History of New Zealand
Chapter ix. Provincial Legislatures
Chapter ix. Provincial Legislatures.
When Sir George Grey left New Zealand the government devolved upon Colonel Wynyard of the 58th regiment (the senior military officer) under the title of the officer administering the government. The departure of their old friend aroused a superstitious regret amongst the Maoris when they found that it was followed by an outbreak of measles which, introduced at Auckland by an American vessel, decimated tribe after tribe in the interior. It was deemed advisable that the Provincial Legislatures should meet before the summoning of the General Assembly. Mr. Weld and some others discovered afterwards that a contrary course should have been adopted, and that the powers of the Provincial Councils should have been defined by the General Legislature before the local parliaments were permitted to plume themselves upon their new honours. Sir George Grey, however, had called the Provincial Councils into existence, and on Colonel Wynyard fell the task of dealing with the larger body. The electors in the provinces chose their leading men as Superintendents. Mr. J. E. Fitzgerald was selected at Canterbury, Mr. E. W. Stafford at Nelson, Colonel Wynyard at Auckland, Dr. Featherston at Wellington, Mr. Brown at Taranaki, and Captain Cargill at Otago.
Mr. Swainson declared (1859) that the Provincial Legislatures ought to have been confined to mere municipal matters, and should have been made more dependent on the General Legislature. They plunged into what he called “a mischievous multiplicity and diversity of legislation.”In three years they passed more than two hundred Ordinances. Mr. Swainson was page 543 the chief adviser of the Acting Governor, and was not slow to put words in his mouth commending the General Assembly to enlarge and solidify the powers of the general government.
By a proclamation dated 18th January, 1854, the General Assembly was convened for despatch of business at Auckland on the Queen's Birthday, 24th May. Mr. Charles Clifford was made Speaker of the elected House. Mr. J. E. Fitzgerald and Mr. David Monro were put forward by their brother members as mover and seconder of the formal but friendly address in reply to the Governor's speech, which had pointed out the dangers which might spring from the Provincial Legislatures, the possible incoherence if not antagonism in their legislation, the duty which lay upon the General Assembly to determine whether New Zealand should “become one great nation or a collection of insignificant, divided, and powerless petty states.”
Mr. Weld and his friends complained that Mr. Swainson did nothing to remedy the dreaded evils. They professed the same apprehensions. But the Assembly burned to exercise their new powers. Their appetite grew by what it fed on. There were also men among them spurred by a noble ambition. The Constitution made no provision for the creation of a responsible ministry. Representatives in the Legislature were to be called into existence, but they had been active in New South Wales in 1843, and as yet responsible government had not been established in Australia. It was to come, but it was to be provided for by special enactment. There had been no preparation for it in New Zealand at the elections. The Royal Letters Patent which made the Executive Council consist of certain functionaries had not been modified. But Gibbon Wakefield sat amongst the representatives. He stirred their minds to demand responsible government; the boast of England, the recent boon to Canada. An address to Colonel Wynyard was carried, expressing a desire for ministerial responsibility without delay. A suggestion that a select committee should be appointed to report upon the subject, found but one supporter, and the senior military officer stood in the novel position of having to solve abstruse political problems. He laid the address before his Executive Councillors with an opinion from his Attorney-General that he might go so far as to add, under existing page 544 instructions, two or three members of the Assembly to the Executive Council, and that body unanimously advised him to do so. Mr. Swainson's opinion showed, by reference to the Constitution Act and to the Royal Instructions, that the Governor was not enabled to establish “ministerial responsibility in the conduct of legislative and executive proceedings by the Governor.”Colonel Wynyard placed in the Executive Council Mr. J. E. Fitzgerald, member for Lyttleton; Mr. F. A. Weld, member for Wairau; and Mr. H. Sewell, member for Christchurch. Mr. Sinclair the Colonial Secretary, and Mr. Shepherd the Treasurer, were willing to resign on receiving fit retiring allowances. Mr. Swainson, Attorney-General, was willing to retire, with or without compensation, if the representative of the Crown should think it advantageous for the public interests. The Legislative Council then deemed it essential that a responsible member of the Government should be chosen from that body, and Wynyard at once (29th June) appointed Mr. F. D. Bell. When Mr. Bell was called away by urgent affairs, Mr. F. H. Bartley, a lawyer, was appointed to the Legislative and Executive Councils. All the newly-appointed councillors undertook without salary to represent the Government in the Legislature, to perform such departmental work as became a concomitant of their legislative duties, and to hold office only so long as they might retain the confidence of the Assembly. Both Houses applauded the arrangement. These proceedings were reported to the Secretary of State for approval.
Such hurried changes produced friction in a machinery not constructed for them. The new men found a want of hearty co-operation on the part of the old, and the representatives began to show uneasy symptoms. Mr. Fitzgerald and his friends sought to smooth all obstacles by obtaining more power. They thought a military governor would yield to the arguments of civilians. To enable them to conduct the public business they recommended, in writing, that the existing office-holders should resign, and that the Government should be “reconstituted on the ordinary responsible basis.”Wynyard laid the document before the Executive Council, and said he was willing to accept the Secretary's resignation on suitable provisions for his retirement, and to appoint a member of Assembly in his room. The page 545 Secretary had been locally appointed, but the Attorney-General and the Treasurer held Crown appointments, and while Wynyard was only temporary administrator of the Government he was not prepared to accept their resignations unless authorized to do so by the Secretary of State. They themselves, though offering to resign if called upon, declined to advise as councillors that such a step should be taken. The ruling passion of duty in the soldier was proof against Mr. Fitzgerald, who, with his colleagues, on the 2nd August, quitted the Executive Council, Wynyard having on the 1st August declined to coerce his legitimate advisers without “being favoured with the views of the Crown.”“I am now called upon (he said) to form an entire new form of Government without even a reference to my Sovereign, thus throwing on me during my temporary administration a grave responsibility I am not prepared or disposed to bear.”If the Home Government should approve the proposition, not much time would be lost in obtaining its sanction; if it should not approve, it was the more necessary for him to await instructions. The suggestion by the retiring councillors that the Assembly might refuse supplies, Wynyard spoke of in a subsequent message to the two legislative bodies (5th August), but did not allow it to warp him from what he thought his duty. He urged that the establishment of responsible government should be provided for by law. He was ready to consider any such measure seriously and favourably. He also urged that some useful practical measures should be passed. Mr. Sewell read to the House of Representatives a narrative of the transactions which, substantially confirming that of Wynyard, caused him to remark to the Duke of Newcastle that it was shown “how necessary it was to make the stand I did.”The Legislative Council (of which Swainson the Attorney-General was Speaker) on the 10th August concurred with what Wynyard had done, and suggested that he should summon to the Executive Council some members of the General Assembly enjoying his confidence, and holding office only while they enjoyed also that of the Assembly.
It was not surprising that when brains were wanted Gibbon Wakefield was applied to. When Fitzgerald abandoned his post, Wynyard wrote: “I (with advice) requested an interview with Mr. E. G. Wakefield… that gentleman having page 546 been originally put forward by 29 out of 30 members in the House of Representatives as their leader in the movement for obtaining the establishment of ministerial responsibility, and having also been its prominent leader in the opposition to the late members of the Executive Council in the Legislature.”
Fitzgerald and his friends had a majority in the House of Representatives, and in reply to Wynyard's message of the 5th of August, they commented with asperity on the position which Gibbon Wakefield had been allowed to assume. He had assured the House that he had drawn up his Excellency's message.1 Such a state of affairs compromised Wynyard, and it would be perilous to the colony if the Queen's representative should act without advice from the Attorney-General. Wynyard rejoiced at being able to assure them, that “throughout the emergency he had enjoyed the unqualified concurrence and support of his constitutional advisers.”He begged them (15th August) to consider his former message “with a view of turning the remainder of the already protracted and fruitless session to some good account for the people of New Zealand.”On the 16th, Fitzgerald and his friends, who adopted the style “We the Commons of New Zealand,”said that, dismissing all that was past, they required “the immediate establishment of the Executive Government on the basis of complete ministerial responsibility.”
1 A droll incident brought the fact to light. When Wynyard's lengthy message was being read to the House a leaf was missing, and the hiatus caused confusion. The message declared that Wynyard “by yielding at all on the point of duty would deserve the censure of Her Majesty, and disapprobation of colonists, for having degraded —– Bill, the passage of which into law,”&c. Gibbon Wakefield drew from his pocket the missing page in draft, but the representatives would not allow it to be received, and the Acting Governor sent down the omitted leaf. (P. P. 1855, p. 16.)
Two days after the struggle in the House Gibbon Wakefield found his position untenable. An adviser without responsibility, conscious that the Assembly would not subject itself to his guidance, he saw that the Acting Governor shrunk from committing himself to it. A Triton among minnows in one sense, he could unfortunately do nothing unless the minnows would accept him as pilot. He sought Swainson on the 19th August, and reasoned for two hours. He recorded the interview. He described Swainson's “masterly command of the conversation by means of the highest diplomatic ability.”Swainson approved of Fabian tactics until events might show in what way the Acting Governor should act. Meanwhile, though to this he did not pledge himself, Colonel Wynyard might govern under the old forms until the Home Government should instruct him. Throughout the long interview each felt that much in his thoughts must remain unspoken. Each watched the other. But Swainson's goal was duty, not ambition, and the light he walked by was not deceitful. It seemed to Wakefield that Swainson had “two distinct policies”in his thoughts. Mr. Weld said afterwards that he had but the one policy of “not committing page 548 himself.”Wakefield at once retired from his anomalous position. Swainson as well as others were relieved from irksome pressure. The doors of the Assembly were closed, but the keys of the Treasury had not been taken from the Government. The Assembly had passed no new law, and the existing law left the Government full power to apply the public revenues to the public service. Thus master of the situation, the Government ascertained that the Assembly, if convened for business on the day to which it had been prorogued, would devote itself to practical legislation and grant supplies.
A final attempt was made to introduce the responsible element so eagerly demanded. Mr. T. S. Forsaith of Auckland, Mr. E. J. Wakefield of Canterbury (Gibbon Wakefield's son), Mr. Travers of Nelson, and Mr. MacAndrew of Otago, were appointed Executive Councillors with the understanding that they would resign if they should “fail to carry with them the support and confidence of the Houses of Assembly, a new Governor be appointed, or any change take place in the Constitution.”They were also to identify themselves with the policy of an address to be sent down by Wynyard to the Houses. He proposed to introduce a Bill to establish ministerial responsibility, and to reserve it for the Queen's decision; to deal in like manner with Bills empowering the General Assembly to transfer to the Provincial Legislatures its own powers with regard to waste lands; and to bestow an elective character on the Legislative Council. Other measures were announced, and it was stated that until the fate of the Land Bill should be decided, Wynyard would use his authority in setting apart not less than one-third of the waste lands in each province to encourage bonâ fide occupation, allowing rebate of passage money to settlers, and giving time for payment, but holding back titles to land “for a reasonable time.”The Council, which had comported itself decorously during the session, accepted the address thankfully. The “Commons of New Zealand”no longer threatened to stop supplies if their desire for responsible government should not be gratified, but they carried an amendment on the address which compelled Mr. Forsaith and his friends to retire two days after accepting office. The address, passed by 22 votes against 11, condemned “a mixed Executive”as utterly bad. page 549 Many members wished to return to their southern homes, and all were willing to vote supplies to the existing Executive Government, trusting that Wynyard and the Home Government would enfranchise them speedily. They promised to devote themselves to work, and kept their promise. They adopted (2nd September) an address to the Queen, praying that the necessary law for establishing responsible Government might be assented to. A fortnight afterwards thirteen Bills had been passed. A Waste Lands Act confirmed existing regulations and enabled Superintendents and Provincial Councils to recommend to the Governor any regulations for sale, letting, disposal, and occupation of Crown lands, proclamation by the Governor being sufficient to give them effect. A provincial Waste Lands Act declared it expedient that in each province there should be local control over waste lands, and provided that, subject to the Constitution Act, it should be lawful for the General Assembly to empower Superintendents and Provincial Councils to make laws to regulate the lands. The administration of revenue from lands was relegated to the Superintendents and Provincial Councils. The Act was not to go into operation until the royal assent should be notified. By a despatch from the Secretary of State, 15th April, 1855, that assent was conveyed. Even the opponents of Gibbon Wakefield admitted that he had taught them parliamentary government. The failures of Fitzgerald and Forsaith did not teach their supporters modesty. They vaunted that no Australian legislature had equalled that of New Zealand in ability; and knew not that it was by the labour of years that Wentworth, the champion of another colony, had wrought out for them and others the constitutional changes which they so strangely abused. Mr. Fitzgerald's principal achievement had been styling himself Prime Minister for little more than two months; Mr. Sewell's title to distinction was a personal assault committed upon a representative member in the hall of deliberation.
A sense of duty to his Queen had preserved Wynyard from disgrace as it has preserved so many English soldiers who make no such high-flown pretensions as were made by the civilians gathered at Auckland in 1854. Swainson was wise enough to keep him from error, and was firm as a rock to duty, though page 550 ready to sacrifice his personal claims. Mere wisdom indeed the Governor could obtain from Gibbon Wakefield's promptings; but though all admitted that fact, no one proposed that Wake-field should be Minister himself; and an ambiguous position is never held in high regard. Mr. Weld, in an address to the electors of the Wairau (November, 1854), bitterly complained that Gibbon Wakefield had insidiously at first, and afterwards openly, devoted his “great fund of information and his activity and energy”to thwarting the “responsible-government party.”
1 The prevalence of the name “Grey”in colonial affairs was confusing even to colonists, and to the Maoris must have been perplexing.
1 It is consoling to reflect that neither Lord John nor Sir George Grey saved the Ministry. Though the former slunk from it, 23rd January, 1855, the manœuvres of the latter did not secure votes enough to ward off Mr. Roebuck's censure, which was carried by a large majority on the 29th.
1 Though Mr. Gladstone became an accomplice in Sir George Grey's despatch, in 1854, it must not be forgotten that while he was a follower of Sir Robert Peel he had written to the Governor of New Zealand (1846): “I conceive it to be an undoubted maxim that the Crown should stand in all matters between the colonists and the natives… the most natural and obvious mode of providing for our relations with the native tribes would be to reserve to the Crown a very large share of authority, real as well as nominal, active and not merely dormant in that department of the functions of the Colonial Government”(P. P. 1846, vol. xxix.).
When Governor Fitzroy found it necessary to examine and to disallow Spain's award in 1844, he endeavoured vainly to purchase from a chief named Katatore two blocks, viz. the Mangoraka and Waiongona, and afterwards offered to some of the settlers (who had been improperly located by the company on native lands) allotments in other parts of the colony. The settlers, unwilling to believe that they would in the end fail to embroil their country, and wrest the coveted lands from the Maori owners, were loth to depart. Like their unprincipled representatives in London, they hoped that the eye of the law would not scrutinize their position. The treaty of Waitangi was by them no more regarded than by Mr. Somes. The Taranaki creed was as bold and false as his. The pretences of some were accepted as truth by others. In what purports to be a history it has been recorded that “there are strong grounds for believing that the company's claims ought never to have been brought into Mr. Spain's Court.”1page 554
The company's local agent, Wicksteed, was in such pecuniary straits in 1844 that he was fain to accept terms which he represented to his principal as unjustifiable.
The block allotted by Fitzroy was occupied. Settlers were removed from all native lands except such as might be parted with fairly by their owners. Fitzroy arranged that the native reserves within the European block should be placed at the company's disposal; the Crown right of pre-emption was waived in favour of the company over a circumjacent tract of about 60,000 acres; and the Crown was pledged to advance funds from time to time (on security) to enable the company to buy lands therein. Wicksteed had no money, and Fitzroy accepted for the Government certain boats and stores for which he paid £382. The needy company only paid their own labourers by means of the Government dole. Some of the settlers remained on sufferance at the Puketapu block, but eventually retired, or were driven to the Fitzroy block.
To this state of affairs succeeded Sir George Grey's endeavour to supersede Fitzroy's decision, under Mr. Gladstone's instruction, that it was “hardly probable”that that decision was “just or wise.”How Donald McLean prevaricated with Te Rangitake in striving to please Governor Grey, who, in order to please others, prevaricated with justice, and violated the pledges of Fitzroy, has been told already. A letter from McLean in October, 1849, summed up his doings thus:—The existing conveyances were: No. 1, November, 1844, of the Fitzroy block; No. 2, May, 1848, of a block (about 4000 acres bought for less than £200) at Tataraimaka; No. 3, August, 1847, of the Omata block, of 12,000 acres; No. 4, October, 1847, of residents' rights in the Grey block, of 9770 acres; No. 5, April, 1848, of rights of certain absentee Ngatiawas at Wellington and Cook's Straits in the Fitzroy and Grey blocks respectively; No. 6, by certain Puketapu natives, conveying lands occupied by a settler near the Hua; No. 7, November, 1848, of 1500 acres by Puketapu natives.
