Strong Membership Inference Attacks on Massive Datasets and (Moderately) Large Language Models
Jamie Hayes, Adam Dziedzic, A. Feder Cooper, Christopher Choquette-Choo, Franziska Boenisch, Georgios Kaissis, Igor Shilov, I Shumailov, Katherine Lee, Matthew Jagielski, Matthieu Meeus, Meenatchi Sundaram Muthu Selva Annamalai, Niloofar Mireshghallah, Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye, Milad Nasr
State-of-the-art membership inference attacks (MIAs) typically require training many reference models, making it difficult to scale these attacks to large pre-trained language models (LLMs). As a result, prior research has either relied on weaker attacks that avoid training reference models (e.g., fine-tuning attacks), or on stronger attacks applied to small-scale models and datasets.However, weaker attacks have been shown to be brittle---achieving close-to-arbitrary success---and insights from strong attacks in simplified settings do not translate to today's LLMs. These challenges have prompted an important question: are the limitations observed in prior work due to attack design choices, or are MIAs fundamentally ineffective on LLMs? We address this question by scaling LiRA---one of the strongest MIAs--to GPT-2 architectures ranging from 10M to 1B parameters, training reference models on over 20B tokens from the C4 dataset. Our results advance the understanding of MIAs on LLMs in three key ways: (1) strong MIAs can succeed on pre-trained LLMs;(2) their effectiveness, however, remains limited (e.g., AUC < 0.7) in practical settings; and, (3) the relationship between MIA success and related privacy metrics is not as straightforward as prior work has suggested.