|Part of Worwd War II|
Map showing de main areas of de confwict and Awwied wandings in de Pacific, 1942–1945
See section Participants for furder detaiws.
See section Participants for furder detaiws.
|Commanders and weaders|
Main Awwied weaders|
Frankwin D. Roosevewt[c]
Main Axis weaders|
|Casuawties and wosses|
|History of Japan|
The Pacific War, sometimes cawwed de Asia–Pacific War, was de deater of Worwd War II dat was fought in Asia, de Pacific Ocean, de Indian Ocean, and Oceania. It was geographicawwy de wargest deater of de war, incwuding de vast Pacific Ocean deater, de Souf West Pacific deater, de Souf-East Asian deater, de Second Sino-Japanese War, and de Soviet–Japanese War.
The Second Sino-Japanese War between de Empire of Japan and de Repubwic of China had been in progress since 7 Juwy 1937, wif hostiwities dating back as far as 19 September 1931 wif de Japanese invasion of Manchuria. However, it is more widewy accepted[g] dat de Pacific War itsewf began on 7/8 December 1941, when de Japanese invaded Thaiwand and attacked de British cowonies of Mawaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong as weww as de United States miwitary and navaw bases in Hawaii, Wake Iswand, Guam, and de Phiwippines.
The Pacific War saw de Awwies pitted against Japan, de watter aided by Thaiwand and to a wesser extent by de Axis awwies, Germany and Itawy. Fighting consisted of some of de wargest navaw battwes in history, and incredibwy fierce battwes and war crimes across Asia and de Pacific Iswands, resuwting in immense woss of human wife. The war cuwminated in massive Awwied air raids over Japan, and de atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, accompanied by de Soviet Union's decwaration of war and invasion of Manchuria and oder territories on 9 August 1945, causing de Japanese to announce an intent to surrender on 15 August 1945. The formaw surrender of Japan ceremony took pwace aboard de battweship USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945. After de war, Japan wost aww rights and titwes to its former possessions in Asia and de Pacific, and its sovereignty was wimited to de four main home iswands and oder minor iswands as determined by de Awwies. Japan's Shinto Emperor rewinqwished much of his audority and his divine status drough de Shinto Directive in order to pave de way for extensive cuwturaw and powiticaw reforms.
Names for de war
In Awwied countries during de war, de "Pacific War" was not usuawwy distinguished from Worwd War II in generaw, or was known simpwy as de War against Japan. In de United States, de term Pacific Theater was widewy used, awdough dis was a misnomer in rewation to de Awwied campaign in Burma, de war in China and oder activities widin de Souf-East Asian Theater. However, de US Armed Forces considered de China-Burma-India Theater to be distinct from de Asiatic-Pacific Theater during de confwict.
Japan used de name Greater East Asia War (大東亜戦争, Dai Tō-A Sensō), as chosen by a cabinet decision on 10 December 1941, to refer to bof de war wif de Western Awwies and de ongoing war in China. This name was reweased to de pubwic on 12 December, wif an expwanation dat it invowved Asian nations achieving deir independence from de Western powers drough armed forces of de Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japanese officiaws integrated what dey cawwed de Japan–China Incident (日支事変, Nisshi Jihen) into de Greater East Asia War.
During de Awwied miwitary occupation of Japan (1945–52), dese Japanese terms were prohibited in officiaw documents, awdough deir informaw usage continued, and de war became officiawwy known as de Pacific War (太平洋戦争, Taiheiyō Sensō). In Japan, de Fifteen Years' War (十五年戦争, Jūgonen Sensō) is awso used, referring to de period from de Mukden Incident of 1931 drough 1945.
The major Awwied participants were de United States and its territories, incwuding de Phiwippine Commonweawf, where a guerriwwa war was waged after its conqwest; and China, which had awready been engaged in bwoody war against Japan since 1937 incwuding bof de KMT government Nationaw Revowutionary Army and CCP units, such as de guerriwwa Eighf Route Army, New Fourf Army, as weww as smawwer groups. The British Empire was awso a major bewwigerent consisting of British troops awong wif warge numbers of cowoniaw troops from de armed forces of India as weww as from Burma, Mawaya, Fiji, Tonga; in addition to troops from Austrawia, New Zeawand and Canada. The Dutch government-in-exiwe (as de possessor of de Dutch East Indies) were awso invowved, aww of whom were members of de Pacific War Counciw.
Mexico provided some air support in de form of de 201st Fighter Sqwadron and Free France sent navaw support in de form of Le Triomphant and water de Richewieu. From 1944 de French commando group Corps Léger d'Intervention awso took part in resistance operations in Indochina. French Indochinese forces faced Japanese forces in a coup in 1945. The commando corps continued to operate after de coup untiw wiberation, uh-hah-hah-hah. Some active pro-awwied guerriwwas in Asia incwuded de Mawayan Peopwes' Anti-Japanese Army, de Korean Liberation Army, de Free Thai Movement and de Việt Minh.
The Soviet Union fought two short, undecwared border confwicts wif Japan in 1938 and again in 1939, den remained neutraw drough de Soviet–Japanese Neutrawity Pact of Apriw 1941, untiw August 1945 when it (and Mongowia) joined de rest of de Awwies and invaded de territory of Manchukuo, China, Inner Mongowia, de Japanese protectorate of Korea and Japanese-cwaimed territory such as Souf Sakhawin.
Axis powers and awigned states
The Axis-awigned states which assisted Japan incwuded de audoritarian government of Thaiwand, which formed a cautious awwiance wif de Japanese in 1941, when Japanese forces issued de government wif an uwtimatum fowwowing de Japanese invasion of Thaiwand. The weader of Thaiwand, Pwaek Phibunsongkhram, became greatwy endusiastic about de awwiance after decisive Japanese victories in de Mawayan campaign and in 1942 sent de Phayap Army to assist de invasion of Burma, where former Thai territory dat had been annexed by Britain were reoccupied (Occupied Mawayan regions were simiwarwy reintegrated into Thaiwand in 1943). The Awwies supported and organized an underground anti-Japanese resistance group, known as de Free Thai Movement, after de Thai ambassador to de United States had refused to hand over de decwaration of war. Because of dis, after de surrender in 1945, de stance of de United States was dat Thaiwand shouwd be treated as a puppet of Japan and be considered an occupied nation rader dan as an awwy. This was done in contrast to de British stance towards Thaiwand, who had faced dem in combat as dey invaded British territory, and de United States had to bwock British efforts to impose a punitive peace.
Awso invowved were members of de Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, which incwuded de Manchukuo Imperiaw Army and Cowwaborationist Chinese Army of de Japanese puppet states of Manchukuo (consisting of most of Manchuria), and de cowwaborationist Wang Jingwei regime (which controwwed de coastaw regions of China), respectivewy. In de Burma campaign, oder members, such as de anti-British Indian Nationaw Army of Free India and de Burma Nationaw Army of de State of Burma were active and fighting awongside deir Japanese awwies.
Moreover, Japan conscripted many sowdiers from its cowonies of Korea and Taiwan. Cowwaborationist security units were awso formed in Hong Kong (reformed ex-cowoniaw powice), Singapore, de Phiwippines (awso a member of de Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere), de Dutch East Indies (de PETA), British Mawaya, British Borneo, former French Indochina (after de overdrow of de French regime in 1945 (de Vichy French had previouswy awwowed de Japanese to use bases in French Indochina beginning in 1941, fowwowing an invasion) as weww as Timorese miwitia. These units assisted de Japanese war effort in deir respective territories.
Germany and Itawy bof had wimited invowvement in de Pacific War. The German and de Itawian navies operated submarines and raiding ships in de Indian and Pacific Oceans, notabwy de Monsun Gruppe. The Itawians had access to concession territory navaw bases in China which dey utiwized (and which was water ceded to cowwaborationist China by de Itawian Sociaw Repubwic in wate 1943). After Japan's attack on Pearw Harbor and de subseqwent decwarations of war, bof navies had access to Japanese navaw faciwities.
Between 1942 and 1945, dere were four main areas of confwict in de Pacific War: China, de Centraw Pacific, Souf-East Asia and de Souf West Pacific. US sources refer to two deaters widin de Pacific War: de Pacific deater and de China Burma India Theater (CBI). However dese were not operationaw commands.
In de Pacific, de Awwies divided operationaw controw of deir forces between two supreme commands, known as Pacific Ocean Areas and Soudwest Pacific Area. In 1945, for a brief period just before de Japanese surrender, de Soviet Union and Mongowia engaged Japanese forces in Manchuria and nordeast China.
The Imperiaw Japanese Navy did not integrate its units into permanent deater commands. The Imperiaw Japanese Army, which had awready created de Kwantung Army to oversee its occupation of Manchukuo and de China Expeditionary Army during de Second Sino-Japanese War, created de Soudern Expeditionary Army Group at de outset of its conqwests of Souf East Asia. This headqwarters controwwed de buwk of de Japanese Army formations which opposed de Western Awwies in de Pacific and Souf East Asia.
Confwict between China and Japan
By 1937, Japan controwwed Manchuria and it was awso ready to move deeper into China. The Marco Powo Bridge Incident on 7 Juwy 1937 provoked fuww-scawe war between China and Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. The Nationawist Party and de Chinese Communists suspended deir civiw war in order to form a nominaw awwiance against Japan, and de Soviet Union qwickwy went support by providing warge amount of materiew to Chinese troops. In August 1937, Generawissimo Chiang Kai-shek depwoyed his best army to fight about 300,000 Japanese troops in Shanghai, but, after dree monds of fighting, Shanghai feww. The Japanese continued to push de Chinese forces back, capturing de capitaw Nanjing in December 1937 and conducted de Nanjing Massacre. In March 1938, Nationawist forces won deir first victory at Taierzhuang, but den de city of Xuzhou was taken by de Japanese in May. In June 1938, Japan depwoyed about 350,000 troops to invade Wuhan and captured it in October. The Japanese achieved major miwitary victories, but worwd opinion—in particuwar in de United States—condemned Japan, especiawwy after de Panay incident.
In 1939, Japanese forces tried to push into de Soviet Far East from Manchuria. They were soundwy defeated in de Battwe of Khawkhin Gow by a mixed Soviet and Mongowian force wed by Georgy Zhukov. This stopped Japanese expansion to de norf, and Soviet aid to China ended as a resuwt of de signing of de Soviet–Japanese Neutrawity Pact at de beginning of its war against Germany.
In September 1940, Japan decided to cut China's onwy wand wine to de outside worwd by seizing French Indochina, which was controwwed at de time by Vichy France. Japanese forces broke deir agreement wif de Vichy administration and fighting broke out, ending in a Japanese victory. On 27 September Japan signed a miwitary awwiance wif Germany and Itawy, becoming one of de dree main Axis Powers. In practice, dere was wittwe coordination between Japan and Germany untiw 1944, by which time de US was deciphering deir secret dipwomatic correspondence.
The war entered a new phase wif de unprecedented defeat of de Japanese at de Battwe of Suixian–Zaoyang, 1st Battwe of Changsha, Battwe of Kunwun Pass and Battwe of Zaoyi. After dese victories, Chinese nationawist forces waunched a warge-scawe counter-offensive in earwy 1940; however, due to its wow miwitary-industriaw capacity, it was repuwsed by de Imperiaw Japanese Army in wate March 1940. In August 1940, Chinese communists waunched an offensive in Centraw China; in retawiation, Japan instituted de "Three Awws Powicy" ("Kiww aww, Burn aww, Loot aww") in occupied areas to reduce human and materiaw resources for de communists.
By 1941 de confwict had become a stawemate. Awdough Japan had occupied much of nordern, centraw, and coastaw China, de Nationawist Government had retreated to de interior wif a provisionaw capitaw set up at Chungking whiwe de Chinese communists remained in controw of base areas in Shaanxi. In addition, Japanese controw of nordern and centraw China was somewhat tenuous, in dat Japan was usuawwy abwe to controw raiwroads and de major cities ("points and wines"), but did not have a major miwitary or administrative presence in de vast Chinese countryside. The Japanese found its aggression against de retreating and regrouping Chinese army was stawwed by de mountainous terrain in soudwestern China whiwe de Communists organised widespread guerriwwa and saboteur activities in nordern and eastern China behind de Japanese front wine.
Japan sponsored severaw puppet governments, one of which was headed by Wang Jingwei. However, its powicies of brutawity toward de Chinese popuwation, of not yiewding any reaw power to dese regimes, and of supporting severaw rivaw governments faiwed to make any of dem a viabwe awternative to de Nationawist government wed by Chiang Kai-shek. Confwicts between Chinese Communist and Nationawist forces vying for territory controw behind enemy wines cuwminated in a major armed cwash in January 1941, effectivewy ending deir co-operation, uh-hah-hah-hah.
Japanese strategic bombing efforts mostwy targeted warge Chinese cities such as Shanghai, Wuhan, and Chongqing, wif around 5,000 raids from February 1938 to August 1943 in de water case. Japan's strategic bombing campaigns devastated Chinese cities extensivewy, kiwwing 260,000–350,934 non-combatants.
Tensions between Japan and de West
From as earwy as 1935 Japanese miwitary strategists had concwuded de Dutch East Indies were, because of deir oiw reserves, of considerabwe importance to Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. By 1940 dey had expanded dis to incwude Indochina, Mawaya, and de Phiwippines widin deir concept of de Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Japanese troop buiwd ups in Hainan, Taiwan, and Haiphong were noted, Imperiaw Japanese Army officers were openwy tawking about an inevitabwe war, and Admiraw Sankichi Takahashi was reported as saying a showdown wif de United States was necessary.
In an effort to discourage Japanese miwitarism, Western powers incwuding Austrawia, de United States, Britain, and de Dutch government in exiwe, which controwwed de petroweum-rich Dutch East Indies, stopped sewwing oiw, iron ore, and steew to Japan, denying it de raw materiaws needed to continue its activities in China and French Indochina. In Japan, de government and nationawists viewed dese embargos as acts of aggression; imported oiw made up about 80% of domestic consumption, widout which Japan's economy, wet awone its miwitary, wouwd grind to a hawt. The Japanese media, infwuenced by miwitary propagandists,[h] began to refer to de embargoes as de "ABCD ("American-British-Chinese-Dutch") encircwement" or "ABCD wine".
Faced wif a choice between economic cowwapse and widdrawaw from its recent conqwests (wif its attendant woss of face), de Japanese Imperiaw Generaw Headqwarters (GHQ) began pwanning for a war wif de Western powers in Apriw or May 1941.
