“We therefore cannot count on maintaining our security through a monopoly of fundamental knowledge in the atomic field […]. Further, our monopoly of technical information and facilities is limited and is diminishing. At present we do have a monopoly of stockpiles of raw materials and finished atomic bombs, and we are equipped with gigantic plants for producing these materials. Within something like ten years, however, our monopoly in technology may have disappeared completely, whatever the policy we now adopt with respect to international action.”
This could almost pass as modern commentary for the U.S., but it was written 71 years ago (July 1946) by Caryl P. Haskins, then deputy executive officer of the National Defense Research Committee, who conveyed a heightened level of concern that the U.S. would lose its monopoly in nuclear science and technology for military applications. This created a direct threat to the U.S. and the world as the Soviet Union leveraged nuclear energy in its pursuit of military primacy over America and geopolitical dominance in Europe and Asia. The genie was out of the bottle and nuclear science was in the public domain. Consequently, America had a peer competitor militarily and its national security was at risk.
The following year, the Truman Doctrine became the foundation for American foreign policy as America committed itself to “actively offering assistance to preserve the political integrity of democratic nations when such an offer was deemed to be in the best interest of the United States.” The premise being, America’s national security “depended on more than just the physical security of American territory.” Then, on July 26, 1947, President Truman signed the National Security Act, which “mandated a major reorganization of the foreign policy and military establishments of the U.S. Government.” America had accepted its role as a full participant in global affairs and leader of a new international order.
The prospects of another nation developing the capacity to harness the energy of the atom, for any purpose, compelled America to establish and maintain a secure distance between itself and proto-peer nations harboring ambitions to become competitors with America in nuclear capabilities. In national security parlance, this secure distance translates as American primacy, and, with respect to military capabilities, it remains the cornerstone to national security strategy: "America will not tolerate a peer competitor".
The scope of national security has become more geopolitically complex since WWII, particularly in the wake of globalization and the emergence of economic and military powers in Asia. Consequently, national security and America’s perception of power projection from peers and proto-peers must account for not only the military capabilities of other nations, but also economic strength, technological capabilities and institutional capacity to innovate, among other things. Threats to U.S. national security are multidimensional, and nuclear technology is a paramount issue of concern. Recent missile tests by nuclear-armed North Korea reaffirm this concern.
America’s Civilian Nuclear Power Conversation
Currently, civilian nuclear power in America is being discussed in silos as if it is an energy issue, or a climate issue, or an energy security issue or an economics issue. While relevant, each of these is a subset of the raison d’être for America’s full engagement in nuclear energy—that being, the national security of U.S. vital interests, which is provided to a great extent under the umbrella of American primacy in nuclear technology. It wasn’t a singular response to the Soviet Union possessing nuclear weapons. It was America’s response to the sobering reality that nuclear science and technology couldn’t be contained by U.S. military might or sequestered for American interests only. Nuclear science was available to any nation willing to commit resources to probe the power of the atom. Moreover, the secrets of that atom were indifferent to geographical boundaries and agnostic to geopolitical motivations—good or bad. America’s strategic response, therefore, was to pursue primacy in the nuclear space and assume authority to set the rules governing the use of nuclear technologies in international affairs.
Nuclear energy is unique among energy resources. Ensuring domestic U.S. supplies of coal, oil and natural gas constitutes an energy security issue, whereas renewables such as solar and wind offer other benefits. While technological advances to extract more productive work from these resources may produce a better boiler, gas turbine, solar panel or wind turbine, these technologies, in the hands of other nations, pose little if any threat to U.S. national security. However, advanced nuclear reactor technologies and the underlying nuclear science can be a threat, especially if the U.S. lags proto-peer nations in those technologies and in that science. Even more threatening is the absence of U.S. nuclear expertise to innovate in the advanced reactor space. This runs counter to America’s commitment to primacy in the science, engineering and technology of the most powerful energy resource on Earth. Given that America’s military primacy in nuclear is linked to research and development in the civilian nuclear sector, this calls into question whether the current international order might be subject to realignment if America allows another nation such as China or Russia to assume the mantle of primacy in civilian nuclear power and science.
