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Public International Law/International Economic Law/Monetary Law

Author: Kanad Bagchi "Required knowledge: Link" "Learning objectives: Understanding XY."

A. Introduction
Even though money has been a crucial instrument of political and social control, the international legal framework around it still remains largely understudied. International monetary law (IML) occupies much less attention within debates on international economic law, as against international trade and investment, for instance. This has meant that questions concerning monetary autonomy, sovereignty, and the way international law deals with monetary conflicts and determines the distribution of rights and obligations remain largely ignored in legal scholarship. What is also missing is a systematic engagement with how money sustains not only the infrastructure of world capitalist expansion, but is also an important instrument of hierarchy, subordination, and imperial expropriation.

In this chapter, I attempt to open up a conversation about the manifold transformations that the field has witnessed in the last decades and how the study of monetary law accordingly needs to be reoriented. I focus on the structural changes in IML and the kind of questions which have become relevant today. In addition, I place IML in conversation with the politics of money and hierarchy in the international monetary system (IMS). This overview is necessarily going to be partial, hence every effort will be made to reference liberally, especially for some of us who might want to take the conversation further.

B. History(s) of International Monetary Law
Most accounts of international monetary law trace the origins of the field to the Bretton Woods Conference in 1945 and to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF/Fund). To be sure, Bretton Woods was a landmark event. It was the first time that a multilateral instrument for monetary coordination was established. It was also the first time that some semblance of participation of the ‘Third World’ in monetary affairs was envisioned, albeit in a very limited way. Against the backdrop of the inter-war years that witnessed several episodes of monetary and financial instability accompanied by discriminatory currency practices, the intention at Bretton Woods was to put in place an international organization with legal powers to enforce a code of conduct for monetary affairs. Thus, the IMF was given a permanent mandate for international monetary cooperation and far-reaching powers to impose sanctions. Scholars thereafter heralded the dawn of a new system, “a new kind of highly legalized multilateral monetary and financial order”, and the birth of a “public international law of money.”

This highly abstract and sanitized version of the origins of international monetary law erases the role that money and international law played in the longue durée of capitalism and imperialism. From the powerful Economic and Financial Organization (EFO) of the League of Nations (League) to the erstwhile Gold Standard adopted among imperial powers in the 19th century, money represented a crucial terrain for the civilizing mission as well as resistance to it. Control over money in the colonies was both a means to limit sovereignty, but also to conditionally grant it upon satisfactory transformation. Colonial currency systems were systematically placed subordinate to currency systems in the metropoles enabling the exploitation and extraction of wealth from the former. Moreover, the League was singularly responsible for the unequal economic integration of the mandated territories into the circuits of global capitalist accumulation. This was done through monetary reforms, austerity induced lending and the propagation of ideas regarding stable money and central bank independence – ideas we take for granted today. Much of what the IMF came to embody at Bretton Woods was an extension of the League’s powers of monetary and financial oversight – what we broadly refer to as monetary surveillance in contemporary IMF law. In other words, Bretton Woods did not signify a distinct break from the past. To the contrary, as TWAIL scholars have highlighted, the institutional structures of the IMF reflected deep continuities of the imperial order through other legal means. In other words, money then as it today, operates as a crucial medium of exclusion and inclusion between the core and the periphery.

The task then is to decenter the conventional story of BWS as birth of public international law of money, a story that effaces the history of money as an exploitative tool. Accounts of monetary law need to reckon with its colonial origins and illustrate the continuing forms of subordination and asymmetry embedded within the international monetary system – a point that we will come back to in the conclusion of this chapter.

C. The Scope of International Monetary Law
The scope and subject matter of international monetary law continues to be a matter of debate. The term ‘international monetary system’ was first introduced in the IMF Agreement. Yet, it was left undefined. This meant that much of what this ‘system’ would comprise and consequently the legal framework around it would be elaborated through institutional practise and adaptation. This gave international monetary institutions, including the IMF, a tremendous leeway in shaping the contours of the discipline and in expanding its own mandate for the regulation of money. To put it differently, the study of international monetary law must pay close attention to internal legal rules, procedural adaptation and soft legal frameworks underpinning the law of monetary institutions.

It was only in 2012 that the IMF would make the first attempt at defining the international monetary system, as well as the law governing it. In it, the IMF defined international monetary law as the collection of rules that govern the balance-of-payments relations among states. These include, as the IMF notes, rules on (1) exchange relations, (2) international payments (3) cross-border capital flows and (4) monetary reserve management – all of which determine a particular state’s monetary relationship with the rest of the world. In monetary law, the balance-of-payments relationship is the governing anchor and the institutional link among states. This is because national economies do not exist in isolation, but are intimately tied through a vast network of closely interconnected balance sheets and currency relations. Balance-of-payments however, is a zero-sum game in the sense that one country’s balance-of-payments deficit is another country’s balance-of-payments surplus. Much of the politics over money revolves around balance-of-payments adjustment and who bears the burden of such adjustment.

As one may notice, the IMF defines the IMS and the rules governing it from the perspective of a state’s external monetary relations. Exchange rates, capital flows, international payments, and monetary reserve management all pertain to how states interact with the currency systems of other states. Yet, several aspects of a state’s internal monetary affairs are also in significant ways determined by the strictures of international monetary law and institutions. Domestic central bank regulations, monetary policy frameworks, standards regarding central bank independence and transparency, as well as monetary crisis response, are conditioned by rules and ideational paradigms of international institutions tasked with governing money. In other words, international monetary law determines and shapes the contours of domestic monetary autonomy. Consequently, monetary sovereignty and what that implies is a contested terrain in which states and domestic monetary authorities continuously negotiate the bounds of autonomy and control over money. The scope of international monetary law, then, is neither fixed nor set in stone, but continues to evolve in response to changing law of monetary institutions.

D. Expanding Institutions
This raises an important question. Which institutions are relevant for the study of international monetary law?

I. International Monetary Fund
For the most part, international monetary law has had an outsized focus on the IMF. This is, of course, for good reasons. The Bretton Woods System put the IMF at the centre of international monetary relations. It was tasked with enforcing the par-value system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates – a purpose which it lost in 1971 when the US under President Nixon refused convertibility of the dollar in exchange for gold – an event that sent shockwaves across the international monetary system. Indeed, since then, the IMF evolved in multiple ways and its role within the IMS has changed significantly. The Second Amendment to the IMF agreement in 1979 granted it a new mandate for ‘firm surveillance’ and changed fundamentally the character of the IMS. Currencies that were tied to each other through an interlocking system of par values came to be free floating in the international market. The Fund has since then not only revamped its conditionality framework, but also expanded its surveillance infrastructure – a point which we will come back to in just a bit.

II. Bank for International Settlements
The IMF is neither the first nor the only institution tasked with monetary cooperation. We must go further back to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) established in 1929 with a specific mandate “to promote the cooperation of central banks.” The uniqueness of the BIS lies in the fact that its membership comprises not states, but 63 central banks across the world. From an institution envisioned with a mandate to determine and settle financial reparations stemming from World War I, the BIS has evolved into a credible forum for central bank cooperation – hosting a number of influential committees dedicated towards promoting financial and monetary stability. The BIS has played an important role in setting monetary standards, creating coherent frameworks of knowledge as well as synthesizing monetary policy approaches. It has been the frontrunner in promoting global financial stability, macroprudential policies and capital flow regulation. Even though these standards lack legal enforcement they come with tremendous authority and are backed by market and peer mechanisms of enforcement. Its role in the international monetary system has been variously described as an anchor and think tank for monetary policy coordination. At least since the demise of the BWS of exchange rates in the 1970s, the BIS has “emerged as [a] competing source of international monetary authority.”

III. Informalization of International Monetary Law and Cooperation
The fall of Bretton Woods also resulted in the informalization of international monetary law and cooperation. This shift was transformational in the way it ushered a whole range of new actors in the monetary field. Already in the 1960, an influential group of ten (G10) industrial nations agreed to establish the General Agreements to Borrow (GAB) to supplement the resources of the IMF. GAB resulted in a system of a “double lock” on the resources of the IMF, such that decisions on conditional lending by the IMF would now require also the concurrence of the G10. Thereafter, informality would become a regular feature of international monetary law. The 1970s and the 1980s saw the rise of the G5 and the G7 as the principal forums for international monetary cooperation, much of which was transpiring outside of the IMF. As one commentator put it, “[T]he 1970s was a low point for the IMF as the official hub of international monetary coordination.” The developing world too resorted to informality and minilateralism by establishing the G24, with the mandate to coordinate joint actions, especially on international monetary and financial affairs.

