A Frustratingly Simple Yet Highly Effective Attack Baseline: Over 90% Success Rate Against the Strong Black-box Models of GPT-4.5/4o/o1
Zhaoyi Li, Xiaohan Zhao, Dong-Dong Wu, Jiacheng Cui, Zhiqiang Shen
Despite promising performance on open-source large vision-language models (LVLMs), transfer-based targeted attacks often fail against black-box commercial closed-source  LVLMs. Analyzing failed adversarial perturbations reveals that the learned perturbations typically originate from a uniform distribution and lack clear semantic details, resulting in unintended responses. This critical absence of semantic information leads commercial LVLMs to either ignore the perturbation entirely or misinterpret its embedded semantics, thereby causing the attack to fail. To overcome these issues, we propose to refine semantic clarity by encoding explicit semantic details within local regions, thus ensuring interoperability and capturing finer-grained features, and by concentrating modifications on semantically rich areas rather than applying them uniformly. To achieve this, we propose *a simple yet highly effective baseline*: at each optimization step, the adversarial image is cropped randomly by a controlled aspect ratio and scale, resized, and then aligned with the target image in the embedding space. While the na\"ive source-target matching method has been utilized before in the literature, we are the first to provide a tight analysis, which establishes a close connection between perturbation optimization and semantics. Experimental results confirm our hypothesis. Our adversarial examples crafted with local-aggregated perturbations focused on crucial regions exhibit surprisingly good transferability to commercial LVLMs, including GPT-4.5, GPT-4o, Gemini-2.0-flash, Claude-3.5/3.7-sonnet, and even reasoning models like o1, Claude-3.7-thinking and Gemini-2.0-flash-thinking. Our approach achieves success rates exceeding 90\% on GPT-4.5, 4o, and o1, significantly outperforming all prior state-of-the-art attack methods. Our code and optimized adversarial examples are available in supplementary materials.