All these deeds left untouched the coveted lands at the Waitara, the abode of Te Rangitake. The gradual extension of rights of Europeans sharpened their appetites, and led to what McLean called an anti-land-selling league. Archdeacon page 555 Hadfield, however, wrote (Oct. 1860) “There is no such league and there never has been any such league.”Kata-tore led the majority, who opposed sales. Rawiri headed the malcontent minority. Maori common rights of course forbade a sale while any dissentient remained; but evil seemed good in the eyes of the settlers. Yielding to the ethics of his neighbours, one Cooper, Land Commissioner of the Taranaki district, in 1854, in spite of Katatore's well-known opposition, accepted an offer made by Rawiri to sell land. The probable result was not more doubtful than the intention to produce it. Rawiri went with an armed force to mark the boundaries. Katatore warned him to stay his hand. To prove his determination he sent Rawiri a gun to defend himself with, saying he would fight to the death rather than part with his rights. Rawiri persisted. Katatore fired one shot in the air, and another into the ground as a final signal that he would fight. If Rawiri's men had then sat down there would have been peace; but they rushed to battle. Katatore shot Paora and Rawiri as they advanced. Six fell, and more were wounded. Katatore drew off his successful men. The settlers, considering that the wounded Rawiri was serving their cause when he fell, removed him to the hospital, but he died after three days. The Maoris prepared for further strife amongst themselves, and the settlers invited the Acting Governor, Wynyard, to “execute the law against the murderers.”1
Wynyard visited Taranaki, and strove to make peace. He reported that there were several causes of quarrel: Rawiri's death at the hand of Katatore, the enemy of land-selling; the seduction of Ihaia's wife; the killing of the seducer, and insults offered by Ihaia to the bodies of men slain in fight. Ihaia had disinterred and fired shots at the dead. Arama Karaka plainly told Wynyard that he would persevere in fighting, and that as the quarrels had nothing to do with Europeans, they should be directed not to interfere. Wynyard wrote that the feud “must be watched with care, as the connection of the contending tribes extends far north and south, and may, if neglected, sooner or later lead to a state of things such as Sir G. Grey prognosticated when applying for pensioners to be located”at Taranaki. For himself he accepted the neutral position marked out by the Maoris. He wrote, however, to Te Rangitake, urging him to prevent molestation of the English. The chief responded: “Yes, our father, we will guard against all evil to the Pakeha… I will go into the midst of them, and the evil shall fall on me.”But Te Rangitake was to discover that amongst those whom he was prepared to protect there were intriguers against himself.
1 A petition from the Provincial Council at Taranaki (hostile to Katatore and Te Rangitake) admitted in May, 1858, that “the mass of the settlers were known to sympathize with (Ihaia and others), and many of them were supplying the besieged with the “munitions of war.”N. Z. P. P., 1860, E. No. 2. p. 29.
Bishop Selwyn's presence was occasioned by a special request page 558 of the Acting Governor, that influence might be exerted to stay bloodshed. Prompt as of old, the Bishop, with Archdeacon Abraham, and a Maori clergyman, Rota Waitoa, travelled overland on foot. The Archdeacon described their reception. “Te Rangitake's fine handsome face, and iron-grey hair, and his giant form of six feet three inches, with breadth in proportion, certainly gave one the idea of a warrior chieftain.”1 At daylight he paid salutations at the Bishop's tent, and breakfasted with him. The Bishop proceeded afterwards to Katatore's pah, where about a hundred men sat down to hear the visitor. Katatore, a small “cunning-looking”man, told his story. When he described the shooting of Rawiri, the Bishop interjected, “So, then, you killed an unarmed man2 in cold blood for the matter of land?”— “Yes.”“Then you repeated the act of Cain towards Abel, and, in the sight of God and man, are a murderer.”Katatore started up in wrath, but the Bishop repeated his words, and Katatore, muttering ominously, left the assemblage which appeared more attentive to the Bishop than to him. This was on the 15th August. Rangitake “did not wish to take part in the quarrel between Katatore and Arama Karaka,”but the latter had lately encroached and aroused suspicions as to his intention to “sell land to the Pakeha.”On the 31st, at a meeting where Major Nugent was present, an oration by the Bishop concluded by a quotation from a Maori poet seemed to win the Maori hearts, which had been already pacified by a letter from the Acting Governor to Te Rangitake, promising that the Government would not interfere in intertribal quarrels.
1 Journal of a walk with the Bishop of New Zealand from Auckland to Taranaki; August, 1855.
Such language was acceptable to readers amongst whom the Atkinsons and the Richmonds were about to become notorious by plunging the colony into unjust war. The Bishop did not answer these attacks directly; but, in a pastoral letter to the members of his church at Taranaki, he uttered solemn warnings. He had not spoken of the murder of Rawiri except “to condemn it in the strongest language, even in the presence of the murderer.… It is strange indeed that your advisers in the local newspapers, who dwell so much upon the sixth commandment, should forget altogether that the same law has said, ‘Thou shalt not covet.’ They may disguise it to their own consciences, but it is my duty, as a minister of the law and of the gospel, to lift up my voice against the publication of opinions which would lead on to the sin of murder as the direct consequence of the sin of covetousness. I offer to my countrymen my best assistance and influence with the native people in all their just and lawful desires, but I have no fellowship with covetousness, which Ahab found to be the first step to blood-guiltiness… I cannot remain silent while opinions are being expressed, which if you prove to be the stronger would destroy the New Zealanders, or if you be found the weaker, would destroy yourselves.”
The Maoris at Taranaki had sold 30,000 acres at tenpence an acre. “Nothing is more easy than to extinguish the native title; nothing will be more difficult than to extinguish a native war.”Te Rangitake, he was confident, had no ill-will to the English, and ought not to be “forced into a position of hostility by their suspicions and their threats.”He would urge the Maoris to sell land amicably, but he would resist by all lawful means every attempt to carry out any other interpretation of the treaty of Waitangi than that in which it was explained to the natives by Governor Hobson, and understood and accepted by them.”The Bishop's words were good; but so long as the Bishop might assert the claims of justice, so long would he have enemies among men quartered upon Taranaki by the frauds of the New Zealand Company and the folly of Lord John Russell, page 560 in defiance of the sagacity and resolution of Gipps, and the honesty of Hobson.
A new Governor, Colonel Gore Browne, assumed office in September, 1855, and he visited Taranaki forthwith: it is convenient to record the opinion he then formed. He had previously written from Auckland that the colony would sustain great loss if Major Nugent should be withdrawn with departing troops. That officer knew the Maori language, and to his conduct and discretion was due the satisfactory condition of Taranaki. Colonel Browne, like his predecessors, promptly pledged himself to act honourably towards the Maoris. He wrote (20th September, 1855) to Lord John Russell: “Different despatches will have satisfied your Lordship that I have given the strongest assurances of protection in all their rights to the Maoris, and that I have declared my determination neither to interfere in native questions, nor to permit the purchase of lands until the owners are united in desiring to sell them, and have agreed upon the terms.”He speedily visited Taranaki, where he held a levée in October, 1855, but neither Katatore nor Te Rangitake attended it. The native feud still raged, and neither of them cared to ask for safe-conduct to the levée, which was, nevertheless, well attended by Maoris and settlers. The Governor directed that militia should be embodied, but at the earnest request of the Provincial Superintendent and of the Land Commissioner did not reduce the military garrison. He told the Secretary of State that the warfare between the followers of Katatore and his opponents had been injudiciously aggravated by a Wesleyan missionary, a friend of Rawiri. He also “disapproved of the conduct of Cooper, the sub-commissioner, in commencing a survey of land before he was assured that all who had even a disputed title desired it should be sold.”It would have been well if he had continued in such a frame of mind. A careful letter from the Rev. J. F. Riemenschreider, a Wesleyan missionary, ought to have warned him of the thorns on which he stood. It proves that even in 1855 the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki tribes sagaciously forecast the course of events; and it is melancholy to think that their suspicions were confirmed by the conduct of Colonel Browne. Mr. Riemenschreider apprised him that the Taranaki natives as well as Te Rangitake's own page 561 tribe, the Ngatiawa, looked upon that chief as “the real and true chief of Waitara.”Neither the efforts of Mr. Riemenschreider, nor the joint labours of Major Nugent and Donald McLean, could allay the feud between Katatore and Arama Karaka. Old Waka Nene, the Ngapuhi chief, lent his advice in vain. He suggested that Katatore should cede land to the relatives of Rawiri as reparation for his loss. Old E Puni, from Wellington, who was also on the spot, failed similarly; although, as a powerful Ngatiawa chief, he might have been expected to exert some influence with Rangitake and his friends. The Wanganui chief, Hori Kingi te Anaua, wrote that his people would take no part in any quarrel at Taranaki. He was ever friendly to the English. Yet no dissuasions with the hostile chiefs prevailed. Colonel Browne wrote in November, 1855: “The native feud appears to me to be much in the same condition as before.”
Mr. Turton, the Wesleyan missionary (Browne wrote), had, by letters in newspapers and privately, not only “revived the old suspicion that the Europeans would not rest till they had slain and taken possession of that which the Maoris liken to Naboth's vineyard,”—but, emulous of an affray like that at the Wairau, had endeavoured to “bring Rawiri's widow to swear to the murder (of her husband) before the resident magistrate. This was prevented by Major Nugent, who inquired whether the magistrate intended issuing a warrant for the murderer, and if so, whether he had the means of enforcing it, adding that his own instructions forbade him acting in any manner not necessary for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity within the European part of the province.”
Thus warned, Colonel Browne ought to have had no doubt about his duty. The significance of the opposition to landsales was undeniable, and adherents in distant places had joined it. Only by prudent avoidance of provocation could it be hoped that it would die a natural death. To play into the hands of those whose evil designs he understood in 1855 would have seemed to be the one course which could not be expected from Colonel Browne. Yet it was the course into which in less than four years he was seduced, when he had by his side as native minister, the man whom in 1855 he found clerk to the Provincial Council, and Provincial Attorney atpage 562
Taranaki,—Mr. Christopher William Richmond. Eventually, in 1856, the native feud died out; but it was believed that sixty Maoris had been killed, and many more wounded, before a truce was made by Maori persuasion. The warfare incommoded, but did not include, the settlers. For months the Bell block and the Puketapu district were disturbed by bands of Maoris going gaily to shoot their enemies morning after morning. Bands of the Ngatiruanui, aided by Katatore and patronized by Te Rangitake, annoyed Arama Karaka, Ihaia, and their friends; and though no Englishmen were injured, skirmishes took place near their homesteads. It was a relief to all when the land had rest in 1856. The military officer in charge, the Governor, and Colonel Wynyard reported that the peace was definitive, and Mr. Labouchere at the Colonial Office congratulated Colonel Browne on the prudent measures adopted by the civil and military authorities, and on their satisfactory result. 19086
1 One address said:… “The first Governor was Captain Hobson. He died, and his grave is with us. That is satisfactory. The second was Governor Fitzroy… he is gone, and our hearts long after him. That is unsatisfactory… great is our dissatisfaction at this system of recalling Governors… Are you to be permanent Governor till the day of your death?”—P. P., 1860, vol. xlvi.
On the 15th of April the Governor convened the General Assembly at Auckland. Some former members were not there. Gibbon Wakefield, being ill, was absent. The same Speaker was chosen (Clifford). Swainson being absent on leave, the obstacle to which Mr. Weld and his friends attributed their defeat in 1854 was removed. The Governor entrusted Mr. Sewell with the formation of a ministry. Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Weld were not at Auckland. Mr. Sewell associated with himself Messrs. F. Whitaker, F. D. Bell, and H. J. Tancred. They were formally to accept office on the passing of a Bill granting pensions to the former officials, Sinclair, Swainson, and Shepherd. On imperial subjects, including relations with the Maori race, the Governor was to hear his advisers; reserving power to act on his own opinions pending a reference to England. On all matters under control of the Assembly he would be guided by advice, whether agreeing with it or not. These terms, with certain interpretations, were agreed to. Mr. Sewell explained the position to the House, approving the reservation of Maori questions, because they involved peace or war. The Pensions Bill was vigorously debated. It was desired to limit the pensions to half the amount of the salaries, but the Governor announced that he would only give the royal assent if two-thirds of the salaries were settled as pensions. A remnant of the former opposition murmured that charges for malpractice as to land regulations and defalcation could be established against the retiring officials. The Governor declared, that if furnished with proof, he would at once recommend to the Secretary of State a summary dismissal without pension for an offender. Committees, after careful inquiry, entirely exonerated the several officers. The Pensions Bill was assented to on the 7th May, and on the same day Mr. Sewell became Colonial page 565 Secretary; Mr. F. Whitaker, Attorney-General; and Mr. F. D. Bell, Colonial Treasurer.
On the threshold of office the new minister met a difficulty which was to distract the colony for a generation. He was called a Centralist, or an advocate of united government. He was opposed by Provincialists, or champions of provincial liberties, amongst whom Dr. Featherston, the Provincial Superintendent of Wellington, was conspicuous. After an adverse vote, carried by Dr. Campbell of Auckland, early in May, Mr. Sewell tendered his resignation; and Dr. Campbell and Dr. Featherston, successively applied to by the Governor, declined to take office. Mr. Sewell was then encountered by Mr. Fox, who, after his unsuccessful mission to England, was ill-pleased to see Mr. F. D. Bell promoted to the office of Treasurer. Mr. Bell's success in disproving Mr. Fox's charges was undoubted. Mr. Fox based his antagonism on public grounds. He carried resolutions (14th May), long celebrated as “the compact of 1856.”
1 The reader will observe that the lawless manner in which responsible government had been forged by the Secretary of State exempted members from the constitutional necessity of appealing to constituencies on assuming office, and thus facilitated ministerial changes by intra-mural intrigues.
There is something captivating to young legislators in contracting debt, and the Loan Bill (assented to on the 7th August) had the reputation of securing Mr. Stafford and Mr. Sewell in their positions. Thirty-five other Acts were passed. A Waste Lands Act was the most important. Superintendents and Provincial Councils might make land laws, the Bills being “reserved for the signification of the Governor's pleasure there-on.”The Governor might, nevertheless, fulfil all promises he had made, and could except from sale land required for military defence, roads, or public buildings; and no land acquired from the Maoris after the passing of the Act could be offered for sale till the Governor had proclaimed that the native title was extinguished. A Native Reserves Bill vexed the Governor and his advisers. As introduced it preserved his position of freedom. A clause (18th) added subsequently, provided that every act page 567 done under it should be “only with the advice and consent of the Executive Council.”Either the insidious astuteness of the Attorney-General and Mr. Richmond thus early developed itself in weaving nets to entrap the Governor and make him a co-agent in defrauding the Maoris, or the possession of power had warped the minds of the Ministry, and they cast behind them their pledge that on native questions the Governor should be free from their control. Reluctantly the Governor consented to the addition of the clause. When it reached the Legislative Council it was seen to be in danger. Major Richmond, who had been Superintendent of New Munster, was in the Council He and three others protested against the passing of the Bill. They forwarded their protest to the Governor with an address, declaring that they viewed with apprehension the future relations with the Maoris, “seeing that the first act of legislation presented to us upon native affairs is, in our opinion, a direct violation of the arrangement made with your Excellency and your responsible advisers upon your granting responsible government; in contravention of the Royal Instructions, and an infringement of the Constitution Act.”They pointed out that the obnoxious clause had only been carried in the Council by the Speaker's casting vote. The Ministry, through the Colonial Secretary, Mr. C. W. Richmond, adhered to their position. They averred, illogically, that “they had no desire to trespass on the rule”respecting native affairs. The House of Representatives was unanimous, and it was improper for a minority in the Council to arrest the measure. The Ministry “strongly advised”the Governor to “assent to the Bill, and not to reserve it for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure.”
In a weak moment, of which Sir George Grey might have been found incapable, and from which Wynyard's sense of duty had preserved him, the Governor offered to assent to the Bill, on the understanding that the protest, address, and the minute of his advisers should be forwarded to England with the Bill. The offer was “respectfully accepted”by his advisers. Mr. Labouchere, the Secretary of State, vied with the Governor in ineptitude. He said that the clause was certainly opposed to the principle on which it had been agreed that native affairs should be managed; but in the hope that the Governor would page 568 be able to make opposite principles harmonize, the assent given by the Governor would not be over-ruled. The danger invited by such a ruling was swift to come. The body which has made one unlawful stride to power will make another, not the less surely because in the first instance it protested that it “had no desire to trespass”on the rule of right. Mr. Swainson, in a work published in 1859, uttered forebodings as to the impolicy and injustice of leaving the Governor responsible for native affairs without providing him with means. He hinted that it might have been well to withhold responsible government, at least for a time. Another New Zealand legislator (Mr. Cracroft Wilson) bluntly declared that it was a mad thing to confer such a government on a country, where all the landed gentry were savages, and most of them cannibals. A friend of Mr. Stafford's government boasted that the Native Reserves Act was an important step to “extricate the Maoris from tribal barbarism.”It was, in fact, an impeachment of their guaranteed rights, and well known so to be by those who framed it. A Land Claims Settlement Act was passed after the subject had been reported upon by a select committee of the representatives. Without comment upon its principles, Colonel Browne sent the Act and the report of the committee to England, and the Secretary of State was as succinct in announcing the Queen's approval. Land Claims Commissioners were to be empowered to deal with all claims arising before or after the establishment of British sovereignty in the colony, under the limitation that any claim not notified to the Government before the passing of the Act should not be entertained. Claims already made were to lapse if not brought under the Act within two years. The undecided residues of old land claims (anterior to 1840), of pre-emption waiver claims, ten shillings an acre proclamation claims, and penny an acre claims, were to be finally settled by a Commission appointed by the Governor, which was to have the powers of a Court of Record, and to sit in public.
The remaining Acts of the session need not be expatiated upon. Nevertheless, as indications of the points which the first responsible Ministry thought it necessary to deal with, the subjects deserve brief mention. Much time was consumed in discussing the livery to be worn by the doorkeepers in the page 569 Chamber. Privilege of Parliament; increase of the Governor's salary; winding up of the New Zealand Bank of Issue; adoption of certain English statutes relating to evidence and to the law of debtor and creditor; Savings' Bank and Trust Acts; extension of powers of Provincial Councils, so that they might deal with cases not exceeding £20, and with penalties of £100 or six months imprisonment; Marriage; Customs laws; Supreme Court Procedure; division into counties; Friendly Societies; local postage; giving Scotch law practitioners power to practise in New Zealand Courts; giving validity to certain provincial laws, land orders and scrip, were the staple of the session's labours. The last Act defined the extent to which land orders issued in old time were to be available. An order of the defunct New Zealand Company for fifty acres at New Plymouth, gave priority to the holder over lands declared open for purchase, to extent of one acre of town, twelve and a half of suburban, and fifty acres of rural land, at the holder's option. There were undisposed of, in Auckland, 219,000 acres; Wellington, 3,000,000 acres; Taranaki (New Plymouth), 25,000 acres; Nelson, 14,000,000 acres; Canterbury, 9,000,000 acres; Otago, 15,000,000 acres.