With the Global Financial Crisis in 2008, another informal body, the G20, would acquire a lead role in the global governance of financial and monetary matters. The G20 was not simply a political forum comprising heads of states, but also a technical forum, which brought together finance ministers and central bankers. It gathered a greater legitimacy than the G5/G7 given the broader representation of the several developing countries in the G20. The G20 has engaged with several issues, such as the governance reform of the IMF, augmenting global monetary liquidity through additional SDR allocation, inducing balance-of-payments adjustments, and legitimizing the use of capital controls to arrest the volatility of international capital flows. Alongside the IMF, the G20 is regarded as an important “hub of global economic governance.”

IV. Decentralization in International Monetary Law
The GFC also prompted a decentralization in international monetary law, characterised by the creation of a number of regional monetary institutions in the Global South. Especially in Asia, three new institutions, namely, Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), and Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development (EFSD) were established in quick succession following the GFC. A common theme underlying the establishment of these arrangements was a sense of deep dissatisfaction with the nature and exclusivity of international monetary governance and the need for “self-insurance” against short-term liquidity shortages. All of them can be characterised as what are called ‘reserve pooling or liquidity sharing arrangements’, i.e., they entail a set of commitments undertaken by national central banks to provide short-term financing to member states facing balance-of-payment difficulties.

There is quite some dynamism in how these institutions have been established and in the scope of their mandates. While the EFSD and CRA were created through treaty mechanisms in 2009 and 2014 respectively, the CMIM was created through a ‘single multilateral swap arrangement’ among its member states in 2010. With a total size of swap commitments at $240 billion, a permanent secretariat, and an in-house monetary surveillance unit, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), CMIM is the largest and most sophisticated regional rescue fund outside Europe. Both the CRA and EFSD entail smaller contributions, yet, their appeal lies in the flexibility of their design. Unlike the CMIM, the CRA and EFSD lack a permanent secretariat. And neither of them possesses an independent legal personality – they are “multilateral agreement(s) without a funding institution.” The legal mandates of these institutions also vary considerably. While the CMIM and BRICS CRA are primarily geared towards forestalling short term balance-of-payments pressures and promoting mutual support, the EFSD is tasked to balance BOP concerns simultaneously with an attending focus on growth and development. This makes the EFSD a small but unique institution in the landscape of international monetary law.

The emergence of regional monetary institutions has been heralded as a new era of ‘South-South’ monetary coordination. Its distinctiveness lies in the fact that, unlike in the past, these newer mechanisms of coordination are being systematically institutionalized through an elaborate system of rules for monitoring, surveillance and dissemination of monetary policy standards. Much of legal scholarship has hardly paid any attention to monetary institutions outside the ‘West’. This has left a significant gap in the literature and in our understanding of how monetary law and coordination might look differently in other institutional spaces. What this brief survey illustrates is that the IMF is “not the only organization that has a place in the system.” We have shifting institutional configurations characterised by informality and regional monetary integration, and newer mechanisms through which the old multilateral order is being contested.

E. Expanding Interactions
The emerging institutional landscape is thus highly segmented, scattered, and multi-layered. In contrast to the top-down centralized system of international monetary coordination, which the BWS put in place, what we have today is a “decentralized, heterogeneous, pluripolar” global order for monetary coordination. In this setting, multiple institutions interact and compete for authority and also legitimacy. In other words, there is an evolving pattern of interaction among a range of different monetary institutions that govern the field, and it is these interactions which produce new sources of authority accompanied by a unique set of interventions.

For instance, G20 operates in a close relationship with and within an institutional space occupied by formal institutions, most notably the IMF. The IMF has gradually emerged as the G20’s closest ally. It formed the backbone of the G20 Mutual Assessment Procedure (MAP) - a mechanism of ‘peer review’ and collective policy action for balance-of-payment adjustments in member countries. Roped in by the G20 as its ‘technical advisor’, the IMF was tasked to evaluate key imbalances, how members' policies fit together, and whether they can achieve the G20's goals collectively. Conversely, for the IMF, assistance to G20 members brought “additional insights” into their policy plans and provided a separate channel to “reinforce the traction of its bilateral and multilateral surveillance of G20 members.”

Similarly, the IMF interacts very closely with regional monetary institutions. For instance, the constitutive documents of both CMIM and BRICS CRA provide for a substantive link with the IMF. Only a certain percentage (40% under the CMIM and 30% under CRA) of funds are readily available to member states without the involvement of the IMF. For any amount exceeding this limit, borrowing member states are required to enter into an IMF supported surveillance and lending programme. The central rationale for this linkage was so that liquidly arrangements under the CMIM and BRICS CRA go hand in hand with the IMF assistance. The EFSD too underscores the IMF to be a “key counterpart” in its own operations. The IMF has welcomed the creation and strengthening of regional monetary and financial institutions, especially as a compliment to the IMF and towards “supporting” the international monetary system as a whole. Recognizing this growing interaction, the G20 came up with principles for cooperation between the IMF and regional ﬁnancing arrangements, which must “take account of region-speciﬁc circumstances and the characteristics of RFAs.”

The crucial task of international monetary law scholarship, then, is to study how these interactions bring multiple institutions together, produce new sources of knowledge and effectuate different kinds of experimental interventions. Interestingly, we see both cooperation and contestation. The inflexibility of the IMF, its skewed system of quotas and voting and its coercive mechanism of enforcing conditionality were among the chief reasons for developing countries to go their own way. Moreover, some of these regional monetary institutions do not necessarily function within the paradigm of IMF orthodoxy. They have different mandates, different ways to measure compliance and sometimes radically opposing set of priorities. These institutions operate and are situated within a specific cultural, geographical and economic space which allows them to build closer and more lasting contact with domestic monetary authorities. This is the single most important reason as to why regional monetary institutions enjoy a high sense of “ownership” from its member states. An approach to monetary law that takes interactions seriously must be able to conceptualize the field in its varied manifestations and complexities, typified by a proliferation of institutions and legal frameworks.

F. Expanding Instruments
Conditional lending is an important function of international monetary institutions. Simply put, conditionality is the device by which monetary institutions lend financial resources on the satisfactory fulfilment of certain prescriptions by the receiving state, which is expected to solve its BOP crisis. For the IMF, the legal basis of conditionality is usually traced to Article V, section 3 (a) of the IMF agreement, which refers to “conditions governing use of the Fund's general resources” and calls upon the IMF to establish “adequate safeguard” for the use of its funds. The parameters for conditionality, its content and scope have, however, evolved through practise and internal law making. Over the years, conditional lending has transformed into a mammoth exercise with several distinct regimes, facilities, adjustment programmes depending on the development parameters of the member in question and its capacity for repayment. Conditional lending, especially its more structural kind, has faced tremendous criticism, and rightly so, as being “overly extensive, intrusive and deflationary” - often drawing the ire of governments and civil society organizations. Conditionality has been associated with a “one size fits all” approach where standard prescriptions for deregulation, greater capital account openness, labour market reforms, deficit reduction and large-scale austerity programmes, are prescribed across the board. This has occasioned a substantial overhaul of the IMF conditionality lending, including a clear preference for ex-ante as opposed to ex-post conditionality, as well as quicker disbursement.

The resistance against IMF conditionality and later World Bank structural adjustment programmes ushered in a change of strategy within these institutions. In the last decades and at least since the fall of the BWS in 1971, a big part of the function of monetary institutions has focused on monetary surveillance. The Second Amendment to the IMF Agreement in 1979 and revised Art IV reoriented the objectives of the IMF towards prompting “a stable system of exchange rates.” For this purpose, the Fund was also granted a new mandate to exercise “firm surveillance” over exchange rate policies of its members, as well as broad powers to “oversee” the international monetary system. Most importantly, new Art. IV did not define what surveillance is and left it entirely to the Fund to adopt “specific principles” for the guidance of its members regarding its powers of monetary surveillance. A number of internal board decisions and guidance notes thereafter, have clarified the scope, nature as well as the legal mandate of the Fund with respect to monetary surveillance.

Monetary surveillance typically entails both bilateral consultations and multilateral reporting. Bilateral surveillance consists of country visits, which are then followed up with the publication of a Consultation Report. These reports contain analysis and recommendations on a range of structural problems associated with a member state’s financial and monetary infrastructure, including financial soundness, monetary stability and exchange rate misalignment. Multilateral surveillance, on the other hand, entails information gathering and dissemination, analysis of macroeconomic spillovers, monitoring of cross-country linkages, standard setting and knowledge production on key monetary policy frameworks.

