SUBJECT AREA National Military Strategy
CHEMICAL WARFARE IN FUTURE MILITARY OPERATIONS
The Writing Program
Command and Staff College
Commander Robert W. Adams, MSC
United States Navy
April 6, 1984
Chemical Warfare in Future Military Operations
Chemical agents will play a significant role in future military
conflicts, because their tactical and strategic effectiveness
out weigh existing legal and moral restraints.
A. Horrors of Chemical Warfare
1. Hague Agreement 1899
2. Geneva Protool 1925
II. History of Development
B. Porton Downs and Edgewater Arsenal
C. Germany - Nerve gas
III. Types of Chemical Agents
IV. Delivery Systems
C. The Binary Concept
V. Chemical Agent Use
A. British - Afghanistan
B. Japan - China
E. World War II
G. Soviets - Afghanistan
H. Iran - Iraq War
As the spring day of April 22, 1915 drew to a close,
the Allied soldiers were entrenched around the small village
of Langemarck, near Ypres, France. A few hundred yards away
across the no man's land, the 23rd and 26th German Army
Corps were crouched in their trenches. The German bombard-
ment had momentarily stopped, and the Allies, French reserv-
ists and Algerians, enjoyed the soft cool breeze that had
recently sprung up. At 5:00 p.m. the Germans began another
artillery barrage. High explosive shells pounded Ypres and
surrounding villages. The allies around Langemarck saw
greenish yellow clouds rise from the enemy lines and slowly
move toward them carried by the light breeze. The clouds of
gas were chlorine, released from 6,000 cylinders spread out
along the four mile German front. As "the breeze stirred
again, one hundred and sixty tons of it, five feet high and
hugging the ground, began to roll towards the Allied trenches".1
What happened next was one of the most frightening and
horrible experiences ever faced by men at war. The acrid
green cloud enveloped the soldiers and they began to cough,
clutch at their throats and gasp for air. The chlorine gas
produced an immediate inflammation of the bronchial tubes
and lungs. Massive amounts of fluid blocked their windpipes.
Many turned blue and fell to the ground dead. Others
panicked and ran, only later to be caught by the cloud and
stopped dead in mid-flight. Those who were able to escape
stumbled, coughing and choking, into first aid stations
where doctors and other medical personnel were unable to
provide any effective medical treatment. The gas and artil-
lery attack had killed 5,000 men and injured 10,000 more.
The Germans had opened a four mile gap in the Allied front.
Chemical warfare had begun.
"The feelings of shock and outrage produced by this
first gas attack were compounded by the fact that poison gas
was specifically outlawed by international law."2 The
Hague Declaration of 1899, with Germany a signatory, prohib-
ited the use of projectiles the object of which is the
diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The Germans
insisted that by using gas cylinders rather than projectiles,
they had avoided breaking the Hague agreement.
As horrible as it was, the gas attacks were to continue
for the remainder of the war. Chlorine and other agents
developed by both the Germans and the allies, claimed over
1.3 million wounded and 91,000 dead. Professor Fritz Haber,
pioneer of gas warfare, upon receiving the Nobel Prize for
Chemistry in 1919, made a statement that has and will continue
to haunt all of mankind, In no future war will the military
be able to ignore poison gas , he predicted, for it is a
higher form of killing.
Many people will argue that "the 1925 Geneva Protocol,
an international treaty that puts poison gas in a special
category of horror and commits its signatories--now just
about everybody--to avoid its use", 3 has and will continue
to be an effective ban to chemical agents. I do not believe
this to be true. An examination of warfare, since the signing
of the treaty, reveals chemical agent development and use up
to the present day. What is even more alarming, is the apparent
escalation and proliferation of chemical warfare in the last
five years. Chemical agents will play a significant role in
future military conflicts, because their tactical and strategic
effectiveness outweigh existing legal and moral restraints.
The end of the first World War brought with it an increase
in research and development of chemical warfare agents.
Phosgene and mustard, developed and used by the British in
World War I, were to signal the start of this ultimate weapon
race. In 1918, a team based at Catholic University, Washington,
D. C. discovered Lewisite.4 A blister agent, it was faster
acting than mustard gas and caused "immediate excruciating
pain in the skin, and sneezing, coughing, pain and tightness in
the chest on inhalation, often accompanied by nausea and
vomiting." 5 These developments were followed by improve-
ments of earlier discovered agents. Hydrogen mustard,
phosgene oxime, hydrogen cyanide, cyanogen chloride and
others came out of the super secret laboratories such as
England's Porton Downs or the United States' Edgewater Arsenal.
