Battle of Hoover's Gap
Following the Battle of Stones River, Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, remained in the Murfreesboro area for five and one-half months. To counter the Yankees, Gen. Braxton Bragg, commander of the Army of Tennessee, established a fortified line along the Duck River from Shelbyville to Wartrace. On the Confederate right, infantry and artillery detachments guarded Liberty, Hoover’s, and Bellbuckle gaps through the mountains. Rosecrans’s superiors, fearing that Bragg might detach large numbers of men to help break the Siege of Vicksburg, urged him to attack the Confederates. On June 23, 1863, he feigned an attack on Shelbyville but massed against Bragg’s right. His troops struck out toward the gaps, Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’s men, on the 24th, forced Hoover’s Gap. The Confederate 3rd Kentucky Cavalry Regiment, under Col. J.R. Butler, held Hoover’s Gap, but the Yankees easily pushed it aside. As this unit fell back, it ran into Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson’s and Brig. Gen. William B. Bate’s Brigades, Stewart’s Division, Hardee’s Corps, Army of Tennessee, which marched off to meet Thomas and his men. Fighting continued at the gap until just before noon on the 26th, when Maj. Gen. Alexander P. Stewart, the Confederate division commander, sent a message to Johnson and Bate stating that he was pulling back and they should also. Although slowed by rain, Rosecrans moved on, forcing Bragg to give up his defensive line and fall back to Tullahoma. Rosecrans sent a flying column (Wilder’s Lightning Brigade, the same that had spearheaded the thrust through Hoover’s Gap on the 24th) ahead to hit the railroad in Bragg’s rear. Arriving too late to destroy the Elk River railroad bridge, the Federals tore up lots of track around Decherd. Bragg evacuated Middle Tennessee.
Battle of Hoover's Gap
At 0400 on the 24th three divisions (3rd Division was supporting XX Corps) of the XIV Corps began their move toward Hoover’s Gap. The 4th Division of MG Joseph Reynolds led the way with Colonel John T. Wilder’s mounted brigade in the advance. The 1st Division troops of MG Lovell Rousseau followed at 0700 and MG James Negley’s 2nd Division left three hours later. Corps commander, MG George H. Thomas described their mission as an attempt “to seize and hold Hoover’s Gap. “
Wilder’s advance consisted of five companies, led by LTC Kirkpatrick of the 72nd Indiana preceded by an “extreme advance” comprised of 25 scouts from the 17th and 72nd Indiana. These men met the pickets of the 3rd Kentucky Cavalry just two miles after leaving the Murfreesboro defenses. This small force was easily pushed back to the reserve located on a hill “thickly covered with cedars” in the gap. Kirkpatrick deployed a company on each side of the road and “without halting” drove the Confederate troopers from their position, taking two prisoners. The advance was ordered to “push speedily forward” to prevent the enemy from occupying defensive works known to be in the Gap. LTC Kirkpatrick “dashed forward along the pike” driving the defenders back so rapidly that they had no time to establish a defense. The retreat of the Confederate cavalrymen was so disorganized that as they scattered the regimental colors were left behind and a small train of seven wagons was left undefended and captured. With nothing left to stop them the column continued on to the southern end of the gap.
The contact between the two forces was not reported to the Confederate commanders responsible for defending the gap until 1300. BG Bushrod Johnson reports that the first he heard of the attack came from two local boys who “muddied with hard riding, appeared at my headquarters and reported the enemy advancing from Hoover’s Gap”, moments later this report was verified by a wounded cavalryman and “the adjutant of the First (Third) Kentucky Cavalry Regiment. “ The alarm was sent forward to MG A. P. Stewart who dispatched messengers to BG William Bate, commanding a brigade near the Gap. Bate immediately put the 20th Tennessee, the 37th Georgia, and the Eufala Light Artillery on the road to Beech Grove at the exit to the Gap. Caswell’s Georgia Sharpshooters were ordered to follow and the rest of the brigade ordered to prepare to move at a moment’s notice. Bate reports that they “had not passed the confines of my camp” before meeting remnants of the First (Third) Kentucky Cavalry. About a mile from camp they came upon a “scattered” section of the cavalry that included their Colonel and “some 8 or 10 of his men.” This group joined the column to act as guides and scout forward. Learning from the cavalrymen the extent of the Union advance Bate sent word back for the deployment of his remaining regiments. The 15th/37th Tennessee (Consolidated) was ordered to defend the right by taking a position on the road to Noah’s Fork and the left was to be defended by the 9th Alabama Battalion on the Dismal Hollow Road. The main body continued on to Beech Grove where they were determined to arrest the Union advance.