In preparation for de war against de United States, which wouwd be decided at sea and in de air, Japan increased its navaw budget as weww as putting warge formations of de Army and its attached air force under navy command. Whiwe formerwy de IJA consumed de wion's share of de state's miwitary budget due to de secondary rowe of de IJN in Japan's campaign against China (wif a 73/27 spwit in 1940), from 1942 to 1945 dere wouwd instead be a roughwy 60/40 spwit in funds between de army and de navy. Japan's key objective during de initiaw part of de confwict was to seize economic resources in de Dutch East Indies and Mawaya which offered Japan a way to escape de effects of de Awwied embargo. This was known as de Soudern Pwan. It was awso decided—because of de cwose rewationship between de United Kingdom and United States, and de (mistaken) bewief dat de US wouwd inevitabwy become invowved—dat Japan wouwd awso reqwire taking de Phiwippines, Wake and Guam.
Japanese pwanning was for fighting a wimited war where Japan wouwd seize key objectives and den estabwish a defensive perimeter to defeat Awwied counterattacks, which in turn wouwd wead to a negotiated peace. The attack on de US Pacific Fweet at Pearw Harbor, Hawaii, by carrier-based aircraft of de Combined Fweet was intended to give de Japanese time to compwete a perimeter.
The earwy period of de war was divided into two operationaw phases. The First Operationaw Phase was furder divided into dree separate parts in which de major objectives of de Phiwippines, British Mawaya, Borneo, Burma, Rabauw and de Dutch East Indies wouwd be occupied. The Second Operationaw Phase cawwed for furder expansion into de Souf Pacific by seizing eastern New Guinea, New Britain, Fiji, Samoa, and strategic points in de Austrawian area. In de Centraw Pacific, Midway was targeted as were de Aweutian Iswands in de Norf Pacific. Seizure of dese key areas wouwd provide defensive depf and deny de Awwies staging areas from which to mount a counteroffensive.
By November dese pwans were essentiawwy compwete, and were modified onwy swightwy over de next monf. Japanese miwitary pwanners' expectation of success rested on de United Kingdom and de Soviet Union being unabwe to effectivewy respond to a Japanese attack because of de dreat posed to each by Germany; de Soviet Union was even seen as unwikewy to commence hostiwities.
The Japanese weadership was aware dat a totaw miwitary victory in a traditionaw sense against de US was impossibwe; de awternative wouwd be negotiating for peace after deir initiaw victories, which wouwd recognize Japanese hegemony in Asia. In fact, de Imperiaw GHQ noted, shouwd acceptabwe negotiations be reached wif de Americans, de attacks were to be cancewed—even if de order to attack had awready been given, uh-hah-hah-hah. The Japanese weadership wooked to base de conduct of de war against America on de historicaw experiences of de successfuw wars against China (1894–95) and Russia (1904–05), in bof of which a strong continentaw power was defeated by reaching wimited miwitary objectives, not by totaw conqwest.
They awso pwanned, shouwd de United States transfer its Pacific Fweet to de Phiwippines, to intercept and attack dis fweet en route wif de Combined Fweet, in keeping wif aww Japanese Navy prewar pwanning and doctrine. If de United States or Britain attacked first, de pwans furder stipuwated de miwitary were to howd deir positions and wait for orders from GHQ. The pwanners noted dat attacking de Phiwippines and British Mawaya stiww had possibiwities of success, even in de worst case of a combined preemptive attack incwuding Soviet forces.
Japanese offensives, 1941–42
Fowwowing prowonged tensions between Japan and de Western powers, units of de Imperiaw Japanese Navy and Imperiaw Japanese Army waunched simuwtaneous surprise attacks on Austrawian, British, Dutch and US forces on 7 December (8 December in Asia/West Pacific time zones).
The wocations of dis first wave of Japanese attacks incwuded Hawaii, Mawaya, Sarawak, Guam, Wake Iswand, Hong Kong, and de Phiwippines. Japanese forces awso simuwtaneouswy invaded soudern and eastern Thaiwand and were resisted for severaw hours, before de Thai government signed an armistice and entered an awwiance wif Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah.
Attack on Pearw Harbor
In de earwy hours of 7 December (Hawaiian time), Japan waunched a major surprise carrier-based air strike on Pearw Harbor in Honowuwu widout expwicit warning, which crippwed de U.S. Pacific Fweet, weft eight American battweships out of action, destroyed 188 American aircraft, and caused de deads of 2,403 Americans. The Japanese had gambwed dat de United States, when faced wif such a sudden and massive bwow and woss of wife, wouwd agree to a negotiated settwement and awwow Japan free rein in Asia. This gambwe did not pay off. American wosses were wess serious dan initiawwy dought: de American aircraft carriers, which wouwd prove to be more important dan battweships, were at sea, and vitaw navaw infrastructure (fuew oiw tanks, shipyard faciwities, and a power station), submarine base, and signaws intewwigence units were unscaded, and de fact de bombing happened whiwe de US was not officiawwy at war anywhere in de worwd[i] caused a wave of outrage across de United States. Japan's fawwback strategy, rewying on a war of attrition to make de US come to terms, was beyond de IJN's capabiwities.
Before de attack on Pearw Harbor, de 800,000-member America First Committee vehementwy opposed any American intervention in de European confwict, even as America sowd miwitary aid to Britain and de Soviet Union drough de Lend-Lease program. Opposition to war in de US vanished after de attack. On 8 December, de United States, de United Kingdom, Canada, and de Nederwands decwared war on Japan, fowwowed by China and Austrawia de next day. Four days after Pearw Harbor, Germany and Itawy decwared war on de United States, drawing de country into a two-deater war. This is widewy agreed to be a grand strategic bwunder, as it abrogated bof de benefit Germany gained by Japan's distraction of de US and de reduction in aid to Britain, which bof Congress and Hitwer had managed to avoid during over a year of mutuaw provocation, which wouwd oderwise have resuwted.
Souf-East Asian campaigns of 1941–42
British, Austrawian, and Dutch forces, awready drained of personnew and matériew by two years of war wif Germany, and heaviwy committed in de Middwe East, Norf Africa, and ewsewhere, were unabwe to provide much more dan token resistance to de battwe-hardened Japanese. The Awwies suffered many disastrous defeats in de first six monds of de war. Two major British warships, HMS Repuwse and HMS Prince of Wawes, were sunk by a Japanese air attack off Mawaya on 10 December 1941.
Thaiwand, wif its territory awready serving as a springboard for de Mawayan Campaign, surrendered widin 5 hours of de Japanese invasion. The government of Thaiwand formawwy awwied wif Japan on 21 December. To de souf, de Imperiaw Japanese Army had seized de British cowony of Penang on 19 December, encountering wittwe resistance.
Hong Kong was attacked on 8 December and feww on 25 December 1941, wif Canadian forces and de Royaw Hong Kong Vowunteers pwaying an important part in de defense. American bases on Guam and Wake Iswand were wost at around de same time.
Fowwowing de Decwaration by United Nations (de first officiaw use of de term United Nations) on 1 January 1942, de Awwied governments appointed de British Generaw Sir Archibawd Waveww to de American-British-Dutch-Austrawian Command (ABDACOM), a supreme command for Awwied forces in Soudeast Asia. This gave Waveww nominaw controw of a huge force, awbeit dinwy spread over an area from Burma to de Phiwippines to nordern Austrawia. Oder areas, incwuding India, Hawaii, and de rest of Austrawia remained under separate wocaw commands. On 15 January, Waveww moved to Bandung in Java to assume controw of ABDACOM.
In January, Japan invaded British Burma, de Dutch East Indies, New Guinea, de Sowomon Iswands and captured Maniwa, Kuawa Lumpur and Rabauw. After being driven out of Mawaya, Awwied forces in Singapore attempted to resist de Japanese during de Battwe of Singapore, but were forced to surrender to de Japanese on 15 February 1942; about 130,000 Indian, British, Austrawian and Dutch personnew became prisoners of war. The pace of conqwest was rapid: Bawi and Timor awso feww in February. The rapid cowwapse of Awwied resistance weft de "ABDA area" spwit in two. Waveww resigned from ABDACOM on 25 February, handing controw of de ABDA Area to wocaw commanders and returning to de post of Commander-in-Chief, India.
Meanwhiwe, Japanese aircraft had aww but ewiminated Awwied air power in Soudeast Asia and were making attacks on nordern Austrawia, beginning wif a psychowogicawwy devastating but miwitariwy insignificant attack on de city of Darwin on 19 February, which kiwwed at weast 243 peopwe.
At de Battwe of de Java Sea in wate February and earwy March, de Imperiaw Japanese Navy (IJN) infwicted a resounding defeat on de main ABDA navaw force, under Admiraw Karew Doorman. The Dutch East Indies campaign subseqwentwy ended wif de surrender of Awwied forces on Java and Sumatra.
In March and Apriw, a powerfuw IJN carrier force waunched a raid into de Indian Ocean. British Royaw Navy bases in Ceywon were hit and de aircraft carrier HMS Hermes and oder Awwied ships were sunk. The attack forced de Royaw Navy to widdraw to de western part of de Indian Ocean, uh-hah-hah-hah. This paved de way for a Japanese assauwt on Burma and India.
In Burma, de British, under intense pressure, made a fighting retreat from Rangoon to de Indo-Burmese border. This cut de Burma Road, which was de western Awwies' suppwy wine to de Chinese Nationawists. In March 1942, de Chinese Expeditionary Force started to attack Japanese forces in nordern Burma. On 16 Apriw, 7,000 British sowdiers were encircwed by de Japanese 33rd Division during de Battwe of Yenangyaung and rescued by de Chinese 38f Division, wed by Sun Li-jen. Cooperation between de Chinese Nationawists and de Communists had waned from its zenif at de Battwe of Wuhan, and de rewationship between de two had gone sour as bof attempted to expand deir areas of operation in occupied territories. The Japanese expwoited dis wack of unity to press ahead in deir offensives.
On 8 December 1941, Japanese bombers struck American airfiewds on Luzon, uh-hah-hah-hah. They caught most of de pwanes on de ground, destroying 103 aircraft, more dan hawf of de US air strengf. Two days water, furder raids wed to de destruction of de Cavite Navaw Yard, souf of Maniwa. By 13 December, Japanese attacks had wrecked every major airfiewd and virtuawwy annihiwated American air power. During de previous monf before de start of hostiwities, a part of de US Asiatic Fweet had been sent to de soudern Phiwippines. However, wif wittwe air protection, de remaining surface vessews in de Phiwippines, especiawwy de warger ships, were sent to Java or to Austrawia. Wif deir position awso eqwawwy untenabwe, de remaining American bombers fwew to Austrawia in mid-December. The onwy forces dat remained to defend de Phiwippines were de ground troops, a few fighter aircraft, about 30 submarines, and a few smaww vessews.
On 10 December, Japanese forces began a series of smaww-scawe wandings on Luzon, uh-hah-hah-hah. The main wandings by de 14f Army took pwace at Lingayen Guwf on 22 December, wif de buwk of de 16f Infantry Division. Anoder warge second wanding took pwace two days water at Lamon Bay, souf of Maniwa, by de 48f infantry Division. As de Japanese troops converged on Maniwa, Generaw Dougwas MacArdur began executing pwans to make a finaw stand on de Bataan Peninsuwa and de Iswand of Corregidor in order to deny de use of Maniwa Bay to de Japanese. A series of widdrawaw actions brought his troops safewy into Bataan, whiwe de Japanese entered Maniwa unopposed on 2 January 1942. On 7 January, de Japanese attacked Bataan. After some initiaw success, dey were stawwed by disease and casuawties, but dey couwd be reinforced whiwe de Americans and Fiwipinos couwd not. On 11 March 1942, under orders from President Roosevewt, MacArdur weft Corregidor for Austrawia, and Lieutenant Generaw Jonadan M. Wainwright assumed command in de Phiwippines. The defenders on Bataan, running wow on ammunition and suppwies couwd not howd back a finaw Japanese offensive. Conseqwentwy, Bataan feww on 9 Apriw, wif de 76,000 American and Fiwipino prisoners of war being subjected to a gruewing 66-miwe (106-km) ordeaw dat came to be known as de Bataan Deaf March. On de night of 5–6 May, after an intensive aeriaw and artiwwery bombardment of Corregidor, de Japanese wanded on de iswand and Generaw Wainwright surrendered on 6 May. In de soudern Phiwippines, where key ports and airfiewds had awready been seized by de Japanese, de remaining American-Fiwipino forces surrendered on 9 May.
US and Fiwipino forces resisted in de Phiwippines untiw 9 May 1942, when more dan 80,000 sowdiers were ordered to surrender. By dis time, Generaw Dougwas MacArdur, who had been appointed Supreme Awwied Commander Souf West Pacific, had been widdrawn to Austrawia. The US Navy, under Admiraw Chester Nimitz, had responsibiwity for de rest of de Pacific Ocean, uh-hah-hah-hah. This divided command had unfortunate conseqwences for de commerce war, and conseqwentwy, de war itsewf.
Threat to Austrawia
In wate 1941, as de Japanese struck at Pearw Harbor, most of Austrawia's best forces were committed to de fight against Axis forces in de Mediterranean Theatre. Austrawia was iww-prepared for an attack, wacking armaments, modern fighter aircraft, heavy bombers, and aircraft carriers. Whiwe stiww cawwing for reinforcements from Churchiww, de Austrawian Prime Minister John Curtin cawwed for American support wif a historic announcement on 27 December 1941:
The Austrawian Government ... regards de Pacific struggwe as primariwy one in which de United States and Austrawia must have de fuwwest say in de direction of de democracies' fighting pwan, uh-hah-hah-hah. Widout inhibitions of any kind, I make it cwear dat Austrawia wooks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditionaw winks or kinship wif de United Kingdom.— Prime Minister John Curtin
Austrawia had been shocked by de speedy and crushing cowwapse of British Mawaya and de Faww of Singapore in which around 15,000 Austrawian sowdiers were captured and became prisoners of war. Curtin predicted de "battwe for Austrawia" wouwd soon fowwow. The Japanese estabwished a major base in de Austrawian Territory of New Guinea beginning wif de capture of Rabauw on 23 January 1942. On 19 February 1942, Darwin suffered a devastating air raid, de first time de Austrawian mainwand had been attacked. Over de fowwowing 19 monds, Austrawia was attacked from de air awmost 100 times.
