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GIGovernment Defence Anti-Corruption IndexmapView the maplistView all countriesreportView report & datasethttp://government.defenceindex.org/why-it-matters/infoGovernment Defence Anti-Corruption Indexhttp://government.defenceindex.org/why-it-matters/More infohttp://government.defenceindex.org/why-it-matters/Why it mattershttp://government.defenceindex.org/analysis/Analysishttp://government.defenceindex.org/methodology/Methodologyhttp://government.defenceindex.org/press/Presshttp://government.defenceindex.org/contact/ContactTake action!AThis Index is the first global analysis of corruption risk in defence establishments worldwide.http://government.defenceindex.orgTransparency International UKGIGoverment defence anti-corruption index
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Band F 26%
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This country is placed in Band F
Recommendations Unavailable
Policy recommendations not available for this country's assessment
Political 13%
Financial 11%
Personnel 21%
Operational 15%
Procurement 11%
Is there formal provision for effective and independent legislative scrutiny of defence policy?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The parliament exercises control and legislative scrutiny over national defence policy via the parliament's Defence and Security Committee. In reality, however, public evidence suggests that legislative scrutiny of defence policy is very weak and undermined by undue influence.
In terms of powers, the Committee is responsible for examining matters that the Assembly must hear with special attention given to the general organization of defence and security, civil and military armed forces personnel, the gendarmerie, military justice, the police, territorial integrity, the security of persons and assets, cooperation policy and military assistance. The composition of the Committee reflects the numerical strength of each party in the parliament.
The executive branch retains the sole right of veto in the legislative process. Although the President possesses constitutional control over defence committees, under Article 72 of the Togolese Constitution the president must receive authorization for war from the legislature.
There is no evidence to suggest that the legislature has any significant influence over defence issues or has any input on them through dialogue or debate.
Freedom House reports that &quoute;Internal divisions, as well as district allocations dramatically favoring [ruling party] UNIR, are sources of weakness for the opposition. [President] Gnassingbé's family has ruled the country for nearly 50 years, and the government is dominated by his Kabyé ethnic group, who also comprise the vast majority of the security services.&quoute; Moreover, recent news reports indicate that the 2013 legislative and 2015 presidential elections were marked by allegations of irregularities, suggest undue influence from the executive on the legislature is possible.
COMMENTS -+
Inter-parliamentary Union. 'TOGO Assemblée nationale (National Assembly).' No date, accessed October 18, 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2315_F.htm#defnat
BTI. Togo Country Report. 2012.
Retrieved from: http://www.bti-project.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Togo.pdf
BBC News. 'Togo - Timeline.' 4 May 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14107024
Republic of Togo. Constitution. 1992, amended 2002 and 2007. Retrieved from: https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007.pdf and http://www.antogo.tg.refer.org/IMG/pdf/CONSTITUTION.pdf
Freedom House. Freedom in the World: Togo. 2015. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2015/togo
SOURCES -+
Opinion: Agree with Comments
Comment: Although the President possesses constitutional control over defence committees, under Article 72 of the Togolese Constitution (http://www.antogo.tg.refer.org/IMG/pdf/CONSTITUTION.pdf) the president must receive authorization for war from the legislature.
Suggested score:
Peer Reviewer-+
Opinion: Agree
Government Reviewer-+
Comment: The executive branch retains the sole right of veto in the legislative process. There is no evidence that the legislature has any significant influence over defence issues or has any input on them through dialogue or debate.
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007.pdf
Does the country have an identifiable and effective parliamentary defence and security committee (or similar such organisation) to exercise oversight?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The National Defence Committee provides oversight and is responsible for examining matters that the Assembly must hear with special attention given to the general organisation of defence and security, civil and military armed forces personnel, the gendarmerie, military justice, the police, territorial integrity, the security of persons and assets, cooperation policy and military assistance. The composition of the Committee reflects the numerical strength of each party in the parliament.
By means of hearings in the committees, the parliament exercises control over the actions of the administration.The National Assembly may authorise the committees to appoint information or inquiry missions for issues within their competence. The objective, duration and composition of the mission must be stated, and it must report to the Assembly within the fixed deadline. A committee of inquiry or control is created by the Assembly as a result of voting for a motion for resolution. This motion must state precisely, either the factors that give rise to an inquiry or the public services or state enterprises whose management must be examined by the committee. The relevant committee must submit its report during the month of the ordinary session following the appropriation of this motion.
The official website of the Togolese legislature only publishes releases about the passage of laws. Discussions from committee meetings were not available.
According to a 2008 report by the African Security Sector Network, the Defence Council is overseen by the President of the Republic, undermining its effectiveness as an auditing or oversight body. Similarly, the parliamentary defence committee is presided over by the Prime Minister. Tools for oversight are primarily ad hoc surveys, investigations etc, and as such is does not appear that the defence committees are particularly active.
No more recent evidence could be found to comment on the committee's activity or effectiveness.
US Department of State. 2011. 2010 Human Rights Report: Togo.
Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154374.htm
World Bank. 2012. 'Togo - Workshop on Public Financial Accountability and Oversight.' West Africa Association of Public Accounts Committees (WAAPAC). June 19-21, 2012. http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/PARTNERS/EXTPARLIAMENTARIANS/0,,contentMDK
Republic of Togo. National Assembly - Official Website. No date, accessed October 17, 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.assemblee-nationale.tg/
African Security Sector Network. &quoute;INTERACTIVE NEEDS ASSESSMENT OF THE DEFENCE AND
SECURITY COMMITTEES OF BENIN AND TOGO.&quoute; August 22-23, 2008. Retrieved from: http://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/site/components/com_medialibrary/emedia/Workshop%20Report%20-%20Parliamentary%20oversight%20of%20the%20security%20sector%20an%20interactive%20needs%20assessment%20for%20the%20commissions%20of%20defence%20a.pdf
Comment: The official website of the Togolese legislature (http://www.assemblee-nationale.tg/) only publishes releases about the passage of laws. Discussions from committee meetings were not available.
Comment: The National Defence Committee's decisions are taken into account before voting on the issue regarding the security and Defence.
Comment: The Defence Council is overseen by the President of the Republic, undermining its effectiveness as an auditing or oversight body. Similarly, the parliamentary defence committee is presided over by the Prime Minister. Tools for oversight are primarily ad hoc surveys, investigations etc, and as such is does not appear that the defence committees are particularly active.
Source: African Security Network
http://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/site/components/com_medialibrary/emedia/Workshop%20Report%20-%20Parliamentary%20oversight%20of%20the%20security%20sector%20an%20interactive%20needs%20assessment%20for%20the%20commissions%20of%20defence%20a.pdf
Is the country's national defence policy debated and publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Togo's national defence policy is not publicly available or accessible. And the researcher could find no substantial evidence to indicate that Togo's national defence policy is publicly debated.
Although the press code provides for public access to government information, the pre-Faure Gnassingbe (elected 2005) government in the past did not permit access for either citizens or non-citizens, including foreign media.
While the current law provides for public access to government information, the US State Department in 2014 reported that the Togolese government does not always respond to requests and many documents are only available in hard copy.
General Assembly of the United Nations. General Debate of the 64th Session (2009) http://www.un.org/en/ga/64/generaldebate/TG.shtml
African Security Sector Network (2008). 'Interactive Needs Assessment of the Defence and Security Committees of Benin and Togo.' Lome: UNREC. http://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/site/components/com_medialibrary/emedia/Workshop%20Report%20-%20Parliamentary%20oversight%20of%20the%20security%20sector%20an%20interactive%20needs%20assessment%20for%20the%20commissions%20of%20defence%20a.pdf
United States Department of State, 2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Togo, 24 May 2012, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4fc75a562.html [accessed 11 February 2015]
United States Department of State, 2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Togo, 2014, available at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236628.pdf
Ebenezer Obadare. The Handbook on Civil Society in Africa. Springer. 2013. Retrieved from: https://books.google.com/books?id=3VPABAAAQBAJ&pg=PA156&lpg=PA156&dq=Obadare,+E.+(2013).+The+Handbook+on+Civil+Society+in+Africa.&source=bl&ots=bg_LkGrRpN&sig=IcONCOPUuCbGRZEaJeTDfS_zXVw&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CCcQ6AEwAWoVChMIpaWi7sHMyAIVyD8-Ch3N3w7N#v=onepage&q=Obadare%2C%20E.%20(2013).%20The%20Handbook%20on%20Civil%20Society%20in%20Africa.&f=false
International Monetary Fund (African Department). 2013. Togo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report 14/224, p. 98. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14224.pdf
Do defence and security institutions have a policy, or evidence, of openness towards civil society organisations (CSOs) when dealing with issues of corruption? If no, is there precedent for CSO involvement in general government anti-corruption initiatives?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that CSO engagement has taken place on any significant subject by defence institutions. Civil society development, especially in the area of anticorruption reform, is a very recent phenomenon in Togo. According to BTI &quoute;This is primarily due to the fact that under the dictatorship of General Eyadéma (1967-2005), any gathering that had not been organised by the government was likely to face fatal consequences. The present government seems to be much more open to civil society participation than any earlier government.&quoute;
According to the IMF's poverty reduction strategy for Togo, &quoute;civil society organizations have played an active role in socioeconomic development and the development of the rule of law in Togo, thanks to their skill at mobilizing human resources, their ability to call public authorities to account.&quoute; A US State Department also reports that &quoute;A variety of domestic and international human rights groups operated generally without government restriction, investigating and publishing their findings on human rights cases.&quoute; The report also noted, however, that &quoute;Government officials often cooperated but typically were not responsive to NGO recommendations.&quoute; Whilst CSOs are therefore permitted to operate, there are many questions surrounding the level of genuine openness of government institutions in terms of policy debate and formulation. No recent reporting could be found to indicate that governments openly welcomed engagement with CSOs anti-corruption or defence subjects.
Many media and journalists in Togo who denounce corruption and human rights violations are subject to judicial harassment. According to the 2012 International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) report, in the years 2010 and 2011, the Togolese government clearly demonstrated its will to muzzle and punish the media considered as critical, through judicial pressure, particularly against media that denounced corruption and human rights violations. As an example, the daily newspapers Freedom, L'Indépendant Express and the weekly La Lanterne, three press publications that denounce corruption within the State's leading bodies, faced legal proceedings in various cases in which the plaintiff was the President of the Republic. Complaints filed by the Head of State in August and September 2010 for "spreading false news", "defamation", "insults" and "attacks on honour", offences under the Press and Communication Code and the Criminal Code, targeted these three newspapers, which in July and August had published articles denouncing the State's poor governance, the influence of the executive government in the legal domain and the corruption of the administration.
Since 2011, regular anti-government demonstrations of the Collectiv Sauvons le Togo (CST), an alliance of parties of radical opposition and civic groups, have been harassed by security forces and pro-government militias. Demonstrations gained new momentum in mid-2012 when a "moderate" opposition alliance, Arc-en-Ciel, joined in, resulting in increased anti-government protests in major urban centers.
In mid-2012, freedom of expression in Togo experienced a setback with the passage in parliament of a new media bill that allows the government to revoke, suspend or withdraw the media license of organizations whose activities are deemed to be, as defined by the state, "dangerous to national security and unity" or contain "serious errors."
On August 27 2013, Togolese authorities shut down the leading private Radio Légende after suspending the station for one month in connection with its coverage of concluded parliamentary elections. Togo's Broadcast and Communications High Authority (HAAC) on July 25, 2013, suspended Radio Légende for one month after the station broadcasted live that electoral fraud was being perpetrated in the home of a local official. Police shut down the station during the live broadcast without a warrant (Committee to Protect Journalists 2013).
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: A closer study of Togo shows that that civil society operates in a very difficult political, social, economic, cultural and legal environment. There is no record of substantive engagement on defence anti-corruption or anti-corruption more generally. Score maintained.
BTI 2012, Togo Country Report. Retrieved from: http://www.btiproject.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Togo.pdf
BTI 2014, Togo Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014. http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Togo.pdf
Civil Society Platform for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (2014). Togolese CSOs engagement in support of the implementation of the New Deal. 17 September. http://www.cspps.org/documents/130616042/130793247/Report+Togo+CSOs+support+ND+Implementation.pdf/9eeb6d5a-1af7-4a77-817b-c7dff1eb9a2d
FIDH (2012). Togo (2010-2011) - Situation of Human Rights Defenders.' https://www.fidh.org/International-Federation-for-Human-Rights/Africa/Togo,210/TOGO-2010-2011
Committee to Protect Journalists (2013). Togo shuts down private radio station permanently. October 2. https://cpj.org/2013/10/togo-shuts-down-private-radio-station-permanently.php
International Monetary Fund (African Department). July 2014. Togo: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. IMF Country Report 14/224, p. 98. Retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2014/cr14224.pdf
Civicus 2006. 'A Diagnostic Study of Togolese Cviil Society.' International Action Research Project. http://www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Togo/CSI_Togo_Country_Report.pdf
Opinion: Disagree
Comment: There is a confusion in this comment. Despite the lack of evidence that civil societies and Defence -security are engaged in significant subject, there is a freedom of expression in Togo since the year 1990. The freedom of expression is one of fundamental aspect of democracy. No journalist or media who denounces corruption is subjected to harassment. The examples given in the comment are related to other matters.