The objective of monetary surveillance is twofold. On the one hand, bilateral surveillance provides an opportunity for “dialogue and persuasion” where international monetary institutions interact closely with domestic central banks and other monetary authorities of member states. On the other hand, multilateral surveillance is geared towards cross-country references, ranking, standardizing and creating coherent cognitive frameworks around contested monetary issues. The recommendations, which are part of the multilateral and bilateral surveillance, are not legally binding. They are offered as advice in the form of best practices. Yet, they carry tremendous weight and have visible impact as they engage processes of peer review, public scrutiny, and induce market pressure. In other words, monetary surveillance operates at the interface of informal and formal law making. Through surveillance, monetary institutions do not seek to change legal relations directly, but indirectly shape preferences and background assumptions of the actors involved in the process. Surveillance is a typical example of the exercise of cognitive and communicative power, which builds on knowledge, expertise and information instruments that structure cognitive conditions. The inherently evaluative character of surveillance also makes it a highly political instrument, through which certain forms of knowledge systems, standards and monetary practices are privileged over others.

As opposed to the top-down coercive mechanism of conditionality, surveillance aims to convince and nudge domestic monetary authorities towards particular policies. International monetary institutions rely on their discursive powers rather than their purse strings to achieve their goals. To quote the IMF itself, in an interconnected globalized economy, monetary surveillance is a “core responsibility of the IMF.” The latest IMF report is revelatory in this regard. In it, the Fund documents that conditional lending today comprises merely 15% of the share of total IMF activity. Surveillance, both bilateral and multilateral, on the other hand, comprises a total of 42% of the Fund’s regular work. Similarly, even regional monetary institutions such as the BRICS CRA, the CMIM as well as the EFSD have developed elaborate mechanisms of monetary surveillance, allocating a significant proportion of their technical staff and material resources for that purpose.

To sum up, even while conditional lending is an important function of international monetary institutions, much of international monetary governance today transpires through the instrument of monetary surveillance. In an age where information and knowledge is power, the instrument of monetary surveillance is precisely the means through which deep political and social contestations about money are mediated through the law. Consequently, our focus must shift towards analyzing how the expanding legal framework around monetary surveillance makes international monetary institutions emerge not only repositories of material influence, but as norm diffusers, policy advisors and consensus builders.

G. Contested Issues in International Monetary Law
As argued above, at the heart IML is the question of balance-of-payments. Balance-of-payments is in turn influenced by a number of different monetary related measures, including exchange rate manipulation, monetary spillovers, controls on international capital flows and the management of international liquidity. Even though each of these issues are governed by a broad set of parameters laid down within the rules of the IMF and other institutions, the legal framework is neither straightforward nor settled. These issues are also deeply political and have important effects not only on the global distribution of wealth and resources among states, but also for individuals and for domestic policy making.

I. Currency Manipulation and Exchange Rate Misalignment
The issue of currency manipulation, i.e., the practice of directly or indirectly tinkering with the value of a particular currency to gain a competitive trade advantage, has been a recurring concerning in IML. The central provision that deals with the question of currency manipulation is Art IV:1 (iii) of the IMF agreement, which reads that member states ought to “…avoid manipulating exchange rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments adjustment or to gain an unfair competitive advantage over other members…”. The IMF has the ultimate authority to find a country in violation of the above provision. Despite the clear nature of the obligation, the process of determining whether a country is, in fact, manipulating its exchange rate has been fraught with economic, legal and political hurdles. In economic theory, currency manipulation remains a contested concept, with no strict rules capable of determining a particular practice or set of practices as currency manipulation. This allows a great deal of deference to be afforded to a country's interpretation. Moreover, Art IV:1 (iii) requires the indication of a subjective intent (“in order to”) for the purposes of determining whether a particular action, even if considered as manipulation, actually falls foul of the provision. Consequently, the IMF has never found any member in violation, even though accusations of currency manipulation are rife in international monetary relations. Many have thus questioned the effectiveness of IML, its lack of a clear set of rules and absence of a dispute settlement mechanism. Some have turned to trade rules in agitating matters relating to currency manipulation as akin to an import tariff and an export subsidy against the mandate of the WTO.

II.Cross-Border Monetary Spillovers
Monetary spillovers refer to the phenomenon whereby monetary policy actions by one state have negative effects and consequences for monetary policy decisions on others. While monetary spillovers is not a new problem, it came back into focus after the GFC when core economy central banks such as the U.S. Federal Reserve and the ECB experimented with a number of unconventional monetary policy measures (UMP). UMP generated large scale financial and monetary stability implications for the developing world such as exchange rate volatility, asset price mismatches and currency appreciations across the developing world. Monetary spillovers also negatively affect the pursuit of monetary autonomy in the periphery. Central banks in the latter are forced to respond to decisions taken elsewhere, steering them away from monetary policy which might be otherwise optimal for domestic circumstances. The regulatory framework for monetary spillovers remains dispersed and is hardly settled. The IMF’s multilateral surveillance infrastructure, the G20 MAP as well as the BIS’s standardization frameworks form the core set of rules regulating monetary spillovers. Yet, they all suffer from a fundamental asymmetry. They fall short of explicitly requiring ‘source’ countries, i.e. those largely responsible for monetary spillovers in the first place, to adjust their monetary policy decisions. Instead, the focus remains on structural adjustment in ‘receiving’ countries. As several commentators have highlighted, the international legal framework on monetary spillovers privileges the promotion of domestic stability, even if that might come at the cost of international stability.

II.Cross Border Capital Flows
The movement of international capital has been a defining feature of twenty-first century globalization, far outpacing international trade in recent decades. International capital, however, exhibits a dual quality. Even when it comes with several benefits, capital flows can also be accompanied by financial and monetary instability. Several periods of financial crisis, in the past, attests to the inherently volatile and disruptive nature of capital flows. Despite being allowed under the IMF Agreement, capital controls were shunned for the most part of 20th century, when a combination of neo-classical and monetarist economies ideas propagated freedom of capital as the cornerstone of growth and development. International institutions like the IMF and OECD as well as the regime for international trade and investment pushed for capital liberalization, often with devastating consequences for the Global South. The GFC witnessed a change in perspective. A number of states and their central banks resorted to capital controls to protect financial and monetary stability. Even the IMF was forced to advise several of its members to impose controls on both the inflow and outflow of capital. As Grabel notes, controls which were “denigrated as a tool for the weak and misguided…have now been normalized as a tool of prudential ﬁnancial management, even within the corridors of the IMF.” Today, IMF law as illustrated in its 2012 Institutional View on the Liberalization and Management of Capital recognizes capital controls as a legitimate monetary policy tool, which can be used under certain circumstances, even pre-emptively. Similarly, the OECD and a growing number of Free Trade Agreements as well as BITs allow for capital controls as part of BOP exceptions. Yet, given that the regulation of capital flows remains fragmented across a range of institutional regimes, including monetary, trade and investment, conflicting obligations and overlapping mandates remain a concern.

III. The Provision of International Liquidity and Monetary Reserves
States typically require access to international liquidity, i.e., the provision of monetary reserves to finance its balance-of-payments and intervene in foreign exchange market to stabilize its exchange rate. How states can access reserves and what indeed counts as reserves have been a source of much of contestation. The IMF sought to provide a solution to the problem of international liquidity by creating Special Drawing Rights (SDR) as a global reserve asset in 1969. SDRs were to be assigned automatically to countries in proportion to their respective quotas and did not come with any strings attached. In fact, the intention was to promote SDR as the “principal reserve asset in the international monetary system”. Yet, for the most part, the key role of the US dollar as the leading currency for international transactions and payments also made it the defacto reserve asset for the world. This meant that the Federal Reserve, i.e. the only central bank with unlimited access to dollar liquidity, effectively became the international lender of last resort, sometimes even outpacing the Fund. For the rest of the world, access to dollar liquidity depends on either the largesse of the Federal Reserve or tied to the coerciveness of IMF conditionality. This makes the international monetary system and especially the provision of international liquidity highly asymmetric in that deficit countries are perennially forced to accumulate dollar reserves despite the costs associated with it. International monetary law lacks a clear set of rules on the provision of international liquidity, consequently shifting the burden of adjustment to deficit countries alone.

H. Conclusion: Politics, Hierarchy and Subordination in International Monetary Law
The illustrated list of issues in IML reveals a number of elements about the international monetary system. First, that money is not a neutral instrument of economic policy, but a highly political one through which a range of contestations over key distribution and allocation of resources transpire. The rules pertaining to international monetary cooperation reflect the underlying distribution of international monetary power and how the burdens and benefits of monetary adjustment are ultimately shared. Much of the development of IML happened through a complex interaction of internal legal rules and informal instruments, rather than grand treaty amendments, reflecting the close interplay between law and politics, formality and informality.

Second, the international monetary system is an inherently hierarchical one. In this, some currencies enjoy what is called “exorbitant privilege” i.e., the ability to act as a medium of exchange and store of value both domestically and internationally. For instance, the US dollar, a domestic currency, is also the linchpin of the international monetary system, allowing the US economy to deflect and delay the cost of monetary adjustment onto others. It also places the Federal Reserve at the apex of the global currency hierarchy, as it is the only central bank capable of issuing an unlimited supply of dollars to the international monetary system.

