Recently the Germans have intensified their efforts to exploit armor, in
spite of the deteriorating situation. These notes reveal the tactics of German
armor at the present time.
Alarmed by the growing German tendency, early in 1945, to commit armor in small
groups, or even singly, General Student, Supreme Commander of a German army group, made
a vigorous attempt to correct this practice. General Student was shrewd enough to know
that the reason for so much dispersion of armored equipment within his command was the
very natural anxiety of his troops to obtain security in all localities. In stressing
that strong measures would be necessary
"to combat the tendency prevailing in the infantry to split up assault-gun battalions
and tank, assault-gun, and tank-destroyer companies," Student pointed out that success
is achieved only by commitment in a body—in battery or company strength, at
least—at points of main effort. In effect, what he demanded was a return to
normal German doctrine.
When tanks, assault guns, or tank destroyers lose their full mobility because of
Allied action or mechanical defects, the General observed, it is folly to retain
such equipment in the line merely so that their weapons can be utilized.
In the light of the situation then existing, he declared, "The fuel and spare-parts
situation does not permit so much as 1 meter of unnecessary travel." As a result, he
allowed only corps or divisions to decide on, and supervise, the shifting, routing, and
other movement of tank and assault-gun units.
As to commitment, General Student ordered that if, in a battery or company, the number
of weapons ready for action should drop to less than three, the unit was to be committed
only in conjunction with other tank or assault-gun units until the weapons could be
built up to their full strength.
"I prohibit the piecemeal commitment of tanks, assault guns, or tank destroyers," the
Divisions which had tank, assault-gun, or tank-destroyer units assigned to them were
to keep a reserve of these weapons in readiness, preferably in company or battery
strength. After a commitment, such a reserve was to be restored to full strength as
rapidly as possible. For security reasons, these reserve weapons were not to remain
in the main line of resistance.
Of timely-value, in connection with these problems with which General Student has had
to cope, is some further information from a well-informed and credible prisoner of war.
The primary mission of German tanks, as this source explains, is to provide the heavy
mobile punch. This is why
"piecemeal commitment" violates the basic German canon of tank warfare. And it also
explains why the enemy has gone to such great lengths to increase the caliber and
of his tank guns. The better the gun, the better the tank, according to the German
way of thinking. Machine guns play a secondary role, and are used relatively little,
except against tank hunters. A hard-hitting tank that can crush steel is the equipment
in which the Germans now place their faith, believing, as they do, that such tanks
must clear the way for Panzer Grenadier elements to advance with their automatic
|This is the latest model of the Pz.Kpfw. Panther.|
Conforming to this tactical doctrine, the Panther has a super-long 75-mm gun. Panther
personnel, according to this prisoner-of-war source, are trained to engage a Sherman
tank without hesitation at a range of from 2,000 to 2,200 yards. They are
taught that while the preferable range of 800 to 900 yards will improve accuracy, it
will not add greatly to the punch. The gun has an optical sight with three
graduations: one for high-explosive shells, one for armor-piercing shells, and the
third for the coaxially-mounted machine gun. Each graduation has its own range
subdivision. According to the source, the gun is seldom, if ever, used as indirect
This source had been taught that, in the approach march, the tanks moved in
column, covered by eight-wheel armored reconaissance cars ahead. These vehicles,
he states, are part of the reconnaissance platoon of each tank battalion. If contact
with hostile armor is made, the tanks deploy and attack, echeloned in depth. However,
in the battle around Noville on Christmas Day, these tactics were not followed. A
Captain Hingst, commanding officer of a 1st (German tank) Battalion, ordered all tanks
to attack in a shallow skirmish line. The U.S. commander quickly sized
up the situation, and in 45 minutes his Shermans had completely destroyed six
Panthers. The Germans withdrew, and Hingst was replaced by a Captain Scheer, commanding
officer of the 2d Battalion. What was left of the two battalions was combined into
an improvised team. Captain Scheer then tried to bypass the U.S. center of
resistance, but it was too tough a nut for him to crack.
An interesting prisoner-of-war disclosure confirms the existence of a German order
to the effect that if a hopeless situation develops, and if a unit is threatened
with capture or annihilation, all officers and sergeants are to withdraw and report
to the next higher command. It is explained that this measure was adopted to reduce
the heavy battle losses in unit leaders.