Suggested score: 2
Has the country signed up to international anti-corruption instruments such as, but not exclusively or necessarily, UNCAC and the OECD Convention? (In your answer, please specify which.)
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Togo signed the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) on 10 December 2003. On 6 July 2005 Togo ratified the UNCAC. There is no evidence of compliance.
As of the time of its implementation review in 2012, 'legislation to implement the Convention had not yet been adopted at the time of the review; however, Togo submitted a draft law implementing the provisions of the Convention for the consideration of the reviewers in accordance with paragraph 33 of the guidelines for governmental experts and the secretariat. The draft law had initially been prepared in 2008 with the assistance of UNODC, and validation workshops had been held to discuss the draft, but it had not been submitted for parliamentary approval owing to internal constraints and outstanding issues. Those issues included, inter alia, the possibility of anonymous complaints, the scope of asset declarations for public officials and the mandate and composition of the proposed new anti-corruption body.'
The body officially responsible for combating corruption was the National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage. It remained inactive due to the lack of a specific legal mandate to fight corruption (State Department, 2014; BTI, 2014). The government generally neither investigated nor punished effectively those who committed abuses.
Togo has signed (30/12/2003) and ratified (14/09/2009) to the African Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. The country is also signatory to the International Anti-Corruption Academy (IACA).
Togo is currently going through the validation process as a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative. It was declared compliant in 2013 following its first extractive industries report. Its compliance will be reassessed in 2016 after the release of its next report at the end of the year.'
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 'United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 2 April 2014.'
Retrieved from: https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html.
African Union Commission (2013). List of countries which have signed, ratified/acceded to the African Convention on Prevention and Combating Corruption.' http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/Corruption.pdf
UN Implementation Review Group June 2012. 'Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations
Convention against Corruption.' Review of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. CAC/COSP/IRG/I/1/1/Add.3. https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/18-22June2012/V1187226e.pdf
EITI. &quoute;EITI Implementation,&quoute; no date, accessed October 18, 2015. Retreived from: https://eiti.org/togo/implementation
Comment: Togo is currently going through the validation process as a member of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (https://eiti.org/togo/implementation). It was declared compliant in 2013 following its first extractive industries report. Its compliance will be reassessed in 2016 after the release of its next report at the end of the year.
Is there evidence of regular, active public debate on issues of defence? If yes, does the government participate in this debate?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The researcher could find no evidence of public debates on matters of defence in Togo. The lack of available sources may suggest that Togo is closed to public engagement with issues of defence. Issues of national security are often regarded as sensitive issues that are confidential. Government is generally unresponsive to requests for information and public debates, citing national security and confidentiality as the reasons.
In Togo there exists a wide and vibrant range of daily and weekly newspapers, many local radio stations and three TV stations that offer regular news programs. Additionally a number of foreign media channels are available and can be watched or heard without impediment. Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are guaranteed by law, but the law is not always respected. However, the assessor could not locate evidence of public debates on issues of defence.
RESPONSE TO GOVERNMENT REVIEWER: The assessor could not find evidence of regular, active public debates on issues of defence in Togo. As such, the score of 0 is considered appropriate.
Comment: Sometimes, when it is required, debates regarding defence and security sector are organized.
Comment: While the government did roll out a pilot public relations programme in 2007 to improve civil-military relations, there is no evidence that there is any consultative aspect to it.
Source: ASSN/UNREC
Does the country have an openly stated and actively implemented anti-corruption policy for the defence sector?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no sign of an anti-corruption policy in existence now, nor is one likely to be in existence soon.
Whilst no such policy exists, Togo has established laws to detect, prevent, correct and punish acts of corruption and similar offences, including an Anti-Money Laundering law and the Penal Code. However, public evidence suggest that anti-corruption laws are weakly enforced and that defence officials often engage in corrupt practices with impunity.
Moreover, while the government set up the National Commission to Combat Corruption and Economic Sabotage (CNLCSE) in 2001, reports indicate that the body remained moribund due to the lack of a specific legal mandate to fight corruption.
The Intergovernmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa also stated in May 2011 that the Togolese government does not persecute acts of international money laundering, although the legal framework to do so has been established. A World Bank survey of businesses (2010) revealed that 60% of respondents believed that the courts were neither impartial nor free from corruption.
Criminal offences are covered by the Criminal Code of 1980 (Law No. 80-01 of 13 August 1980), amended by Law No. 2002-02 of 20 February 2002. Specific legislation to implement the Convention has not yet been adopted. Article 208 of the Criminal Code partially covers active and passive bribery. The scope of the definition of "public official" is broad, since it refers to "a person vested with public authority or charged with a public service remit, or holding elected public office, or any agent of the State." However, the concept of an undue advantage for a person or entity other than the public official is not addressed. There is no specific mention or exclusion of foreign public officials or officials of public international organizations that would satisfy the provisions contained in article 16 of the Convention.
Article 202 of the Criminal Code partly criminalizes the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official, referring to "any official or agent of the State, of a local authority, public institution or company in which the State or another public authority has acquired an interest or, more
generally, any agent or official of a legal entity under public law who has embezzled, removed, misappropriated or dissipated public funds or equivalent effects, or items, securities, deeds or movable property that were in his or her possession by reason of, or in connection with, the performance of his or her duties"
Profiles of Anti-Bribery Laws/Enforcement in SSA Countries. 2009. Retrieved from: http://www.igbanugolaw.com/Resources/antibriberylawsinSSA.pdf
UN Implementation Review Group. 'Conference of the States Parties to the United Nations
Convention against Corruption.' Review of implementation of the United Nations Convention against Corruption. CAC/COSP/IRG/I/1/1/Add.3. June 2012. Retrieved from: https://www.unodc.org/documents/treaties/UNCAC/WorkingGroups/ImplementationReviewGroup/18-22June2012/V1187226e.pdf
Are there independent, well-resourced, and effective institutions within defence and security tasked with building integrity and countering corruption?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is little evidence of the existence of independent and effective anti-corruption institutions within defence and security in Togo. The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively, and defence officials frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.
The Commission nationale de lutte contre la corruption et le sabotage économique (CNLCSE) is Togo's national anti-corruption commission. The State Department reported that the body &quoute;remained moribund due to the lack of a specific legal mandate to fight corruption.&quoute; The World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators for 2013 also reflected that government corruption was severe and most severe among prison officials, police officers, and members of the judiciary. There were no major corruption cases reported during the year. The government has established various other entities such as the Government Accounting Office and Finances Inspectorate to investigate and audit public institutions, but their resources were limited and they reported little in the way of results. In 2011, the government worked towards improving transparency with a large-scale audit of all ministries and public services to trim government spending. No evidence could be found to indicate these institutions' remit extended to the defence sector.
Corrupt abuses by security forces in Togo are subject to internal disciplinary investigations and criminal prosecution by the Ministry of Justice, but this rarely occurred.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014 - Togo, 22 August 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53fc3658b5.html [accessed 30 August 2014]
US Department of State. 2010 Human Rights Report: Togo. 2010. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154374.htm
US Department of State. 2013 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Togo, 2013. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220381.pdf
United States Department of State. 2014 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Togo, 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/236628.pdf
Does the public trust the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There appears to be very low public trust in the institutions of defence and security to tackle the issue of bribery and corruption in their establishments. Corruption is still rampant in Togo as pertinent indices reveal. For instance, the World Bank survey of businesses in 2010 revealed that 60% of respondents believed that the courts and defence officials were neither impartial nor free from corruption.
US Department of State. 2010 Human Rights Report: Togo. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/af/154374.htm
BTI 2012. Togo Country Report. Retrieved from: http://www.bti-project.org/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2012_Togo.pdf
World Bank (2010). Doing Business 2010: Reforming through Difficult Times. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Transparency International (2013). Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. http://issuu.com/transparencyinternational/docs/cpi2013_brochure_single_pages?e=2496456/5813913
Günther Eichhorn (2012). Togo - Empty Wildlife Reserves and Corrupt Police.
http://gei.aerobaticsweb.org/togo.html
Freedom House (2012). Togo - Freedom in the World 2012. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/togo#.VNssumSsXpA
Comment: In spite of the little trust between the public and the defence institutions, corruption is not as major as it is said to be. Defence and security personnel fear to be persecuted.
Are there regular assessments by the defence ministry or another government agency of the areas of greatest corruption risk for ministry and armed forces personnel, and do they put in place measures for mitigating such risks?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of regular assessment of areas of greatest corruption risk within the defence ministry. A UNODC assessment indicates that bribery and corruption is endemic within the defence and security service and there is considerable red tape. Lack of transparency also remains a major problem.
According to the Togo 2013 Human Rights Report by the US Department of State, bribery and corruption permeates government institutions in Togo, including defence institutions. The Bertelsmann Stiftung's Transformation Index (BTI) for 2014, which covers the period from 31 January 2011 to 31 January 2013, notes that although a national anti-corruption commission (Commission nationale de lutte contre la corruption et le sabotage économique, CNLCSE) was formed in 2001, the Togolese government lacks the political will to effectively combat corruption.
Coface. 2014. Major Macro Economic Indicators. Retrieved from: http://www.coface.com/Economic-Studies-and-Country-Risks/Togo
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 2014. Togo. Retrieved from: https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/togo.html
BTI 2014, Togo Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung. http://www.bti-project.de/uploads/tx_itao_download/BTI_2014_Togo.pdf
US Department of State (2013). TOGO 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220381.pdf
Comment: Despite the lack of a national strategy of anti corruption it is important to notice the will of Togo government to fight corruption in all sectors. Many reforms have been undertaken to combat corruption.
Does the country have a process for acquisition planning that involves clear oversight, and is it publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There appears to be no information to reflect a formalised process in place for acquisition planning in Togo.
Inter-parliamentary Union. 'TOGO Assemblée nationale (National Assembly).' Retrieved from: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2315_F.htm#defnat
The World Bank and the Togolese Ministry of Finance September 2012.
Retrieved from: http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/Data/boost/boostcms/files/field/country-attachments/togo_users_manual_boost_1.0.pdf
Comment: The IMF conducted a review of Togolese budgetary management in September 2013 as a whole (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/cr1398.pdf), noting that &quoute;only a very small portion of capital expenditure appropriated in the budget law is actually executed, mainly because of
poor programming and budgeting, procurement delays, and inadequate application of the
bidding procedures.&quoute; This seems to denote that there are acquisition protocols for defence in place but they are only loosely followed.
Opinion: Not Qualified
Comment: Acquisition appears to be done on an ad hoc basis and is especially reliant on donations, particularly for large ticket items such as the small naval patrol vessels received from the United States in 2010. If oversight mechanisms do exist, they are likely largely subservient to the decisions of the executive branch.
Source: Jane's Military and Security Assessments Centre
Is the defence budget transparent, showing key items of expenditure? This would include comprehensive information on military R&D, training, construction, personnel expenditures, acquisitions, disposal of assets, and maintenance.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Despite Togo's efforts to make its budget more rigorous and clear (World Bank 2012), information on Togo's defence security budget could not be found at all. This may indicate that Togo's defence budget is non-transparent.
Despite their relevance for policymakers, public and defence budgets are not publicly accessible. In that spirit, the World Bank has collaborated with governments around the World to create transparent, easy-to-use public expenditure databases that make budgets accessible, understandable, and ready to use. According to the World Bank (2012) report on Togo's budget, in recent years, the Government of Togo has embarked on an effort to make its budget more rigorous, transparent, and clear. As part of its commitment to more efficient and effective Public Financial Management, the Government of Togo created, jointly with the World Bank, a public expenditure database to track and analyse public expenditures.
Since its first Trade Policy Review (TPR) in 1999, Togo has improved the institutional framework for drawing up, implementing and monitoring the budget following the introduction of the new budgetary nomenclature and the harmonised accounting plan on 1 January 2003, pursuant to the relevant WAEMU regulations. According to a report by the World Trade Organisation, this reform enhances transparency and good governance in government finance, as well as budgetary management as a whole, by combining operating and investment expenditure in a single budget.
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014 - Togo, 22 August 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53fc3658b5.html
World Trade Organisation (no date/online source). Togo. 'Economic Environment: Trade Policy Review.' WT/TPR/S/166.
World Bank (2012). The Togo Budget. User's Manual to The Togo Expenditures Database. http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/Data/boost/boostcms/files/field/country-attachments/togo_users_manual_boost_1.0.pdf
Comment: Despite the lack of information about Togo's Defence and Security expenditure, sector-based committees are been set up. The defence and security expenditures are submitted to special procedures.
Is there a legislative committee (or other appropriate body) responsible for defence budget scrutiny and analysis in an effective way, and is this body provided with detailed, extensive, and timely information on the defence budget?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The scrutiny of finance bills, including defence budgets, takes place in accordance with ordinary legislative procedure in Togo. Amendments to the annual finance bill are received by the Finance Committee at the latest four days with effect of the distribution of the general report for articles of the first part of the bill and articles of the second part whose consideration is not linked to a budgetary entry, and with effect of the consideration of each special report for the appropriations of a budget clause and the articles linked to it.