American Isolationism by Nuclear Retreat
In October 1947, Henry Stimson, Secretary of War during WWII, penned the article: “The Challenge to Americans.” In it, he reiterated the imperative of American engagement in international affairs, imploring Americans to “put away forever any thought that America can again be an island to herself” and to not “retreat to isolationism or in suggested solutions whose simplicity is only matched by their folly.” He further elaborated that “it would be shriveling timidity for America to refuse to play to the full her present necessary part in the world. And the certain penalty for such timidity would be failure.” And, as a warning against policies that may attempt to circumvent full participation, Stimson further implored Americans to accept the realities of a new global order that will require America, “to act in the world as it is, and not in the world as we wish it were, or as we would like it to become. It is a world in which we are only one of many peoples and in which our basic principles of life are not shared by all our neighbors.”
Secretary Stimson’s counsel is timeless—but what does it recommend for U.S. civilian nuclear power and America’s national security today?
Consider some early nuclear science pioneers: Ernest Rutherford (New Zealand); Neils Bohr (Denmark); James Chadwick (England); Leo Szilard (Hungary); Enrico Fermi (Italy); Otto Hahn (Germany); Lise Meitner (Austria); Robert Oppenheimer (U.S.).
While only a few, the names aren’t as compelling as the parenthetical homelands. Some of the early scientists came from countries lacking the institutional capacity or national commitment to support the study of an emerging science with unknown prospects. Others fled their home countries because of ethnic persecution. In either case, there was an exodus of expertise as scientific curiosity drove these individuals to do what was necessary to explore the atom. If America abandons civilian nuclear power, and, by extension, the supporting science and engineering, it practically guarantees an exodus of expertise from America as scientists and engineers will pursue opportunities to discover and innovate. The pursuit of knowledge will follow the demand for that knowledge. If America isn’t the attractor, it will be countries where civilian nuclear power is advancing and the expertise is in demand (e.g., China, Russia, India).
A U.S. retreat from civilian nuclear power, combined with an exodus of nuclear expertise, would eventually culminate in an unprecedented form of American isolationism—an isolationism in nuclear expertise. This fundamentally conflicts with America’s legacy as a full participant in what is arguably the most strategic and potentially threatening issue related to U.S. and international security. American isolationism from the nuclear space is the national security antithesis of American primacy in the nuclear space. In fact, it could be termed American abandonment, which some proto-peer nations would welcome (again, see China and Russia).
Primacy in Civilian Nuclear Power: A National Security Strategy Objective
The gravity of America’s precarious disposition in civilian nuclear power can’t be overstated as existing plants are closing, new construction is trying to restart following a 30-year dormancy and U.S. policy won't allow nuclear fuel reprocessing. All the while, proto-peer nations advance.
Civilian nuclear in America is struggling, the world is watching, and aggressive national initiatives are needed to elevate nuclear power as the national security issue it should be. However, this is not the time for half measures or timidity (to borrow Stimson’s word). Moreover, the objective should not be limited to stopgap measures that rescue a few nuclear plants imperiled by market economics that cannot detect or monetize the national security benefits of nuclear. These efforts, while necessary, are insufficient as they lack long-range strategy, vision and an institutional commitment that would project to the world that America has the power and political resolve to live up to its original national and international security obligations. What’s called for is a national commitment to nothing short of American primacy in the full cycle of civilian nuclear power—that being, nuclear energy resources, fuel enrichment and fabrication, advanced reactor technologies (small modular, molten salt, fast breeders), fuel reprocessing and waste management.
President Trump recently announced his commitment to energy dominance and Secretary Perry reiterated a commitment to an all-the-above energy strategy. However, there can be no U.S. energy dominance in an all-the-above energy strategy without American primacy in the technologies to stand up those energy resources. This is particularly applicable to nuclear power. Therefore, as President Trump develops his formal National Security Strategy, he has an opportunity to set a precedent by including American primacy in civilian nuclear power as a national security objective, thus elevating it as a strategic national security interest.
Today, the U.S. has more proto-peer nations in the nuclear space (civilian and military) than it did 70 years ago when the National Security Act was signed. But does America recognize the heightened national security implications, and is it willing to commit the resources to pursue and establish American primacy in civilian nuclear power as a strategic national security issue?
As a thought experiment, consider a world where America is weak or inactive in nuclear science, engineering and technology. Ironically, this scenario may represent the greatest nuclear and national security threat the world could ever know—a world without American primacy in the full nuclear energy space, including civilian nuclear power.