Aristotle’s ethical writings include the Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics, and Magna Moralia. The Magna Moralia may not actually have been written by Aristotle, but may have been compiled from his lectures and written by one of his students after his death. The Eudemian Ethics may also have been compiled from his lectures and later edited by Eudemus (a student of Aristotle’s at the Lyceum). The Nicomachean Ethics is the most comprehensive of the three works, and is regarded as the definitive statement of Aristotle’s ethical views. The title of the Nicomachean Ethics may refer to Aristotle’s son (who was named Nichomachus, after Aristotle's father), but it is unknown whether the work was dedicated to Nichomachus, or whether the work was later edited by Nichomachus after Aristotle’s death.
The Nicomachean Ethics is divided into ten books. Book I discusses how good is to be defined, Books II-V discuss the moral virtues, Book VI discusses intellectual virtue, Book VII describes moral continence and incontinence, Books VIII-IX describe the nature of friendship, and Book X discusses how pleasure and happiness are to be defined.
According to Aristotle, the purpose of every human action is to achieve something which is good. The question is therefore how the term 'good' is to be defined. Various people may define goodness as happiness, pleasure, honor, wealth, power, knowledge, wisdom, or virtue. But Aristotle simply defines the 'good' as that at which every action is aimed.
The question arises as to whether there is a single Idea of 'good' which determines the moral quality of an action, or whether there are many Ideas of 'good' which are independent in determining the moral quality of an action. Thus, there may be some actions which are good in themselves, and other actions which are good because they are performed for the purpose of something other than themselves which is good.
An individual may choose to perform an action because the action is good in itself, and/or because the action will make him or her happy. If goodness is seen as pleasure or happiness, then actions which are performed for the sake of honor, benevolence, justice, or other virtues may be judged as good because they bring pleasure and happiness.
If virtue is seen as the 'good,' then the question arises as to whether or not the quality of virtue is the same as the practice of virtue. If the virtuous individual merely possesses virtue, but does not practice virtue, then this quality is not revealed by virtuous action. However, Aristotle explains that the virtuous individual, by nature, enjoys acting virtuously. The virtuous individual may act virtuously because virtuous actions make him or her happy, and/or because virtuous actions make others happy. The virtuous individual may also act virtuously because he or she believes that virtuous actions are intrinsically good.
Aristotle distinguishes between two kinds of virtue: moral virtue and intellectual virtue Aristotle says that moral virtues are not innate, but that they are acquired by developing the habit of exercising them. An individual becomes truthful by acting truthfully, or becomes unselfish by acting unselfishly. Aristotle notes that it may be difficult for an individual to become virtuous if he or she has not acquired the habit of acting virtuously. For example, it may be difficult for an individual to become tactful, if he or she has not acquired the habit of acting tactfully. It may also be difficult for an individual to become unselfish, if he or she has acquired the habit of acting selfishly.
A morally virtuous action requires an individual to be able to choose how to respond to his or her own thoughts and feelings. Thus, the concept of moral responsibility implies that an individual has some freedom to choose his or her own actions.
Moral responsibility for an action may be partly determined by whether the action is voluntary or involuntary. An individual may not be morally responsible for having performed an action, if the individual was forced to perform the action against his or her own will. An individual may also not be morally responsible for having performed an action, if the individual has no control over the action.
Moral responsibility may be partly determined by whether an individual, prior to performing an action, was aware of the possible consequences of the action. Moral responsibility may also be partly determined by whether an individual, prior to performing an action, should have known the possible consequences of the action.
Moral responsibility may also be partly determined by whether an action is impulsive or deliberate. Impulsive actions may be voluntary but may not be as purposeful and planned as deliberate actions. An individual may have a responsibility to control his or her impulses, but the individual who acts impulsively may not be as aware of the possible consequences of his or her actions as the individual who acts deliberately.
Just as an individual may be responsible for his or her actions in a situation, an individual may be responsible for his or her inaction in a situation. A lack of action by an individual in a situation may imply his or her responsibility for not having acted in that situation. An action by an individual in a given situation may be judged accordng to the way in which the individual could have acted in that situation.
According to Aristotle, the moral virtues include: courage, temperance, self-discipline, moderation, modesty, humility, generosity, friendliness, truthfulness, honesty, justice. The moral vices include: cowardice, self-indulgence, recklessness, wastefulness, greed, vanity, untruthfulness, dishonesty, injustice. Acts of virtue bring honor to an individual, acts of vice bring dishonor to an individual.