The National Assembly votes the final decision on the finance bill (Article 81 of the Constitution). However, the Senate compulsorily gives its recommendation before the National Assembly vote on the finance bill. In all cases, the recommendation of the Senate is considered as given if it is not announced within 15 days of the bill being submitted before the court, or 8 days in the case of an emergency. The Finance Committee carries out the examination of the finance bills. Any committee may appoint one or several of its members to take part in an advisory capacity in the work of the Finance Committee during the examination of the articles of the finance bill or national appropriations using its expertise.
The Court of Audit is mandated to judge the accounts of public accountants (Article 107 of the Constitution). It guarantees the audit of the accounts and the management of public establishments and public companies. It assists the parliament and the Government in controlling the execution of the finance bill and carries out all finance and public accounting audits that the latter requests of it, including matters related to defence budgetary scrutiny. According to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (2013), the Court of Audit draws up an annual report addressed to the President and to the Government and to the National Assembly and in which it states, if appropriate, violations committed and liabilities incurred. The documents and information for carrying out a parliamentary audit of the state budget or the verification of the accounts of state companies are communicated by the competent authorities to the President of the National Assembly, for the attention of the President of the Finance Committee. There is no evidence that the Court of Audit has an impact on decision making.
Defence Web. 'Togo 2012 budget sees 4.5 pct growth, slight deficit.'
Retrieved from: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21306&catid=74&Itemid=30
Retrieved from: http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/Data/boost/boostcms/files/field/countryattachments/togo_users_manual_boost_1.0.pdf
Inter-parliamentary Union. (2013). TOGO Assemblée nationale (National Assembly). http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2315_F.htm#execdeppub
constituteproject.org. (2007). Togo's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007. Translated by Jefri J. Ruchti (2012). https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007.pdf
Comment: (http://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/site/components/com_medialibrary/emedia/Workshop%20Report%20-%20Parliamentary%20oversight%20of%20the%20security%20sector%20an%20interactive%20needs%20assessment%20for%20the%20commissions%20of%20defence%20a.pdf)
A 2008 conference held by the African Security Sector Network featured governmental speakers from Togo and a number of other West African countries. The Togolese presenters said that the tools for parliamentary oversight of defence &quoute;remain traditional (oral interpellations, questions, fact finding mission/ investigation etc) with the political will to do better. As regards the limitations to existing parliamentary oversight the following factors are hindrances; the lack of expertise as regards parliamentary oversight of the security sector, lack of information relating to matters of defence and security, the inexistence of a parliamentary mechanism of control of the intelligence service and the lack of institutionalrelations between the members of Parliament and the defence and security institutions.&quoute;
Comment: Besides, the Senate assembly has not been yet set up in Togo. At the moment, Togo's parliament is unicameral.
Comment: Despite all the institutional process and consultative frameworks described by the assessor, in practice the executive branch can easily supersede or influence the final outcome of any audit or legislative challenge, rendering ineffective any official oversight mechanisms.
12B.
Is the approved defence budget made publicly available? In practice, can citizens, civil society, and the media obtain detailed information on the defence budget?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The researcher was unable to gain access to the defence budget of Togo because it is not publicly available. No data was found.
Defence Web. 'Togo 2012 budget sees 4.5 pct growth, slight deficit.' Retrieved from: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21306&catid=74&Itemid=30
The World Bank and the Togolese Ministry of Finance September 2012. Retrieved from: http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/Data/boost/boostcms/files/field/country-attachments/togo_users_manual_boost_1.0.pdf
MilitaryBudget.org (2006-2012). Togolese Military Budget. http://militarybudget.org/togo/
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SPRI) (2012). Togo - Military Expenditure 2001-2012. http://portal.sipri.org/publications/pages/expenditures/country-search
Comment: SIPRI (http://knoema.com/SIPRI2014/sipri-military-expenditure-database-1988-2013) has managed to pull together annual military expenditure for Togo over the last decade, but there is no breakdown of expenditure components. The organisation collates their information largely through &quoute;government responses to questionnaires about military expenditure sent out by SIPRI, the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and expert analyses of government budgets by members of the SIPRI Military Expenditure and Arms Production Expert Network.&quoute; Accordingly, defence budget information appears available but only through high profile international bodies.
Comment: Some information on defence budgets are publicly available. The accessibility depends on the identity of the person or organization requesting the information.
Comment: Togo's military budget is rarely made public, and its military expenditure has not been reported by the World Bank since 2011. When details of Togo's budget are released, military spending is not usually included as a standalone section. For instance, in 2010, no mention was made of military spending in the budget document. The budget's listed priorities were instead social initiatives, promoting employment, developing the agricultural sector, tackling domestic debt, strengthening the rule of law, and supporting growth sectors.
Source: Jane's Sentinel Security Assessments
If an information request mechanism does exist for the public, the reliability of the process is not verifiable, but is not likely to be adhered to by the relevant administrative body beyond an ad hoc and preferential basis depending on the identity of the interested party.
Are sources of defence income other than from central government allocation (from equipment sales or property disposal, for example) published and scrutinised?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The sources of defence income other than from central government allocations in Togo are not available. There is no evidence, should non-government allocations exist, that they are published and scrutinised.
Is there an effective internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (that is, for example, transparent, conducted by appropriately skilled individuals, and subject to parliamentary oversight)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Given that the Togo's defence budget is not made publicly accessible, there is no reliable data on the internal audit process involved in defence ministry expenditure.
The parliament exercises control over all public funds, including the defence budget (Inter-parliamentary Union 1996-2013). The Court of Audit guarantees the audit of the accounts and the management of public establishments and public companies. It assists the parliament and the Government in controlling the execution of the finance bill and carries out all finance and public accounting audits that the latter requests of it.
Given Togo's institutional weakness and capacity constraints, coupled with the country's weak ranking in the 2013 Doing Business Survey (156, out of 185 countries), it is likely that the country has a poor internal audit process for defence ministry expenditure (see IMF Country Report 2014). Among other things, the 2014 IMF Country Report stresses the importance of improving economic governance and transparency and the need to reduce extra-budgetary spending; suggests focusing on strengthening fiscal management (including through strengthened oversight and external controls), and enhancing the autonomy of public enterprises (including through privatization).
The Court of Audit judges the accounts of public accountants under Article 107 of the Constitution. It guarantees the audit of the accounts and the management of public establishments and public companies. It assists the parliament and the Government in controlling the execution of the finance bill and carries out all finance and public accounting audits that the latter requests of it. The President of the Court of Audit is elected by his/her peers for three years renewable.
The consideration of finance bills takes place in accordance with ordinary legislative procedure. Amendments to the annual finance bill are received by the Finance Committee at the latest four days with effect of the distribution of the general report for articles of the first part of the bill and articles of the second part whose consideration is not linked to a budgetary entry, and with effect of the consideration of each special report for the appropriations of a budget clause and the articles linked to it.
The National Assembly votes the final decision on the finance bill (Article 81 of the Constitution). However, the Senate compulsorily gives its recommendation before the National Assembly vote on the finance bill. In all cases, the recommendation of the Senate is considered as given if it is not announced within 15 days of the bill being submitted before the court, or 8 days in the case of an emergency. Legally, the parliament enjoys budgetary autonomy, but in practice there are difficulties in effectively implementing this autonomy.
Inter-parliamentary Union (1996-2013). TOGO Assemblée nationale (National Assembly). http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2315_F.htm#execdeppub
IMF Country Report 14/225 (2014). TOGO POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PAPER—JOINT STAFF
ADVISORY NOTE. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
Is there effective and transparent external auditing of military defence expenditure?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: As far as the researcher knows, there is no evidence of an effective process of external audit of Togo's military defence expenditure. According to the 2014 Freedom House, Freedom in the World Report on Togo, the new National Assembly was freely elected and has influence over policy, but corruption remains a serious problem. The report further notes that anti-corruption commission was reformed under the current president so its members would be appointed by the National Assembly rather than the president, but it has been slow to make progress and appears to still be aligned with President Eyadéma and the Union for the Republic (UNIR). Togo was ranked 123 out of 177 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International's 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index. The absence of effective investigation of defence expenditure provides significant opportunity for corruption and prevents citizens in Togo from holding their government accountable for public spending.
Freedom House (2014). Freedom in the World - Togo. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2014/togo#.VNyeyGSsXpA
Comment: CSOs and NGOs do not have access to the necessary information to conduct effective auditing of military defence expenditure, likely under the given pretext of national security concerns from the government.
Is there evidence that the country's defence institutions have controlling or financial interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation and, if so, are these interests publicly stated and subject to scrutiny?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Togo is a very poor country with limited natural resources. Agriculture is the major source of income in Togo which also provides jobs for the vast majority of the population. Natural raw materials like Cocoa, Coffee, and Cotton seed contribute up to 40 percent of all earnings and exportation. There is no evidence that defence institutions have financial or controlling interests in businesses associated with the country's natural resource exploitation. In light of the Peer Reviewers' comments, however, there is clear risk and the score has been selected to reflect this.
Good Governance Africa 2013. Togo: afloat in water, but still thirsty. July 13. http://gga.org/stories/editions/aif-13-out-of-water/togo-afloat-in-water-but-still-thirsty
Comment: This somewhat dated article from shortly after the 2005 election (http://www.afrology.com/pol/togo_amaizo_uetax.html) noted the concentration of decision-making power among senior military officials as well as their extensive business interests in Togo's enterprise zone. However, a June 2014 State Department report on investing into Togo (http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/229292.pdf) noted that the country has undertaken substantial economic reforms to attract foreign investment, including meeting the criteria for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative and privatizing state-owned industries, with varying levels of progress. Mining is noted as one of the key sectors for privatization efforts.
Comment: Defence and security have no financial or controlling in business.
Comment: The constitution does not explicitly bar the military from ownership of businesses relating to the natural resources sector. The publication Africa Mining Intelligence reports that the entire phosphates industry is managed out of the office of the presidency, for intstance, and involvement of the executive branch and defence institutions in the operations of the natural resources industry writ large cannot be discounted and are possible on an ad hoc basis and at the individual or local level. However, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative country report for Togo in 2012 does not explicitly mention defence institutions as owners of businesses related to natural resource extraction. Therefore the reviewer suggests a score of 0.
Is there evidence, for example through media investigations or prosecution reports, of a penetration of organised crime into the defence and security sector? If no, is there evidence that the government is alert and prepared for this risk?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is likely to be considerable penetration of organised crime in the defence and security sector in Togo. Contested newspaper reports in 2010 indicated that there are serious concerns regarding the link between corruption and drug trafficking as Togo becomes a transit country for drug smuggling, especially cocaine. Members of the security forces have been implicated in these extra-legal activities. According to U.N. reports, there are indications that Togo may be becoming a transit country for international drug smuggling – in particular cocaine. In early December the accounts of Togo's diplomatic representatives at the UN in New York were blocked because they were allegedly used for money laundering and drug trafficking. However there is no hard evidence per se that organised crime has penetrated the defence and security sector of Togo (UN Security Council 2013).
There is evidence that the government is making some effort to tackle the problem of transnational organised crime. For example, Togo's involvement in INTERPOL's West African Police Information System (WAPIS) programme and Project AIRCOP, which tackles illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and drug abuse in West Africa, were recently highlighted by the INTERPOL Chief as clear examples of the country's commitment to combating transnational organised crime (see INTERPOL, 10 February 2014). PANA press reported in 2014 that several Togolese security forces are being trained in Lomé by experts from the US Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) on investigation into organized crime. The sources said 40 agents from the Togolese police and gendarmerie are attending the one-week course to learn how to fight against extremism, terrorism, organized crime. The training is held within the framework of the multiform cooperation between US and Togo and concerns, among other domains, the fight against maritime piracy, the trafficking of animal species, drugs, etc. (PANA Press, 27 August 2014).
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. Togo.
Retrieved from: https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/togo.html
UN Security Council 2013. Report of the Secretary-General on transnational organized crime and illicit drug trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel region. S/2013/359. 17 June 2013. http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2013_359.pdf
INTERPOL (2014). Togo role in fighting wildlife and transnational crime focus of INTERPOL Chief visit. 10
February 2014. http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-016
PANA Press (2014). Togo: FBI agents train Togolese security forces on how to investigate organized crimes. 27 August 2014. http://www.panapress.com/Togo--FBi-agents-train-Togolese-security-forces-on-how-to-investigate-organized-crimes--13-926566-17-lang2-index.html
Comment: In addition to the anti-crime programmes above, Togo is also involved in the Global Container Control Program (http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf) and other measures to interdict the international drug trade. This would indicate sufficient government action on organised crime to merit a higher score. However, this February 2015 university study (http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62029/1/MPRA_paper_62029.pdf) did note extensive military links between Togolese armed forces and Nigerian pirate gangs.
