Over a 90-day period this summer, 365 key Taliban commanders were either killed or captured in a total of 3,000 night raids carried out by British and American special forces units, operating predominantly in southern Afghanistan. Another 1,031 "rank and file" fighters were killed, and 1,355 taken into custody.  Not surprisingly, this unprecedented level of special forces activity is having a devastating impact on the Taliban's effectiveness and morale. British commanders have reported a significant drop in their casualty rates, while the number of roadside bombs has fallen by a quarter.  Equally important, the high attrition rate has led many potential Taliban recruits to have second thoughts about risking their lives for the cause. "When the average life expectancy of a commander is around six months, it certainly concentrates the minds of those who are thinking about joining the insurgency," says a senior British officer working with SAS units in Afghanistan. "Suddenly there is an awareness that there is a price to be paid for planting roadside bombs. Families are less keen to let their sons volunteer."  It would be tempting fate to say that we are finally winning the war against the Taliban, especially as the overall casualty rate for Nato forces this year is the highest since Western troops first deployed in late 2001. But these recent successes do suggest that the mission is heading in the right direction at last, with all the implications that might have for its future success.  If, by virtue of the special forces' relentless onslaught, the Taliban can be persuaded that they are fighting a war they can never win, then the more moderate elements within the leadership might be persuaded to opt for political reconciliation with the Afghan government, which is the fundamental objective of Gen Petraeus's counter-insurgency strategy.  Unfortunately, however, the overwhelming majority of the British public appears to be totally unaware of these highly significant developments. Rather than cheering the success of the SAS – and all the other British units committed to fighting the Taliban – the general tendency has been to lament our failures. That was the case again this week over Nato's decision to redeploy British troops from the bitterly contested town of Sangin, where 106 soldiers have lost their lives over the past four years.  Sangin will hardly go down in the annals of this campaign as a stunning success. The woefully under-resourced British contingent was never able to achieve its original objective of dominating the area surrounding this strategically important town. But through their heroic efforts, British troops did manage to defeat repeated Taliban attempts to retake the town, killing hundreds of insurgents and denying the enemy control of a vital supply route.  So why is it that all people want to discuss is our losses in Sangin, rather than our successes? Part of the answer lies in the strange reluctance of senior British officers to provide details of the scale of the carnage that is daily being inflicted on the Taliban. Normally, governments are only too eager to proclaim the military's successes in times of war, not least because of their propaganda value. Churchill sustained morale during the darkest hours of the Second World War with constant updates on enemy losses, while Thatcher was unequivocal in her praise of British victories in the Falklands.  Those responsible for prosecuting the war in Afghanistan, by contrast, fall silent when asked to provide details of enemy losses. The explanation, or so I was told by one Cabinet minister, is a concern that publishing details of Taliban deaths would play into the hands of anti-war campaigners, who would exploit the information for their own propaganda purposes. Politicians are also mindful of the impact the true level of Taliban casualties might have on British Muslims. There are already significant numbers who actively support the Taliban and its allies, and ministers have convinced themselves that the total would only grow if the movement's true plight were more widely known.  This policy of restraint, however, is self-defeating, because public support is crucial to the ultimate success of any military campaign. British backing for the effort in Afghanistan will continue to wane until we focus on our successes, rather than obsess about our failures.
Why does the Government insist on playing down the successes of our Forces,    asks Con Coughlin.