Yoshida Yutaka, “Nippon Gunpeishi – Ajia Taiheiyõ Sensõ no Genjitsu” (Soldiers of Japan – the Reality of the Asia – Pacific War), Chuõkõron, 2018 (Numbers in parenthesis indicate page numbers)
The soldiers who went to their deaths
The truth of the forlorn defence campaign
1.The exponential growth in deaths from disease and starvation
The rapid growth in casualties stemming from disease
Given the various developments that took place during the course of the war, how and in what way did Japanese soldiers die? It is commonplace to think of deaths that occurred as a result of fighting when examining casualties on the battlefield. However this logic cannot be applied to the Asia-Pacific War, in particular the reality of the defence campaign, or from 1944 onwards. Hereafter I intend to examine the type of deaths that were experienced during that phase and earlier phases of the war. (28).
The first thing to point out is that there were an extraordinary number of deaths from disease. When examining deaths in battle and deaths from disease, they are generally placed under the combined heading of ‘casualties’. However I shall divide them up so that I can refer to those who died in battle as “battle casualties”, while those who died of illness will be “casualties from disease”.
Wars of the early modern era were marked by a considerably greater number of casualties from disease than from actual fighting. As a result of advancements in military medicine and nursing, as well as developments in logistics, the number of casualties from disease fell. During the Russo-Japanese War, for example, the percentage of casualties from disease dropped to 26.3% of the total number of casualties suffered by the Japanese army. (28-29) The Russo-Japanese War thus marked the first time in the history of conflict that the number of battle casualties actually surpassed those who succumbed to illness (source: Soldiers and Battles of the Asia-Pacific War).
However during the Japan-China War, according to documents compiled by the 1st Department of Veterans’ Affairs in November 1945, the longer that conflict dragged on, the greater the increase in casualties from disease. By 1941, the number of battle casualties from fighting in China had reached 12,498, while the number of casualties from disease totalled 12,713 (not including those involved in the Mukden Incident). The percentage of those who died of illness, when compared to the total number of casualties, came to 50.4% (source: An Examination of Modern Warfare). While no comprehensive statistics survive from the Asia-Pacific War, as we shall soon see, when one considers the ferocity with which the Asia-Pacific War was fought, surpassing that of the Japan-China War, it is inconceivable to think that the number of casualties from illness in that war were less than those suffered in China. (28-29)
In order to narrow down on the number of casualties from illness, we must first examine unit histories. Amid these histories, there are often lists of total casualties compiled using the unit’s own records. However these lists very rarely make the distinction between those who died in combat and those who died from illness. Let us therefore examine, for example, the unit history of the 1st Infantry Regiment of the China Occupational Army. From the outset of the Japan-China War, the overall casualties from this regiment, which was at the forefront of fighting throughout the war, and according to its own “casualty lists”, came to 2,625. (29-30)
Thereafter, the number of battle casualties that took place during the so-called “defence campaign” period from 1944 onwards, and when combined with post-war deaths, came to 533, while deaths from illness came to 1,475, making a total of 2,008 (not including 14 whose date of death was uncertain, and 2 who died by accident). The percentage of those who died from illness, compared to the total number of deaths from 1944 onwards, thus came to 73.5% of the casualties suffered by the 1st Regiment (source: Unit History of the 1stRegiment of the China Occupational Army). (30)
However one cannot rule out the possibility that the number of those who died of illness was greater than that quoted in the source above. This is because there was a tendency to “re-classify” deaths from illness as battle casualties at the front. The reason stemmed from the fact that in both the military and society, a death in battle was regarded as a more meaningful then that from disease and was certainly considered more honourable. Torizawa Yoshio, who was sent as a reservist to the China front in June, 1942 as part of the 3rd Regiment of the China Occupational Army, wrote the following note about his experience. The 3rd Regiment, like the 1stRegiment, was affiliated with the 27th Division. (30)
“Members of the company fell ill, and as it was not easy to nurse people under field conditions, some of those men died. Given the situation at the time, those who died from illness under such cruel conditions were looked on with pity, and so as their deaths were regarded as no different to those who died in combat. Thereafter, despite the absence of fighting, they would be recorded as having died in combat. What is more, as in the case of “T”, those who committed suicide while in the field would also be treated as combat casualties.” (source: 8000km Across the Continent). (30)
Unparalleled casualties rates from starvation