Comment: In addition, there is no evidence that criminals have penetrated defence and security body. Trainings are given to police, gendarmerie, FIU agencies to build their capacity. For example on June 2015, the US Embassy is having a training with a total of 100 including police , gendarmerie, OCTRIDB and CENTIF personnel.
Is there policing to investigate corruption and organised crime within the defence services and is there evidence of the effectiveness of this policing?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There appears to be a policing function in Togo to investigate and deal with issues of corruption and organised crime in general. The National Integrated Programme (NIP), for example, was established to enhance the government's capacities illicit drug trafficking, drug abuse and related organized crime. The key objectives of the NIP, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), is to (a) 'Strengthen the operational capacities of the national coordination framework as well as those of the law enforcement agencies combating drugs and crime'; (b) 'Support the Programme on the Modernisation of Criminal Justice in the field of drugs and crime'; (c) 'Provide support to anti‐corruption structures; and (d) Strengthen anti‐money‐laundering efforts and the combat against financial crime (UNODC 2015).
In its Thematic Area I, the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan has specifically requested all ECOWAS Members State to develop a NIP. The NIP has the overriding task of placing the fight against drug and organized crime within the context of the overall national development strategy. In its report, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) notes that 'Security and rule of law being prerequisites to any sustainable development, NIPs intend to address all problems related to the management of intelligence, effectiveness and coordination among all law enforcement agencies, functional and effective criminal justice systems, crime and HIV/AIDS prevention, drug abuse as well as countering money‐laundering and the financing of terrorism' (UNODC 2015). The mandate of the NIP is therefore likely to extend to investigation of corruption and organised crime within the defence force.
INTERPOL. 2014. Togo role in fighting wildlife and transnational crime focus of INTERPOL Chief visit. 10 February. Retrieved from: http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News/2014/N2014-016
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2015). Togo. Retrieved from: https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/togo.html
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. (2015). The problem of Drug and Organized crime in West and Central Africa. Retrieved from: http://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/regional-programme-framework.html
Comment: In addition, the Togo FIU fights against corruption in sectors including Defence and security.
Are the policies, administration, and budgets of the intelligence services subject to effective, properly resourced, and independent oversight?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is some evidence of internal controls over the services of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). The researcher could not find any effective independent oversight of the activities of the National Intelligence Agency (NIA). In 2012 the Human Rights Committee of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights released a report criticising the Togolese government for its lack of independent oversight over the abusive activities of NIA. The lack of oversight over the activities of the NIA has also been criticised by journalists (Committee to Protect Journalists 2011).
Parliamentary oversight of the intelligence and security sector in Togo occurs through traditional methods such as (oral interpolations, questions, fact finding mission/ investigation etc) with the political will to do better. A number of factors act as hindrances to oversight, including the lack of expertise as regards parliamentary oversight of the security sector, lack of information relating to matters of defence and security, the in-existence of a parliamentary mechanism of control of the intelligence service and the lack of institutional relations between the members of Parliament and the defence and security institutions.
Since 2007 there has been public awareness campaigns to sensitise and improve civil-military relations, and they have also organised several capacity building workshops for the armed forces at which the commission of defence and security was invited to take part.
African Security Sector Network 2008. Interactive Needs Assessment of the Defence and Security Committees of Benin and Togo. Lome 22-23 August 2008. The Pelican Hotel. In collaboration with The United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC) .
Alemika, Etannibi. 2005. Police Oversight Organisations in West Africa. Commissioned on behalf of the African Policing Civilian Oversight Forum (APCOF). Open Society Foundation in South Africa.
US Department of State 2012. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR.
2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - Togo. May 24, 2012. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186252.htm
Committee to Protect Journalists. (2011). Togo journalists protest purported security threats. https://cpj.org/blog/2011/08/togo-journalists-protest-purported-security-threat.php#more
Comment: Some intelligence agencies' resources are subject to effective and independent oversight.
Comment: During a UN-sponsored workshop on security sector reform in Togo, it was reiterated by representatives of CSOs that there is no parliamentary oversight mechanism for the intelligence services.
Source: Africa Security Sector Network/UNREC
Are senior positions within the intelligence services filled on the basis of objective selection criteria, and are appointees subject to investigation of their suitability and prior conduct?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is a lack of clarity on the selection criteria for senior positions in Togo. Public evidence suggest that the selection process is not based on meritocracy or objective standards however. Evidence also indicates that Togo does not provide equal opportunities to all citizens and that while the political factors that disadvantaged the southern part of the country before 2006 no longer play an important role, it remains important to have a sufficiently wealthy family or relations in the administration when securing formal employment. The command of the armed forces is often restricted to a few selected personnel, all from the same ethnic group and dominated by close allies of the president. This also undermines the process of meritocracy in the process of senior intelligence appointments.
WN.com. 'TOGO: Hardline Gnassingbe loyalists and opposition defectors dominate new government.' http://article.wn.com/view/2005/06/21/TOGO_Hardline_Gnassingbe_loyalists_and_opposition_defectors_/
Zeilig, Leo and David Seddon. A Political and Economic Dictionary of Africa. Philadelphia: Routledge/Taylor and Francis, 2005.
Decalo, Samuel. Togo. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Clio, 1995.
BTI 2012. Togo Country Report.
Comment: There is no evidence or indicator to prove that Togo does not provide equal opportunities to all citizens. It is not true to say that the command of armed forces are selected from the president ethnic group. According to the constitution, the nomination of some important agencies is at the discretion of the president of the Republic. All of command of armed forces are not from the president's ethnic group.
Does the government have a well-scrutinised process for arms export decisions that aligns with international protocols, particularly the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Togo has voted for the adoption of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which it signed on 3 June 2013 and ratified on 8 October 2015. There is no evidence of compliance or non-compliance with international protocols.
Togo has also signed and ratified the United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition. On 21 July 2001, Togo committed to a consensus decision of the United Nations to adopt, support and implement the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. In its UN small arms Programme of Action Implementation Monitor (PoAIM Phase 1), the Small Arms Survey scored Togo against its commitments to the PoA, then ranked it at No. 86 among 159 Member States.
United Nations Treaty Collection. (2013). Arms Trade Treaty. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVI-8&chapter=26&lang=en
armstreat.org. (2009). Togo: Arms Treaty Issues. http://armstreaty.org/state/togo/
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. (2009). Togolese National Consultation on the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). http://unrec.org/index/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=205%3Atogolese-national-consultation-on-the-arms-trade-treaty-att&catid=51%3Aasserrep&Itemid=44%3F%3Den&lang=en
Parker, Sarah and Katherine Green. (2012).'Introduction', 'Point Allocation System', 'Findings - Table 3: Reporting States by Rank and Score' and 'What do the PoAIM Scores Represent? How Should the PoAIM Scores Be Interpreted?.' The Programme of Action Implementation Monitor (Phase 1): Assessing Reported Progress.Geneva:Small Arms Survey, the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies,1 August.
http://972mag.com/who-will-stop-the-flow-of-israeli-arms-to-dictatorships/114080/
Comment: This site tracks ratification and signatures to the ATT (http://armstreaty.org/issue/tracking-the-universalisation-of-the-att/), and noted that as of 21 April 2015 Togo has signed but failed to ratify the treaty.
Risk management 60
How effective are controls over the disposal of assets, and is information on these disposals, and the proceeds of their sale, transparent?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There appears to be no available evidence or information on assets disposal in Togo. No data could be found addressing the subject matter. Given the general climate of the country the process is likely to be corruption-ridden and non-transparent.
Inter-parliamentary Union. 'TOGO Assemblée nationale (National Assembly).'
Retrieved from: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2315_F.htm#defnat
Comment: The peer reviewer could not find evidence or information on assets disposal in Togo.
Is independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals conducted by defence establishments, and are the reports of such scrutiny publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Constitution of Togo (1992) makes no explicit provisions for independent and transparent scrutiny of asset disposals. There is no evidence that independent and transparent scrutiny of the disposal of assets takes place for the defence services in Togo, nor are reports of any such scrutiny publicised.
Constitution of Togo (1992). Togo's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007.pdf
BTI (2012). Togo Country Report.
What percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no official indication or media briefing from the government regarding what percentage of defence and security expenditure in the budget year is dedicated to spending on secret items relating to national security and the intelligence services. Some sources (e.g. Index Mundi & Macro Economic Meter) have tried to provide some estimate of military expenditure in Togo. However, the method of data collection of these sources are not clear and their calculations are quite dated.
Contextual data:
The value for Military expenditure (current LCU) in Togo was 27,849,000,000 as of 2011. As the graph below shows, over the past 23 years this indicator reached a maximum value of 28,148,000,000 in 2010 and a minimum value of 12,834,000,000 in 1988. The Military expenditure as % of central government expenditure of Togo is 10.1 (% of central government expenditure) with a global rank of 41. Togo's Military expenditure as % of central government expenditure had a negative growth (decline) of 5.61 (%) in the last 7 years from (2004 to 2011). Togo had an average Military expenditure as % of central government expenditure of 9.33 (% of central government expenditure) in the last 7 years from (2004 to 2011).
Index Mundi. 'Togo Military Expenditure.' Retrieved from: http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/togo/military-expenditure
Macro Economic Meter. 'Military Expenditure as Percentage of Central Government Expenditure - Togo.'
Retrieved from: http://mecometer.com/whats/togo/military-expenditure-percentage-of-government-expenditure/
Is the legislature (or the appropriate legislative committee or members of the legislature) given full information for the budget year on the spending of all secret items relating to national security and military intelligence?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no direct evidence that parliament examines secret budgets nor is there evidence of receiving full information for the budget year. In fact, researcher could find no specific information on secret budget or gain access to audit reports relating to the security sector and secret programs. This may suggest that the process of secret items spending is non-transparent and aggregated. According to the Inter-parliamentary union, the Togolese parliament does not approve government expenditures annually. Under the authority of the President, the Government decides and leads national policy and directs civil and military administration (Article 77 of the Constitution). The President may address messages to the nation, and once a year he/she addresses the state of the nation to the parliament (Article 74 of the Constitution).
DCAF 2010. Parliamentary Oversight of the Security Sector: ECOWAS Parliament-DCAF Guide for West African Parliamentarians. ECOWAS Publication. file:///Users/danielagbiboa/Downloads/ECOWAS%20Parliament-DCAF%20Guide%20eng%20(1).pdf
Comment: This 2010 country report on Togo (http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/Togo2010.pdf) notes the high degree of executive control over the legislation, calling the National Assembly a &quoute;rubber stamp institution.&quoute;
Are audit reports of the annual accounts of the security sector (the military, police, and intelligence services) and other secret programs provided to the legislature (or relevant committee) and are they subsequently subject to parliamentary debate?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that the audit reports are subject to parliamentary debate. Asides from this, the researcher could not find any evidence to support the fact that parliamentary audit of the state budget include annual accounts of the security sector and other secret programs. However, the Inter-parliamentary union (1996-2013) does state that the parliament exercises control over all public funds including defence budget.
It is very unlikely that legislators in Togo are provided with detailed information on secret items; there is little evidence of parliamentary debates on audit reports in Togo. The Court of Audit is responsible for drawing up an annual report addressed to the President and to the Government and to the National Assembly and in which it states, if appropriate, violations committed and liabilities incurred. The documents and information for carrying out a parliamentary audit of the state budget or the verification of the accounts of state companies are communicated by the competent authorities to the President of the National Assembly, for the attention of the President of the Finance Committee.
Inter-parliamentary Union (1996-2013). 'TOGO Assemblée nationale (National Assembly).' Retrieved from: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2315_F.htm#defnat
Comment: As mentioned at the African Security Sector Network in 2008, Togolese legislators are largely informed on defence matters through verbal channels such as conversation and oral questions, with no window into intelligence matters.
(http://www.africansecuritynetwork.org/site/components/com_medialibrary/emedia/Workshop%20Report%20-%20Parliamentary%20oversight%20of%20the%20security%20sector%20an%20interactive%20needs%20assessment%20for%20the%20commissions%20of%20defence%20a.pdf)
Off-budget military expenditures are those that are not formally authorised within a country's official defence budget, often considered to operate through the 'back-door'. In law, are off-budget military expenditures permitted, and if so, are they exceptional occurrences that are well-controlled?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In its report, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) notes that in Togo there is evidence of frequent expenditure overruns and large expenditures through off-budget operations and exceptional procedures, resulting in the accumulation of substantial domestic and external arrears. In fact, implementation of fiscal policy has been constrained by severe weaknesses in (military) expenditure management and budgetary transparency.
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2007. Staff Monitored Program. IMF Country Report. No. 07/22.
Accessed via: https://www.imf.org/external/country/TGO/index.htm?type=9998
World Bank (2012). The Togo Budget. User's Manual to The Togo Expenditures Database. The World Bank and the Togolese Ministry of Finance September 2012. http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/Data/boost/boostcms/files/field/country-attachments/togo_users_manual_boost_1.0.pdf
African Economic Outlook (2012). Togo. http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/fileadmin/uploads/aeo/PDF/Togo%20Full%20PDF%20Country%20Note.pdf
In practice, are there any off-budget military expenditures? If so, does evidence suggest this involves illicit economic activity?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that off-budget military expenditures in Togo involves extra-legal economic activities. Most information on the Togo budget are scanty and comes from external sources (e.g. Trading Economics, Index Mundi, & Open Budget Portal of the World Bank), most of which are either dated or lack detail.
