Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities
To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it
can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new
"dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our
evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security;
(3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of
strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early
warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous
capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.
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Mary Phuong
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Mary Phuong
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Matthew Aitchison
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Elliot Catt
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Sarah Cogan
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2024-03-21T11:47:36.474Z
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Sarah Cogan
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Alexandre Kaskasoli
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Victoria Krakovna
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David Lindner
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David Lindner
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Matthew Rahtz
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2024-03-21T11:48:00.324Z
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Matthew Rahtz
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Yannis Assael
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Yannis Assael
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Sarah Hodkinson
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Heidi Howard
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Tom Lieberum
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Ramana Kumar
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Maria Abi Raad
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Albert Webson
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Albert Webson
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Lewis Ho
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Sharon Lin
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Sebastian Farquhar
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Marcus Hutter
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Gregoire Deletang
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Anian Ruoss
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Anian Ruoss
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Seliem El-Sayed
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Sasha Brown
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Anca Dragan
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Rohin Shah
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Allan Dafoe
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Toby Shevlane
Evaluating Frontier Models for Dangerous Capabilities
To understand the risks posed by a new AI system, we must understand what it
can and cannot do. Building on prior work, we introduce a programme of new
"dangerous capability" evaluations and pilot them on Gemini 1.0 models. Our
evaluations cover four areas: (1) persuasion and deception; (2) cyber-security;
(3) self-proliferation; and (4) self-reasoning. We do not find evidence of
strong dangerous capabilities in the models we evaluated, but we flag early
warning signs. Our goal is to help advance a rigorous science of dangerous
capability evaluation, in preparation for future models.
Evaluations of dangerous capabilities in AI models across persuasion, cyber-security, self-proliferation, and self-reasoning are introduced and pilot-tested on Gemini 1.0 models.
dangerous capability evaluations persuasion deception cyber-security self-proliferation self-reasoning