Multiplayer Federated Learning: Reaching Equilibrium with Less Communication
TaeHo Yoon, Sayantan Choudhury, Nicolas Loizou
Traditional Federated Learning (FL) approaches assume collaborative clients with aligned objectives working towards a shared global model. However, in many real-world scenarios, clients act as rational players with individual objectives and strategic behaviors, a concept that existing FL frameworks are not equipped to adequately address. To bridge this gap, we introduce *Multiplayer Federated Learning (MpFL)*, a novel framework that models the clients in the FL environment as players in a game-theoretic context, aiming to reach an equilibrium. In this scenario, each player tries to optimize their own utility function, which may not align with the collective goal. Within MpFL, we propose *Per-Player Local Stochastic Gradient Descent (PEARL-SGD)*, an algorithm in which each player/client performs local updates independently and periodically communicates with other players. We theoretically analyze PEARL-SGD and prove that it reaches a neighborhood of equilibrium with less communication in the stochastic setup compared to its non-local counterpart. Finally, we verify our theoretical findings through numerical experiments.