Justice as a moral virtue includes lawfulness (universal justice) and fairness (particular justice). Injustice as a moral vice includes unlawfulness and unfairness. Fairness requires that the privileges and responsibilities of persons in a given situation be distributed proportionally and equally (distributive justice). Fairness also requires that an unfair inequality or disproportion in the privileges and responsibilities of persons in a given situation be rectified (rectificatory justice). Rectificatory justice may restore equality, or may reallocate privileges and responsibilities to persons in a given situation, or may prescribe some form of penalty for persons who have been unjust, or may award some form of compensation to those persons who have been treated unfairly.
Injustice may be classified as inadvertent or accidental (when it is not expected to be a consequence of an action), incidental (to an action which was not intended to cause any injustice), or intentional (when it is an intended consequence of an action). Unjust actions may also be classified as impulsive or deliberate.
Virtue (arete) is also a principle of temperance and moderation, which achieves a mean between the vice of excess and the vice of deficiency of a moral quality. Thus, bravery as a moral virtue achieves a mean between recklessness and cowardice. Generosity as a moral virtue achieves a mean between wastefulness and greed.
According to Aristotle, the intellectual virtues include: scientific knowledge (episteme), artistic or technical knowledge (techne), intuitive reason (nous), practical wisdom (phronesis), and philosophic wisdom (sophia). Scientific knowledge is a knowledge of what is necessary and universal. Artistic or technical knowledge is a knowledge of how to make things, or of how to develop a craft. Intuitive reason is the process that establishes the first principles of knowledge. Practical wisdom is the capacity to act in accordance with the good of humanity. Philosophic wisdom is the combination of intuitive reason and scientific knowledge.
Understanding (synesis) and good judgment (gnome) may also be combined with the other intellectual virtues. Moral virtues may be combined with intellectual virtues; for example, an individual or society may combine practical wisdom and justice, or may combine artistic knowledge and moral truthfulness.
Aristotle distinguishes between moral incontinence and moral vice by saying that moral incontinence is involuntary and that moral vice is voluntary. Moral incontinence is an excessive and involuntary pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain. Both continence and incontinence may cause involuntary actions. The morally continent individual can adhere to his or her own standards of conduct, but the morally incontinent individual cannot adhere to his or her own standards of conduct.
Aristotle describes the ethics of friendship (philia) as defined by the principles of goodness and virtue. People may become friends when they recognize virtues in each other. The motives which people have to become friends are important in determining the nature of their friendship. True friends enjoy being able to interact with each other, and enjoy sharing experiences with each other. True friends have a feeling of caring and affection for each other. True friends share an understanding and appreciation of each other. True friends share a mutual concern for each other’s well-being. True friendship is based on mutual trust and respect. Mutual support for, or cooperation with each other, may also enable people to develop a friendship. People who feel committed to each other may have a truer friendship than people who become friends merely because they believe that they may be useful to each other.
The question arises as to whether or not friendship is necessary in order to be happy. If a person believes that he or she can be happy by becoming self-sufficient, is it necessary for that person to have friends in order to be happy? Aristotle’s answer is that having friends cannot be separated from being happy. Happiness is not characterized by not having friends. Having friends is a part of being happy.
The question also arises as to whether there is a limit to the number of friends that a person can have and still be able to maintain close personal relationships. Aristotle answers that a person can have intimate relationships with only a limited number of people simultaneously, and that therefore it is only possible to sustain a limited number of close friendships simultaneously.
According to Aristotle, pleasure is not the aim of every human action, because not every pleasure is good. Pleasure is found in various forms of activity, and a proper pleasure or pain may belong to any activity.The pleasure which is found in some forms of activity may be good, and the pleasure which is found in other forms of activity may be bad. Pain may similarly be good or bad.
Happiness (eudaimonia) is virtuous activity, which is guided by the intellect and by reason. Thus, happiness is also a contemplative activity. Happiness is not merely a means to an end, but is an end in itself. Happiness is a unity of will and action, of intellect and reason. Happiness is not merely a feeling of pleasure or contentment, but is a fulfillment of the human soul. Aristotle says that human beings are happiest when they are guided by reason. Thus, the happiest life is that of the philosopher. Perfect happiness is achieved by a unity of practical and theoretical (philosophic) wisdom.
Aristotle. Ethica Nicomachea. Translated by W.D. Ross, in The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941.
Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics. Translated by Martin Ostwald. Indianapolis: The Library of Liberal Arts, 1962.
Bostock, David. Aristotle's Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.