Most people don’t think of the philosopher David Hume as having much influence over Reformed Christianity, but in an indirect way his influence has been quite profound. Most known for his skeptical epistemology, he argued with such force that he compelled reactions from two other philosophers: Immanuel Kant and Thomas Reid. Kant’s “Copernican Revolution” – in which the mind imposes order on objects rather than conforms to them – changed the course of philosophy, and was subsequently borrowed in various ways by Kuyper, Dooyeweerd, and Van Til, insofar as they promote the idea that basic ideas or presuppositions are filters through which we see all things. The “transcendental argument” of Bahnsen also flowed from Kant’s ideas.
Although it is a matter of some scholarly debate, many argue that Old Princetonians such as Charles Hodge and B.B. Warfield followed the “common sense” philosophy of Thomas Reid, later cited by Alvin Plantinga as he developed his idea of “basic beliefs.” The title of “common sense” sounds simple and naïve, but Reid was no simpleton and his ideas should not be confused with the popular notion of common sense.
So what was Reid’s common sense philosophy? In the belief that primary sources are typically the best sources, the following is taken from An Inquiry into the Human Mind.
A man who has grown up in all the prejudices of education, fashion, and philosophy will need great caution and great concentration if he is to unravel his notions and opinions until he finds out the simple and original forces of his constitution, which can’t be explained except in terms of the will of our maker. This may be truly called an analysis of the human faculties; and until it is performed we have no chance of finding a sound theoretical account of the mind—that is, a list of the original powers and laws of our constitution, and an explanation in terms of them of the various phenomena of human nature.
…Even those who have never closely examined it have grounds for conjecturing that contemporary philosophy concerning the mind and its faculties is in a very low state. Are any principles regarding the mind settled with the clarity and evidentness that the principles of mechanics, astronomy and optics have?
…Descartes, Malebranche and Locke have all used their talents and skill to prove the existence of a material world; and with very little success! Poor uneducated folk believe unquestioningly that there is a sun, moon and stars; an earth that we inhabit; country, friends and relations that we enjoy; land, houses and furniture that we possess. But philosophers, pitying the credulity of the vulgar, resolve not to trust anything that isn’t founded on reason.
…I despise philosophy and renounce its guidance; let my soul dwell with common sense.
…In this unequal contest between common sense and philosophy the latter will always come off with both dishonour and loss; nor can she ever prosper until this rivalry is dropped, philosophy gives up encroaching on the territory of common sense, and a cordial friendship is restored; for the fact is that common sense doesn’t need philosophy’s help. On the other side (if I may be permitted to change the metaphor), philosophy’s only root is the principles of common sense; it grows out of them, and draws its nourishment from them; when it is cut off from this root its honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots.
…It is a bold philosophy that unceremoniously rejects principles which irresistibly govern the belief and the conduct of all mankind in the common affairs of life—principles to which the philosopher himself must surrender after he imagines he has refuted them. Such principles are older than philosophy, and have more authority than she does; she is based on them, not they on her. If she could overturn them, she would inevitably be buried in their ruins; but all the siege-machines that philosophical subtlety can create are too weak for this purpose; and the attempt is just as ridiculous as it would be for a mechanic to construct a windlass for winching the earth out of its circuit, or for a mathematician to claim he could demonstrate that things equal to the same thing are not equal to one another.
…But is it absolutely certain that this fair lady [philosophy] does belong to the scepticism party? Isn’t it possible that she has been misrepresented? Haven’t brilliant men in earlier times often passed off their own dreams as philosophy’s pronouncements? Should we, then, condemn her without any further hearing? This would be unreasonable. I have found her in all other matters to be an agreeable companion, a faithful counsellor, a friend to common sense and to the happiness of mankind. In fairness, this entitles her to have me stay in touch with her, and to trust her until I find infallible proofs that she is not to be trusted.
[Here, for the majority of the Inquiry, Reid argues for the validity of trusting the five senses]
…The way to avoid both these extremes is to admit the existence of things of which we are conscious…
…I have already called attention to several original forces for belief in the course of this Inquiry; and when other faculties of the mind are examined we shall find others that haven’t come up in the examination of the five senses. Such original and natural judgments are therefore a part of the provision nature has made for the human understanding. Just as much as our notions or simple apprehensions, they are put into our minds by God. They serve to direct us in the everyday affairs of life, where our reasoning faculty would leave us in the dark. They are a part of our constitution, and all the discoveries of our reason are based on them. They make up what is called ‘the common sense of mankind’; and what is plainly contrary to any of them is what we call ‘absurd’.
According to the The Philosophy Index, Reid argued that the following must be accepted by all:
- That the thoughts of which I am conscious are thoughts of a being which I call myself, my mind, my person;
- That those things did really happen that I distinctly remember;
- That we have some degree of power over our actions, and the determination of our will (That is, we have free will, at least to some degree);
- That there is life and intelligence in our fellow men with whom we converse;
- That there is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion;
- That, in the phenomena of nature, what is to be, will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances. (That is, that the future will resemble the past.)