Dignity: Its History and Meaning Hardcover – Mar 20 2012
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Dignity: Its History and Meaning has all the virtues readers of Michael Rosen have come to expect: argumentative lucidity, fair-mindedness, and clarity of expression. It opens up a world of interesting and timely questions. (Martin Jay, University of California, Berkeley)
Michael Rosen takes us on an extraordinary journey through the tangled ethical, religious, and legal roots of the concept of dignity, showing its association with the distinct ideas of status, intrinsic value, bearing, and respect. This book is a one-off, exhibiting Rosen's characteristic and unique blend of scholarly insight and analytic power, presented in superbly accessible style. It culminates in a persuasively authentic interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy. Anyone wishing to understand the contemporary concept of dignity, or its history, must read this book. (Jonathan Wolff, University College London)
A thought-provoking book which combines reflections on a rather old philosophical and a quite new legal concept of rapidly increasing interest in a particularly stimulating way. (Dieter Grimm, Former Justice, Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, Humboldt University Berlin, and Yale Law School)
Rosen offers a thoughtful examination of the term's multiple definitions and uses. (Publishers Weekly 2011-12-31)
With this book Michael Rosen...adds a new voice to the defense of the concept of human dignity. Adapted from three lectures, his brief text has refreshingly accessible prose and a comfortable style, while at times giving very thorough accounts of complex ideas...The more general audience at which it is aimed will find Dignity engaging, challenging and stimulating...Rosen's book is an important one. (Charles Camosy The Tablet 2012-04-21)
In Dignity: Its History and Meaning, Michael Rosen employs philosophy and political theory to unpack this contested term. He opens with a lively history of the concept, sketching its development from Cicero to Kant and beyond...This short, rich work ends with Rosen musing on dignity, duty, and respect: where we deny human dignity to others, we risk losing our own humanity. (John Gallagher The Guardian 2012-03-25)
[An] elegant, interesting and lucid exploration of the concept of dignity...Drawing on classical, liberal and Catholic traditions, Rosen hopes to rehabilitate dignity to its rightful place near the centre of moral thought...Rosen's admirable book deserves wide attention from political theorists, jurisprudes and political philosophers. (Simon Blackburn Times Higher Education 2012-03-29)
Beautifully written and argued...The concept of dignity is fundamental to many conventions on human rights, yet no one seems to have a firm idea of what it actually entails...One only need think of the different ideas of dignity employed in debates about euthanasia to see that the argument is far from resolved...Rosen does not claim to have resolved these conflicts but he does add something significant to the debate. (Richard King Weekend Australian 2012-05-26)
Rosen's prose is delightful in its clarity, concision, fair-mindedness, and occasional playfulness—no negligible feat for a slim volume that takes on a hefty portion of the intellectually gobsmacking Kant. And in its affable, yet rigorous intelligence, the book recollects Harry Frankfurt's diminutive philosophical bestseller, On Bullshit… Perhaps the most winning aspect of Dignity is the case it makes in implicitly linking Kant and the philosophical history of dignity to contemporary legal cases, constitutions, and laws. Rosen contends quietly that philosophy still signifies in real ways in our world: shaping states, laws, and human attitudes. In an era when the study of the humanities is in decline, this is heartening stuff. More heartening still is Rosen's interest in reaching an audience beyond philosophy professors. His easy, conversational style and pointed avoidance of jargon invite the educated lay reader into a culturally relevant and interesting conversation. This is the sort of work that humanities professors need to undertake if they want their disciplines to survive. (Emily Wilkinson Weekly Standard 2012-07-30)
Rosen's lucid style and engaging examples make this book especially suitable for general readers and undergraduates; it engagingly conveys some of the most complicated issues of Kantian ethics in an accessible way. The book's use of concrete legal cases shows the real-world implications of the philosophical debates… Rosen has given readers a well-written, highly accessible, and deeply insightful look at the sources and use of an important and much debated concept. (A. W. Klink Choice 2012-08-01)
Rosen has shown dignity has some kind of a serious moral role, whilst at the same time showing that it can't justify as much as Catholics and Kantians want it to. It has a dramatic parasitical quality, so that it seems tangible and magnificent but also often foolhardy and empty. It is a value that appears powerful but often is less than it seems. Rosen's brilliant book gives us dignity's history and a cunningly disguised radical ending… Rosen's narrative illuminates a subject that as he notes himself has eluded serious analysis for too long. (Richard Marshall 3:AM Magazine)
Dignity deserves to be widely read, not only for its intrinsic interest, but also as a corrective to the habit of discussing such topics in abstraction from their social context. Whether or not one agrees with Rosen's arguments, there can be no doubt he has widened our horizons. (Rae Langton Times Literary Supplement 2012-08-31)
Stimulating and informative. (Thomas Nagel New York Review of Books 2012-12-06)
Penetrating and sprightly…Rosen rightly emphasizes the centrality of Catholicism in the modern history of human dignity. His command of the history is impressive…Rosen is a wonderful guide to the recent German constitutional thinking about human dignity…[Rosen] is in general an urbane and witty companion, achieving his aim of accessibly written philosophy. (Samuel Moyn The Nation 2013-10-15)
About the Author
Michael Rosen is Professor of Government at Harvard University.
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Much like the alleged fourth strand of dignity does not convince, Mr. Rosen postulates a distinction of "respect-as-observance" and "respect-as-respectfulness" that is of dubious quality.
