1 2/3 innings. David Hernandez, Jared Hughes and Raisel Iglesias each added one shutout inning to complete the win. Iglesias picked up his 15th save.
Cincinnati won two of three in the series and has won nine of its last 10 games. The Reds improved to 31-31 since Jim Riggleman became manager on April 19.
Cincinnati starter Luis Castillo began the game by retiring the first 11 batters he faced. He then allowed six straight base runners with two outs in the fourth. Castillo gave up five runs, four earned, in four innings.
Atlanta starter Sean Newcomb worked six innings and allowed three runs on seven hits and two walks, striking out six.
The Reds scored single runs in the second on an RBI single from Billy Hamilton and in the third on Jose Peraza's solo homer, his third.
The Braves took a 4-2 lead in the fourth. Kurt Suzuki, Charlie Culberson, Johan Camargo and Dansby Swanson each had consecutive RBI singles.
Cincinnati scored in the fifth on Brandon Dixon's RBI single, only to have the Braves get it back in the bottom of the inning when Ender Inciarte scored on third baseman Eugenio Suarez's throwing error.
The Reds played most of the game without first baseman Joey Votto. The veteran was ejected in the first inning after complaining about a called third strike.
The Braves made a roster move on Wednesday, placing rookie pitcher Mike Soroka on the 60-day disabled list. The right-hander was shut down after his last start due to shoulder soreness. Atlanta recalled right-hander Wes Parsons from Triple-A Gwinnett and optioned righty Matt Wisler to Gwinnett. Parsons is 4-3 with a 2.10 ERA in 14 games, 13 starts between two minor league levels.


text:
XXR may refer to:

Little fresh meat (Chinese: xiǎo xiān ròu), Chinese slang for handsome young males, especially celebrities
Koropó language (ISO 639-3 code xxr), an extinct Brazilian language
XXR, an ISO 3166 placeholder code for an imaginary country

redpajama_set_name: RedPajamaWikipedia


Horses typically eat hay that's grown locally, which means their options are often restricted to what grows best in their area. While alfalfa is considered an ideal hay, horses can also eat timothy, clover and tall fescue hays as well as mixtures of these hays. No matter what the variety of hay they eat, hay that retains its green color is preferable to yellow hay, and clean hay is a priority.
Legume hays, such as alfalfa, clover, and soybean hays, are generally nutrient-rich. They may have higher calorie, protein and calcium content than other hays. Legume hay may also offer nutrients that are more digestible than other hays and may be too rich for many horses. For this reason, legume hays are often mixed with grass hays. Legume hays harvested before the plant begins to blossom have the best taste and are the most nutrient dense.
Small grain hays include oats and pearl millet, as well as cereal grain hays from barley, wheat or rye. These kinds of hay offer horses a significant amount of carbohydrates through the sugars and starches they provide, although they are not as dense in calories as legume hays. In addition, small grain hays do not offer as much potassium as legume hays or grass hays. Small grain hays may have higher nitrate levels than legume hays or grass hays. Because horses can tolerate no more than 2 percent nitrates in their diets, small-grain hays require testing for nitrate levels prior to feeding.
Grass hays, such as tall fescue, timothy, or orchard grass, only offer a low to medium amount of protein to your horse. These hays also fail to provide a sufficient amount of calcium if they are fed by themselves. Ideally, you should feed these hays in combination with a legume hay. Grass hays are highly palatable and are high in fiber, despite not being high in nutrients. Tall fescue hay is not appropriate for pregnant mares, as it may lead to stillbirths and abortions.
Moldy or dusty hay can actually harm your horse's health. It can cause upper respiratory infections and ailments. Moldy hay can cause the heaves, a chronic lung diseases. It can also cause colic, a serious and often fatal condition. While hay stored outside can be fine if it's sun-bleached to a light yellow, brown hay is often moldy. It is best to assess the color of the hay at the center of a bale to determine freshness: Mold is often found on the inside of a hay bale rather than on the outside. Clean hay should be free of dirt and trash and mostly free of weeds.