In Togo, there is some evidence of frequent expenditure overruns and large expenditures through off-budget operations, including off-budget military expenditures and exceptional procedures, resulting in the accumulation of substantial domestic and external arrears. Lack of transparency in government and defence financial spending often results in overspending and distortions in expenditure compositions. About 40 percent of all government financial operations in Togo are effected through "suspense account" (Abed 1998). According to George T. Abed of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 'The prevalence of extra-budgetary funds, the separation between capital and current budgets, and the inability of the Ministry of Finance to control wages have led to spending overruns and inefficiencies.'
George T. Abed. 1998. Fiscal Reforms in Low-Income Countries: Experience Under IMF-Sponsored Programs. Washington DC: IMF.
https://www.imf.org/external/country/TGO/index.htm?type=9998
IMF (2013). IMF Executive Board Concludes 2013 Article IV Consultation with Togo Press Release No. 13/514 December 16, 2013. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2013/pr13514.htm
World Bank (2012). Open Budget Portal - Togo. http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/country/togo
Trading Economics (2015). Togo Government Budget (2002-2015).
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/togo/government-budget
Reuters (2013). UPDATE 1-Togo increases 2014 spending, sees stronger growth. December 5. http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/05/togo-budget-idUSL5N0JK4AH20131205
Comment: Assessor concedes that there is no definite evidence that illegal activity stems from extra-budgetary expenditure but marks 0: &quoute;There is evidence this involves illicit economic activity&quoute;. The correct score should be 1.
In law, are there provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security, and, if so, are they subject to effective scrutiny?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence in the Togolese law of any provisions regulating mechanisms for classifying information on the grounds of protecting national security. There is evidence of government officials influencing decisions.
For example, Ayi Ayayi (2014) finds in empirical research that there are regulations on
which procurement professionals are supposed to base their decisions. However, they have to deal with inappropriate governmental interference, creating an ethical dilemma. This problem impacts the entire public procurement community because interference or pressure from government officials forces acquisition professionals to make unethical decisions. The Guardian (May 19, 2013), in its Special Report, sees the Togolese government's 'undue interference' as a 'major problem in the aviation sector.'
Nigerian News Beat (May 2013). Government Undue Interference is a Major Problem in the Aviation Sector.
http://www.nigerianewsbeat.com/%E2%80%98government%E2%80%99s-undue-interference-major-problem-aviation-sector%E2%80%99
Ayi Ayayi (2014). GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING IN UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES: AN ETHICAL
DILEMMA - CASE OF TOGO (WEST AFRICA). A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Business Administration. Baker College Flint, Michigan.
Comment: It is misleading to use the Nigerian Newsbeat article to discuss Togo since it only touches on the latter tangentially. The &quoute;undue interference&quoute; in the article refers to the Nigerian government's actions, with Togo only discussed as a West African country which does not have a well-functioning airline.
Do national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses? If so, how transparent are details of the operations and finances of such businesses?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: While there is no available evidence that national defence and security institutions have beneficial ownership of commercial businesses in Togo, the Freedom House, Freedom in the World (2012) reports that corruption in Togo continues to be a serious problem, with nepotism and bribery commonplace. In 2011, the Togolese government worked towards improving transparency with a large-scale audit of all ministries and public services to trim government spending. Togo was ranked 143 out of 183 countries surveyed in Transparency International's 2011 Corruption Perceptions Index. And in 2013, Togo was ranked 123 out of 177 countries surveyed by Transparency International.
Corruption among defence officials in Togo are well documented (Freedom House 2012; US Department of State 2014). According to the Togo 2013 Human Rights Report of the US Department of State, members of the police force tend to carry out their operations with impunity.
Transparency International (2013). Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2013. http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-Transparency-International-Corruption-Perceptions-Index-2013/$FILE/EY-Transparency-International-Corruption-Perceptions-Index-2013.pdf
US Department of State. (2014). TOGO 2013 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220381.pdf
Freedom House (2012). Freedom in the World 2012 - Togo. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/togo#.VN0BXWSsXpA
Comment: I do not agree with the US Department Right's Report stating that the members of police forces carry out their mission with impunity. Some policemen are subject to tribunal when they commit an offence. Before that they are subject to internal investigation.
Are military-owned businesses subject to transparent independent scrutiny at a recognised international standard?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence on military-owned business in Togo. If they exist, they are not publicly declared nor subject to transparent independent scrutiny. Reports by the US Department of State (2014) and Freedom House (2012) suggests that military are often perceived by the public as corrupt and abusive.
African Security Sector Network 2008. Interactive Needs Assessment of the Defence and Security Committees of Benin and Togo. Lome 22-23 August 2008. The Pelican Hotel. In collaboration with The United Nations Regional Center for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (UNREC).
Comment: There is no declaration of commercial businesses on the Togolese military's official website (http://forcesarmees.tg/)
Comment: As far as I know corruption affects all the society, not only in the defence sector. Many efforts are being done to combat it effectively.
Is there evidence of unauthorised private enterprise by military or other defence ministry employees? If so, what is the government's reaction to such enterprise?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no substantial evidence to suggest that the military in Togo engages in unauthorised private enterprise, nor that the government outlaws private enterprise on the part of military officials.
African Development Bank. 2011. Togo: Country Strategy Paper. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-Operations/Togo-CSP%202011-2015%20%283%29%20Full%20Final.pdf
Constitution of Togo (1992 & 2007). Togo's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007.pdf
Comment: This dated article from the Afrology think tank (http://www.afrology.com/pol/togo_amaizo_uetax.html) refers to mafia-style activity in Togo's enterprise zone, with strong military control over informal activities. In addition, this April 2015 article (http://news.yahoo.com/togos-leader-tries-push-family-rule-second-half-112236754.html) notes that the military is a &quoute;state within the state&quoute;, implying a high degree of power and impunity.
Comment: No comment.
Comment: The reviewer was unable to find clear evidence of the regulations surrounding the ownership of private businesses by Ministry of Defence personnel, or indeed evidence of specific cases of enterprises owned by such persons.
Policies & codes 90
Do the Defence Ministry, Defence Minister, Chiefs of Defence, and Single Service Chiefs publicly commit - through, for example, speeches, media interviews, or political mandates - to anti-corruption and integrity measures?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is only a general commitment to anti-corruption and integrity measures in Togo; the research could find no public commitment to corruption cleanup specific to defence institutions and its agents. The United States Department of State Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs asserted that despite corruption being widespread, Togo's government is taking steps to reduce corruption (2012). According to the same report, in 2011, the Togo government successfully implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency, with the expectation of reducing corruption (United States Department of State, 2012).
Freedom House, Freedom in the World (August 2014). Togo, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53fc3658b5.html.
www.Parliament.Uk. (February 2011). Strategic Export Controls. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmquad/writev/arms/m4.htm
Peoples Daily Online. (June 2008). Togolese PM: &quoute;Corruption is an obstacle to development." http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90855/6427557.html
United States Department of State (2012). 2012 Investment climate statement. Retrieved from
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191250.htm
Comment: Until now many reforms have been taken to reinforce transparency. In November 2014, the government adopted a measure of the creative of the high authority of fight against corruption but has not yet set up.
Comment: Reviewer equally found evidence of initiatives by the Togolese government to reduce corruption in the public sector, but these were primarily focused on the natural resources, economic and business sectors, without explicitly mentioning defence institutions.
Are there effective measures in place for personnel found to have taken part in forms of bribery and corruption, and is there public evidence that these measures are being carried out?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Article 202 of the Criminal Code partly criminalizes the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official, referring to "any official or agent of the State, of a local authority, public institution or company in which the State or another public authority has acquired an interest or, more
generally, any agent or official of a legal entity under public law who has embezzled, removed, misappropriated or dissipated public funds or equivalent effects, or items, securities, deeds or movable property that were in his or her possession by reason of, or in connection with, the performance of his or her duties" but not to the benefit derived from such illicit acts for another person or entity.
Giving a bribe, whether to private, government or police officials, is considered a crime but is often expected. Also, corruption and mismanagement of public funds remains a widespread problem in the government and security sector. The National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage is the body responsible for combating corruption. However it remained weak as a result of lack of specific legal mandate to fight corruption. According to the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators for 2012, corruption was endemic and that government corruption was most serious among prison officials, police officers, and members of the judiciary.
The Togolese authorities reported that several cases had been brought under Article 202 in the first years of work of the National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage but that most of those cases had been settled when the offenders returned the misappropriated funds or property at the investigation stage. Those persons had nonetheless been subject to disciplinary proceedings.
Article 46 of Togo's Constitution (1992) states that 'The public assets are inviolable. Any person or any public agent must scrupulously respect the and protect them. Any act of sabotage, of vandalism, of embezzlement of public assets, of corruption, [or] of dilapidation is punished within the conditions provided by the law.' Notably, this is the only time when corruption is explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. The researcher could find no evidence of any public action against personnel on evidence of bribery and corruption.
Ireland: Refugee Documentation Centre, Togo: Information on effectiveness of police/corruption in the police force?, 29 September 2009, Q10981 , available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ac5d11f0.html
Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014 - Togo, 22 August 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53fc3658b5.html.
US Department of State. 2013. Togo. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/220381.pdf
Constitution of Togo (1992). Togo's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007.pdf
Freedom House (2012). Freedom in the World - Togo. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2012/togo#.VNsvLGSsXpB
Comment: In addition the articles 208, 209 and 210 of the criminals code provide sanction for the all person,including member of armed forces who commit an offence related to the corruption.
Comment: Reviewer found that although military tribunals do exist (US State Dept report on Togo), they are generally closed to public scrutiny and there is no evidence of institutional prosecutions beyond an ad hoc basis for corruption offenses. However the presence of the tribunal combined with the stated illegality of corruption by public servants in the constitution merit a score of 2, despite the lack of transparency and presumed lack of effectiveness or consistency.
Is whistleblowing encouraged by the government, and are whistle-blowers in military and defence ministries afforded adequate protection from reprisal for reporting evidence of corruption, in both law and practice?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The researcher could find no institutionalised mechanisms of Whistle-blower protection applicable to military and official personnel that exists to facilitate corruption reporting. Transparency International (2013) report notes that in Togo procedures for whistle-blower protection appear to be restricted to those who report suspicious money-laundering transactions in good faith. Companies, for example, are not required to adopt whistleblower protections and they generally do not do it. When employees report any wrongdoing, they do it anonymously because no protection is offered and they could be fired for doing so (World Bank 2009). While the World Bank source seems dated, the researchers findings from other sources (Transparency International, Freedom House, US Department of State, etc.) suggests that no much has changed.
In 1989, the Whistleblower Protection Act was enacted to strengthen protections, for Federal employees who believe they have been subjected to unjustified personnel actions in reprisal for their whistleblowing activities. In 1994, whistleblower protections were extended to the Department of Veteran Affairs (see Memorandum from Togo West).
World Bank (2009). Corporate Governance Country Assessment Togo. March. Report on the Observance of
Standards and Codes (ROSC) Corporate Governance. http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_cg_togo.pdf
Memorandum from Togo West (no date), Secretary of the Department of Veteran's Affairs. MEMORANDUM TO ALL EMPLOYEES From: Togo West RE: Whistleblower Protection. https://osc.gov/Resources/letter2.htm
Transparency International (2013). WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION AND THE UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/libe/dv/ti_report_/ti_report_en.pdf
Is special attention paid to the selection, time in post, and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, including officials and personnel in defence procurement, contracting, financial management, and commercial management?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that there is (or is not) special attention paid to the selection and oversight of personnel in sensitive positions, nor is there any evidence of recognition that certain positions may be more open to corrupt transactions than others. Moreover, the vast bulk of officers in Togo are made up of men coming from the president's area. Also, the tendency is to favour the units closer to the leader, including paracommando of the Po in Burkina Faso, the 'Pigeons' battalion, the rapid intervention force in Togo, and the paramilitary and specific security forces
Ministry of Economy and Finance (2010). Missions and functions in the control of public procurement and public service delegations and monitoring their implementation. http://www.marchespublics-togo.com/
Comment: It is not true to say that most of commanders are closer from the president of the Republic or are from para commando, Pigeon battalion and so on. The 'Pigeon battalion' has been dissolved since the year 1991.
Is the number of civilian and military personnel accurately known and publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The sources available on the number of military personnel in Togo are quite dated and lack detail. Drawing on a World Bank report, Trading Economics notes that the total armed forces personnel in Togo was last measured at 9300 in 2010. No further break-down is provided. In a more recent article, published in January 2014, Defence Web estimates the total force strength of Togo as follows: Army: 8 800, Air Force: 650, Navy: 220, Paramilitary: 2 500 Gendarmerie.
Response to Peer Reviewers: The number of civilian personnel could not be verified. Score has been adjusted to 1.
