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American Journal of Physical Anthropology. 2002 Jul; 118(3):292-297.It has become increasingly apparent over the past several decades that there is a growing tension between two seemingly irreconcilable trends. On one hand, moderate-to-conservative demographic projections indicate that global human numbers will almost certainly reach 9 billion (or more) by the mid-to-late 21st century. On the other, prudent and increasingly reliable scientific estimates suggest that the Earth's long-term sustainable carrying capacity (at what might be defined as an "adequate to comfortable" standard of living) may not be much greater than 2--3 billion. (excerpt)
[Fertility and household standard of living: a new look] Fecondite et niveau de vie des menages: un nouveau regard.
Rabat, Morocco, Direction de la Statistique, Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Demographiques [CERED], 1992 Mar. 50 p.The relationship between household expenditure and fertility in Morocco is examined using data from the 1984-1985 National Survey on Consumption and Household Expenditure (ENCDM). The results indicate that fertility declines as household expenditure increases. Female education and economic activity appear to be the primary determinants associated with lower fertility. (ANNOTATION)
[The Permanent Household Survey: provisional results, 1985] Enquete Permanente Aupres des Menages: resultats provisoires 1985
Abidjan, Ivory Coast, Ivory Coast. Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances. Direction de la Statistique, 1985. 76 p.This preliminary statistical report provides an overview of selected key economic and social indicators drawn from a data collection system recently implemented in the Ivory Coast. The Ivory Coast's Direction de la Statistique and the World Bank's Development Research Department are collaborating, under the auspices of the Bank's Living Standards Measurement Study, to interview 160 households per month on a continuous basis for 10 months out of the year. Data are collected concerning population size, age structure, sex distribution, family size, nationality, proportion of female heads of household, fertility, migration, health, education, type of residence, occupations, employment status, financial assistance among family members, and consumption. Annual statistical reports based on each round of the survey are to be published, along with brief semiannual updates.
JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW. 1996 Sep; 47(3):313-20.The differential incidence between the consumption tax and the labour income tax is examined in a model where altruistic parents decide the number of children endogenously. In contrast with past results, the consumption tax is not neutral and exerts distortional effects. As a result, welfare gets worse off through the tax reform of switching from a labour income tax to a consumption tax. This provides the argument about the treatment of bequests under a consumption tax. (EXCERPT)
In: Feminist perspectives on sustainable development, edited by Wendy Harcourt. London, England, Zed Books, 1994. 238-46.In this document, the 17th chapter in a book that considers feminist perspectives on sustainable development, a Norwegian woman attempts to define her relationship with nature to illustrate the social poverty caused when development is equated with economic growth. After invoking the nonsustainability of the Western development model and calling for diverse groups of women to collectively analyze action in the area of consumption, the author's consumption patterns are shown to be entirely dependent upon commodities purchased without benefit of the complex information required to allow determination of the impact on human and natural resources. The steps involved in the creation of a radio are used to model the complexity that is required to bring this item to the marketplace. This reveals that Western consumers are ignorant of their relationship with nature and people as producers of the necessities of their lives and are fundamentally dependent upon a complex market structure. Thus, purchasing is a political act that requires suspension of the values of caring, sharing, solidarity, and responsible action. By linking underconsumption in the South with overconsumption in the North, the author challenges the right of Northerners to accuse women in the South of excess fertility. This leads to consideration of the population rhetoric and a questioning of the common claim that overpopulation creates environmental degradation. Low fertility in the North is then ascribed to social poverty that eliminates the social networks that women in the South have the time and energy to enjoy rather than to the desire of Northern women to have fewer children. This social poverty of the North (and of middle- and upper-income women in the South) mocks those who would locate solutions to all problems in the North. It is concluded that Northern women must attempt to reduce consumption and dependence on an exploitative and energy-consuming global market.
REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS. 1994 May; 76(2):255-66.This proposed theoretical model is based on new models of Barro and Becker and Becker, Murphy, and Tamura and explains the interaction of family decisions about fertility and the macroeconomy in a growth situation. The proposed model captures a dynamic interaction between labor/leisure and fertility choice and a structural fertility preference shock. Endogenous factor are consumption, labor/leisure, and fertility, while exogenous factors are production and utility parameters. The aim was to develop a general equilibrium model which expresses short- and long-term dynamics, to test the impact of economic disturbances on fertility, and to explain the US baby boom and subsequent fertility patterns. Savings in capital accumulation and in labor supply were expected to have ambiguous effects, while improved productivity was expected to increase steady state consumption. The methodology, a structural Vector Auto Regression (VAR) model, was developed by Blanchard and Quah and Ihmed, Ickes, Wang, and Yoo. Structural impacts include disturbances in employment, fertility (theoretical preference shift), and output. Long-term restrictions are based on theory, rather than on ad hoc causal orderings (Sims method) or current responses (Bernanke method). The structural VAR model is estimated using the logged differences of labor, fertility rate, and output. The empirical results are based on analysis of US data (1949-88) on fertility, weekly hours worked, and real gross national product. The model revealed that fertility choice should not be considered exogenous to the labor market or to economic growth. Variance of the forecast error for the fertility rate was significantly explained by employment shocks; the effect was reduced fertility and increased labor force effort. Output responses to fertility and technology shocks were similar to those reported by Shapiro and Watson. In the variance decomposition analysis, output shocks explained about 33% of output variance. Fertility shocks explained about 33% of labor growth and 25% of output growth after the first year. With a lag of one year, about 37% of fertility variance was explained by employment shocks. Concluding remarks underscore the importance of knowing which shock initiated the motion and causal ordering.
Ann Arbor, Michigan, University Microfilms International, 1993. viii, 117 p.The author models fertility and economic growth simultaneously in overlapping generations frameworks. The first chapter focuses upon the relationship between fertility and wage rates, examining the effects on fertility and growth of subsidies for education and for the cost of rearing children by assuming that agents care about the consumption and number of children. Chapter two compares fertility and economic growth between economies with or without markets and firms by assuming that agents are concerned about the consumption of their old parents and/or the consumption and the number of their children. It is shown that transforming a traditional economy into a market economy brings about lower fertility but faster growth of per capita output if altruism is one-sided towards parents. Chapter three then investigates the effects of social security upon fertility and economic growth. It is shown that an unfunded social security program may speed up economic growth by reducing fertility and increasing the ratio of human capital investment per child to family income even if saving rates fall, and may bring about faster economic growth than a funded program. Even if fertility is exogenous and private intergenerational transfers are operative, the neutrality of unfunded social security fails to hold due to human capital investment in children, although the saving rate is unchanged.
JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS. 1994 Feb; 7(1):49-62.A model of capital accumulation is built in relation with fertility and consumption. Avoiding [the imposition of] a direct analytical relationship between these three variables, the author studies the set of possible evolutions under the constraints imposed by the inertia of habit change. The conflict between the necessity to avoid impoverishment, the desire to increase consumption when possible and the reproduction intensity delineate the set of viable solutions and the set of attitudes leading to capital extinction. This qualitative view of change of behaviors provides an alternative explanation to historical fertility fluctuations outside the usual Easterlin framework. The geographical focus is on Western developed countries, with particular reference to Sweden. (EXCERPT)
Washington, D.C., World Bank, 1992 Nov. 51 p. (Policy Research Working Paper: Population, Health, and Nutrition No. WPS 1039)The author "develops a simulation model...[that] links fertility decisions with consumption/saving decisions....The model is extended to reflect education as an endogenous decision and then further to look at the effects of an external effect of education on economic growth." (EXCERPT)
SOCIOLOGICAL SPECTRUM. 1992 Apr-Jun; 12(2):167-82.According to the demographic transition theory and the wealth flows model, it is expected that fertility will decline with socioeconomic development, manifested in part through increasingly greater proportions of the population with formal education. Since their independence in the 1960s, most sub-Saharan African nations have experienced rapid changes in educational levels. However, recent estimates indicate that high levels of fertility are being maintained as reflected in the high rates of population increase of approximately 3%/year. Controlling for socioeconomic development as measured by per capita energy consumption and percentage of labor force in agriculture, this article examines the relationship between education and fertility for men and women in 37 sub-Saharan nations. Results indicate that primary school enrollment in 1960 and 1980 for both males and females had a weak negative and nonsignificant relationship with the total fertility rate 15-30 years later. Secondary school enrollment in 1960 for both males and females had weak relationships with the total fertility rate. However, secondary school enrollment for males in 1980 had a significant negative effect on the total fertility rate 10-25 years later. Implications are discussed. (author's)
[Births are affected by economic concerns] Geboorteontwikkeling wordt beinvloed door vertrouwen in de economie.