The second reading of a Native Offenders Bill, introduced by Mr. Stafford in July, was carried by 13 votes against 7. It was referred, on the motion of Mr. Sewell, to a select committee, which reported that the unusual powers embodied in the Bill were not demanded by past events, but that in a modified form it might be expedient to arm the Governor with power, with the advice of his Council, to test the proposed plan of proscribing districts in which native offenders might be harboured. Donald McLean and many Maori chiefs gave evidence before the committee. Mr. Fenton, then Native Secretary, and Major Nugent, approved of the Bill, but the latter saw danger of retaliation by the natives. The law should be temporary, and only put in force “after mature consideration.”One witness thought the Bill “very objectionable.”It enabled the Governor not only to proscribe districts, but to seize vessels and property. It would cause open revolt, which would combine “friends, relations, and allies.”When Mr. Sewell moved the committal of the Bill, Mr. Fox page 570 endeavoured to postpone it for six months. Mr. Fox did not succeed, but eventually the Bill was dropped. Soon afterwards resolutions were carried which recommended that during the recess the Ministry should devise schemes for the government of the Maoris, and that all departments should be under the control of responsible Ministers, subject to the accepted rule that the Governor had the option of not acting on advice tendered upon Maori affairs. It would seem that the Governor had qualms with regard to native affairs when sanctioning the 18th clause of the Natives Reserves Bill. Within a week he issued circulars (31st July, 1856) to Colonel Wynyard, Major Richmond, Major Nugent (58th Regiment); Mr. Busby, the first British Resident; Baron de Thierry; to Mr. F. E. Maning;1 to other old settlers; to the Bishop of New Zealand; to missionaries, many of whom had been on the spot more than twenty years; and to Mr. Donald McLean. He wished to quote their opinions to the Secretary of State. 1. Could the management of native affairs be entrusted to responsible advisers liable to be changed on political grounds; the Governor reserving a veto, and a recommendation in reference to expenditure? 2. “Would any ill effect result from the participated responsibility involved in such a change in the system of administering native affairs?”3. Ought the entire management to be vested in the Queen's representative? Colonel Wynyard, Major Richmond, Major Nugent, Busby, Clarke (the late Chief Protector), Baron de Thierry, and others, were emphatic in urging that the Governor should retain control. The Bishop of New Zealand; missionaries, whether of the Church of England or Wesleyan; the Roman Catholic Bishop of Auckland, gave the same advice. The Pakeha Maori, Mr. Maning, was distinct and positive in like manner; so was Mr. Donald McLean. Even Mr. Turton, the friend of Ihaia, was opposed to the project of weakening the Governor's hands. There were only two notes of approval, qualified by requirements that the natives must first be officially informed of their constitutional rights and become electors, and that the colonial exchequer should defray military expenditure if the troops should be employed against the Maoris. There was virtual unanimity against change.
1 The Author of ‘Old New Zealand,’—by a Pakeha Maori.
But Mr. Stafford and his colleagues were not idle. The wily Whitaker and the pervicacious Richmond worked by sap rather than by assault. On the 11th August the representatives resolved that, not seeking at present to disturb the existing “relations between the Governor and his advisers as to the management of native affairs (pending reference to the Home Government), “it would greatly conduce to peace and good government”if all departments were placed under control of the Governor's advisers, subject to the arrangement that the Governor on receiving advice might adhere to his own opinion till that of the Secretary of State might be received. When the session closed, the Ministry drew up a minute embodying the meaning of the resolution. They needed Imperial forces to support them in the quarrel they were about to provoke; and assuming that the maintenance of force by the Imperial Government was indefensible, they recognized that England should have a paramount authority in direction of native affairs. It was agreed that the Chief Commissioner for land purchases, Donald McLean, should become Native Secretary, should submit the business of the department to one of the Ministers; should be removable only with the Governor's sanction, and should have access to the Governor, with whom was to rest the final decision. It was not likely that the Maoris would remain ignorant of these arrangements. The chiefs, who were alert with regard to the House of Commons' report in 1844, watched attentively the machinations at their door.
The Governor relied much upon Donald McLean, who assured him that no doubt the Ministry would make provision for “carrying out measures for the amelioration of the native race.”But the Ministry thwarted rather than assisted. The Civil List in the Constitution guaranteed an annual provision of £7000 for native education. Mr. Fox during his short term of office wished to remove £5900 of this charge from the Civil List, but the Governor would not consent. Of the Customs revenue of £112,000 not less than £51,000 were estimated in 1856 by Mr. Fox as contributed by the Maoris, and the sale of lands by the Government yielded nearly £50,000 more. Without sanction from England the Governor would not rob the Maoris of the provision for education. Other sums were voted, but un- page 572 graciously. Messages from the Governor elicited no satisfactory reply from the representatives at a later date. They averred that they desired to respond with proper liberality; but recollecting that the Civil List provision for the Maoris “had been without the sanction of the House, and contrary to its wishes appropriated to objects over which it had no control,”and, larding their refusal with several sorts of reasons, they declared that the House would “fail in its duty to the country were it in the present state of the finances to place a further sum for native services upon the estimates for the year.”If they reasoned thus when panting for an Imperial guarantee for their loan,—when Mr. Sewell was about to proceed to England to urge their claims,—it was manifest that under favouring circumstances they would be transformed from beggars to dictators. They knew not at the time the views of the Home Government on control of native affairs. Mr. Labouchere, by a despatch dated 10th December, 1856, announced it thus: “Notwithstanding all the respect due to the principle of responsible government, the management of native affairs should remain for the present mainly in the hands of a Governor responsible for it to the Crown.”
While straining every nerve to bring the Maoris under the yoke of an elected House, there were not wanting proofs that leading colonists were jealous of any attempt on the part of the Maoris to share in the elections. The Superintendent at Wellington (Dr. Featherston) reported in November, 1856, that thirty-five Maoris were on the electoral roll, and that it was “solely owing to the prudence of the bearer”(of his letter) that forty-nine native claimants at Otaki had not been registered. The attempt of the Maoris (or, as was insinuated, of certain missionaries) to influence elections had excited considerable indignation throughout the province, and would occasion serious disturbance “if the plot be not at once crushed by the Government.”He suggested that the Government should so alter the electoral regulations as to defeat the scheme. It is due to Mr. Stafford to state that he deprecated any interference with registration of natives duly qualified to be electors. Suspicion engendered fear, and an attack on Auckland was dreaded. In September the matter was seriously taken up by the Govern- page 573 ment. Though the rumour was unfounded, the unguarded state of Auckland was admitted by all, and it was resolved that militia should be organized and 500 rifles should be imported, with 100,000 rounds of ammunition.
The Maoris were always informed as to passing events. Governor Browne, in November, visited the Rev. Robert Maunsell's school, seven miles from the mouth of the Waikato river. It was supported by a grant from the Civil List, and ninetyseven scholars of various ages were in the Governor's opinion well taught. Several chiefs told him that the Government ought not to withdraw aid from the school. They expressed unalterable attachment to the Queen, and to Browne as her representative; but “declared in the most emphatic terms that they would never recognize the Assembly in any way, speaking of it in contemptuous terms, and calling it the English Committee.”
A careful report drawn up by Dr. A. S. Thomson (58th Regiment), was transmitted by the Governor to the Secretary of State. Dr. Thomson plainly declared that in mapping out the electoral districts the Maoris had been ignored; that, unrepresented themselves, they were taxed by a Government responsible to the settlers; that Browne's reservation of native control would prove a fiction—for power would follow the purse, and injustice would be done. Either there should be Maori members in the General Assembly, or the Governor ought to have £25,000 at his disposal for Maori purposes. Dr. Thomson's ability was acknowledged, but he must have been too wise to expect that his counsel would be taken. He was a true prophet as to Governor Browne's weakness. He concluded his paper by saying that the amalgamation of the European and Maori races made it daily more probable that Gibbon's hope might be realized, and that, as a Hume had sprung from the northern savages of Caledonia, so a Maori might be the ancestor of an historian in the south. It was not surprising that suspicious Maori minds deemed self-defence necessary. Immediately after Grey's departure and the development of the pretensions of the General Assembly, or “Pakeha Committee,”which contained so many of the former enemies of their race, steps were taken to give consistency to Maori aspirations. A memorandum drawn page 574 up at Browne's request by his responsible advisers narrates that: “The first proposal for a separate native state under the Waikato chief Te Whero Whero, seems to have been made as far back as in 1854.”The objects of the Maori king party were various. Some of its supporters were loyal to the Queen, and desired to assist the Government in ameliorating the condition of the Maoris. Some were disloyal. Some were provoked by “a degraded portion of the newspaper press which teemed with menaces of the time when the whole Maori race would be reduced to a servile condition.”Some were prompted by doubts as to the good faith of the Europeans. Even the Stafford Government “at one time entertained a hope that the good elements in the Maori king movement might gain the ascendency, and become the means of raising the population in the social scale.”Who could blame a Maori patriot for the hope with which a grasping Ministry professed to sympathize? The selection of Te Whero Whero as king was a guarantee that the movement was not directly hostile, for the old man had been the constant friend of the English. His paramount position could be admitted without murmur, for the Waikato, though defeated by the firearms of the Ngapuhi, were perhaps the most powerful of all the tribes in the land. The league on the west coast to prohibit further land sales to Europeans, fell naturally under the protection of the Maori king, but the settlers, in their eagerness to govern, or through want of foresight, did not appreciate the importance of the Maori king or of his functions until long after the suggestion of his appointment. In one sense it might be said that the idea of a Maori kingdom preceded the English settlement. It was a project mooted in the days of Samuel Marsden to save the Maori race from degradation.
Early in 1856 the Governor appointed a Board to inquire into the land question, but neither he nor his advisers ascribed any importance to the king movement, or to the land sales prohibition league. He desired to know whether a Maori selling land “could not be made to a degree answerable for subsequent claims?”Of Major Nugent, who sat at the Board, Colonel Browne reported that “it is not easy to over-rate his ability and knowledge of native affairs.”Under these circumstances it was mischievous to make Mr. Ligar, the Surveyor- page 575 General, chairman of the Board, for he was conspicuous in no good sense. Evidence was taken from McLean, Bishop Selwyn, Mr. Whiteley, a Wesleyan missionary, and many others. Tamati Ngapora, the future counsellor of the Maori king, was examined. The report of the Board was that “generally there is no such thing as an individual claim, clear and independent of the tribal right,”that “each native has a right in common with the whole tribe over the disposal of the land of the tribe,”and that “the chiefs exercise an influence in the disposal of the land, but have only an individual claim like the rest of the people to particular portions.”On this head there was scarcely any difference or doubt among the witnesses, several of whom were Maoris. Rare instances to the contrary were mentioned by two or three persons. Mr. Brown, Superintendent at Taranaki, said: “I do not think that any native has a strictly individual claim to land.”Mr. Busby (formerly British Resident) emphatically stated that “the Government should decline purchasing disputed lands.”Strangest of all, considering the part he was to take at Taranaki, McLean said: “I do not think that any native has a clear individual title to land in the Northern Island.”Mr. Whiteley, after twenty-three years' residence, was equally positive. “No native has anything more than a right to individual occupation and cultivation, or locating a house on the land. If a sale is to be effected the sanction of the tribe is required.”Riwai-te-ahu said: “I consider there is no individual claim. They are all entangled or matted together—the children of our common ancestor claiming the land bequeathed to them.”The Board discovered also that as land was heritable in the female as well as in the male line, intermarriages between members of different tribes caused an involvement of titles in two tribes which it was highly dangerous to endeavour to dispose of by any rash purchase. The report was laid before the New Zealand representatives in July, 1856, and was sent to England. A chief, Hira Taiwhanga, made statements which ought to have made Browne's advisers pause if their intentions were honourable. A drunken American settler named Marsden had killed a native woman Kerara, in November, 1855. She was a Rotorua woman, but was murdered near Auckland. The man was tried and convicted, but not hanged until delay made the Maoris suspect that the woman's death page 576 was to be unavenged. They had demanded the surrender of the murderer as soon as his victim was buried. They asked if Englishmen thought them cattle to be slaughtered. Three hundred and seventy men went in their own vessels from Maketu to Auckland, intending to cut down the flagstaff if Marsden should not be hung. There had been meetings at Rotorua and elsewhere as well as at Auckland. Governor Browne's absence in the south delayed his decision upon the murderer's case. There were proposals to seize upon Auckland, or to retaliate by killing some European. A clergyman remonstrated against the sending to a magistrate of a violent Maori letter, threatening war against the Government. Moderate counsels prevailed, and it was determined to wait until the Governor should decide upon Marsden's case. Colonel Browne saw a letter from one chief to another, containing the ominous words: “I and my people were within a little of standing up and calling upon the whole island to join me in contending with the English for the independence of this island which has been trampled on; also on account of this murder.… Had this murderer been acquitted I should have given my voice for downright open war. As it is, the judge and the jury of twelve have consented that the man shall die, and that is satisfactory.”Chiefs with their retainers arrived in Auckland and demanded justice. Colonel Wynyard attended a conference. To the Maori mind even the trial of the murderer was a mockery, inasmuch as he had never denied his deed. On the 12th February, the man was executed: but the Governor was so impressed with the difficulties of the situation that he asssumed the responsibility of detaining the 58th Regiment, then under orders to leave New Zealand. Colonel Wynyard and the Executive Council concurred in the retention of the troops. The Stafford Ministry could only rely upon them for the coercion of the Maoris. Yet Browne, though he co-operated with his advisers, distrusted their motives. On the 14th February he wrote: “Political dissensions have been for some time and still are the bane of this colony”… “elements of discord between the races are in existence, and imprudent legislation or interference with the rights of the Maoris would fan them into a flame not easily extinguished.… I shall view with page 577 apprehension, and object to, any attempt to alter the provisions of the 73rd clause of the Constitution Act, or to bring the powers thereby entrusted to the Governor in any way under the control of the Assembly.”
But while the Governor was thus reasoning, his Ministry were intoxicated with power and thirsted to enlarge it. In March, 1856, he devoted a despatch to the subject. It came to his knowledge that different opinions were entertained about the 73rd clause. If his views were correct the chief Land Commissioner must take orders from the Governor alone. “If the power of interference with the natives is confided to gentlemen liable to the pressure of public opinion, and whose tenure of office is dependent on the confidence of a public assembly, it will be impossible to foresee the result.”He urgently referred the Secretary of State to Chief Justice Martin, who was returning to England, and was intimately acquainted with the subject. Mr. Labouchere scarcely rose to the necessity of the case. He dallied with it. The Palmerston Government comprised great names, although Gladstone, Graham, and Sydney Herbert had withdrawn because of the Crimean Inquiry Committee. Lord John Russell, after showing his incompetence at Vienna, had slunk from the Ministry to avoid censure; but Sir G. C. Lewis, Sir Charles Wood, Mr. Labouchere, Mr. Lowe, Sir Richard Bethell, Mr. Horsman, and others remained. The Crimean war was at an end. The Treaty of Paris was concluded before Governor Browne's despatch reached England. But other matters occupied the Ministry. Baron Rothschild and his fellow-Syrians were to be admitted into Parliament, and a new Abjuration Bill was in the Commons; Lord Granville was to go as ambassador-extraordinary to attend the coronation of the Emperor of Russia; public attention was more intent on the Rugely poisoning case and the Robson and Redpath frauds than on the fortunes of a rising colony or the fate of the Maori race; and if there was any superfluity of care for distant events it was to be expended in punishing the Chinese for seizing a piratical lorcha manned by Chinese but claiming to sail under English colours. Governor Browne was informed that “Her Majesty's Government consider that, notwithstanding all the respect due to the principle of responsible government, the page 578 management of native affairs should remain for the present mainly in the hands of a Governor responsible for it to the Crown.”“Until further instructions”he was to pursue his previous course. These qualifications as to scope and duration of his control were calculated to stir up the local Ministry to further encroachment on his functions. So little did Mr. Labouchere foresee the result that he did not lay the despatches on the table of the House of Commons. From April, 1854, till July, 1860, they slumbered in recesses, from which they were to be produced only when the nation was startled by a new crisis. Sir George Grey had in 1853 been deemed competent, and a listless public assumed that all must go well under Colonel Browne. For Mr. Labouchere, warned as he was by the Governor, there was no excuse.
Meanwhile the Governor, with the help of McLean, wound up some disputes (clinging to the land purchases, thought to have been finally made by Sir George Grey), and struggled for a time to resist the tendency of his advisers' opinions. What both he and they ought to have foreseen took place. In November, 1856, the District Commissioner apprised him that there was to be a great assembly of Maori chiefs at Taupo. The main object was to check the decline of the Maoris, and the principal weapon was to be an arrest of land sales to the Government. While the Commissioner wrote the Maoris worked. Te Heu Heu was the moving spirit, and he called the meeting at Taupo. A missionary at Taupo, Mr. Grace, was reported by McLean to be aiding and abetting the Maori schemes, and the Governor was moved to procure Mr. Grace's removal by the Church Missionary Society. Browne reported that Te Heu Heu's assembly separated without effecting much beyond “a declaration by certain tribes that they would not permit land to be sold to the Europeans.”But the Maori king movement may be said to have taken shape at Taupo. It was not then linked with the anti-land-selling league at Taranaki, nor did Te Rangitake ally himself with the king movement. But the object of both was the same. The “mana”of the Maori chiefs was to be carefully guarded. The collective title of the tribe was to be scrupulously respected. No sales of land by individual members of a tribe could be valid without sanction of the supreme tribal authority. That some “mana” page 579 existed and was recognized among the Maoris was not unknown to the English, for McLean declared before the House of Representatives, with regard to the Taranaki territory, that “on each occasion on which the Ngatiawa sold land there they sent a portion of the payment to Waikato as an acknowledgment of conquest, or of the right of ‘mana’ possessed by the Waikato chiefs as their conquerors.”The Ministry, however, were too much bent on their own aggrandisement to care for any of these things. But the Governor was ill at ease. It appeared that the more reflective Maoris were unsettled in their minds, and the impulsive could less and less be restrained. The labours of the English Committee and the Ministry were bearing fruit. Colonel Browne wrote (18th February, 1857) that it was difficult if not impossible to satisfy “views opposed to each other, as those who want land and are in no way responsible for the manner in which it is obtained, and those who, like Mr. Mantell, consider the colonial government bound to care for the interests of the natives.”
