The committee's specific recommendations include: reduction to 1,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons on each side within a decade (with a later goal of 1,000 total nuclear weapons on each side); cradle-to-grave transparency on all U.S. and Russian warheads and fissile materials; elimination of the launch-on-warning option and massive attack options from nuclear war plans; and consolidation of Russia's weapons-usable materials into the smallest possible number of locations.
The Committee on Nuclear Policy was formed in 1997 by project directors of several independent non-governmental organizations dealing with nuclear weapon policy issues. Its members include scholars, scientists and researchers, as well as retired military leaders and national lawmakers. (See list of committee members.)
The Berlin Wall fell a decade ago. The Cold War ended almost nine years ago. The old nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union has been transformed. Nevertheless, the nuclear arsenals and attitudes of the United States and Russia still reflect Cold War postures. Worse still, terrifying new nuclear dangers have emerged as these postures are maintained in the face of Russia's on-going economic collapse.
If the notion of either side launching a deliberate, massive nuclear attack against the other is wildly unrealistic, why have the nuclear doctrines of the United States and Russia not changed? Why are thousands of nuclear weapons on both sides still on hair-trigger alert even though they no longer target each other's territory? If Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev could agree that a nuclear war could not be won, and must not be fought, why have the United States and Russia not moved faster in the post-Cold War period to reduce the risk of a nuclear exchange precipitated by a breakdown of authority or miscalculation?
One answer may be that the formal treaty negotiation process, used by the United States and the Soviet Union/Russian Federation to manage their Cold War nuclear rivalry, has not dealt effectively with new post-Cold War realities. The START II Treaty, signed in 1993, aims at force levels (3,000–3,500 deployed strategic warheads) that are no longer appropriate for today, let alone for the 21st century. Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev has stated publicly that Russia is likely to have no more than 500 deployed strategic warheads by 2012 for economic reasons. Yet, START II still has not gone into force because of opposition in the Russian Duma, where it has languished for the past six years. Moreover, formal negotiations for a follow-on START III pact (with further reductions to levels between 2,000 and 2,500) are likely to be time-consuming and, according to the Clinton administration, cannot begin until START II is formally approved by the Duma.
Treaties have served U.S. national interests well, but the pace of this process simply has not kept up with the expansion of nuclear dangers inside Russia. Senior Russian officials have publicly acknowledged that 70 percent of Russia's early warning satellites are either past their designed operational life or in serious disrepair. Senior Russian military officials also have acknowledged that 58 percent of Russia's ballistic missiles are well past their operational life span. Vast amounts of bomb-making materials—plutonium and highly-enriched uranium [HEU]—are poorly protected. These grave conditions invite catastrophic accidents or proliferation.
Neither the United States nor Russia has been willing, in recent years, to complement the slow and cumbersome process of treaty negotiations with actions that could be implemented far more rapidly. The time has now come to supplement treaties with parallel, reciprocal, and verifiable steps to reduce these dangers; dangers that directly threaten vital U.S. national interests.
Following a careful and painstaking examination over the past few months of the formal treaty negotiating process, the Committee on Nuclear Policy has concluded that the START process must be augmented with immediate, parallel, and reciprocal actions. The Committee strongly calls upon the Clinton administration to: reduce nuclear forces to levels far lower than currently envisioned under a START III treaty; take the majority of U.S. forces, alongside Russia, off hair-trigger alert; and, secure, monitor and greatly reduce fissile materials and warhead stockpiles. Concerted effort to achieve these goals could pave the way for formal negotiations at a later date and lock in these initiatives with treaties.
The Committee acknowledges the Reagan, Bush and Clinton administrations' efforts to advance the START process. Even before the end of the Cold War, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev acted prudently to end the U.S.-Soviet strategic rivalry by declaring that a nuclear war must never be fought. They followed up that declaration with the elimination of an entire class of nuclear weapons in Europe by signing the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Presidents Bush and Gorbachev continued to pull back from the strategic competition by concluding the START I Treaty in 1991, obligating the United States and the Soviet Union to deploy no more than 6,000 strategic nuclear weapons. President Bush and Russian President Boris Yeltsin kept that momentum going, agreeing to further reduce deployed strategic forces by half in START II.