MAANDSTATISTIEK VAN DE BEVOLKING. 1991 Sep; 39(9):25-30.The author uses a regression model to explain the effects of consumer confidence and the economic climate on fluctuations in the total fertility rate. Data are for the Netherlands and cover the period 1972-1990. (SUMMARY IN ENG) (ANNOTATION)
JOURNAL OF QUANTITATIVE ECONOMICS. 1988 Jan; 4(1):11-7.The impact on fertility of parents' desire to have children in order to provide support in old age is analyzed. "Two alternatives are compared with respect to their fertility outcome; one in which a parent in his old age receives a customary contribution from each of his children and another in which the society allocates the output produced by working young among the young and non-working old for their consumption. It is shown that there is no theoretical support for the view that old age security motive necessarily leads to higher fertility than socially optimal....It is [also] shown that under certain assumptions about the shape of parental preferences over consumption in their working and retired life, exogenous changes in infant mortality will have no impact on fertility." (EXCERPT)
Intergenerational transfers in industrialised countries: effects of age distribution and economic institutions.
JOURNAL OF POPULATION ECONOMICS. 1989; 1(4):269-84.In Great Britain, using mid 1980s data and assuming no productivity increase over generations thereby making the discount rate and population growth rate 0, the average ages of household consumption and production stood at 46.3 and 41.3 respectively. Further, assuming 2% annual productivity growth and discount rates, the average consumption age was 41.7 and the average production age was 38.7. Therefore, net transfers here passed from the younger to older generations. In Japan, 1985 data shows that, under the same assumptions as Great Britain, the average ages of household consumption and production stood at 50.8 and 44.3 respectively. When assuming 2% annual productivity growth and discount rates, Japan's average consumption age was 41.7 and it's average production age was 38.7. Like Great Britain, Japan's net transfers passed from the younger to older generations. Specifically, production was significantly higher than consumption in the 20-60 year old age group and the reverse occurred in the older age groups. Even though there were similar patterns between the 2 countries, the difference between the average ages of consumption and production for Japan is much larger than for Great Britain. Further, it is even greater than the United States' whose estimates correspond to Japan's and Great Britain's. Specifically, the strength of the transfer effect is higher for Japan than Great Britain or the US because of the longer life expectancy among the Japanese. In addition, due to changes in fertility and mortality, the proportion of the <15 year olds has decreased and the proportion of those > or = 65 years old has increased. Therefore net transfers have shifted in favor of the older generations.
[Overlying cultural factors: the saturation of tensions as an explanation of fertility decline in Switzerland] Uberlagerte kulturelle Faktoren: ein Sattigungsmodell zur Erklarung des schweizerischen Geburtenruckgangs.
SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FUR VOLKSWIRTSCHAFT UND STATISTIK/REVUE SUISSE D'ECONOMIE POLITIQUE ET DE STATISTIQUE. 1989 Jun; 125(2):165-88.The purpose of this article is to provide an explanation of the recent decline of fertility in Switzerland with a saturation model. This process, which can be observed in the majority of highly developed countries since about 1965, is part of a long-term process of limitation of births. Factors considered in the model include the segregation between the work place and household, the development of social security systems, excessive consumption, and changing values. The model attempts to show that individuals are experiencing increasing structural and cultural tensions due to an increase in the impact of such factors that lead them to react in a variety of ways, some of which can affect the number and timing of births. The author suggests that both the fertility level and fertility decline have different determinants and concludes that fears of the "dying out" of the Swiss population are premature. (SUMMARY IN ENG AND FRE) (EXCERPT)
In: Economics of changing age distributions in developed countries, edited by Ronald D. Lee, W. Brian Arthur and Gerry Rodgers. Oxford, England, Clarendon Press, 1988. 139-50. (International Studies in Demography)This chapter examines the consequences of grafting an economic theory of fertility on to a simple model of economic growth. Our 1st discovery was that the existence of a sustainable equilibrium with growing per capita income imposes certain local restrictions on the form of the utility function. By exploiting those restrictions, the author was able to derive conclusions about the effects of government intervention on the long-term behavior of the model economy. The most striking of those conclusions was that a policy of taxing income and redistributing the proceeds to families in proportion to the number of children would increase income, consumption, and the number of children per adult, but would permanently reduce the amount spent on each child. By contrast, income taxation would have no macroeconomic effects, no matter how the proceeds were spent, if population were exogenous. Strong results obtained with a highly stylized model must be taken with the proverbial pinch of salt, particularly so when they concern complex phenomena like fertility. But the approach followed in this discussion, namely inferring the properties of the utility function from the conditions for a sustainable equilibrium and then seeing how these properties affect the comparative statics and dynamics of the system, appears to be promising. It might even be that some of the steady-state results would carry over to models with a variable saving rate and a more detailed age structure.
