Airlift of a Marine Corps
battalion to Lebanon demonstrated that deploying contingency
forces from the continental United
States to an overseas operation was feasible and expeditious.
During the Cold War, the United States deployed its Armed Forces
to support the national objectives of various countries around
the globe. The majority of those operations were short in duration
and occurred in underdeveloped areas of the world. Most were
joint operations, and some were conducted with forces from
allied nations. Nearly all of them were contingency operations
in which the goals, the time available, and the operational
area were limited. One such mission was Operation Bluebat,
the code name for the U.S. military intervention in Lebanon
in 1958. That country, which is situated between Israel and
Syria, was threatened by a rebellion aimed at toppling its
pro-Western government. Because the resources needed to deploy
an airborne brigade were limited, Operation Bluebat was one
of the most complex operations of the Cold War.
A Continental U.S. Strike Capability
The XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, was
designated as the Strategic Army Corps (STRAC) in 1958. The
designation was, in reality, the assignment
of an additional mission rather than a true designation. The additional mission
was to provide a flexible strike capability that could deploy worldwide on
short notice without declaration of an emergency. The 4th
Infantry Division at Fort
Lewis, Washington, and the 101st Airborne Division at Fort Campbell, Kentucky,
were designated as STRAC’s first-line divisions, while the 1st Infantry
Division at Fort Riley, Kansas, and the 82d Airborne Division at Fort Bragg were
to provide backup in the event of general war. The 5th Logistical Command (later
inactivated), also at Fort Bragg, would provide the corps with logistics support,
while Fort Bragg’s XVIII Airborne Corps Artillery would control artillery
Airlift assets were made available to U.S. forces based on the possible outbreak
of a general war in Europe.
In his paper, “Not War But Like War: The American Intervention in Lebanon,” prepared
for the Army Command and General Staff College’s Combat Studies Institute,
Roger J. Spiller notes—
The Military Air Transport Service could deliver up to 188 million ton-miles
of mobility under the general war scenario, and it was calculated that the
part would come to 80 million ton-miles of the total. From these figures, the
Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Major General Earle Wheeler,
made the assumption that “if the general war requirement could be met,
it would seem likely that the limited war requirement of the Army could be
met in most
Although the STRAC mission was to provide an easily deployable force for use
in a limited war or other emergency, its ability to deploy overseas was limited
by airlift constraints. Without the declaration of a national emergency, the
required lift assets would not be released to support a STRAC deployment.
In March 1957, a year after its deployment to Germany, the 11th Airborne Division
under the “Pentomic” structure. A poorly conceived organization,
the Pentomic division was cellular in structure and designed to fight on nuclear
and conventional battlefields. Five infantry battle groups replaced three infantry
regiments and became the basic fighting units of the division. Each battle
group contained a headquarters company; five rifle companies;
an organic mortar battery; and the reconnaissance, antitank, and logistics
units needed to make it an independent, self-sustaining fighting force. The
supporting units (artillery, signal, engineer, support, and command and control)
were organized similarly in cellular multiples of five.
Based at Augsburg, the 11th Airborne Division was forward deployed, which limited
its use as an airborne counterattack force. The division planned for numerous
contingency missions requiring an airborne assault capability, not only in
Europe but also in other parts of the world. However, the 11th Airborne Division
inactivated 1 July 1958, and its assets were transferred to the 24th Infantry
Division, also in Germany.
Two-thirds of the 24th Infantry Division was organized as airborne, which made
the division the first infantry division to have organic airborne assault units.
Airborne elements of the division consisted of two battle groups; an artillery
battery; a cavalry troop; two engineer companies; a parachute supply and maintenance
company; and signal, ordnance, supply, and medical detachments provisionally
formed into an airborne brigade known as the 24th Airborne Brigade.
Unrest in the Middle East
In the spring of 1958, U.S. interests in the Middle East were compromised when
nationalist uprisings threatened pro-Western governments. In May, troubles
sprang up in Jordan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria. On 14 July, King Faisal and
Abdul Illah of Iraq were assassinated in a coup d’état led by Brigadier
General Abdul Karim al’Kassim, a nationalist. At the same time, it was
rumored that another coup was in the making against King Hussein of Jordan.
and tank convoy of marines from the 2d Battalion,
2d Marine Regiment, was the first convoy to enter
Beirut in July 1958. (Marine Corps photo.)
President Dwight D. Eisenhower,
reacting to the overthrow of King Faisal’s government
in Iraq, alerted U.S. forces and deployed to Europe a tactical
strike force from the Ninth Air Force at Shaw Air Force Base,
South Carolina, and transport planes from Donaldson Air Force
Base, South Carolina. A naval task force of 75 ships, including
three aircraft carriers and two cruisers, and 45,000 men,
5,000 of whom were marines, was deployed to the Middle East
from the Sixth Fleet in Italy.
The Government of Lebanon, faced with political turmoil,
requested United States military intervention to prevent
a collapse. With the situation deteriorating,
President Eisenhower ordered U.S. forces to begin deploying on 14 July. The
purpose of Operation Bluebat was to bolster the pro-Western
government of President Camille
Chamoun against internal opposition and threats from Syria and Egypt. The plan
was to occupy and secure Beirut International Airport, a few miles south of
the city, then secure the port of Beirut and the approaches
to the city.
Because it was difficult to obtain sufficient airlift assets, the decision
was made to employ forces that were closer to the region rather than STRAC
elements. Contingency plans that had been formulated in 1956 for such an eventuality
gave the 11th Airborne Division responsibility for the mission. The 24th Infantry
Division assumed the mission after the 11th Airborne Division was inactivated.