In 1936, however, Dr. Gerhard Schrader, a German scientist
researching organic phosphorus compounds for a more effective
insecticide, came upon a series of poisons that "were as great
an advance over the chemical weapons of the First World War
as the machine gun was over the musket."6 Tabun, the first
nerve agent; caused numerous lethal symptoms in laboratory
animals, acted rapidly, was colorless, practically odorless,
and could poison the body by either inhalation or penetration
through the skin.
While it is not the purpose of this paper to make the
reader an expert in chemical warfare agents, a short explana-
tion of the various common types may be in order at this time.
The U. S. military services identify four major categories of
agents: Nerve, Blister, Blood and Choking. Each of these
categories contain agents which cause different symptoms, and
have a different effect on the human body.
Choking agents are volatile gases, such as Phosgene or
Diphosgene, which are colorless. They, like the earlier
mentioned chlorine gas, cause the symptoms of coughing,
choking, nausea and headache, and effect man by damaging
and flooding the lungs. The rate of action is immediate to
three hours after exposure. First aid includes avoiding
movement, keeping warm and assisting in respiration, if
Blood agents, such as hydrogen cyanide or cyanogen
chloride, are a vapor producing liquid which, when inhaled,
cause convulsions and coma and are generally lethal. For
example, hydrogen cyanide is normally utilized in this country's
prison gas chambers. Its rate of action is rapid and, like
the choking agents, is non-persistent because of its vola-
tility. First aid consists of inhaling amyl nitrate and arti-
ficial respiration if necessary.
Blister agents, such as mustard, nitrogen mustard, and
Lewisite, are oily, often viscous liquids which cause eye
irritation and stinging of the skin initially followed in hours
to days by blistering of the skin, destruction of the respira-
tory tract and temporary blindness. Because of their viscosity,
they can remain on the ground and on objects to contaminate
persons weeks, or even months, after application. First aid
consists of decontaminating the skin, as soon as possible after
exposure, with a decontamination kit or warm soapy water.
Nerve agents are of two major types, the G-agents, such
as Tabun, Sarin and Soman; and the V-agents, such as VX which
is a thickened G-agent. It is interesting to note that Sarin
is about ten times as powerful as Tabun, and Soman (currently
being manufactured in great quantities by the Soviets) is
several times more powerful than Sarin. Nerve agents can be
distributed as a liquid, aerosol spray or vapor. As previously
mentioned, they are rapid acting causing difficulty in breathing,
nausea, vomiting, convulsions, dim vision, and muscular twitching
First aid treatment is atropine injection, artificial respiration
and rapid skin decontamination.
In addition to these four major categories of agents,
there are several others which are significant because of their
use as chemical warfare agents in recent military conflicts.
These include defoliants (agent orange), tear or riot gas (CS),
and toxins (mycotoxins, yellow rain).
There are a variety of delivery systems utilized for
chemical agents. The nerve gas artillery shell, such as the
American 121 series of 155-mm projectiles, have been in produc-
tion since the middle 1950's. This shell, containing approxi-
mately six pounds of chemical may be detonated as an air burst
by use of a proximity or time fuse. The nerve agent is atomized
into a cloud of small droplets which are inhaled by the lungs or
settle on the skin. Other methods of delivery include hand
grenades, mortar shells, bombs or helicopter spray units.
Mines utilizing a persistent agent, such as nitrogen mustard
or VX, may be utilized to deny certain terrain to the enemy,
thereby restricting his movement. Tactical missiles, such
as the Soviet SCUD-B, may contain either bulk agents or small
bomblets which are dispersed over the target.
A recent development in delivery systems is the binary
concept. First proposed by the U. S. Army in 1954, it is the
idea of keeping two harmless agents apart until delivery, at
which time they are mixed forming the lethal agent. The Army
has spent approximately 100 million dollars to develop the
155-mm artillery projectile which contains the non-persistent
nerve agent Sarin (GB) and the XM-736 8-inch howitzer round
containing the persistent VX agent.7 Each shell contains
two canisters, separated by rupture discs, which fracture on
firing. Needless to say, this concept solves many of the pre-
vious problems associated with chemical weapons including
handling and storage hazards, and container corrosive hazards.