While he includes an interesting (legal) case of dwarf throwing - can that be prohibited on grounds of dignity (as a matter of public order), even when the dwarf in questions consents to be thrown? - he doesn't thoroughly unfold and answer to it. As with a brief detour into free speech, one is left with superficially described - yet meaningful - conflicts: is the dignity of the individual dwarf to be protected when that individual doesn't want it to be protected (wants to be thrown)?; does the dwarf's consent ensure his dignity?; would overriding his consent violate his dignity?; does some idea of the dignity of the group of dwarves override the dignity that lies in the individual dwarf's choice?; how far does the dignity of the individual speaker demand that he be free to speak - to "insult" others - and how far does the dignity of the to be "insulted" person demand that the aspiring speaker remain silent?
Mr. Rosen takes a look at some of Kant's writing about the intrinsic worth of each person (ends in themselves; not necessarily law unto themselves) and briefly engages with choice-/autonomy-based interpretations of it, notably by Ms. Korsgaard. He disagrees with her (voluntarist) intepretation and supports one that relies more on duty; the duty to act with dignity, with respect to a relatively abstract concept of humanity's worth (noumenal). When he does that, he claims that it's an understanding distinct from Plato's idea of pursuing some ideal good that can not be obtained but merely be expressed respect for. Unfortunately, the book doesn't offer substantial material to build this distinction. In the end of his less than thorough contemplations, readers can learn (as an example showing the general principle) that he thinks the dead should be shown respect not necessarily because it promotes some tangible good (read: not because it makes people feel better, facilitates peace, strengthens adherence to moral behavior in general, is in any way evolutionarily beneficial) but because each living person owes it to himself to do so.
He writes: "My claim is that we can reasonably believe that we have a basic duty to respect the dignity of humanity without accepting either humanism (that everything that is good is good only because it benefits a human being) or Platonism (that there are timelessly valuable things toward which we must act with respect or reverence). [...]
Such duties are principally symbolic: they require us to act in ways that express respect. And I am not put off by the thought that it may well be that we are being asked to express respect when there is no one else there to become aware of the expression. Our duty to respect the dignity o humanity is - on this I agree with Kant - fundamentally a duty toward ourselves. By which I mean, not that we are benefited when we observe our duties, but that our duties are so deep a part of us that we could not be the people that we are without having them. In failing to respect the humanity of others we actually undermine humanity in ourselves. [...]
Suffering, to my mind, is bad, and love good, in themselves, not, as Kantianism implies, because of their relationship to something else." (p. 156 - 7) So it's deontology combined with utilitarianism/humanism, in uncertain consistence.
Now, who is this book for? I don't entirely know. (The limited insights into German law can be neglected; German law, which more overtly considers dignity as a guiding principle, is of interest, however. The laws on abortion, torture and shooting down highjacked passenger planes get a few pages.) It challenges one interpretation of Kant, and Kant is its main focus. There are mere glances at Cicero and Plato. Anyone who has read a number of philosophical works by Cicero and Plato (Socrates) is unlikely to considerably benefit from Mr. Rosen's book. Those who have read only fractions from these two are probably better adviced to read them instead of "Dignity". That leaves those who have had very little contact with writing on the subject. They may profit from Mr. Rosen's book, which is quite readable -- more so than my review (a circumstance for which I would like to apologize).
To anyone interested in the idea(s) of dignity, I would suggest reading Cicero:On Ends (Loeb Classical Library), and Cicero, Volume XXI. On Duties (De Officiis): De Officiis (Loeb Classical Library No. 30); Aristotle, XIX, Nicomachean Ethics (Loeb Classical Library); and then most of Plato's Socratic Dialogues. Anything that has to do with virtues (and expediency [that would also suggest reading about stoicism, beyond Cicero: Epictetus, for example]) has to do with dignity. That is because virtues have much to do with honor, which is interwoven with dignity.
Furthermore, I would recommend Passmore's The Perfectibility of Man; Welsh's What Is Honor?: A Question of Moral Imperatives; and By Jerome Neu - Sticks and Stones: The Philosophy of Insults (on insults).
Criticism is welcome.
Rosen looks at dignity through some interesting lenses--from dwarf-tossing to satire to the Catholic Church's evolving view of women. He shows how, if we leave the concept mysterious and untouchable, it can be used to justify just about anything.
On the other hand, dignity is fundamental to law, society, the humanities, and the essence of being human. So rather than taking it for granted, and rather than dismissing it as indefinable, we should notice the various ways that it's being understood today.
For instance he chides at one crucial moment that it is 'not particularly clever' to describe a position he has just detailed as 'stupid'. Given that the philosophical position he is talking about justifies the arrogation of privileged rights of adjudication on social and political structures in the society I happen to live in, on the basis of an intellectually incoherent bunch of superstitions (by people who are demonstrably happy to use such arguments to justify gratuitous cruelty - 'objective disorder', anybody), our agreement stretches no further than that 'stupid' is indeed the wrong word. A compounding problem (for me) is that, in spite of working through any number of arguments against deontological ethics, he is unwilling to give up on the idea of deontological ethics as such. I, on the other hand, accord deontological ethics the same sort of intellectual respect that I accord to belief in fairies - as far as I (like Alfred Doolittle) can see, its core constituency is intellectually complacent bourgeois males such as priests, constitutional judges and certain types of philosopher. Not company I have automatic sympathy with.