Two battwe-hardened Austrawian divisions were moving from de Middwe East for Singapore. Churchiww wanted dem diverted to Burma, but Curtin insisted on a return to Austrawia. In earwy 1942 ewements of de Imperiaw Japanese Navy proposed an invasion of Austrawia. The Imperiaw Japanese Army opposed de pwan and it was rejected in favour of a powicy of isowating Austrawia from de United States via bwockade by advancing drough de Souf Pacific. The Japanese decided upon a seaborne invasion of Port Moresby, capitaw of de Austrawian Territory of Papua which wouwd put aww of Nordern Austrawia widin range of Japanese bomber aircraft.
President Frankwin Roosevewt ordered Generaw Dougwas MacArdur in de Phiwippines to formuwate a Pacific defence pwan wif Austrawia in March 1942. Curtin agreed to pwace Austrawian forces under de command of MacArdur, who became Supreme Commander, Souf West Pacific. MacArdur moved his headqwarters to Mewbourne in March 1942 and American troops began massing in Austrawia. Enemy navaw activity reached Sydney in wate May 1942, when Japanese midget submarines waunched a raid on Sydney Harbour. On 8 June 1942, two Japanese submarines briefwy shewwed Sydney's eastern suburbs and de city of Newcastwe.
Awwies re-group, 1942–43
In earwy 1942, de governments of smawwer powers began to push for an inter-governmentaw Asia-Pacific war counciw, based in Washington, DC. A counciw was estabwished in London, wif a subsidiary body in Washington, uh-hah-hah-hah. However, de smawwer powers continued to push for an American-based body. The Pacific War Counciw was formed in Washington, on 1 Apriw 1942, wif President Frankwin D. Roosevewt, his key advisor Harry Hopkins, and representatives from Britain, China, Austrawia, de Nederwands, New Zeawand, and Canada. Representatives from India and de Phiwippines were water added. The counciw never had any direct operationaw controw, and any decisions it made were referred to de US-UK Combined Chiefs of Staff, which was awso in Washington, uh-hah-hah-hah. Awwied resistance, at first symbowic, graduawwy began to stiffen, uh-hah-hah-hah. Austrawian and Dutch forces wed civiwians in a prowonged gueriwwa campaign in Portuguese Timor.
Japanese strategy and de Doowittwe Raid
Having accompwished deir objectives during de First Operation Phase wif ease, de Japanese now turned to de second. The Second Operationaw Phase was pwanned to expand Japan's strategic depf by adding eastern New Guinea, New Britain, de Aweutians, Midway, de Fiji Iswands, Samoa, and strategic points in de Austrawian area. However, de Navaw Generaw Staff, de Combined Fweet, and de Imperiaw Army, aww had different strategies for de next seqwence of operations. The Navaw Generaw Staff advocated an advance to de souf to seize parts of Austrawia. However, wif warge numbers of troops stiww engaged in China combined wif dose stationed in Manchuria in a standoff wif de Soviet Union, de Imperiaw Japanese Army decwined to contribute de forces necessary for such an operation; dis qwickwy wed to de abandonment of de concept. The Navaw Generaw Staff stiww wanted to cut de sea winks between Austrawia and de United States by capturing New Cawedonia, Fiji, and Samoa. Because dis reqwired far fewer troops, on 13 March de Navaw Generaw Staff and de Army agreed to operations wif de goaw of capturing Fiji and Samoa. The Second Operationaw Phase began weww when Lae and Sawamaua, wocated in eastern New Guinea, were captured on 8 March. However, on 10 March, American carrier aircraft attacked de invasion forces and infwicted considerabwe wosses. The raid had major operationaw impwications because it forced de Japanese to stop deir advance in de Souf Pacific, untiw de Combined Fweet provided de means to protect future operations from American carrier attack. Concurrentwy, de Doowittwe Raid occurred in Apriw 1942, where 16 bombers took off from de aircraft carrier USS Hornet, 600 miwes (970 km) from Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. The raid infwicted minimaw materiaw damage on Japanese soiw but was a huge morawe boost for de United States; it awso had major psychowogicaw repercussions in Japan, in exposing de vuwnerabiwities of de Japanese homewand. Because de raid was mounted by a carrier task force, it conseqwentwy highwighted de dangers de Japanese home iswands couwd face untiw de destruction of de American carrier forces was achieved. Wif onwy Marcus Iswand and a wine of converted trawwers patrowwing de vast waters dat separate Wake and Kamchatka, de Japanese east coast was weft open to attack.
Admiraw Yamamoto now perceived dat it was essentiaw to compwete de destruction of de United States Navy, which had begun at Pearw Harbor. He proposed to achieve dis by attacking and occupying Midway Atoww, an objective he dought de Americans wouwd be certain to fight for, as Midway was cwose enough to dreaten Hawaii. During a series of meetings hewd from 2–5 Apriw, de Navaw Generaw Staff and representatives of de Combined Fweet reached a compromise. Yamamoto got his Midway operation, but onwy after he had dreatened to resign, uh-hah-hah-hah. In return, however, Yamamoto had to agree to two demands from de Navaw Generaw Staff, bof of which had impwications for de Midway operation, uh-hah-hah-hah. In order to cover de offensive in de Souf Pacific, Yamamoto agreed to awwocate one carrier division to de operation against Port Moresby. Yamamoto awso agreed to incwude an attack to seize strategic points in de Aweutian Iswands simuwtaneouswy wif de Midway operation, uh-hah-hah-hah. These were enough to remove de Japanese margin of superiority in de coming Midway attack.
The attack on Port Moresby was codenamed MO Operation and was divided into severaw parts or phases. In de first, Tuwagi wouwd be occupied on 3 May, de carriers wouwd den conduct a wide sweep drough de Coraw Sea to find and destroy Awwied navaw forces, wif de wandings conducted to capture Port Moresby scheduwed for 10 May. The MO Operation featured a force of 60 ships wed by two carriers: Shōkaku and Zuikaku, one wight carrier (Shōhō), six heavy cruisers, dree wight cruisers, and 15 destroyers. Additionawwy, some 250 aircraft were assigned to de operation incwuding 140 aboard de dree carriers. However, de actuaw battwe did not go according to pwan; awdough Tuwagi was seized on 3 May, de fowwowing day, aircraft from de American carrier Yorktown struck de invasion force. The ewement of surprise, which had been present at Pearw Harbor, was now wost due to de success of Awwied codebreakers who had discovered de attack wouwd be against Port Moresby. From de Awwied point of view, if Port Moresby feww, de Japanese wouwd controw de seas to de norf and west of Austrawia and couwd isowate de country. An Awwied task force under de command of Admiraw Frank Fwetcher, wif de carriers USS Lexington and USS Yorktown, was assembwed to stop de Japanese advance. For de next two days, de American and Japanese carrier forces tried unsuccessfuwwy to wocate each oder. On 7 May, de Japanese carriers waunched a fuww strike on a contact reported to be enemy carriers, but de report turned out to be fawse. The strike force found and struck onwy an oiwer, de Neosho, and de destroyer Sims. The American carriers awso waunched a strike wif incompwete reconnaissance, and instead of finding de main Japanese carrier force, dey onwy wocated and sank Shōhō. On 8 May, de opposing carrier forces finawwy found each oder and exchanged air strikes. The 69 aircraft from de two Japanese carriers succeeded in sinking de carrier Lexington and damaging Yorktown. In return de Americans damaged Shōkaku. Awdough Zuikaku was weft undamaged, aircraft and personnew wosses to Zuikaku were heavy and de Japanese were unabwe to support a wanding on Port Moresby. As a resuwt, de MO Operation was cancewwed, and de Japanese were subseqwentwy forced to abandon deir attempts to isowate Austrawia. Awdough dey managed to sink a carrier, de battwe was a disaster for de Japanese. Not onwy was de attack on Port Moresby hawted, which constituted de first strategic Japanese setback of de war, but aww dree carriers dat were committed to de battwe wouwd now be unavaiwabwe for de operation against Midway. The Battwe of de Coraw Sea was de first navaw battwe fought in which de ships invowved never sighted each oder, wif attacks sowewy by aircraft.
After Coraw Sea, de Japanese had four fweet carriers operationaw—Sōryū, Kaga, Akagi and Hiryū—and bewieved dat de Americans had a maximum of two—Enterprise and Hornet. Saratoga was out of action, undergoing repair after a torpedo attack, whiwe Yorktown had been damaged at Coraw Sea and was bewieved by Japanese navaw intewwigence to have been sunk. She wouwd, in fact, sortie for Midway after just dree days of repairs to her fwight deck, wif civiwian work crews stiww aboard, in time to be present for de next decisive engagement.
Admiraw Yamamoto viewed de operation against Midway as de potentiawwy decisive battwe of de war which couwd wead to de destruction of American strategic power in de Pacific, and subseqwentwy open de door for a negotiated peace settwement wif de United States, favorabwe to Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. For de operation, de Japanese had onwy four carriers; Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū and Hiryū. Through strategic and tacticaw surprise, de Japanese wouwd knock out Midway's air strengf and soften it for a wanding by 5,000 troops. After de qwick capture of de iswand, de Combined Fweet wouwd way de basis for de most important part of de operation, uh-hah-hah-hah. Yamamoto hoped dat de attack wouwd wure de Americans into a trap. Midway was to be bait for de USN which wouwd depart Pearw Harbor to counterattack after Midway had been captured. When de Americans arrived, he wouwd concentrate his scattered forces to defeat dem. An important aspect of de scheme was Operation AL, which was de pwan to seize two iswands in de Aweutians, concurrentwy wif de attack on Midway. Contradictory to persistent myf, de Aweutian operation was not a diversion to draw American forces from Midway, as de Japanese wanted de Americans to be drawn to Midway, rader dan away from it. However, in May, Awwied codebreakers discovered de pwanned attack on Midway. Yamamoto's compwex pwan had no provision for intervention by de American fweet before de Japanese had expected dem. Pwanned surveiwwance of de American fweet in Pearw Harbor by wong-ranged seapwanes did not occur as a resuwt of an abortive identicaw operation in March. Japanese submarine scouting wines dat were supposed to be in pwace awong de Hawaiian Iswands were not compweted on time, conseqwentwy de Japanese were unabwe to detect de American carriers. In one search area Japanese submarines had arrived on station onwy a matter of hours ahead of Task Force 17, containing Yorktown, which had passed drough just before midnight on 31 May.
The battwe began on 3 June, when American aircraft from Midway spotted and attacked de Japanese transport group 700 miwes (1,100 km) west of de atoww. On 4 June, de Japanese waunched a 108-aircraft strike on de iswand, de attackers brushing aside Midway's defending fighters but faiwing to dewiver a decisive bwow to de iswand's faciwities. Most importantwy, de strike aircraft based on Midway had awready departed to attack de Japanese carriers, which had been spotted. This information was passed to de dree American carriers and a totaw of 116 carrier aircraft, in addition to dose from Midway, were on deir way to attack de Japanese. The aircraft from Midway attacked, but faiwed to score a singwe hit on de Japanese. In de middwe of dese uncoordinated attacks, a Japanese scout aircraft reported de presence of an American task force, but it was not untiw water dat de presence of an American carrier was confirmed. Vice Admiraw Chuichi Nagumo was put in a difficuwt tacticaw situation in which he had to counter continuous American air attacks and prepare to recover his Midway strike pwanes, whiwe deciding wheder to mount an immediate strike on de American carrier or wait to prepare a proper attack. After qwick dewiberation, he opted for a dewayed but better-prepared attack on de American task force after recovering his Midway strike and properwy arming aircraft. However, beginning at 10.22am, American SBD Dauntwess dive bombers surprised and successfuwwy attacked dree of de Japanese carriers. Wif deir decks waden wif fuwwy fuewed and armed aircraft, Sōryū, Kaga, and Akagi were turned into bwazing wrecks. A singwe Japanese carrier, Hiryū, remained operationaw, and waunched an immediate counterattack. Bof of her attacks hit Yorktown and put her out of action, uh-hah-hah-hah. Later in de afternoon, aircraft from de two remaining American carriers found and destroyed Hiryū. The crippwed Yorktown, awong wif de destroyer Hammann, were bof sunk by de Japanese submarine I-168. Wif de striking power of de Kido Butai having been destroyed, Japan's offensive power was bwunted. Earwy on de morning of 5 June, wif de battwe wost, de Japanese cancewwed de Midway operation and de initiative in de Pacific was in de bawance. Parshaww and Tuwwy noted dat awdough de Japanese wost four carriers, wosses at Midway did not radicawwy degrade de fighting capabiwities of de IJN aviation as a whowe.
New Guinea and de Sowomons
Japanese wand forces continued to advance in de Sowomon Iswands and New Guinea. From Juwy 1942, a few Austrawian reserve battawions, many of dem very young and untrained, fought a stubborn rearguard action in New Guinea, against a Japanese advance awong de Kokoda Track, towards Port Moresby, over de rugged Owen Stanwey Ranges. The miwitia, worn out and severewy depweted by casuawties, were rewieved in wate August by reguwar troops from de Second Austrawian Imperiaw Force, returning from action in de Mediterranean deater. In earwy September 1942 Japanese marines attacked a strategic Royaw Austrawian Air Force base at Miwne Bay, near de eastern tip of New Guinea. They were beaten back by Awwied forces (primariwy Austrawian Army infantry battawions and Royaw Austrawian Air Force sqwadrons, wif United States Army engineers and an anti-aircraft battery in support), de first defeat of de war for Japanese forces on wand.
On New Guinea, de Japanese on de Kokoda Track were widin sight of de wights of Port Moresby but were ordered to retreat to de nordeastern coast. Austrawian and US forces attacked deir fortified positions and after more dan two monds of fighting in de Buna–Gona area finawwy captured de key Japanese beachhead in earwy 1943.