Historical accounts of military conflicts since World War
I would lead us to believe that chemical weapons use was non-
existent for legal or ethical restrictions, or for fear of
retaliation. Matthew Meselson, a noted biochemist, quoted in
CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare, published in 1968, states
that "there have been only two instances of verified poison
gas warfare since 1925--in Ethiopia and in Yemen." 8 A
preponderance of evidence, however, now exists to indicate that
there have been numerous instances of chemical warfare use in
military conflicts since World War I. This information has
only recently become available, because of the high degree of
classification of this sensitive subject.
In 1919 in India, stocks of phosgene and mustard gas were
sent out from Britian for use on the frontier. "The Royal Air
Force is alleged to have used gas bombs against the Afghans.
By 1925, the French and Spanish were employing poison gas in
Morocco, and it had become clear that chemical warfare had
found a new role, as a tool by which major powers could police
rebellious territories."9 These two allegations, although
not backed by specific governmental records, have been cited in
several well researched texts on chemical warfare history and
In 1933, the Japanese established The Army Chemical Warfare
School at Narashino, twenty-one miles east of Tokyo. The eleven
month course ran for twelve years and turned out over 3300 chem-
ical warfare officers for the Japanese Army. "There is little
doubt that from 1937 onwards, the Japanese made extensive use
of poison gas in their war against the Chinese."1O They were
alleged to have used mustard gas to drive Chinese peasants from
caves and tunnels. This was witnessed by a large number of
people including a British surgeon who treated a number of
the gas casualties. In 1938, China made a formal protest to the
League of Nations.
In 1935 and 1936, after the Italian invasion of Abyssinia,
over 700 tons of mustard gas was shipped there for use by the
Italian Air Force. Torpedo shaped 500 lb. bombs, with a time
fuse, were utilized. These bombs burst about 200 feet above
the ground, scattering spray over a considerable area. Later-
aerial spraying was the preferred method. "Groups of 9 to 15
aircraft followed one another so that the liquid issuing from
them formed a continuous fog...soldiers, women, children,
cattle, rivers, lakes and pastures were drenched continually
with this deadly rain." 11 As a result, over 15,000 Abyssinians
were killed or wounded by chemical weapons during this war.
The non-use of chemical warfare agents during World War II
is looked upon by many as an example of the effectiveness of
international legal (Geneva Protocol) and moral restrictions.
After all, this major world conflict offered many opportunities
for poison gas use. Why then wasn't it utilized? For a variety
of reasons, I believe, none of which were influenced by the
legalities or ethics involved.
In the case of the allies, it was mainly because they were
not nearly as well prepared as the Germans and they realized it.
They knew from various intelligence sources that Germany had
thousands of tons of a variety of types of chemical warfare
agents stockpiled. Also, they were aware of the development of
the nerve agent (Tabun), although they were unable to duplicate
it in their own laboratories. In addition, Americans also
feared that the Japanese possessed large stocks of poison gas.
This later was determined to be untrue. It is interesting to
note that public opinion polls in 1944 suggested that as much as
40% of the American population favored the use of chemical war-
fare agents against the Japanese. Newspaper headlines shouted
support of this concept: "We Should Gas Japan' (1943); 'You Can
Cook 'Em Better With Gas'(1944); 'Should We Gas the Japs?'
In the case of the Germans, the reasons for non-use are
more complex. They had the capability of producing over 12,000
tons of poison gas every month. They were believed to have had
over 70,000 tons of Tabun and two types of mustard gas stockpiled
The German high command's view of moral actions, as exemplified
by their treatment of Jews and other minorities, was certainly
not a restricting factor. Why then did Hitler not order its use?
"The reason he failed to do so probably had much
to do with a conversation at the Wolf's Lair,
his headquarters in East Prussia, back in May 1943.
After the collapse at Stalingrad, both Speer and
his chemical warfare expert, Otto Ambros, were sum-
moned to a special conference by Hitler to discuss
using gas to stem the Russian advance. Ambros
began by saying that the Allies could out-produce
Germany in chemical weapons. Hitler interrupted
to say that he understood that might be true of
conventional gases-'but Germany has a special gas,
tabun. In this we have a monopoly in Germany.'
