So could the Russians invent a hack to steal the election by infecting the voting machines and tabulation systems of just two or three technology vendors? And if we assume that a Stuxnet type attack exposed the systems at several vendors, how would a hack likely work in order to remain undetected?
Election Day Only. First, the attack would be planted in advance and would only work on election day. In addition to using the clock on the device, the hacking program could actually verify that the system clock had not been altered for testing purposes, in other words it would know that the system date had not been changed to “simulate” Election Day for the purposes of testing. Second, the hack could erase itself and bleach itself from the system after it performed its business. So the only way to detect the hack would be to find the offending virus or malware before election day and recognize it for what it is or observe it actually executing on election day. After election day, it could vanish without a trace (or at least without an obvious file or erased file.)
Voting for Non Voters. This is difficult to pull off because measures are in place to compare the number of voters who showed up and voted (votes cast) to the number of votes tabulated. So this type of election fraud is not likely at the polling place but is possible in small counties where absentee ballots are cast. The hack could try to vote for voters who failed to return their ballots in the mail. This is extremely difficult to do because the dataset containing the number of ballots mailed and returned is isolated from the dataset that tabulates these votes. It is not impossible to imagine that these precautions could be bypassed, however, particularly in smaller more rural counties where systems are more likely to connect to the same networks and where sophisticated computer system audits and precautions may not be adequately observed. The risk of course, is that dead people would accidentally vote. There is almost no way for the hacker to prevent at least some dead voters from voting in such a scenario. So if you were going to use this method, then it would be smart to spread stories about dead people voting before the election in question. You would want to inoculate opinion using an Obi Wan Kenobi “there’s nothing to see hear” trance.
Hacking Accessibility Voting Machines. The Americans with Disabilities Act has required all polling locations to have at least one accessible voting machine The totals coming from these machines have to be added to the totals coming from the standard voting machines. The more devices involved in the system, the greater the number of vulnerabilities and possible points of attack.
Switching Votes at time of Entry. This seems to be an unlikely scenario as well because the voter themselves can usually see how they have voted. Still, in states like Pennsylvania where no paper trail is maintained, the possibility is a concerning one. Indeed, a few voters in Pennsylvania reported system malfunctions that prevented them from changing a straight ticket ballot from Democrat to Republican. Onsite inspection found these to be calibration errors. When the calibration re-ran, the changed votes were allowed as desired by the voter. Could such a malfunction be a red herring? An attempt to document votes being switched to Hillary? If so, and it was accompanied by a different type of voter fraud executed by Russians supporting Trump, it would be sheer genius. But what type of fraud might they be able to execute without detection? What if the voter saw one thing and the system saved a different result invisible to the voter. Without a paper trail, how would this be detected?
Recasting Votes. When there is no paper trail, recasting electronic votes later on election day before they are tabulated could occur as well. This would require overcoming several failsafe protections against such activity. But if a system is compromised at multiple points of vulnerability, recasting of ballots prior to tabulation is an eerie thought.
Mis-Tabulating. The tabulation system could be compromised and simply told to count wrong. Make the total vote match, but adjust the totals between certain candidates. Double-blind measures would have to be tricked. But just like air gaps, double blind measures may not be what they seem to be, especially if the infected devices can open up a back-alley means of communicating, tabulating, or worse yet, a predictive algorithm that avoids detection.
Detecting the Fraud. The vendors that provide these systems, of course, are highly financially motivated to not only claim that hacks are impossible but also to prove it. If the hack has already occurred and it has already erased itself, how can it be detected? Since it is unlikely that all voting machines can be hacked or that all can be hacked in the same way, and since provisional ballots, absentee ballots, in-person ballots and accessibility ballots are reported in different ways. A statistical analysis is needed to compare Tuesday’s results, which are not even final yet, with past results and statistical polling regarding this election. For example, did Trump outperform or underperform the GOP candidate for Senator or Governor differently in polling locations with one type of voting machine?
While it is clear to many observers that the Russians hacked the Democratic National Committee, used bots, paid trolls on online social media, and showed other interest in affecting the outcome on Tuesday, I have not seen any evidence of a secret cyber coup. But of course if there was direct evidence, then it wouldn’t be a secret.