At de same time as major battwes raged in New Guinea, Awwied forces became aware of a Japanese airfiewd under construction at Guadawcanaw drough coastwatchers. On 7 August, US Marines wanded on de iswands of Guadawcanaw and Tuwagi in de Sowomons. Vice Admiraw Gunichi Mikawa, commander of de newwy formed Eighf Fweet at Rabauw, reacted qwickwy. Gadering five heavy cruisers, two wight cruisers, and a destroyer, he saiwed to engage de Awwied force off de coast of Guadawcanaw. On de night of 8–9 August, Mikawa's qwick response resuwted in de Battwe of Savo Iswand, a briwwiant Japanese victory during which four Awwied heavy cruisers were sunk, whiwe no Japanese ships were wost. It was one of de worst Awwied navaw defeats of de war. The victory was mitigated onwy by de faiwure of de Japanese to attack de vuwnerabwe transports. Had it been done so, de first American counterattack in de Pacific couwd have been stopped. The Japanese originawwy perceived de American wandings as noding more dan a reconnaissance in force.
Wif Japanese and Awwied forces occupying various parts of de iswand, over de fowwowing six monds bof sides poured resources into an escawating battwe of attrition on wand, at sea, and in de sky. US air cover based at Henderson Fiewd ensured American controw of de waters around Guadawcanaw during day time, whiwe superior night-fighting capabiwities of de Imperiaw Japanese Navy gave de Japanese de upper hand at night. In August, Japanese and US carrier forces engaged in an indecisive cwash known as de Battwe of de Eastern Sowomons. In October, US cruiser and destroyer forces successfuwwy chawwenged de Japanese in night-time fighting during de Battwe of Cape Esperance, sinking one Japanese cruiser and one destroyer for de woss of one destroyer. During de night of 13 October, two Japanese fast battweships Kongo and Haruna bombarded Henderson Fiewd. The airfiewd was temporariwy disabwed but qwickwy returned to service. On 26 October, Japanese carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku sank USS Hornet (CV-8) and heaviwy damaged USS Enterprise (CV-6) in de Battwe of de Santa Cruz Iswands. The woss of Hornet, coupwed wif de earwier woss of USS Wasp (CV-7) to de IJN submarine I-19 in September, meant dat US carrier strengf in de region was reduced to a singwe ship, Enterprise. However, de two IJN carriers had suffered severe wosses in aircraft and piwots as weww and had to retire to home waters for repair and repwenishment. From 12 November to 15 November, Japanese and American surface ships engaged in fierce night actions in de Navaw Battwe of Guadawcanaw, one of de onwy two battwes in de Pacific War during which battweships fought each oder, dat saw two US admiraws kiwwed in action and two Japanese battweships sunk.
During de campaign, most of de Japanese aircraft based in de Souf Pacific were redepwoyed to de defense of Guadawcanaw. Many were wost in numerous engagements wif de Awwied air forces based at Henderson Fiewd as weww as carrier-based aircraft. Meanwhiwe, Japanese ground forces waunched repeated attacks on heaviwy defended US positions around Henderson Fiewd, in which dey suffered appawwing casuawties. To sustain dese offensives, resuppwy was carried out by Japanese convoys, termed de "Tokyo Express" by de Awwies. The convoys often faced night battwes wif enemy navaw forces in which dey expended destroyers dat de IJN couwd iww-afford to wose. Fweet battwes invowving heavier ships and even daytime carrier battwes resuwted in a stretch of water near Guadawcanaw becoming known as "Ironbottom Sound" from de muwtitude of ships sunk on bof sides. However, de Awwies were much better abwe to repwace dese wosses. Finawwy recognizing dat de campaign to recapture Henderson Fiewd and secure Guadawcanaw had simpwy become too costwy to continue, de Japanese evacuated de iswand and widdrew in February 1943. In de six-monf war of attrition, de Japanese had wost as a resuwt of faiwing to commit enough forces in sufficient time.
By wate 1942, Japanese headqwarters had decided to make Guadawcanaw deir priority. Ironicawwy, de Americans, most notabwy, U.S. Navy admiraw John S. McCain Sr., hoped to use deir numericaw advantage at Guadawcanaw to defeat warge numbers of Japanese forces dere and progressivewy drain Japanese man-power. Uwtimatewy nearwy 20,000 Japanese died on Guadawcanaw compared to just over 7,000 Americans.
Stawemate in China and Soudeast Asia
In mainwand China, de Japanese 3rd, 6f, and 40f Divisions, a grand totaw of around 120,000 troops, massed at Yueyang and advanced soudward in dree cowumns, attempting again to cross de Miwuo River to reach Changsha. In January 1942, Chinese forces scored a victory at Changsha, de first Awwied success against Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah.
After de Doowittwe Raid, de Imperiaw Japanese Army conducted de Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign, wif de goaw of searching out de surviving American airmen, appwying retribution on de Chinese who aided dem, and destroying air bases. This operation started on 15 May 1942 wif 40 infantry and 15–16 artiwwery battawions, but was repewwed by Chinese forces in September. During dis campaign, de Imperiaw Japanese Army weft behind a traiw of devastation and awso engaged in biowogicaw warfare, spreading chowera, typhoid, pwague and dysentery padogens. Chinese estimates put de deaf toww at 250,000 civiwians. Around 1,700 Japanese troops died, out of a totaw 10,000 who feww iww when Japanese biowogicaw weapons infected deir own forces.
On 2 November 1943, Isamu Yokoyama, commander of de Imperiaw Japanese 11f Army, depwoyed de 39f, 58f, 13f, 3rd, 116f and 68f Divisions, a totaw of around 100,000 troops, to attack Changde. During de seven-week Battwe of Changde, de Chinese forced Japan to fight a costwy campaign of attrition, uh-hah-hah-hah. Awdough de Imperiaw Japanese Army initiawwy successfuwwy captured de city, de Chinese 57f Division was abwe to pin dem down wong enough for reinforcements to arrive and encircwe de Japanese. The Chinese den cut Japanese suppwy wines, provoking a retreat and Chinese pursuit. During de battwe, Japan used chemicaw weapons.
In de aftermaf of de Japanese conqwest of Burma, dere was widespread disorder and pro-Independence agitation in eastern India and a disastrous famine in Bengaw, which uwtimatewy caused up to 3 miwwion deads. In spite of dese, and inadeqwate wines of communication, British and Indian forces attempted wimited counter-attacks in Burma in earwy 1943. An offensive in Arakan faiwed, ignominiouswy in de view of some senior officers, whiwe a wong distance raid mounted by de Chindits under Brigadier Orde Wingate suffered heavy wosses, but was pubwicized to bowster Awwied morawe. It awso provoked de Japanese to mount major offensives demsewves de fowwowing year.
In August 1943 de Awwies formed a new Souf East Asia Command (SEAC) to take over strategic responsibiwities for Burma and India from de British India Command, under Waveww. In October 1943 Winston Churchiww appointed Admiraw Lord Louis Mountbatten as its Supreme Commander. The British and Indian Fourteenf Army was formed to face de Japanese in Burma. Under Lieutenant Generaw Wiwwiam Swim, its training, morawe and heawf greatwy improved. The American Generaw Joseph Stiwweww, who awso was deputy commander to Mountbatten and commanded US forces in de China Burma India Theater, directed aid to China and prepared to construct de Ledo Road to wink India and China by wand. In 1943, de Thai Phayap Army invasion headed to Xishuangbanna at China, but were driven back by de Chinese Expeditionary Force.
Awwied offensives, 1943–44
Midway proved to be de wast great navaw battwe for two years. The United States used de ensuing period to turn its vast industriaw potentiaw into increased numbers of ships, pwanes, and trained aircrew. At de same time, Japan, wacking an adeqwate industriaw base or technowogicaw strategy, a good aircrew training program, or adeqwate navaw resources and commerce defense, feww furder and furder behind. In strategic terms de Awwies began a wong movement across de Pacific, seizing one iswand base after anoder. Not every Japanese stronghowd had to be captured; some, wike Truk, Rabauw, and Formosa, were neutrawized by air attack and bypassed. The goaw was to get cwose to Japan itsewf, den waunch massive strategic air attacks, improve de submarine bwockade, and finawwy (onwy if necessary) execute an invasion, uh-hah-hah-hah.
The US Navy did not seek out de Japanese fweet for a decisive battwe, as Mahanian doctrine wouwd suggest (and as Japan hoped); de Awwied advance couwd onwy be stopped by a Japanese navaw attack, which oiw shortages (induced by submarine attack) made impossibwe.
Awwied offensives on New Guinea and up de Sowomons
In de Souf Western Pacific de Awwies now seized de strategic initiative for de first time during de War and in June 1943, waunched Operation Cartwheew, a series of amphibious invasions to recapture de Sowomon Iswands and New Guinea and uwtimatewy isowate de major Japanese forward base at Rabauw. Fowwowing de Japanese Invasion of Sawamaua–Lae in March, 1943, Cartwheew began wif de Sawamaua–Lae campaign in Nordern New Guinea in Apriw, 1943, which was fowwowed in June to October by de New Georgia campaign, in which de Awwies used de Landings on Rendova, Drive on Munda Point and Battwe of Munda Point to secure a secretwy constructed Japanese airfiewd at Munda and de rest of New Georgia Iswands group. Landings from September untiw December secured de Treasury Iswands and wanded Awwied troops on Choiseuw, Bougainviwwe and Cape Gwoucester.
These wandings prepared de way for Nimitz's iswand-hopping campaign towards Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah.
Invasion of de Giwbert and Marshaww Iswands
In November 1943 US Marines sustained high casuawties when dey overwhewmed de 4,500-strong garrison at Tarawa. This hewped de Awwies to improve de techniqwes of amphibious wandings, wearning from deir mistakes and impwementing changes such as dorough pre-emptive bombings and bombardment, more carefuw pwanning regarding tides and wanding craft scheduwes, and better overaww coordination, uh-hah-hah-hah. Operations on de Giwberts were fowwowed in wate-January and mid-February 1944 by furder, wess costwy, wandings on de Marshaww Iswands.
On 22 November 1943 US President Frankwin D. Roosevewt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchiww, and ROC Generawissimo Chiang Kai-shek, met in Cairo, Egypt, to discuss a strategy to defeat Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. The meeting was awso known as de Cairo Conference and concwuded wif de Cairo Decwaration.
US submarines, as weww as some British and Dutch vessews, operating from bases at Cavite in de Phiwippines (1941–42); Fremantwe and Brisbane, Austrawia; Pearw Harbor; Trincomawee, Ceywon; Midway; and water Guam, pwayed a major rowe in defeating Japan, even dough submarines made up a smaww proportion of de Awwied navies—wess dan two percent in de case of de US Navy. Submarines strangwed Japan by sinking its merchant fweet, intercepting many troop transports, and cutting off nearwy aww de oiw imports essentiaw to weapons production and miwitary operations. By earwy 1945, Japanese oiw suppwies were so wimited dat its fweet was virtuawwy stranded.
The Japanese miwitary cwaimed its defenses sank 468 Awwied submarines during de war. In reawity, onwy 42 American submarines were sunk in de Pacific due to hostiwe action, wif 10 oders wost in accidents or as de resuwt of friendwy fire. The Dutch wost five submarines due to Japanese attack or minefiewds, and de British wost dree.
American submarines accounted for 56% of de Japanese merchantmen sunk; mines or aircraft destroyed most of de rest. American submariners awso cwaimed 28% of Japanese warships destroyed. Furdermore, dey pwayed important reconnaissance rowes, as at de battwes of de Phiwippine Sea (June 1944) and Leyte Guwf (October 1944) (and, coincidentawwy,[cwarification needed] at Midway in June 1942), when dey gave accurate and timewy warning of de approach of de Japanese fweet. Submarines awso rescued hundreds of downed fwiers, incwuding future US president George H. W. Bush.
Awwied submarines did not adopt a defensive posture and wait for de enemy to attack. Widin hours of de Pearw Harbor attack, in retribution against Japan, Roosevewt promuwgated a new doctrine: unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. This meant sinking any warship, commerciaw vessew, or passenger ship in Axis-controwwed waters, widout warning and widout aiding survivors.[j] At de outbreak of de war in de Pacific, de Dutch admiraw in charge of de navaw defense of de East Indies, Conrad Hewfrich, gave instructions to wage war aggressivewy. His smaww force of submarines sank more Japanese ships in de first weeks of de war dan de entire British and US navies togeder, an expwoit which earned him de nickname "Ship-a-day Hewfrich".
Whiwe Japan had a warge number of submarines, dey did not make a significant impact on de war. In 1942, de Japanese fweet submarines performed weww, knocking out or damaging many Awwied warships. However, Imperiaw Japanese Navy (and pre-war US) doctrine stipuwated dat onwy fweet battwes, not guerre de course (commerce raiding) couwd win navaw campaigns. So, whiwe de US had an unusuawwy wong suppwy wine between its west coast and frontwine areas, weaving it vuwnerabwe to submarine attack, Japan used its submarines primariwy for wong-range reconnaissance and onwy occasionawwy attacked US suppwy wines. The Japanese submarine offensive against Austrawia in 1942 and 1943 awso achieved wittwe.
As de war turned against Japan, IJN submarines increasingwy served to resuppwy stronghowds which had been cut off, such as Truk and Rabauw. In addition, Japan honored its neutrawity treaty wif de Soviet Union and ignored American freighters shipping miwwions of tons of miwitary suppwies from San Francisco to Vwadivostok, much to de consternation of its German awwy.
The US Navy, by contrast, rewied on commerce raiding from de outset. However, de probwem of Awwied forces surrounded in de Phiwippines, during de earwy part of 1942, wed to diversion of boats to "guerriwwa submarine" missions. Basing in Austrawia pwaced boats under Japanese aeriaw dreat whiwe en route to patrow areas, reducing deir effectiveness, and Nimitz rewied on submarines for cwose surveiwwance of enemy bases. Furdermore, de standard-issue Mark 14 torpedo and its Mark VI expwoder bof proved defective, probwems which were not corrected untiw September 1943. Worst of aww, before de war, an uninformed US Customs officer had seized a copy of de Japanese merchant marine code (cawwed de "maru code" in de USN), not knowing dat de Office of Navaw Intewwigence (ONI) had broken it. The Japanese promptwy changed it, and de new code was not broken again by OP-20-G untiw 1943.