Defence Web. (January 2014). Togolese Armed Forces. http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33344:togolese-armed-forces&catid=119:african-militaries
Trading Economics (2014). Armed forces personnel - total in Togo. http://www.tradingeconomics.com/togo/armed-forces-personnel-total-wb-data.html
Comment: The Togolese armed forces website (http://forcesarmees.tg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41&Itemid=53) provides an order of battle for the branches of the armed forces as well as the gendarmerie. While exact numbers are not specified, there is sufficient information to provide estimates of total troop numbers.
Comment: IHS Jane's puts the total number of military personnel at 8,550, with 8,100 in the army, 250 in the navy and 200 in the air force. Confirms assessor's finding that the number of personnel is not accurately known. Furthermore, the website of the Togolese armed forces does not feature a personnel count.
Are pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel openly published?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Research found no reliable information published on pay rates and allowances for civilian and military personnel for Togo.
Do personnel receive the correct pay on time, and is the system of payment well-established, routine, and published?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: According to an interview with a university academic in Lome, there are widespread delays in salary payment for public servants in Togo. There is an unreliable system of state payment and this extends to the MoD also.
Telephone Interview with university academic in Lome, Togo. 11 February 2015.
Comment: The peer reviewer could not find publicly available information on the payment system.
Comment: Every member of public service receive par month his payment bulletin. This payment is not supposed to be published. These information are available but not published
Comment: The FAT's statutes guarantee all personnel adequate remuneration appropriate to their position in the armed forces and discretionary adjustments based on need for equipment, clothing and lodging, as well as a standard fixed rate pension. However, the salaries are not published in real terms.
(http://forcesarmees.tg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=82)
Articles in Togolese publications and blogs critical of the government do frequently mention salary arrears as relate to the wider civil service and the police, indicating that this problem likely extends to the military as well. The column below states that the police force was facing nine months' arrears, for instance.
http://www.27avril.com/blog/actualites/politiques/togo-police-nationale-9-mois-sans-salaire-pour-un-millier-de-recrues-entre-temps-les-gouvernants-se-goinfrentcomme-des-porcs
Is there an established, independent, transparent, and objective appointment system for the selection of military personnel at middle and top management level?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Defer to Peer Reviewer comments. Reports like Freedom House (2012) and US Human Rights Report (2012) have touched on the widespread level of corruption and nepotism in government institutions in Togo, including defence institutions.
Diastode. 'Togo: Fifty years of suffering.' Retrieved from: http://www.diastode.org/Echoseng/invit_eng72.html
Guiseppe Caforio (ed). 2006. Handbook on the Sociology of the Military. Springer.
Comment: The Togolese armed forces website (http://forcesarmees.tg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=79) lists a series of requirements for entry into military academies, which would provide a pathway into the junior and middle officer ranks. However, at the senior-most levels there is an endemic practice of selecting senior military officials from those close to President Gnassingbe and from his Kabye ethnic group (http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62029/1/MPRA_paper_62029.pdf).
Comment: In Togo there is no system for the appointment in Defence and security sector. But the appointment is not arbitrary. There are some criteria to be respected.
Comment: The FAT statute states that promotions are based on time served and the position of the individual in visible promotion tables, whose positions are determined by scores given to them by their superiors through reviews. Furthermore, the statue states that no individual may rise to a rank without serving a minimum length of time in the preceding rank. All promotions are approved by the Ministry of Defence.
However, there is no firm evidence that these practices are adhered to, and there are many reports of favouritism based on ethnic background, political affiliation and other nepotistic considerations. Therefore the reviewer suggest a score of 2.
http://forcesarmees.tg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=81&Itemid=82
Are personnel promoted through an objective, meritocratic process? Such a process would include promotion boards outside of the command chain, strong formal appraisal processes, and independent oversight.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of a formalised process or oversight to regulate the promotion process for defence officers. It is also likely that corruption or other inappropriate conduct occurs during the promotions process. Corruption and nepotism is widespread and systemic among public officials in general, according to reports from Freedom House (2012), Transparency International (2013), and World Bank (2010) . According to the US Department of State (2012), approximately 80 percent of the army's officers and soldiers were from the Kabye ethnic group, which constituted 23 percent of the population and to which the current and previous presidents belonged.
Rotberg I. Robert. 2007. Worst of the Worst: Dealing with Repressive and Rogue Nations. Cambridge, MA: World Peace Foundation.
US Department of State 2011. Retrieved from: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186462.pdf
Günther Eichhorn (2012). Togo - Empty Wildlife Reserves and Corrupt Police. http://gei.aerobaticsweb.org/togo.html
US Department of State (2012). Togo - Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2011/af/186252.htm
Comment: A January 2012 report from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/archives/asb/ASB-17.pdf) found that promotions are skewed towards favoring the presidential guard, who are predominantly drawn from President Gnassingbe's Kabye ethnic group.
Comment: As far as I know there is no evidence that 80% of defence and security personnel are from Kabyè ethnic group.
It is true that in the army the personnel from the North part of Togo is more than those coming from the south.
The promotion in senior position is not necessarily based on the association with the ethnic group.
Comment: The FAT statute states that promotions are based on time served and the position of the individual in promotion tables, whose positions are determined by scores given to them by their superiors through reviews. Furthermore, the statue states that no individual may rise to a rank without serving a minimum length of time in the preceding rank. All promotions are approved by the Ministry of Defence.
Where compulsory conscription occurs, is there a policy of not accepting bribes for avoiding conscription? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: In Togo, the age for compulsory and voluntary military service is 18; there is a 2-year service obligation. There is no evidence of mechanisms in place to deal with issues of bribery and corruption aside from the broad measures mentioned in Question 35. There is likely to be widespread bribery and corruption.
Index Mundi. 2014. Togo Military Profile 2014. http://www.indexmundi.com/togo/military_profile.html
JoinAfrica.com Togolese Armed Forces. Military Capabilities of Togo. Retrieved from: http://www.joinafrica.com/countries1/Togo/military.htm
No official source could be found on compulsory conscription in Togo.
Comment: This review of anti-bribery laws and enforcement in Sub-Saharan Africa (http://www.igbanugolaw.com/Resources/antibriberylawsinSSA.pdf) found that Togo has ratified UN and African Union conventions against corruption, but bribery is widespread among government officials. The peer reviewer believes that the pervasive nature of bribery would also extend to conscription.
Comment: There is no evidence to demonstrate bribery and corruption. It could be possible.
Comment: The reviewer could not find any firm evidence or public reports of corruption in the conscription process in Togo.
With regard to compulsory or voluntary conscription, is there a policy of refusing bribes to gain preferred postings in the recruitment process? Are there appropriate procedures in place to deal with such bribery, and are they applied?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of mechanisms in place to deal with conscription related issues of bribery and corruption aside from the broad measures mentioned in Question 35. There is likely to be widespread bribery and corruption in Togo according to reports (e.g. Transparency International 2013; Freedom House 2012). No further information could be obtained.
Freedom House (2013). Freedom in the World - Togo. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/togo#.VN5NB2SsXpA
Transparency International (2013). Corruption Perception Index 2013. http://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results
Is there evidence of 'ghost soldiers', or non-existent soldiers on the payroll?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The research could find no information or media reports on the phenomenon of ghost soldiers in Togo. There is also no evidence that this is problematised by the Togolese government or defence institutions. However, given the issues with the payment system and limited information regarding the strength of personnel, there is a strong risk of such phenomenon and the score has been selected accordingly.
Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Accepted, comments and score adjusted accordingly.
Comment: This 2001 report by Child Soldiers International (http://www.refworld.org/docid/498805c6c.html) did not make any reference to ghost soldiers, noting that recruitment stems overwhelmingly from the president's ethnic group on an ostensibly voluntary basis.
Comment: The assessor and the reviewer found no information explicitly confirming the presence of ghost soldiers in Togo, but the problematic nature of the salary system and budget opacity in the country certainly creates the possibility. Therefore the reviewer suggests a score of 2.
Are chains of command separate from chains of payment?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: This question could not be verified due to lack of available information.
Comment: The peer reviewer could find no evidence of a published chain of command, or that chains of payment are separate from the command structure. However, considering the strong emphasis on personal loyalty and favoritism in the senior ranks of the armed forces (particularly following the coup attempt in 2009) it is unlikely that separation between command and payment is in place.
Comment: In the Defence and security sector the chain of command is different from the chain of payment. The chain of payment works closely with the ministry of finance while the chain of command is link to the ministry of defence. But department in charge of the payment prepare the payroll before submitting to the department in charge of the payment.
Comment: Neither the constitution of Togo nor the statute of its armed forces mentioned chains of payment or their relation to chains of command, and there is no other immediate evidence in third party sources.
Is there a Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel that includes, but is not limited to, guidance with respect to bribery, gifts and hospitality, conflicts of interest, and post-separation activities?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no known Code of Conduct for all military and civilian personnel in Togo which covers corruption-related conduct. If there is, it is likely to be ineffective given reports of endemic corruption, inefficiency and abuse in defence institutions in Togo (US Department of State 2012).
Article 202 of the Criminal Code partly criminalizes the embezzlement, misappropriation or other diversion of property by a public official, referring to "any official or agent of the State, of a local authority, public institution or company in which the State or another public authority has acquired an interest or, more generally, any agent or official of a legal entity under public law who has embezzled, removed, misappropriated or dissipated public funds or equivalent effects, or items, securities, deeds or movable property that were in his or her possession by reason of, or in connection with, the performance of his or her duties" but not to the benefit derived from such illicit acts for another person or entity. The Togolese authorities reported that several cases had been brought under this provision in the first years of work of the National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage but that most of those cases had been settled when the offenders returned the misappropriated funds or property at the investigation stage. Those persons had nonetheless been subject to disciplinary proceedings.
Comment: The FAT statutes state that military personnel are subject to civilian criminal law, and as such are subject to codified anti-corruption legislative frameworks, which dovetail into military disciplinary regulations. However these are not explicitly related to the armed forces but do count as a Code of Conduct extending to military personnel. Therefore the reviewer suggests the score should be 1.
Is there evidence that breaches of the Code of Conduct are effectively addressed ,and are the results of prosecutions made publicly available?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of a code of conduct which is effectively enforced in Togo although conduct standards are specified in legislation in regard to bribery and corruption, as discussed in Question 35. Notably, the country was ranked 123 out of 177 countries and territories surveyed in Transparency International's 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index. The operational capacities of anti‐corruption agencies and of those promoting transparency and good governance (Anti‐Corruption Commission, State General Controller, Cells in charge of controlling the management of public funds within the Ministries) to deal with corruption cases and other financial offences are very weak (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2014).
Response to Peer Reviewer: Accepted, comments reflected in main answer and score adjusted to 1.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). (2014). Togo. Retrieved from: https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/togo.html
Does regular anti-corruption training take place for military and civilian personnel?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence of some anti-corruption training in Togo. The capacity of law enforcement agencies (Search and Investigation Service, Anti‐Gang Brigades (Gendarmerie), Anti‐Narcotics and Prostitution Brigades, Criminal Directorate of the National Police and the Anti‐Drugs Directorate of the Togolese Customs) to investigate transnational organised crime cases is increasingly improved through training and appropriate logistical support provided by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Also, an UNODC report notes that the capacities of Togo's intelligence agencies to collect, analyse, process and exchange intelligence for the purpose of investigation are strengthened through the provision of equipment and technical training so as to foster prosecution; and Strategic advice on criminal justice matters is provided within the framework of the ongoing Justice Modernisation Programme.
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Togo. Retrieved from: https://www.unodc.org/westandcentralafrica/en/togo.html
UK parliament website (2011). Strategic Export Controls. February 2. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmselect/cmquad/writev/arms/m4.htm
Peoples Daily Online. June 2008. Togolese PM: &quoute;Corruption is an obstacle to development." http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90777/90855/6427557.html
Is there a policy to make public outcomes of the prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities, and is there evidence of effective prosecutions in recent years?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The researcher could find no evidence of prosecution of defence services personnel for corrupt activities. There is an entrenched culture of impunity among defence officials according to public evidence (US Department of State). Although abuses by security forces were subject to internal disciplinary investigations and criminal prosecution by the Ministry of Justice, this rarely occurred. The government generally neither investigated nor punished effectively those who committed abuses (BTI 2014).
Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI (2014). Togo Country Report.
Comment: Even if the criminal persecution occurs rarely, you shouldn't state that there is no evidence of persecution of defence and security members. Some serious cases are subject to tribunal.
Are there effective measures in place to discourage facilitation payments (which are illegal in almost all countries)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There are no specific law that directly addresses facilitation payments. Although Article 46 of Togo's 1992 Constitution does state that 'The public assets are inviolable. Any person or any public agent must scrupulously respect the and protect them. Any act of sabotage, of vandalism, of embezzlement of public assets, of corruption, [or] of dilapidation is punished within the conditions provided by the law.