In other words, as one moves from the financial core to the periphery, neither monetary sovereignty nor monetary autonomy is necessarily guaranteed. Peripheral central banks are continually tied to monetary policy decisions of core central banks. This is visible not only regarding large scale monetary spillovers from the Federal Reserve and other core central banks to central banks in the periphery, but also in the way that peripheral central banks are forced to accumulate international reserves primarily in US dollars (and to some extent in Euro) to ward off monetary and financial instability. The inability of peripheral currencies to act as either a medium of exchange or store of value internationally also forces the latter to borrow in currencies that are not their own, increasing the likelihood of balance-of-payments crisis. This is because monetary policy decisions in the financial core affect the value of foreign debt, most of which is denominated in core currencies, but held by peripheral economies. In recent years, both the IMF and the World Bank have sounded the alarm over a mounting debt burden for countries which have a high exposure to debt denominated in a foreign currency.

Many thus view international monetary and currency relations as a manifestation of imperial power in contemporary society. Much like how colonial currency systems were systematically subordinated to currency systems in the metropole, the present monetary system creates and sustains bonds of subordination and dependency between the core and the periphery. This is the case not only for direct forms of subordination but also indirect forms of control through the provision of international liquidity and reserve accumulation. In this, money operates as a ‘neo-colonial’ tool which binds the prospects for growth, economic development and social transformation of the periphery to the economic and political imperatives of the core. Control over money, then, is a crucial element of economic self-determination.

The lasting legacy of Bretton Woods is that while the regulation of money was entrusted to an international organization, namely the IMF, a national currency came to acquire a central place in the international monetary system. International monetary law and especially the framework of the IMF does not fundamentally challenge this framework. Scholarship on international monetary law, then, must be able to uncover the deep structural continuities between old imperial formations and present-day economic governance.

Summary

 * Summary I
 * Summary II

Further Readings

 * Reading I
 * Reading II


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Writing Adolescent Fiction/Character names/Congolese

Like many other African countries, the Congos have many tribes, each of those tribes having their own unique names.

Mavinga, Malanda, Mambwene, Tulunga, Masamba, Luyeye, Teholo, Mambweni, Mambu,Fimpa, Mateta, Tuzolana, Matumona, Matunwene, Malangi, Wasewa, Bukaka ,Mayala, Masukidi, Diawaku, Diakanua, Ndongala, Ndombele, Matondo, Mampasi, Sita, Luzolo, Nsimba, Nzuzi, Landu, Nsakala, Nsukula, Diyamona, Biyavanga, Zola, Nkiluku, Kimwina, Kukiele, Kuyela, Kuma, Kimbangu, Kisolokele, Diasivi, Mamona, Zolana, Batukweme, Wasewa, Nseyila, Nkembo, Nsambu, Siluvagi, Vangu, Nzumba, Nsukula, Mavoka, Bwene, Mbala, Mbunba, Sala, Diasivi, Dialungana, Banzola, Mbala, Mbemba, Bisala, Nsiluvangu, Bueyasa, Makiadi, Makiese, Bukaka, Mayenda, Kiala, Malanga, Manzambi, Ntunga, Mbambi, sela, Mavoka, Sumpi, Mabiala, Makiadi, Lengi, Tezo, Tekasala, Tangi, Kamwanako, Nseka, Manduakila, Teholo, Tezangi, Mbutu, Nsinsani, Maviokele, Diambuana, Lukombo, Lusikila, Luyeye, Nzazi, Vayemba, Yengo, Kiambukuta, Tulunga, Dilu, Kiamwangana, Diwete, Nzomuisi, Senga, Mpaka, Ntalu.

Kongo First names
The kongo tribe makes a difference between first and last names. Most first names are gender neutral.

 * 1) Angola
 * 2) Angolo
 * 3) Kimpa
 * 4) Longi
 * 5) Luzolo
 * 6) Manzambi
 * 7) Masa
 * 8) Matondo
 * 9) Mawete
 * 10) Maza
 * 11) Mbuetete
 * 12) Mfumu
 * 13) Mfulutoma
 * 14) Miezi
 * 15) Muanda
 * 16) Mvemba
 * 17) Mvembaur
 * 18) Namibi
 * 19) N'semi
 * 20) Ntangu
 * 21) Ntinu
 * 22) Nzinga
 * 23) Nzola
 * 24) Sema
 * 25) Vita
 * 26) Wasakumunua
 * 27) Yulu
 * 28) Zayi
 * 29) Zulu

Luba names

 * 1) Babanya
 * 2) Badiambila
 * 3) Badibanga
 * 4) Badila
 * 5) Bakika
 * 6) Bakaji
 * 7) Bakatupenda
 * 8) Bajikijayi
 * 9) Balela
 * 10) Baloji
 * 11) Bambi
 * 12) Batubenga
 * 13) Beleshayi
 * 14) Bende(a)
 * 15) Biakabutuka
 * 16) Biakupa
 * 17) Bikuta
 * 18) Bintu
 * 19) Bitumba
 * 20) Biuma
 * 21) Bolayi
 * 22) Bulembi
 * 23) Buloba
 * 24) Diba
 * 25) Dibuba
 * 26) Dibwe(a)
 * 27) Dikasa
 * 28) Dikoba
 * 29) Ditu
 * 30) Ilonda
 * 31) Ilunda
 * 32) Ilunga
 * 33) Kabange(a)
 * 34) Kabasele
 * 35) Kabasubabo
 * 36) Kabatuswila
 * 37) Kabedi
 * 38) Kabeya
 * 39) Kabishi
 * 40) Kaboko
 * 41) Kabongo (boy's name)
 * 42) Kabose
 * 43) Kabudi
 * 44) Kabula
 * 45) Kabundi
 * 46) Kabungama
 * 47) Kadima
 * 48) Kakona
 * 49) Kalala
 * 50) Kalambayi
 * 51) Kalengayi
 * 52) Kalombo
 * 53) Kalonda
 * 54) Kalonji
 * 55) Kalwanda
 * 56) Kamanda
 * 57) Kamudimba
 * 58) Kamwanya
 * 59) Kambuji
 * 60) Kande(a)
 * 61) Kanjinga (girl's name)
 * 62) Kapela
 * 63) Kapeta
 * 64) Kapinga
 * 65) Kantu
 * 66) Kanubantu
 * 67) Kapuku
 * 68) Kasanda
 * 69) Kasanji
 * 70) Kasenda
 * 71) Kashala
 * 72) Kashama
 * 73) Kasukupa
 * 74) Kasumpata
 * 75) Kasusula
 * 76) Katanda (boy's name)
 * 77) Katuku
 * 78) Katuma
 * 79) Katumbi
 * 80) Kayembe
 * 81) Kazadi
 * 82) Kazambu
 * 83) Kidiaba
 * 84) Kimba
 * 85) Kitambala
 * 86) Kongolo
 * 87) Konji
 * 88) Luboya
 * 89) Lukoji
 * 90) Lukusa
 * 91) Lusamba
 * 92) Lwakanwanga
 * 93) Kasanda
 * 94) Mambuyi
 * 95) Mampuya
 * 96) Mbelu
 * 97) Mbuyi
 * 98) Mbwaya
 * 99) Meji Mwamba
 * 100) Mfuni/Mfunyi
 * 101) Midibu / Midjibu
 * 102) Mikalayi
 * 103) Misenga
 * 104) Mpoku
 * 105) Mputu
 * 106) Mpyana
 * 107) Mubiala
 * 108) Muboyayi
 * 109) Muci
 * 110) Mudiayi
 * 111) Mudimbe
 * 112) Mudingayi
 * 113) Mufuta
 * 114) Mujanayi
 * 115) Mujinga (girl's name)
 * 116) Mukeba
 * 117) Mukebayi
 * 118) Mukendi
 * 119) Mukenge
 * 120) Mukengeshayi
 * 121) Mukinayi
 * 122) Mukoka
 * 123) Mukuna
 * 124) Mukunayi
 * 125) Mukunyi
 * 126) Mukuta
 * 127) Mulamba
 * 128) Mulanga
 * 129) Mulenda
 * 130) Mulondo
 * 131) Mulongo
 * 132) Mulowa
 * 133) Mulowayi
 * 134) Mulumba
 * 135) Mulumbu
 * 136) Mulume
 * 137) Mumengi
 * 138) Muntu/Bantu
 * 139) Musanda
 * 140) Mushiya
 * 141) Musungayi
 * 142) Muswama
 * 143) Muswamba (wa ba Mbuyi)
 * 144) Muteba
 * 145) Mutoke
 * 146) Mutombo
 * 147) Mutshipayi
 * 148) Mvidiakuumpa
 * 149) Mwambi
 * 150) Mwepu
 * 151) Mwipatayi
 * 152) Ndala
 * 153) Ndaye(a)
 * 154) Ndomba
 * 155) Ndombela
 * 156) Nga(lu)lamulume
 * 157) Ngalula(mukaji)
 * 158) Ngandu
 * 159) Ngondu
 * 160) Ngoyi
 * 161) Nkala
 * 162) Nkashama
 * 163) Nsanga (Diboko)
 * 164) Nsanza
 * 165) Ntambwe
 * 166) Ntumba
 * 167) Ntumpula
 * 168) Nzadi
 * 169) Shambuyi
 * 170) Tshamba
 * 171) Tshambwe
 * 172) Tshiabu
 * 173) Tshianza
 * 174) Tshibamba
 * 175) Tshibanda
 * 176) Tshibangu
 * 177) Tshibelu
 * 178) Tshibuabua
 * 179) Tshidinda Kasapa
 * 180) Tshiela (Makasa)
 * 181) Tshiende(a)
 * 182) Tshika
 * 183) Tshikala
 * 184) Tshikudimena
 * 185) Tshikuta
 * 186) Tshikuatakuata
 * 187) Tshilanda
 * 188) Tshilemba
 * 189) Tshilobo
 * 190) Tshilombo
 * 191) Tshilonga
 * 192) Tshimankinda
 * 193) Tshimanga
 * 194) Tshimpaka
 * 195) Tshinabu wa Munda
 * 196) Tshintu
 * 197) Tshingombe
 * 198) Tshinyama Tshiolola
 * 199) Tshiomba ou Tshomba
 * 200) Tshiowa (Mashi)
 * 201) Tshiowela
 * 202) Tshipamba
 * 203) Tshisekedi
 * 204) Tshiswabantu
 * 205) Tshiswaka
 * 206) Tshituka
 * 207) Tshomba
 * 208) Tumbishayi
 * 209) Tunda wa Munda
 * 210) Waku Menga