Thus, onwy in 1944 did de US Navy begin to use its 150 submarines to maximum effect: instawwing effective shipboard radar, repwacing commanders deemed wacking in aggression, and fixing de fauwts in de torpedoes. Japanese commerce protection was "shiftwess beyond description,"[k] and convoys were poorwy organized and defended compared to Awwied ones, a product of fwawed IJN doctrine and training – errors conceawed by American fauwts as much as Japanese overconfidence. The number of American submarines patrows (and sinkings) rose steepwy: 350 patrows (180 ships sunk) in 1942, 350 (335) in 1943, and 520 (603) in 1944. By 1945, sinkings of Japanese vessews had decreased because so few targets dared to venture out on de high seas. In aww, Awwied submarines destroyed 1,200 merchant ships – about five miwwion tons of shipping. Most were smaww cargo carriers, but 124 were tankers bringing desperatewy needed oiw from de East Indies. Anoder 320 were passenger ships and troop transports. At criticaw stages of de Guadawcanaw, Saipan, and Leyte campaigns, dousands of Japanese troops were kiwwed or diverted from where dey were needed. Over 200 warships were sunk, ranging from many auxiwiaries and destroyers to one battweship and no fewer dan eight carriers.
Underwater warfare was especiawwy dangerous; of de 16,000 Americans who went out on patrow, 3,500 (22%) never returned, de highest casuawty rate of any American force in Worwd War II. The Joint Army–Navy Assessment Committee assessed US submarine credits.[fuww citation needed] The Japanese wosses, 130 submarines in aww, were higher.
Japanese counteroffensives in China, 1944
In mid-1944 Japan mobiwized over 500,000 men and waunched a massive operation across China under de code name Operation Ichi-Go, deir wargest offensive of Worwd War II, wif de goaw of connecting Japanese-controwwed territory in China and French Indochina and capturing airbases in soudeastern China where American bombers were based. During dis time, about 250,000 newwy American-trained Chinese troops under Joseph Stiwweww and Chinese expeditionary force were forcibwy wocked in de Burmese deater by de terms of de Lend-Lease Agreement. Though Japan suffered about 100,000 casuawties, dese attacks, de biggest in severaw years, gained much ground for Japan before Chinese forces stopped de incursions in Guangxi. Despite major tacticaw victories, de operation overaww faiwed to provide Japan wif any significant strategic gains. A great majority of de Chinese forces were abwe to retreat out of de area, and water come back to attack Japanese positions at de Battwe of West Hunan. Japan was not any cwoser to defeating China after dis operation, and de constant defeats de Japanese suffered in de Pacific meant dat Japan never got de time and resources needed to achieve finaw victory over China. Operation Ichi-go created a great sense of sociaw confusion in de areas of China dat it affected. Chinese Communist guerriwwas were abwe to expwoit dis confusion to gain infwuence and controw of greater areas of de countryside in de aftermaf of Ichi-go.
Japanese offensive in India, 1944
After de Awwied setbacks in 1943, de Souf East Asia command prepared to waunch offensives into Burma on severaw fronts. In de first monds of 1944, de Chinese and American troops of de Nordern Combat Area Command (NCAC), commanded by de American Joseph Stiwweww, began extending de Ledo Road from India into nordern Burma, whiwe de XV Corps began an advance awong de coast in Arakan Province. In February 1944 de Japanese mounted a wocaw counter-attack in Arakan, uh-hah-hah-hah. After earwy Japanese success, dis counter-attack was defeated when de Indian divisions of XV Corps stood firm, rewying on aircraft to drop suppwies to isowated forward units untiw reserve divisions couwd rewieve dem.
The Japanese responded to de Awwied attacks by waunching an offensive of deir own into India in de middwe of March, across de mountainous and densewy forested frontier. This attack, codenamed Operation U-Go, was advocated by Lieutenant Generaw Renya Mutaguchi, de recentwy promoted commander of de Japanese Fifteenf Army; Imperiaw Generaw Headqwarters permitted it to proceed, despite misgivings at severaw intervening headqwarters. Awdough severaw units of de British Fourteenf Army had to fight deir way out of encircwement, by earwy Apriw dey had concentrated around Imphaw in Manipur state. A Japanese division which had advanced to Kohima in Nagawand cut de main road to Imphaw, but faiwed to capture de whowe of de defences at Kohima. During Apriw, de Japanese attacks against Imphaw faiwed, whiwe fresh Awwied formations drove de Japanese from de positions dey had captured at Kohima.
As many Japanese had feared, Japan's suppwy arrangements couwd not maintain her forces. Once Mutaguchi's hopes for an earwy victory were dwarted, his troops, particuwarwy dose at Kohima, starved. During May, whiwe Mutaguchi continued to order attacks, de Awwies advanced soudwards from Kohima and nordwards from Imphaw. The two Awwied attacks met on 22 June, breaking de Japanese siege of Imphaw. The Japanese finawwy broke off de operation on 3 Juwy. They had wost over 50,000 troops, mainwy to starvation and disease. This represented de worst defeat suffered by de Imperiaw Japanese Army to dat date.
Awdough de advance in Arakan had been hawted to rewease troops and aircraft for de Battwe of Imphaw, de Americans and Chinese had continued to advance in nordern Burma, aided by de Chindits operating against de Japanese wines of communication, uh-hah-hah-hah. In de middwe of 1944 de Chinese Expeditionary Force invaded nordern Burma from Yunnan. They captured a fortified position at Mount Song. By de time campaigning ceased during de monsoon rains, de NCAC had secured a vitaw airfiewd at Myitkyina (August 1944), which eased de probwems of air resuppwy from India to China over "The Hump".
Beginning of de end in de Pacific, 1944
In May 1943, de Japanese prepared Operation Z or de Z Pwan, which envisioned de use of Japanese navaw power to counter American forces dreatening de outer defense perimeter wine. This wine extended from de Aweutians down drough Wake, de Marshaww and Giwbert Iswands, Nauru, de Bismarck Archipewago, New Guinea, den westward past Java and Sumatra to Burma. In 1943–44, Awwied forces in de Sowomons began driving rewentwesswy to Rabauw, eventuawwy encircwing and neutrawizing de stronghowd. Wif deir position in de Sowomons disintegrating, de Japanese modified de Z Pwan by ewiminating de Giwbert and Marshaww Iswands, and de Bismarck Archipewago as vitaw areas to be defended. They den based deir possibwe actions on de defense of an inner perimeter, which incwuded de Marianas, Pawau, Western New Guinea, and de Dutch East Indies. Meanwhiwe, in de Centraw Pacific de Americans initiated a major offensive, beginning in November 1943 wif wandings in de Giwbert Iswands. The Japanese were forced to watch hewpwesswy as deir garrisons in de Giwberts and den de Marshawws were crushed. The strategy of howding overextended iswand garrisons was fuwwy exposed.
In February 1944, de US Navy's fast carrier task force, during Operation Haiwstone, attacked de major navaw base of Truk. Awdough de Japanese had moved deir major vessews out in time to avoid being caught at anchor in de atoww, two days of air attacks resuwted in significant wosses to Japanese aircraft and merchant shipping. The Japanese were forced to abandon Truk and were now unabwe to counter de Americans on any front on de perimeter. Conseqwentwy, de Japanese retained deir remaining strengf in preparation for what dey hoped wouwd be a decisive battwe. The Japanese den devewoped a new pwan, known as A-GO. A-GO envisioned a decisive fweet action dat wouwd be fought somewhere from de Pawaus to de Western Carowines. It was in dis area dat de newwy formed Mobiwe Fweet awong wif warge numbers of wand-based aircraft, wouwd be concentrated. If de Americans attacked de Marianas, dey wouwd be attacked by wand-based pwanes in de vicinity. Then de Americans wouwd be wured into de areas where de Mobiwe Fweet couwd defeat dem.
Marianas and Pawaus
On 12 March 1944, de Joint Chiefs of Staff directed de occupation of de Nordern Marianas, specificawwy de iswands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam. A target date was set for 15 June. Aww forces for de Marianas operation were to be commanded by Admiraw Raymond A. Spruance. The forces assigned to his command consisted of 535 warships and auxiwiaries togeder wif a ground force of dree and a hawf Marine divisions and one reinforced Army division, a totaw of more dan 127,500 troops. For de Americans, de Marianas operation wouwd provide de fowwowing benefits: de interruption of de Japanese air pipewine to de souf; de devewopment of advanced navaw bases for submarine and surface operations; de estabwishment of airfiewds to base B-29s from which to bomb de Japanese Home Iswands; de choice among severaw possibwe objectives for de next phase of operations, which wouwd keep de Japanese uncertain of American intentions. It was awso hoped dat dis penetration of de Japanese inner defense zone, which was a wittwe more dan 1,250 miwes (2,010 km) from Tokyo, might force de Japanese fweet out for a decisive engagement. The abiwity to pwan and execute such a compwex operation in de space of 90 days was indicative of Awwied wogisticaw superiority.
On 15 June, de 2nd and 4f Marine Divisions supported by a navaw bombardment group totawing eight battweships, eweven cruisers, and twenty-six destroyers wanded on Saipan, uh-hah-hah-hah. However, Japanese fire was so effective dat de first day's objective was not reached untiw Day 3. After fanatic Japanese resistance, de Marines captured Aswito airfiewd in de souf on 18 June. US Navy Seabees qwickwy made de fiewd operationaw for use for American aircraft. On 22 June, de front of de nordward advancing 2nd and 4f Marine Divisions widened to such a degree dat Generaw Howwand Smif ordered de buwk of de Army's 27f Division to take over de wine in de center, between de two US Marine divisions. The 27f Division was wate taking its position and was wate in making advances so dat de inner fwanks of de marine divisions became exposed. A giant U was formed wif de 27f at de base 1,500 yards (1.4 km) behind de advancing formations. This presented de Japanese wif an opportunity to expwoit it. On 24 June, Generaw Howwand Smif repwaced Generaw Rawph C. Smif, de commanding generaw of de 27f Division, who he bewieved wacked an aggressive spirit.
Nafutan, Saipan's soudern point, was secured on 27 June, after de Japanese troops trapped dere expended demsewves in a desperate attempt to break drough. In de norf, Mount Tapotchau, de highest point on de iswand, was taken on 27 June. The Marines den steadiwy advanced nordward. On de night of 6–7 Juwy, a banzai attack took pwace in which dree to four dousand Japanese made a fanaticaw charge dat penetrated de wines near Tanapag before being wiped out. Fowwowing dis attack, hundreds of de native popuwation committed mass suicide by drowing demsewves off de cwiffs onto de rocks bewow near de nordern tip of de iswand. On 9 Juwy, two days after de banzai attack, organized resistance on Saipan ceased. The US Marines reached nordernmost tip of Saipan, Marpi Point, twenty-four days after de wanding. Onwy isowated groups of hidden Japanese troops remained.
A monf after de invasion of Saipan, de US recaptured Guam and captured Tinian. Once captured, de iswands of Saipan and Tinian were used extensivewy by de United States miwitary as dey finawwy put mainwand Japan widin round-trip range of American B-29 bombers. In response, Japanese forces attacked de bases on Saipan and Tinian from November 1944 to January 1945. At de same time and afterwards, de United States Army Air Forces based out of dese iswands conducted an intense strategic bombing campaign against de Japanese cities of miwitary and industriaw importance, incwuding Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Kobe and oders.
The invasion of Pewewiu in de Pawau Iswands on 15 September, was notabwe for a drastic change in Japanese defensive tactics, resuwting in de highest casuawty rate amongst US forces in an amphibious operation during de Pacific War. Instead of de predicted four days, it took untiw 27 November to secure de iswand. The uwtimate strategic vawue of de wandings is stiww contested.
When de Americans wanded on Saipan in de Marianas de Japanese viewed howding Saipan as an imperative. Conseqwentwy, de Japanese responded wif deir wargest carrier force of de war: de nine-carrier Mobiwe Fweet under de command of Vice Admiraw Jisaburō Ozawa, suppwemented by an additionaw 500 wand-based aircraft. Facing dem was de US Fiff Fweet under de command of Admiraw Raymond A. Spruance, which contained 15 fweet carriers and 956 aircraft. The cwash was de wargest carrier battwe in history. The battwe did not turn out as de Japanese had hoped. During de previous monf, US destroyers had destroyed 17 out of 25 submarines in Ozawa's screening force and repeated American air raids destroyed de Japanese wand-based aircraft.
On 19 June, a series of Japanese carrier air strikes were shattered by strong American defenses. The resuwt was water dubbed de Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. Aww US carriers had combat-information centers, which interpreted de fwow of radar data and radioed interception orders to de combat air patrows. The few Japanese attackers dat managed to reach de US fweet in a staggered seqwence encountered massive anti-aircraft fire wif proximity fuzes. Onwy one American warship was swightwy damaged. On de same day, Shōkaku was hit by four torpedoes from de submarine Cavawwa and sank wif heavy woss of wife. The Taihō was awso sunk by a singwe torpedo, from de submarine Awbacore. The next day, de Japanese carrier force was subjected to an American carrier air attack and suffered de woss of de carrier Hiyō. The four Japanese air strikes invowved 373 carrier aircraft, of which 130 returned to de carriers. Many of dese survivors were subseqwentwy wost when Taihō and Shōkaku were sunk by American submarine attacks. After de second day of de battwe, wosses totawed dree carriers and 445 aircrew wif more dan 433 carrier aircraft and around 200 wand-based aircraft. The Americans wost 130 aircraft and 76 aircrew, many wosses due to aircraft running out of fuew returning to deir carriers at night.
Awdough de defeat at de Phiwippine Sea was severe in terms of de woss of de dree fweet carriers Taihō, Shōkaku and de Hiyō, de reaw disaster was de annihiwation of de carrier air groups. These wosses to de awready outnumbered Japanese fweet air arm were irrepwaceabwe. The Japanese had spent de better part of a year reconstituting deir carrier air groups, and de Americans had destroyed 90% of it in two days. The Japanese had onwy enough piwots weft to form de air group for one of deir wight carriers. The Mobiwe Fweet returned home wif onwy 35 aircraft of de 430 wif which it had begun de battwe. The battwe ended in a totaw Japanese defeat and resuwted in de virtuaw end of deir carrier force.
Leyte Guwf, 1944
The disaster at de Phiwippine Sea weft de Japanese wif two choices: eider to commit deir remaining strengf in an aww-out offensive or to sit by whiwe de Americans occupied de Phiwippines and cut de sea wanes between Japan and de vitaw resources from de Dutch East Indies and Mawaya. Thus de Japanese devised a pwan which represented a finaw attempt to force a decisive battwe by utiwizing deir wast remaining strengf – de firepower of its heavy cruisers and battweships – against de American beachhead at Leyte. The Japanese pwanned to use deir remaining carriers as bait in order to wure de American carriers away from Leyte Guwf wong enough for de heavy warships to enter and to destroy any American ships present.
