Resolution of Simpson's paradox via the common cause principle
A. Hovhannisyan, Armen Allahverdyan
Simpson's paradox poses a challenge in probabilistic inference and decision-making. Our study revisits the paradox by re-estimating its frequency with an unbiased data generation process and reaffirms that it is not an artifact of deficient data collection. Thus, it can lead to incorrect recommendations in fields as diverse as statistics, psychology, and artificial intelligence. We show that the paradox can be resolved by assuming a minimal — though not necessarily observed — common cause (or screening) variable for the involved random variables. In our approach, conditioning on this minimal common cause establishes the correct association between events, which coincides with the conditioning option of the original Simpson paradox. This resolution applies to both discrete cases of binary variables and continuous settings modeled by Gaussian variables. For a non-minimal common cause, the resolution of the paradox is possible, but detailed knowledge of the common cause is required. Our findings extend traditional understandings of the paradox and offer practical guidance for resolving apparent contradictions in probabilistic inference, ultimately enhancing decision-making processes. This point is illustrated by several examples.