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Congressional reaction to Ares 1-X
By Jeff Foust on 2009 October 29 at 7:03 am ET
It should be little surprise that many of the same members of Congress who issued comments about the Augustine committee report last week also issued statements after the successful test flight of the Ares 1-X rocket Wednesday. Indeed, they were able in many cases to repeat the same themes as their comments last week. For example, Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords (D-AZ), chair of the House Science and Technology Committee's space subcommittee, had this to say in response to the launch: "It is one more significant achievement for the Constellation program, and a clear indication that NASA is on track with its human space exploration program."
Congressman Bill Posey (R-FL) reiterated his call for more funding for NASA: "It's my hope that the President will now give NASA the resources it needs to close the space gap."
On the Senate side, Sen. Richard Shelby (R-AL) said the launch was a vindication for Constellation: "If we are to maintain our leadership in space, the work on Constellation must continue with the further development of the Ares vehicles, which provide the safest and most capable transport of our astronauts to the space station, the Moon, and beyond. Without Ares, the backbone of the Constellation program, there will be no successful U.S. human exploration program at NASA."
Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) called the launch an "important milestone" but noted it's not the only thing that needs to happen for the program to be successful. "We have many issues to resolve in charting the path forward for the U.S. space program, but this test and the upcoming launch of the space shuttle next month proves NASA still has the 'Right Stuff.' Now we need to work with the President and make sure NASA has the right budget to be able to do its job."
83 comments to Congressional reaction to Ares 1-X
October 29, 2009 at 10:58 am · Reply
Regardless of congressional press releases to pump up the NASA workers (and voters) in certain districts and states, it's impossible at this point to say that this was a successful test flight. It was only a successful launch.
It remains to be seen whether it was a successful test. NASA will need weeks to months to process all the data from the 700-odd sensors and instruments that were attached to the Ares I-X stack. Whether NASA got the data it needs, what changes that data says need to be made to the Ares I design going forward, and whether Ares I is viable from a technical, budget, and schedule standpoint after those changes, is unknown.
And moreover, it was not a successful flight. At a minimum, the second stage separation did not go as planned. At worst, the second stage may have recontacted the first stage. Either way, were this a crewed flight, Orion was put into orientations that would have made an abort impossible or killed the crew if they had aborted. Now to be fair, it was a dummy upper stage and theoretically a powered upper stage may have maintained control and/or avoided recontact. But because its solid-fueled first-stage cannot be shut down and because it stages at such a high speed, this is an especially critical issue for Ares I. The Ares I-X flight shows that the program is basically at square one on this issue, and we won't know until the Ares I-Y flight in 2013 (or later) whether it can be remedied.
[As NASAWatch notes, it's exactly this issue — crew abort during high-speed events — that caused NASA to erroneously mark down EELVs on safety in the ESAS report. Of course — surprise, surprise — we're seeing the same issue come back to bite Ares I. And if it's significant, it will bite Ares I worse than the EELVs as Ares I lacks the margin necessary to fly a different profile or the ability to shut down its first stage during abort events.]
I realize congressmen have to cheer the troops, and I expect these details to be lost on all but their professional committee staff. But it would be nice if their press releases showed a little discernment between just getting a rocket off its pad and actually conducting a successful flight test.
Ari Litwin
I tried to watch the launch from my house but sadly it was too cloudy and with too much sunlight (funny how it was too cloudy and too sunny at the same time) it was impossible to see anything.
It good to see these politicians supporting our space program, I just wish this debate between NASA and private enterprise wasn't a, one side or the other, debate. I don't know if, from an engineering standpoint, Ares is the best solution for NASA but, in general, pushing at the frontiers of space is what they should be doing. At the same time private enterprise should be working at decreasing the costs and increasing the reliability of launches into LEO and working toward servicing the space station. There is a need for both sides of this coin.
One thing I have noticed is that when politicians make statements on space now they are often including the words "transport astronauts to the Moon". The idea of going to the Moon (beyond LEO) is becoming almost a given in their minds. This is good, it makes going to the Moon (and implicitly this time to stay, build habitats, explore, and utilize) sound less like science fiction and more like a plan.
(http://www.space-issues.com)
Bill White
Chair Force Engineer offers a good (if troubling) insight:
For members of Congress who don't comprehend how much more work beyond Ares I-X is necessary before the real Ares I is ready, the visual of Ares I-X lifting off is evidence that the program is on track. Indeed, members of Congress are already spinning the Augustine Report as evidence that Ares is being well-executed, even though the committee largely ignored that question (and largely endorsed the idea of commercial spacecraft for low earth orbit missions, with Ares V Lite for deep space exploration.) Somewhere, Mike Griffin is smiling with glee. Not just because Ares I-X succeeded, but because the political winds growing across the Potomac will keep his Shaft Rocket airborne for the foreseeable future.
http://chairforceengineer.blogspot.com/2009/10/mike-griffin-saturn-i-and-potemkin.html
I also have to say, at $450 million — almost a half billion dollars — this was an egregiously expensive test given that nearly all of the vehicle was made from existing and dummy components and given how little it informs the critical Ares I design issues going forward.
The marginal cost of a Space Shuttle flight is $60-100 million, depending on whose figures you're using to. Refurbishment, refueling, and restacking of two SRBs should be a fraction of this (subtract out ET, SSME, TPS, etc. work), and the cost of doing so for one SRB should be about half that. So the one SRB used in the Ares I-X test should have cost low millions to tens of millions of dollars, maybe double that to instrument the stack for a test flight. Call it $30-60 million tops. The other existing hardware used in the test was Atlas V avionics. Again, producing another set of Atlas V avionics should be a fraction of the cost of an Atlas V launch vehicle. Again, we're talking low millions to tens of millions of dollars, and again, maybe double that for new software. Again, I'd call it $30-60 million tops. Practically everything else on the vehicle — the mock upper stage and mock crew capsule — was dummy hardware, the costs of which should be small, maybe $20 million. Add it all up, and the most I can come up with is ~$150 million.
Now, to be fair, the Ares I-X SRB stack did have to incorporate a roll control system that the Shuttle SRBs don't utilize. But I have a hard time believing that the development of this new roll control system cost $300 million. $100 million I could see, but $300 million? Lawdy…
I honestly don't know where the other $200 million or so is coming from, and if anyone has ideas or knows, I'd love to hear it. Even using the inefficient Shuttle workforce and infrastructure, I have a hard time believing that half or more of the vehicle's cost comes from wrap and overhead.
Of course, this goes back to points that were made during the Augustine Committee meetings. They claimed that even if Ares I was fully developed and operational today and free of technical issues, NASA could not afford to operate it. The cost of the Ares I-X test appears to be proving this in spades.
And this has been hashed to death before, but it's also important to note how little the four-segment first stage and dummy second stage on the Ares I-X test informs the five-segment first stage and J-2X powered second stage on the actual Ares I design. Even after spending nearly half a billion worth of taxpayer dollars, key issues like thrust oscillation and flight control will remain unknown until the (much more expensive) Ares I-Y test flight in 2013 (or later).
"One thing I have noticed is that when politicians make statements on space now they are often including the words "transport astronauts to the Moon".
But did you notice that in the NASA coverage of the Ares I-X launch, the Moon was not mentioned at all? It was a "flight test for future exploration launch vehicles", and an exercise in "developing new launch vehicle technologies". The flavor of the Ares I-X commentary has evolved a lot in the last month or two. Nice technical job by NASA on this launch, though it appears they're well aware that the ground is shifting, policy-wise. They may be one step ahead of congressional advocates with this awareness.
InTheKnow
The booster and upper stage DID recontact.
Looks like NASA didn't adequately assess the SRB residual thrust at stage sep. A rookie mistake, eeriely similar to SpaceX's Falcon1 Flight 3 failure.
Amid all the NASA Ares 1-X hoopla, we must ask ourselves.. "how many other Ares 1 rookie mistakes are lurking out there?"
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Gary Miles
October 29, 2009 at 12:03 pm · Reply
Lolololololol! LMAO! An awesome launch and flight! NASA was able to obtain data from virtually all of its sensors. So both a successful launch and test flight. Go Ares I! For all of you naysayers on here…LOLOLOLOLOL!
Robert Oler
"It's my hope that the President will now give NASA the resources it needs to close the space gap."
I am having visions of General Turgidson (USAF) standing up and saying "Mr. President we cannot allow a mine shaft gap"
Moonliner
Unfortunately, the apparently successful flight is only going to fuel the fire to continue this keep-NASA-employed program.
If the test flight had been less successful, NASA would have been forced to look south over the fence at the Cape and say "Hey, look over there. Delta IV is already operational, has an American-built engine and the Orion capsule could be easily adapted to it. Why don't we use that instead?"
All right where to start?…
As usual Major Tom provides a great "analysis" of the subject. I'd like to add this though. During launch you can see the vehicle passing Mach 1 where a shock wave develops (~52 sec) right before Max-Q. Abort at this stage is quite dramatic actually, possibly even more so than high speed abort, notwhithstanding the inability to interrupt thrust. The Apollo LEV had a major issue at transonic were it to abort (I'll leave it to you guys to look up the papers). It is perfectly unclear to me that thiss issue has been resolved with the Ares I – LAV system. Instead of just a nice take-off test NASA should have tested an abort at transonic. Even with a dummy LV and a dummy Orion that is precisely the kind of data the industry needs. Sure roll control is nice even though it seems to roll quite a bit on launch and I remember a lot of comments about Falcon 1 on this but without getting into a controversy yet again I'd say there was not much here. I can really see onee major thing and that is that NASA somewhat demonstrated they can assemble a "design" and launch team together, still successfully if not a great expense. Future will tell. And yes take off was apparently successful but I have no idea how Gary you can tell that they collected ALL the data they needed, unless you are part of the team and have already done it. I know you are a cheerleader for this program but I think you may be a little too cheering just yet.