The Clinton administration has made great strides in implementing START I. The U.S. arsenal has now dropped below 7,000 accountable warheads. The administration persuaded Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to allow ex-Soviet nuclear warheads to be removed from their territories, and to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states. The administration worked hard to get START II ratified by the U.S. Senate, and successfully engaged President Boris Yeltsin at Helsinki by outlining a START III framework in 1997. The Clinton administration's efforts to secure the indefinite extension of the NPT and the completion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) are equally laudable. All of these efforts have contributed to reducing nuclear dangers of the 21st century.
These notable achievements can be nullified, however, if Russia's continued decline leads to vastly increased nuclear dangers. The Committee believes strongly that more can and must be done to radically reduce the number of U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, reliance on them, and the political value attached to them. While the Committee supports effective nuclear treaties, and the START process, it believes that new impetus is required to reduce nuclear dangers.
After meeting with Clinton administration officials, and with Russian civilian and military leaders, the Committee crafted, and now proposes, a set of initiatives to serve as the basis for supplementing the formal treaty negotiating process—initiatives similar to those undertaken by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1991. Keenly aware of the threat posed by a quickly disintegrating Soviet Union—one nuclear power dangerously on the verge of splitting into multiple nuclear powers—President Bush moved creatively and boldly. In September 1991, he announced that the United States would withdraw to its territory U.S. non-strategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons—artillery shells, short-range missiles, gravity bombs and nuclear weapons aboard U.S. surface naval vessels. He also ordered a thousand U.S. warheads deployed on strategic bombers and ballistic missiles that were slated for dismantlement under START I be taken off alert, even before the treaty was ratified. He further proposed new negotiations on strategic reductions.
President Gorbachev responded in kind, withdrawing all tactical weapons from Warsaw Pact nations and non-Russian republics, removing most categories of tactical nuclear weapons from service and designating thousands of nuclear warheads for dismantlement, while taking several classes of strategic systems off alert. The Soviet president also agreed to the negotiations that Mr. Bush proposed, which resulted in START II.
Mr. Bush's action successfully paved the way for larger nuclear reductions by taking the initiative to reduce an immediate nuclear threat. So, too, should the Clinton administration now take a similar leadership role in advancing creative and bold new steps to address newly pressing nuclear dangers within Russia. The Committee is convinced that such an approach provides the much-needed flexibility for adapting to the pace of the political, economic and military realities of the post-Cold War period.
Part I: Nuclear DangersConsider the following scenarios. Russian strategic rocket forces commanders, unable to reach their ailing president, come dangerously close to launching Russian missiles because an aging early warning radar erroneously indicates their country is under nuclear attack by the United States. A Russian nuclear weapons designer, who has not been paid for nearly a year, sells his services to Iran or Libya. A worker at a facility in one of Russia's once-closed "nuclear cities," now suffering severe economic conditions, delivers enough bomb-grade plutonium or uranium for one or two weapons to a terrorist organization or a rogue state.
These are no longer the scenarios of science fiction. They are real and present dangers that are no longer improbable. The following anecdotes demonstrate just how imminent these dangers are.
• January 1995, a scientific rocket launched by Norway was mistaken for a missile attack on Russia by the West due to a malfunction of Russia's aging early warning system. The Russian president's nuclear briefcase containing Russian forces' launch codes was activated for the first time before the Norwegian launch was deemed peaceful.
• September 1998, five soldiers from the 12th Main Directorate at Novaya Zemlya—Russia's only nuclear weapons test site—killed a guard at the facility, took another guard hostage and tried to hijack an aircraft. The soldiers seized more hostages before being disarmed by other Ministry of Defense forces and Federal Security Service commandos.
• September 1998, a 19-year-old sailor went on a rampage on an Akula-class nuclear-attack submarine, killing seven of his fellow sailors. He barricaded himself inside the torpedo bay for 20 hours, threatening to blow up the submarine with its nuclear reactor. He either committed suicide or was shot by Russian security forces. Russian officials insisted there were no nuclear weapons on board at the time, but unofficial accounts suggest otherwise.