Early in 1857 the future Maori king-maker, Wiremu Tamihana Te Waharoa visited Auckland to lay the Maori grievances for the last time before the Governor. He it was who, as Tarapipipi, in 1844, peremptorily exacted restitution of property taken from settlers by Maoris returning to their homes from the great meeting at Remuera. His resolute character might have warned the Governor's advisers against lightly offending a chief so wise, so influential, and so friendly, at a time when the Maori mind was excited by suspicion and distrust. Yet Mr. Gorst distinctly records the fact that Te Waharoa was denied access to the Governor, and that McLean, the Native Secretary, refused him the common favour of a loan to enable him to erect a mill. A friend to whom he complained said that the chief must help himself. He went home, resolved to ask no more favours, and in February, 1857, sent a circular “to all Waikato,”declaring that his tribe, Ngatihaua, agreed that Potatau should be king of New Zealand. “Be speedy. You will write to the remote tribes that they may hear.”Potatau was loth to assume authority, and when he yielded claimed only the title “matua,”or father. When it was known that, thus stirred, the Maoris were to assemble at Rangiriri in May, 1857, the Governor's page 580 advisers were alarmed, and a valuable paper prepared by Mr. Fenton guided their action. Colonel Browne, Mr. C. W. Richmond, and Mr. McLean started for Rangiriri. The meeting had been postponed. They journeyed to Otawhao in the Upper Waikato territory. Mr. Fenton joined them. They met Te Heu Heu, the Taupo chief, who bitterly told them that the lowest Englishman was hospitably entertained by Maoris, but that a chief of high rank visiting Auckland was rudely neglected by the Pakehas. Moreover, the debased English who lived in Maori districts committed wrongs for which there was no redress. The Maoris would have a king and assemblies of their own. They would not interfere with English settlements, but for the English in native districts they would make laws. Commencing mildly he rose to Maori oratoric heat, and said that in what the Maoris were doing they were advised by a Pakeha. The Governor rode on to Rangiaohia, a district smiling with Maori cultivations. There he received loyal salutes and addresses, but found the new movement stirring the Maori mind everywhere. He returned to Rangiriri. Potatau met him at Paetai. Chiefs made speeches to him. They wished to have runangas (Maori assemblies), a resident magistrate, and law administered locally. Browne assented, and was cheered. Potatau approved. He oracularly said he was a dying man, but would be guided by the Governor, and would bequeath his people to his care. “Enough,”he said; “give the runanga, give the law, and the magistrate. It is ended.”1 Mr. Richmond distrusted the chief's “apparent acquiescence.”He considered him “a profound diplomatist.”2
1 Evidence of Heta Tarawhiti, N. Z. P. P., 1860. F. No. 3, p. 52.
2 Richmond's evidence, ibid. p. 53.
From Rangiaohia, Hoani Papita and other chiefs wrote a long letter on the 10th June. “We are here gathered together to appoint a king to check the evils amongst us.”They quoted St. Paul to show that the king was the minister of God for good, and would execute wrath upon evil-doers. They had heard that the Europeans were opposed to their projects, but could not understand the justice of such opposition. “It will be better for the Pakeha to be friendly to the Maori, and let the love of God govern both; that is, the law of love.”They had heard that Mr. C. O. Davis was accused of inciting them to elect a king. That was utterly untrue. They had long ago thought of doing so. “It was commenced by Te Heu Heu, who proposed it to Potatau, afterwards by Hoani, and after that by Wiremu Tamihana Te Waharoa. If you disapprove of this act of God, take back your Gospel also. Let it not rest upon us, and let page 583 our island be a heap of dirt.”The Governor told the Secretary of State (12th June, 1857), that he apprehended “no sort of danger from the present movement,”which was “arrested”(he trusted), but was “too deeply rooted to be eradicated by argument or persuasion.”He considered the “time critical, and that much good or evil must result from the manner in which we now act or neglect to act.”A code of laws adapted to Maori needs should at once be prepared, and circulated in the Maori language. In the preparation of the code the services of Mr. Frederick Dart Fenton were enlisted. A solicitor by profession, he had arrived in New Zealand in 1850, and rented land from the Maoris on the south bank of the Waikato river. After a time Sir George Grey offered him a civil appointment (in the Deeds Office), which he accepted, and afterwards quitted in order to become resident magistrate at Kaipara. In March, 1856, he became temporarily Native Secretary to Governor Browne. Mr. McLean then became Native Secretary and Chief Land Commissioner, and in the latter part of the year Fenton was appointed resident magistrate at Whaingaroa. Thence he was summoned to act as magistrate at Waikato in order to redeem Colonel Browne's promise in April, 1857, at Rangiriri. He laboured at disadvantage. Donald McLean strove to obtain the appointment for another, and detracted from Fenton's ability so rashly as to tell a committee that Fenton had “little or no knowledge of Maori language.”
1 The liability to error on the part of those who did not study the language grammatically will be understood when it is mentioned that the inflexion of possessive pronouns was so nice, that by a slight variation of a word meaning “your”—the phrase, “That is your cooking-vessel,”conveyed to the Maori mind either, “That is your vessel”(to be used for your culinary purposes)—or, “That is your vessel,”i.e. the one in which you shall be cooked.
1 N. Z. P. P. E. No. 1, C.
2 This was not a new idea. Acting-Governor Shortland (Despatch 89; 30th October, 1843) told Lord Stanley that he agreed with Protector Clarke that the time had arrived for the “establishment of Native Courts.”
3 Evidence of Mr. Richmond, N. Z. P. P., 1860. F. No. 3, p. 52.
1 N. Z. P. P., 1860. F. No. 3, p. 141.
2 Fenton's Diary, 17th August, 1857. N. Z. P. P. E. No. 1, C. p. 27.
As a proof of the confusion denounced by Davis, it may be mentioned that while Mr. Richmond, the Native Minister, stated that Ministers were “powerless in the matter”of the omission to conciliate Potatau, because they “had no medium of com- page 589 munication except McLean's office,”McLean himself stated that he had “no opportunity”to remedy it because Fenton “received his instructions from Richmond.”Fenton stated that he had no instructions to visit Potatau, and though it occurred to him that it might be beneficial he was restrained by a fear that his “visit might be construed into an unauthorized interference.”1 He was recalled to Auckland to prepare a book of “Laws for the use of the natives,”and was informed that in future he was to send to the Native Secretary a copy of every communication he might make respecting native affairs. The Governor was confused by the contention for power between Richmond and McLean. He had directed in August that all magisterial business should be divided into “two classes, European and native.”On the first, magistrates were to address the Treasurer; on the second, Mr. McLean. “When the correspondence is of a mixed nature they will address both departments simultaneously.”Mr. Richmond shrunk from a system which withdrew native affairs from his cognizance, and the Governor shrunk from making any changes without the sanction of the Secretary of State. The arrangement of 1856 provided that in all native affairs the Native Secretary's advice should reach the Governor through the hands of a responsible Minister, and Colonel Browne would not depart from it. His advisers refused to aid him in measures of defence. “I told them (he wrote 8th August, 1857) that if they would undertake to provide, or cause the province of Auckland to provide, proper accommodation for (H.M. troops) I would not remove them. My advisers, however, distinctly decline to do so.”
1 N. Z. P. P., 1860. F. No. 3 contains the evidence of Messrs. Richmond, McLean, and Fenton.
1 The Governor's despatches do not show that he appreciated the blunder committed in failing to secure Potatau's co-operation with Fenton's mission. On the 13th June, 1859, he wrote that “Potatau gave me assurance (in 1857) that he had no desire to be a king… that he would always be faithful to Her Majesty, and I have every reason to believe that he has adhered to his promise. At the time alluded to I appointed Mr. Fenton, that officer being enthusiastic in his desire to introduce law amongst the natives. It soon appeared, however, that the tribes were divided into two parties… (one) Potatau… and all the old and important chiefs… the other consisting of young men who called themselves the Queen's party… I will not assert that Mr. Fenton's indiscretion was the cause of this formation of two distinct parties, because it is possible that this movement was beyond his control, but he unwisely allied himself to the latter party. Potatau complained that his position as the great chief of Waikato had been recognized by all Governors, but that now young men were encouraged to disregard his authority, and that some slights had been put upon him. I soon found that if he had chosen to assume the position his followers desire to thrust upon him, all the chiefs of importance in the south would join him (an opinion in which I am fully confirmed by my recent tour), and I had strong reason to believe that many of the leading men on the other side only waited to see if he really would establish a national party when they would also join him. As soon as this came to my knowledge, I declared that I would recognize no parties at all; that Her Majesty was the only Sovereign of New Zealand, but that I fully acknowledged Potatau (as all my predecessors had done) as the great chief of Waikato. This tranquillized affairs, but I was accused of putting an extinguisher upon the Queen's party, who were alone thought deserving of consideration.”As Mangere, where Potatau lived, was close to Auckland, and the Governor could send for or see him at any moment, the Governor's explanation leaves his own and his advisers' conduct almost unintelligible, except on the assumption that the omission to consult the chief in the customary manner was intended as a slight. Colonel Browne added that he afterwards sent for Tamati Ngapora, “whose character is unblemished, and whose truth has never been questioned,”and acting on his advice resolved to postpone the appointment of another magistrate until after the irritation caused by the disrespect shown to Potatau might subside. In a later despatch (27th November, 1860), the confused condition of the Governor's mind is exhibited. It tells how he appointed Fenton Native Secretary in 1856; how the Ministry urged that the office of Native Secretary should be merged in that of the Land Purchase Commissioner (McLean); how Browne consented on condition that Fenton should be otherwise provided for, and Fenton was made magistrate at Raglan, and afterwards transferred to Waikato; how Fenton's report on Maori affairs was prepared by Browne's desire; how Fenton omitted to negotiate with Potatan (who lived close to the door of the Governor and the Ministers!); how McLean grumbled because Fenton's letters were addressed to a responsible Minister, and Browne ordered that there should be duplicates to gratify McLean; how Browne recognized Fenton's language in a leading article in the ‘Southern Cross’ newspaper (4th February, 1858), and thought the editor primed Fenton, or Fenton the editor; how it was gravely agreed that Fenton should be “offered the choice between Government service and that of the press;”how Fenton assured the Governor that he “would cease from communicating with the press,”but attacks were continued against the Native Department; how McLean would not answer for the peace of the district unless Fenton were withdrawn; how, while Browne was thinking, Whitaker asked that Fenton might be made assistant law officer, and Browne welcomed the relief; how the original report of the Waikato Select Committee stated, “It is due to Ministers to state that Mr. Fenton's withdrawal took place against their advice;”how Browne thought the statement “not true”and it was withdrawn, the Committee having “discovered that so far from Ministers having disapproved of Mr. Fenton's removal from the Waikato it took place at the request of the Attorney-General;”and how, lumbering through the sea of crossing opinions, the Governor could “not agree with the Committee in thinking that Mr. Fenton's task was attended on the whole with success.”
A Committee appointed in 1860 to inquire as to the abortive effort to introduce civil institutions in Waikato, reported that they could see no sufficient reason for the withdrawal of Mr. Fenton, and that it had disheartened the friendly Maoris. How the king-maker Waharoa answered an invitation to appear before the Committee will be seen hereafter.
1 It has been the contention of Mr. Richmond and his friends that they loyally abstained from pressing their views upon Colonel Browne. Mr Richmond admits that the Governor felt the indignity of the British position, and “frequently discoursed with the Attorney-General (Whitaker) and myself on the possibility of a change… It may be thought as I speak of these conversations that we were the advisers of the Governor in native affairs. This was not so… The only person who had the Governor's confidence was Donald McLean… and for my part I can truly say that I never possessed his confidence in the slightest degree. He talked to Whitaker and myself on this particular matter more as lawyers. I mention the matter to show what Governor Browne's real aim was—namely, to put down the fighting which he felt was a disgrace, as he would so say, to ‘our flag;’ and that throughout the initiative was taken by the Governor”(MS. by Mr. Richmond written in 1878). The foregoing extract is made from a paper furnished to the author by a highly honourable gentleman who (after the outbreak of the war in 1860) became a colleague of Mr. Richmond, and remains his friend. Mr. Richmond seems to under-rate the influence of mind upon mind. The more the Governor respected Mr. Richmond, the more would his judgment be unconsciously warped. The MS. above quoted, adds that before Colonel Browne went to Taranaki he “brought before the Executive Council the often-mentioned subject of proclaiming British law in Taranaki… and we thought it not a bad opportunity to declare that no more fighting would be allowed in the neighbourhood of our settlement. This was a reversal to some extent of Governor Wynyard's policy of absolute non-intervention.”Mr. Richmond's explanation removes from the Governor and his advisers, in 1859, none of the blame cast upon them in the text; nor is it compatible with the elaborate advice tendered by Mr. Richmond in September, 1858, on native affairs.
1 He was addressing the Waikato Committee in 1860. The above extracts are from the evidence taken. N. Z. P. P. F. No. 3, 1860.
It must ever seem strange that when rumours of disaffection were flitting through the air, like bats in the darkness, the Governor and his advisers relaxed the restrictions upon the acquisition of firearms by the natives. Within six months the Maoris were said to have possessed themselves of thousands of firearms, together with ammunition. Even when Waata Kukutai implored the Governor by letter to prohibit their sale (October, 1858), neither Mr. Richmond nor the Governor would take warning. The wisdom of Sir George Grey had no imitator. In 1858, the General Assembly found that a blunder had been committed, and recommended that there should be no further relaxation. Internal strife was promoted by the arming of a warlike race. Te Hapuku was taunted with selling land. “As he had sold the forest, he must cook his food with his ancestors' bones.”He resented the affront; and, when at war, said in vindication—“A blow is soon forgotten, but an insulting speech lives for ever.”The incensed chief was besieged, and when it was thought that a crisis was approaching, the Governor sent nearly 300 soldiers to Port Napier to avert it. McLean entreated both sides to accept a peace. Te Hapuku was allowed to march off, with the honours page 596 of war, to his land in the interior, and his pah was destroyed by fire. At Port Napier as at Taranaki the contending Maoris were peaceful towards the English. At the latter place the hollow truce was broken by the treachery of Ihaia. Katatore, after the truce of 1856, changed his tactics, and advocated sales of land. The provincial authorities, nothing loth, received his advances gladly. Ihaia burned with jealousy. In January, 1858, as Katatore and three friends were riding from Taranaki they were waylaid and shot, on one of the main roads in the Bell block district, in sight of Europeans. The Assistant Native Secretary reported that Ihaia admitted that the plot was laid by him; that the attack was made on the first occasion on which Katatore had gone unarmed; that after he was shot in many places three guns were broken in beating him, and that he was finally mangled with tomahawks. Tamati Tiraurau, who traded extensively with the English, was reported as having been “specially prominent for his ferocity.”Ihaia's old ally Arama Karaka had died in 1857, and Ihaia's resources were few. The friends of Katatore at once killed two of Ihaia's tribe, and sacked the Ikamoana pah; but Ihaia escaped, and his deserted property and live stock were destroyed by the enraged tribe. Te Rangitake with Katatore's friends besieged Ihaia in the Karaka pah at Waitara. Many of the settlers sympathized with Ihaia; and besought the Governor that Ihaia and his friends might be rescued. The Government offered to remove the besieged to the Chatham Islands; but, relying on the settlers and the Ministry, Ihaia declined the proffered asylum. He sent ambassadors to ask for help from Waikato and the Upper Wanganui. A shameful document is extant in the English blue-books. E. L. Humphries, Speaker of the Provincial Council, on behalf of that body, pleaded in May, 1858, for Ihaia as having by his “friendly, honest character gained a foremost place in the esteem of the settlers.…”“If at any time he has evinced hostility to the Government, he has always been actuated by a sincere desire to serve what he thought the cause of the settlers.”He had committed a crime, but considering the circumstances, “and that it only took place after the Government had for years abandoned all control over the natives, they cannot but express their opinion that page 597 the crime is in some measure shared by the more civilized race which compelled a rude people to return to their barbarous customs.”The aid of the Government was entreated to coerce the natives to sell their lands.1 The terrors of the situation must needs have been great, or the greed for Maori land immeasurably unscrupulous, when such words were penned by the Provincial Council at Taranaki. The settlers were not directly attacked, but they lived in an atmosphere of fire and slaughter. It was rumoured that Te Rangitake threatened to throw Ihaia and two of his principal accomplices into a furnace.
1 The reply of the Governor to this part of their petition was that “in reference to a proposal to coerce a minority of native proprietors who might be disinclined to sell,”he had already expressed his opinion “that such a course would be unjust and impolitic; and Her Majesty's Government had conveyed to him in a despatch received by him the other day, their unqualified approval of his views.”—P. P. 1860. Vol. xlvii. Mr. Fox's speech, p. 424.
(22nd January, 1858.) “I have expressed strong disapprobation of the conduct of the gentleman who communicated with Ihaia after the murder, though in so doing I have little doubt he was actuated by the best motives. I regret our inability to vindicate the law by seizing Ihaia and his accomplices in his own district, but have desired that no communication should be held with them, and that they should be informed that if found within the English settlement the law will be allowed to take its usual course.”
