An arms race in Asia over the past decade to acquire naval warfare weapons means that any political miscalculation over the many territorial disputes in the region can quickly lead to conflict.
The arms race is a response by Far Eastern and southeast Asian governments to uncertainty surrounding the objectives of China as Beijing seeks to ensure its own security and assert its sovereignty over disputed island chains by building a modern, blue-water navy.
Maritime confrontations in recent months between China and its neighbours in the East and South China seas have so far only involved maritime surveillance, fisheries protection and coast guard vessels.
But elections in Japan on Sunday are likely to produce a coalition government led by the Liberal Democratic Party whose leader, Shinzo Abe, is outspoken on what he sees as Chinese provocation.
Abe is committed to trying to revise Japan’s pacifist constitution, adopted after the Second World War, and to beef up the military.
Japan already has the most powerful navy in Asia, despite China’s huge investment over the past few years.
Abe has suggested during the campaign he might deploy troops and warships to the Senkaku Islands (called the Diaoyutai in Chinese), the main territorial bone of contention between Beijing and Tokyo.
Ownership of the five uninhabited islands is a matter of intense nationalism in both China and Japan, but so far it has not been an issue of great concern to China’s People’s Liberation Army, which has had significant influence on Beijing’s approach to the other major area of territorial disputes, the South China Sea, whose sea routes carry much of China’s trade and strategically crucial oil supplies.
That will change if Japan uses navy ships to assert its sovereignty over the Senkakus instead of the coast guard ships it has used up until now.
In designing and building its modern naval forces, Beijing’s aim is primarily to enable it to invade Taiwan, which it claims to own, and any other claimed territory in the region.
China also wants to be able to protect the shipping lanes carrying its imports and exports.
To this end, Beijing aims to deter or defeat any United States forces that might be sent to assist Washington’s allies in the region.
It has therefore built a large submarine fleet of 62 attack boats, and three carrying intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of hitting most of the U.S.
China has also acquired a large arsenal of missiles capable of sinking U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups, and a range of more than 75 missile-equipped frigates and destroyers.
Most recently, it has launched a re-built aircraft carrier acquired from Russia, which is being used to train crews for three or more carriers Beijing plans to build.
Japan has two aircraft carriers, 32 destroyers of various types, and 16 submarines. Although substantially smaller than China’s navy, Japan’s is technically far more advanced, and the abilities of its crews are considered well ahead of those of China.
Significantly, the prospect of Japan dropping the pacifist clause in its constitution, which severely limits the places and situations in which its self-defence forces can be used, is being applauded among Southeast Asian nations, which have disputes with China over islands and resources in the South China Sea.
Philippines foreign minister Albert del Rosario last week told London’s Financial Times newspaper: “We would welcome that very much. We are looking for balancing factors in the region, and Japan could be a significant balancing factor.”
The Manila government of President Benigno Aquino has been a special target of China’s power projection over the Scarborough Shoals in the South China Sea, which are well within the Philippines exclusive economic zone under maritime law.
A confrontation started in June when the Philippines Coast Guard attempted to detain Chinese fishing vessels in a lagoon in the shoals.
China has not only reneged on an agreement to remove patrol ships from the area, it has put a boom across the entrance to the lagoon.
The Aquino administration’s response has been to revive the defence alliance with the U.S., which Manila walked out of in the early 1990s, and to build new military ties with Japan and South Korea.
Manila is also buying a lot of new naval hardware. Acquisitions to date include patrol boats, helicopters, a refurbished U.S. frigate, and two former U.S. Coast Guard cutters. It is buying Taiwan-manufactured multi-purpose attack craft and is placing orders with Italy for frigates and anti-ship attack aircraft.
The other main target so far of Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea is Vietnam. Last weekend, there were anti-Chinese demonstrations in Hanoi after Beijing threatened reprisals if Vietnamese ships did not stop surveying for submarine resources in disputed waters.
Vietnam, which fought a bloody sea battle with China in 1974 over the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea, has embarked on a major naval modernization program.
Hanoi is buying six Russian submarines equipped with anti-ship missiles. Also from Russia are coming about 20 fighter aircraft designed for marine warfare and two Gepard-class stealth frigates.
Vietnam is buying corvettes from Holland, and acquiring a full kit of coastal anti-ship ballistic missiles as well as Israeli extended-range artillery munitions.
At the same time, Hanoi is encouraging the U.S. and the other major regional naval power India, to use Vietnam’s port facilities and engage in joint exercises.
Among other southeast Asian countries, submarines are the favourite means of providing security against the Chinese navy.
Indonesia was the first to acquire submarines. Singapore is upgrading its submarine fleet with the addition of two Swedish Archer-class boats, and Malaysia has bought two French Scorpene-class vessels. Thailand and the Philippines are considering similar moves.
Asia’s sealanes, according to a recent report by Australia’s Lowly Institute for International Policy, are becoming more “crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed strife.”