• September 1998, a Ministry of Internal Affairs sergeant at the Mayak facility, where over 30 tons of separated weapons-usable plutonium is stored, shot two fellow soldiers and wounded another before escaping heavily armed. The incident led President Boris Yeltsin to order a review of nuclear security at the site.
• September 1998, a team of U.S. experts visiting Moscow was shown a building containing 100 kilograms of highly enriched uranium—enough for several nuclear bombs—that was completely unguarded because the facility where the fissile material was stored could not afford the $200-a-month salary for a security guard.
• September 1998, some 47,000 unpaid nuclear workers joined in protests at various locations around Russia over what the workers' trade union said was over $400 million in back wages owed to the nuclear sector.
• December 1998, the Chief of the Federal Security Service (FSB) in the Chelyabinsk region told Itar-Tass that FSB agents had prevented the theft and illicit appropriation of 18.5 kilograms of nuclear materials suitable for use in nuclear weapons from one of the nuclear facilities in the Chelyabinsk region.
• Today, Ministry of Internal Affairs guards at several nuclear facilities have left their posts to forage for food. Others have been reluctant to patrol facility perimeters because they did not have winter uniforms to keep them warm on patrol.
• Today, at some nuclear facilities, entire security systems—alarms, surveillance cameras, portal monitors, etc.—have been shut down because electricity was cut off to the facilities for non-payment of bills.
• Today, in hundreds of silos across Russia, sit over 20-year-old ICBMs, with service lives of only ten years, that are so unstable they pose risks of catastrophic proportion to life and the environment.
These examples represent only the tip of a nuclear iceberg. Clearly, time is of the essence. Waiting on the START process not only exacerbates these dangers for Russia but increases the risks of a nuclear accident, unauthorized launch, or nuclear materials falling into hostile hands. Waiting for the Duma to ratify START II also weakens the NPT, which requires a good faith effort toward meeting nuclear disarmament obligations.
The Committee on Nuclear Policy calls on the Clinton administration to lead, and, to engage Russia in parallel, reciprocal, and verifiable measures to reduce post-Cold War nuclear dangers. The Committee calls on the administration to establish a new nuclear relationship with Russia for the post-Cold War era.
Part II: Recommendations I. Deep Reductions
Russia can no longer afford to maintain the huge nuclear arsenal that it inherited from the former Soviet Union, and its civilian and military leadership have publically acknowledged that Russia will not be able to deploy the forces allowed under START II or START III. Because of serious concerns over safety and control of Russia's arsenal presented above, and because both Russia and the United States have arsenals well in excess of that needed to deter an attack, the United States should:
• Supplement formal arms control treaties with parallel, reciprocal, and verifiable reductions;
• Immediately declare U.S. intention to reduce, alongside Russia, to 1,000 deployed strategic nuclear weapons within a decade;
• Offer cradle-to-grave transparency on the status of all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons as the basis for reciprocal reductions;
• With reciprocal verification, subsequently reduce to 1,000 total nuclear weapons on each side;
• Seek agreement from the other nuclear weapons states on a ceiling on their current deployment levels and begin multilateral talks on reductions once the United States and Russia reach 1,000 total nuclear weapons.
The formal treaty process is stalled. There is no telling when START II will be ratified by the Russian Duma. The Clinton administration's posture of waiting for the Duma to act before proceeding to negotiate START III is untenable. Even if the Duma did act, it is highly unlikely that START III negotiations would result in a complete agreement before Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin leave office. That means more time lost.
Supplementing the formal treaty process with parallel, reciprocal, verifiable, and deep reductions serves U.S. national security interests. By proposing reductions down to 1,000 deployed strategic weapons, well below currently proposed START III levels, the United States opens the door for Russia to move more quickly in the direction that it has to go anyway. Willingness by the United States to cooperatively reduce strategic forces down to this level sends a signal that Washington seeks a new post-Cold War nuclear relationship with Moscow. Consequently, Russia may be more likely to agree to greater openness and transparency on its weapons, which the United States must insist on for deep reductions. The Committee advocates this positive-sum tradeoff: Russia secures rough parity at lower levels, while the United States secures transparency in Russia needed to make reductions irreversible.