Ambros shook his head. 'I have justified reasons to
assume that tabun, too, is known abroad.' According
to Ambros, the essential nature of tabun and sarin
had been disclosed in technical journals as long
ago as 1902, and like many other German scientists
he could not believe that the chemical warfare
experts of Porton Down or Edgewood Arsenal had
failed to develop them. Whether Ambros genuinely
believed that the Allies had their own nerve gases,
or whether he was merely trying to put off Hitler,
the result was the same: Hitler turned on his heel
and abruptly left the meeting. From that moment
on, no matter how tempted he felt to use his secret
gases, Hitler had always to balance in his mind
the conviction of his scientists that the Allies had
them too." (13)
In November 1966 began the most extensive use of chemical
warfare agents since World War I -- the Vietnam conflict.
Directed against the environment, rather than people, the
defoliants utilized (agents: Green, Pink, Purple, White, Blue
and Orange -- named after the color of the containers they came
in) were very effective in stripping away the dense protective
jungle cover which facilitated enemy ambushes. Although not
specifically prohibited by the Geneva Protocol, there are many
who today feel that the massive amounts used by the American
forces resulted in tragic human consequences. Agent Orange
contained minute amounts of the extremely poisonous sub-
stance, dioxin. Although the amount of dioxin contained
within a dose of agent orange was miniscule, and would not
affect humans, the cumulative effects of the large scale
sprayings may have had some residual, long-term effects, such
as cancer and birth defects, on those who were exposed.
There can be no doubt that the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan was a brutal act violating norms of civilized
conduct among nations. Most nations have condemned the Soviet
military for trying to impose its will on an independent people.
In addition to the conventional savagery, including massacres
of non-combatants and destruction of food crops, there is no
doubt that chemical weapons are being used by the Soviets to
accomplish their objective. Although denied by the Soviets,
there is abundant evidence to document the facts that, since
the summer of 1979, agents such as blister, lethal nerve and
recently discovered trichothecene toxins (mycotoxin) have been
This evidence is from a wide variety of sources and
includes testimony from hundreds of eye witnesses to attacks,
testimony from those who have attempted to treat the victims,
photographic evidence including film footage shot by a Dutch
journalist showing a Soviet helicopter dropping canisters that
produced a yellow cloud and an analysis of numerous physical
samples. Defectors report rocket, aerial spray and bomb
attacks that caused death within minutes and caused the flesh
of victims to soften, and decompose within a few hours after
the attack. A report from Secretary of State, George Shultz,
stated that "We have information that both phosgene oxime and
tabun are stored by the Soviets in Afghanistan."14
The Afghanistan war has been a very difficult one for the
Soviets. They are much more deeply involved than they antici-
pated or hoped to be. Fighting the mujahidin on their own
mountainous terrain is extremely difficult. Use of chemical
agents have given the Soviets a tactical advantage. They are
able to disable or kill many of the independent fighters,
terrorize the sympathetic civilian population and deny key
terrain to the Afghans.
It is not surprising that the Soviets took the calculated
gamble of introducing chemical warfare into the conflict.
First, I believe that they felt they would not be caught.
Secondly, I believe they felt that, if it was discovered, not
much would be done about it. Unfortunately, this has
essentially turned out to be the case. It appears that the
Soviet Army will continue to use chemical agents in Afghanistan
to gain tactical advantage without incurring the wrath of the
The most current, if not the most blatant, use of chemical
weapons is occurring in the almost four year-old Iran-Iraq war.
