Stackelberg Self-Annotation: A Robust Approach to Data-Efficient LLM Alignment
Chu Xu, Zhixin Zhang, Tianyu Jia, Yujie Jin
Aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences typically demands vast amounts of meticulously curated data, which is both expensive and prone to labeling noise. We propose Stackelberg Game Preference Optimization (SGPO), a robust alignment framework that models alignment as a two-player Stackelberg game between a policy (leader) and a worst-case preference distribution (follower). The proposed SGPO guarantees $\mathcal{O}(\epsilon)$-bounded regret within an $\epsilon$-Wasserstein ball, offering formal robustness to (self-)annotation noise. We instantiate SGPO with Stackelberg Self-Annotated Preference Optimization (SSAPO), which uses minimal human-labeled “seed” preferences and iteratively self-annotates new prompts. In each iteration, SSAPO applies a distributionally robust reweighting of synthetic annotations, ensuring that noisy or biased self-labels do not derail training. Remarkably, using only 2K seed preferences—about 1/30 of standard human labels—SSAPO achieves strong win rates against GPT-4 across multiple benchmarks within three iterations. These results highlight that a principled Stackelberg formulation yields data-efficient alignment for LLMs, significantly reducing reliance on costly human annotations.