Online Learning in the Repeated Mediated Newsvendor Problem
Nataša Bolić, Tom Cesari, Roberto Colomboni, Christian Paravalos
Motivated by real-life supply chain management, we study a repeated newsvendor problem in which the learner is a mediator that facilitates trades between suppliers and retailers in a sequence of supplier/retailer interactions. At each time step, a new supplier and retailer join the mediator's platform with a private production cost and utility function, respectively, and the platform proposes a unitary trading price. The supplier accepts the proposed price if it meets or exceeds their unitary production cost and communicates their decision to the platform; simultaneously, the retailer decides the quantity to purchase at the proposed trading price based on their private utility function and sends their decision to the platform. If the supplier accepts the trading price, the transaction proceeds, and the retailer purchases their chosen quantity of units, paying the product of this quantity and the trading price to the supplier. The mediator's objective is to maximize social welfare. We design an online mediator's pricing strategy that features sharp regret rates under some natural assumptions, and we investigate the necessity of these assumptions, proving that relaxing any of them leads to unlearnability.