license: Creative Commons - Attribution Share-Alike - https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/


text:
Talk:Planet Earth/4h. What Makes Wind?

the impact of topography on biophysicalenvironmen

title: Talk:Planet Earth/4h. What Makes Wind?


text:
Public International Law/Climate Change Law

Author: Required knowledge: International Environmental Law

Learning objectives:

 * 1) Discern the multifaceted implications of climate change from various lenses including biophysical, socioeconomic, and political perspectives, to appreciate the complexities involved in formulating international legal responses.
 * 2) Identify the core principles of international climate change law, the major stakeholders, their interests, and the inherent political challenges, utilizing the terminology specific to the UNFCCC.
 * 3) Understand the development, functionality, and criticisms of the main mechanisms in the international climate change treaty regime, incorporating historical context and current scholarship in the field.
 * 4) Understand how climate change law interacts with other areas of international law, with a particular focus on multilateral environmental agreements and human rights law, and how these intersections can enhance climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies.
 * 5) Critically examine the potential opportunities, challenges, and the role of international climate change law in achieving climate justice, integrating contemporary literature and ongoing debates in the field. This is where the text begins. This template follows our style guide. Please take into account our guidelines for didactics. If you're wondering how to create text in Wikibooks, feel free to check out our  guide on how to write in Wikibooks.

A. Introduction
[T]he climate crisis is so violent and has exacerbated so much injustice […] It is not only the biggest challenge humanity has ever faced but also the biggest opportunity we have to change the world.

– Xiye Bastida, Climate Justice Activist. Today, we know with high certainty that the emission of greenhouse gases (GHG) into the atmosphere, a consequence of human activities, has warmed the climate at an unprecedented rate. By altering the composition of the global atmosphere, such anthropogenic release of gases has induced a change in the state of the climate over extended periods, a phenomenon known as "climate change." In its most recent Sixth Assessment Report (AR6), the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—the lead scientific body on climate change—attests that climate change is already affecting every region across the globe by altering the frequency and intensity of heatwaves, heavy precipitations, droughts, and tropical cyclones. Concerningly, the report's projection about a continuous increase in the global surface temperature until mid-century has become increasingly evident. This claim has been further corroborated by a recent update from the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) issued in May 2023. The WMO states that there is a 66% likelihood that the annual average global temperature, measured near the Earth's surface, will exceed 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels for at least one year between 2023 and 2027. Additionally, it indicates a 98% likelihood that at least one of the next five years—and the overall five-year period—will be the warmest on record. In the face of such compelling evidence, it becomes crucial to drastically reduce GHG emissions in the forthcoming decades. Otherwise, the global warming threshold of 1.5°C and 2°C could be exceeded within the 21st century, ushering in a host of serious risks to both ecosystems and human societies.

Climate change's complexities extend beyond the simple correlation between human-induced emissions and an amplified greenhouse effect—on which the IPCC concentrated in its earliest reports. This issue is intertwined with how current socioeconomic and political systems function and distribute resources. For instance, while the top 10% of the global population is responsible for half of all CO2 emissions, the bottom 57%—those living below the World Bank poverty line—generated only 16%. These vulnerable groups, often marginalized due to gender, race, or ethnicity, are disproportionately impacted by climate change due to limited coping mechanisms and resources. Indeed, between 2010 and 2020, such populations suffered 15 times higher mortality from climate-induced disasters than those in less vulnerable regions. Consequently, climate change—a 'wicked problem,' as some have famously labeled it —demands deep and fast transformations not only in the environmental sphere but also in how the current social, economic, and even political systems work.

To confront this global problem, the international community responded by establishing a multilateral climate change regime to mitigate and adapt to climatic changes. Initiated by the 1990 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 45/212, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) became the bedrock for contemporary international climate change law. This Convention serves as the foundational framework through which climate change has been comprehended and incorporated into the legal arena. It articulates the core concepts and principles related to climate change and provides a platform for other legislative instruments that contribute to the evolving international climate change regime. Over time, this regime has experienced transformations in its legal form, character, and architecture. It has walked away from its original niche in environmental law to, for some commentators, even forge its own identity and interconnect with other fields of law, such as human rights and financial law. However, with the global temperature trajectory surpassing 2°C, the efficacy of such laws is under scrutiny. Meanwhile, young activists —including Xiye Bastida, a climate justice activist from Mexico, and Greta Thunberg, the young founder of #FridaysForFuture —are advocating for a carbon-free world. Hence, the study of international climate change law should critically assess its potential and constraints in tackling climate change. This chapter aims to provide an overview of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Agreement, while emphasizing the deeply rooted socioeconomic and political systems that contribute to climate change. It seeks to foster critical thinking in overcoming the limits of international climate change law and realizing the change young activists envision.

1. Concepts
The core objective of international climate change law, as established by Article 2 of the UNFCCC, is ‘to achieve […] stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.’ To accomplish this, much of international climate change law spans two different sets of actions: mitigation and adaptation. On the one hand, human interventions aimed at mitigating climate change seek to reduce GHG emissions, including preserving carbon sinks such as wetlands and forests. And on the other, adaptation involves actions geared at adjusting to the actual or expected climate and its effects.

Commitments under the UNFCCC concern both mitigation and adaptation. They span the development of programs, international cooperation, education, and public awareness. For example, Article 4 of the Convention sets out that all parties shall "‘[f]ormulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases […] and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change.’"However, despite the dual emphasis of the Convention, during the first decade of the UN climate regime, efforts concentrated mainly on mitigation. This is reflected in the fact that the first legally binding instrument that arose from the Convention, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, prescribed specific GHG mitigation targets and timetables while not laying the same focus on climate adaptation. It was not until the Convention’s second legally binding instrument, the 2015 Paris Agreement, that the UNFCCC climate regime strengthened the importance of climate adaptation by agreeing to define a global goal on adaptation.

2. Implementation and Oversight Mechanisms
The UNFCCC established a Conference of the Parties (COP) and a permanent secretariat which facilitate negotiations. Article 7 of the UNFCCC confers on the COP the status of the supreme body of the Convention and the duty to keep its implementation under regular review. The COP meets every year. The first COP meeting (COP1) was held in Berlin, Germany in March, 1995. The latest meeting (COP27) took place in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt in November 2022. Further, Article 8 of the Convention set a secretariat to make arrangements for the COP meetings, facilitate assistance to the parties, and ensure coordination with the secretariats of other relevant international bodies, among other functions. The secretariat is located in Bonn, Germany and employs around 450 staff from over 100 countries.