BTW, the politicians cheerleading a program that a WH committee jut showed to be flawed if not technically at the very least financially are just losing all credibility. How do they compare to any one of the august members of the WH panel? The only one with some measure of sanity here seems to be Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison.
Sidenote since I really don't like the sidemount vehicle… The transonic abort with the sidemount in an unusual attitude would be very interesting to analyze…
@Major Tom.
" it's impossible at this point to say that this was a successful test flight. It was only a successful launch."
"And moreover, it was not a successful flight."
So first you say its impossible to determine its a successful flight yet and then you make a declaration it is? How do you know, without access to the data, if the tumble of the dummy upper stages was modeled by the computer or not? IN any case the purpose was to test the pogoing of the booster and its stability with the stack, not the separation of the dummy upper stages. So the odds are what happened after booster cutoff had nothing to do with the test objectives. Using that to make an argument that the flight was unsuccessful is grasping at straws to support your failing arguments against the Ares I, not something that is supported by evidence. Accept the fact that maybe, just maybe, the NASA engineers know more about what they are doing then the blogsphere does.
@Common Sense
Except that its the members of Congress that will make the decision to fund the program if the President approves it, not the Augustine Committee. And the President also needs their votes on issues like Health Care and the Economy, not the votes of the Augustine Committee. So the question is why should members of Congress care about their creditability with anti-Ares advocates?
Both "common sense" and "Major Tom" have hit the technical nail on the head…
I agree that KBH's statement is one of the few with any level of sanity on it.
One has to wait, in my view, for the politics of it until two things happen to see how the test flight and the test flight alone (regardless of other things) impacted the political equation.
The first is to let the data come out. It will, even if NASA tries to sugar coat it (and they will). At some point the data on things like POGO and stability and even seperation will drift out either allaying or confirming the various technical challenges that will drive cost (excellent cost analysis by Major Tom).
The second is Musk and the EELV folks. What happens when Musk flies his 9 and how badly teh EELV manufactors smell the federal dollar is going to have a lot of impact on the lobbying, particularly where it counts at the mid levels of the administration.
And that is where this debate in my view is going to be played out. Congress is almost a non player here.
Obama has (like it or not) demonstrated a very nifty ability to 1) analyze various situations free of the ebb and flow of congressional and public debate (grin) and 2) pushing the Congress into the direction that I think really he and the administration want things to go. See the health care and Afland debate.
At some point someone in the administration is going to hit on a strategery for human spaceflight that mixes with the politics of the administration and the Augustine commissions numbers are going to be used to justify it.
"Except that its the members of Congress that will make the decision to fund the program if the President approves it, not the Augustine Committee."
Are you saying that the WH assembled a team just for fun?
"And the President also needs their votes on issues like Health Care and the Economy, not the votes of the Augustine Committee."
On this we do agree and Ares/Orion or the whole NASA for that matter won't stand a chance if they are brought into the fight… So?
"So the question is why should members of Congress care about their creditability with anti-Ares advocates?"
Well, I know. But anti-Ares advocates or pro-Ares advocates won't matter much either. See it looks like you see this as a pro/anti-vehicle issue. In my particular case it is not. My problem is with a program that ultimately will go nowhere as a whole because it cannot. Okay let's assume for a second Ares/Orion goes on as is. We will be landing someone on the Moon when? 2020? 2050? Who the heck cares? Can't you see that? It is important to revisit the whole thing and try to make sense of the plan. Right now and as it is, it just does not make any sense. Please instruct me in what the benefit is to go with a dangerous booster such as a solid (I cannot care less it is an SRB), it is more dangerous than a liquid. I do not believe the pseudo risk analysis either. A risk analysis can be pushed in different directions according to whatever the arbitrary weighing factors are. Remind me the risk analysis for Shuttle before Challenger? Before Columbia? In any case those politicians may not be around to cheerlead this program in 2020 so yeah why would they care?
Anon wrote @ October 29th, 2009 at 2:01 pm
Except that its the members of Congress that will make the decision to fund the program if the President approves it, not the Augustine Committee…
and in that decision making process I dont think that the Richard Shelby's or Pete Olsen's or even Bill Nelsons are going to make a lot of difference. they might be effective around the margins, but not in the primary thrust of the direction, what the White House proposes…it will in my view get. particularly if (and I suspect he will be) Obama is successful in the health care debate.
Second, I wont get much into the technical end as "Major Tom" is more then capable of doing that…but the folks at NASA cannot be happy with the separation of the stack. I assume that the dummy parts were "mass correct" and if that is the case even with an inert system, then the second stage is unstable dynamically and OR the FCS was working very hard to keep the entire stack going up hill ..which might be the case with the performance of the first stage after cuttoff.
There is footage on the web of stagings between active stages and boilerplates…and this is really a first.
Let's give NASA — and MIchael Griffin — credit for the successful Ares test flight. I have no doubt there were problems identified in this test, but isn't that why you run test flights? Of course it is. I also wish the test could have involved the full five segment version, but NASA clearly anticipated that a test indicating feasibility of the base concept was going to be necessary (if only for political purposes) — and they were surely right. If we can avoid cancellation of Ares by President Obama in lieu of a paper commercial alternative, I think we have the makings of a first class rocket here. If not — if Ares is cancelled — we will have wasted the last four years and billions of dollars and we will surely be right back at this same point testing yet another rocket in three or four years (having wasted more billions to develop it) with a new group of critics singing the same old song "If Only (my perfect concept) Had Been Chosen."
Whether we go to the Moon next or do a group of fly-bys to NEO's while we look for the courage to go forward into space, we at minimum need to move ahead to develop the basic infrastructure for our next steps into space. Policies that wipe the board clean every three or four years accomplish nothing except sending a clear message to the world that America's greatest days are behind us.
Personally, I believe that the NASA can– eventually– develop the Ares 1 and Ares V architecture. But at what cost???
NASA already admits that the Ares 1/V architecture is at least three times as expensive as a shuttle derived SD-HLV with an EDS (Earth Departure Stage). And despite what the Augustine Commission said, it will only take two launches (not three) of an SD-HLV to place a 22 tonne Orion CEV into lunar orbit and an Altair lunar lander weighing up 47 tonnes into lunar orbit.
In fact, the SD-HLV should also be able to place the 22 tonne Orion plus an additional 25 tonnes into lunar orbit (that's more mass than the original Apollo lunar lander). So in theory, just one SD-HLV launch could place humans on the Moon if a smaller lunar lander were built. A full scale Altair could then be used as a truck to place over 10 metric tonnes of payload on the lunar surface per launch to build habitats.
It strikes me that had there been a LES on the vehicle, the actions of the stack after separation, would have triggered it.
"Let's give NASA — and MIchael Griffin — credit for the successful Ares test flight."
Sorry but no! How do you know it was successful? Because it went up?
"If we can avoid cancellation of Ares by President Obama in lieu of a paper commercial alternative, I think we have the makings of a first class rocket here. "
What do you know about the "paper" commercial rocket that the Augustine panel does not? Because as I saw they are providing more options with commercial providers than that with Ares I.
"If not — if Ares is cancelled — we will have wasted the last four years and billions of dollars and we will surely be right back at this same point testing yet another rocket in three or four years (having wasted more billions to develop it) with a new group of critics singing the same old song "If Only (my perfect concept) Had Been Chosen." "
We would save many more billions if we stop it just now before it gets really bad. What do you knoww about thee alternate concepts? Such as the EELVs? They could be flying NOW. At a much lower cost. Go check the OSP program if you don't believe me. And, I am saying that even though I'd rather see flying a "new" space rocket here rather than an EELV for other than technical reasons.
"we at minimum need to move ahead to develop the basic infrastructure for our next steps into space. "
The problem is that we are not doing this. Period.
stargazer not so much
There are times when "wasting" is preferred to "being stuck" with what one has…or as the saying goes throwing good money after bad trying to make the bad money good.
or put another way, it is "when do you backtrack on a bad decision?:"
One of the things that I have learned in my life is that what has been spent, lives money, time etc…has been spent. It is kind of like leaving Dallas on North Central expressway and taking the exit for I 35 instead of I-45.
After you figure out you took the wrong turn, no amount of driving is going to get you to Houston as long as you stay on I 35. And the longer you stay on I 35 the longer it is going to take you to get to Houston, once you get off of it.
Ares is that bad mistake
'it's impossible at this point to say that this was a successful test flight. It was only a successful launch.'
"And moreover, it was not a successful flight."
So first you say its impossible to determine its a successful flight yet and then you make a declaration it is?"
No, "test" and "flight" are two different things. It's impossible to know whether the test was successful until the data is analyzed. However, we can look at the footage today and know that the flight, especially the second stage separation, did not go as planned and is going to raise new problems, even though the separation was not an object of the test.
"Common Sense" —
— Let me reverse the question: How do you define a successful test? The rocket did go up — no apparent catastrophic failures of the first stage (the prinicple object of interest) with lots of data collected on how it fared and what happened to the second stage. Now its time to check out the data and see what it tells us. But critics (like you?) aren't going to bother wating for the data. No, they had their answer before the test began. I have a feeling — a very strong feeling — that nothing short of the second coming of Christ would satsify Ares critics of this test or of the program as a whole.
— I also want to reverse your question of what the Augustine Commission "knew" of the commercial alternatives. It is not clear what they knew. It seems to me that they gave commercial proposals and financial projecttions of commercial rockets that might be the same weight as the NASA rockets that are actually being built. I have no problem with commercial rockets, I just don't want to dump years of work and billions of dollars of R&D in endless pursuit of the chimera of what might be.
