The Royal Navy’s plans for its carriers are not about “asserting its position as a leading maritime force” or inter-service arguments about who can best deliver a punch. Naval warfare is fought in three dimensions: below, on, and above the surface, and naval combatants have to be able to fight in each of those dimensions. The Bismarck would not have been sunk, nor the Falklands retaken, without the help of carrier-borne aircraft, while HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sunk for lack of carrier-borne aircraft.
Without carriers, a navy becomes a coastal defence force, capable of operating effectively only under the umbrella of land-based aircraft.
David J. Critchley
Since the end of the Cold War, the British government has reduced our armed forces to the point where the political and operational risks of operating alone as a national force would usually be intolerable. Press reports indicate that the remaining Joint Force Harrier aircraft are heavily tasked in support of operations in the Middle East, so it should not be surprising that Harriers
were not available for training on HMS Illustrious. The fact that HMS Illustrious operated with US Marine Corps aircraft is an excellent example of training for coalition operations. Our armed forces need to train with potential allies to improve effectiveness and to reduce the probabilities of fratricide. Again, the media records that our forces train with many other nations including ones that are not recent operational allies (for example India); this is good preparation for the unexpected. Armed forces can be equated to an insurance policy; you get what you pay for and you never know what you need until the unexpected happens. Thus, we should not criticise (even by inference) the preparation for the unexpected.