The multinational, multibillion‐dollar F‐16 fighter program is plagued by production delays and cost increases, according to a report drafted for Congress by the General Accounting Office.  The G.A.O. report said that the program “is behind schedule,” that its costs rose by $7.7 billion in 1976 and that its success or failure “will have a significant influence on the fate of future co‐production programs” in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.  Air Force sources reported that the estimated total expenditure for the F‐16 program for research and development through 1986 would be $13.8 billion.  General Dynamics, the prime contractor, Pratt & Whitney, which manufactures the engines, and the Air Force dispute the G.A.O.'s criticisms of the program, contending that the program is proceeding according to schedule.  The original program, which began in 1975, called for production of a new lightweight fighter to replace the F‐4 by a consortium made up of the United States and four European members of NATO—Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands and Norway. The initial target was 998 aircraft, of which the European members of the group would buy 348 and the Air Force 650. The Air Force has since announced its intention to buy an additional 678 F‐16's.  Additional sales are expected to Iran, which wants to purchase 300 F‐16's, Israel, Spain and Turkey. Pentagon sources envisage a global market for the fighter worth approximately $15 billion.  Since the memorandum of understanding was signed in 1975 by the five members of the consortium, the program has faced a number of problems. Some arose from engineering changes. Others resulted from the European members’ requirement for an aircraft that will be more than an air‐to‐air fighter and will be able to carry out an air‐to‐ground support role it combat.  The conclusion drawn by sources in the aircraft industry is that the solution of these problems will result in an increase in the $6,091,000 cost of each plane in 1975 dollars cited in the memorandum of understanding.  The G.A.O. believes that the Air Force is concerned over the problem of restarting the engine at an acceptably low speed. The Air Force, however, does not think this is a serious problem and believes that it will be solved.  Program costs—originally estimated at $4 billion for the United States — increased by $7.7 billion last year with $6.3 billion of this resulting from the addition of 73 F‐16B two‐seater aircraft to the program. The Air Force believes it can justify the addition of the other $1.4 billion.  Planes to Be Built In Europe  The co‐production sector has also raised some difficulties. The United States is committed to offsetting European procurement costs through European participation in production. Under the General Dynamics plan there will be two F‐16 assembly lines in Europe, operated by the Dutch and the Belgians, each assembling 174 fighters.  Fabrique National in Belgium will assemble Pratt & Whitney F100 engines for the European fighters.  The G.A.O. report estimated that approximately 55 contracts would be awarded for European co‐production. In late 1976 only 23 contracts had been signed, largely because differences in European and American contractual and business practices had to be resolved.  The report also said that the Air Force did not know the extent of the impact that European co‐production would have on overall costs. The Air Force replied that it did not believe that European participation would increase costs.  General Dynamics, in an answer to some parts of the G.A.O. report, declared, “The F‐16 fighter program is and has been proceeding on schedule and we do not anticipate any delays in the future. The F100 engine has performed in excellent fashion and we have experienced no (unintentional) engine stalls or engine restart problems.”  Assertions by Tactical Air Command officers are included in the report on the need for radar‐guided air‐to‐air missiles for the F‐16 in addition to the infraredguided missiles that are now its basic armament. According to the G.A.O., the F‐16 does not have space for the additional missiles suggested by the Tactical Air Command.  Other changes in the F‐I6 have been necessitated to give it a dual capability; air‐to‐ground as well as air‐to‐air. These changes are due in part to urgings from the European allies.  Potential for Further Cost Growth  The G.A.O. reported the following other causes for potential cost growth for the United States:  ¶European equipment produced to meet offset requirements is expected to be more costly than components made in America. An increase in European inflation could increase the cost of the American F‐16's.  ¶European production problems, especially in the quality control field, could result in delays and substitution of parts could lead to higher costs.  ¶American commitments that fall short of European expectations, the G.A.O. said, “could become very sensitive” and will affect dealings with NATO members interested in other co‐production arrangements.  The last co‐production contract will probably be awarded by June, The Defense Department will then be able to revise the letter of offer and acceptance of January 1977 to “stipulate more realistic prices based on known data and will know if the memorandum of understanding not‐to‐exceed price needs to be revised,” the report said.  We are continually improving the quality of our text archives. Please send feedback, error reports, and suggestions to archive_feedback@nytimes.com.  A version of this archives appears in print on May 1, 1977, on page 11 of the New York edition with the headline: F 16 FIGHTER PROGRAM IS HURT BY DELAYS. Order Reprints| Today's Paper|Subscribe
GAO rept finds F-16 fighter program for NATO allies plagued by delays and cost increases; finds costs increased by $7.7-billion in '76 and that success or failure of program will have significant effect on future of similar co-production programs; planes are being developed jointly by US and Eurs (M)