Besides these institutions, other issues structural to the international climate change regime are its means of implementation, namely its financial and oversight mechanisms. The UNFCCC climate regime sets the commitment for developed countries to provide financial resources to developing countries as an instrumental measure to advance climate action. Because meeting the costs of mitigation and adaptation is instrumental for accomplishing the regime’s objectives, the parties to the Convention have agreed on establishing a financial mechanism and special funds to facilitate the flow of resources. The operating entities of the financial mechanism set by the UNFCCC are the Global Environmental Facility (GEF) and the Green Climate Fund (GCF). Special funds complement the primary mechanism and support specific countries and projects through the Special Climate Change Fund, the Least Developed Countries Fund, and the Adaptation Fund.

The UNFCCC climate regime has also created oversight mechanisms to ensure implementation and compliance. The Convention requires states to periodically communicate their mitigation and adaptation measures' progress as a general means for promoting accountability. The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement set their implementation frameworks, as the following sub-sections of this chapter will elaborate.

3. Principles
Principles form the bedrock of international climate change law, with roots in general and international environmental law.These principles encompass the no-harm rule, its complementary obligation of due diligence, and the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR).

The no-harm rule, a cornerstone of international environmental law, obliges states to ensure activities within their jurisdiction don't harm the environment of other states or areas beyond national jurisdiction. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment and the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development set the responsibility of states to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment of other states or areas beyond the limits of national jurisdictions. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) emphasizes this obligation as requiring states to take appropriate measures to prevent harm to other states' environment or the global commons, linking it with the due diligence principle. The latter demands that states enforce preventive measures with a certain level of vigilance over both public and private operators. The UNFCCC broadens the scope of the no-harm rule, incorporating potential harms lacking full scientific certainty—embracing the precautionary principle outlined in Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration.

The CBDR principle, initially codified in the Rio Declaration and subsequently adopted by the UNFCCC, acknowledges shared yet differing responsibilities among states for preventing harmful interference with the climate system. This principle takes into account historical contributions to the problem and current capacities to respond, thus accounting for national and regional development priorities, objectives, and circumstances.

II. Stakeholders and Politics
While states have traditionally led international climate change law development, both intergovernmental organizations and non-state actors have gained influence within the UNFCCC, participating actively in Conferences of Parties (COPs). Their rise in prominence has, directly or indirectly, impacted the trajectory of international climate change law. These non-state actors or NGOs, including nonprofit organizations, private corporations, trade unions, and academic institutions, have seen their participation within the UNFCCC process increase. Currently, they are grouped into nine constituencies: Business and industry NGOs (BINGO), Environmental NGOs (ENGO), Farmers, Indigenous peoples organizations (IPO), Local government and municipal authorities (LGMA), Research and independent NGOs (RINGO), Trade union NGOs (TUNGO), Women and Gender (WGC), and Youth NGOs (YOUNGO). The IPCC, established in 1988, is another key player. This body of 195 governments provides scientific data on climate change, informing international climate negotiations. To date, six assessment reports (AR) highlighting critical areas for climate action have been issued. AR1 was issued in 1990, and the most recent AR6 was in 2022. The work of the IPCC thereby constitutes an essential input for international climate change negotiations.

The varying interests and concerns colliding in the UNFCCC process, due to the diverse participants, expose the political complexities challenging international climate change law. Three distinct perspectives on climate change have emerged amongst these actors. Some, mainly European states and organizations, regard climate change primarily as an environmental issue, advocating for a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. Conversely, other entities, including non-European high-income countries like the US, approach climate change as an economic issue. They support emissions reduction only when benefits exceed costs, prioritizing economic growth and job creation. Global South countries and organizations, however, frame climate change as a matter of 'climate justice'. Despite contributing minimally to the problem, these nations bear the brunt of its effects. Therefore, they call for high-income countries to acknowledge and assume their responsibilities, including reparations for damage caused by climate change.

These differing viewpoints have shaped the evolution of the international climate change regime, creating opportunities and obstacles in reaching global agreements. As a result, international climate change law has adapted its form and structure to navigate these complex political tensions. The subsequent section examines the UNFCCC regime's three core agreements and their responses to these contextual political challenges.

I. Emergence of the UNFCCC
Early scientific research into climate change revealed rising atmospheric CO2 levels during the 1960s. Enhanced computing power in the subsequent decades deepened our understanding of the issue, leading the 1979 US National Academy of Sciences report to state that unabated increases in CO2 would result in significant climate change. The First World Climate Conference convened in Geneva that year under the WMO, resulting in an urgent appeal for nations to anticipate and mitigate potential climate changes harmful to humanity. The conference laid the foundation for the World Climate Program and future climate-focused assemblies, such as the 1985 Villach Conference and the 1988 Toronto Conference.

During the 1980s and 1990s, escalating environmental activism and political developments like the adoption of the 1987 Montreal Protocol and the 1992 Rio Conference helped raise public awareness on climate issues. This, in turn, pressed policymakers to prioritize environmental protection, including atmospheric preservation. The amalgamation of scientific advancement and growing social and political awareness facilitated the global recognition of climate change, cementing it as an international law concern. In 1988, the WMO and UNEP founded the IPCC and the United Nations General Assembly recognized climate change as a 'common concern of mankind.'

In 1989, the Netherlands hosted the Hague Summit and the Noordwijk meeting, the first high-level intergovernmental forum devoted exclusively to climate change. That same year, the climate issue was on the agenda of various international summits, including the Small Island States meeting, the Francophone Summit in Dakar, the G7 Meeting, the Non-Aligned meeting, and the Commonwealth Summit. The Second World Climate Conference in 1990 issued a widely endorsed call for global action on climate change, setting the stage for the negotiation of the UNFCCC. The IPCC also published its inaugural report on climate change's scientific, environmental, and policy implications.

II. Evolution of the UNFCCC
In 1990, the UNGA adopted Resolution 45/212, setting in motion the creation of the UNFCCC. Entrusted by the General Assembly, the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) finalized the Convention in 1992, and it came into effect two years later when it achieved ratification by fifty countries. The Convention aims to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations to prevent dangerous interference with the climate system. It sets out five guiding principles: (1) the CBDR principle, urging developed nations to lead in climate change mitigation, (2) special attention to the needs of developing countries, (3) the precautionary principle, (4) the right to sustainable development, and (5) the importance of cooperation in an open international economic system.

These principles reflect the tensions between developed and developing countries concerning equity, which influenced the Convention's commitments. The CBDR principle, in particular, underscores the Convention's distinction between 'Annex I' (developed) and 'non-Annex I' (developing) countries. Annex I countries, including members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and nations with economies in transition, are encouraged to limit greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. Annex II, a subgroup of Annex I, are expected to provide financial resources to assist developing countries in adapting to climate change. Non-Annex I parties, mostly developing nations, include the United Nations' 49 classified Least Developed Countries (LDCs) which receive special consideration due to their limited capacity to adapt to climate change.

Moreover, the Convention recognizes the importance of economic development and promotes an open international economic system. While it does not set specific emission targets, the UNFCCC establishes general obligations and provides a base for international climate change regulation. Its importance extends beyond previous conventions by setting up a financial mechanism (Article 11), requiring detailed reporting (Article 12) and international review (Article 7.2(e)).

III. The Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol, adopted in 1997, emerged due to the UNFCCC's lack of specific emission reduction targets. This development started with the 1995 Berlin Mandate at the first Conference of the Parties (COP), which established the Ad Hoc Group (AGBM) to craft a robust legal instrument to fortify the UNFCCC. The AGBM's work culminated in the Kyoto Protocol's adoption in 1997 during COP3. However, its strict provisions led to challenges in securing participation, only entering into force in 2005 when ‘enough’ Annex I parties (accounting for at least 55% of the total CO2 emissions for 1990) deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.

The Kyoto Protocol's goal was to enforce emission reduction targets for Annex I countries, introducing a commitment period (2008-2012) during which parties aimed to reduce their GHG emissions by 5% below 1990 levels. The protocol also mandated national systems for estimating GHG emissions by 2007 and periodic reporting on progress. Perhaps among the most salient features of the Kyoto Protocol are the implementation mechanisms it established. They are three: the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) set up under Article 12, the Joint Implementation (JI) defined by Article 6, and the Emissions Trading (ET) set out in Article 16bis. The CDM allows countries with emission reduction commitments (Annex I parties) to undertake emission reduction projects in non-Annex I countries. In so doing, the former countries earn saleable certified emission reduction (CER) credits (each equivalent to one tonne of CO2) that count towards their Kyoto targets. Similarly, the JI provided the opportunity for Annex I countries to transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction Units (ERUs) resulting from emission reduction projects implemented in another Annex I country. Each ERU is equivalent to one tonne of CO2, which counts toward meeting these countries’ Kyoto targets.

The ET scheme allowed countries whose actual emissions did not surpass their emission reduction commitments—and thus had emission units to spare—to sell this excess capacity to countries that were over their targets. In this way, a new commodity was created through emission reductions or removals, whereby carbon is tracked and traded like any other commodity. Since CO2 is the main GHG, emissions trading is often known as the ‘carbon market.’ CER and ERU units from the CDM and JI, respectively, can also be transferred under this market.