An international team of military and medical experts conducted
a six day investigation on behalf of the United Nations. In a
report released by that international body on March 26, 1984,
was the unanimous finding that both mustard and nerve agents in
the form of aerial bombs had been used in Iran. 15
Iraq has been embroiled in this most costly war for almost
four years. During that time, the once prosperous nation has
expended more and more of its assets until they now are on the
verge of bankruptcy. Still they face hordes of Iranian troops,
many of them children, who pour across the border on a daily
basis. To the Iraqi's, the use of chemical weapons appears to
be a viable alternative to defeat. While stopping short of
admitting to using chemical weapons, Iraqi Defense Minister,
Adnan Khairullah has stated that his government would use "any
weapons at our disposal in any manner we feel necessary."16
What is even more disconcerting is the reaction (or lack
thereof) of the international community to this obvious dis-
regard for legal and ethical standards. A "foreign military
official" is quoted in Patt Derian's article in The Washington
Post as commenting that "the relatively low casualty rate
caused by Iraq's usage indicates, in a crudely pragmatic
sense, that 'it may not be such a big deal.'"17 Also quoted
in the same article is an unnamed diplomat who stated "if
you're prepared to violate the Geneva Convention, then the use
of this gas may seem like a sensible, if controversial, military
solution."18 Michael Berlin's article on the United Nation's
investigation goes on to say that "a majority of council members
(U. N. Security Council), including the United States, the Soviet
Union and France, have been perceived as tilting toward the
Iraqi cause in the Persian Gulf war, and some neutral diplomats
felt they might have reservations about an outright condem-
nation."19 These and other comments quoted in recent articles
reflect something less than moral outrage on the part of the
It is clear to me (and should be to the reader) that the
above mentioned instances of chemical warfare use, and the
international reactions to that use, is a clear indication that
the existing legal and moral constraints have lost their
effectiveness. Chemical weapons are a cheap way to kill people.
They have a devastating effect on morale, and they accomplish
their objective without the destruction of buildings, equip-
ment or land. These advantages, when weighed against the
political consequences incurred by the use of chemical weapons,
come out victorious everytime. Former Assistant Secretary of
State for Human Rights, Patt Derian, summed it up so well when
he said: "The United Nations stretches along the East River
and yawns. Diplomats and military officers shrug and say it's
no big deal. Statesmen/humanitarians we have not any.... It's
a sorry story. And sad."20
1Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of
Killing, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982) p. 1.
2Ibid, p. 5.
3Editorial: "Iraq's Chemical War", The Washington Post,
11 Mar 84, p. c6.
4Harris et. al., op. cit., p. 32.
5Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
The Problems of Chemical and Biological Warfare, (Stockholm,
1971), Vol. I, p. 50.
6Harris et. al., op. cit:, p. 54.
7Hugh Lucas, "Binary Chemical Warfare Weapons", Jane's
Defence Weekly, Vol. 1, No. 4., 4 Feb 84, p. 149.
8Steven Rose, CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare, (Boston,
Ma.: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 45.
9Harris et. al., op. cit., p. 44.
10Ibid., p. 48.
11SIPRI, op. cit., Vol. I, p. 44.
12Ibid., p. 32.
13Harris et. al., op. cit., p. 64.
14George P. Shultz, Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan: An Update, 7 Nov 82, p. 5.
15Michael J. Berlin, "United Nations Team Says Chemical
Agents Used in Gulf War", The Washington Post, 27 Mar 84, p. Al
16Patt Derian, "Mustard Gas and Child Martyrs", The
Washington Post, 20 Mar 84, p. A23.
17Ibid., p. A23.
18Ibid., p. A23.
19Berlin, op. cit., p. A18.
20Derian, op. cit., p. A23.
Bay, Charles. Chemical Warfare and the Military Balance.
Studies Institute, USA War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pa: 15 May 78
Berlin, Michael. "U. N. Team Says Chemical Agents Used in
Gulf War", The Washington Post, 27 Mar 84, pp. A1 and A18
Calvert, Jack. Chemical Weapons: Problems and Policy
Formulation. Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa: 20 Dec 81
Department of Defense. Continuing Development of Chemical
Weapons Capabilities in the USSR, October 1983
Derian, Patt. "Mustard Gas and Child Martyrs", The Washington
Post, 20 Mar 84, p. A23
Harris, Robert and Jeremy Paxman. A Higher Form of Killing.
New York: Hill and Wang, 1982
"Iraq's Chemical War", The Washington Post, 11 Mar 84, p. C6
Lucas, Hugh. "Binary Chemical Warfare Weapons", Jane's Defence
Weekly, Vol. I, No. 4, 4 Feb 84, p. 149
Rose, Steven. CBW Chemical and Biological Warfare. Boston:
Beacon Press, 1968
Shultz, George. "Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and
Afghanistan: An Update". U. S. Department of State
Special Report No. 104, Nov 1982
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The
Problems of Chemical and Biological Warfare. Stockholm: 1971
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