— Maybe the commercial alternative could be flying now — but that's a very big maybe. Maybe they would experiencing massive cost overruns and experiencing unforseen technical delays — happens all the time in rocket and aircraft development. (White Knight 2, Boeing 787, countless defense programs) And maybe their first few tests would have blown up. (Space X anyone?) That happens too doesn't it? And then maybe the critics would be singing the song if only we had gone with the "proven" solid fueled booster alternative that had already been used with the Shuttle.
— At some point you have to decide on an architecture and stick with it unless something unforseen demonstrates it just won't work. If you don't do this it is impossible to move forward. There will always be critics who want to go another direction, with another plan. And people who's real agenda is to undermine the space program will always be only too happy to encourage them and cite them as a reason we shouldn't waste any more money on manned space flight anyway.
Robert Oler —
— Most of my above comments address your points. However, I would like to add one point for you. It may be clear in your mind, but the publicly available evidence does not support your conclusion that the current architecture is a failure. Moreover, the Augustine Commission did not claim it to be a failure. They did say that current funding levels are manifestly inadequate for the exploration program currently contemplated. I think we can all agree with that point. Regarding the endless debate over the launcher architecture, I suggest this: Let NASA go ahead with a quick study of launcher alternatives with a report required in a few months. I believe the Administrator is planning something along these lines. Now even with this concession, I am not sure the current chorus of critics will ever believe the results of such a study unless it happens to endorse their particular pet answer. If not NASA, perhaps we can call upon another world renowned expert in space and rocketry to conduct this survey. Ross, are you still building models or do you have time for such an undertaking?
"Augustine Commission… gave commercial proposals and financial projecttions of commercial rockets that might be the same weight as the NASA rockets that are actually being built."
It's quite the opposite. Falcon 9 is nearly finished in its flight configuration. Atlas V and Delta IV are already flying.
Neither can be said for Ares I. Even the Ares I-Y test flight in 2013 won't include a J-2X engine in the upper stage. It will be many years until Ares I is "actually being built".
It's little wonder that the Augustine Committee came down the way it did. A rocket (or three) in hand is worth one in the bush.
"Maybe the commercial alternative could be flying now"
Under the plan prior to Griffin, an EELV (Atlas V or Delta IV) would have flown with a mock CEV (now called Orion) two years ago (2007).
There may also have been an issue with main parachute deployment and SRB damage. See towards the end of Bill Harwood's article here:
http://news.cnet.com/8301-19514_3-10385536-239.html
At some point you have to decide on an architecture and stick with it unless something unforseen demonstrates it just won't work.
Does arriving many years late (7 for Ares I, who knows when for Ares V, and no fricking clue for Altair), and needing a lot more money both for development but also for testing (requiring double the current budget just to operate) qualify?
I mean, it seems to me its a bit like saying "I am determined to get a Cadillac, even though I am only a delivery person, and I won't buy a car until I can afford a Cadillac" while in the mean time you have to pass up all those delivery oppertunities offerred by having a car.
@stargazer:
"– Let me reverse the question: How do you define a successful test? The rocket did go up — no apparent catastrophic failures of the first stage (the prinicple object of interest) with lots of data collected on how it fared and what happened to the second stage. Now its time to check out the data and see what it tells us."
I think you answered your own question, did you not? "Now its time to check out the data and see what it tells us." Basically you look at the objectives of the test and see whether they were fulfilled. Right? Until then you or I cannot tell one way or another unless you have a really accurate crystal ball.
"But critics (like you?) aren't going to bother wating for the data. No, they had their answer before the test began. I have a feeling — a very strong feeling — that nothing short of the second coming of Christ would satsify Ares critics of this test or of the program as a whole. "
Not sure where I said the flight or the test was a failure. Not seeing the objectives, again… A second coming of christ would certainly help though. I'll agree with that.
"– I also want to reverse your question of what the Augustine Commission "knew" of the commercial alternatives. It is not clear what they knew. It seems to me that they gave commercial proposals and financial projecttions of commercial rockets that might be the same weight as the NASA rockets that are actually being built."
Well. You are the one saying things about them not me. BUT: The committee listened to and visited several places including the so-called commercials. They were presented with technical and financial documents in one way or another by all those interviewed, including NASA. Why should they have different "weights" in their review? Are you saying that the committee was fooled but the "commercials"? That the committee does not know what they are doing? Did you read their credentials? Anyway…
" I have no problem with commercial rockets, I just don't want to dump years of work and billions of dollars of R&D in endless pursuit of the chimera of what might be"
Ares I and Ares IX are two different animals, do you understand that? Ares IX did fly. We will only know howw well only after data reduction. So unlike what you accuse me of I am not going to pass a judgement on this particular flight. My judgement is on the ENTIRE program as it stands today.
"– Maybe the commercial alternative could be flying now — but that's a very big maybe. Maybe they would experiencing massive cost overruns and experiencing unforseen technical delays — happens all the time in rocket and aircraft development. (White Knight 2, Boeing 787, countless defense programs) "
Okay here you're putting words in my hmm keyboard. I said an EELV based vehicle would be flying NOW. Especially that such EELVs have been flying for some time now in a shape and form much closer to the what they'd be for Orion than what Ares IX actually is! EELVs were considered for the OSP program BECAUSE they were the least expensive way to get the program going. AND the different contractors did a lot of study on that somewhat supported by the AeroSpace Corp. report (you'll find the link I don't have it). The OSP approach would have been in a cost-plus contract similar to that of Ares with ATK/Boeing. So in that regard EELVs would have been no more "commercials" than Ares/ATK. What I call commercials are those who actually developed their vehicles on their own dime supported by a COTS like contract.
"And maybe their first few tests would have blown up. (Space X anyone?) That happens too doesn't it? "
Here is the problem with this reasonning: C.O.S.T. Go compare the cost of even Ares 1X alone to that of Falcon 1 or even Falcon 9 or both combined…
"And then maybe the critics would be singing the song if only we had gone with the "proven" solid fueled booster alternative that had already been used with the Shuttle. "
It does not matter that SRBs are "proven". There is an inherent safety issue with a solid, at least one: You cannot stop it once it's lit! You cannot control thrust once it's lit. There is a myriad of other issues BUT it creates a nightmare for aborts.
"– At some point you have to decide on an architecture and stick with it unless something unforseen demonstrates it just won't work. If you don't do this it is impossible to move forward."
No you don't. Full steam ahead os not a strategy. Not a smart one anyway. Your architecture must be evolvable or you may end up in a whole and stick with it.
"There will always be critics who want to go another direction, with another plan. And people who's real agenda is to undermine the space program will always be only too happy to encourage them and cite them as a reason we shouldn't waste any more money on manned space flight anyway"
Now. I would hate to think that you are actually saying I have an agenda to undermine the space program BECAUSE I don't agree with the way it is being handled. Is it what you're saying? See. There was an (more?) engineer sometime in 2003 who told his management that Columbia was unsafe. Said management thought nothing of it since it is an established system (STS) and it has flown so often. You're with me so far? The only way you make progress in any organization is to l isten to dissent.
"– Most of my above comments address your points. However, I would like to add one point for you. It may be clear in your mind, but the publicly available evidence does not support your conclusion that the current architecture is a failure. Moreover, the Augustine Commission did not claim it to be a failure. They did say that current funding levels are manifestly inadequate for the exploration program currently contemplated. I think we can all agree with that point. "
No we cannot agree (I know it's for Robert Oler but since I don't agree…). The plan was for NASA to make do with their budget, not with the budget they'd like to have. I'd love to drive a Ferrari but see I cannot afford it so I don't. What is that complicated here? The funding levels are inadequate BECAUSE NASA chose a path that was not afordable wirth their budget!!!
"Let NASA go ahead with a quick study of launcher alternatives with a report required in a few months. "
It's already been done many times. Augustine only compiled theses options.
"If not NASA, perhaps we can call upon another world renowned expert in space and rocketry to conduct this survey. Ross, are you still building models or do you have time for such an undertaking?"
This finally where I see you are not really serious. Yes it took me that long.
"Most of my above comments address your points. However, I would like to add one point for you. It may be clear in your mind, but the publicly available evidence does not support your conclusion that the current architecture is a failure."
I dont have "much" inside information. I live near JSC, can get on the site without any fanfare (drive up to the gate and they smile as I go by), know a lot of people there, my wife knows a lot of people there…but most of what I am making my judgment on is "publicly available evidence".
A systems is a failure by definition if one cannot afford to use it or build it or a combination of the two. It is that simple.
Of course if something is expensive and yet that is the cheapest you can have it for, then the binary decision is do without or have it at whatever the cost.
But if something is expensive and essentially unfordable and there are cheaper and more useful alternatives…well the definition of pork (or government insanity) is pursueing the most expensive alternative because "we have already invested a lot of money in it".
The paper rocket is Ares. No matter how it is spun what flew yesterday is no where near to the rocket that is functional…and yet as Major Tom has dictated the cost for that "test" were extremely high.
MusK is going to try to go to orbit on a total development cost that is near or UNDER what the test flight itself cost. So I do not see why we are even considering Ares.
Say Musk fails…and say it takes three times for Musk to get it correct…to get to orbit, the margin cost of the effort are still less then the 2 minute test flight of Ares.
The burden is on Ares supporters to say why that cost has value.
As for NASA doing a study. LOL. NASA doing a study will confirm what NASA already is advocating. I have reams of studies that already show that.
Let me reverse the question: How do you define a successful test? ..
when something that was not known, is learned at a cost that is affordable. and it can be put to good use.
The more I think about it the less I understand about why the test had value.
Any information on the "pogo" is less because it was not the five segment booster.