1 History of ‘Taranaki’ B. Wells, 1878. New Zealand.
2 Ihaia perhaps relied upon the offices of a jury composed of his Taranaki friends.
(17th May, 1858.) “My anticipations have been fully realized (as regarded Te Rangitake), the chief who threatened to fire on the troops or any one else who attempted to interfere on behalf of Ihaia. Te Rangitake submitted at once to my decision, in reference to the removal of Ihaia, but the latter having received reinforcement and promise of further aid, declined to accept the interference which he so earnestly solicited in his letter.… I should also add that the settlers openly avow their desire to possess the land which was the original cause, and is now the chief subject of dispute between the contending chiefs.”Just at that period (18th May), Mr. Richmond, the Native Minister (one of the Taranaki settlers), explained in Parliament “the views of the administration as to the government of the natives.”Without a measure “to promote the acquisition by natives of individual titles, and to accelerate the extinction of the native title, we think that any native policy must be incomplete.… The Constitution Act reposes in the General Assembly an immense trust—a power which has been regarded with great jealousy by some friends of the natives. But I, sir, hold that the native needs no protector in this House.”In sending to the Secretary of State a printed copy of Mr. Richmond's speech, the Governor wrote (7th June, 1858), that with two exceptions he agreed with it. “I entirely demur to the opinion that the natives need no protection. I know of no more practical proof page 600 of the incorrectness of this statement than the pressure which is daily brought to bear on the Executive Government by the inhabitants of New Plymouth (Taranaki): that it has been hitherto resisted redounds to the credit of the Executive, who know that I have both the power and the will to support them; but if that power were surrendered no Ministry could hold office in opposition to the wishes of the settlers, whether they were or were not in accordance with justice to the native race.”On the 9th June, 1858, the Governor transmitted a memorial from the inhabitants of New Plymouth to the General Assembly, and said, with regard to a charge that Ihaia and his congeners, in whom the settlers took “deep interest,”had been refused the assistance of the Government, “This is the gravamen of the complaint, and I therefore state distinctly that I am most anxious to acquire land at New Plymouth… to obtain this desirable object I will, however, never permit land to be taken without the consent of those to whom it belongs, nor will I interfere to compel an equitable division of common land among the respective claimants as desired by the memorialists.… This decision is not less one of expediency than of justice, for the whole of the Maori race maintain the right of the minority to prevent the sale of land held in common with the utmost jealousy.… Te Rangitake has no sort of influence with me or the Colonial Government. We believe him to be an infamous character, but I will not permit the purchase of land over which he has any right without his consent.”On 14th October, 1858, he forwarded a formal memorandum, signed by Mr. Richmond on behalf of the Ministry, and contended at great length against the “expediency of subjecting the management of native affairs to the control of the responsible Minister which is inferred throughout the memorandum.”Up to this date it seems that Colonel Browne resisted the persuasions of his advisers, and they were constrained to wait until he could be seduced into some questionable act which would provoke strife, from which, when once committed to it, the gallantry of a soldier would prevent him from shrinking. His good genius still prevailed in November, 1858, when Mr. Carrington, one of the evil spirits of Taranaki, sent to England, through him, a letter urging “that the treaty of Waitangi, being no longer valuable to us, should page 601 be broken.”The Governor would not trouble the Secretary of State with any remarks “on such a document.”In March, 1859, Carrington again importuned Colonel Browne. He learned “with deep concern that special instructions from Her Majesty preclude his Excellency from coercing a minority of the natives into selling their lands,”—and that his Excellency, considering such a “proceeding impolitic and unjust, would never sanction it.”Carrington urged that he really meant well towards the Maoris, and that it was cruel to prevent a minority from “selling their equitable portion of waste land, subject to the approval of the Chief Land Purchase Commissioner.”The Governor replied that he had been inaccurately reported, but that Her Majesty's Government had conveyed to him an “unqualified approval of his views.”He was therefore “unable to adopt”Carrington's. Thus he wrote on the 25th March, and thus he may have thought. But already on the 8th he had entered upon the unjust course he denounced, and Whitaker, the Attorney-General, laughed in his sleeve when he saw a soldier committed to a quarrel, which a morbid sense of honour might constrain him to pursue after it was found to be unjust. One Cutfield was the appropriately-named Superintendent of Taranaki, when Colonel Browne was drawn into the conspiracy of the settlers to rob the Maoris of their cultivations in 1859; but Carrington rose afterwards to the same distinction, for which his sympathies fitted him.
The Governor's contention against the plans of his Ministry, as shown by the foregoing citations from his despatches in June and October, 1858, calls for some description of the measures devised for the control of Maori affairs. In the meshes of law both the rights of the natives and the conscience of the Governor might be inextricably confused. Bills to regulate the local affairs of native districts, and provide for administration of justice therein, were introduced. Mr. C. W. Richmond made an elaborate speech on the 18th May, 1858, on the native question. It was separately printed, sent with his compliments to various friends and public men, and forwarded by Colonel Browne to the Secretary of State. There were three courses open to the Government: (1) To recognize native customs; (2) To enforce British law; (3) To insinuate, or induce the page 602 acceptance of British law. The first was not worthy of adoption. Of the second Mr. Richmond said: “All rational settlers are agreed that here in New Zealand it is neither humane nor possible. The third, which was “Sir George Grey's view,”the Ministry would follow, avoiding his shortcomings. The labour was gigantic, but the British Government were bound in honour and conscience to perform it. The Maoris, moreover, were “a reasoning and a reasonable people… by nature venerators of law… the structure of their society aristocratic, verging upon democratic.… They are not a people who brook despotic rule. They have always been accustomed to debate their affairs in popular assemblies. These are striking coincidences with the qualities which have ever distinguished the races from which we ourselves sprung—striking resemblances to the Teutonic peoples.”Mr. Richmond read an Act passed by an assembly at Taupiri. “An assembly to consider whether pigs shall be fastened by the leg or conveyed to another place. After this assembly all pigs going at large or devouring crops may be caught. Any one who sees the pig may catch it. When a man has caught a pig at large or trespassing, he must go and inform the owner, and the owner shall pay him one sixpence, and fetch the pig that has been fastened.”At Whaingaroa a law was declared to be “settled by the assessors of the Queen and the Governor.”In Waikato alone six court-houses had been erected by the Maoris for the European magistrate. The natives were “anxious and prepared for some better system, such as we are proposing.”One grave question remained. “Without a measure to promote the acquisition of individual titles, and accelerate the extinction of the native title, any native policy must be incomplete.”Mr. Richmond acknowledged the deep obligation of the Government to the missionary body. “We have found amongst them our best counsellors and safest agents. We believe that the natives cannot be efficiently governed without their co-operation. We, at all events, have not attempted and shall not attempt to dispense with that co-operation.”Alas! for the shortsightedness of man. Mr. Richmond was honoured by many friends. His judgment was deemed sound; and yet within two short years he was found vigorously hostile to the ablest and most distinguished page 603 of the body whom he had lauded as the best of counsellors; while, to make the contrast more significant, the retired Chief Justice, Sir William Martin, combined with Bishop Selwyn to seek justice for the Maoris aggrieved by Richmond's advice.
Under the Native Districts Regulation Bill, the Governor in Council—not the Governor—was empowered to proclaim districts and make regulations. Amongst the enumerated powers were “the suppression of injurious native customs,”and “ascertaining, prescribing, and providing for the observance and enforcement of the rights, duties, and liabilities amongst themselves of tribes, communities, or individuals of the native race in relation to the use, occupation, and receipt of the profits of land and hereditaments.”As far as possible, general assent of natives was to be obtained as the Governor might think fit; but the word of promise thus graciously offered was counteracted by a provision that “the issue of any order in Council shall be conclusive proof of such general assent to any regulation thereby made.”If the Governor could be induced to commit a wrong, Mr. Richmond and Mr. Whitaker deprived him of all power to retract. The subjugation of the Governor to his advisers was the battle-ground taken up in the Legislative Council against the Bill. Ever, where Mr. Richmond's name assumes prominence as adverse to Maori rights and disloyal to the word of the Queen, the reader may remember that the crafty Attorney-General was an unseen but potent accomplice. But vainly did Major Kenny, the Chief Justice, Mr. Swainson, and Colonel Wynyard oppose the Bill. The Attorney-General declared that the fate of the Ministry was involved in their measure. Chief Justice Arney demanded information. The Government must condescend to give particulars. He would not degrade himself to “a position something between a registration officer and a printer's devil.”The Attorney-General produced voluminous papers, and carried his Bill on a subsequent day. A Bay of Islands Settlements Act was reserved for the Queen's pleasure, but powers were thrown upon the Governor and not upon his Council. The populous north, where the Ngapuhi dwelt, was more charily handled by his advisers than more distant places. But they carried through the House of Representatives an page 604 insidious measure to deprive the Maoris of the electoral franchise. They wished to annul all titles to land except grants from the Queen. As a step in that direction they provided that in future no man should vote except in right of property held by title derived from the Crown. But though the Representatives passed the clause the Council was neither so grasping nor obsequious. Swainson, the late Attorney-General, declared that “it would be better for the Governor of New Zealand to cut off his right hand than to give such a measure the sanction of his name.”Colonel Browne reported that the obnoxious clauses were rejected, and the natives were left to “enjoy the electoral privileges conferred on them by the Imperial Parliament.”The attempt to withdraw them was only one of a number of floating symptoms which showed how the European flood was rising, and the Maori was to have no rest for the sole of his foot. Earl Grey's attempt to evade the Waitangi Treaty was not forgotten. The Board appointed to investigate the land question in 1856 had recommended, and the Ministry desired, to sweep away Maori title and substitute grants from the Crown. And now, in the elected Assembly, a Bill had been passed which, but for Mr. Swainson and a few others in the Second Chamber, would have forcibly deprived the wealthiest Maori of the suffrage, unless he would crouch down and abandon his hereditary rights guaranteed by the Queen, and would submit to the arbitrary dictates of “the English Committee.”Flesh and blood could hardly be cool under such circumstances, and Maoris were more careful of their honour than even of their flesh and blood. They had Pakeha friends who magnified the dangers. Old Rauparaha's son once declared at a great meeting, in set terms, that a white man, whom he named, was responsible for the disaffection which lurked in the Maori king movement, and the violence it produced. With his despatch narrating the failure of the attempt to deprive the Maoris of the franchise, the Governor forwarded lengthy minutes drawn up by Mr. C. W. Richmond and by Mr. McLean. Mr. Richmond's paper was dated 29th September, 1858, and contained seventy-one paragraphs. It was a code for the control of the Governor as well as of the natives. Colonel Browne sent his own comments with Mr. Richmond's paper. The latter described page 605 the measures of the session of 1858, as “the first attempt of the colonists of New Zealand, in virtue of the powers of representative government now conceded to them, to grapple with the difficulties of the native question.”The presence of increased military force would “greatly forward any efforts for the permanent amelioration of the condition”of the Maoris. He defended the “Native Territorial Rights Bill,”which the Governor had reserved for the signification of Her Majesty's pleasure. The Governor was to be empowered to issue certificates of title to land to a tribe, community, or individual. Questions of title were to be determined by the Governor in Council. For alienation from Maoris to private Europeans, where permitted, the sum of ten shillings per acre was to be paid into the Treasury. The Governor was not to have power to grant more than 50,000 acres in one year, and his power was to cease in December, 1861. Mr Richmond's avowed object was to commute Maori titles into English fee-simple, and accelerate the extinction of the native title; and the Bill was a first step in that direction. Asseverating repeatedly that the Ministry had no desire to encroach upon, but merely to establish a conservative influence over, the Governor's policy, Richmond expressed a hope which he could hardly have entertained, that the Secretary of State would think the House of Representatives liberal and moderate. Donald McLean's protest against the Bill was recorded, and as it animadverted on a Draft Bill not passed, Mr. Richmond could not refrain from saying that the Native Secretary was “quite unjustified in referring to it.”The pith of the matter may be gathered from one sentence, and the Governor's comment on it. Mr. Richmond sneered at the “right of the natives,”to what was “really a gratuitous concession by the Government.”The Legislature, he said, would “not trust Governor or Ministers, both together, with any such extravagant discretion as an unlimited power of granting away the Colonial territory in fee-simple.”The Governor replied: “If the land of the Maoris can be shown to be ‘colonial territory,’ this remark might be admissible; but if the interpretation put upon the treaty of Waitangi by Her Majesty's Government be worth anything, the fallacy of the Treasurer's remarks is self-evident.”page 606
McLean contended, “in contradistinction to the views of his Excellency's responsible advisers,”that the Governor should retain control of native affairs. The natives understood the principle which the Governor's power involved. It was of “paramount importance”to maintain it. “It must be admitted,”he said, “that the most harmonious relations now subsist between the two races… serious inconvenience would ensue from conceding to the representatives of the settlers the entire control of native affairs, nor is it believed that the continuance of the present friendly relations is at all contingent upon such a concession.”Colonel Browne advocated the maintenance of the Governor's powers; and enclosed remarks and citations by the late Chief Justice Martin on the whole question. The New Zealanders had constantly resisted, even to blood, any encroachment on their territorial rights; and Mr. Martin declared that they were not “less disposed to resist now.”The passage of the Territorial Rights Bill through the Legislative Council had been peculiar. The Governor wrote that he had in March, 1857, shown his Ministry a draft despatch to the Colonial Office recommending certain alterations in the Constitution Act. They wished him to withhold his despatch, and promised to introduce measures in the local legislature to effect the Governor's object—“to secure to individual natives by a Crown title lands belonging to themselves.”He withdrew his despatch, but was surprised to find in the Bill prepared by his advisers restrictions to which he could by no means consent. He told them so. They persuaded him to let them inform the Legislative Council that he approved their other measures, and conceal his disapproval of the Territorial Rights Bill. The other Bills, thus vouched, were passed after severe debate; the Ministry threatening to resign if they were defeated. They withdrew this threat as to the Territorial Rights Bill, but still kept the Governor's disapproval out of sight. By one vote, in a House of thirteen members, the Bill passed in the Council with an amendment reserving it for Her Majesty's pleasure. Colonel Wynyard, commanding the forces; Major Richmond, formerly superintendent of New Munster; Major Kenny, commanding the New Zealand Fencibles; Mr. Swainson, formerly Attorney-General; Mr. Gilfillan, a merchant, and Mr. Harrison, a solicitor, voted page 607 against the Bill. The Chief Justice was absent from the division, but had spoken strongly against impairing the Governor's powers. A technical amendment was required to be made (under a provision which enabled Governors to suggest amendments in Bills which had passed both Houses), and Browne consented to recommend it on condition that the House should be informed of his objection, and his intention not to recommend that the Queen should assent to the measure. He gave this information in a message under his own hand to the House. There was some murmuring at the past concealment of the Governor's views, but the Bill passed through its last local ordeal. Mr. C. W. Richmond urged that it would have been unconstitutional to refer to the Governor's opinions earlier than he did: but as he had been careful to make known the Governor's approval of the other Bills, the excuse convinced no one. Colonel Browne kept his promise by recommending that the Queen's assent should not be accorded; and he warned the Secretary of State that if the Crown had insisted on a proprietary right to all unoccupied land when the Queen's authority was proclaimed, “it could only have been established by a war of extermination; and even now, if such a claim were openly preferred, there is scarcely a chief from the North Cape to Queen Charlotte's Sound who would not rise in arms against us, and feel it a duty to do so.”The despatch which explained how the Ministry tricked the Assembly with the Governor's name was shown by him to his advisers, and they employed the Attorney-General (Whitaker) to draw up a memorandum impugning the Governor's statements; to the substantial accuracy of which the Governor nevertheless adhered, and was borne out by the memory of the Chief Justice (Arney). Mr. Whitaker only gibbeted himself by causing reference to his own speeches in which he earnestly represented that the Governor was in favour of the Bills. Soon after the passing of his measures, Mr. Richmond added to his own labours, and the dangers of the country, by assuming, in name as well as fact, the office of Minister for Native Affairs. Mr. Donald McLean's fears were destined to be justified at an early date.
The English Ministry which received Colonel Browne's despatches was that of Earl Derby, who had succeeded to power page 608 when Lord Palmerston seemed ready to change the law of England to please the pseudo-Napoleon. Placed in office by a majority of 157, Lord Palmerston was ejected by a majority of 19 for appearing to truckle to a crowned perjurer. Sir Edward Lytton was Colonial Secretary, and the Earl of Carnarvon as Under-Secretary answered Colonel Browne on the 18th May, 1859, shortly before the Derby Ministry was superseded by the ever-resilient and again popular Palmerston. In defiance of Colonel Browne's vigorous protest against subjecting the Governor to the Ministry on native questions, it would have been difficult for any Minister to approve the Territorial Rights Bill, and it was disallowed. Lord Carnarvon violated the maxim that he whose word is a command does wrong when he gives reasons. He coursed round about the question of Imperial responsibility, which could not at that moment be abandoned. He could not recommend that Her Majesty should assent to the Native Territorial Rights Bill. So far as it related to Maori titles he suggested, with a wonderful imperception of incongruity, that what was aimed at might better be secured by cautious enactment of rules respecting occupation of land, contemplated in the second section of the Act to regulate the local affairs of native districts. As the section related only to cattle trespass, about which the Governor in Council might make rules, it would have been difficult to make a worse suggestion. Titles to land were not within the purview of the section; and, if they had been, the contention between the Governor and his advisers about control of Maori affairs forbade the application of it in this case. The Maoris knew better than Lord Carnarvon the difference between their titles to land and the damage which a law of impounding could redress, and could not be favourably impressed by a recommendation that titles should be dealt with under a clause which was intended for a totally distinct purpose. They were wiser than Lord Carnarvon if he thought they could thus be duped; and to imagine that, not being duped, they would accept his proposal, was to betray on his part a simplicity vainly sought in them. However, the documents transmitted by the Governor and the conflicts of past years produced the needed effect. The military power requisite to enforce the measure, the tortuous method it proposed for undermining page 609 Maori titles and enabling settlers to purchase lands, and its evident tendency to substitute local for Imperial control while yet large parliamentary grants were annually made, barred the measure from the Royal assent. Lord Carnarvon could not approve of the Native Districts Regulation Bill in its existing shape. It invested the Governor in Council with “virtual power”to make laws affecting “that remarkable race,”the Maoris. It “omitted to secure to the Crown its customary right of disallowance.”Loth to disallow the Act altogether, Lord Carnarvon left it to its operation so that the Legislature might amend it by enacting that regulations under it should be subject to disallowance by the Crown.