However, the Kyoto Protocol's architecture, a top-down approach with clear delineations between developed and developing countries, posed some significant challenges. Its prescriptive nature and favor towards developing countries led to the withdrawal of the United States in 2001, one of the largest GHG emitters. Given such a significant withdrawal and the fact that China (a non-Annex I country yet also a major GHG emitter) was not given emission reduction commitments under the Protocol, this treaty’s emissions targets encompassed less than 24% of global GHG emissions.

In 2012, the 'Doha Amendment' extended the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period (2008-2012) to a second period from 2013 to 2020. Nonetheless, due to the same structural issues as the original Kyoto Protocol, several developed country parties opted out from the second commitment period, including Canada, Japan, and Russia, further limiting the Protocol's scope.

IV. The Paris Agreement
Replacing the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement acts as the foundation for specific climate commitments, adopted by the COP during its 21st session in 2015. It marks the first time human rights have been explicitly mentioned in a climate treaty—yet only in its preamble. The development of the Paris Agreement was a politically fraught process starting with the adoption of the 'Bali Action Plan' in 2007. This plan instigated a process that aimed to implement a full, effective, and long-term cooperative action plan under the Convention, originally intended for completion by 2009. The core contention throughout this process was the differentiation of emission reduction commitments between developed and developing countries. The failure to agree on this differentiation led to the inconclusive COP15 in Copenhagen in 2009. The resulting Copenhagen Accords reemphasized the Plan’s invitation to developed countries to submit emission reduction targets for 2020 and to developing countries to submit nationally appropriate mitigation actions.

A new attempt to develop a legal instrument under the Convention was formalized in 2011 at the 17th session of the COP in Durban, South Africa. COP17 established the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (AWG-DP), a process that would lead to an agreed outcome with legal force to be implemented from 2020. That outcome was the Paris Agreement, whose architecture, influenced by the route the preceding negotiations took, contrasts with the Kyoto Protocol, particularly in how it treats the distribution of countries’ emission reduction commitments.

The Paris Agreement's Article 2 outlines two central goals: mitigation and adaptation to climate change. The mitigation aim strives to limit the global temperature increase to well below 2°C and urges efforts to restrict the rise to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. It also advocates for adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change and fostering climate resilience. Furthermore, unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement refrains from mandating differentiated emission reduction targets based on the countries' development trajectories. Instead, it calls for mitigation actions from all parties while recognizing the principle of CBDR. The Agreement's implementation thus entails certain differentiation between developed and developing countries. For example, it expresses the ‘aim’ of Parties to ‘reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that peaking will take longer for developing country Parties, and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter […]’ It also mandates developed parties to continue 'taking the lead' in emission reduction targets and support developing countries in implementing the Agreement.

New principles introduced in the Paris Agreement include the maximum ambition and progression principles. These principles establish a foundation for increasing ambition, requiring each party to periodically enhance its level of commitment over the 5-year cycle. The Agreement employs tools like nationally determined contributions (NDCs), long-term strategies (LT-LEDS), adaptation plans, and the global stocktake for achieving its objectives. NDCs are action plans that both developed and developing countries must communicate every five years, showing a progressive increase in ambition. The NDC cycle began in 2020 when all parties were welcome to submit their initial updated communications.

Furthermore, the Paris Agreement invites countries to ‘formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies’ (LT-LEDS). These strategies define the long-term horizon to the NDCs. However, unlike NDCs, LT-LEDS are not mandatory. The Paris COP15 invited state parties to communicate their LT-LEDS by 2020. As of August 2022, 51 countries had submitted their strategies, including the European Union, United States, and China, the world’s top GHG emitters.

Unlike the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement employs a hybrid architecture that blends top-down and bottom-up approaches. The Agreement's objectives and principles, established by multilateral negotiations, reflect a top-down approach, while the NDCs and adaptation arrangements follow a bottom-up template. This structure grants each state the flexibility to set its mitigation ambition level and incorporates these commitments into an international climate accountability system through a global stocktake, which assesses collective progress and informs the determination of subsequent NDCs and communications. The hybrid architecture of the Paris Agreement has enhanced participation levels compared to its predecessor: a record 175 parties signed the Agreement on its opening day, April 22, 2016, and it came into force less than a year after its adoption.

However, there are concerns about the Agreement's potential to meet the urgent need for global decarbonization, considering that countries' GHG reduction commitments' levels of ambition are left to the states themselves. Despite the Paris Agreement's maximum ambition principle, these concerns are not unfounded, given that governments often express high aspirations but shy away from difficult decisions. As indicated in the advanced box above, the current ambition levels of submitted NDCs are insufficient to prevent global warming beyond 1.5°C.

D. International Climate Change Law beyond the UNFCCC
The UNFCCC treaty regime is a focal point in international climate change law. Nonetheless, the scope extends beyond this treaty. The relevance and substance of international climate change law have expanded considerably, reaching out of its initial confines in environmental law. Some observers even propose that it has developed its own distinct identity, intersecting with various legal domains. As climate change permeates almost all facets of human life, norms in other international law areas regulating such facets also intertwine with global warming concerns. These domains include international environmental law, human rights law, trade and investment law, refugee and migration law, and the law of the sea.

This segment focuses on how international environmental law and human rights law address climate change, thereby enriching international climate change law. While legal perspectives from other areas are crucial, numerous multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) share a particularly close relationship with climate change, as their principles have significantly influenced the UNFCCC. Concurrently, the convergence of climate change and human rights law has forged new avenues, seemingly amplifying the influence of international climate change law, evidenced by the recent surge in rights-based climate litigation.

The Ramsar Convention
Adopted in the city of Ramsar, Iran and in force since 1975, the Ramsar Convention promotes the conservation of wetlands (areas of marsh, fen, peatland, or water with water that is static or flowing, fresh, brackish, or salt) that hold international significance in terms of their environmental characteristics. Despite not directly addressing climate change, it identifies the threats global warming imposes on the ecosystems under its protection. For example, peatlands and mangroves, key components of wetlands, play significant roles in carbon storage and disaster risk reduction. Recognizing the climate mitigation and adaptation capabilities of wetlands, the Conference of the Parties to the Ramsar Convention (COP-Ramsar) has incorporated climate change considerations into the management and protection of these vital ecosystems. Particularly, in 2002, it adopted Resolution VIII.3 on 'Climate change and wetlands; impacts, adaptation and mitigation,' which the Conference subsequently updated through Resolution X.24 during its 10th Meeting in 2008. This superseding resolution entitled 'Climate change and wetlands' mandated contracting countries, among other measures, to ‘include in national climate change strategies the protection of wetlands’ and to ‘improve management practices of peatlands and other wetland types that are significant GHG sinks.’

The Convention on Biological Diversity
Effective since 1993, the CBD has three primary objectives: the conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of ecosystem components, and equitable sharing of benefits arising from their genetic resources. Recognizing the inseparable connection between biodiversity conservation and climate change, the CBD integrates climate change concerns into its core operations[9]. Notably, the findings of the 3rd Global Biodiversity Outlook (GBO), published in 2010, led the Conference of the Parties to the CBD (COP-CBD) to adopt the Strategic Plan 2011-2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, which include climate-related measures in two strategic goals.

The post-2020 Kunming-Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework has continued this trend by including targets designed to directly respond to the impacts of climate change. This framework has 23 action-oriented global targets, of which three seek to respond directly to the impacts of climate change. First, target 8 calls for minimizing the effects of climate change and ocean acidification on biodiversity and increasing its resilience through mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk reduction actions. Second, the framework's target 11 pursues the restoration, maintenance, and enhancement of nature's contributions to people, including the climate. And third, target 19 commends the increase of financial resources by optimizing co-benefits and synergies targeting the biodiversity and climate crises.

Environmental Governance Agreements
The Espoo Convention, a European MEA adopted in 1991, guides countries to implement national environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures to manage adverse transboundary environmental impacts. While not fully encompassing climate change in its provisions, its Kyiv Protocol, in force since 2010, requires a strategic EIA irrespective of the transboundary context, thereby considering effects on the global environment. Further, the EU Commission has called for the mainstreaming of climate mitigation measures into member states’ legislation on EIA and therefore issued guidance documents in 2013 and a directive in 2014 on the matter, which ultimately reverberates on the implementation of the Espoo Convention and its Protocol.

The Escazú Agreement, focusing on Latin America and the Caribbean, assures access to environmental information, public participation, and justice in environmental matters. Adopted in 2018, it commands countries to reveal updated information on climate change sources and encourages public involvement, including in their National Determined Contributions (NDCs). Through these directives, the agreement emphasizes a more inclusive and transparent approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation.