Somehow Atlas, Delta, and even Musk's rockets have managed to fly without boilerplate testing of the rest of the stack…and we have launched solid fuel rockets before.
Plus as Major Tom puts out, I dont understand the cost involved.
If this was a learning experience for the rocket scientist at NASA learning to be rocket scientist, It was a costly one
The costs of the Ares-1X test are doutblessly caused in part by the inherent inefficiency involved in the way the work was split between MSFC, JSC, KSC, and contractors in those locations plus Denver (LM had a hand in the avionics – Atlas heritage). That may not explain all of it, there was probably a lot of bureaucratic waste as well. My guess would be that if one were to audit any given federal agency (NASA included) you would probably come up with a lot of unaccounted for money.
As for the Ares 1 vs EELV (Delta 4 heavy) debate, I think it's really a question, as others have alluded to, of whether or not Ares 1 is trully the better solution or not. I think it's probably reasonable to say that Ares 1 can be done, but at what cost? My gut, and various studies by ULA and Aerospace Corp, tells me that man rating the Delta 4-H would be more cost effective than developing Ares 1.
Furthermore, consider the flight rate of Ares 1. They're only launching 2 per year according to NASA's current plan. On the other hand by 2015 Delta 4 will have performed 20 MLV and 10 HLV launches. That's a total of 30 upper stages and 50 common booster cores flown. It would take 25 years for Ares 1 to match the same number of flights as the number of CBCs flown on Delta 4s. And that's before ever placing a manned Orion capsule on top of one. Not to mention the added safety of liquid vs solid propulsion.
Which brings to the real reason we're going with Ares: sollid propellant. All the talk of Ares 1 being the "safest, most reliable" option is
1) based purely on PBAs which can be influenced greatly by subtle changes in weighting and
2) political smoke and mirrors.
Consider: a shuttle SRB has about as much solid propellant as 10 Navy Trident D5 missiles. I'm not sure how SRBs compare to Minuteman 3 ICBMs, but it's probably safe to say the SRB has quite a bit more propellant. Also consider that there are only 2 solid propellant manufacturers still in business in the entire country. They need the added demand created by Ares 1/5 to keep those solid propellant companies afloat. If they didn't, and the DoD ever decided to upgrade our ICBM fleet, we would no longer have the industrial capability to create the large quantities of solid propellant needed.
Bottom line, Ares 1 is really just an industrial wellfare program. It has nothing to with being the "safest, most reliable" and definately nothing to do with being the most "cost effective" option.
Robert – If I might offer a minor counterpoint
There is a justification for not doing all-up testing, and replacing the top pieces with boiler plates – the big reason is costs. Doing boilerplate upper stages allows you to do incrimental testing, and you don't lose very expenisve hardware when you lack lots of flight data. The caveat to this is that you have to be testing actual hardware. For example, if in your test rocket, the first stage is the same, and the guidence is the same, but your upperstages are boilerplate, thats perfectly acceptable. Particularly when you are operating with entirely new hardware, there can be cost savings in doing it this way. But, as I said, you have to have actual flight hardware in the loop.
This is why I consider the Ares I-Y test a valid and constructive test (as much as I consider any part of Ares rockets "valid and constructive"). The first stage of the actual Ares I will be tested, and if I understand correctly, the guidence system Ares I-Y uses will be the same as the Ares I. So here, we are getting valuable data about the actual operating characteristics of parts of the rocket.
The problem with Ares I-X is that effectively it had almost no relation to the actual Ares I rocket (no second stage, different first stage, different guidence, no payload).
Minor point, but I do think there is a case for doing staged flight testing, in incriments. They just have to be incriments that actually add up
@Major Tom
"However, we can look at the footage today and know that the flight, especially the second stage separation, did not go as planned and is going to raise new problems, even though the separation was not an object of the test."
Evidence? Especially given this press release.
http://www.nasa.gov/home/hqnews/2009/oct/HQ_09-252_Ares_I-X_Success.html
No mention there of any unexpected behavior….
Please stop passing your opinions off as fact.
"Evidence?"
At the top of NASAWatch this morning, there were two or three links to articles that mentioned the off-nominal stage separation. See:
http://nasawatch.com/archives/2009/10/ares-1-x-stagin.html
"No mention there of any unexpected behavior…"
Well of course not. It's a NASA press release. Think critically about your sources.
Please stop making unsupported accusations that turn out to be false.
Photo confirmation of the Harwood story. The SRB hit the water too hard and was damaged. This is not good for Ares I first stage recovery, reusability, and trend analysis for flight safety.
http://www.spaceflightnow.com/ares1x/091029dent/
The culprit appears to be one of the parachutes. If true, then the flight test failed one of its major objectives.
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gI3x65BuamKDkNfyxY_tMNME96tQD9BL0IG02
Again, the congressional statements should not have been so quick to claim victory.
Sigh… FWIW…
"Accept the fact that maybe, just maybe, the NASA engineers know more about what they are doing then the blogsphere does."
Constellation engineers almost certainly know more about what they are doing than anyone else. But that doesn't mean that they are doing it right.
This article claims that the SRB damage was due to a parachute failure:
http://www.floridatoday.com/content/blogs/space/2009/10/live-at-ksc-ares-i-x-parachutes-fail.shtml
Pure speculation, but if the stages recontacted, it may have affected one of the parachutes. Or the design has just driven the parachutes too big to be reliable/effective.
"The parachute recovery system is the most mature element of the Ares hardware that is currently under development."
A sad statement from this article in light of developments today:
http://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2009/10/live-ares-i-x-second-launch-attempt/
Robert Olier —
— I am happy you have such a comfortable relationship with the people at the KSC. Doesn't make you right, but it does make you comfortable. Don't know why you thought that was in any way relevant, but I guess it makes you happy. I am not going to persist in this discussion with you because your reasoning is completely circular. The test happened, the results are in, we will go by the results. If Elon Musk can get his rocket and space craft flying before he goes bankrupt there will be something to discuss. Until then, the new NASA administrator will conduct the new review and we will see what his people come up with.
— Verbosity, thy name is you. Brevity is the soul of wit, learn it. You should get paid by the word. Sorry, but I have to sleep. Fuss with you tomorrow.
@Major Tom,
The article also notes that there have been ripped parachutes on the SRBs as well. Sounds more like a quality control issue for the parachute manufacturers rather then a design flaw. But of course if you are looking to criticize the Ares I you will grasp at any straw to attack it. Let's see what the professionals at NASA announce when they analyze all the data.
Sheesh, Blogsphere engineers…
Anon wrote
I bet you that three things are "unexpected".
The first is the chute problem on the SRB…it seemed to fail completly…I bet part of the issue was recontact with the second stage.
The second is stability at separation. There is nothing normal about what the vehicle did there even with aboilerplate.
Third..I bet number 2 is hinting very hard at other dynamic problems…as I noted earlier I bet roll and pitch authority are working ery very hard going up the hill .
Ferris Valyn wrote @ October 29th, 2009 at 7:32 pm
Robert – If I might offer a minor counterpoint
There is a justification for not doing all-up testing, and replacing the top pieces with boiler plates –"
Oh I concur (and I probably was not clear…its my bday and we have had a pretty good celebration!)
I dont have a problem with test…I just dont see anything useful about this one. lol
off to bed…us old guys have to have our sleep!
Stargazer – you've made it quite clear you see it as Falcon 9 vs Ares I – where does that leave Taurus II, Atlas V, and Delta IV?
October 30, 2009 at 1:38 am · Reply
"Sounds more like a quality control issue for the parachute manufacturers rather then a design flaw."
Unlikely. These are not parachutes off a production line. They were specially made for this test. Per this article, they are actually the biggest parachutes ever built.
This design is at the limits of parachute technology. If stage recontact did not induce the parachute failure, then it is most likely an issue of design, not production.
"you will grasp at any straw"
This is not a straw. It's a major issue. Per the article just referenced, it was a major objective of the test flight to prove that these new parachutes would work. The test flight has now failed to meet that objective.
And that objective is critical because SRB recovery is necessary to achieve the promises that the Constellation Program made for Ares I flight safety and cost. If the SRBs are going to be lost or damaged due to parachute failures, then the program has no way to do trend analysis on the casings for flight safety and must also bear the costs of replacing those casings.
And if the parachute failure was caused by recontact during staging, then there's a whole slew of other problems that the program is going to have to deal with in order to maintain a safe Orion orientation during abort. (Actually, they're going to have to deal with these anyway given how off-nominal the stage separation was, even if there was no recontact.)
"to attack it"
I'm not attacking anything. I'm repeating facts. I've referenced two separate articles on the off-nominal stage separation (which any village idiot can see for himself on the launch video) and four separate articles on the SRB damage and parachute failure. I've run through the likely costs of the components of the Ares I-X test vehicle. I've reiterated how a test of a four-stage SRB and dummy upper stage has little applicability to a test of a five-stage SRB and J2-X powered upper stage.
You've done what? Reference one out-of-date NASA press release that came out before the information on the off-nominal stage separation, SRB damage, and parachute failure were in the public? Whoop-dee-doo. Just because the evidence no longer supports a successful Ares I-X test flight, that doesn't mean that I'm being unfair. Facts are still facts.
Look, there's nothing inherently wrong with playing Ares I fanboy. But this is not the right forum for it. If you can't deal with the technical, budget, and schedule realities associated with your favorite rocket, then take it elsewhere. It's a waste of your time to write up patently erroneous and false arguments, and it's a waste of our time to read and correct them. If you want to cheerlead for Ares I, rather than critically analyze the nation's civil space policies and programs, there are other forums (e.g., the Ares I board at nasaspaceflight.com) for that.