A matter much discussed in 1858 deserves separate mention. The representatives passed a resolution that the opinion of the British law officers should be asked for on the claims “preferred by aboriginal natives under the 7th and 42nd sections of the Constitution Act”to votes for members of parliament. Practically the opinion seemed unnecessary, for in one of the documents transmitted by the Governor for the consideration of the law officers it was stated that the “dangers attendant upon swamping the European constituencies”had been “got over by the very simple expedient”devised by the Ministry, of providing that “no estate should confer a qualification unless held or occupied by title derived from the Crown.”In December, 1859, Sir Richard Bethell and Sir H. Keating gave their opinion. They did not refer to the treaty of Waitangi imparting “all the rights and privileges of British subjects”to all Maoris. With that technical slipperiness which can close the eye upon principle and open it wide upon expediency, they said that “freehold estate”and “leasehold estate”were “terms of art in English law,”and supposed “the establishment of the English law of tenures.”They decided that “natives cannot have such possession of any land used or occupied by them in common as tribes or communities, and not held under title derived from the Crown as would qualify them to become voters.”For electoral purposes it was convenient to maintain the existence of a tribal right differing from English tenure. For other purposes it was often as convenient to reject it.
Lord Carnarvon's despatch disallowing the Native Territorial page 610 Rights Bill reached the Governor on the 16th July, 1859. About that time a member of the Auckland Provincial Council, Mr. Buckland, said, that settlers were called on for sacrifice, “to sympathy for the natives, and all that kind of humbug. The settlers had no room for their stock, and would be obliged to set Government at defiance.… It was impossible to prevent the Anglo-Saxon overcoming the natives; and the Europeans, if they could not get the land with the consent, must get it without the consent, of the Government.”The applause which this rant received might awaken suspicion that the wisest course which England could have adopted would have been to entrust a worthy Governor with power to deport any person whose stay was injurious to peace. Colonel Browne declared that the “immediate consequence of any attempt to acquire Maori lands without previously extinguishing the native title to the satisfaction of all having an interest in them, would be an universal outbreak, in which many innocent Europeans would perish, and colonization would be infinitely retarded, but the native race would be eventually extirpated.”
1 Colonel Browne to Secretary of State, 20th September, 1859.
It is sufficient to say of these measures that the last affected to provide that a land register should be kept by a magistrate in his district; that any Maori wishing to have his land partitioned should apply to the magistrate, who should notify the application; and if within a given time no adverse claim should be delivered, or if adverse claims should have been made, the magistrate should then fix a day for hearing and decision. He might postpone or abstain from any decision; but if he should decide he was to define the boundaries of the lands of which he might make partition. No one familiar with the subject could doubt that such a measure was fraught with germs of strife.
1 Colonel Browne to Secretary of State, 20th September, 1859.
2 The Governor remarked, “This would lead to an annual debate, though nothing would come of it.”
1 On the 2nd June, 1859, the Governor wrote that Martin held the “enviable distinction of being universally respected by all parties and both races… It would be difficult to add to the esteem which has accompanied him in his retirement from public life.”
1 Patukakariki. The Maoris denied that he asserted no claim. He was of more importance than Teira in the hapu to which both belonged. (Letter from fifteen Maoris, November, 1860.) Pamphlet by Archdeacon Hadfield. Williams and Norgate. 1861.
1 Renata Tamakihikurangi for the Ngatikakungunu tribe, declared: “This is the Maori's most emphatic mode of denial; to say his say, get up and go, that it may be known that he will never consent.”(Published letter, 1861.)
2 Thus Mr. Richmond wrote in 1878. But in 1863 Mr. Domett the New Zealand Premier wrote: “It is difficult to conceive that if these facts had come out clearly at the time of the sale, the practice universally followed (reservations of pahs, &c.) would not have been adhered to… They appear to have been overlooked throughout the discussions on the Waitara purchase.”Out of such conflicting materials a historian must endeavour to distil truth.—Vide P. P. 1864, vol. xli. p. 6. The deed of sale is in the House of Commons Papers, 1860, vol. xlvii. p. 231.
1 MS. drawn up by Mr. Richmond in 1878. “He talked to Whitaker and myself on this particular more as lawyers.”
Unconscious of the gravity of the situation, Colonel Browne, at the conclusion of his first despatch on the subject, told the Secretary of State: “I venture to think that my visit to Taranaki has been useful.… If the land now under negotiation can be obtained legitimately, and without breach of Maori ideas of right, I have little doubt that other tracts of land will be offered for sale, and I shall thus be able to satisfy the demands of all moderate men among the settlers.”He forgot that he had recently been compelled to tell the Taranaki Provincial Council that he could not favour their “proposal to coerce a minority of native proprietors who might be disinclined to sell their land,”and after an experience of years he fondly fancied that Te Rangitake was not in earnest. Yet the acquisition of land had been the one absorbing subject at Taranaki. A resident, who page 619 published a narrative in 1861, declared: “The most frequent topic of discussion with both natives and Europeans was about the land; and the boasting assertion was continually made by the latter, ‘The Waitara will be ours before long.’ “When a skilled witness testified thus, the Government might have been expected to foresee the consequence of their conduct. But they were impenetrably crass, or ruthlessly unjust. From Auckland the Assistant Native Secretary wrote to Te Rangitake (2nd April, 1859), that Teira's land would be bought by the Governor. “The Governor's rule is for each man to have the word about his own land: that of a man who has no claim will not be listened to. This is merely written to let you know the word of the Governor in answer to Te Teira's and Te Retimana's letter.”Te Rangitake's own letter refusing to sell was set aside. The resolute chief wrote to the Governor (25th April, 1859): “Friend, salutations to you. Your letter has reached me about Te Teira's and Te Retimana's thoughts. I will not agree to our bedroom being sold (I mean Waitara here), for this bed belongs to the whole of us; and do not you be in haste to give the money. Hearken to my word. If you give the money secretly, you will get no land for it. You may insist, but I will never agree. Do not suppose that this is folly on my part; no, it is true.… I have no new proposal to make, either as regards selling or anything else. All I have to say to you, O Governor, is, that none of this land will be given to you—never, never, not till I die. I have been told that I am to be imprisoned.… I am very sad because of this word. Why is it? You should remember that the Pakehas and the Maoris are living quietly upon their pieces of land, and therefore do not disturb them.…”
It has been mentioned that when Te Rangitake returned with his tribe from the south, there was some apprehension that the Ngatimaniapoto tribe might again invade the territory. Mr. Gorst thus tells the story: “It was therefore agreed by the whole tribe that instead of Te Rangitake settling on the north bank of the Waitara, where his own possessions were, the whole tribe should live together upon Teira's land, on the south bank, for mutual protection against the common foe. It was in consequence of this arrangement that Te Rangitake originally page 620 established himself on Teira's land1 (hereafter it will be seen that the land was not Teira's), where he laid out cultivations, and built substantial houses. There they all lived happily together, until disturbed by the accursed land feuds, which caused perpetual dissension amongst them. At length Teira, out of spite to Te Rangitake, sold Waitara to the Government, the effect of this sale being to turn the latter suddenly, and without compensation, off land which he had considerably improved by building and cultivation, and which, undder the original agreement, he had certainly an equitable right to hold. It seems quite incredible that circumstances so material to the case should have escaped the notice of the officials concerned in the purchase, and have remained undiscovered for three years, until they were accidentally found out by Sir George Grewy's interpreter, in private conversation with the Waitara natives. The facts were certainly unknown, not only to Governor Browne, but even to Te Rangitake's advocates. It will be readily believed that, had the Governor been informed of a circumstance so material, the Waitara block would never have been purchased.”Mr. Gorst judged the Governor's advisers leniently. Mr. Richmond knew and wrote about the Maori occupants of the Waitara block, but averred that they would be dealt with by reservations in the customary manner. They were, nevertheless, not provided for in the deed. Mr. Parris (July, 1860) reported that the land sold by Teira had never been cultivated by Te Rangitake's people, and may thus have misled the Governor; but the claim which Te Rangitake had made from 1839 to 1859 rested on higher grounds than a permissive tenant right. It was known that no nation on earth paid more sacred reverence to the burial-ground of their ancestry than the Maoris; and the vow of Te Rangitake to his father was rooted in his mind, with the traditions of his people. Such feelings deserved respect, thouggh it might be difficult to define them.
1 It must be remembered that, over land held under tribal rights there was also the “mana”of a chief. It will be seen that in 1869 a judgment pronounced by a New Zealand Court declared that settlement such as that on the south bank of the Waitara gave rights of “ownership according to Maori usage and custom,”even if none existed previously. Mr. Gorst speaks of Wiremu Kingi, but the Maori name is used in the text.
No one could deny the claims of Te Rangitake. Mr. Spain spoke of him in 1844 as “the principal young chief of the place,”at Waiwetu; and on the return of the Ngatiawa to their ancestral homes and consecrated grounds he was the leader page 622 acknowledged alike by Pakeha and Maori. A paper drawn up at the Governor's request, and signed by Mr. C. W. Richmond on behalf of the Ministry, thus spoke of Rangitake: “Williams King was one of the Ngatiawa who had retired to Cook's Straits, whence he returned to Taranaki in 1848. Though a well-born chief his land claims are not considerable, and lie chiefly if not wholly to the north of Waitara.”Mr. Richmond did not affect ignorance of the cultivation by Te Rangitake's people of land south of Waitara, for he wrote at the time: “Te Rangitake has been joined by a number of natives, who have gathered about him since his settlement at Waitara, and these men have encroached with their cultivations upon the proper owners. This has been a source of dissension, and one reason determining the settlers to part with their land.”Mr. Gorst's apology for the Governor's ignorance makes darker the conduct of his advisers; and yet, with such a formal document presented to him in April, 1860, there was still room for honourable escape from the false position into which he had been hurried. But he would not avail himself of it. He abandoned himself to the guidance of advisers desirous to raise a feud between Pakeha and Maori, and one of whom Mr. C. W. Richmond, as regarded the title to the lands, thus echoed in the General Assembly in August, 1860, the rapacious clamour of the Taranaki settlers: “Sir, I know nothing about ‘mana,’ and I don't care to know anything.… I say I know nothing of Maori ‘mana,’ and in the present case I care nothing about it. I only know that we have hitherto dealt without let or hindrance from any lord of the manor with the various families and groups of families which make up the Ngatiawa tribe.… Te Rangitake's title (if he had the best of the world) is merged in his rebellion. At all events it will be time to hear him when he submits to the jurisdiction.… We did not mean to buy unless with the consent of all. But suppose that through their own contumacy, or say even through our own neglect, some are left out, what does common sense tell us is substantial justice? I say substantial justice is partition; and if they can't agree among themselves their boundaries ought to be settled for them by a higher power.”On a later day his brother and supporter, Mr. J. C. Richmond, declared that he agreed with the statements of the Taranaki Provincial Council, page 623 (which Governor Browne had condemned as an attempt “to coerce a minority of the natives into selling their lands,”) and went so far as to declare that “years of weak government had made the storm unavoidable,”and that “it was well perhaps to have the war come whilst the settlers' eyes were open.”1
1 The text which Mr. J. C. Richmond justified in the General Assembly was thus embodied in the Taranaki Provincial Council Petition of 1858. Though written for a different purpose it proves the violent departure of Governor Browne from the former system adopted in dealing with native tribes. “The system heretofore adopted by a Government of requiring the assent of every claimant to any piece of land, before a purchase is made, has been found to operate most injuriously in this province on account of the conflicting interests of the claimants; and the sufferers by this system are invariably the men who are most advanced in civilization, and who possess the largest share in the common property. Your memorialists are therefore of opinion that such of the natives as are willing to dispose of their proportion of any common land to the Government, should be permitted to do so, whether such natives form a majority. or only a large minority, of the claimants; and that the Government should compel an equitable division of such common land among the respective claimants on the petition of a certain proportion of them.”The writers of this memorial, with Mr. C. W. Richmond and Mr. Stafford, must have well known that the Maoris would resist with arms any such infraction of the treaty of Waitangi. To adopt such a principle was virtually to declare war.
1 Mr. Forsaith in reading this expression to the House explained that though the verbal translation of this phrase was, “I was the means of saving your life,”the Maori significance of it was highly offensive, not amounting to a curse, but, when addressed to a New Zealand chief, a grievous insult. The taunt of slavery or dependence was ever galling.
“‘Q. Why will you oppose their selling what is their own?— A. Because I do not wish that the land should be disturbed; and though they have floated it, I will not let it go to sea.
1 Te Rangitake's friends averred that he did not say “the land is ‘ratou,’ theirs, but ‘matou,’ ours.”On such a point it is proper to mention the assertion, together with the fact that Mr. Whiteley, a Wesleyan minister, certified to the accuracy of Parris' version. It is not necessary to believe that either version was wilfully erroneous. It is morally certain, however, that Parris and Whiteley were wrong because, within a week of the occurrence, Te Rangitake wrote thus to Archdeacon Hadfield: The Pakehas say “(Mr. Parris, Mr. Whiteley, and the Governor) that to Te Teira only belongs this piece of land. No; it belongs to us all (kahore, no matou katoa). It belongs to the orphan. It belongs to the widow.”As the chief was, according to Parris, very resolute in his interview, it is unlikely that he kept back any part of the contention which he almost immediately put in writing, and which was in keeping with all his language before and after 1859. Bishop Selwyn (writing in 1849) extolled the “delicate use of the exclusive and inclusive pronoun”so powerful in Maori speech. If they had misreported Te Rangitake wilfully, Mr. Parris and his coadjutor would have been open to the charge of putting the pronouns to a very different use. It will be seen, however, that Mr. Whiteley was content with a very rough translation of a proclamation of martial law.
“Teira stops in town since he received the instalment, considering it not safe to stop at Waitara.”
In August, 1860, Mr. Forsaith said in the House at Auckland: “I stake my reputation for some little acquaintance with the native language and mode of expression upon the assertion that the question and answer are perfectly compatible with the existence of a claim on the part of Te Rangitake.… Those acquainted with native customs will, I am sure, bear me out in the assertion, that, in saying that the land was Teira's, Te Rangitake did not necessarily thereby admit that he had no claim to it. Had the question been followed by another, something to this effect—‘Do you mean that it belongs to Teira and his party only, or have you any claim to this land?’—we should probably be in a better position for arriving at a conclusive opinion. This is the only trace I can find of a scrutiny, and this modicum of evidence is the only proof of that rigid investigation which we are told was extended over a period of eight months. I must now refer to Te Rangitake's own account of the transaction contained in a private letter written after the payment of the money. It is dated 5th December, 1859. I quote the following extracts: ‘Friend, listen to me, this is my saying, that you may explain to me the policy of the new Governor. I heard from Mr. Parris on the occasion of my going to town to prevent the money of the Governor being given for Waitara (£100). I said to him (Parris), “Friend, keep your money.”He answered me, “I will not.”I replied, “There will be no land upon which your money can alight.”’ The word in the original is very significant — ‘taunga.’ I don't recollect ever seeing it used in this sense before. It means the fluttering of a bird over the spot on which it is about to perch. ‘Upon which he (Mr. Parris) answered, “This is wrong. When the Governor comes it will be very wrong.”’ It is difficult to say whether there is not an implied threat here: the original might perhaps without violence be rendered thus: ‘This is very wrong, and so you will find it when the Governor comes.’ ‘I replied, “Be it so. It is for you to bring me the wrong, i. e. you must be the aggressor. Enough for me, I keep the land.”I also said to him, “Land that page 628 is obdurate (pakeke), i. e. disputed land, the Governor is not desirous of having.”He replied, “That was formerly, but now the Governor has a new method.”My belief is, the Governor is seeking to quarrel, as he is putting death before me. Therefore I ask you to enlighten me, as you have perhaps heard of the Governor's new method or policy.… Listen, the land will not be given up by me. If the Governor without cause attacks me, and I am killed, then there will be no help for it, because it is an old saying, “the man first, the land after-wards,”i. e. first kill, and then take possession. Therefore I make known my words to you, that you may quietly understand my offence, and also the offence of all the Europeans, of Mr. Parris, of Mr. Whiteley, of the Governor. They say this piece of land belongs only to Teira. But it is not so; it belongs to us all—to the orphans and widows this piece of land belongs.’ “
Volumes have been written, weeks have been spent in discussing the origin of the Taranaki war; but, after all, it is best understood by study of this letter from the Maori chief. He might not be able to name the chief conspirator, but he knew that guilt was being brought to his door.
Mr. Forsaith illustrated the case from his own experience. In 1839 he wished to buy land on the Wairoa river, in the Kaipara district. “Preliminaries were all settled, and price arranged, when opportunely I had a visit from a friend who had been longer in the country than myself. Hearing of my intended purchase, he advised me before parting with the payment to question the sellers closely on the point, whether they knew of the existence of any native whose consent to the sale would be necessary to secure my quiet possession.”Mr. Forsaith hearkened to the advice. The sellers (Tirarau and Paikea) arrived to “conclude the bargain. The payment was ready, and they were anxious to sign the deed. I put the question. At first there was a dead silence; then, with many shrugs of the shoulder, the evasive answer, ‘How can we tell?’ I was now satisfied that I was on the right scent, and gathering up the payment, I made a show of terminating the negotiation. It then came out that the consent of a woman living at Kaihuf, a relative of Tirarau, was necessary. I postponed the conclusion of the bargain.… On arriving at her residence I found page 629 to my astonishment that she knew all about the transaction. She said, ‘I am glad you came to see me. I shall give my consent, but if you had bought that land without asking my permission I should have gone and turned you off.’ I asked what portion of the payment I was to reserve for her. She replied, ‘I do not claim any portion of the payment; but if you please you can make me a present.’ The purchase was subsequently effected, and I never afterwards heard of a single objection to my title.… The piece of land is now the principal commercial station on the Wairoa.”
This Mr. Forsaith adduced as a proof of the existence of “mana”in New Zealand, and declared that Mr. C. W. Richmond, “in pooh-poohing it, was arraying himself not only against a principle which, however ill-defined and uncertain, does nevertheless obtain, but also against the policy of former Governments, which in many instances have recognized and acted on the admission of this principle.”
