ما هي عملية أجاكس ؟
Mohammed Mossadeq 
In March 1953, a telegram detailing a correspondence from the CIA station in Tehran inquired over American interest in “covertly supporting an Iranian military effort to oust Mossadeq. A meeting was held at the U.S. Embassy in Iran to discuss the telegram. While remaining noncommittal, the Embassy personnel expressed an affable response that suggested a growing US interest. (Dr. Donald Wilber. CIA, Clandestine Services History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. Published by the New York Times. Accessed at the National Security Archives Website. Document 1, Section 1 “Preliminary Steps” p. 1) Dr. Donald Wilber, a writer, spy, and covert consultant to the CIA's Near East and Africa Division (NEA) eventually recognized as the principal architect of Operation Ajax, was charged with investigating and developing the plan to overthrow Mossadeq. He traveled to Nicosia, Greece in May 1953, and together with Matthew Darbyshire, the head of the Secret Intelligence Service's Iran branch, they designed the recommended plan of action. At this point, opposition toward Mossadeq had significantly developed within the US government. The US Embassy personnel in Iran came to view Mossadeq’s government as “totally destructive” and demonstrating “reckless” proclivities. Under Secretary of State General Walter Bedell Smith stated that the U.S. Government preferred for Mossadeq to step down so that stability in the region could be reinstated. Opposition to the National Frontists, a political opposition faction founded by Mossadeq originally in 1949, catalyzed a reversal in policy defined under the Truman administration. Both the CIA and NEA Division were authorized to formulate a plan of action aimed at toppling the Mossadeq regime. The Department of State and the CIA continued to hold meetings discussing the specifics of plans to proceed. (Dr. Donald Wilber. CIA, Clandestine Services History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. Published by the New York Times. Accessed at the National Security Archives Website. Document 1, Section 1 “Preliminary Steps” p. 2) At these meetings, they reviewed all of the important political players in Iran, especially General Fazlollah Zahedi, who was the most pronounced politician who opposed Mossadeq. Zahedi, a former member of Mossadeq's cabinet, commanded an undeniable public stature along with a significant base of supporters. Wilber noted that his views were similar with that of Darbyshire’s, and that SIS was pleased to allow the CIA to take the lead on the operation, because of their advantages in personnel, funding, and facilities. After the discussion of politics in Iran, the parties involved discussed their current assets in Iran. The SIS mentioned that they had Rashidians in the armed forces, members of the Iranian Parliament, religious leaders, and other people they believed to be influential. Although their assets were considered to be useless, the Rashidians came through and were willing to assist in the overthrow. They concluded that Zahedi was the best candidate to support in the coup, and that all attempts must be given the appearance of a legal transition of power, rather than an absolute coup. Zahedi was at one time a member of the Mossadeq government and had sophisticated knowledge of Mossadeq’s plans. (Dr. Donald Wilber. CIA, Clandestine Services History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. Published by the New York Times. Accessed at the National Security Archives Website. Document 1, Section 1, “Preliminary Steps” p. 3) They also concluded that public opinion must be swayed against Mossadeq directly before beginning the operation, and that the plan must be shared and reviewed with the Iranians who will help implement it. To sway the opinion of the public, the CIA devised a plan to expose Mossadeq's collaboration with the Soviet Union and show the falsehood of his patriotism. On April 4, 1953, a budget of one million dollars was approved by the CIA to be used by the Tehran Station with the sole purpose of ousting Mossadeq. (Dr. Donald Wilber. CIA, Clandestine Services History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. Published by the New York Times. Accessed at the National Security Archives Website. Document 1, Section 1 “Preliminary Steps” p. 3) By June 1953, operational plans were finalized and sent for approval. The operational plan was approved by the British (Director of SIS, Foreign Secretary, and Prime Minister) on 1 July 1953, and by the United States (Director of CIA, Secretary of State, and President) on 11 July 1953. About a week later, the Tehran Station made direct contact with General Zahedi to inform him of the plans. (Dr. Donald Wilber. CIA, Clandestine Services History: Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran. Published by the New York Times. Accessed at the National Security Archives Website. Document 1, Section 1 “Preliminary Steps” p. 4)
CIA's Near East and Africa Division (NEA) eventually recognized as the principal architect of Operation Ajax