"Let's see what the professionals at NASA announce…"
"Professionals at NASA" are quoted in the articles I referenced admitting to the off-nominal stage separation, the SRB damage, and the parachute failure. Please read and comprehend the references that other posters provide before responding next time.
"Sheesh, Blogsphere engineers…"
Grow up. No one has called you a name in this thread.
And besides, how do you know that I'm not an engineer inside the program?
And what are your technical credentials again?
Argue the post, not the poster.
And if you can't do that, then go away.
Poor Gerst is having to distance the Shuttle SRBs and parachutes from the Ares I-X SRB and parachutes in the latter half of this article:
http://www.space.com/missionlaunches/091029-ares-1x-big-dent.html
Ares I-X is "a revolution in marketing technology."
This is a phrase we engineers used on an old program of mine where there was a particular technology that looked good on power point and played well with the customer – hence was popular with marketing – but was actually inferior to a more basic technology.
Regardless of the merits of the test – and I agree of Major Tom's and Common Sense's analysis on this – this was a tremendous political victory for Constellation. Expect to see stills and video from this in every presentation to the media and pitch to congress.
The media coverage that I saw did a very poor job at explaining the relationship (or lack there of) between Ares I-X and Ares I. The impression that Ares I-X will create with the public and congress will be favorable out of proportion to the real engineering status of the program.
Anon wrote "…separation was not an object of the test."
Wrong, actually one of the objectives was to test the separation of the 1st and 2nd stages. Recontact = epic fail.
That being said, in any test program you will inevitably have SNAFUs that happen and have to be corrected before the "real" thing flies. Unfortunately, there will only be a couple of test flights for ares: 1X, 1Y, and the first 2 launches are also considered "test flights" of both Ares 1 and Orion. Is that really enough testing? Considering the Delta 4-H will have flown 10 times by 2015?
They need the added demand created by Ares 1/5 to keep those solid propellant companies afloat. If they didn't, and the DoD ever decided to upgrade our ICBM fleet, we would no longer have the industrial capability to create the large quantities of solid propellant needed.
Not necessarily. The Trident is prpbably going to stay in use for an indefinitely long period into the 21st century. There's talk of building a non-nuclear, hardened target penetrating warhead for Trident. This would probably be a useful reason or pretext for manufacturing more Trident boosters.
In addition, the Navy is also interested in an intermediate range ballistic missile short enough to launch from Virginia class submarine vertical launch tubes.
So the argument that Ares must exist in order to keep ATK in business doesn't hold up.
The impression that Ares I-X will create with the public and congress will be favorable out of proportion to the real engineering status of the program.
Huh? Fox Radio news driving in this morning was saying that the booster was dented upon ocean impact because a parachute failed to open. That is not favorable mass market publicity.
Why this insistence on having the launch missile 'man-rated"? When has the Shuttle ever been "man-rated"?
Methinks the demand for launch missile man rating is simply a job creation and job preservation tactic.
"There's talk of building a non-nuclear, hardened target penetrating warhead for Trident."
There's been such talks for a long time now. It is however a very politically dangerous vehicle to use a non nuclear warhead. These missiles are primarily supposed to launch nukes therefore there may be a misinterpretation of what this launch is by any country monitoring the launch. And assuming you'd be able to let them know what you're doing, such as trying for a cave somewhere, then it would defeat the purpose of its immediate response application. So I think that we will not see such technology, in the open anyway: Too politically difficult to implement. Then again we do have "missile defense" so…
"Why this insistence on having the launch missile 'man-rated"? When has the Shuttle ever been "man-rated"? "
Hmm. Are you saying Shuttle is not "man-rated"? Maybe you need to go get NASA's docs about man rating and you'll see how much fun that is. Whether it makes sense is an entirely different story…
And yes SRB for the launcher(s) essentially is about workforce retention. You'd think though that if it is an Air Force need and that consiedring the military budget they would find a way to take care of it, not NASA. Maybe the USAF does not have enough budget to do that.
I think what Rhyolte was trying to point out was that the media is doing a poor job with explaining that the Ares-1X is not the same thing as a "real" Ares 1 rocket.
"The Trident is prpbably going to stay in use for an indefinitely long period into the 21st century. There's talk of building a non-nuclear, hardened target penetrating warhead for Trident. This would probably be a useful reason or pretext for manufacturing more Trident boosters.
So the argument that Ares must exist in order to keep ATK in business doesn't hold up."
Maybe, maybe not. Remember, the whole reason the DoD loves solids for ballistics missiles is that solid propellant can be stored for a very long time without need for refurbishment or maintenance and without significant performance degradation. So while creating a non-nuke version of trident and/or a new intermediate range ballistic missile for the Navy may create some demand, it will only be a temporary increase unless we get into a full scale war with someone (Iran maybe?); where we're actually using the missiles and therefore need new ones to replace the inventory. If the missiles are just sitting in their silos/ tubes the motors only have to be replaced once every several years.
My main point was that the reason for going with Ares 1 has little to do with the often repeated canards of safety, reliability, or man-rating.
In answer to your question about shuttle man-rating, as near as I can tell it's man rated because NASA says so. They're the ones who determine the man rating requirements that any given launch vehicle would have to meet.
"Look, there's nothing inherently wrong with playing Ares I fanboy. But this is not the right forum for it."
I thought this was a space policy forum, not a bash NASA forum. But that seems to be the only tone encouraged here.
You also ignore that two of the parachutes reportedly operated normally which is why its only dented. So the question is why did the third fail to operate normally? Odds are its still a quality control issue, even if hand made and inspected. Quality control is not just about production lines, which you would know IF your were an engineer. But I will wait for the report on it after they get to inspect it then rush to judge the test a failure. But of course you want Ares and NASA to fail so you will grasp at any straw to declare it a failure to further bash Ares.
But again, we need to take the time to let the professionals look at the data and determine what happened instead of guessing based on news reports.
BTW it will be interesting to see if the bash NASA types dissect the Falcon 9 launch to the same degree. BTW anyone have a word on when it will finally be ready to fly? The last I heard was February over two years behind schedule….
Here's an update on the chutes.
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/space/6694875.html
It appears all three opened, but there was a problem with two of them possibly related to their lines. NASA engineers will know more AFTER they inspect them next week.
In terms of the main objective – the shaking, this quote is significant.
"Initial indications are that the rocket was "rock solid" during liftoff, with no worrisome shaking from all the thrust, Ess said. There was concern a year ago, among some, that the launch vibrations could be violent.
The definitive word, Ess said, will come once engineers get the data recorder back and conduct weeks of analysis."
If this is confirmed by the detail analysis it would seem that one of the major attacks by the blogsphere on the Ares I is unsupported. As Von Braun stated one test flight is worth a thousand expert opinions. But as noted the definitive word will come AFTER the professionals have had the time to analyze the data.
"BTW it will be interesting to see if the bash NASA types dissect the Falcon 9 launch to the same degree."
I do agree and fully endorse this activity. Then we will compare the respective costs. Okay? Just to be fair. At least a little.
"BTW anyone have a word on when it will finally be ready to fly? The last I heard was February over two years behind schedule…."
How many years behind schedule Ares/Orion is already? Can't remember just yet. Do you like to handle the stick for beating on this program? Maybe, just maybe, you should find something better to say because right now you're just drowning the whole Ares/Orion thing all by yourself.
we have been down this road a few times. THere is a test of the solids…it is "rock solid" then the data comes out and we never hear those claims again. Remember the "five segment" test a while back…how the claims got squelched.
I have several problems with ares that are not just technical, but the fact that when there are commercial equivelents around I dont like government doing "the same thing"…but with Ares there are schedule adn technical issues.
@Robert G. Oler wrote @ October 30th, 2009 at 1:48 pm
"when there are commercial equivelents around I dont like government doing "the same thing""
You've hit the crux of my objection to Ares I-X. There will be at least three other US vehicles that could fill the 25 MT to LEO mission by the time that Ares I-X enters service. We are passing up a golden opportunity for a competitive acquisition. Moreover, increasing the flight rates for these vehicles will ultimately decrease the cost to civil, DOD, and commercial users.
Maybe, maybe not. Remember, the whole reason the DoD loves solids for ballistics missiles is that solid propellant can be stored for a very long time without need for refurbishment or maintenance and without significant performance degradation. So while creating a non-nuke version of trident and/or a new intermediate range ballistic missile for the Navy may create some demand, it will only be a temporary increase unless we get into a full scale war with someone (Iran maybe?); where we're actually using the missiles and therefore need new ones to replace the inventory. If the missiles are just sitting in their silos/ tubes the motors only have to be replaced once every several years.
No, the Ares missile is NOT a DoD plot to prop up ATK. ATK will continue to have plenty of DoD work manufacturing, among several other large-ish solid-fueled military missiles, surface-launched ICBM interceptor missiles.
The US DoD doesn't need the Ares missile. When have you you ever heard any DoD persons express an interest in Ares? OK, I get it: such silence is an unmistakeable, telltale hint of the Navy's sneaky plot to get more Trident boosters by getting Ares contracts for ATK. ;0) !!!
My mistake for mentioning Trident.
If one wants to fulfill the three goals of (1) building a good enough launch system for manned missions somewhere beyond low Earth orbit, (2) politically placating the North Alabama Space Admin. and related space communities, and (3) giving ATK more work building large boosters, then the correct solution is a launch system evolved from the Shuttle system.
David – First, the office of the UnderSecretary of Defense seems to disagree with you, at least on some level. Quoting
He then made a rather startling comment: "NASA, in terms of solid propulsion, is the 800-pound gorilla." Each Shuttle stack uses up the solid propellant equivalent of ten Trident D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, or seventeen Minuteman III ICBMs. The problem for the DoD is that "we're always at a kind of bare bones bottom" in terms of production, he said. As a result, relatively small decisions can frequently result in major problems—and major costs—for the DoD.