17:00-22:00 - Informal gathering in the hotel bar. Dinner is on your own, although there are usually groups that leave for dinner during this time.
The agenda is usually pretty loosely defined and is often refined throughout the conference, but the topics will be largely constrained to those relating to Wine development. If there is a topic you would like to discuss, send an email to the wineconf mailing list. We usually also set aside time for ad-hoc working groups; we'll keep scratch pads handy for such conversations.
Should we merge the wine-devel and wine-patches mailing lists?
We have a pool of rooms at fixed price 325 PLN/night (around 77 EUR/night) reserved for WineConf attendees. To make a reservation, please fill the form and e-mail it to the hotel (you can change the arrival/departure dates).
Please also fill RSVP form (even if you're not staying in the hotel), so that we know you're coming.
The nearest airport is Wrocław Airport (WRO).
From the airport, you have two choices to get to the hotel. A taxi cab will cost you about 50 PLN (~15 EUR) for the trip (see air port page for details). The 106 bus line will get you to the hotel in about 45 minutes, a ticket ("normal" one way for 3 PLN) can be bought at the bus stop with credit card. Exit the bus at Orląt Lwowskich bus stop and take ~10 minutes walk to the hotel. You can also use Uber.
The train station nearest to the hotel is Wrocław Główny railway station. It's around 25 minutes away by foot from the hotel. There's lots of options for getting from there by tram. The easiest is to take tram no 15 and go to Rynek stop.
The city center is quite crowded. It may be hard to find a parking place there (it's free to park near town square on weekends and after 6 PM). Parking at the hotel should be possible but is expensive.If you wish to avoid parking fees let us know, it should be possible to find a place free to park nearby.
It's easiest to buy the tickets for public transportation in bus/tram. There's a machine that sells them in every vehicle. It's only possible to pay by credit/debit card. If you prefer to pay by cash you should buy the ticket in e.g. newspaper shop. The best page to find public transportation routes is jakdojade.pl (Google Maps also may be used, but it's known to miss some connections).
It's also possible to pay by card in most taxis (but you have to confirm it with the driver).
If you want to do some sightseeing in Wroclaw, area around Sofitel Hotel is a good place to start. It's just next to Market Square (called Rynek), which is the main tourist attraction in Wrocław. All the area around Rynek is nice for walking.
Ostrów Tumski is the oldest part of the town. It's in walking distance from the hotel.
There are multiple museums in the city. Panorama Racławicka, a 15x114m large paining, is also very popular for tourists (tickets are often sold out, so it's safer to buy them online in advance).
If you look closely you can see some of many Wroclaw's gnomes that are placed next to many monuments and other tourist attractions.
Next to the Sofitel hotel, there is St. Elizabeth's Church, which has a high tower with a very nice view of the city (warning: 200 stairs climbing).
See the keynote. Nothing surprising. Lines of code growing, slightly slower than previously. First 10 years for 1 million lines, now approaching 4 million LoC.
Wine 3.0 end of this year (we do yearly time based releases).
Google of Summer Code 2017 was not so good this year. 1 project, failed.
Outreach 2017 was successful, longstanding Wine Community admin Rosanne DiMesio worked on the AppDB (PHP).
CodeWeavers doing quite well, compared to 15 months ago.
CrossOver commercial Wine sells best on MacOS, but not so much on Linux (where there are "free" wines). They saw a large increase of their OEM Business, where they help people port apps to Wine. CodeWeavers hired quite some people in the last year. The open-source Wine developer market is pretty much hired up by CodeWeavers now, no free developers left.
The goal is to run x86_64 Windows binaries on Arm64, with minimal overhead.
Their method is writing a QEMU windows-user-land port, and hooking on the Windows API level, mapping the calls and forwarding them to arm64 Wine.
arm64 kernel32                       QEMU API mapper of kernel32 etc.
The mapper code is made out of 1000s auto-generated API thunks, per API one thunk function on the guest side and one proxy function on the host side. So uses lots of auto-generated code, some hand adjusted.