Cradle-to-grave transparency, the tracking and accountability of every warhead from its production to its dismantlement and destruction, must be the linchpin of a deep reduction regime so as to make it maximally verifiable and irreversible. Russia has been less than enthusiastic about greater openness for its nuclear holdings. This must change, and is more likely with the offer of parallel deep reductions.
Agreement between the United States and Russia to reduce to 1,000 deployed strategic weapons would also include an agreement to second stage reductions down to 1,000 total weapons, which would include the tactical nuclear weapons that concern the United States and our European allies. In return for addressing Russian concerns of asymmetry at the strategic level, Moscow must shed light on its inventory of tactical nuclear weapons, which are aging and reaching obsolescence, in any event. Reductions to 1,000 total weapons on each side coincide with the proposed limit called for in the 1997 report by the National Academy of Sciences, The Future of Nuclear Weapons.
Moreover, bilateral reductions to this level would then pave the way for five power nuclear negotiations to deal with residual nuclear forces. This reduction regime could also reap major non-proliferation benefits. It moves the P-5 states significantly toward meeting their nuclear disarmament obligations under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
II. Removing the Hair-Trigger
That a large, powerful and unstable Russian nuclear arsenal is also on hair-trigger alert, capable of being launched within a few minutes of an attack warning, greatly heightens the risk of an accidental or unauthorized launch. U.S. forces are equally poised for quick launch. Neither the United States nor Russia can be secure with so many nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. No other single measure would more clearly signal the end of the mutual suspicion carried over from the Cold War than taking these weapons off quick launch status. The Committee calls on the United States to:
• Immediately stand down, alongside Russia, nuclear forces slated for destruction under START II;
• Declare its intention, with a parallel, reciprocal commitment from Russia, to eliminate the launch-on-warning option from nuclear war plans;
• Begin discussions among the five nuclear weapon states on verifiably removing all nuclear forces from hair-trigger alert;
• Declare its intention, with a parallel, reciprocal commitment from Russia, to verifiably eliminate massive attack options from nuclear war plans.
Despite the 1994 Clinton-Yeltsin pact not to aim nuclear missiles at each other, U.S. and Russian forces still are loaded with their wartime targets that can be reactivated within seconds for Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and minutes for Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). Therefore, if a launch order were sent under current circumstances, 4,000 ICBM warheads (2,000 on each side) could be on their way to their targets within a few minutes and another 1,000 SLBM warheads could be en route to targets shortly thereafter.
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin also agreed in 1997 at their Helsinki summit to "de-activate" missiles slated for destruction under START II by 2004. The dangers posed by having so many weapons on hair-trigger alert demand that these missiles be stood down immediately. An immediate stand down would reduce the number of weapons on hair-trigger alert from 2,500 (on each side) currently to 500—the number Russia would retain on quick-launch under the START II provisions.
The stand down could be monitored by national technical means, as well as by existing extensive rights for random, short-notice missile inspections under START I. Above all, the stand down would benefit U.S. national security interests and the safety of its citizens. This action would also achieve a major psychological benefit by breaking with the Cold War psyche. So, too, would the declaration to eliminate the launch-on-warning option. The declaration could be implemented by procedural changes similar to those that now preclude the launch of U.S. missiles directed at China. Like the existing de-targeting declaration, these procedural changes could not be readily verifiable. Confidence in and verifiability of the declaration could be achieved gradually as transparency arrangements and other de-alerting measures, such as removing warheads from missiles, are implemented.
The alert levels of French and British nuclear forces are low. China does not appear to have strategic nuclear forces on alert. Including the forces of these nuclear weapons states in talks to verifiably remove all nuclear forces from hair-trigger alert is pivotal to Russia's acceptance of such a move.
The elimination of massive attack options goes to the heart of transforming Cold War postures. Taking this step would be the first material acknowledgment that a deliberate, premeditated, mutually suicidal bombardment is both implausible and unthinkable. The Committee believes that launch-on-warning postures and massive nuclear targeting options are no longer suitable in contemporary circumstances.