The operational capacities of anti‐corruption agencies and of those promoting transparency and good governance (Anti‐Corruption Commission, State General Controller, Cells in charge of controlling the management of public funds within the Ministries) to deal with corruption cases and other financial offences are very weak. 'Government procurement contracts and dispute settlements are more likely to go forward after palms are greased. Giving a bribe, whether to private or government officials, is considered a crime but is often expected' (Wikileaks 2009). Not much has changed in this regard (see BTI 2012).
Profile of Anti-Bribery Laws / Enforcement in SSA Countries. Retrieved from: http://www.igbanugolaw.com/Resources/antibriberylawsinSSA.pdf
Training 60
Do the armed forces have military doctrine addressing corruption as a strategic issue on operations?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence of a military doctrine in Togo that specifically addresses the issue of corruption during operations. At the same time, there is no available reports or news that that peace keeping officers from Togo engage in corruption during operations. Notably, despite its small geographic size and population, Togo has committed almost 200 police, troops and experts to the United Nations as of January 2014. The country has contributed some of the largest continents of peacekeeping forces operating in the African region.
James Broomfield and Min Heo (2006). Security Council - Togolese Republic. Special Council Position Paper.
Peoples Daily. 2006. Togo renews peacekeeping mission in Cote d'Ivoire. April 06. http://english.people.com.cn/200504/06/eng20050406_179733.html
UN News Centre (2013). UN chief discusses new UN mission in Mali with Togolese President Gnassingbé. Retrieved from: http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=44905&Cr=togo&Cr1=#.VAVkRrySw00
Is there training in corruption issues for commanders at all levels in order to ensure that these commanders are clear on the corruption issues they may face during deployment? If so, is there evidence that they apply this knowledge in the field?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is some evidence of military training for Togolese commanders. In 2012, for example, United States's Institute of Peace, USIP travelled to Togo to provide negotiation training to the country's military for upcoming peacekeeping missions. The visit marked the second Togo visit for Milofsky, who works for USIP's Academy for International Conflict Management and Peace building, which trains African Security Personnel as part of the State Department's African Contigency Operations Training and Assistance Program, that USIP has worked with for the last few years. The parliament exercises control over national defence policy when troops are dispatched overseas.
USIP 2012. 'USIP Trains Togolese on Negotiation Skills and Civilian Protection' July 30. Retrieved from: http://www.usip.org/publications/usip-trains-togolese-negotiation-skills-and-civilian-protection-0
James Broomfield and Min Heo. Security Council - Togolese Republic. Special Council Position Paper.
Transparency International. 2013. UN Peacekeeping Missions must tackle Corruption.' http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/un_peacekeeping_missions_must_tackle_corruption
Comment: The assessor's analysis lends itself to a score of 2, rather than 0, as noted.
&quoute;There is some evidence of military training for Togolese commanders. In 2012, for example, United States's Institute of Peace, USIP's Alison Milofsky traveled to Togo to provide negotiation training to the country's military for upcoming peacekeeping missions.&quoute;
Are trained professionals regularly deployed to monitor corruption risk in the field (whether deployed on operations or peacekeeping missions)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that the government of Togo deploys trained professionals to monitor corruption risk during peace keeping operations.It is highly unlikely given the lack of recognition of corruption as an issue in operations and the score has been selected on the basis of this assumption.
Transparency International. (2013). UN Peacekeeping Missions must tackle Corruption.' http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/un_peacekeeping_missions_must_tackle_corruption
Are there guidelines, and staff training, on addressing corruption risks in contracting whilst on deployed operations or peacekeeping missions?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: It is not clear whether or not Togo has any guideline in place for addressing corruption risk in contracting. There is no evidence of any relevant guidelines or training in place for peacekeeping forces.
Response to Government Reviewer: Score adjusted to 1 as there is no public information to verify this.
Comment: Before being deployed to the mission field, Togo defence members extend the training, including the corruption risks they can be faced, in peacekeeping centre (Centre des opérations de maintien de la paix).
Private Military Contractors (PMCs) usually refer to companies that provide operational staff to military environments. They may also be known as security contractors or private security contractors, and refer to themselves as private military corporations, private military firms, private security providers, or military service providers.
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is some evidence that private military contractors are hired in Togo and that their activities are not effectively regulated by the government. In a bid to develop its maritime forces to control piracy and protect the Gulf of Guinea shipping routes, for instance, there are unconfirmed reports that Togo hired the services of the US private maritime security firm AdvanFort. AdvanFort, which has recently rebranded itself as AdvanFort International amid the increased international demand for private maritime security, has successfully conducted counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman for several years. However, AdvanFort has courted some controversy, including the revelation that one of the company's suppliers provided firearms to AdvanFort without the proper export licence in 2011, leading to a fire and a two-year probation period from the US government.
Bureau of Diplomatic Security, US Department of State (2014). Togo 2014 Crime and Safety Report. https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15890
Isenberg Institute of Strategic Satire. (2013). The Cotonou Conundrum: Pirates and Private Security. December 5. http://iissonline.net/the-cotonou-conundrum-pirates-and-private-security/
United Nations Human Rights (2014). 'UN Working Group on mercenaries to launch study on the use of private military and security companies by the UN.' Retrieved from: http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13154&LangID=E
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (2012). Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation. London: The Stationary Office.
Personnel 50
Does the country have legislation covering defence and security procurement and are there any items exempt from these laws?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Togolese government procurement procedures are defined by the Code promulgated in 1993 (Ordinance No. 93-006 of 4 August 1993) and by Decree No. 94-039/PR of 10 June 1994. The Government Procurement
Code is administered by the National Procurement Commission, made up of an official appointed by the Prime Minister (Chairman of the Commission), four representatives of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, two representatives of the Minister of Public Works, one representative of the Minister of Planning, one representative of the Minister of Commerce, one representative of the Minister of State-owned enterprises and three representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry of Togo. The Committee for the Study and Control of Procurement Projects is responsible for monitoring the contracts awarded by the National Commission. In reality, however, procurement decrees are weakly monitored and enforced.
WT/TPR/S/48 (2014). Trade Policies Review. 'Government Procurement.' Retrieved from: http://www.wto.org/spanish/tratop_s/gproc_s/togo.pdf
Ministry of Economy and Finance Official Website (2015). Procurements. http://www.togoreforme.com/fr/
Comment: The online portal for Togolese public procurement can be found at http://www.marchespublics-togo.com/.
Is the defence procurement cycle process, from assessment of needs, through contract implementation and sign-off, all the way to asset disposal, disclosed to the public?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Information related to the complete defence procurement cycle is not available nor accessible.
Response to Peer Reviewer: Information appreciated. However, this is one aspect of the process only and as such a score higher than 0 is not justified.
WT/TPR/S/48 Trade Policies Review (2014). 'Government Procurement.' Retrieved from: http://www.wto.org/spanish/tratop_s/gproc_s/togo.pdf
Comment: A list of procurement tenders (http://www.marchespublics-togo.com/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=category&id=29:travaux&Itemid=77) offer a number of contracts from the Defence Ministry. These contracts outline the tendering process in just one page, stating that all the bids submitted before the deadline will be publicly examined in front of representatives from the bidders.
Comment: In Togo there procurement cycle process is regulated. The Decret n°2008-178/PR dated from 19 December 2008 and the decret n°2009-277/PR date on November, 11, 2009 are laws sources.
The disclosure depends of the amount. When the amount is superior to 25.000.000 XOF, the market is subject to invitation to tend. This concerns either civilian procurement or defence one.
Comment: Any details from the procurement cycle, including tenders, contracting and delivery, are occasionally announced by the supplier organisation or country, but there is little to no transparency from the Togolese government around these initiatives, probably falling under a national security information restriction.
Are defence procurement oversight mechanisms in place and are these oversight mechanisms active and transparent?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence of some defence procurement oversight in Togo. The Government Procurement Code is administered by the National Procurement Commission, made up of an official appointed by the Prime Minister (Chairman of the Commission), four representatives of the Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs, two representatives of the Minister of Public Works, one representative of the Minister of Planning, one representative of the Minister of Commerce, one representative of the Minister of State-owned enterprises and three representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, Agriculture and Industry of Togo. The Committee for the Study and Control of Procurement Projects is responsible for monitoring the contracts awarded by the National Commission. That said, oversight mechanisms in Togo appear to be ineffective and non-transparent according to a detailed empirical report (see Ayayi 2014).
Ayayi, A.J. (2014). Government Contracting in Underdeveloped Countries: An Ethical Dilemma - Case of Togo (West Africa). Baker College, Michigan. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/doc/1526020958.html?FMT=AI
Are actual and potential defence purchases made public?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no report on defence purchases available to the Togolese public. As concerns the public
finance management system, recent diagnostic studies have revealed gaps of which the most prominent are: (i) budget credibility, monitoring of execution and transparency of budget operations; (ii) no accountability in resource use; and (iii) weak internal and external control mechanisms for the financial operations of the State (Trade Policies Review). That said, the regulations required for an equitable and competitive procurement process are increasingly in place in Togo, and most interviewed Togolese public agree that there has been some progress in this area the past decade. In the 2012 Investment Climate Statement, the United States Department of State Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs asserted that despite corruption being widespread, Togo's government is taking steps to reduce corruption (2012). According to the same report, in 2011, the Togo government successfully implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency, with the expectation of reducing corruption. Government procurements are now published in a weekly government periodical, and once contracts are awarded, all bids and the winner are published in the weekly government procurement publication (Ayayi 2014).
Response to Peer Reviewer 2: Given information regarding defence purchases is provided by the delivering country or the manufacturer, rather than the government, a score higher than 0 is not justified.
Profile of Anti-Bribery Laws / Enforcement in SSA Countries (no date). Retrieved from: http://www.igbanugolaw.com/Resources/antibriberylawsinSSA.pdf
Comment: The presence of a government procurement periodical as described by the assessor (below) indicates that progress is being made, but the executive branch can still choose to withhold information on an ad hoc basis as it sees fit and as such it is not a wholly transparent process. Furthermore, there is no sign that this publication or any other is focused on defence procurement. Some defence purchases are announced by the manufacturer or the delivering country, so there is not totally secrecy for every contract. Therefore the reviewer suggests an intermediate score of 2.
&quoute;According to the same report, in 2011, the Togo government successfully implemented procurement reforms to increase transparency, with the expectation of reducing corruption. Government procurements are now published in a weekly government periodical, and once contracts are awarded, all bids and the winner are published in the weekly government procurement publication (Ayayi 2014).&quoute;
What procedures and standards are companies required to have - such as compliance programmes and business conduct programmes - in order to be able to bid for work for the Ministry of Defence or armed forces?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: No specific information applicable to defence contracts was found. However, there are general requirements (compliance and ethical standards) which companies are expected to follow in Togo. The National Directorate of Procurement Monitoring works with the regulator of public procurement, the relevant ministries, professional organizations, writing and validation of implementing legislation relating to public procurement regulations and delegations public service, in particular, standard documents, procedure manuals, guides and others. A government contract is compulsory for all expenditure on works, supplies or services exceeding CFAF 15 million, whether the orders come from the State, from local authorities or from governmental corporations, including State-owned companies; parastatals are excluded from the application of the Government Procurement Code.
Score 0 has been selected as there appears to be no discrimination between bidding companies on grounds of integrity.
Direction Nationale du Controle des Marches Publics (2010). 'Missions and functions for control of procedures for the award of public contracts and public service delegations and monitoring their implementation.' http://www.marchespublics-togo.com/
Comment: The description offered by the assessor (below) lends itself to a more intermediate score of 1.
&quoute;there are general requirements which companies are expected to follow in Togo. The National Directorate of Procurement Monitoring works with the regulator of public procurement, the relevant ministries, professional organizations, writing and implementing legislation relating to public procurement regulations and delegations public service, in particular, standard documents, procedure manuals, guides and others. &quoute;
Are procurement requirements derived from an open, well-audited national defence and security strategy?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no data to support the fact that there is a national security strategy guiding the formulation of procurement requirements in Togo.
Ajayi, Ayi J. 2014. 'Government Contracting in Underdeveloped Countries: An Ethical Dilemma - Case of
Togo (West Africa).' Baker College, Flint, Michigan. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/1526020958.html?FMT=AI
Comment: A January 2012 report from the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/archives/asb/ASB-17.pdf) noted that Togo lacked clarity on &quoute;general doctrine, strategy, and defence structures.&quoute; This would appear to indicate that there is no national security strategy in place to guide procurement beyond ad hoc, opportunistic purchases.
Comment: At best, government procurement is conducted on an ad hoc basis driven by the immediate needs of the various branches of the armed forces, for instance the donated Defender patrol boats given by the US to Togo amid high levels of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in 2010 and 2014. Togo maintains an active presence in multinational missions, including the current UN mission in Mali, in part for the funding and equipment its armed forces receive from supporting partners.
Are defence purchases based on clearly identified and quantified requirements?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no sign that defence purchases are disclosed or based on identified and quantified requirements. Information on defence purchases are not accessible. There is also evidence that Togo government officials interfere unduly in the public procurement processes (Ayayi 2014).
Score 1 has been selected in recognition of comments put forth by Peer Reviewer 2 and the Government Reviewer (whose comments could not be verified by public information).