[Population and consumption in Morocco. Part 1: The impact of consumption on demographic trends] Population et consommation au Maroc. Premiere partie: l'influence de la consommation sur les variables demographiques.
Rabat, Morocco, Morocco. Direction de la Statistique. Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Demographiques, 1988 Jul. 56 p.This is the first of a planned two-part study concerning the relationships between consumption and selected demographic variables in Morocco. The emphasis in Part 1 is on the demographic impact of consumption. Data are from a survey on household expenditures conducted in 1984-1985, and from the censuses of 1971 and 1982. Separate consideration is given to infant mortality, female age at marriage and fertility, the rural exodus and rural-urban migration, urbanization, and literacy and education. (ANNOTATION)
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. 1988 Jun; 96(3):618-51.A theoretical model of intergenerational transfers is developed in order to examine the effect of low fertility and older age distributions in developed countries on consumption. "With the aid of time budget and consumer expenditure surveys, empirical estimates of the age profiles of various types of time and goods consumption are presented, and we conclude that (1) the net direction of intergenerational transfers is from younger to older ages; (2) under the golden-rule assumption, these transfers largely constitute an externality to childbearing; and (3) they are not large enough to offset the capital dilution effect that would result from higher fertility and more rapid population growth." (EXCERPT)
[Unpublished] . 35 p.Data from a study of parents and their adolescent children are used to examine 4 questions: 1) How are the characteristics of the parental family related to the material aspirations and the achieved consumption of their adolescent children? 2) How do the adolescents' own experiences affect their consumption aspirations? 3) Do the consumption aspirations of young adults affect their family size plans? 4) What is the likelihood that their actually achieved living standards may cause them to revise their fertility plans downwards? The study was done in 1980 by interviewing the 18-year old young adult children from 677 white families, who had been selected in Detroit, Michigan, in 1962 because the children had been born in 1961. 4 consumption measures were included in the analysis: 1) aspiration attached to having each of 7 specific consumer items in the future as measured on a scale of 7 to 28; 2) actual ownership before age 18 of a car, a stereo set and/or a television set; 3) their assessment of their own families' standard of living and their own personal consumption as compared with that of their peers; and 4) how they expected their own future living standard to compare with that of their parents. Other adolescent variables included work status, school attendance, living situation, educational expectations, sex experience, and desired family size. Parental variables included age, religion, final parity, education, father's income, family income, home value, and ownership of consumer durables. The most desired item of future consumption among the adolescents was a home. Just before they turned 18, 50% of the adolescents had had their own car; 50% had had their own stereo set; and 40% had had their own television set. Most of the young adults assessed their living standards as about the same as those of their peers; 40% expected to exceed the standards of their parents. Mean desired family size was 2.9 children. Regression analysis focused on the consumption aspirations of the adolescents and their actual ownership of consumer goods. It also examined determinants of adolescent desired family size -- consumption aspirations, number of siblings, parental education, and family income. Parental education and number of siblings had a negative relation to adolescent ownership of durables. Family income had a slight positive effect on adolescent ownership. Parental ownership of durable goods also had a positive effect on adolescent ownership. The strongest relationship shown was the negative one between being in college and living in a dorm and owning consumer durables during the previous year. The adolescents with the highest educational expectations spent least on durable goods and had less premarital sex. None of the familial variables had any significant affect on adolescent consumption aspirations. In fact, the only variable that had a significant and positive affect on adolescent consumption aspirations was their own prior ownership of consumer durables. The very small effect of parental income on adolescent ownership and aspiration is probably explained by the fact that most high school students have jobs and thus have their own source of income, all of which is disposable, since they live and eat at home. This fact also supplies 1 reason why adolescent aspirations are unrealistic; they do not yet know how much having a family costs. Another reason is that there are no longer many high-paying factory jobs available and other jobs require years of expensive education. Consumption aspiration is significantly negatively related to desired family size, but number of siblings is strongly positive. Nevertheless, their desired number of 2.9 children is likely to be revised downward when these adolescents enter the job market and discover that if they are to achieve their desired level of consumption, their wives will probably have to work and they will have to limit the size of the family. Thus, the unrealistic consumption aspirations of young adults will keep birth rates and population growth depressed.
