Since Madrid authorized a suspension of hostilities less than forty-eight hours before Mckinley was to deliver his message on Cuba to Congress, attention was immediately directed to how Spain's decision would affect his message and Congress. The results quickly disillusioned Madrid; the announcement of a suspension of hostilities produced no discernible effect on the White House, Congress, or the Cuban insurgents. Europe's diplomats were frustrated by the Mckinley administration's failure to respond, yet they were unwilling to do anything for Spain. In Washington the most important question was whether to recognize the Cuban Republic, and once that was resolved, Congress quickly empowered the president to use force in Cuba.
At first, hopes for peace ran high when Spain agreed to a suspension of hostilities; diplomats were euphoric. Woodford predicted a final Cuban settlement by 1 August and asked that "nothing . . . be done to humiliate Spain as [he was] satisfied that the present Government [was] going and [was] loyally ready to go, as fast and as far as it [could.]" Ireland thought that the cease-fire would enable Mckinley to delay congressional action, since the president could tell Congress that the Cuban war had ended, that Spain would now try by ever greater concessions to win