This isn't about Ares specifically, but about production facilities, and infrastructure.
Second, if those are your only concerns, then you are right a shuttle evolved system makes sense. However, I submit that there is/should be at least 1 more goal, which more important than the ones you stated, and which are not served by a Shuttle evolved system.
It has to serve a national need. And I see no national need that is served by having this system. And because of this fact, it calls into question the whole reason for having a human space program.
Until we have a reason, like we did with Apollo (and I am not saying that country competition is the only reason – it just needs to be a national reason), we won't get anywhere of substance in space.
I missed that by Loki:
"That being said, in any test program you will inevitably have SNAFUs that happen and have to be corrected before the "real" thing flies. Unfortunately, there will only be a couple of test flights for ares: 1X, 1Y, and the first 2 launches are also considered "test flights" of both Ares 1 and Orion. Is that really enough testing? Considering the Delta 4-H will have flown 10 times by 2015?"
And if I remember well the original plan was calling for even fewer tests. I am not sure but I cannot remember the 1X and 1Y tests for example. Now and again, I don't know where they get the impression that the LAV will not require a lot of tests to be "man rated" as well…
It was really the belief that when the whole thing started it'd be a walk in the park so to speak… What does that say to y'all?
mm. Are you saying Shuttle is not "man-rated"?
I can't speak for him, but yes, the Shuttle is not, and have never been man-rated. It cannot be, by its design. Which is one of the reasons that calling an SRB "man rated" is nonsensical. You don't human-rate a component. To the degree that the phrase means anything (not much) it only applies to a total system.
The biggest myth in the space industry is the notion of "man rating." It is an arbitrary barrier to entry that NASA uses to maintain its monopoly of sending government employees to orbit.
Space Politics » Congressional reaction to Ares 1-X Love Style
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Folks, It is time to fold up the HSF tent, or at least shrink it dramatically.
The American public writ large does not get anything of value (in their minds, which is all the counts here) out of NASA HSF other than warm fuzzies. Moreover, unlike NASA Science communities, which have customers and partners across the U.S and the globe, NASA HSF has no international customers for it's data.
As embarrassing as it is to say, NASA HSF is a jobs program that no right minded politician is willing to kill off. Therefore it will limp along like the unwanted stepchild hidden in the basement.
Which has nothing to do with the amazing people who actually work in HSF. They are if nothing else, persistent committed amazing people (notwithstanding a few bad apples here and there)
So, what to do:
I"m with Robert: If Commercial is doing the same thing, get the government out of it. Let Orion be launched on Space X or Orbital or EELV,,,doesn't matter.
Therefore, it is time to close Stennis (no more Government rocket testing), time to close MSFC (flexible path studies will not employ that workforce in it's entirety). and shift those who will be working on a heavy lift vehicle (the bone Obama will throw to NASA to give it 'hope' for the future) to JSC.
JSC will also have to shrink quite considerably as flexible path studies and ISS will not sustain that workforce either.
Sadly, with commercial folks already setting shop up on the CCAFS side of the cape, there is no need for pads 39A or 39B. ..and all the supporting infrastructure there. Shut down the VAB, the pads, anything to do with launching out of government own infrastructure in favor of buying/using CCAFS assests. These icons of NASA HSF will be nice additions to the touring public at KSC.
This of course will result in even more job loss at KSC. So, best to shift the remaining flexible path study folks to JSC.
This leaves JSC with operations of ISS, Flexible path study leads, and lead for developing the Orion. Pulling employees in from KSC and MSFC might keep the overall body count at JSC the same, but overall, HSF must shrink post Obama decision – no matter the choice.
The non HSF centers will be impacted by this as well, since Griffin, in creating 10 healthy centers, created an unhealthy Cx program by shifting work all over the country. Not a very efficient organizational structure for using scare taxpayer dollars. So, see the non HSF centers suffer as well, though not to the extent of HSF centers.
Its a mean lean world NASA will have to live in .
Ferris…and all.
I dont think things are that grim actually. I just think it is way past time that we rethink the entire notion of human space flight.
NASA has become almost unique among federal agencies…in that it exist for the most part (or at least human spaceflight does) for reasons which have no solid connection to the rest of The REpublic and which see a very very small percentage of its workforce become the focus of the entire agency. Imagine the FAA or the USCG or the USN or the NHI or any other federal agency where tops 50 people a year are the focus of the entire agencies operation (that is a little oversimplified of course JPL and robots etc)…
We have all gotten use to the churn of "we have to do exploration"…but really what the churn should be is "we have to do infrastructure". and that means a complete redirection of the agency and its focus.
As an example…JSC should be a provider of services (like the FAA) for various companies that want to do things in space.
It is hard to do particularly when one has the right wing and the pork mysters cheering exploration forever, but there is a place for NASA…it just isnt exploration centered around humans.
We would all do better if we just recognized that the dreams of lots of people colonizing space are not going to happen in this generation or probably the next. The technology is just not there.
Robert – I am actually quite optimistic. If I may quote myself
And I see no national need that is served by having this system.
I bolded that last part, because that is the important point – Using Constellation as is, no need is served. BUT, if we were to restructure Constellation, into a program that has 4 primary points
1. Develop Self-sustainable industries
2. Build in-space infrastructure
3. Promotes R&D of multiple varieties that are aimed at better space operations
4. Continuously puts humans further and further out into space
A human spaceflight program, that embodied this, would, IMHO, quickly shut up the people saying human spaceflight is wasteful. I am sure that more than a few people thought that the 80s video games were quite wasteful, but with the internet & computer revolution has permanently shut up any discussion about computer games being wasteful. We are already seeing the first real human based industry developed, in the form of space tourism. And there are other industries that look poised to take off – some of these require actual humans in the loop (like tourism), while others only require the technology for frequent, regular, cheap access to space (such as suborbital research), but that will greatly benefit human spaceflight.
Which brings me to one particular point I always feel worth making – the word exploration, for space, is absolutely meaningless, and if people really want a space program that is responsive to national need, then its time to ditch the exploration monikor – its time to talk about infrastructure, and more importantly, development. That is why I try to avoid the word space exploration when I talk/write.
I should add, I also do see a role for international involvement, and alliance building, but this has already been utilized a fair amount, and so I see no point in talking too much about that potential.
I do believe that there is a role for NASA, a major role for NASA, in human spaceflight, but it needs some major reforms. And yes, this even assumes a place for science based missions utilizing humans, infrastructure development, and moving us towards becoming a spacefaring society.
Finally, to the issue of how long it will take to do large – I think its hard to predict what will happen, and exactly how close the technology is, since there are many people working on it – again, look at the development of computer tech. I don't think it'll happen in 5-10 years, but I think much speculation beyond that timeframe is very hard to consider.
In short, I am quite optimistic about there being a rationale for human spaceflight, and the time frame. But it all depends on the type of program.
The Augustine committee offered some very interesting options that do not involve losing the current investment in the Ares architecture. This is an important point to keep in mind. I understand that a lot of people are concerned about spending $8 billion and 4 years in an architecture and then not using it. But this is not necessary.
Personally I am very excited about the "Flexible Path" offered by the Augustine Committee. One way to follow the Flexible Path is using the Ares V Light rocket. This rocket was suggested by the NASA engineers working on Constellation. The Augustine Committee had enough sense to ask the engineers on the ground for a suggestion, and what they came up with was a simplified version of the Ares V rocket which has more in common with the Ares I.
The Ares I has a 5 segment SRB with a J-2X upper stage. The Ares V has a 5.5 segment SRB plus an RS-68B first stage, followed by a J-2X upper stage. The 5.5 segment SRB and the RS-68B both require new development.
The Ares V Light rocket proposed by NASA engineers looks exactly like an Ares V, except it replaces the 5.5 segment SRB by the 5 segment ones already being developed for the Ares I. It also uses the RS-68A engine already being developed for the Delta IV.
In this way, the Ares V Light actually reuses the existing investment. Even the Ares I-X test is not lost. The Ares I-X test is not only about testing the Ares I. It is also about validating the computer models used by NASA, remind NASA how to build a tall rocket, and giving them experience launching something other than a space shuttle. All of these things are very useful for the Ares V Light.
In brief, the Ares V Light allows you to keep the current investment, and it is actually closer to the initial CaLV design in the ESAS study. In addition, the Ares V Light has some important benefits:
* It can be developed sooner, since it has more in common with the Ares I and the Delta IV.
* It has greater launch capability than the 1.5 launch.
* It is possible to do interesting missions beyond LEO with only one launch.
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It has greater launch capability than the 1.5 launch.
Please explain what this greater capability is. Why are missions that do it all with one heavy or very heavy launch better than architectures that require more than one launch?
My suspicion is that there is a hidden agenda in the insistence on building a much heavier payload launch system than the US presently has.
The hidden agenda is to block newcomers from entering the NASA launch business. … Not really deeply hidden.
GuessWho
Past experience has shown that the life-cycle costs are lower as you minimize the number of launches. This is true of both commercial and USG focused launch systems (Atlas family, Delta family, Titan family, etc.). As payload mass increases (i.e., on-orbit capability increases), the LV capability per single launch has needed to increase to remain competitive. If a true commercially driven human spaceflight industry is to emerge (as many at this site hope for), and this industry is driven by delivered mass to orbit (history would suggest this is also true), then competition will favor a single launch approach over a multi-launch approach for the same payload mass delivered regardless of the actual mass involved.
Past experience has shown that the life-cycle costs are lower as you minimize the number of launches. …
Can you cite any evidence for that? Life cycle costs of what sort of mission?
… competition will favor a single launch approach over a multi-launch approach for the same payload mass delivered regardless of the actual mass involved.