It helps being 64 <-> 64bit, so pointers do not need to converted. Exception handling is troublesome as usual.
notepad++ works nicely and is quite quick.
A 32 bit x86 <-> 64 bit arm was also demoed. This needs more mapping, especially the 32 bit <-> 64 bit pointer need to be mapped. But "Notepad++" partially works already, is also kind of fast.
Aric told us about the Sticker project, handed out several blocks.
How to get more people to contribute ... Lots of back and forth, not many ideas.
Marcus got a stack of Wine Project Stickers for FOSDEM et.al..
Apple will remove 32 bit libraries in 12-24 months, which makes 32 bit Wine much harder.
Solutions: 32 <-> 64 bit thunking, might need quite some work. But see "Hangover".
CodeWeavers has been working on a (stand-alone) Direct3D 12 implementation based on Vulkan called "vkd3d". Vkd3d is licensed under the LGPL, and the intention is that eventually Wine's Direct3D 12 implementation will be based on this library. At the same time, vkd3d is intended to be useful to non-Wine ("native") ports.
Demoed a Linux port of Microsoft's ModelViewer demo using this library.
We discussed largely where this library should be hosted.
The Wine Staging patchset is growing. More stuff should go to regular wine. Sadly the maintainers of Wine Staging were not there.
We need to focus more on getting patches into mainline. Subsystem maintainers should perhaps check out staging more frequently. Vincent Povirk does regularly.
To ease entry for new submitters and better discussions there was the proposal to merge the two lists. It looks like we agreed on doing that.
Needs some adjustments to the patch tracking engines, which Alexandre wants to do.
Largely a report of improvements over the Outreach work by Rosanne, and demos e.g. when to assign high ratings.
The appdb admin frontend was demoed.
Alexandre has some wayland things working on his Laptop, but it's alpha and not production ready.
He showed clock.exe and one other app. No keyboard yet, a bit mouse, window management is not working.
Discussion of larger commits logs, and also including bug references.
Concerns are mostly around "how large?", "style?" and "more rejects based on bad commit messages?".
Bug links should be included (standard format e.g. bug 424242). (Similar also CIDs, appdb links or similar I think).
It seems we want to try it.
Alexandre does not want to frustrate maintainers by rejecting submissions that were approved by other reviewers. So general question if this works good.
Review of process of reviewers besides Alexandre? Seems while there is no big enthusiasm, it seems to work ok-ish right now. Some more reviewers were found/will be added.
We did a live brainstorming and added topics to the Wiki pages, which need to be refined further.
Next year's Wine conference will likely be held in The Hague ('s-Gravenhage), The Netherlands.
Another wine test review session.
This page was last modified on 6 November 2017, at 10:47.


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Into the woods: JourneyCare helps siblings cope with loss of brother
Vanessa, Edward and Brian Morales always counted on their oldest brother, Alejandro, to pave the way in life for them and for their baby sister, Kendrah.
He would be the one to teach them what to expect in high school, to have his first date, or be the first to bend the rules.
Vanessa said bereavement camp
helped her deal with the loss of her
older brother, as well as bullying at
That changed, however, when Alejandro became ill and was diagnosed with hemophagocytic lymphohistiocytosis, a life-threatening condition commonly called HLH. In an effort to treat this disorder, doctors at an area hospital performed a bone marrow transplant on 15-year-old Alejandro.
Delia Morales shares a moment with her
son, Alejandro, before he died at age 15.
But his body did not accept the transplant, and Alejandro died in the hospital.
"His death caught us by surprise, because we never thought we would lose him," said Delia Morales, the children's mother.
Vanessa, who was just two years younger and extremely close with Alejandro, felt like the floor had fallen from underneath her.
As the family sorted through the devastation of losing Alejandro, a social worker at the hospital recommended JourneyCare's bereavement camps for children and teens.
Edward says camp is an important place
to disconnect from technology and focus on
connecting with others who understand loss.
These free summer camps, called Camp Courage, help children and teens who are grieving the loss of a loved one. Participants explore and express their feelings in a safe, supportive and fun environment, led by professional counselors and volunteers from JourneyCare.