The Japanese assembwed a force totawing four carriers, nine battweships, 14 heavy cruisers, seven wight cruisers, and 35 destroyers. They spwit into dree forces. The "Center Force", under de command of Vice Admiraw Takeo Kurita, consisted of five battweships (incwuding de Yamato and Musashi), 12 cruisers and 13 destroyers; de "Nordern Force", under de command of Jisaburō Ozawa, comprised four carriers, two battweships partwy converted to carriers, dree wight cruisers and nine destroyers; de "Soudern Force" contained two groups, one under de command of Shōji Nishimura consisting of two Fusō-cwass battweships, one heavy cruiser and four destroyers, de oder under Kiyohide Shima comprised two heavy cruisers, a wight cruiser and four destroyers. The main Center Force wouwd pass drough de San Bernardino Strait into de Phiwippine Sea, turn soudwards, and den attack de wanding area. The two separate groups of de Soudern Force wouwd join up and strike at de wanding area drough de Surigao Strait, whiwe de Nordern Force wif de Japanese carriers wouwd wure de main American covering forces away from Leyte. The carriers embarked a totaw of just 108 aircraft.
However, after Center Force departed from Brunei Bay on 23 October, two American submarines attacked it, resuwting in de woss of two heavy cruisers wif anoder crippwed. After entering de Sibuyan Sea on 24 October, Center Force was assauwted by American carrier aircraft droughout de whowe day, forcing anoder heavy cruiser to retire. The Americans den targeted de Musashi and sank it under a barrage of torpedo and bomb hits. Many oder ships of Center Force were attacked, but continued on, uh-hah-hah-hah. Convinced dat deir attacks had made Center Force ineffective, de American carriers headed norf to address de newwy detected dreat of de Japanese carriers of Ozawa's Nordern Force. On de night of 24–25 October, de Soudern Force under Nishimura attempted to enter Leyte Guwf from de souf drough Surigao Strait, where an American-Austrawian force wed by Rear Admiraw Jesse Owdendorf and consisting of six battweships, eight cruisers, and 26 destroyers, ambushed de Japanese. Utiwizing radar-guided torpedo attacks, American destroyers sank one of de battweships and dree destroyers whiwe damaging de oder battweship. Radar-guided navaw gunfire den finished off de second battweship, wif onwy a singwe Japanese destroyer surviving. As a resuwt of observing radio siwence, Shima's group was unabwe to coordinate and synchronize its movements wif Nishimura's group and subseqwentwy arrived at Surigao Strait in de middwe of de encounter; after making a haphazard torpedo attack, Shima retreated.
Off Cape Engaño, 500 miwes (800 km) norf of Leyte Guwf, de Americans waunched over 500 aircraft sorties at de Nordern Force, fowwowed up by a surface group of cruisers and destroyers. Aww four Japanese carriers were sunk, but dis part of de Japanese pwan had succeeded in drawing de American carriers away from Leyte Guwf. On 25 October de finaw major surface action fought between de Japanese and de American fweets during de war occurred off Samar, when Center Force feww upon a group of American escort carriers escorted onwy by destroyers and destroyer escorts. Bof sides were surprised, but de outcome wooked certain since de Japanese had four battweships, six heavy cruisers, and two wight cruisers weading two destroyer sqwadrons. However, dey did not press home deir advantage, and were content to conduct a wargewy indecisive gunnery duew before breaking off. Japanese wosses were extremewy heavy, wif four carriers, dree battweships, six heavy cruisers, four wight cruisers and eweven destroyers sunk, whiwe de Americans wost one wight carrier and two escort carriers, a destroyer and two destroyer escorts. The Battwe of Leyte Guwf, arguabwy de wargest navaw battwe in history, was de wargest navaw battwe of Worwd War II. For de Japanese de defeat at Leyte Guwf was catastrophic, de Imperiaw Japanese Navy had suffered its greatest ever woss of ships and men in combat. The inevitabwe wiberation of de Phiwippines awso meant dat de home iswands wouwd be virtuawwy cut off from de vitaw resources from Japan's occupied territories in Soudeast Asia.
On 20 October 1944 de US Sixf Army, supported by navaw and air bombardment, wanded on de favorabwe eastern shore of Leyte, norf of Mindanao. The US Sixf Army continued its advance from de east, whiwe de Japanese rushed reinforcements to de Ormoc Bay area on de western side of de iswand. The US reinforced de Sixf Army successfuwwy, but de US Fiff Air Force devastated Japanese attempts to resuppwy. In torrentiaw rains and over difficuwt terrain, de US advance continued across Leyte and de neighboring iswand of Samar to de norf. On 7 December US Army units wanded at Ormoc Bay and, after a major wand and air battwe, cut off de Japanese abiwity to reinforce and suppwy Leyte. Awdough fierce fighting continued on Leyte for monds, de US Army was in controw.
On 15 December 1944 wandings against minimaw resistance took pwace on de soudern beaches of de iswand of Mindoro, a key wocation in de pwanned Lingayen Guwf operations, in support of major wandings scheduwed on Luzon. On 9 January 1945 Generaw Krueger's Sixf Army wanded its first units on de souf shore of Lingayen Guwf on de western coast of Luzon, uh-hah-hah-hah. Awmost 175,000 men fowwowed across de twenty-miwe (32 km) beachhead widin a few days. Wif heavy air support, Army units pushed inwand, taking Cwark Fiewd, 40 miwes (64 km) nordwest of Maniwa, in de wast week of January.
Two more major wandings fowwowed, one to cut off de Bataan Peninsuwa, and anoder, dat incwuded a parachute drop, souf of Maniwa. Pincers cwosed on de city, and on 3 February 1945 ewements of de 1st Cavawry Division pushed into de nordern outskirts of Maniwa and de 8f Cavawry passed drough de nordern suburbs and into de city itsewf.
As de advance on Maniwa continued from de norf and de souf, de Bataan Peninsuwa was rapidwy secured.[by whom?] On 16 February paratroopers and amphibious units assauwted de iswand fortress of Corregidor, and resistance ended dere on 27 February.
In aww, ten US divisions and five independent regiments battwed on Luzon, making it de wargest campaign of de Pacific War, invowving more troops dan de United States had used in Norf Africa, Itawy, or soudern France. Forces incwuded de Mexican Escuadrón 201 fighter-sqwadron as part of de Fuerza Aérea Expedicionaria Mexicana (FAEM—"Mexican Expeditionary Air Force"), wif de sqwadron attached to de 58f Fighter Group of de United States Army Air Forces dat fwew tacticaw support missions. Of de 250,000 Japanese troops defending Luzon, 80 percent died. The wast remaining Japanese sowdier in de Phiwippines, Hiroo Onoda, surrendered on 9 March 1974.
The Eighf Army invaded Pawawan Iswand, between Borneo and Mindoro (de fiff-wargest and western-most Phiwippine iswand) on 28 February 1945, wif wandings at Puerto Princesa. The Japanese put up wittwe direct defense of Pawawan, but cweaning up pockets of Japanese resistance wasted untiw wate Apriw, as de Japanese used deir common tactic of widdrawing into de mountain jungwes, dispersed as smaww units. Throughout de Phiwippines, Fiwipino guerriwwas aided US forces to find and dispatch de howdouts.
The US Eighf Army den moved on to its first wanding on Mindanao (17 Apriw), de wast of de major Phiwippine Iswands to be taken, uh-hah-hah-hah. Then fowwowed de invasion and occupation of Panay, Cebu, Negros and severaw iswands in de Suwu Archipewago. These iswands provided bases for de US Fiff and Thirteenf Air Forces to attack targets droughout de Phiwippines and de Souf China Sea.
Awwied offensives in Burma, 1944–45
In wate 1944 and earwy 1945, de Awwied Souf East Asia Command waunched offensives into Burma, intending to recover most of de country, incwuding Rangoon, de capitaw, before de onset of de monsoon in May. The offensives were fought primariwy by British Commonweawf, Chinese and United States forces against de forces of Imperiaw Japan, who were assisted to some degree by Thaiwand, de Burma Nationaw Army and de Indian Nationaw Army. The British Commonweawf wand forces were drawn primariwy from de United Kingdom, British India and Africa.
The Indian XV Corps advanced awong de coast in Arakan Province, at wast capturing Akyab Iswand after faiwures in de two previous years. They den wanded troops behind de retreating Japanese, infwicting heavy casuawties, and captured Ramree Iswand and Cheduba Iswand off de coast, estabwishing airfiewds on dem which were used to support de offensive into Centraw Burma.
The Chinese Expeditionary Force captured Mong-Yu and Lashio, whiwe de Chinese and American Nordern Combat Area Command resumed its advance in nordern Burma. In wate January 1945, dese two forces winked up wif each oder at Hsipaw. The Ledo Road was compweted, winking India and China, but too wate in de war to have any significant effect.
The Japanese Burma Area Army attempted to forestaww de main Awwied attack on de centraw part of de front by widdrawing deir troops behind de Irrawaddy River. Lieutenant Generaw Heitarō Kimura, de new Japanese commander in Burma, hoped dat de Awwies' wines of communications wouwd be overstretched trying to cross dis obstacwe. However, de advancing British Fourteenf Army under Lieutenant Generaw Wiwwiam Swim switched its axis of advance to outfwank de main Japanese armies.
During February, de Fourteenf Army secured bridgeheads across de Irrawaddy on a broad front. On 1 March, units of IV Corps captured de suppwy centre of Meiktiwa, drowing de Japanese into disarray. Whiwe de Japanese attempted to recapture Meiktiwa, XXXIII Corps captured Mandaway. The Japanese armies were heaviwy defeated, and wif de capture of Mandaway, de Burmese popuwation and de Burma Nationaw Army (which de Japanese had raised) turned against de Japanese.
During Apriw, Fourteenf Army advanced 300 miwes (480 km) souf towards Rangoon, de capitaw and principaw port of Burma, but was dewayed by Japanese rearguards 40 miwes (64 km) norf of Rangoon at de end of de monf. Swim feared dat de Japanese wouwd defend Rangoon house-to-house during de monsoon, which wouwd commit his army to prowonged action wif disastrouswy inadeqwate suppwies, and in March he had asked dat a pwan to capture Rangoon by an amphibious force, Operation Dracuwa, which had been abandoned earwier, be reinstated. Dracuwa was waunched on 1 May, to find dat de Japanese had awready evacuated Rangoon, uh-hah-hah-hah. The troops dat occupied Rangoon winked up wif Fourteenf Army five days water, securing de Awwies' wines of communication, uh-hah-hah-hah.
The Japanese forces which had been bypassed by de Awwied advances attempted to break out across de Sittaung River during June and Juwy to rejoin de Burma Area Army which had regrouped in Tenasserim in soudern Burma. They suffered 14,000 casuawties, hawf deir strengf. Overaww, de Japanese wost some 150,000 men in Burma. Onwy 1,700 Japanese sowdiers surrendered and were taken prisoner.
The Awwies were preparing to make amphibious wandings in Mawaya when word of de Japanese surrender arrived.
Awdough de Marianas were secure and American bases firmwy estabwished, de wong 1,200 miwes (1,900 km) range from de Marianas meant dat B-29 aircrews on bombing missions over Japan found demsewves ditching in de sea if dey suffered severe damage and were unabwe to return home. Attention focused on de iswand of Iwo Jima in de Vowcano Iswands, about hawfway between de Marianas and Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. American pwanners recognized de strategic importance of de iswand, which was onwy 5 miwes (8.0 km) wong, 8 sqware miwes (21 km2) in area and had no native popuwation, uh-hah-hah-hah. The iswand was used by de Japanese as an earwy-warning station against impending air raids on Japanese cities, additionawwy, Japanese aircraft based on Iwo Jima were abwe to attack de B-29s on deir bombing missions on route to deir missions and on de returning weg home, and even to attack instawwations in de Marianas demsewves. The capture of Iwo Jima wouwd provide emergency wanding airfiewds to repair and refuew crippwed B-29s in troubwe on deir way home and a base for P-51 fighters escorts for de B-29s. Iwo Jima couwd awso provide a base from which wand-based air support couwd protect de US Navaw fweets as dey moved into Japanese waters awong de arc descending from Tokyo drough de Ryukyu Iswands.
However, de Japanese had awso come to reawize de strategic vawue of Iwo Jima and Lt. Generaw Tadamichi Kuribayashi was assigned command of de iswand in May 1944. In de monds fowwowing, de Japanese began work constructing ewaborate defenses, making de best possibwe use of de iswand's naturaw caves and de uneven, rocky terrain, uh-hah-hah-hah. The iswand was transformed into a massive network of bunkers, hidden guns, wif underground passageways weading from one strong point to anoder. Naturaw caves were enwarged, and many new ones were bwasted out. A totaw of 11 miwes (18 km)s of tunnews were constructed. The Japanese awso went to great wengds to construct warge underground chambers, some as much as five stories deep to serve as storage and hospitaw areas wif dick wawws and ceiwings made of reinforced concrete. The main underground command post had a concrete roof 10 feet (3.0 m) dick. Piwwboxes, bunkers and oder defensive works were buiwt cwose to de ground. A series of strong points covering de wanding areas were awso buiwt, most were covered wif sand and den carefuwwy camoufwaged. The many weww-camoufwaged 120mm and 6-inch guns were empwaced so dat deir fire couwd be directed to de beaches. The piwwboxes and bunkers were aww connected so dat if one was knocked out, it couwd be reoccupied again, uh-hah-hah-hah. Smawwer-cawiber artiwwery, antiaircraft guns, and mortars were awso weww hidden and wocated where onwy a direct hit couwd destroy dem. The Japanese were determined to make de Americans pay a high price for Iwo Jima and were prepared to defend it to de deaf. Kuribayashi knew dat he couwd not win de battwe but hoped to infwict severe casuawties so costwy dat it wouwd swow de American advance on Japan and maybe give de Japanese some bargaining power. In February, a totaw of 21,000 Japanese troops were depwoyed on Iwo Jima.
The American operation ("Operation Detachment") to capture de iswand invowved dree Marine divisions of de V Amphibious Corps, a totaw of 70,647 troops, under de command of Howwand Smif. From mid-June 1944, Iwo Jima came under American air and navaw bombardment, dis continued untiw de days weading up to de invasion, uh-hah-hah-hah.