The Duke of Newcastle acknowledged and approved the Governor's report of his proceedings in March, 1859. After the occurrences on the 29th November, 1859, the Governor (25th January, 1860) reminded the Duke that his Tarnaki measures had been approved in England. He described Mr. Parris's conduct, and stated that he had “directed the land to be surveyed in the usual manner. Rumours have reached me that the survey will be interrupted by the chief Te Rangitake (who has evidently been advised by some disaffected persons), and that difficulties may ensue. I do not put much faith in these rumours, or anticipate resistance, when the natives see that, though always ready to consider every reasonable objection, I am not the less determined to enforce Her Majesty's right to deal with her own subjects without hindrance from any one not having a legitimate interest in the transaction. I have, however, taken every precaution, and made preparation for every contingency which may arise.”On the same day Richmond himself told Parris that “with the advice of the Executive Council”(ominous words), the Governor had determined that the survey of the land should be proceeded with without further delay. An unarmed party was to go to the ground, but the survey was to be notified beforehand. “Should resistance be page 630 made the survey party will quietly retire, and you are then to intimate to Lieutenant-Colonel Murray that the assistance of a military force has become necessary. Military possession of the block will thereupon be taken and kept by the forces… and the survey is to be prosecuted under the protection of the troops.”
It would seem incredible, were not the documents still extant, that while telling the Secretary of State that he anticipated no resistance, the Governor signed (on the same day) a proclamation of martial law. “Whereas active military operations are about to be undertaken by the Queen's forces against natives in the province of Taranaki in arms against Her Majesty's authority, now I, the Governor, do hereby proclaim and declare that martial law will be exercised throughout the said province from publication hereof, within the province of Taranaki, until relief of the said district from martial law by public proclamation”(25th January, 1860). Bad in the original, the edict became worse in the Maori version promulgated at Taranaki.
Mr. Forsaith in August, 1860, read it in the Parliament at Auckland. “Whereas the natives of the Queen are just about to begin their work against the natives of Taranaki who are disobedient, and are fighting against the Queen's authority; therefore I, the Governor, do proclaim and publish abroad this word. The law of fighting is now to appear at Taranaki, and remain in force until countermanded”(25th January, 1860). “Who can tell,”said the speaker, “how far this document operated to encourage the interference of the Ngatiruanui, who were in no wise concerned in the original dispute?… I hold the Government accountable for this outrageous announcement, which, in point of fact, amounts to a declaration of war on the 25th January.”1
1 Mr. Stafford, from whose office the original proclamation emanated, defended the translation on the ground that honourable members might remember how hard it was to retranslate passages at school or college, and he read a certificate from the Wesleyan Missionary, Mr. Whiteley, to the effect that Mr. Parris showed the translation to him before it was sent to the press, and he approved of it. If his object was to create a war Mr. Whiteley might reasonably approve. This notable document was forwarded by Mr. Stafford to the officer in command at Taranaki, with the name of the Queen taken in vain at its foot. Colonel Browne himself expressly requested Colonel Gold, commanding the troops in the colony, to give the necessary instructions to his subordinate at Taranaki.
1 Men were at hand to help them in case of need. The ‘Southern Cross’ newspaper reported that the surveyor with his theodolite was embraced by one of the old creatures, the chain was removed by another, and the surveying party—ignominiously overcome—abandoned its task. A Maori elergyman (Rev. Riwai te Ahan) said, “It was the wife of Patukakariki and their own two daughters and some other women of their hapus, who drew off the Governor's surveyors from their own pieces of land.”
On the 1st March he reached Taranaki and sent for the chief, offering him a written promise of safety. Mr. Whiteley and Messrs. Parris and Rogan carried the offer, and conferred with the chief, who promised to announce his decision on the following day. The Governor's pledge was thus worded: “I hereby pledge my word that Te Rangitake, and any reasonable number of his followers, who may choose to come to New Plymouth unarmed and converse with me, shall be allowed to return unharmed and in freedom to the place from whence they came. This promise shall be good from this day (1st March) until the night of the 3rd March, 1860.”On the 2nd he wrote: “Friend Governor, I received your message requesting me to go to town to see you.… Listen. In days gone by things were different from what they are now. I could then have gone to town to see you; but now I am afraid of your force, because you have brought soldiers with you to the town, and therefore I think you are angry with me.”He was still anxious for peace, and asked if the Governor would come to the Kaipakopako “where we can see each other.”His suspicions were not unnatural. One Governor had seized Rauparaha by stealth, and Colonel Browne himself had granted an amnesty to the acknowledged murderer of Katatore. The Governor (2nd March) told the Duke of Newcastle that Te Rangitake's letter was nothing but a mockery and a subterfuge, to obtain time till assistance could be got. He “still had hopes of being able to avoid bloodshed.”On the 3rd March he directed Colonel Gold (65th Regiment) to take possession of the land, and proposed that a block-house should be built in a commanding position. Collision was to be avoided, if possible, because Maoris attached much importance to the first blood shed; and many tribes would join the chief in demanding “utu”if he could show that he had not been the aggressor. Settlers at Tataraimaka were summoned to Taranaki, and block-houses were built on the north and on the south of the latter place.
1 The student meets many difficulties in tracing the facts. For instance, in an elaborate paper drawn up by Mr. Richmond on 28th December, 1860 (N. Z. P. P., 1861, E. No. 2), it is said to be “established that neither Te Rangitake nor any of his people have had cultivations on the block… No pah was burnt by the soldiers.”In April, 1863, Lieutenant Bates, 65th Regiment, reported, after inquiry on the spot, that Carrington, a surveyor in the district, admitted that two inhabited pahs were destroyed by the troops and allies in 1860; and the evidence of soldiers who were engaged confirmed the admission. In 1860, Sir W. Martin asserted in a pamphlet on “the Taranaki question”that on the block stood two “pahs.”Governor Browne published ‘Notes on Sir W. Martin's pamphlet,’ and C. W. Richmond and F. D. Bell drew up the facts for him. They admitted (Note 19) the existence of the pahs, but denied Te Rangitake's “proprietary right”in them. “It must not be supposed (they said) that Te Rangitake's residence in a pah erected by permission of Tamati Raru was in itself any ownership of the land which was offered for sale.”In 1878 Mr. Richmond wrote: “Everybody knew there were pahs—and to make this discovery an important matter is—well, I don't know what to call it. Yet it is utterly untrue that Te Rangitake or any one else was expelled from his habitation. Several days before the troops went on to the block, Te Rangitake and all his people had retired…”It may be hoped that Colonel Browne would not have allowed martial law to be proclaimed and the troops to advance if he had known what Mr. Richmond says was known to everybody. To seize a man's land, to burn his house and his church, and then to accuse him of rebellion for resistance, is in keeping with the argument of Mr. Richmond, that to approach with shot and shell, and desolate the hearths which are abandoned, is not to expel the inhabitants. By a strange irony of fate, Mr. Bell, who assisted Mr. Richmond in framing the ‘Notes on Sir W. Martin's pamphlet’ in 1860, became Native Minister in 1862 in the Domett Ministry, learned at Taranaki from the mouths of Teira and Ihaia the truth of Sir W. Martin's statements about the pahs, and joined in a formal ministerial statement that it was “difficult to conceive that if these facts had come out clearly at the time of the sale, the universal practice of reserving pahs, cultivations, and burial-places would not have been adhered to in this particular instance.”
1 I observe that in ‘Reminiscences of the War in New Zealand,’ T. W. Gudgeon (of the Colonial Forces, New Zealand), London, 1879, it is stated that “the material used for the parapet was straw and turnips.”It may be presumed that the officer, who reported his proceedings forthwith, may be trusted as to this matter of fact.
The first-fruits of the crop which the Governor's advisers had sown were not gratifying to the community, whose leaders had recommended rapine. Nevertheless they considered every slain settler murdered by the Maoris, and described in glowing colours the gallantry of those who slaughtered the natives. The Maoris, on the other hand, were equally ruthless. A strange exception deserves notice. A settler, who was a Baptist minister, declined to serve in the militia. This the Maoris knew, and when their bands arrived to fight the troops, they made him and the Rev. Mr. Brown put on a white scarf to signify that no Maori would molest them. Thus distinguished they were shaken hands with by each Maori, and a notice, signed by Te Rangitake and other chiefs, was posted up, declaring that the Baptist minister, Mr. Brown, and other enumerated persons, were to be respected, and that their property was to be strictly preserved. They and their children were safe while the fighting raged around them. But not the less did the Maoris sack the abandoned homesteads of settlers with whom they were at war. Captain Cracroft retaliated. He steamed southwards on the coast, and destroyed native settlements at Warea and elsewhere. Armed parties sallied from Taranaki to gather what they could from the deserted farms, and to harass the natives, who in their turn pillaged and burnt. The Governor reported that Captain Cracroft had battered Warea “with good effect,”but he earnestly asked for more forces. Having thus managed military page 638 matters, he was going, he said, to Auckland, to meet the General Assembly, whose sanction for certain expenses was very desirable. There he organized militia and volunteers, and built defensive block-houses, but did not convene the Assembly. He sent friendly missives to the Maori king and other chiefs, and wrote a long account of a great Maori meeting (7th April, 1860) at Ngaruawahia, which Mr. Smith of the native department and some missionaries attended, and by which the importance of the king movement was impressed on the Governor's mind in a new manner. Deputations from distant tribes were “received in some state,”—“allegiance was tendered,”—“lands were presented to the league of which the king was the nominal head,”—“the king's council openly assume the right to decide on the justice of my proceedings, and consider whether or not they will aid a chief in rebellion against Her Majesty's Government;”—“under these circumstances”(the Governor said), “the dispute at Taranaki sinks into insignificance.”But the ideas of his advisers still swayed him, for he added: “I cannot but think the occurrences at Taranaki fortunate, because, to use the expression adopted at the Maori king meeting, ‘it has led to the discovery of the pah before the builders have had time to complete it.’”His last words were a prayer for “three regiments and a company of artillery without delay.”The “fortunate occurrences at Taranaki,”where “the issue had been carefully chosen”by his Ministry, demanded more men from England. Such was the position into which malign influences had led a man whom all his friends agreed in honouring as a frank, kind-hearted Englishman.
Mr. Smith at Ngaruawahia heard Potatau's explanation of the state of affairs at Taranaki. Mr. Richmond always relied much on the sale by Potatau to Governor Hobson of the claims of the Waikato tribe to the territory at Waitara, and alleged that the sale barred all Te Rangitake's claims. Potatau explained the matter differently. Payment having been made by Colonel Wakefield for land, he, as chief of the Waikato conquerors, was entitled to some of it, and as the receivers gave him none, he applied to the Government. But this did not affect the position of Te Rangitake. On the contrary, that chief never having been conquered (being, indeed, at the south page 639 when the slaughter and captures of Pukerangiora took place), came back with common consent to the Waitara in 1848, the Waikato tribes having abandoned their claims in favour of the returning Ngatiawa at Potatau's request. Potatau had invited him to return to the land of his ancestors in consequence of the Governor's words to Potatau. There was, therefore, a “mana”1 attaching to Te Rangitake as well as to Potatau. It was only his own share of the Waikato claim that Te Whero Whero could sell, and Te Rangitake's right was yet alive. Mr. Smith argued that the Government thought otherwise, and quoted the deed signed by Te Whero Whero in 1842 as conclusive, but failed to obtain an admission to that effect from the chiefs. They must hear the other side, they said. If Te Rangitake had no claim to the land, “he was wrong, and they would advise him to give up his opposition, but not otherwise.”
The killing of the settlers by the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui after the English had commenced warfare, was not, in their eyes, murder, though a crime in the light of Christianity. Such acts were incident to Maori wars, and were in a great measure chargeable on those who caused the war. “Under any circumstances they regarded the proceedings of the Governor as hasty.”
Interviews between Mr. Smith and the chiefs continued for days. He saw a sketch of the Waitara block, showing that Te Rangitake had special claims within it, and was told that application had been made by him for the aid of the Ngatimaniapoto. “Friends, blood has been shed—that of the land, and that of the men. Friends, when you see this, think of us. Friends, if you see it well to do so, come to us; or if you see it well, turn you to Auckland.”A deputation from the Ngatiruanui and Ngatiawa arrived and formally tendered the allegiance of their tribes to the king. Mr. Smith could obtain no assurances that the Waikato or the Ngatimaniapoto would pronounce against Te Rangitake.
1 The story of ‘Old New Zealand’ by a Pakeha Maori, explains the numerous meanings of the word “mana.”Virtus, prestige, authority, good fortune, influence, sanctity, luck, dominion, are all comprehended in it, though none contain it, and there is a Maori essence of meaning still left in it, which none of them express.
The Maori king at the end of the gathering of the chiefs at Ngaruawahia enjoined peace, and desired that the Ngatimaniapoto should take no guns with them in escorting the Ngatiruanui home to Taranaki. The chief Rewi thus described (in the author's hearing) what he and Potatau did. They were at Ngaruawahia. “The people clamoured for war. I said, ‘No; do not go to the fight.’ I wished the matter to be referred to the missionaries in order that they might lay it before the Government. Wetini said, ‘No; let us go to the fighting; let us waste no time in investigations.’ Purukuru went to Kihikihi (Rewi's settlement), and, at the runanga there, the people first resolved to go and fight. Epiha was the first to urge it, and Rewiti supported him. When Potatau heard of the runanga, he asked me to follow the war-party to dissuade them. I overtook them at Mokau and asked them to return. Epiha refused, and said I might return by myself. I then wrote to Parris and asked him to meet me. He did so, and was in danger of being killed. Then there was fighting at Taranaki in which the page 642 Pakehas were worsted. Then it was that I consented to the war, and warned the people that if I joined the fighting it would not speedily come to an end.”
Mr. Parris' escape deserves to be chronicled. Receiving Rewi's message on the 11th May, he started northwards, and at Pukekohe met the war-party, consisting of about fifty Ngatiruanui and Taranaki men, and about 150 Waikato. There was evident disagreement between Rewi's Waikato friends and the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki natives who were being escorted home. The treatment to be shown to Parris divided them. The Ngatiruanui and Taranaki men started by themselves in anger. Epiha went to Parris and upbraided him for approaching the war-party without sending a messenger or letter beforehand. “If we had met you on the march you would have been shot dead without our being able to save you.”After long and eager converse Epiha went in advance to Urenui to endeavour to counteract the ambush which the Ngatiruanui and Taranaki were bent on forming. At Urenui many Maoris were assembled, and amongst them Parris thought that by the starlight he saw some of his enemies. He was hustled. The authority of Epiha and another chief caused the crowd to fall back. An armed band of Waikato took charge of Parris. There was an advanceguard and a rear-guard. A Waikato warrior on each side grasped his hand. At Wairau he was called upon to join in an extempore prayer for the King, for the Queen, and for his own safety. All danger having been passed he was allowed to proceed alone. He poured forth natural thanks to his preserver. Epiha answered: “Do not attribute your deliverance to me, but to God. I shall yet meet you as an enemy in the daylight. You have seen that I would not consent to your being murdered.”
Governor Browne asked for the opinions of his Ministry on the situation into which he had been seduced. Mr. Richmond, as their mouthpiece, drew up a long and argumentative memorandum (27th April), narrating all past facts, and defending the contempt shown for Rangitake's claims. “The question of title is one on which persons not versed in the intricacies of native usage cannot expect to form an independent judgment.”McLean, Parris, and the Wesleyan missionary Mr. Whiteley, page 643 were adverse to the claim of Rangitake, and the chief, Wi Tako, had written a letter condemning him. But the pretensions of the king movement though absurd “were not less dangerous.”The natives despised the warlike prowess of the English, “and it must be confessed that the imperfect success of military operations in New Zealand has given some countenance to the natives' fixed opinion of their own superiority.”Everywhere in the Northern Island, except to the north of Auckland, “the determination to shake off the British dominion has been steadily gaining ground.”A war of merciless character was probable. With daring irreverence for facts Mr. Richmond said: “The colonists as a body are in no degree responsible, directly or through their representatives, for the existing state of affairs. They have never had the direction of native policy, nor have they dictated, or even suggested, the acts of the Imperial Government in its relations with the natives; but they approve of the stand made by his Excellency in the Taranaki case, and are naturally willing, as their present attitude proves, to risk life itself in the maintenance of the Queen's authority over the islands of New Zealand.”But the colony had not resources for the struggle. England must provide them. Of this memorandum the Governor on the day of its date sent twenty-five printed copies to the Secretary of State. About the same time the Provincial Council at Napier (Hawke's Bay) passed a resolution congratulating the Governor on his policy at Taranaki, “at present under martial law owing to the meddling of disaffected aborigines.”This was too much for Bishop Selwyn's patience. He sent a deliberate protest (28th April, 1860) on behalf of his Maori flock to the Government. Martial law was, he said, proclaimed before a single native had taken up arms, though there had been “unarmed obstruction of the work of the surveyors.”He claimed on behalf of the Maoris an investigation of all land titles before a regular tribunal, with the usual safeguards against partiality or error, viz. evidence on oath, arguments of counsel, and right of appeal; abstinence from employing military force till all civil measures might be found ineffective; and, as the “colony was avowedly formed not for the acquisition of territory for the English race, but for the protection of the New Zealanders,”he demanded that “this primary page 644 object shall not be sacrificed to the aggrandisement of the English provinces.”The Governor wrote (25th May) with regard to the Bishop's remonstrance: “The cordial support which I have received from my responsible advisers, and their avowed approval of the policy I have thought it my duty to pursue, have been most gratifying to me and deserve my warmest acknowledgments.”The Ministry spent nearly a month in preparing a memorandum to be sent to England with the Bishop's protest, and thus postponed its arrival in England until August. They complained that it was “an indirect attack”and their reply occupied nearly ten times as much space as the protest. They averred that Te Rangitake's advocates “strangely jumbled”the Maori “mana”with English feudal law. “As to the proclamation of martial law, that was a measure of precaution rather intended to restrain, if necessary, the European population than directed against the natives.”It was “blinnd unreason to expect that Te Rangitake could or ought to be dealt with in all respects as a peaceable citizen.” They denied that the primary object in founding the colony was the protection of the Maoris. “If his Lordship” (the Bishop) “desired to arouse and stimulate the hatred of race, he could not do so more effectually than by such assertions.… Once let it be understood that the interest of the settlers is to be subordinated to that of the natives and a war of races is inevitable.” Te Rangitake's claim was “simply the right of the strong arm.… The matter was to all intents and purposes res judicata. But had this been otherwise a trial with the usual safeguards against partiality or error, viz. evidence on oath and arguments of counsel, would under the circumstances have been something more ludicrous than has yet been seen in our public dealing with the Maoris, which is saying a great deal.” The document concluded by enumerating the hardships of the settlers exposed to Maori violence, their respect for law, and their laudable desire to establish British supremacy; and by declaring that the decisive action of the Governor, with which the Ministry concurred (though they denied being the cause of it), was dictated by regard for the welfare of New Zealand, for the dignity of the Crown, and for those just principles which had previously regulated the conduct of the British Government in the colony. It page 645 was natural indeed that the settlers, aware of the ferocity of Maori warfare, should fervently desire to see violence put down by the strong arm; and peace, if possible, secured. From every province addresses were sent to the Governor. The Canterbury Provincial Council proffered assistance and an asylum for refugees from Taranaki. The Taranaki province prayed, “That your Excellency will not make peace with Te Rangitake upon any terms in the least compromising the Queen's supremacy, and that as regards the Taranaki and Ngatiruanui natives that no peace will be made with them until they have been severely punished for the barbarous murders committed by them upon unoffending and helpless settlers, and that compensation will be exacted from them for the ruinous losses sustained by the settlers in the marauding expedition of these natives.” Thus wrote Mr. Cutfield the superintendent, and twenty-two others. It is the curse of a wrongful act that it entails suffering upon the innocent. Homes were devastated; farms, flocks, and herds had been abandoned to Maori ravagers. Taranaki was crowded with flying settlers, whose wives and families were deported to safer harbours. But no dismay was in the hearts of those who remained. They would brave all dangers of war, “would rather abandon the hearths for which they have lately fought, to commence again the arduous labours of founding a new home, than run the risk of being again subjected to the domination of a savage race.” Mr. Richmond had sown the dragon's teeth, and the blood of descendants of the Norsemen was as hot as that of the fiery children of the South.
