The Council of Constance was called in 1414 to settle three major disputes, including the Knights’ claim to Lithuania. The Knights argued (1) that their territorial and jurisdictional claims could be traced to papal bulls from the Crusading era, which had authorized the complete confiscation of the property and sovereignty of non-Christians; and (2) that infidels lacked dominium and therefore were subject to Christian control. Click Here The International Law of Discovery, Indigenous Peoples, and Chile Robert J. Miller Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon
John Cabot (Italian: Giovanni Caboto, Venetian: Zuan Chabotto; c. 1450 – c. 1500) was an Italian navigator and
On 5 March 1496 Henry VII gave Cabot and his three sons letters patent with the following charge for exploration:
…free authority, faculty and power to sail to all parts, regions and coasts of the eastern, western and northern sea, under our banners, flags and ensigns, with five ships or vessels of whatsoever burden and quality they may be, and with so many and with such mariners and men as they may wish to take with them in the said ships, at their own proper costs and charges, to find, discover and investigate whatsoever islands, countries, regions or provinces of heathens and infidels, in whatsoever part of the world placed, which before this time were unknown to all Christians.
Giovanni Caboto (known in English as John Cabot) is credited with the discovery of continental North America on June 24, 1497, under the commission of Henry VII of England. Though the exact location of his discovery remains disputed, the Canadian and United Kingdom governments’ official position is that he landed on the island of Newfoundland. The English presence through Giovanni Caboto was signaled in Juan de la Cosa`s map of 1500. The plaintiff in Martin v. Waddell 41 U.S. 367 (1842) makes title under the charters granted by Charles II to his brother, the Duke of York, in 1664 and 1674, for the purpose of enabling him to plant a colony on this continent. The last-mentioned grant is precisely similar to the former in every respect, and was made for the purpose of removing doubts which had then arisen as to the validity of the first.
The boundaries in the two charters are the same, and they embrace the territory which now forms the State of New Jersey. The part of this territory known as East New Jersey, afterwards, by sundry deeds and conveyances which it is not necessary to enumerate, was transferred to twenty-four persons, who were called the Proprietors of East New Jersey, who, by the terms of the grants, were invested, within the portion of the territory conveyed to them, with all the rights of property and government which had been originally conferred on the Duke of York by the letters patent of the King. Some serious difficulties, however, took place in a short time between these proprietors and the British authorities, and after some negotiations upon the subject, they in 1702 surrendered to the Crown all the powers of government, retaining their rights of private property.
The English possessions in America were not claimed by right of conquest, but by right of discovery. For according to the principles of international law as understood by the then civilized powers of Europe, the Indian tribes in the new world were regarded as mere temporary occupants of the soil, and the absolute rights of property and dominion were held to belong to the European nation by which any particular portion of the country was first discovered. Whatever forbearance may have been sometimes practiced towards the unfortunate aborigines, either from humanity or policy, yet the territory they occupied was disposed of by the governments of Europe at their pleasure, as if it had been found without inhabitants. The grant to the Duke of York therefore was not of lands won by the sword; nor were the government or laws he was authorized to establish intended for a conquered people.
The country mentioned in the letters patent was held by the King in his public and regal character, as the representative of the nation and in trust for them. The discoveries made by persons acting under the authority of the government were for the benefit of the nation, and the Crown, according to the principles of the British constitution, was the proper organ to dispose of the public domains, and upon these principles rest the various charters and grants of territory made on this continent. The doctrine upon this subject is clearly stated in the case of Johnson v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 595.
In that case, the Court, after stating it to be a principle of universal law that an uninhabited country, if discovered by a number of individuals who owe no allegiance to any government, becomes the property of the discoverers, proceeded to say that “if the discovery be made and possession taken under the authority of an existing government which is acknowledged by the emigrants, it is supposed to be equally well settled that the discovery is made for the benefit of the whole nation, and the vacant soil is to be disposed of by that organ of the government which has the constitutional power to dispose of the national domains; by that organ in which all territory is vested by law. According to the theory of the British constitution, all vacant lands are vested in the Crown as representing the nation, and the exclusive power to grant them is admitted to reside in the Crown as a branch of the royal prerogative. It has been already shown that this principle was as fully recognized in America as in the Island of Great Britain.”
2013 New Jersey Revised Statutes
Title 2C – THE NEW JERSEY CODE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Section 2C:1-3 – Territorial applicability
a.Except as otherwise provided in this section, a person may be convicted under the law of this State of an offense committed by his own conduct or the conduct of another for which he is legally accountable if:
(1)Either the conduct which is an element of the offense or the result which is such an element occurs within this State;
(2)Conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to constitute an attempt to commit a crime within the State;
(3)Conduct occurring outside the State is sufficient under the law of this State to constitute a conspiracy to commit an offense within the State and an overt act in furtherance of such conspiracy occurs within the State;
(4)Conduct occurring within the State establishes complicity in the commission of, or an attempt, or conspiracy to commit, an offense in another jurisdiction which also is an offense under the law of this State;
(5)The offense consists of the omission to perform a legal duty imposed by the law of this State with respect to domicile, residence or a relationship to a person, thing or transaction in the State; or
(6)The offense is based on a statute of this State which expressly prohibits conduct outside the State, when the conduct bears a reasonable relation to a legitimate interest of this State and the actor knows or should know that his conduct is likely to affect that interest.
b.Subsection a.(1) does not apply when either causing a specified result or a purpose to cause or danger of causing such a result is an element of an offense and the result occurs or is designed or likely to occur only in another jurisdiction where the conduct charged would not constitute an offense, unless a legislative purpose plainly appears to declare the conduct criminal regardless of the place of the result.
c.Except as provided in subsection g., subsection a. (1) does not apply when causing a particular result is an element of an offense and the result is caused by conduct occurring outside the State which would not constitute an offense if the result had occurred there, unless the actor purposely or knowingly caused the result within the State.
d.When the offense is homicide, either the death of the victim or the bodily impact causing death constitutes a “result,” within the meaning of subsection a.(1) and if the body of a homicide victim is found within the State, it may be inferred that such result occurred within the State.
e.This State includes the land and water, including the waters set forth in N.J.S.40A:13-2 and the air space above such land and water with respect to which the State has legislative jurisdiction. It also includes any territory made subject to the criminal jurisdiction of this State by compacts between it and another state or between it and the Federal Government.
f.Notwithstanding that territorial jurisdiction may be found under this section, the court may dismiss, hold in abeyance for up to six months, or, with the permission of the defendant, place on the inactive list a criminal prosecution under the law of this State where it appears that such action is in the interests of justice because the defendant is being prosecuted for an offense based on the same conduct in another jurisdiction and this State’s interest will be adequately served by a prosecution in the other jurisdiction.
g.When the result which is an element of an offense consists of inflicting a harm upon a resident of this State or depriving a resident of this State of a benefit, the result occurs within this State, even if the conduct occurs wholly outside this State and any property that was affected by the offense was located outside this State.
L.1978, c.95; amended 2003, c.184, s.1.
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