An architecture of infrequent big big payloads does not rationalize and minimize labor costs, unless one plans on furloughing workers during the long "off seasons" between launches. Labor costs more than hardware — hardware per se, separated from the cost of materials and equipment.
Occasional big big launches are not necessarily what is needed to support continuous occupation of a Moon base or other manned outpost beyond low Earth orbit.
Nor does the infrequent big big launch concept maximize mission success. In contrast, a systems architecture using smaller but more frequent launches which puts mission hardware on target before launching humans offers more redundancy and more opportunity to correct mistakes before endangering humans.
Furthermore, The one or occasional big push concept implies less need for a refuelable space tug and a manned spacecraft that doesn't have to return to Earth after every return from beyond LEO.
David Davenport wrote @ November 1st, 2009 at 9:47 am
My suspicion is that there is a hidden agenda in the insistence on building a much heavier payload launch system than the US presently has…
I agree that there is a hidden agenda, but I dont think it is to block out new entrants. I think that the US military wants it.
This is my own private opinion and has nothing to do with anything professionally..
I can see several weapon systems tracks (directed energy …ie high RF…massive communications and control platforms, large geo synch recon (both optical and RF) ) that would require a couple of systems that flexible path enables.
The space station has proven a few things. One there is some competence in assembly of things in LEO, two there is an optimum "bite" for launches of parts), and that human interface in that assembly is useful.
My impression is that the "big industry" for the next decades or so in space (and ISS or something will have a role in this) is assembly of large geosynch platforms in LEO where EVA's are "doable" (ie the correct side of the belt) in reasonable safety and then driving them to GEO with something like the "VASIMER" drive..and some efforts a periodic servicing in GEO.
What in my view is driving "heavy lift" is…The question if you are going to assemble things in LEO and push them to GEO is what bites do you throw them up in. To large and you need a large booster that cost a lot to develop and you risk losing everything if it goes bang.
To small and you take forever like the station to assemble.
ASSUMING The Republic survives intact its present fiscal problems which are getting worse and in my view are our weak point, I can see the US military wanting to toss up platforms that take a year or less to assemble, "nudge them" to GEO…and I can see Ares lite about the number of the bites that they want to throw up.
The US military is looking (under Gates) at "game changers"…space assets that are beyond anything that the opposition can even hope for…and yet which really change the ability of the US to dominate the battlespace. Big platforms in GEO do this in so many ways.
Look at Iridium, GPS, Commercial GEO ComSat, USG MilSat and trend that with evolution of the Atlas Family, Delta Family, and Ariane Family of rockets. Look at what LV's dominate the manifests. I have personally been performing due diligence on three commercial space activities brought forward for investment/financing (sorry can't elaborate any further) where the business cases live or die on the cost to getting to orbit. In every case, greater launch capability to orbit (2 GEO, 1 LEO) for the fewest dollars (which translates to fewest launch vehicles) is THE biggest driver in closing the business case.
"An architecture of infrequent big big payloads does not rationalize and minimize labor costs, unless one plans on furloughing workers during the long "off seasons" between launches."
That sounds like a NASA Govt. program. As I stated before, "If a true commercially driven human spaceflight industry is to emerge…". ATLAS and DELTA don't furlough, but they do optimize for a given launch rate. Between the two, they have historically flown 12-16 per year, mostly for the USG. And if you look at their manifest, ULA has greater than 20 planned for 2010. Most of these are trending to higher and higher payload masses. This is the same trend that caused the ATLAS II's, the DELTA II's, the Thors, etc to ultimately be replaced by larger vehicles. ULA continues to look at upsized versions (ACES fro example) to enable larger and larger payloads (or multi-payloads) to get off the ground with a single launch.
I didn't reference any specific mission. I haven't done the due diligence for these missions, have you? Do you know what the life cycle costs are? What are the delivery requirements (mass, schedule, etc.) to build and sustain either? How many launches of existing LV's does it take to put the first system in place? How often does it need replenishment? What are the non-recurring and recurring costs of the solution using existing capabilities? Using next-generation capabilities? What is optimum solution and does that entail a new vehicle? What are the financial risks of multiple launches versus a few? What are the technical risks of same question? Multiple launches with assembly on-orbit require greater mass for those interfaces, greater complexity of design (a welded tube versus two tubes with end fittings, power connects, fluid connects, electrical connects, etc.). Think from a commercial viewpoint where you actually have to turn a profit to stay alive. And of course, neither of these missions exist, at least not yet so it is mostly an academic exercise anyway.
And adds cost and complexity per statement above RE: multiple interfaces where none existed before. You also need to define mission success. I can certainly build a hotel and rent out rooms. But if I don't have all the pieces there, restaurant, bar, parking, cable TV, internet, etc. I will not attract enough users to cover my costs and make a profit. I need all the pieces in place before I open. And I want to do this as quickly and as cost-effectively as possible. How does this translate to space? Put the entire hotel in place with all the amenities on a single launch (that is VERY reliable). Any interface problems that arise can be taken care of on the ground where it is cheap and efficient to do so. If something goes amiss in space as I try to assemble, the cost to fix is another launch vehicle plus the cost of the lost hardware.
"Furthermore, The one or occasional big push concept implies less need for a refuelable space tug and a manned spacecraft that doesn't have to return to Earth after every return from beyond LEO."
Less need for yet another piece of hardware is bad because….? You will have to enlighten me as to why a system that doesn't need a tug to be successful is worse off than one that relies on one.
"You will have to enlighten me as to why a system that doesn't need a tug to be successful is worse off than one that relies on one."
Maybe because the system that doesn't need a tug has an order of magnitude higher specific cost and an order of magnitude lower reliability?
Yes, I know that such a tug-based system don't exist yet… but you did ask.
"Maybe because the system that doesn't need a tug has an order of magnitude higher specific cost and an order of magnitude lower reliability?"
Show me real numbers. And don't use ARES I/V as your whipping post. That is a NASA Government solution, not a commercial one. Lay out a commercial human spaceflight program that ultimately produces a tangible product and can do so in a business case that closes. COTS may ultimately do that but until either actually starts to deliver on their contracts, we won't know whether their business models close. So far they have been paid progress payments for meeting predefined design milestone (albeit both companies were behind schedule) with the expectation that ultimately they deliver at the cost promised. While progress payments help their cash flow position, and perhaps enable them to attract further 3rd party investment, they don't demonstrate a delivered service.
And BTW, how much does that non-existent tug system actually cost to develop and operate? So far you've offered up a wanna-be system reliant on wanna-be tugs? Now that's a business plan!
GuessWho, me thinks you do protest too much (sheesh!)… you asked a silly question and guess what you got?
Look, as far as I know, no one in their right mind is saying that there's currently a commercial business case for a tug-based system to serve the commercial satellite market (extraordinary systems will require extraordinary markets!) let alone one that services human spaceflight, so your argument is something of a straw man.
What they are saying is that a government programme that's intent on spend billions of dollars on space launch would do better spending it on in-orbit infrastructure (propellant depots, tugs, etc.) than on developing new ELV's that simply increase throw mass. In this way, they both retire risk and create market conditions (demand to launch propellant into orbit) that help encourage commercial RLV development.
By the way, if you think the case of bigger ELV's is such a no-brainer, why isn't anyone – other than NASA – "investing" in one?
Dave Salt – Go back to my first post and the comment I was addressing; namely this statement from Mr. Davenport
"Please explain what this greater capability is. Why are missions that do it all with one heavy or very heavy launch better than architectures that require more than one launch? My suspicion is that there is a hidden agenda in the insistence on building a much heavier payload launch system than the US presently has."
I tend to doubt there is a hidden agenda. A desire to maintain NASA jobs doing whatever the space policy flavor of the month, yes.
But the larger argument on this forum has been the need to foster a sustainable human space flight program. And the proffered solution has been to rely on commercial entities to achieve this given the demonstrated incompetence of NASA. That is the premise for my discussion.
Mr. Davenport argued that more launches using smaller launch vehicles as opposed to developing higher lift capability was the better approach. Somewhere in is logic, he brought up the justification against larger LV's by stating:
"The one or occasional big push concept implies less need for a refuelable space tug and a manned spacecraft that doesn't have to return to Earth after every return from beyond LEO."
The implication here is that by staying with smaller LV's, we also generate a market need for refuelable space tugs. This was his solution, not mine. However, if a space tug is the only viable alternative, then indeed that market segment might emerge. Someone has to pay for it though. And if that someone is a private company, they have to be able to make a living doing so. But a larger lift capacity also solves the problem, potentially at a lower life cycle cost. Want proof? Look at the evolution of launch vehicles. When customers demanded higher lift capability, did the LV providers respond by launching twice and using a tug to take the larger payload to its final orbit or did they develop larger LV's?
"What they are saying is that a government programme that's intent on spend billions of dollars on space launch would do better spending it on in-orbit infrastructure (propellant depots, tugs, etc.) than on developing new ELV's that simply increase throw mass."
This is the same Government that can't do the LV solution economically, and you want them to tackle the harder problem of developing fuel depots, space tugs, etc.? In one of the few instances that I can agree with Robert Oler, "there is a place for NASA…it just isnt exploration centered around humans." And this from an avowed conservative with very strong Libertarian leanings.
"By the way, if you think the case of bigger ELV's is such a no-brainer, why isn't anyone – other than NASA – "investing" in one?"
Umm, let's see, both ATLAS and DELTA continue to develop higher lift capability via ACES, dual-Centaur upper stages, etc. The whole premise of the ATLAS V and Delta IV lines was to increase launch capability (and increase reliability while reducing life cycle costs). Give them credit, they were the leaders in the LV industry at the time they started the EELV efforts. And yes, I know this was driven by the USG military needs, but both Boeing and Lockheed invested significantly in their respective products with internal dollars. If you think ULA doesn't continue to invest in greater lift capability, then you are clearly out of your league.