A memorial of a different nature reached the Governor in April, 1860. Archdeacon Hadfield sent him a petition, numerously signed by Maoris at Otaki, asking the Queen to remove Colonel Browne on account of his unwarrantable proceedings at Waitara. He detained the petition for a month, because it was “an evident translation from English,”—some names were in European handwriting, and he wished to inquire as to the genuineness of the signatures. Nepia Taratoa, Kingi Te Ahoaho, and 495 others subscribed it. In May, the Governor transmitted the petition to the Secretary of State, with letters from the resident magistrate and the District Commissioner, imputing the petition to the advice of Archdeacon Hadfield. It page 646 was admitted, however, that the chiefs held a meeting at which the Archdeacon was not present, and that some violent speeches had been made against the Governor's conduct. From his correspondents the Governor learned that most of the signatures were written without consulting the persons represented. The petition was worded as inoffensively as such a petition could be. It deplored the loss of Governor Grey, who only punished Maoris when they were wrong, asserted that Te Rangitake was a loyal subject, that the Queen (they knew) did not want to take away their lands unjustly as was being done by the Governor, and prayed for a Governor “competent properly to carry out the Queen's measures.” When in August, 1860, Archdeacon Hadfield saw in sessional papers the imputation that he had originated the petition, he sent through the Governor a letter to the Secretary of State denying that he had directly or indirectly originated or suggested it, and adding that he believed it to be genuine and spontaneous. The statements to the contrary had been obtained from one Maori who had been removed from office (as a teacher) by the Archdeacon many years before. Far from regarding the action of the petitioners as insubordinate, the Archdeacon cited it as a proof of the advancement of religion, civilization, law, and order among them, that more than 500 of them had met in a time of great excitement, and after two or three days' deliberation addressed a humble and loyal petition to the Queen. As to the Governor's statement that the language proved the petition to be translated from the English, “in the opinion of some of the best Maori scholars in the country” the fact was otherwise. The Archdeacon warned the English Government against confounding dissatisfaction at the Governor's proceedings with disaffection to the Crown. “I would further observe, that whereas the natives of this country are a high-mineded people, and at present have no legal tribunal to appeal to for the protection of their territorial rights, there will be great danger, if they are debarred from using the right open to all British subjects of petitioning the Crown in a constitutional manner for the redress of their wrongs, that they will be driven to seek redress by force of arms.” As Mr. Richmond on more than one occasion rejoiced in the idea that the war was brought about before the Maori king page 647 party had been consolidated, the Archdeacon's fears found no sympathy among Colonel Browne's Ministers, and the Governor himself was but a floating accompaniment of the prevailing stream. His Attorney-General, Mr. Whitaker, was contemptuous as Mr. Richmond of abstract rights on the part of the Maoris.
On the 6th April, the Governor notified to the colonists at Auckland that the town and district were secure against “any attack which could be made by the largest force the Maoris could bring into the field.” He had no sooner dissipated the fears of the Europeans, than the pensioners and others began to insult the Maoris in the town. “Unless something was done to prevent it collision would be inevitable, and the whole native population would be in arms against us. I therefore published a notification,” “to ensure friendly treatment for individuals of the native race.” To the colonies in Australia Colonel Browne had written from Taranaki in hot haste in March, asking for reinforcements with the least possible delay. Wiser heads than his had been watching events for some time. Sir Henry Barkly, Governor of Victoria, when he heard (7th March) of the proclamation of martial law at Taranaki foresaw that all the soldiers in the south would be called for to support the authority of the Crown so rashly jeopardized. He telegraphed at once to Sir William Denison (Governor…) in Sydney, inquiring if assistance had been asked for; but, being answered in the negative, consulted with Major-General Pratt (Commander of the Forces), so that all things might be in readiness for the event which was sure to follow. When the cry for help arrived in April, detachments of the 12th and 40th Regiments were despatched from Sydney, Melbourne, and Tasmania. The armed colonial steam-sloop ‘Victoria’ was sent from Melbourne. The provident Sir H. Barkly suggested to other Governors that they should follow the example of Victoria, in prohibiting by Order in Council the exportation of arms and ammunition to New Zealand, “except under special permit.” For the “sympathy and generosity” shown in Victoria, the Duke of Newcastle conveyed the warm thanks of the Government. Sir William Denison read a moral lesson to Colonel Browne and his advisers, which, if they had been wise, might yet have saved life and honour. Colonel Browne in his appeal dwelt on the page 648 marvellous manner in which seventy Maoris in a pah built in one night kept Colonel Gold nearly two days from effecting an entrance, protecting themselves in excavations from “a heavy and constant fire from two twenty-four-pounders and two rocket-tubes,” and finally “evacuating it with a loss of only four wounded.” With this specimen of the task to be done by the English, he forwarded a memorandum written by Mr. C. W. Richmond, showing the premeditation with which the Ministry plunged into the affray, and hoped to involve their countrymen in it. “An occasion has now arisen on which it has become necessary to support the Governor's authority by a military force. The issue has been carefully chosen—the particular question being as favourable a one of its class as could have been selected.” Unconsciously the writer framed an indictment against himself—for in three years the Government abandoned as unjust the so-called favourable claim at Waitara. He added that the Maoris who promoted the king movement asserted “national independence,” and opposed further extension of European settlement. The military force “should be forthwith augmented to the greatest extent practicable.” Sir W. Denison promptly sent succour. Commodore Loring despatched H.M.S. ‘Cordelia,’ and the ‘Iris.’ The ‘Pelorus’ left Melbourne; and nearly a thousand soldiers and sailors were sent to New Zealand within ten days of the demand for reinforcements. On the 16th May, Sir W. Denison sent to Colonel Browne a confidential commentary upon Mr. Richmond's memorandum. “I do not think,” he said, “that you have derived much information from this document. The views and opinions of your responsible advisers are to all appearance confined to these: first, that they ought to have something to say in the discussion of questions having reference to the natives (of whom I observe by the way they are in no way the representatives); and second, that as they are unable to defend themselves, England should step in to help them.” But the manifesto opened up the wider question of the whole policy of the Government towards the Maoris. Sir William Denison accepted the election of Potatau as evidence of their willing assent to the establishment of some system of Government amongst themselves. Mr. Richmond had passed lightly over “the causes which have induced a people, page 649 consisting of clans or septs analogous to those which used to occupy the Highlands of Scotland, to forget their old feuds, and unite together for a common object.” Their position as subjects of the Queen imposed limitations without corresponding benefits. Their lands were obtained from them at nominal rates, and retailed before their eyes at an enormous advance in price. Mr. Richmond's “policy and that of his colleagues would lead to steps, which, if they were backed up in England, would in a short time annihilate the Maori race, and permit the occupation by the white man of the rich land, yet in native hands, upon which for years past greedy and longing eyes have been cast. My view, however, of the Maori is very different—he is the subject of the Queen, and as such is entitled to have his rights respected and his feelings considered; he has shown an aptitude for civilization which ought to be encouraged; his efforts to raise himself in the social scale should be assisted. If this policy were carried out steadily and consistently, all causes of disaffection would soon be done away: there would be an end to these petty warfares, which, while they cause a large expenditure of money, result in nothing but an aggravation of the feeling of hostility between the races. The Government, it is true, would be abused by certain classes of the white population. The land speculators might grumble, but I feel convinced that the prosperity of the colony and the happiness of the people would be promoted by such a change of system.” He reminded Colonel Browne, that in 1857 he had in New Zealand personally suggested the necessity of such legislation. Late occurrences had strengthened his opinions. He urged his friend to recognize the Maori craving for legitimate authority. He would not quarrel with the name—chief or king; if the Maoris in search of order would bend to any paramount authority and submit their schemes to the Governor, let him utilize those schemes. The first effect would no doubt be to diminish land purchases. “The Maoris will decline to sell: and were I in your place, I should be in no hurry to buy.” Eventually the appetite for gain would lead to further sales. He gave his opinions merely for what they were worth, and apologized for obtruding them, differing as they did from those of Mr. Richmond and his friends. The ordinary course doubtless would be to treat the page 650 Maori as a rebel, to overwhelm him with troops, regardless of expense, and sweep from the earth a “race which occupies land of which the white man professes to be in want, though has millions of acres of which he can or does make no use.” Thus the Imperial Government would buy, at high cost of blood and treasure, land which it would hand over to the colonists to be sold for their benefit. Costly, immoral, and impolitic would be such a policy, and he commended the alternative to Governor Browne's consideration; sending at the same time a copy of his despatch to the Secretary of State, and trusting that he would not be deemed to have meddled presumptuously with a matter which did not concern him.
It would have been well if Lord Derby had held the seals of the Colonial Office when Sir William Denison's despatch arrived there in August, 1860. It was perhaps fortunate that the of Newcastle was absent in America, and that Sir G. Cornewall Lewis presided temporarily in Downing Street. But though wiser than the Duke, he did not pierce so far into the matter as to prize at its worth Sir William Denison's advice. Bishop Selwyn, writing to his friend, Sir John Patteson, explained that he and Sir William Martin had been compelled to make a stand against the violent change initiated by Governor Browne under his new prompters. “Up to the time when the soldiers were sent to Taranaki I was in the most friendly communication with the Governor and his Ministers. Sir William Martin was his constant adviser in all matters relating to the social improvement of the natives, and had just compiled a small code of rules for the use of native magistrates at his request. We had not even the opportunity of offering advice, for we heard nothing of the matter till the order was given for the troops to embark.” The new keepers of the Governor's conscience, like Lady Macbeth, feared his nature. Like Macbeth's it was “too full of the milk of human kindness” to be trusted if wise cautions of Martin and Selwyn should reach him. Unless he could be entrapped into a struggle, from which it could be impressed upon him that without success in war he could not extricate himself with honour, there was danger lest the new policy might, by a few words of truth and soberness, be exploded. If Martin or Selwyn should hear of the plot those words would be spoken. page 651 The Governor preserved the requisite secrecy. “The affair” (the Bishop wrote) “was announced by the Government, and looked upon by the natives as the beginning of a new policy for the whole of New Zealand. It became necessary for us to enter the strife, and I hope it was done temperately and respectfully.” Colonel Gold used reinforcements at Taranaki in carrying on the melancholy strife. Being instructed not to attack Te Rangitake (for in their secret minds Colonel Browne's advisers must have feared that the English Government would detect the injustice committed at Waitara), he marched on the 20th April to Tataraimaka:—destroyed houses, and machinery of a water-mill, and scattered to the winds quantities of wheat and grain at a large Maori settlement; shelled a pah at Warea, destroyed it and the property it contained; and regretted, on the 4th May, that he could do no more in the south, though he felt “assured that the destruction of the mill and crops, corn, houses, canoes, and ploughs, at the different stations we went to, will severely cripple the resources of the Taranaki natives this winter.” He was prepared to attack Te Rangitake when permitted. But Colonel Browne feared that such an attack would stir the Maoris to union. “For this reason,” he told the Secretary of State, “I have requested Colonel Gold to refrain from attacking Te Rangitake again unless that chief commences hostilities.” To such a pass had ill advice reduced him that the object for which he proclaimed martial law was already abandoned, and the efforts of the troops were directed against the Taranaki natives, to whom Colonel Gold was ordered to “show no forbearance.” Hearing that the king natives were to assemble at Ngaruawahia in May, Browne invited all the most important chiefs, well-disposed to the English, to meet him at Auckland on the 2nd July. Throughout June the state of the roads prevented Colonel Gold from operating against the natives to the south of Taranaki.
Donald McLean went to the meeting at Ngaruawahia with Wiremu Nera, a friendly Waikato chief. From the 21st to the 29th he constantly attended it. It was composed principally of Waikato, Taupo, and Manukau natives, about 3000 in number. The main object was to confirm Potatau as king and to erect his flag. War-dances were “indulged in with savage delight,” as page 652 the lower Waikato and Manakau natives landed from their flotilla of canoes. Orators expressed “discontent with the Governor for not consulting Potatau and the Waikato Maori assessors before he declared war; and said the land sold at Waitara would be held by the king natives, conjointly with Te Rangitake, if the sale had taken place, since the flag was sent there, or if he could establish a title; but if not, and his title proved defective, it should be handed over to the Governor.” The majority of the meeting staunchly supported the king movement. Some were moderate adherents. Some opposed it as likely to lead to a war of races. Wiremu Nera was one of the last class. To show that he required no support, Mr. McLean requested Wiremu Nera to leave before McLean harangued the meeting. Te Heu Heu interrupted him, but sat down when requested to do so, and McLean's speech was unfinished at night. It was to be resumed in the morning, but the Maoris were slow to assemble, and as McLean heard that the flagstaff was to be reared that day—a ceremony he desired not to see—he bade farewell to Potatau, who was very friendly to him. The flagstaff was erected on the 29th May, and named after Potatau's ancestor, Te Paue. Potatau on that day spoke publicly for the first time, and spoke in friendly terms of the English. McLean could not gather that there was any intention to molest the Europeans, and his report showed that his mind was tossed by doubts as to the king movement. It had an early origin in men's minds, he said. The founder of the New Zealand mission, Marsden, had first suggested it, and the Ngapuhi (Waka Nene's) tribe were then favourable to it. It failed through inter-tribal jealousies, but had frequently been revolved in Maori minds. Designing Europeans had constantly urged it. Land was a powerful lever in supporting the movement. “It is not to be wondered at that an imaginative and poetic race like the New Zealanders, whose memories live so much in the past, should have a strong attachment to the land of their forefathers.… Almost every mountain, hillock, forest, valley, river, or stream has its particular history of wars, defeats, conquests, or secret repositories of their dead… and while the Europeans are too apt to believe that the land is a mere article of commercial exchange, of little consideration beyond its page 653 monetary value, the natives, on the other hand, from motives not easily understood or appreciated, deem the alienation of certain spots, which they regard with romantic veneration, as a species of desecration.” With such knowledge, if he could have had the courage of his convictions, McLean might have kept the Governor from wrong-doing, but he sturdily maintained at Ngaruawahia the validity of his purchase from Teira. The king-maker, Te Waharoa, advised the chiefs to find out who was in the wrong. “Let us not take up an unrighteous cause. Let us search out the merits of the case, that if we die we may die in a righteous cause.” Kopara Ngatihinetu said: “Let us have patience till our friends who have gone to Taranaki shall return, then we shall know the merits of the case.… If the land was paid for before the flag reached it the Governor is right; if not, then the matter cannot rest where it is. If the mana and flag went before, we must contend for our land.” Te Wetini said: “If the Governor's money was laid down for the land at Waitara before it came under our law then he is right.… If the land was purchased after it became ours then I shall show my love to Rangitake.” With such councils amongst the friends of the Maori king there was yet space for repentance, but there is no sign that the Governor or his advisers repented. McLean reported that Potatau's advisers kept records, assigned certain duties to certain chiefs, and appointed councillors, magistrates, and constables. The king-maker was “actively engaged in preparing a new code of laws, using such portions of the ‘Nga Ture,’1 which was published by the Government in Maori, as may suit the purposes they have in view.” Admitting (May, 1860) that the king movement might, under other circumstances, have been regarded as an interesting feature of progressive advancement, McLean feared that as matters stood concessions might be construed as a recognition of proceedings injurious to British supremacy.
1 A compilation by Sir W. Martin.
1 In after years Mr. Weld admitted that “this sentence was not very clear,” but affirmed that neither by himself, nor Messrs. Dillon Bell and Stafford, who saw it, was it deemed a denial “of tribal rights, where tribal rights existed.” The minds of many public men in New Zealand, in 1860, were clouded, when such a sentence could be so written and understood by so honourable a man as Mr. Weld.