Solidarity Comes to Power
One of the benefits of using primary documents to trace the fall of Poland’s communist regime step by step is that it restores some of the suspense to the proceedings. For although it is easy today to view the transition from state socialism to democratic capitalism as part of an inexorable world-historical development, a look at the thinking of decision-makers at the time reminds us that this was, in fact, a leap in the dark. Not only Communist Party functionaries but also Solidarity leaders and Western diplomats were frequently surprised and alarmed by events and often uncertain about what to do next. What is instructive and fascinating is examining how these fears and miscalculations affected key decisions, ultimately shaping an outcome that most participants would subsequently view as a major success story.
It is useful to keep in mind—and highlight to students—a couple of the key tensions and paradoxes involved in the agendas of both Communist Party leaders and Solidarity activists:
The Prospect of Violence:
The peaceful nature of the fall of Communism in Poland, as well as most of the rest of Eastern Europe, is perhaps the most striking aspect of the transformation. Why were the tanks never called out when it appeared the regime could lose power—as they were so spectacularly in China (Tiananmen Square) just as the Polish elections were underway? One answer is a growing sense of pessimism, especially economic: what good was repeatedly repressing dissent without some prospect of addressing underlying social discontent? But the restraint of both the Polish and the Soviet regimes was also, ironically, a function of confidence: With the largest military forces in the world at their disposal and a track record of crushing every revolt, they assumed they could afford to hold back.
The absence of violence in 1989 can also be traced to decisions by the opposition. Solidarity activists could have pursued a path of violent resistance (indeed, after the declaration of martial law in 1981, a few had), which could have provided easy justification for a crackdown by the regime. The refusal of the leadership to countenance such tactics—or even to encourage confrontational non-violent demonstrations—seemed to confirm the regime’s invincibility. But over time, the renunciation of violence ended up neutralizing the regime’s greatest advantage.
Political vs. economic “reform"
Although Poland, like most of Eastern Europe, would move simultaneously from one-party rule to parliamentary democracy and from a planned economy to a market economy, it was far from clear that two processes went hand-in-hand. Market-oriented reforms, after all, involved rising prices and unemployment and tended to hurt workers more than management. It was, then, rather extraordinary that an opposition movement based on a trade union championed such measures and that this stance did not seem to alienate Solidarity’s leaders from their constituency. It is worth discussing why this was the case. Was it a matter of oppositionists prioritizing political principle (achieving democracy) over economic interests? Did Solidarity leaders and supporters underestimate the costs of economic transition? Or did they (as well as many reformists in the Communist party) simply believe market-oriented reforms were unavoidable?