Ajayi, Ayi J. 2014. 'Government Contracting in Underdeveloped Countries: An Ethical Dilemma - Case of Togo (West Africa).' Baker College, Flint, Michigan. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/1526020958.html?FMT=AI
Comment: A February 2015 report (http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62029/1/MPRA_paper_62029.pdf) noted that corruption was widespread during government procurement and dispute resolution, making it likely that military procurement is similarly opportunistic.
Comment: Nothing could sustain this affirmation. In the most of the case, defence purchases are based on an identified and quantified requirements. If the delivery is not as per order, it is to be returned.
Comment: Defence procurement is conducted on an ad hoc basis driven by gaps in its capabilities and the immediate operational requirements of the various branches of the armed forces. For instance the donated Defender patrol boats given by the US to Togo amid high levels of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Guinea in 2010 and 2014. Togo maintains an active presence in multinational missions, including the current UN mission in Mali, in part for the funding and equipment its armed forces receive from supporting partners.
Therefore, the reviewer suggests an intermediate score of 2.
Is defence procurement generally conducted as open competition or is there a significant element of single-sourcing (that is, without competition)?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Although the Togo government as a whole is striving to improve the public procurement system along with an open competition system, media reports suggest that a number of public officials still believe most contracts are single-sourced and it is acceptable to influence procurement professionals in order to get contracts awarded to companies that they personally favour (The guardian 26 September 2013). The regulations required for an equitable and competitive procurement process are increasingly in place in Togo, and there is some agreement that there has been some progress in this area in the past decade (Ayayi 2014).
The Guardian, September 2013. 'Public procurement: is open competition bad for development?' Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/sep/26/public-procurement-contracts-competition
Are tender boards subject to regulations and codes of conduct and are their decisions subject to independent audit to ensure due process and fairness?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Tender boards appear to be subject to some degree of regulation by an oversight body. Created by Decree No. 2009-295 / PR, the National Monitoring Directorate of Public Procurement (DNCMP) is a structure under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Its main role to control for a priori procedure for the award of contracts valued above a threshold set by regulation and public service delegations. It may carry a posteriori control of procedures for the award of contracts below the threshold. The DNCMP mission control procedures for awarding public contracts and public service delegations and monitoring their implementation. The DNCMP is under the Ministry of Economy and Finance. The Ministry of Economy and Finance is responsible for the overall direction of economic and financial policy of the government and the management of state assets.
Direction Nationale du Controle des Marches Publics. 'Missions and functions for control of procedures for the award of public contracts and public service delegations and monitoring their implementation.' http://www.marchespublics-togo.com/
Comment: The assessor's own comments (below) indicate the appropriate score for this question is 2.
&quoute;Tender boards appear to be subject to some degree of regulation by an oversight body. Created by Decree No. 2009-295 / PR, the National Monitoring Directorate of Public Procurement (DNCMP) is a structure under the authority of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. Its main role to control for a priori procedure for the award of contracts valued above a threshold set by regulation and public service delegations. It may carry a posteriori control of procedures for the award of contracts below the threshold. The DNCMP controls procedures for awarding public contracts and public service delegations and monitoring their implementation. The DNCMP is under the Ministry of Economy and Finance.&quoute;
Does the country have legislation in place to discourage and punish collusion between bidders for defence and security contracts?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no law specific to the defence sector that outlaws collusive behaviour between bidders for defence and security contracts.
Togo (West Africa).' (PhD Thesis). Baker College, Flint, Michigan. http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/1526020958.html?FMT=AI
Comment: A February 2015 paper (http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62029/1/MPRA_paper_62029.pdf) notes that Togo lacks the foundations for strong market competition, with extremely limited contract enforcement and widespread corruption, including within the judiciary. For example, affluent officials, politicians and businessmen are known to exploit Togo's land tenure system to expropriate land from poor or disadvantaged communities. This abuse of power by the elite makes it likely that collusion and other corrupt practices extend to defence and security contracts.
Are procurement staff, in particular project and contract managers, specifically trained and empowered to ensure that defence contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is evidence of limited, general training provided to project and contract managers in Togo. The National Directorate of Procurement Monitoring works with the regulator of public procurement to the planning and organization of the education and training of actors in the system for the award of public contracts and public service delegations. According to the Ministry of Economy and Finance, one of the core activities of the National Monitoring Directorate of Public Procurement (DNCMP) is to provide seminars and training workshops for capacity building to ensure that contractors meet their obligations on reporting and delivery. However, widespread corruption in procurement and the shortage of manpower remains significant problems in Togo according to research (Ayayi 2014).
Comment: The assessor's own comments (below) indicate the most appropriate score is 1.
&quoute;There is evidence of limited, general training provided to project and contract managers in Togo. The National Directorate of Procurement Monitoring works with the regulator of public procurement in the planning and organization of the education and training of actors charged with the award of public contracts and public service delegations. (Ayayi 2014)&quoute;
Are there mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, and are companies protected from discrimination when they use these mechanisms?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no formal mechanisms in place to allow companies to complain about perceived or real malpractice in procurement in Togo.
Response to Government Reviewer: It is not clear what regulation is being referred and given no evidence has been presented or found, score 0 is maintained.
Comment: The peer reviewer could not find evidence of instances where companies have complained about malpractice in procurement.
Comment: This comment is not true. The regulation authorizes the contracts who seem to be discriminated. They can complain about perceived malpractice in procurement, if they have evidence to prove it.
What sanctions are used to punish the corrupt activities of a supplier?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no knowledge of the existence of effective sanctions for corrupt suppliers. Reports suggest that public officials in Togo practice corruption with impunity and the business climate is generally corrupt and non-conducive for business and investment (US Department of State 2012).
Comment: There are sanctions to punish the corrupt supplies. The Hight Authority of officials market trought in committee takes sanctions against this practice. The person who finds guilty can be banned from being candidates to official positions market for many years.
Comment: There are likely codes of conduct governing sanctions against corrupt suppliers present in government departments tasked with procurement, but these are unlikely to be strictly enforced beyond an ad hoc basis informed by political and financial considerations. The more appropriate score is 1.
When negotiating offset contracts, does the government specifically address corruption risk by imposing due diligence requirements on contractors? Does the government follow up on offset contract performance and perform audits to check performance and integrity?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The Togolese government does not appear to impose any anti-corruption due diligence or auditing requirements on offset contracts. World Bank Doing Business Indicator places Togo at 162 out of 183 countries for ease of doing business. The Doing Business Indicator is the most relevant of all indicators because it measures multiple issues, including corruption risk, start up cost and barriers to entry, which are high in Togo due to an unclear regulatory environment and a lengthy business-formation process.
US Department of State. 2012 Investment Climate Statement - Togo. Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs. June 2012. http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2012/191250.htm
Comment: The peer reviewer could find no evidence of anti-corruption due diligence for offset contracts.
Does the government make public the details of offset programmes, contracts, and performance?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: Details of government's offset contracts are not made public.
Comment: The decisions page for public contracts (http://www.marchespublics-togo.com/index.php?option=com_phocadownload&view=section&id=14&Itemid=81) does not appear to have any content, indicating that transparency during decision-making and tracking performance is not a high priority.
Comment: The reviewer could not find any immediate evidence of public disclosure of offset programmes, although other parties to contracts could potentially issue information.
Are offset contracts subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no supporting evidence that offset contracts are subject to the same level of competition regulation as the main contract. This is partly due to the lack of information on offset contracts. However, competition for offset contracts in Togo is very limited, according to research (Ayayi 2014). Media report suggest that public officials still believe most contracts are single-sourced and it is acceptable to influence procurement professionals in order to get contracts awarded to companies that they personally favour (The guardian 26 September 2013).
How strongly does the government control the company's use of agents and intermediaries in the procurement cycle?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no policy in Togo on the use of agents and intermediaries.
Ajayi, Ayi J. 2014. 'Government Contracting in Underdeveloped Countries: An Ethical Dilemma - Case of Togo (West Africa).' Baker College, Flint, Michigan.
http://pqdtopen.proquest.com/pqdtopen/doc/1526020958.html?FMT=AI
The Guardian, September (2013). 'Public procurement: is open competition bad for development?' Retrieved from: http://www.theguardian.com/global-development-professionals-network/2013/sep/26/public-procurement-contracts-competition
Comment: The peer reviewer could find no evidence of a policy on the use of agents and intermediaries.
Comment: The reviewer could not locate any further information on the use of agents and intermediaries in contracts or procurement negotiations with the government of Togo.
Are the principal aspects of the financing package surrounding major arms deals, (such as payment timelines, interest rates, commercial loans or export credit agreements) made publicly available prior to the signing of contracts?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: The parliament exercises control over all public funds, including defence budget and financing package surrounding major arms deal. There is no publicly available Information on financing package surrounding major arms deal in Togo. The National Assembly votes the final decision on the finance bill (Article 81 of the Constitution). However, the Senate compulsorily gives its recommendation before the National Assembly vote on the finance bill (Inter-parliamentary Union 2013).
The World Bank and the Togolese Ministry of Finance. 2012. The Togo Budget. http://wbi.worldbank.org/boost/Data/boost/boostcms/files/field/country-attachments/togo_users_manual_boost_1.0.pdf
United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Togolese National Consultation on the Arms Trade Treaty. http://unrec.org/index/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=205%3Atogolese-national-consultation-on-the-arms-trade-treaty-att&catid=51%3Aasserrep&Itemid=44%3F%3Den&lang=en
Inter-parliamentary Union (2013). TOGO Assemblée nationale (National Assembly). http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/CtrlParlementaire/2315_F.htm#conbudgt
Comment: In spite of the fact that the constitution provides for the set up of the Senate it has not yet been implemented
Does the government formally require that the main contractor ensures subsidiaries and sub-contractors adopt anti-corruption programmes, and is there evidence that this is enforced?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: There is no evidence that having anti-corruption programmes is a formal requirements for subsidiaries and sub-contractors in Togo. However, Togolese law (Article 46) makes provisions for criminal penalties for official corruption and related misconduct. However, the government did not implement the laws effectively and officials and contractors frequently engaged in corruption with impunity. Giving a bribe, whether to private, government or police officials, is considered a crime but is often expected. Also, corruption and nepotism remains a widespread problem in the procurement cycle (Ayayi 2014). The National Commission for the Fight against Corruption and Economic Sabotage is the body responsible for combating corruption . However it remained weak as a result of lack of specific legal mandate to fight corruption (BTI 2012).
Ireland: Refugee Documentation Centre (2009). Togo: Information on effectiveness of police/corruption in the police force?, 29 September 2009, Q10981 , available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/4ac5d11f0.html
Freedom House (2014). Freedom in the World 2014 - Togo, 22 August 2014, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/53fc3658b5.html.
The Constitution of Togo (1992). Togo's Constitution of 1992 with Amendments through 2007. https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Togo_2007.pdf
How common is it for defence acquisition decisions to be based on political influence by selling nations?
Researcher + Peer Reviewer4237: According to SIPRI's arms transfers database, France and Botswana have been its only arms suppliers in the past ten years, with France accounting for a majority of the arms purchases. Togo has significant historical ties with France and has strong existing historical relations and as such political influence cannot be ruled out, especially given that there is no public information to verify the need for purchases made. This likely materialises in the case of French desire to sell surplus or older equipment that is not necessarily mission-specific for Togo, but will be heavily discounted or incentivised. Exaggeration of threats and strategic responsibilities from a French defence marketing point of view may aid in this, and risk overwhelming any initial, legitimate military need by Togo.
SIPRI, Arms Transfers Database, http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/html/export_values.php
France Diplomatie, La France et le Togo, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/fr/dossiers-pays/togo/la-france-et-le-togo/
Small Arms Survey 2005. Togo. http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/D-Book-series/book-01-Armed-and-Aimless/SAS-Armed-Aimless-Part-2-15-Togo.pdf
Comment: There is some evidence that powerful Western arms suppliers -- particularly France -- have strong influence in Togolese defence acquisitions. This 2011 article (http://www.defenceiq.com/air-land-and-sea-defence-services/articles/defence-sales-to-africa-reveal-france-is-still-bli/) from Defence IQ indicates that French arms exports to Togo have been motivated by a quid pro quo of French access to the domestic market (as well as international political support) in exchange for military supplies and aid, with a gradual shift from France which demanded reforms as a condition of sale.
Comment: As far as I know, the government military procurement defens on the military need
Comment: Former colonial power France still exerts influence and has been the main foreign supplier over the past 30 years, especially for armoured vehicles, aircraft and patrol vessels. However, Togo has also reportedly acquired Soviet-designed equipment from Bulgaria, China, North Korea, and Poland.
There is also evidence that operational needs play a role in donations of military equipment to Togo, such as the three Defender patrol boats that the US donated to the navy starting in 2010 for anti-piracy operations and to plug the patrol capability gap.
Previously, Togo had received eight reconnaissance vehicles from French manufacturer Panhard for its contingent deployed in Chad, in another example of operational requirement driving procurement.
Source: Jane's Military and Security Assessments Centre.
Procurement is therefore driven by a mix of both political influence and operational need, and the reviewer recommends a score of 2.