Attractive Metadata Attack: Inducing LLM Agents to Invoke Malicious Tools
Kanghua Mo, Li Hu, Yucheng Long, Zhihao Li
Large language model (LLM) agents have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in complex reasoning and decision-making by leveraging external tools. However, this tool-centric paradigm introduces a previously underexplored attack surface: adversaries can manipulate tool metadata—such as names, descriptions, and parameter schemas—to influence agent behavior. We identify this as a new and stealthy threat surface that allows malicious tools to be preferentially selected by LLM agents, without requiring prompt injection or access to model internals. To demonstrate and exploit this vulnerability, we propose the Attractive Metadata Attack (AMA), a black-box in-context learning framework that generates highly attractive but syntactically and semantically valid tool metadata through iterative optimization. Our attack integrates seamlessly into standard tool ecosystems and requires no modification to the agent’s execution framework. Extensive experiments across ten realistic, simulated tool-use scenarios and a range of popular LLM agents demonstrate consistently high attack success rates (81\%–95\%) and significant privacy leakage, with negligible impact on primary task execution.Moreover, the attack remains effective even under prompt-level defenses and structured tool-selection protocols such as the Model Context Protocol, revealing systemic vulnerabilities in current agent architectures.These findings reveal that metadata manipulation constitutes a potent and stealthy attack surface, highlighting the need for execution-level security mechanisms that go beyond prompt-level defenses. Code is available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AMA-A753.