III. Fissile Material and Warhead Controls
Central to U.S. security is ensuring that nuclear weapons and the essential ingredients to make them do not fall into hostile hands. With the escalating economic crisis in Russia, immediate action is needed to consolidate, secure, and account for all stockpiles of nuclear warheads and weapons-usable nuclear materials. A comprehensive accounting and monitoring regime for warheads and fissile materials is critical to the verification of the deep reductions the Committee proposes, and, to making them irreversible. This regime would also provide an urgently-needed defense against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and fissile materials to other states or sub-national groups. The Committee calls on the United States to:
• Help install modern security and accounting systems and provide resources and incentives for sustaining effective security at all Russian nuclear facilities;
• Help consolidate Russia's weapons-usable materials into the smallest possible number of locations;
• Help shrink the Russian nuclear weapons complex;
• Promote alternative employment in Russia's nuclear cities;
• Build a cradle-to-grave transparency and monitoring system for all warheads and fissile materials;
• Negotiate reductions in fissile material stocks in excess of that needed to support a 1,000-warhead stockpile;
• Triple current funding for fissile materials controls.
With nuclear guards walking off their posts to forage for food and thousands of workers with access to fissile materials striking to protest months of unpaid wages, improving the security at Russia's nuclear facilities is warranted on an emergency basis. The expanded scope of assistance that the Committee proposes is essential not only to control missiles and launchers as in the past, but also to expand controls over nuclear warheads and fissile materials.
Fissile materials are stored at over 100 buildings located in over 50 different sites throughout Russia and the former Soviet Union. It is essential to consolidate this material at as few sites as possible. It is equally essential that all remaining facilities are equipped with modern security and accounting systems, and are provided with the resources and incentives necessary to sustain security well into the future, including a new focus on the "human factor" to help instill a new safeguards culture.
The sheer size of Russia's vast nuclear weapons complex poses a monumental challenge in controlling and safeguarding fissile materials and warheads. In Russia's ten "nuclear cities," tens of thousands of nuclear scientists, engineers and technicians, are in dire economic straits. An investment of roughly $500 million over the next five years by the United States—with Russian contributions as well—could be used to downsize this giant complex and provide alternative employment to its workers who might be tempted not only to steal fissile materials, but also sell their services to others.
Cradle-to-grave transparency needed to achieve deep reductions requires a credible, detailed exchange of data on stockpiles of warheads and fissile materials. Reciprocal monitoring of sites where warheads are stored pending dismantlement would be required as well. Relaxing nuclear secrecy would require a major change in psychology, particularly on the Russian side. Russian transparency will be difficult to secure unless the United States is willing to make the kinds of reductions in its arsenal that Russia is now forced to make because of its economic crisis, and to permit equivalent transparency.
Both to ensure that excess warheads are dismantled as rapidly and as safely as practicable, and to increase the incentive for Russia to accept cradle-to-grave transparency, the United States should provide financial assistance to defray Russian dismantlement costs, including costs to increase its dismantlement capacity if necessary.
To avoid having to secure vast stockpiles of excess fissile materials indefinitely, and to make deep reductions irreversible, the Committee calls on the United States and Russia to agree on a level of plutonium and highly enriched uranium stocks sufficient only to maintain the maximum 1,000 total warhead-stockpile. While en route to this fissile material stockpile, the United States and Russia should move as quickly as possible to establish arrangements to transform current excess fissile material stocks into forms that would make it far more difficult to ever convert them for use in weapons again. As a first step, the United States could offer to purchase additional amounts of Russia's HEU from weapons that have been blended down to non-weapons usable form, with the proceeds going back into consolidating and improving security at fissile material storage cites. The United States could also offer Russia financial incentives to blend down all its excess HEU to less than 20 percent as quickly as possible, thereby reducing risks of proliferation.
The United States could encourage the conversion of excess plutonium to forms that are no more weapons-usable than the plutonium in commercial spent fuel, using the method preferred by each side that could be implemented quickly and with stringent safeguards and security throughout the process.
As the United States and Russia reduce their stockpiles of fissile materials, it is vitally important to ensure that no new materials are being produced. The Committee calls on the United States and Russia to establish transparency at each other's enrichment plants to ensure that no additional HEU is being produced. The two countries should also complete the conversion of Russia's plutonium production reactors so that they no longer produce weapons-grade plutonium. These measures would provide valuable experience and impetus for concluding an international fissile material cutoff treaty.