Since 2003, the Ariane-5 has been upgraded for better reliability and lift capacity. In 2003 the A-5G launched 6200 kg to GTO, they upped it to 6950 kg with the A-5G+ in 2004, and again to 10000 kg with A-5ECA in 2006. The A-5ECB is in development and is targeting 12000 kg to GTO.
While none of these commercial companies is targeting the lift numbers that NASA "needs", they are addressing future LV needs of their customers and this trend is definitely upward. If NASA turns to EELV's, then I would expect ULA will respond with upgrades versions of their current heavy versions.
Sorry, it is a no brainer. Take some time to know and understand the industry before you post such idiotic arguments.
Sheesh!!!!
When customers demanded higher lift capability, did the LV providers respond by launching twice and using a tug to take the larger payload to its final orbit or did they develop larger LV's?
The former, because there were a sufficient number of customers for the larger payloads to justify the development and operation of a larger vehicle, and the vehicle development was affordable. Neither is the case for exploration, as NASA currently plans it.
This is the same Government that can't do the LV solution economically, and you want them to tackle the harder problem of developing fuel depots, space tugs, etc.?
That it's a harder problem is an opinion, and not a particularly well-founded one, not a fact. Not, of course, that I want the government to do it. I just want the government to be a good customer for the services. Private industry is quite capable of doing so, given sufficient market incentives.
While none of these commercial companies is targeting the lift numbers that NASA "needs", they are addressing future LV needs of their customers and this trend is definitely upward. If NASA turns to EELV's, then I would expect ULA will respond with upgrades versions of their current heavy versions.
The short-term trend is upward, but it will top out long before anything approaching an Ares V. There is no customer for that vehicle, or at least not a sufficient number of them, other than NASA, to justify such a development privately. And the only reason that NASA is a customer is because it remains mired in an Apollo mindset.
Take some time to know and understand the industry before you post such idiotic arguments.
Physician, heal thyself.
GuessWho wrote @ November 1st, 2009 at 11:00 pm
This is the same Government that can't do the LV solution economically, and you want them to tackle the harder problem of developing fuel depots, space tugs, etc.? In one of the few instances that I can agree with Robert Oler, "there is a place for NASA…it just isnt exploration centered around humans." And this from an avowed conservative with very strong Libertarian leanings…
thanks …I would clarify my position on two points
First I dont think that human exploration of "space" (meaning other worlds) has any real value at this point.
Historically if you go look at the "great voyages of discovery" whether they be on land, or sea, or air they only occur when the technology to accomplish them is on the verge or already is "common place". Lets stay away from ships…try "Slim" Lindbergh…his flight in 1927 across "the pond" is only a few years before doing "the pond" became fairly routine (although still quite hazardous). Lewis and Clark went west and shortly thereafter an entire nation followed.
We went to the Moon in 69…on a time span basis it is pretty clear that space "goings" are about in line with say exploring Antarctica…as opposed to say "flying the Atlantic".
I dont see any real need for human voyages of discovery (exploration) because the technology for it is far to primitive and the markets non existant to allow the rest of America come along.
Second…government spending does in my view two things…the first is to develop technologies (the turbojet is a great example) that are to expensive for private sector alone technology (ie no company was going to spend the dollars to make the turbojet work in an era of prop airplanes and prop customers)….the second is build infrastructure that allows Americans and America to take advantage of new opportunities.
What is infrastructure is always an entertaining political debate. The right wing of the GOP opposed the Ike Highway system preferring toll roads.
Health care might be infrastructure…we are debating that.
Going to the Moon for some NASA employees is not infrastructure.
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My mistake about the human-rating requirements for Shuttle. I guess I spoke too fast.
I guess sometime common sense does fail me.
GuessWho said: "But a larger lift capacity also solves the problem, potentially at a lower life cycle cost. Want proof? Look at the evolution of launch vehicles. When customers demanded higher lift capability, did the LV providers respond by launching twice and using a tug to take the larger payload to its final orbit or did they develop larger LV's?"
I'd tend to agree with you if we were talking about increasing launch performance by the odd few tens of percent, but that's just not the case. The sort of increase required to support the "Program of Record" or any HLV based architectures for human exploration missions is a factor of more than SIX (x6!!!) beyond anything that's commercially available today or even likely to be within the next decade.
GuessWho said: "Sorry, it is a no brainer. Take some time to know and understand the industry before you post such idiotic arguments."
Do you really think the cost of fielding orbit-based systems like a propellant depot and tug would be anything like the cost of fielding a HLV (i.e. 100T-200T payload to LEO)? What alternate markets would be able to make use of even a fraction of this capacity? Do you know how much trouble Arianespace has manifesting just two comsats? Why do you think ESA is taking so long deciding what it builds after Ariane 5? Do you know about ESA's Tomorrow's Bird Study and why they're so slow to publish it?
You said in an earlier post that you "…have personally been performing due diligence on three commercial space activities brought forward for investment/financing". Based upon your comments to date, I can quite understand why you post here anonymously.
I'll say no more because Rand beat me to the punchline.
Sheesh, indeed.
In response to those who are worried about the seperation of the second stage during the Ares launch, the second stage was merely a lauch mass simulator and had no guidance system whatsoever. It is safe to say that if it had the second stage would not have rotated with the first stage.
@Red:
Not sure how you can make such a statement here unless you have access to the simulation and data reduction after the flight. I personnaly am not going either direction but… Some have voiced concern about an abort with failure of 2nd stage ignition and pointed to this flight to say it'd be a pretty bad day for the astronauts. Now. Is this founded? I don't know for sure BUT still it looks hmmm odd.
"I thought this was a space policy forum, not a bash NASA forum."
Policy is about making decisions between alternatives on the basis of critical thought. It necessarily involves a lot of criticism. Critiquing something is not the same thing as bashing it.
And even if folks were bashing Ares I-X or Ares I, that's not the same thing as bashing NASA.
"You also ignore that two of the parachutes reportedly operated normally"
That's factually wrong. Two of the parachutes were off-nominal.
"Odds are its [sic] still a quality control issue"
Not if there is a systemic design issue affecting multiple parachutes, as appears to have happened with the Ares I-X test flight.
"which you would know IF your were an engineer."
How juvenile. How old are you? Ten?
And exactly what are your technical credentials?
An engineer gets his facts straight. You have failed to do so, repeatedly. Until you can, go away.
An engineer argues technical issues and options based on facts and logic. You debate by throwing insults and making appeals to authority. Until you
can do the former and stop doing the latter, go away.
"But of course you want Ares and NASA to fail"
Where have I ever said that I "want… NASA to fail"?
If you can't carry on an argument without putting word in the other poster's mouth, then go away.
"so you will grasp at any straw"
Where have I grasped at straws? These are facts.
It's a fact that the Ares I-X upper-stage separation was off-nominal. It's a fact that the off-nominal separation would have put Orion in a dangerous orientation that would have prevented crew abort or killed the crew in a crew abort. It's a fact that good stage separation is more critical on a solid-fueled rocket like Ares I that can't turn off its thrust than on a liquid-fueled rocket than can turn off its thrust. It's a fact that after the Ares I-X test flight, there is now doubt whether Ares I/Orion can carry out safe stage separations and launch aborts. It's a fact that the Constellation Program has recommended cancelling the Ares I-Y test flight that would have provided such a test.
It's a fact that deployment for two of the Ares I-X parachutes was off-nominal. It's a fact that the parachutes are pushing the limits of technology. It's a fact the parachute failures dented the SRB. It's a fact such denting prevents the SRBs from being reused. It's a fact that SRB reusability is key to Ares I operational costs and safety.
Where are your facts?
Stop cheerleading and face reality. If you can't, then go away. There are other sites for Ares I or NASA cheerleading.
"to declare it a failure to further bash Ares."
Again, pointing out obvious off-nominal events and failures and their implications for the program is not the same thing as bashing a program.
Do you somehow think that the "professionals" are going to tell us that the Ares I-X upper stage was pointing forwards after separation when it was pointing backwards in the launch film?
Do you somehow think that the "professionals" are going to tell us that all the Ares I-X parachutes properly inflated when two of them clearly did not in the launch film?
Do you somehow think that the "professionals" are going to tell us that the Ares I-X first-stage SRB was not dented when it clearly was in various photos?
Again, stop cheerleading and face reality. If you can't, then go away. There are other sites for Ares I or NASA cheerleading.
If the professionals do weigh in, it will only be on those things we don't know about — specifically the data from the 700-odd sensors and instruments on the Ares I-X stack. And to the extent its public, it's unlikely to be good news. For example, the strain gauges may reveal that the stack was close to rupturing or the flight recorder may reveal that the flight control system was barely able to keep the vehicle properly oriented.
For the umpteenth time, pointing out obvious failures and their implications for a vehicle or program is not the same thing as bashing that vehicle or program. If you don't or can't understand the difference, then go away.
"BTW anyone have a word on when it will finally be ready to fly? The last I heard was February over two years behind schedule…"
And Ares I/Orion is at least five years behind schedule, and most likely seven years. Your point?
Most complex development projects run behind schedule. Only the painfully uninformed or uncritical wouldn't bother to compare schedules.
Lawdy…
"the second stage was merely a lauch mass simulator and had no guidance system whatsoever. It is safe to say that if it had"
It's safe to say nothing until it's tested. (And the Constellation Program has recommended cancelling the relevant test flight, Ares I-Y.) For all we know, the upper stage flight control system would not have overcome the induced moments, at least not enough to save the mission or crew.
"the second stage would not have rotated with the first stage."
The first stage did not "rotate".
Evan Nelson
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