The main source of documentation for Salerno to Cassino is the body of official records of the U.S. Army in the Mediterranean theater, the files of reports, letters, and messages contained at the time of the volume's preparation for the most part in the General Services Administration's National Archives and Records Service in Washington, D.C., and in the Federal Records Centers at Suitland, Maryland, and Kansas City, Missouri. Incidental files maintained by the General Reference Branch of OCMH were also helpful. Because the bulk and extent of the official records impose the problem of selection on the historian, it is necessary to add that the major research was carried out in the files of the Operations (G-3) Sections of the pertinent headquarters.
Compared to the records maintained later in the war and particularly by those engaged in the European theater, the official records of the Mediterranean theater are impersonal even though they are copious. Telephone journals, which reveal not only the personalities of commanders but their methods of operation, for example, are entirely lacking. In their place are found occasional memorandums of record, which may or may not disclose the significant details that permit human characterization to be added to a narrative. All the major headquarters and units in the theater prepared monthly after action reports supported by journals and journal files, in which are found directives, operations instructions, periodic reports, messages, and the like. The narrative reports vary in quality, that is, in the perception they offer. The after action reports of the 3d, 34th, and 45th Divisions concentrate on the movements of regiments and battalions and are lacking in exposing commanders' observations, estimates of the situation, and reasons for decisions; the monthly reports of the 36th Division are somewhat better, but they are not as good as the best ones prepared by units later in the war. It would seem that as the war continued, the participants improved their reporting techniques and learned increasingly how to present significant accounts of their experience.
The best secondary source on the American operations in the Italian campaign is the Fifth Army History, written by members of the Fifth Army Historical Section and published shortly after the war in Italy. An after action report in concept, the History gives a straightforward account of operations, including material not only on the command problems but also on the tactical details of the subordinate units. The appendixes contain personnel and ammunition figures and lists, operations orders and directives, and other useful information; maps, charts, and statistics are included. Volumes I through IV are relevant for the period under consideration.
Unit histories are few in number. Excellent for local color and tactical detail are: Donald G. Taggart, ed., The History of the Third Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); James J. Altieri,
Darby's Rangers (Durham, N. C.: Seaman Printery, 1945); Robert D. Burhans, The First Special Service Force (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); and George F. Howe, The Battle History of the 1st Armored Division (Washington: Combat Forces Press, 1954). Unfortunately, published histories of the 34th, 36th, and 45th Infantry Divisions do not seem to exist; nor are there published accounts of the II and VI Corps operations.
Four pamphlets--Salerno: American Operations from the Beaches to the Volturno (Washington, 1944); From the Volturno to the Winter Line (Washington, 1944); Fifth Army at the Winter Line (Washington, 1945); and Anzio Beachhead (Washington, 1947)--in the AMERICAN FORCES IN ACTION series give excellent accounts of particular segments of the Italian campaign. They emphasize small unit action. Their clear maps and vivid illustrations make them particularly valuable. No similar study was made of the fighting around Cassino.
For operations of the British Eighth Army in Italy, I have relied largely on Field Marshal Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's El Alamein to the River Sangro (Germany: British Army of the Rhine, 1946); on the more personal account of his chief of staff, Major-General Sir Francis de Guingand, Operation Victory (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947); and on Lt. Col. G. W. L. Nicholson's The Canadians in Italy, 1943-1945, Volume II of the "Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War" (Ottawa: E. Cloutier, Queen's Printer, 1956). The operations of the French Expeditionary Corps have been ably presented by General Marcel Carpentier, who was General Alphonse Juin's chief of staff, in his Les Forces Alliées en Italie: la Campagne d'Italie (Paris: Berger-Levrault, 1949).
The memoir literature for the period is extensive. Particularly important are: Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950); Lucian K. Truscott, Jr., Command Missions (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1954); Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1951); Albert Kesselring, A Soldier's Record (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1954); and Siegfried Westphal, The German Army in the West (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1951).
Not quite in the category of memoir literature because they are less personal in their views are the published dispatches of General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, General Sir Harold R. L. G. Alexander, and Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, and the unpublished dispatch of General Eisenhower on Mediterranean operations. All are interesting for the analyses of the operations that these commanders directed.