In order to complete the examination of casualties from disease, one must also examine its close relationship with deaths stemming from starvation. This is because there were huge numbers of such deaths during the Asia-Pacific War. As noted earlier, the total number of battle casualties among military and military affiliated personnel following on from the Japan-China War came to around 2.3 million. (31) According to the ground-breaking research conducted by Fujiwara Akira, this figure can be further divided up into soldiers who died from malnutrition and those who contracted diseases like malaria as a result of their malnutrition and subsequently died. When such casualties are totalled up, they constitute around 1.4 million deaths (or 61% of the total number of deaths) (source: The Starved Heroes). (31) These statistics have been criticised by Hata Ikuhiko as excessively high, and that deaths from starvation constituted more like 37% of the total number of casualties. However Hata himself has admitted that “There is no escaping the fact that this was an absolutely unprecedented level (of deaths from starvation) in the annals of both domestic and foreign military history” (source: The Ecology of the former Imperial Japanese Army and Navy). (31)
The reality of this tragedy is seen in what occurred during the defensive war in The Philippines that commenced in October, 1944. According to a survey conducted by the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare in 1964, around 518,000 army, navy and associated personnel perished during that conflict. It also mentioned the following in relation to those members of the Imperial Army who died (not counting those who drowned at sea, details on which will be revealed later):
“While there is a scarcity of resources from which accurate data can be obtained concerning the breakdown of casualty rates, in general around 35 – 40% of casualties came as a result of direct fighting (including operations against guerrillas), which meant that the remaining 60-65% of deaths were a result of disease. Furthermore, among these casualties, those who actually died after contracting a malady of some form constituted less than half of the death rate from disease, which meant that a majority of those who died did so as a result of illness made worse because of starvation.” (source: A History of Army Sanitation during the Great East Asian War) (The Philippines Conflict) (32)
The main reason for this increase in deaths from starvation was the loss of both sea and air superiority, which cut off supply lines for the Japanese military and led to severe shortages of food. The percentage of war material that arrived at the front undamaged (also known as the rate of stability) stood at 96% in 1942. By 1943 it had dropped to 83%, and then 67% in 1944, and then finally 51% in 1945. This meant that from one-third to half of all foodstuffs transported by sea were lost. The drop in the rate of stability led to accumulated war material falling far below levels necessary to sustain an army in the field (source: The Pacific War – A record of Japan’s lost transport ships). (33)
The Japanese High Command was certainly aware of just how serious the shortage in supplies was and the problem of starvation among the troops. Kanbayashi Hiroshi, director of the Imperial Army Medical Corps within the Department of the Army, and who had recently returned to Japan from the southern front, issued the following warning about the state of health within the army in both the Solomon Islands and New Guinea at a meeting of the Medical Corps on the 23rd of August, 1943:
“Again, while local self-sufficiency can be sustained in Rabaul, it most certainly cannot at the front. At the front, soldiers lack the strength to be able to bear the weight of their weapons because of their malnutrition (abridged) Furthermore, the leading cause of death at Wau (a New Guinea battlefield) is starvation. (Abridged) Malnutrition robs soldiers of their will to fight.” (source: Daily Record of Duties within the Department of the Army, Vol.2, Chapter 8). (33)
Even the Shõwa Emperor (Emperor Hirohito) was aware of what the true state of affairs was. On the 7th of September 1943, the Emperor, when speaking to Lieutenant General Hasunuma Shigeru, the Emperor’s Aide de Camp, about the halt in supplies to the front, stated “(I cannot bear) the fact that the officers and soldiers have been plunged into something resembling starvation”, and then addressing the Chief of the General Staff, dictated that “I order you to convey my outrage about the supply situation (to the General Staff)” (source: Private Record of the Prime Minister within the Tõjõ Cabinet) (33)
War-related trophopathy (malnutrition) - “like a living corpse”
It is important to note that in relation to issues surrounding malnutrition, there is a link between war-related malnutrition and war-related mental illnesses. This malady was first noticed during the early stages of the Japan-China War. During the Xuzhou campaign of April to June, 1938, many of the soldiers taking part in that conflict began to fall ill primarily a result of dramatic losses in weight, a lack of appetite, anaemia, and chronic diarrhea. As treatment for such ailments was difficult, there were many cases which ended in death. To address this problem, Lieutenant General Nagino Itsuki of the Army Medical Corps wrote a thesis titled “War-related Trophopathy”. The date of publication is unclear, however the cover contains the heading “Army Medical School (Northern China Army Edition)” written in typeset. Within the thesis, General Nagino addressed the “three main symptoms” of high levels of atrophy, loss of appetite, and diarrhea. (36)
In relation to his patients, General Nagino wrote “The ceaseless diarrhea brings on a decrease in the overall corporeal condition. In addition to dramatic atrophy, patients lose subcutaneous fat, thus leading to shrunken muscles. Patients’ bodies begin to appear mummified, vessels begin to constrict, and the patient is unable to maintain a constant body temperature. The limbs turn clammy, while the face turns expressionless and all desire to speak is lost. Patients fall into a stupor, with glassy eyes, unable to communicate, and for all purposes appear to be ‘living corpses’. Some fade away like ‘a slowly extinguishing candle’, while others who don’t appear to have such serious symptoms suddenly ‘collapse, and suffer cardiac arrest or pulmonary arrest and die’”. This paints a very vivid picture. (36)