Force Package Deployment
Although both Army and Marine Corps troops were ordered to Lebanon, only Marine
Corps units made assault landings. On 15 July, within 30 hours of the President’s
order, a battalion landing team from the 2d Battalion, 2d Marine Regiment, from
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, arrived at Red Beach—only 700 yards from
Beirut International Airport—and went ashore on landing craft or amphibious tractors. In cooperation
with the Lebanese Army, marines kept the airport open for
commercial air traffic. The following day, a second battalion
landing team from the 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment,
also from Camp Lejeune, landed at Yellow Beach 4 miles north
U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR) was to provide forces as stipulated in the February
1958 revision of Emergency Plan 201. This plan directed the formation of Army
Task Force (ATF) 201 to handle emergencies in the Middle East. The task force
would consist of two airborne battle groups that were reinforced with minimal
combat support and combat service support elements. The task force would comprise
five echelons, four of which were committed to the operation in Lebanon.
Alpha, which was composed of the task force command group and the 1st Airborne
Battle Group, 187th Infantry
Regiment, received orders to move from Germany to
Adana, Turkey. On 16 July, the unit departed an air base near Munich, Germany,
for a staging area in Adana and then moved to Beirut International Airport
on 19 July.
On 18 July, the 2d Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, arrived
in Beirut by airlift through Port Lyautey, Morocco. It
took 34 hours in the air on board 26 C–124C
Globemaster II aircraft and 54 hours overall for approximately 800 marines
and their equipment to reach their destination. In less
than a week, 7,200 combat
troops were in Beirut, including three battalions of marines.
arrive at the port area in Beirut to establish security
around the congested facility. In the photo below,
marines man machinegun positions atop buildings near
the dock. (Marine Corps photos.)
The troops established Camp Zeitune in an olive grove near
the airport and manned a perimeter defense around the airport.
All three marine battalions
northeast of the city. U.S. soldiers and marines made a show of force in
and around the area. By the end of July, they encircled
Beirut with an armed perimeter.
Since combat did not develop in Lebanon, a second airborne battle group,
Force Bravo, and the advance headquarters of ATF 201 never
deployed from Germany.
Force Charlie, made up of combat, combat support, and
combat service support units, deployed from Germany by
air beginning 19 July and closed
on Beirut by 25 July. By the time the airlift phase was completed, over
and 1,718 tons of equipment had been flown into Beirut in 166 C–124C Globemaster
II and C–130 Hercules transports from four separate airfields in
According to Emergency Plan 201, Force Echo, a medium tank battalion, was
to move by sea. Leaving Germany on 22 and 23 July, the battalion arrived
on 3 August. Force Delta, which was the sea echelon of the second airborne
battle group, left Germany on 26 July and closed on Beirut between 3 and
5 August. By
5 August, all major ATF 201 forces had reached Beirut and the bulk of their
equipment and initial resupply had arrived or was en route. A total of 3,234
and more than 2,310 tons of equipment were airlifted for the Army in 242
aircraft. All operations had gone according to plan, and conditions remained
a new government was installed in Lebanon.
Plans to end the intervention were underway as soon as it began, and President
Eisenhower called on the United Nations to safeguard Lebanese independence.
However, a Japanese resolution in the Security Council calling on the United
protect Lebanon was vetoed by the Soviet Union.
Robert D. Murphy, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, arrived
in Beirut on 17 July as President Eisenhower’s personal representative. His
task was to speed a political solution to the internal Lebanese problems that
had led to the intervention. He and U.S. military leaders believed that the causes
of Lebanon’s internal conflict were domestic and bore little
relationship to international issues.
As the political situation cleared, U.S. forces trained Lebanese forces to
use American weapons and conducted a combined land-sea-air training exercise
shore adjacent to the historic ruins of Byblos. U.S. Army and Marine Corps
units continued to man checkpoints and conduct patrols, and the 1st Airborne
Group jumped occasionally.
In October, after 3H months in Lebanon, the United States began to
withdraw its forces and the confrontation subsided. On 23 October,
formed a balanced
government with representatives from each of the major parties. Two
days later, the remaining U.S. Army forces left the country. During
one U.S. soldier was killed by sniper fire and four others died in
what a Pentagon spokesman told the New York Times on 16 July was “not
war, but like war.”
The absence of opposition during Operation Bluebat and the underlying dilemma
of whether contingency forces should be supplied by USAREUR or STRAC in the
United States were significant factors in the Lebanon operation. Airlift
of a Marine
Corps battalion from the continental United States to the objective area
demonstrated that such a movement was feasible and could be done quickly.
The airlift increased
the difficulty of justifying the need for a USAREUR contingency force for
the Middle East when STRAC was being maintained for that purpose.
Although the intervention did not solve Lebanon’s chronic political
chaos, it helped maintain peace and demonstrated that the United States
a small country that wanted to maintain its independence. The United
States did not use its military power to sustain one faction against
presence made it possible for the Lebanese to devise a temporary political
solution. Importantly, U.S. forces pulled out voluntarily as soon as
Operation Bluebat was a nominal test of power. Because its amphibious and
air landings were unopposed, the operation has been recorded in history only
a brief note. That it might have been the beginning of a conflict of Korean
proportions is overshadowed by the fact that it was not. ALOG
Lieutenant Colonel Mark A. Olinger is the Secretary of the General
Staff of V Corps in Heidelberg, Germany. He has a bachelor’s
degree from California State Polytechnic University at Pomona and is
Course and the Army Command and General Staff College.