II. Human Rights Law
Despite climate change impacting nearly every aspect of human well-being, the formal convergence of international climate change and human rights law is a recent development. These two legal domains arose from different historical and political contexts, leading to distinct normative paths. The treaty-based international human rights regime can be traced back to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, facilitated by the post-World War II momentum. Conversely, the UNFCCC emerged four decades later in 1992. However, the formal interaction between human rights and climate change only took place in 2008, when the Human Rights Council adopted Resolution 7/23. The UNFCCC adopted human rights language two years later, in 2010.

Resolution 7/23, introduced in 2008, marked the first time a UN human rights body acknowledged climate change's impact on human rights. This resolution led to a comprehensive analysis by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) on the relationship between the two. The OHCHR report, submitted in 2009, highlighted the effects of rising global temperatures on specific human rights and groups. It also underscored the importance of procedural rights in addressing climate change, providing an early clarification on human rights obligations concerning climate change. Since then, numerous resolutions, studies, and discussions on the relationship between climate change and human rights have been adopted by the UN human rights system. Regional human rights systems, like the African and Inter-American Commissions, have also approved resolutions establishing the connection between human rights obligations and the need to prevent dangerous global warming.Some of these developments are indicated in the boxes below.

This expanding focus on human rights in climate change discourse has led to significant institutional and normative developments. For instance, in 2021, the Human Rights Council appointed a special rapporteurship to make recommendations on addressing and preventing climate change's adverse effects on human rights. Moreover, in July 2022, the UN General Assembly recognized the right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, compromised by climate change, as a human right.

In parallel to international human rights law, the link between human rights and climate change has also evolved within climate change law, albeit at a slower pace. The COP to the UNFCCC first acknowledged this link at its 10th session in Cancún in 2010. However, a stronger emphasis came with the Paris Agreement, the first legally binding instrument to explicitly refer to human rights, despite the political tension that relegated human rights to a preambular reference.

The Paris Agreement represents a milestone for the integration of these two legal fields. As a result, policy and judicial efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change increasingly aim to merge human rights and climate change frameworks. For example, the development of National Adaptation Plans under a human rights approach is gaining momentum as a strategy to advance specific human rights in high inequality contexts. Additionally, the Paris Agreement has triggered a surge in climate change lawsuits worldwide, using human rights arguments to urge national courts to redress climate-induced risks. In this respect, the IPCC has acknowledged the importance of climate-related litigation as a means to facilitate the implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions.

Conclusion
Climate change, one of the most complex challenges of our era, demands robust legal responses. This chapter has endeavored to provide an overview of the international climate change law primarily anchored on the UNFCCC regime. It has traced the historical background, structural blueprint, and normative propositions of the UNFCCC, aiming to delineate the pathways for the practical implementation of these written legal instruments.

However, the effectiveness and timeliness of these tools, as well as those emerging from the intersection of climate change law with other legal domains, remain critical questions in the prevention and adaptation to escalating global temperatures. The inescapable interlinkages between climate change and global inequality patterns underscore political and socioeconomic conflicts. Untangling these tensions is a prerequisite for achieving climate justice. As the law is a perfectible instrument, its adequacy in addressing climate change largely depends on our ability to prioritize a healthy planet over accumulation and dispossession.

Further Readings

 * Benoit Mayer, The International Law on Climate Change (1st edn, Cambridge University Press 2018).
 * Cinnamon Carlarne, Kevin R Gray and Richard Tarasofsky, 'International Climate Change Law: Mapping The Field' in Kevin R Gray, Richard Tarasofsky and Cinnamon Carlarne (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2016).
 * Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford University Press 2017).
 * Henry Jiménez Guanipa and Marisol Luna Leal (eds), Crisis climática, derechos humanos y los Acuerdos de París y Escazú. Crisis climática, transición energética y derechos humanos (Fundación Heinrich Böll 2020).
 * Jacqueline Peel, 'Climate Change Law: The Emergence of a New Legal Discipline' (2008) 32 Melbourne University Law Review 922.
 * Joyeeta Gupta, 'A History of International Climate Change Policy' (2010) 1 WIREs Climate Change 636 https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.67.
 * Jutta Brunnée, 'Legal Argumentation in the Evolving Climate Regime' in Ian Johnstone and Steven R Ratner (eds), Talking International Law: Legal Argumentation Outside the Courtroom (Oxford University Press 2021) 239.
 * Katrina Fischer Kuh, 'International Climate Change Treaty Regime' in Karl S Coplan and others (eds), Climate Change Law: An Introduction (Edward Elgar Publishing 2021) 5.
 * Lavanya Rajamani and Jacob D Werksman, 'Climate Change' in Lavanya Rajamani and Jacqueline Peel (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press 2021) 492.
 * Rosemary Gail Rayfuse and Shirley V Scott (eds), International Law in the Era of Climate Change (Edward Elgar Publishing 2012).
 * Susana Borràs, 'Movimientos para la justicia climática global: replanteando el escenario internacional del cambio climático' (2016) 33 Relaciones Internacionales.


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Category:Book:Complex Geometry

Complete Geometry

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User talk:Number03

Pure Maths

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C Programming/stdalign.h

To query and specify the alignment of an object, include the header.

Macro
In, four macros are defined.

 * alignas
 * Expanded to.

 * alignof
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 * _alignas_is_defined
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Expanded to integer constant 1. and  are suitable for use with   preprocessing directives.
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alignas
specifies the alignment in bytes for declaring variables.

 * Example
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 * Result

alignof
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The alignas type specifier (keyword_Alignas), alignof operator (keyword_Alignof), header, added in ISO/IEC 9899:2011.

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Wikijunior:History in pictures/Ancient Rome

The Romans had a large army.


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Wikijunior:History in pictures/Ancient China

The Ancient Chinese were a technologically advanced and powerful culture.


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Wikijunior:History in pictures/Vikings

The Vikings were not only people on boats, and they had their own homes and lives. They made art and had culture.

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Traditional Abacus and Bead Arithmetic/Division

Introduction
Of the four fundamental arithmetic operations, division is probably the most difficult to learn and perform. Being basically a sequence of subtractions, there are a large number of algorithms or methods to carry it out and many of these methods have been used with the abacus. Of these, two stand out for their efficiency and should be considered the main ones:

 * The modern division method (MD), shojohou in Japanese, shāng chúfǎ in Chinese (商除法); the oldest of the two, its origin dates back to at least the 3rd to 5th centuries AD, as it is cited in the book: The Mathematical Classic of Master Sun (Sūnzǐ Suànjīng 孫子算經). If we call it modern it is because it is the one taught today because it is the most similar to the division with paper and pencil. This method of division is based on the use of the multiplication table. During the Edo period it was introduced to Japan by Momokawa Jihei, but it did not gain popularity until the 20th century with the development of what we have been calling the Modern Method.
 * The traditional division method (TD), kijohou in Japanese, guī chúfǎ in Chinese (帰除法), first described in the Mathematical Illustration (Suànxué Qǐméng, 算學啟蒙) by Zhū Shìjié 朱士傑 (1299) . Its main peculiarity is that it uses a division table in addition to the multiplication table, which saves the mental effort of determining what figure of the quotient we have to try. In addition, we can design custom division tables for multi-digit dividers that save us the use of the multiplication table.

Both methods were first used in China with Counting rods.

In this Part of the book we deal primarily with the traditional method of division while assuming that the reader already has experience with the modern method of division.

Modern and traditional division; close relatives
In this chapter we try to show how modern and traditional methods, apparently so different, are actually closely related, while trying to justify why this method was invented.

Guide to traditional division (帰除法)
Here, we will see how to use the traditional method.

Learning the division table
It contains some indications that may make it easier for you to memorize the division table.

Dealing with overflow
How to cope with the traditional division arrangement (TDA) using different types of abacuses, especially the modern 4+1 and the traditional Japanese 5+1.

Special division tables
Division tables can be coined for multi-digit divisors, allowing dividing by them without resorting to the multiplication table.

Traditional division examples
A basic set of examples to illustrate all of the above.

Division by powers of two
Another traditional division method different from 帰除法 based in fractions; a form of division in situ.


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Wikijunior:History in pictures/Space Race

After the Space Race, countries began cooperating, instead of only competing in space.


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Public International Law/Actors in International Law/International Organizations/United Nations

Author: Jane Doe "Required knowledge: Link" "Learning objectives: Understanding XY."

This is where the text begins. This template follows our style guide. Please take into account our guidelines for didactics. If you're wondering how to create text in Wikibooks, feel free to check out our guide on how to write in Wikibooks.

Just replace the content above and below with your content.

Further Readings

 * Source I
 * Source II

Conclusion

 * Summary I
 * Summary II