The Cost of Compression: Tight Quadratic Black-Box Attacks on Sketches for $\ell_2$ Norm Estimation
Sara Ahmadian, Edith Cohen, Uri Stemmer
Dimensionality reduction via linear sketching is a powerful and widely used technique, but it is known to be vulnerable to adversarial inputs. We study the \emph{black-box adversarial setting}, where a fixed, hidden sketching matrix $A \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times n}$ maps high-dimensional vectors $\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ to lower-dimensional sketches $A\boldsymbol{v} \in \mathbb{R}^k$, and an adversary can query the system to obtain approximate $\ell_2$-norm estimates that are computes from the sketch.We present a \emph{universal, nonadaptive attack} that, using $\tilde{O}(k^2)$ queries, either causes a failure in norm estimation or constructs an adversarial input on which the optimal estimator for the query distribution (used by the attack) fails. The attack is completely agnostic to the sketching matrix and to the estimator—it applies to \emph{any} linear sketch and \emph{any} query responder, including those that are randomized, adaptive, or tailored to the query distribution.Our lower bound construction tightly matches the known upper bounds of $\tilde{\Omega}(k^2)$, achieved by specialized estimators for Johnson–Lindenstrauss transforms and AMS sketches. Beyond sketching, our results uncover structural parallels to adversarial attacks in image classification, highlighting fundamental vulnerabilities of compressed representations.