"She told me they would have a chance to talk with other children about their loss and learn that death is a normal part of the life process," Delia said.
Vanessa, Edward and Brian were all apprehensive the first time they attended their respective camps. In addition to the loss of her brother, Vanessa also lived with bullying at school and feared other campers would judge her.
"Then I thought 'What's stopping you from going? If it's simply not knowing what camp will be like, that's a bad reason,'" Vanessa said.
Soon, the three eldest Morales siblings found themselves immersed in activities like hiking, high ropes courses, journaling and team building. And they all felt relieved to connect with other young people who understood the loss that their classmates at school could not.
Brian and his siblings were all apprehensive
when they started camp, but they quickly
gained new friends.
Today, Edward and Vanessa are 19 and 17, and they have completed five years of camp. Brian is now 12 and still participates annually, while 7-year-old Kendrah may join once she is older.
The three eldest siblings say any young person who has lost a loved one should step out of their comfort zone and join a JourneyCare camp. Edward says it's especially an important space for taking a break from smart phones and computers, and focusing on what really matters.
"Camp offers a way to express yourself and meeting people who have gone through the same loss as you," Edward says. "I always think 'What would have happened if I didn't go there, disconnect and discover all these new things?'"
– By Elisabeth Mistretta, JourneyCare Content Specialist
Originally published in Together to Care, Spring 2016
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The Young Lions ladies are one win away from a Madden Trophy grand final berth having accounted for Wagga United in last week's semi-final. Played in warm conditions at Rawlings Parks at Lake Albert on Sunday afternoon, the Lions raced two a two goal lead in the first-half of the elimination final and managed to hold on to book a spot in this week's semi-final against Junee. Defender Tessa Long was solid all game, while defensive midfielder Bianca Roach and goalkeeper Maggie Davis made sure the Lions didn't concede, repelling United on several occasions. READ ALSO: Matt Murray picks up two major awards at Group 9 presentation Keen to show that this year has not just been about the boys, the Lions continued to move the ball around and control the pace of the game as they've done in recent weeks. Player of the year nominees Micaela Hall and Freya Hewitson scored the first half goals to put Young ahead 2-0 at the break. In the second-half, the Lions pushed to extend the lead, piling pressure on the United goalkeeper however the match ended 2-0. READ ALSO: Konah Miller wins Stableford competition The victory sews up a spot in this week's semi-final against Junee with a place in the grand final up for grabs. The two sides met before the finals and Young went down 2-0. "I am so proud of the girls, we played at 110 per cent, linking passing and shifting the ball well," Jemma Long said. "Next week we have Junee, but we have improved against them. Hopefully we can play like this week, and if we do, we will scare them and could sneak away with a win." The semi-final is set for a 9am kick-off at Junee.
Bianca Roach, pictured in action this season, and the Young Lions ladies are preparing for a grand final bid on Sunday.
The Young Lions ladies are one win away from a Madden Trophy grand final berth having accounted for Wagga United in last week's semi-final.
Played in warm conditions at Rawlings Parks at Lake Albert on Sunday afternoon, the Lions raced two a two goal lead in the first-half of the elimination final and managed to hold on to book a spot in this week's semi-final against Junee.
Defender Tessa Long was solid all game, while defensive midfielder Bianca Roach and goalkeeper Maggie Davis made sure the Lions didn't concede, repelling United on several occasions.
Keen to show that this year has not just been about the boys, the Lions continued to move the ball around and control the pace of the game as they've done in recent weeks.
Player of the year nominees Micaela Hall and Freya Hewitson scored the first half goals to put Young ahead 2-0 at the break.
In the second-half, the Lions pushed to extend the lead, piling pressure on the United goalkeeper however the match ended 2-0.
The victory sews up a spot in this week's semi-final against Junee with a place in the grand final up for grabs. The two sides met before the finals and Young went down 2-0.
"I am so proud of the girls, we played at 110 per cent, linking passing and shifting the ball well," Jemma Long said.
The semi-final is set for a 9am kick-off at Junee.