Tanaka Hidetoshi, a medic assigned to the 4th Field Hospital of the 27th Division during the continental campaign of 1944, also portrayed the state of patients suffering from war-related malnutrition in a field hospital in the following manner:
“(Because of the large number of patients) In the case of the army, long periods of time spent at the front, with its lack of supplies and excessive mental strain, led to high incidences of acute malnutrition. While this was generally described as “war-related malnutrition”, many of those who suffered from this illness also had amoebic dysentery, bacterial diarrhea, or malaria. Opinions regarding the malady varied when it first began to be researched, with the predominant theory being that it was by nature infectious.” (source: Materials concerning War-Related Malnutrition). (37)
However in the preface to his thesis, General Nagino noted that “From around 1942 onwards, and as a result in the spread of education regarding this condition, identical cases were detected in inland areas that had not experienced any fighting. What is more, in the following year there was an increase in such cases, which was a completely unforeseen development.” What this demonstrated was that it was impossible to simply conclude that harsh fighting conditions led to outbreaks of infectious disease cases. (37)
One person acutely aware of this situation was army medic Colonel Namba Mitsushige. In the preface to his thesis written after the war, he stated that “In relation to the state of health (within the army), long conflicts led to a drop in nutrition, or to put this another way, it led to a condition known as war-related malnutrition syndrome. Its primary symptoms are malnutrition leading to a loss in weight and motivation, and exhaustion brought on by the nature of the war. I intend to argue that there were in fact two separate kinds of war-related malnutrition syndrome. The first I have dubbed “chronic war-related malnutrition syndrome”, as it included infectious diseases like amoebic dysentery, malaria, or tuberculosis, which would repeatedly re-occur. The other was not an infectious disease, but rather something that appeared in conjunction with any serious pre-existing ailment, and had no known infection source. This I refer to as “primary war-related malnutrition syndrome” (Source: A pathological anatomical study of 51 strains of so called ‘war-related malnutrition syndrome’). (38-39)
What is important to note here is that army physicians had already established the existence of “primary war-related malnutrition syndrome”, which had no relation to any infectious disease. (39)
When compared to the army, naval studies into war-related malnutrition syndrome were both late and appeared to favour the infectious-disease theory. Naval medic Commander Abe Isao, along with five other physicians, examined the possibility that Gartner’s bacillus (a form of salmonella) had led to food poisoning among 11 sailors who were part of a group of 18 suspected of having war-related malnutrition syndrome. In the chapter of their report titled “In relation to the so-called war-related malnutrition syndrome”, they surmised their belief that the principle cause of this condition lay in malaria, dysentery, amoebic conditions, as well as Gartner’s bacillus (source: Self-instruction manual for local conditions in the southern theatre). (39)
As we shall see, one of the characteristics of the Imperial navy was its disregard for psychiatric illness. Yet this factor repeatedly made an appearance in issues related to war-related malnutrition syndrome. (39)
The strong link to neuropsychiatric symptoms
Ultimately the army collapsed without ever establishing the origins of war-related malnutrition syndrome. However thereafter a new theory emerged to explain its prevalence. Aoki Tõru, himself a physician during the war and who engaged in the study of war-related malnutrition syndrome, noted that “There is a tendency to believe that a majority of the army medical corps considered amoebic dysentery the cause of war-related malnutrition syndrome”. He himself, by concentrating on the pituitary gland, below which lay the part of the brain controlling appetite, posited the following:
“In relation to war-related malnutrition syndrome, its early symptoms were a passivity exacerbated by monomaniacal strategists (i.e., commanders that ignored the lack of supplies). The loss of physical strength derived from this passivity would progress, with latter symptoms fatally affecting those areas of the brain located under the pituitary gland. This would result in the loss of regulatory functionality, which then led to the collapse of homeostasis in the patient, which would eventually result in death.” (source: A secret record of war-related malnutrition syndrome). (40).
In other words, a shortage of supplies including food, physical and mental exhaustion brought on by the constant fighting, and the cruelties of war, together with stress, nervousness, tension and fear, brought about changes to the equilibrium within the body known as homeostasis. This led to a loss of appetite and the appearance of eating disorders. More recently, Dr Noda Masaaki, a psychiatrist, has written about war-related malnutrition syndrome. In his study, Dr Noda wrote that “In truth, soldiers began to refuse to eat. They would vomit up anything they did eat, which made their condition worse. At the front, where one had to maintain one’s health, this amounted to a decision by the body to quit living”. (41)
Nevertheless, war-related malnutrition syndrome was not a result of simple malnutrition, but one inexorably linked to war-related neuropsychological conditions.
We have examined this issue from a variety of angles during this chapter, so we can conclude that the largest number of deaths among the soldiery were not battle casualties, but rather casualties from disease, among which starvation ranked as the principal culprit. (41)