The first effort at attacking the Federal advance was made by the 20th Tennessee and the 37th Georgia. Bate reports that the “enemy was driven back” but this may have been the recall of Wilder’s advance in an effort to consolidate a defense of the gains already made. Having exceeded the letter of his orders by moving all the way through the Gap Wilder was determined not to surrender the ground gained. He refused an order to fall back and set a defense to fend off the expected Confederate counter-attacks. The Confederate commander also consolidated his forces to oppose any advance beyond the Gap. Once the troops were gathered he would try to regain the exit from the Gap.
With the gap now completely in his grasp Wilder prepared to defend his prize. He set his defense for the expected Confederate response by placing 2 companies of the 98th Illinois to the left of the road on the only acceptable terrain, a small hill with the remainder forming a reserve. To the right of the road the Union line started with the 72nd Indiana on “a hillock on which there was a graveyard”. They were supported by two mountain howitzers which were placed on the front of the hill. Captain Eli Lilly’s six ten-pound Rodman’s anchored the center from a hill set back slightly from the main line. They were supported by the 123rd Illinois. The right was held the 17th Indiana. The mounted men had pushed about six miles ahead of the main infantry column and would have to hold out long enough for their support to close the distance.
Opposing them was Bate’s fully assembled Brigade with two batteries in support (Eufala and Maney’s). They were equally determined to regain their responsibility. The first effort started with a barrage from the Confederate guns that killed two gunners and all the mules of one of the mountain howitzers. Lilly’s Rodman’s responded and dismounted one Confederate piece and forced the others to move. It is unclear if Bate was aware of the main battery before starting the assault. The rain and accumulated gun smoke had settled in the gap and made visibility an issue. Nevertheless the 20th Tennessee and Caswell’s (Georgia) Battalion pushed across the field in an effort to flank the 17th Indiana. Wilder responded by dispatching the reserve companies of the 98th to extend the line there. They arrived just as the Confederate line had succeeded in turning the position. The reinforcements greeted the attackers with a “tornado of death” at about 100 yards. The volume of fire emanating from the Federal line drove the Confederates to the ground and they were forced to crawl back to safety. At this point in the fight a messenger from division headquarters arrived with instructions for Wilder. Recalling the episode 44 years later Wilder described the situation this way;
Captain Rice, adjutant-general of the division, came riding speedily to the front with orders from General Reynolds to me to fall back immediately, as the division was six or eight miles in our rear, having stopped to repair a bridge, without letting me know of it. I told him I would hold this position against any force, and to tell General Reynolds to come on without hurrying, as there was no danger of our being driven out of the position. Capt. Rice repeated his order for me to fall back, and I told him I would take the responsibility of remaining where I was, and that if General Reynolds were on the ground he would not give such an order. Capt. Rice said that he had no discretion in the matter, and that if I did not obey the order he would put me in arrest and give the command to Colonel Miller, who would fall back as ordered. I declined to obey the order of arrest, and requested Captain Rice to return to General Reynolds and tell him we had driven their force back, and could not be driven by any forces that could come at us.
As Captain Rice rode away to make his report Bate made another thrust that was directed at the Captain Lilly’s battery of Rodman’s. Two Confederate regiments (20th Tennessee and 37th Georgia) surged across the field but were met by three well concealed companies of the 123rd Illinois who sprang up from a ravine and poured rapid fire into the Confederate ranks. This withering fire was joined by oblique fire from the 72nd Indiana from the cemetery. Wilder would later say that “no human being could successfully face the avalanche of destruction” that was poured into the attacking ranks and he was correct. The badly battered Confederate’s withdrew again.
It was a brutal day for the men of Bate’s Brigade. In his Official Report of the affair Bate estimated that “nearly twenty-five per cent of the number engaged”* had become casualties in the unsuccessful attempt to regain control of the Gap. Bushrod Johnson’s Tennessee brigade arrived from Fairfield at 1800 and began the process of relieving Bate’s men. All but the 20th Tennessee and the Eufala Battery were moved back into a reserve position. At the exit to the gap Wilder’s exhausted men were also being relieved by the 3rd Brigade troops of BG George Crook. Despite the refused order Wilder was congratulated by the Division, Corps, and Army commander for his stand. A General Order was announced changing the name of the brigade from the “Hatchet” brigade to the “Lighting” Brigade the next day.
On the 25th there was some sparring between the opposing artillery batteries and some skirmishing by Company A of the 44th Tennessee who possessed the only rifled weapons in the regiment but otherwise the day was quiet. At the Union and Confederate headquarters decisions were being made that would alter the shape of the campaign.
- Figures for Bate’s Brigade show that the 37th Georgia suffered the most with 48 casualties (3k and 45w), followed by Caswell’s Battalion with 43 (4k and 39w), and the 20th Tennessee with 33 (9k and 24w). The other two units of the brigade 9th Alabama Bn (5w) and the 15th/37th Tennessee (1k and 5w) remained out of the main action and the two Batteries collectively had 8 casualties (2k and 6w).In comparison Wilder suffered 61 casualties in the Gap (14k and 47w).