Chicago, Illinois, National Opinion Research Center, Economics Research Center, 1988. 30,  p. (Discussion Paper No. 88-8.)Altruistic parents make choices of family size along with decisions about consumption and intergenerational transfers. The authors apply this framework to a closed economy, where the determination of interest rates and wage rates is simultaneous with the determination of population growth and the accumulation of capital. Thus, the literature on optimal economic growth to allow for optimizing choices of fertility and intergenerational transfers is extended. The authors use the model to assess the effects of child-rearing costs, the tax system, the conditions of technology and preferences, and shocks to the initial levels of population and the capital stock. (author's)
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS. 1988 Feb; 103(1):1-25.An economic analysis of the linkages in fertility rates and capital accumulation across generations is developed, considering the determination of fertility and capital accumulation in each generation when wage rates and interest rates are parameters to each family and to open economies. The model is based on the assumption that parents are altruistic toward their children. The utility of parents depends on their own consumption and on the utility of each child and the number of children. By relating the utility of children to their own consumption and to the utility of their children, a dynastic utility function was obtained that depends on the consumption and number of descendants in all generations. The term "reformulation" was used because of the emphasis on dynastic utility model of altruism toward children and deriving the budget constraint and utility function of a dynastic family, the model was applied to the Great Depression and World War II. The 1st-order conditions to maximize utility imply that fertility in any generation depends positively on the real interest rate and the degree of altruism and negatively on the rate of growth in per capita consumption from 1 generation to the next. Consumption of each descendant depends positively on the net cost of rearing a desdendant. Applying the model, it is shown that the analysis is consistent with baby busts during the Depression and the war and with a baby boom after the war. The effects on fertility of child mortality, subsidies to (or taxes on) children, and social security and other transfer payments to adults were considered. The demand for surviving children rises during the transition to low child mortality, but demand for survivors return to its prior level once mortality stabilizes at a low level. Fertility falls in response to declines in international real interest rates and increases in an economy's rate of technological progress. Extending the analysis to include life-cycle variations in consumption, earnings, and utility, fertility emerges as a function of expenditures on the subsistence and human capital of children but not of expenditures that simply raise the consumption of children. The path of aggregate consumption in demographic steady states does not depend on interest rates, time preference, or other determinants of life-cycle variations in consumption.
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1987 Dec; 13(4):639-70, 763-4, 766.This article examines the demographic consequences of China's Great Leap Forward--the massive and ultimately unsuccessful drive during 1958-62 to leap ahead in production by mobilizing society and reorganizing the peasantry into large-scale communes. Severe excess mortality and massive fertility shortfalls are documented, but with wide variations among provinces and between rural and urban areas. The demographic crisis was caused, in the first instance, by nationwide food shortages. However, these are attributable to declines in grain production, entitlement failure, and changes in consumption patterns, all of which are ultimately traceable to political and economic policies connected with the Great Leap. (SUMMARY IN FRE AND SPA) (EXCERPT)
[Demographic variables in neoclassical growth models] Demographische Variablen in neoklassischen Wachstumsmodellen.
Bochum, Germany, Federal Republic of, N. Brockmeyer, 1987. 285 p. (Contributions to Quantitative Economics/Beitrage zur Quantitativen Okonomie Vol. 10)A comparative dynamic analysis of the relationships between demographic and economic development is provided using neoclassical growth and stable population models. The influence of fertility on population growth rates, age structure, and the economic system is examined. Specifically, the author investigates the influence of population growth on the quality and quantity of the supply of labor, discusses the relationship between trends in productivity and population growth, and tries to determine the impact of demographic variables on consumer and capital goods production. The influence of population growth on the distribution of labor and capital is also discussed. The focus is on economics at the national level.