Official histories relevant for the period include: Maurice Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1943-1944, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959); two volumes of "The Army Air Forces in World War II," edited by Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate, Volume II, Europe: TORCH to POINTBLANK (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1949), and Volume III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951); The Tiger Triumphs: The Story of Three Great Divisions in Italy (His
Majesty's Stationery Office for the Government of India, 1946); John Ehrman, "History of the Second World War," Grand Strategy, Volume V, August 1943-September 1944 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1956); and Robert W. Coakley and Richard M. Leighton, Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1968), which I was privileged to see in manuscript.
The General Reference Branch of OCMH has collected personal accounts written shortly after the war as student theses by officers attending the Advanced Courses at Fort Benning, Georgia, and Fort Knox, Kentucky. These studies detail the experience of junior officers in the combat arms during the Italian campaign and give valuable impressions of men under fire.
The Mathews file in OCMH consists of miscellaneous materials gathered by Dr. Sidney T. Mathews during the war, when he was a combat historian in Italy, and afterwards. The Salmon file, also in OCMH, consists of documents and records collected by Dr. Dwight Salmon during the course of his service as a senior historian in the Mediterranean theater.
I have had the privilege of consulting the wartime diaries of General Jacob Devers, General Mark W. Clark, Maj. Gen. John P. Lucas, and Maj. Gen. Fred L. Walker. I have also had access to notes made by Dr. Howard McGaw Smyth from General Eisenhower's office diary. Generals Clark and Walker have been most gracious in their help not only by giving me their personal impressions of incidents and events but also by answering questions on the conduct of operations. In addition, I have used notes of interviews by Dr. Mathews, Dr. Smyth, Dr. Philip A. Crowl, and others with some of the principal commanders in the campaign.
The best short account of the Italian campaign is Chester G. Starr's From Salerno to the Alps (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948). Jacques Mordal's Cassino (Paris: Amiot-Dumont, 1952) is a superb rendering of the battles in that area. Fred Majdalany's Cassino (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1952) is a beautifully written account of the same subject, though somewhat unfair to certain American commanders and units. Wynford Vaughan-Thomas gives a British point of view in his Anzio (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1961). My version, Anzio: The Gamble That Failed (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1963), might be said to have an American viewpoint. Two essays in Kent Roberts Greenfield, ed., Command Decisions (Washington, 1960) are relevant: Ralph S. Mavrogordato's brilliant account, "Hitler's Decision on the Defense of Italy," and my study, "General Lucas at Anzio."
The German side of the story has been drawn largely from seven manuscripts prepared by Mr. Mavrogordato for this volume, manuscripts that are filed in OCMH. The documentary basis of Mr. Mavrogordato's work is the body of official German records. He made particular use of the diary and diary appendixes of the German Tenth Army, which reflect events occurring below, at the corps level, and above, at army group level. He found corps documents generally too detailed and somewhat unbalanced. Most records of the army group have been lost. The journal of telephone
conversations between commanders and between chiefs of staff on army group and army echelons--not kept until the middle of October 1943--reveals personal attitudes and reactions, as well as facts.
The war diary of the OKW Armed Forces Operations Staff is the most valuable source for strategic background and high-level policy. It shows how decisions were reached and details the differences of opinion between Hitler and his Operations Staff (in particular Jodl and Warlimont). Comments on the diary, written by Warlimont after the war (in OCMH files), form an important supplement that cannot be separated from the diary itself.
Among the postwar narratives written by German officers, the best ones for the period under study are Kesselring's (less an apology than his published book) and Westphal's (less tendentious than his book); these accounts in Der Feldzug in Italien, a manuscript collection in OCMH files, are interesting for their revelations of attitudes and opinions rather than beneficial for accuracy and completeness. Vietinghoff's and Senger's comments, in the same manuscript collection, are also useful for insights into German operations, though the former is rather concerned with defending the honor of the German soldier and the latter turns strongly around critical evaluations of commanders holding Nazi political beliefs. Hauser's manuscript and Mackensen's comments are important for the period of the Anzio beachhead.
The Steiger manuscript, written by Mr. Alfred G. Steiger, a member of the Canadian Army Historical Section, has been most helpful.
Since the research for and writing of Salerno to Cassino were completed in 1965, other materials have become available in the form of histories and memoirs.