The expanded scope and level of effort proposed by the Committee would require a tripling of the funds currently spent on fissile materials controls in Russia. The cost to address this threat is small compared to the cost and risk of failure to control fissile materials in the former Soviet Union.
Finally, effective management of a new U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship also involves addressing differences over the issue of ballistic missile defenses (BMD). Members of the Committee have strongly held views on the utility of BMD. Many members seriously question the efficacy of a national missile defense (NMD) and seek to maintain the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as the cornerstone of U.S.-Russian strategic stability. Others are inclined to support a limited nmd, if combined with deep cuts in offensive weapons. Realizing that another significant debate over defenses and the ABM Treaty is in the offing, the Committee agreed on a set of criteria by which to evaluate objectively any NMD proposals and against which a deployment decision should be weighed. The Committee believes that national missile defense deployment proposals should:
• Have a clearly defined, achievable mission;
• Prove missile defense technologies under repeated, rigorous testing;
• Be affordable;
• Be cost effective at the margin;
• Be pursued in a balanced fashion along with other measures to reduce nuclear threats;
• Have an overall impact that should reduce nuclear dangers, taking into account their potential impacts on nuclear arms reductions and non-proliferation.
The Committee does not believe that the START process of formal treaty negotiations is irrelevant, or that it should be jettisoned. The Committee believes, however, that the START process should be supplemented with new initiatives to directly address the new nuclear realities and risks of the post-Cold War period. The Committee calls on the Clinton administration to break the current six-year logjam on START II ratification; radically reform the management of the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship; and, to take the lead in reducing both reliance on nuclear weapons and the political value attached to them.
To continue to rely solely on the stalemated START process is to needlessly increase the costs and risks of maintaining U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals at levels well in excess of what is needed to deter an attack. The Committee's initiatives for deep reductions, removing nuclear forces from hair-trigger alert, safeguarding fissile materials and warhead controls, not only would reduce these costs and risks, but could also set the stage for a larger, more cooperative multilateral security framework for the 21st century.
Prior to the disintegration of the Soviet Union, President Bush responded quickly and successfully to an immediate nuclear danger. Immediately following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar acted quickly to harness U.S. funds and expertise to consolidate scattered Soviet warheads under Russian control and to destroy the delivery vehicles for those warheads. Even more far-reaching measures, to be implemented just as quickly, are now needed by the United States to respond to even greater post-Cold War nuclear dangers.
Committee on Nuclear Policy
[Back to Introductory text]Jesse James, executive director, The Henry L. Stimson Center
Alexi Arbatov, Center for Political and Military Forecasts
Bruce Blair, The Brookings Institution
Matthew Bunn, Harvard University
Adm. Eugene Carroll (U.S. Navy, Ret.), Center for Defense Information
Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Sen. Alan Cranston, State of the World Forum
Amb. Jonathan Dean, Union of Concerned Scientists
Harold Feiveson, Princeton University
Trevor Findlay, Verification Research, Training and Information Centre
Cathleen Fisher, The Henry L. Stimson Center
Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster (U.S. Army, Ret.)
Amb. Thomas Graham, Jr., Lawyers Alliance for World Security
Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute
Wade Huntley, Nautilus Institute
John Isaacs, Council for a Livable World
Rebecca Johnson, The Acronym Institute
Daryl Kimball, Coalition to Reduce Nuclear Dangers
Andrew Krepinevich, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
Michael Krepon, The Henry L. Stimson Center
Ken Luongo, Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council
Robert Manning, Council on Foreign Relations
Will Marshall, Progressive Policy Institute
Robert S. McNamara
Alistair Millar, Fourth Freedom Forum
Harald Müller, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt
Janne Nolan, The Century Fund
Christopher E. Paine, Natural Resources Defense Council
Alexander Pikayev, Carnegie Endowment Moscow Center
Daniel Plesch, British American Security Information Council
Ben Sanders, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Annette Schaper, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
Lawrence Scheinman, The Monterey Institute
Stephen Schwartz, Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science
Leon Sigal, Social Science Research Center
John Simpson, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Clifford Singer, University of Illinois
John Steinbruner, The Brookings Institution
Adm. Stansfield Turner (U.S. Navy, Ret.)
Frank von Hippel, Princeton University