Bangkok, Thailand, United Nations, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific [ESCAP], 1987. 10 p. (Population Research Leads No. 25)The Asian and Pacific region's decline in fertility and mortality over the past 2 decades has resulted in large shifts in the age composition of national populations, which affects planning in nearly every social and economic sector. For the region as a whole, the crude birthrate is estimated to have remained at 40/1000 population until about 1970, declining to 27/1000 in the 1980-85 period. This rapid decline in fertility has complicated population policy formulation and the integration of population factors into development planning. The demonstration that government programs could alter demographic trends meant that population no longer could be treated simply as an exogenous variable in development planning. The combination of previously high fertility and declining mortality, which particularly affected the survival rates of infants and children, resulted in a small increase in the proportion of the population of the region below age 15, from 37% in 1950 to 41% in 1970. By 1985, the latter proportion dropped to 35% because of declining fertility. Due to the previously high fertility and more recent declines, the proportion of the population in working-age groups increased from 56% in 1975 to 61% in 1985 and is projected to reach 65% by 2000. Providing employment for this rapidly increasing population of labor-force age is a major challenge for countries of the region over the next several decades. For those few countries in the Asian and Pacific regions who had low birth and death rates by 1960, the current issue is demographic aging. As the rate of population growth per se decreases in importance as a planning goal, other aspects of population, such as spatial distribution, take on more significance. The rising marriage age and organized family planning programs were the primary causes of fertility decline in the region, although the decline was limited in South Asia where large pockets of high fertility (a total fertility rate in the range of 5-7) remain. The contribution of rising marriage age to further fertility decline is approaching the limit, except in the countries of South Asia where the marriage age continues to be below 20 years. In most of the countries of the region, the potential also exists for a 2nd generation "baby boom" resulting from a changing age structure. This would in turn slow down the pace of fertility decline unless compensated by a rapid fall in fertility of younger married women caused by successful implementation of family planning programs and other associated socioeconomic changes. Aside from the straightforward implications of demographic change, changes in age structure also imply changes in consumption patterns. Thus, planning for production, consumption, investment, and distribution always should incorporate changes in age structure.
GENUS. 1986 Jul-Dec; 42(3-4):13-21.The author examines the writings of Malthus and compares them with basic tenets of two modern economic approaches to fertility studies. It is suggested that "Leibenstein and Easterlin, on the one hand, base their arguments on the central role of aspirations and of relative income or status, whether it be that of the parents or of the friends and neighbors. We argue that aspirations and relative income effects are quite close to Malthus' ideas on 'forward looking' and self respect. The other modern economic approach to fertility studies, the Chicago school, is centered on the effect of human capital on consumption and fertility decisions, and we think that this idea was not too strange to Malthus when he emphasized foresight and the desire for knowledge." (SUMMARY IN FRE AND ITA) (EXCERPT)
POPULATION AND DEVELOPMENT REVIEW. 1986; 12 Suppl:139-54.Mean family size in the industrial nations is less than the 2.1 children per couple needed for the population to remain constant over the long run. The countries of Western Europe have a mean family size of about 1.61 children per couple, with West Germany as low as 1.42, Japan at 1.71, Europe as a whole at 1.9, and the US at 1.85. The decline of births is related to 1) contraception, for the 1st time controlled by women; 2) women's employment outside the home; and 3) the democratization of decision making within couples. Work opportunities for women lower the birth rate, but they do so by freeing women from the dictatorship of men. The activity of child rearing is compared with other uncompensated activities that occupy people's leisure on the one hand, and with paid work in the other hand. Clerical work, women's current alternative to the 19th century factory, has agreeable social elements combined with tolerable and limited duties. Staying home with children can be lonely 7 days a week; it lacks crisp challenges and interpersonal relations. If parents do not spend their money and time producing children, they can apply both money and time to the purchase and use of dazzling array of other goods. Children are no longer investments in the traditional sense because 1) children are in large part no longer formed by parents but by television, schools, and peer groups; and 2) parents rely on their own savings and the state to provide for their old age. A feature of earlier high fertility was the inculcation of differentiated gender roles starting long before marriage. Women has few choices beyond raising children. The spread of high-fertility cultures did not need to be planned by anyone; sheer aithmetic worked at 2nd remove to make male dominance universal. This article argues that under modern conditions there will be few children.