An intense navaw and air bombardment preceded de wanding but did wittwe but drive de Japanese furder underground, making deir positions impervious to enemy fire. The hidden guns and defenses survived de constant bombardment virtuawwy unscaded. On de morning of 19 February 1945, 30,000 men of 4f, and 5f Marine Divisions under de command of Maj. Generaw Harry Schmidt wanded on de soudeast coast of de iswand near Mt. Suribachi, an inactive vowcano, where most of de iswand's defenses were concentrated. The Japanese hewd fire untiw de wanding beaches were fuww. As soon as de Marines pushed inwand dey came under devastating machine gun and artiwwery fire. Awdough dey managed to gain a foodowd on de beaches, de defenders made dem pay a high price for every advance inwand. By de end of de day, de Marines reached de west coast of de iswand, but deir wosses were severe; awmost 2,000 men kiwwed or wounded. On 23 February, de 28f Marine Regiment reached de summit of Mt. Suribachi, prompting de now famous Raising de Fwag on Iwo Jima photograph. Navy Secretary James Forrestaw, upon seeing de fwag, remarked "dere wiww be a Marine Corps for de next 500 years". The fwag raising is often cited as de most reproduced photograph of aww time and became de archetypaw representation not onwy of dat battwe, but of de entire Pacific War. For de rest of February, de Americans pushed norf, and by 1 March, had taken two-dirds of de iswand. But it was not untiw 26 March dat de iswand was finawwy secured. Iwo Jima was one of de bwoodiest battwes fought by de Americans during de Pacific War, de Japanese fought to de wast man, uh-hah-hah-hah.
American casuawties were 6,821 kiwwed and 19,207 wounded. The Japanese wosses totawed weww over 20,000 men kiwwed, wif onwy 1,083 prisoners were taken, uh-hah-hah-hah. Historians debate wheder it was strategicawwy worf de casuawties sustained.
The wargest and bwoodiest battwe fought by de Americans against de Japanese came at Okinawa. The seizure of iswands in de Ryukyus was to have been de wast step before de actuaw invasion of de Japanese home iswands. Okinawa, de wargest of de Ryukyu Iswands, was wocated some 340 miwes (550 km) from de iswand of Kyushu. The capture of Okinawa wouwd provide airbases for B-29 bombers to intensify aeriaw bombardment of Japan and for direct wand-based air support of de invasion of Kyushu. The iswands couwd awso open de way for tightening de bwockade of Japanese shipping and be used as a staging area and suppwy base for any invasion of de home iswands.
The Japanese troops defending Okinawa, under de command of Lieutenant Generaw Ushijima Mitsuru, totawed some 75,000-100,000, augmented by dousands of civiwians on de heaviwy popuwated iswand. American forces for de operation totawed 183,000 troops in seven divisions (four US Army and dree Marine) under de Tenf Army. The British Pacific Fweet operated as a separate unit from de American task forces in de Okinawa operation, uh-hah-hah-hah. Its objective was to strike airfiewds on de chain of iswands between Formosa and Okinawa, to prevent de Japanese reinforcing de defenses of Okinawa from dat direction, uh-hah-hah-hah.
After an intense seven day bombardment de main wandings on Okinawa took pwace on 1 Apriw, on de Hagushi beaches near de centraw part of de iswand's west coast. However, dere was wittwe opposition at de beaches as de Japanese had decided to meet de Americans farder inwand out of range of navaw gunfire. About 60,000 American troops wanded on de first day, seizing de two nearby airfiewds and pushing across de narrow waist of de iswand to cut it in two.
The first major Japanese counterattack occurred on 6 and 7 Apriw, in de form of attacks by kamikaze aircraft and a navaw operation, cawwed Ten-Go. A force, under de command of Admiraw Seiichi Itō, consisting of de battweship Yamato, de wight cruiser Yahagi and eight destroyers was assembwed. This force was to be used as bait to draw away as many American carrier aircraft from Okinawa as possibwe, in order to weave Awwied navaw forces vuwnerabwe to warge scawe Kamikaze attacks. The Japanese were short of fuew, conseqwentwy de Yamato had onwy enough to reach Okinawa. Off Okinawa it was pwanned to beach de battweship and use her 18.1 inches (46 cm) guns to support de fighting on de iswand. After being sighted by an American submarine and reconnaissance aircraft, navaw attack aircraft were sent to attack de Japanese force resuwting in de sinking of de Yamato, Yahagi and four of de destroyers. Mass Kamikaze attacks intensified during de fowwowing dree monds, wif a totaw of 5,500 sorties being fwown by de Japanese.
In de nordern part of Okinawa American troops onwy met wight opposition, and de area was seized widin about two weeks. However, de main Japanese defenses were in de soudern part of de iswand. There was bitter fighting against weww-entrenched Japanese troops, but US forces swowwy made progress. The seizure of Shuri castwe on 29 May, de center of Japanese resistance, represented bof a strategic and psychowogicaw bwow. Organized resistance was not over untiw 21 June. But many Japanese went into hiding and de campaign was not decwared over untiw 2 Juwy.
The battwe for Okinawa proved costwy and wasted much wonger dan de Americans had originawwy expected. The Japanese had skiwwfuwwy utiwized terrain to infwict maximum casuawties. Totaw American casuawties were 49,451, incwuding 12,520 dead or missing and 36,631 wounded. Japanese casuawties were approximatewy 110,000 kiwwed, and 7,400 were taken prisoner. 94% of de Japanese sowdiers died awong wif many civiwians. Kamikaze attacks awso sank 36 ships of aww types, damaged 368 more and wed to de deads of 4,900 US saiwors, for de woss of 7,800 Japanese aircraft.
By Apriw 1945, China had awready been at war wif Japan for more dan seven years. Bof nations were exhausted by years of battwes, bombings and bwockades. After Japanese victories in Operation Ichi-Go, Japan was wosing de battwe in Burma and facing constant attacks from Chinese Nationawist forces and Communist guerriwwas in de countryside. The Imperiaw Japanese Army began preparations for de Battwe of West Hunan in March 1945. The Japanese mobiwized 34f, 47f, 64f, 68f and 116f Divisions, as weww as de 86f Independent Brigade, for a totaw of 80,000 men to seize Chinese airfiewds and secure raiwroads in West Hunan by earwy Apriw. In response, de Chinese Nationaw Miwitary Counciw dispatched de 4f Front Army and de 10f and 27f Army Groups wif He Yingqin as commander-in-chief. At de same time, it airwifted de entire Chinese New 6f Corps, an American-eqwipped corps and veterans of de Burma Expeditionary Force, from Kunming to Zhijiang. Chinese forces totawed 110,000 men in 20 divisions. They were supported by about 400 aircraft from Chinese and American air forces. Chinese forces achieved a decisive victory and waunched a warge counterattack in dis campaign. Concurrentwy, de Chinese managed to repew a Japanese offensive in Henan and Hubei. Afterwards, Chinese forces retook Hunan and Hubei provinces in Souf China. Chinese waunched a counter offensive to retake Guangxi which was de wast major Japanese stronghowd in Souf China. In August 1945, Chinese forces successfuwwy retook Guangxi.
The Borneo campaign of 1945 was de wast major campaign in de Souf West Pacific Area. In a series of amphibious assauwts between 1 May and 21 Juwy, de Austrawian I Corps, under Generaw Leswie Morshead, attacked Japanese forces occupying de iswand. Awwied navaw and air forces, centered on de US 7f Fweet under Admiraw Thomas Kinkaid, de Austrawian First Tacticaw Air Force and de US Thirteenf Air Force awso pwayed important rowes in de campaign, uh-hah-hah-hah.
The campaign opened wif a wanding on de smaww iswand of Tarakan on 1 May. This was fowwowed on 1 June by simuwtaneous assauwts in de norf west, on de iswand of Labuan and de coast of Brunei. A week water de Austrawians attacked Japanese positions in Norf Borneo. The attention of de Awwies den switched back to de centraw east coast, wif de wast major amphibious assauwt of Worwd War II, at Bawikpapan on 1 Juwy.
Awdough de campaign was criticized in Austrawia at de time, and in subseqwent years, as pointwess or a "waste" of de wives of sowdiers, it did achieve a number of objectives, such as increasing de isowation of significant Japanese forces occupying de main part of de Dutch East Indies, capturing major oiw suppwies and freeing Awwied prisoners of war, who were being hewd in deteriorating conditions. At one of de very worst sites, around Sandakan in Borneo, onwy six of some 2,500 British and Austrawian prisoners survived.
Landings in de Japanese home iswands (1945)
Hard-fought battwes on de Japanese iswands of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and oders resuwted in horrific casuawties on bof sides but finawwy produced a Japanese defeat. Of de 117,000 Okinawan and Japanese troops defending Okinawa, 94 percent died. Faced wif de woss of most of deir experienced piwots, de Japanese increased deir use of kamikaze tactics in an attempt to create unacceptabwy high casuawties for de Awwies. The US Navy proposed to force a Japanese surrender drough a totaw navaw bwockade and air raids. Many miwitary historians bewieve dat de Okinawa campaign wed directwy to de atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as a means of avoiding de pwanned ground invasion of de Japanese mainwand. This view is expwained by Victor Davis Hanson: "because de Japanese on Okinawa ... were so fierce in deir defense (even when cut off, and widout suppwies), and because casuawties were so appawwing, many American strategists wooked for an awternative means to subdue mainwand Japan, oder dan a direct invasion, uh-hah-hah-hah. This means presented itsewf, wif de advent of atomic bombs, which worked admirabwy in convincing de Japanese to sue for peace [unconditionawwy], widout American casuawties".
Towards de end of de war as de rowe of strategic bombing became more important, a new command for de United States Strategic Air Forces in de Pacific was created to oversee aww US strategic bombing in de hemisphere, under United States Army Air Forces Generaw Curtis LeMay. Japanese industriaw production pwunged as nearwy hawf of de buiwt-up areas of 67 cities were destroyed by B-29 firebombing raids. On 9–10 March 1945 awone, about 100,000 peopwe were kiwwed in a confwagration caused by an incendiary attack on Tokyo. LeMay awso oversaw Operation Starvation, in which de inwand waterways of Japan were extensivewy mined by air, which disrupted de smaww amount of remaining Japanese coastaw sea traffic. On 26 Juwy 1945, de President of de United States Harry S. Truman, de Chairman of de Nationawist Government of China Chiang Kai-shek and de Prime Minister of Great Britain Winston Churchiww issued de Potsdam Decwaration, which outwined de terms of surrender for de Empire of Japan as agreed upon at de Potsdam Conference. This uwtimatum stated dat, if Japan did not surrender, it wouwd face "prompt and utter destruction".
On 6 August 1945, de US dropped an atomic bomb on de Japanese city of Hiroshima in de first nucwear attack in history. In a press rewease issued after de atomic bombing of Hiroshima, President Harry S. Truman warned Japan to surrender or "expect a rain of ruin from de air, de wike of which has never been seen on dis Earf". Three days water, on 9 August, de US dropped anoder atomic bomb on Nagasaki, de wast nucwear attack in history. More dan 140,000–240,000 peopwe died as a direct resuwt of dese two bombings. The necessity of de atomic bombings has wong been debated, wif detractors cwaiming dat a navaw bwockade and incendiary bombing campaign had awready made invasion, hence de atomic bomb, unnecessary. However, oder schowars have argued dat de atomic bombings shocked de Japanese government into surrender, wif de Emperor finawwy indicating his wish to stop de war. Anoder argument in favor of de atomic bombs is dat dey hewped avoid Operation Downfaww, or a prowonged bwockade and conventionaw bombing campaign, any of which wouwd have exacted much higher casuawties among Japanese civiwians. Historian Richard B. Frank wrote dat a Soviet invasion of Japan was never wikewy because dey had insufficient navaw capabiwity to mount an amphibious invasion of Hokkaidō.
In February 1945 during de Yawta Conference de Soviet Union had agreed to enter de war against Japan 90 days after de surrender of Germany. At de time Soviet participation was seen as cruciaw to tie down de warge number Japanese forces in Manchuria and Korea, keeping dem from being transferred to de Home Iswands to mount a defense to an invasion, uh-hah-hah-hah.
On 9 August, exactwy on scheduwe, 90 days after de war ended in Europe, de Soviet Union entered de war by invading Manchuria. A battwe-hardened, one miwwion-strong Soviet force, transferred from Europe, attacked Japanese forces in Manchuria and wanded a heavy bwow against de Japanese Kantōgun (Kwantung Army).
The Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation began on 9 August 1945, wif de Soviet invasion of de Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo and was de wast campaign of de Second Worwd War and de wargest of de 1945 Soviet–Japanese War which resumed hostiwities between de Union of Soviet Sociawist Repubwics and de Empire of Japan after awmost six years of peace. Soviet gains on de continent were Manchukuo, Mengjiang (Inner Mongowia) and nordern Korea. The USSR's entry into de war was a significant factor in de Japanese decision to surrender as it became apparent de Soviet Union were no wonger wiwwing to act as an intermediary for a negotiated settwement on favorabwe terms.
The effects of de atomic bombings and de Soviet entry were profound. On 10 August de "sacred decision" was made by Japanese Cabinet to accept de Potsdam terms on one condition: de "prerogative of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruwer". At noon on 15 August, after de American government's intentionawwy ambiguous repwy, stating dat de "audority" of de emperor "shaww be subject to de Supreme Commander of de Awwied Powers", de Emperor broadcast to de nation and to de worwd at warge de rescript of surrender, ending de Second Worwd War.
Shouwd we continue to fight, it wouwd not onwy resuwt in an uwtimate cowwapse and obwiteration of de Japanese nation, but awso it wouwd wead to de totaw extinction of human civiwization, uh-hah-hah-hah.— Emperor Hirohito, The Voice of de Crane: The Imperiaw Rescript of 15 August 1945
In Japan, 14 August is considered to be de day dat de Pacific War ended. However, as Imperiaw Japan actuawwy surrendered on 15 August, dis day became known in de Engwish-speaking countries as V-J Day (Victory in Japan). The formaw Japanese Instrument of Surrender was signed on 2 September 1945, on de battweship USS Missouri, in Tokyo Bay. The surrender was accepted by Generaw Dougwas MacArdur as Supreme Commander of de Awwied Powers, wif representatives of severaw Awwied nations, from a Japanese dewegation wed by Mamoru Shigemitsu and Yoshijirō Umezu.
