EMPIRES OF THE SAND
The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789-1923.
By Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh.
Illustrated. 409 pp. Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press. $29.95.
With ''Empires of the Sand,'' Efraim and Inari Karsh attempt a major reinterpretation of Middle Eastern history in the ''long 19th century,'' which stretched from the French Revolution to the final peace settlements after World War I. The importance of this period for the Middle East is immense; indeed, the whole Middle East agenda in the 20th century was laid out between 1915 and 1922.
The Ottoman Empire, which had maintained a kind of regional order for six centuries, was extinguished. Radically new national borders were established in those years, and these still stand. At the same time, the resentments and conflicts generated by the war and by the postwar settlement have been equally durable -- a shattered and embittered Armenian nation, a failed Kurdistan, an Arab world divided into suspicious small states and above all the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The story of these events has of course been told many times, but Efraim Karsh, the director of the Mediterranean studies program at King's College, the University of London, and Inari Karsh, a scholar of Middle Eastern history, believe that this story has been governed by a number of self-serving myths. Among the chief myths are the following: the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century was a helpless pawn in the hands of its far more powerful and aggressive European rivals; the European powers intended all along to dismantle the empire; the Ottomans did not enter World War I as a partner of Germany and Austria of their own free will but were either beguiled by German promises or forced to join the Central Powers by the dark designs of the Allies, especially Russia; and the revolt led by Sherif Hussein in 1916 represented a true Arab national movement.
In assaulting these myths, the Karshes bring a lot of artillery to bear, and their book is distinguished by both clear, vigorous writing and much new research. The tale of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire is hideously complicated, but they hold it all together in a narrative that is not only coherent but often dramatic. Yet in the final analysis, ''Empires of the Sand'' is unsatisfying and at points even annoying.Continue reading the main story
To start with, the authors' approach is startlingly old-fashioned. It is all diplomacy and war. The enormous demographic, economic, social and cultural changes that reshaped the Ottoman Empire in the 19th and early 20th centuries go almost unmentioned. One would never guess that there were huge displacements of Muslim populations from Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the Caucasus, or that the empire's population underwent rapid growth in the decades before World War I because of improvements in public health and internal security. One could not surmise that the press in the Ottoman Empire was gaining in influence, literary culture was flourishing and education was spreading rapidly. Even in the arenas of administrative and political reform, we are given only glimpses, although Ottoman statesmen were striving not only to keep their empire together but to recast it as a modern state.
All these changes were constantly present in the minds of the empire's rulers and shaped Ottoman actions quite as much as the doings of the British, French and Russian governments. What we are given is war and diplomacy without context.
A second problem lies in the sources used -- or not used -- by the authors. They have searched the Public Record Office in London quite effectively and even found some new veins of ore in that much-exploited mine. But they seem to use only published documents from the French and German archives. Most troubling, they make very little use of the Ottoman archives, which are relatively accessible for much of the period they cover. Surely the Ottomans ought to be allowed some voice of their own.
Still another problem is the authors' habit of making blanket characterizations of motives and purposes, when the evidence they themselves present would permit very different constructions. The two principal leaders of the Arab revolt, the Sherif Hussein of Mecca and his son Faisal, are subjected to a withering critique of everything they did or said. Yet even on the facts included here, Hussein and Faisal were no worse than two ambitious men trying to hedge their bets and make the best deal they could in the chaos of the war. How were their actions in any way different from, or more corrupt and self-serving than, those of the British and French statesmen the Karshes admire?
What is finally most unsatisfying, however, is the authors' insistence that they are the first to make a serious critique of the myths they identify, when in fact every one of these myths has been subject to intense scrutiny for the last four decades. For example, Ottoman diplomatic skill in a very difficult environment has attracted increasing admiration from many scholars. And I cannot remember when the Arab revolt was not looked upon with considerable skepticism.
On the other hand, the authors might be accused of creating a countermyth of their own. Never have the intentions and actions of Russia, France and Britain in the Middle East seemed so benign. One can hardly imagine why Middle Eastern politicians and intellectuals might have feared them. It is perfectly clear, as the authors argue, that the Great Powers did not want the Ottoman Empire to collapse into chaos. Yet it is hardly arguable that they meant to dominate every aspect of life there as far as they could, and were quite ready to dismantle the empire if that was to their advantage. There is nothing particularly sinister about this -- that is how great powers have behaved since time immemorial, and how the Ottomans themselves behaved in the empire's glory days. But neither was there anything benign about it. The conduct of the Great Powers was undeniably a grave threat to the Ottomans and their way of life.
The Karshes have, as they intended, given us a controversial book, and its forceful and provocative presentation will make it an important contribution to the literature. But ''Empires of the Sand'' falls well short of transforming our understanding of the Middle East during the last decades of Ottoman rule.Continue reading the main story