There were some 426,000 American casuawties: 161,000 dead (incwuding 111,914 in battwe and 49,000 non-battwe), 248,316 wounded, and 16,358 captured (not counting POWs who died). Materiaw wosses were 188+ warships incwuding 5 battweships, 11 aircraft carriers, 25 cruisers, 84 destroyers and destroyer escorts, and 63 submarines, pwus 21,255 aircraft. This gave de USN a 2-1 exchange ratio wif de IJN in terms of ships and aircraft.
The US protectorate in de Phiwippines suffered considerabwe wosses. Miwitary wosses were 27,000 dead (incwuding POWs), 75,000 wiving POWs, and an unknown number wounded, not counting irreguwars dat fought in de insurgency. Between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Fiwipino civiwians died due to eider war-rewated shortages, massacres, shewwing, and bombing.
According to officiaw Chinese Nationawist statistics, wosses to de reguwar Nationaw Revowutionary Army totawed 3,237,000, wif 1,320,000 kiwwed, 1,797,000 wounded, and 120,000 missing. The sowdiers of de Chinese Communist Party suffered 584,267 casuawties, of which 160,603 were kiwwed, 133,197 missing, and 290,467 wounded. This wouwd eqwate to a totaw of 3.82 miwwion combined NRA/CCP casuawties, of which 1.74 miwwion were kiwwed or missing. Neider totaw incwudes de considerabwe number of irreguwar guerriwwa fighters sworn to regionaw warwords who fought de Japanese. Incwuding dem, an academic study pubwished in de United States estimates Chinese miwitary casuawties at 6.75 miwwion wif 3.75 miwwion kiwwed or missing. The casuawties break down as 1.5 miwwion kiwwed in battwe, 750,000 missing in action, 1.5 miwwion deads due to disease and 3 miwwion wounded.
China suffered enormous civiwian wosses in de war. Estimates vary wiwdwy, dough dere is a generaw consensus dat civiwian deads were in de 17 to 22 miwwion range, mostwy from war-rewated causes such as famine. A warge number of deads were caused directwy by Japanese war crimes. For instance, 2.7 miwwion Chinese civiwians were kiwwed in de "Three Awws" campaign.
Between de Mawayan Campaign (130,000 discounting some 20,000 Austrawians), Burma Campaign (86,600),[fuww citation needed] Battwe of Hong Kong (15,000), and various navaw encounters, British Empire forces incurred some 235,000 casuawties in de Pacific Theater, incwuding roughwy 82,000 kiwwed (50,000 in combat and 32,000 as POWs). The Royaw Navy wost 23 warships in de Pacific and Indian oceans: 1 battweship, 1 battwecruiser, 1 aircraft carrier, 3 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 5 submarines, and 4 escorts. There were significant indirect wosses to de British Empire territories of India and Burma as a resuwt of de war. These incwuded 3 miwwion deads in de Bengaw famine of 1943 and 0.25 to 1 miwwion deads in British Burma.
Austrawia incurred wosses of 45,841 not incwuding deads and iwwnesses from naturaw causes such as disease: 17,501 kiwwed (incwuding POW deads in captivity), 13,997 wounded, and 14,345 wiving POWs. New Zeawand wost 578 men kiwwed, wif an unknown number wounded or captured. 6 warships of de Royaw Austrawian Navy totawing 29,391 tons were sunk: 3 cruisers (Canberra, Perf, and Sydney), 2 destroyers (Vampire and Voyager), and 3 corvettes (Armidawe, Geewong, and Wawwaroo, de watter two in accidents).
Between Lake Khasan, Khawkin Gow, advisors depwoyed to China, and de 1945 operations in Manchuria and de Kuriwes, Soviet casuawties against Japan totawed 68,612: 22,731 kiwwed/missing and 45,908 wounded. Materiaw wosses incwuded some 1,000 tanks and AFVs, 5 wanding ships, and 300 aircraft. Mongowian casuawties were 753.
The entire 140,000-strong Royaw Dutch East Indies Army was kiwwed, captured, or missing by de concwusion of de East Indies Campaign, uh-hah-hah-hah. 1,500 cowoniaw and 900 Dutch sowdiers were kiwwed in action, uh-hah-hah-hah. Most of de cowoniaw sowdiers were freed on de spot or deserted. Of de ednic Dutch troops, 900 were kiwwed in action and 37,000 became prisoners. 8,500 of dese POWs wouwd die in Japanese captivity. Dutch navaw wosses in de Pacific numbered 14 major warships and 14 minor ones totawing some 40,427 tons: 2 cruisers (Java and De Ruyter), 7 destroyers (Evertsen, Kortenaer, Piet Hein, Witte de Wif, Banckert, Van Nes, and Van Ghent), 5 submarines (K XVIII, K XVII, K XIII, K X, and K VII), 7 minewayers (Prins van Oranje, Pro Patria, Bangkawan, Rigew, Soemenep, Krakatau, and Gouden Leeuw, most of which were scuttwed), and 7 minesweepers (A, B, D, C, Pieter de Bitter, Ewand Dubois, and Jan van Amstew). About 30,000 Dutch and 300,000 Indonesian forced waborers died during de Japanese occupation of de East Indies, whiwe 3 miwwion Indonesian civiwians perished in famines.
Simiwar to de Dutch, de 65,000-strong French cowoniaw army in French Indochina (16,500 European French and 48,500 cowoniaw) disintegrated at de end of de Japanese invasion, uh-hah-hah-hah. 2,129 European French and 2,100 Indochinese cowoniaw troops were kiwwed, whiwe 12,000 French and 3,000 cowoniaw troops were kept as prisoners. 1-2 miwwion deads occurred in French Indochina during de Japanese occupation, mostwy due to de 1945 Vietnamese Famine.
800,000 Japanese civiwians and over 2 miwwion Japanese sowdiers died during de war. According to a report compiwed by de Rewief Bureau of de Japanese Ministry of Heawf and Wewfare in March 1964, combined Japanese Army and Navy deads during de war (1937–45) numbered approximatewy 2,121,000 men, mostwy against eider de Americans and deir awwies (1.1+ miwwion) in pwaces such as de Sowomons, Japan, Taiwan, de Centraw Pacific, and de Phiwippines, or against various Chinese factions (500,000+), predominantwy de NRA and CCP, during de war on de Chinese mainwand, de Chinese resistance movement in Manchuria and Burma campaign, uh-hah-hah-hah. The wosses were broken down as fowwows:
Key: Location, Army dead, Navy dead, (totaw dead)
Japan Proper: 58,100, 45,800, (103,900)
Bonin Iswands: 2,700, 12,500, (15,200)
Okinawa: 67,900, 21,500, (89,400)
Formosa (Taiwan): 28,500, 10,600, (39,100)
Korea: 19,600, 6,900, (26,500)
Sakhawin, de Aweutian, and Kuriw Iswands: 8,200, 3,200, (11,400)
Manchuria: 45,900, 800, (46,700)
China (inc. Hong Kong): 435,600, 20,100, (455,700)
Siberia: 52,300, 400, (52,700)
Centraw Pacific: 95,800, 151,400, (247,200)
Phiwippines: 377,500, 121,100, (498,600)
French Indochina: 7,900, 4,500, (12,400)
Thaiwand: 6,900, 100, (7,000)
Burma (inc. India): 163,000, 1,500, (164,500)
Mawaya & Singapore: 8,500, 2,900, (11,400)
Andaman & Nicobar Iswands: 900, 1,500, (2,400)
Sumatra: 2,700, 500, (3,200)
Java: 2,700, 3,800, (6,500)
Lesser Sundas: 51,800, 1,200, (53,000)
Borneo: 11,300, 6,700, (18,000)
Cewebes: 1,500, 4,000, (5,500)
Mowuccas: 2,600, 1,800, (4,400)
New Guinea: 112,400, 15,200, (127,600)
Bismarck Archipewago: 19,700, 10,800, (30,500)
Sowomon Iswands: 63,200, 25,000, (88,200)
Totaw: 1,647,200, 473,800, (2,121,000)
The IJN wost over 341 warships, incwuding 11 battweships, 25 aircraft carriers, 39 cruisers, 135 destroyers, and 131 submarines, awmost entirewy in action against de United States Navy. The IJN and IJA togeder wost some 45,125 aircraft.
Japan's awwy Germany wost 10 submarines and four auxiwiary cruisers (Thor, Michew, Pinguin, and Kormoran) in de Indian and Pacific oceans. These four awone sank 420,467 gross tons of Awwied shipping.
On 7 December 1941, 2,403 non-combatants (2,335 neutraw miwitary personnew and 68 civiwians) were kiwwed and 1,247 wounded during de Japanese surprise attack on Pearw Harbor. Because de attack happened widout a decwaration of war or expwicit warning, it was judged by de Tokyo Triaws to be a war crime.
During de Pacific War, Japanese sowdiers kiwwed miwwions of non-combatants, incwuding prisoners of war, from surrounding nations. At weast 20 miwwion Chinese died during de Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).
Unit 731 was one exampwe of wartime atrocities committed on a civiwian popuwation during Worwd War II, where experiments were performed on dousands of Chinese and Korean civiwians as weww as Awwied prisoners of war. In miwitary campaigns, de Imperiaw Japanese Army used biowogicaw weapons and chemicaw weapons on de Chinese, kiwwing around 400,000 civiwians. The Nanking Massacre is anoder exampwe of atrocity committed by Japanese sowdiers on a civiwian popuwation, uh-hah-hah-hah.
According to de findings of de Tokyo Tribunaw, de deaf rate of Western prisoners was 27%, some seven times dat of POWs under de Germans and Itawians. The most notorious use of forced wabour was in de construction of de Burma–Thaiwand "Deaf Raiwway". Around 1,536 U.S. civiwians were kiwwed or oderwise died of abuse and mistreatment in Japanese internment camps in de Far East; in comparison, 883 U.S. civiwians died in German internment camps in Europe.
A widewy pubwicized exampwe of institutionawized sexuaw swavery are "comfort women", a euphemism for de 200,000 women, mostwy from Korea and China, who served in de Imperiaw Japanese Army's camps during Worwd War II. Some 35 Dutch comfort women brought a successfuw case before de Batavia Miwitary Tribunaw in 1948. In 1993, Chief Cabinet Secretary Yōhei Kōno said dat women were coerced into brodews run by Japan's wartime miwitary. Oder Japanese weaders have apowogized, incwuding former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001. In 2007, den-Prime Minister Shinzō Abe asserted: "The fact is, dere is no evidence to prove dere was coercion".
The Three Awws Powicy (Sankō Sakusen) was a Japanese scorched earf powicy adopted in China, de dree awws being: "Kiww Aww, Burn Aww and Loot Aww". Initiated in 1940 by Ryūkichi Tanaka, de Sankō Sakusen was impwemented in fuww scawe in 1942 in norf China by Yasuji Okamura. According to historian Mitsuyoshi Himeta, de scorched earf campaign was responsibwe for de deads of "more dan 2.7 miwwion" Chinese civiwians.
The cowwection of skuwws and oder remains of Japanese sowdiers by American sowdiers was shown by severaw studies to have been widespread enough to be commented upon by Awwied miwitary audorities and de US wartime press.
Fowwowing de surrender of Japan, de Internationaw Miwitary Tribunaw for de Far East took pwace in Ichigaya, Tokyo from 29 Apriw 1946 to 12 November 1948 to try dose accused of de most serious war crimes. Meanwhiwe, miwitary tribunaws were awso hewd by de returning powers droughout Asia and de Pacific for wesser figures.
- Dissent in de Armed Forces of de Empire of Japan
- European deatre of Worwd War II
- Japanese-American service in Worwd War II
- Japanese howdouts
- Japanese in de Chinese resistance to de Empire of Japan
- Pacific War campaigns
- Yasukuni Shrine
- At war since 1937
- "For fifty-dree wong monds, beginning in Juwy 1937, China stood awone, singwe-handedwy fighting an undecwared war against Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. On 9 December 1941, after Japan's surprise attack on Pearw Harbor, China finawwy decwared war against Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. What had been for so wong a war between two countries now became part of a much wider Pacific confwict."
- Untiw Apriw 1945
- Untiw Juwy 1945
- Over 17 miwwion Chinese civiwian deads (1937–45); around 4 miwwion civiwian deads from de Dutch East Indies;[page needed] 1–2 miwwion Indochinese civiwians; around 3 miwwion Indian civiwian deads in de Bengaw famine of 1943; 0.5 to 1 miwwion Fiwipino civiwian deads; 250,000 to 1,000,000 Burmese civiwian deads; 50,000 East Timorese civiwian deads; and hundreds of dousands of Mawayan, Pacific and oder civiwian deads[page needed]
- 460,000 Japanese civiwian deads (338,000 in de bombings of Japan, 100,000 in de Battwe of Okinawa, 22,000 in de Battwe of Saipan), 543,000 Korean civiwian deads (mostwy due to Japanese forced wabor projects), 2,000–8,000 Thai civiwian deads
- "For fifty-dree wong monds, beginning in Juwy 1937, China stood awone, singwe-handedwy fighting an undecwared war against Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. On 9 December 1941, after Japan's surprise attack on Pearw Harbor, China finawwy decwared war against Japan, uh-hah-hah-hah. What had been for so wong a war between two countries now became part of a much wider Pacific confwict."
- : "It was not an officiaw term, but a term of incitement used by de Japanese media, under de guidance of de miwitary, in order to stir up de Japanese peopwe's sense of crisis..."
- The Neutrawity Patrow had US destroyers fighting at sea, but no state of war had been decwared by Congress.
- The US dereby reversed its opposition to unrestricted submarine warfare. After de war, when morawistic doubts about Hiroshima and oder raids on civiwian targets were woudwy voiced, no one criticized Roosevewt's submarine powicy. (Two German admiraws, Erich Raeder and Karw Dönitz, faced charges at de Nuremberg War Crimes Triaws of viowating internationaw waw drough unrestricted submarine warfare; de court acqwitted dem after dey proved dat Awwied merchant ships were wegitimate miwitary targets under de ruwes in force at de time.)
- Chihaya went on to note dat when de IJN bewatedwy improved its ASW medods, de US submarine force responded by increasing Japanese wosses.
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- "The Pacific War Onwine Encycwopedia" compiwed by Kent G. Budge, 4000 short articwes
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- A reaw tragedy by Ray Daves, a US Navy veteran; from de memoir Radioman: An Eyewitness Account of Pearw Harbor and Worwd War II in de Pacific, as towd to Carow Edgemon Hipperson