4 Trade Unions and Industrial Organisation
|The basis of the anti-parliamentary communist
critique of trade unionism was that trade unions organised workers within
the capitalist system, as 'The Pimps Of Labour' bargaining with the
capitalists over the sale of the commodity labour power .
The anti-parliamentarians, however, wanted to see workers organised against
the capitalist system, for the abolition of wage labour. The
anti-parliamentarians sought the replacement of trade unions with
revolutionary organisations, whose primary function would be to overthrow
the capitalist system and thereafter administer communist society. In
keeping with the anti-parliamentary communists' views on how the
revolution would be carried out, these organisations would be constituted
in such a way as to enable the vast majority of workers to organise and
lead themselves. These views help to explain the particular
criticisms which the anti-parliamentarians levelled at trade unionism, and
the alternative forms of organisation that they proposed.
Dreadnought, 30 October 1920.
|PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES
|One of the features of trade unionism
criticised by the Dreadnought group was the opposition between the
unions' leaders and officials and the rank and file membership. This was
partly explained in material terms: Sylvia Pankhurst described full-time
officials as 'respectable, moderate men in comfortable positions', 
whose salaries, status and security of position elevated them to the ‘middle
class’ and gave them a political outlook different from that of
shopfloor workers. Since the trade union officials' privileges depended on
the continued existence of capitalism, they had a vested interest in
maintaining the status quo and opposing revolution: ‘material
interest ranges the Trade Union officials on the side of capitalism’. 
Thus CP(BSTI) secretary Edgar Whitehead wrote: 'It cannot be too strongly
impressed by Communists upon all workers that T.U. officials, both by
their secure position and their enhanced salaries, serve the maintenance
of capitalism much more than they serve the cause of the emancipation of
the workers.' 
Dreadnought, 13 September 1919.
3. Workers' Dreadnought, 15
4. Circular concerning 'Activity on the
Industrial Field' from E. T. Whitehead, CP(BSTI) Secretary, to Party
branches, 12 July 1920, file 124, Pankhurst Papers.
|The Dreadnought group also drew
attention to the officials' common contempt for their members. Sylvia
Pankhurst wrote that 'the apathy of the membership produces the officials'
lack of faith in the capacity of the membership, and, even apart from
other causes, is a source of the cynical contempt for the rank and file
which so many officials display'.  Yet
there was nothing inevitable about the rank and file's 'apathy': it was a
condition which the union officials deliberately fostered, since one of
the ways in which they could maintain their own positions of power and
privilege was by excluding the rank and file from participating in union
affairs. The officials were assisted in this by the form of trade
union organisation :
Dreadnought, 21 April 1923.
The members . . . resign all their authority, all their rights and
liberties, as far as the Union is concerned, to the Union officials.
This is an essential feature of Trade Unionism . . . The Parliamentary
form of the trade unions, which removes the work of the Union from the
members to the officials, inevitably creates an apathetic and
unenlightened membership which, for good or evil, is a mere prey to the
manipulation of the officials. 
Dreadnought, 21 April 1923.
|Guy Aldred also observed the antagonism between
the unions' officials and rank and file and the differences between these
two groups' power. He explained this by reference to the trade unions role
as permanent negotiating bodies within capitalism. Unions could not hope
to bargain successfully with the bosses unless they had the disciplined
backing of their entire membership. Since criticisms of the union by the
rank and file, or rank and file actions which the union had not
sanctioned, would undermine the leaders' position vis-à-vis the
capitalists, the leaders were forced to urge caution on the members and
suppress any criticisms coming from the rank and file. In short,
successful bargaining required the members to relinquish all power and
initiative to their leaders; the more they did this, however, the greater
would be the scope for the leaders to betray the members. Thus it was the
trade unions' role as bargainers and negotiators which led to the growth
of oligarchic leadership and to the likelihood of the rank and file being
'sold out'. 
Aldred, Trade Unionism and the Class War (London: Bakunin Press
1919), p. 7.
|The anti-parliamentary communists also
criticised the way that unions organised workers on the basis of their
sectional differences (according to craft, trade and so on) rather than on
the basis of what they had in common: 'instead of preserving the vaunted
unity of the working class [the trade unions] prevent it by dividing the
workers into watertight compartments'. 
Since capitalism could only be overthrown by a united working class,
organisations such as trade unions, which divided the working class, were
obviously counterrevolutionary. Guy Aldred argued, further, that even in
reformist terms 'trade unionism has accomplished nothing so far as the
well-being of the entire working class is concerned', since the
effectiveness of unionisation depended on excluding other workers
(such as the unskilled) from its ranks, for example through
apprenticeships and the closed shop.  This
sectional and divisive mentality also led unionised workers to spend as
much time fighting each other over issues such as demarcation disputes as
they spent struggling against their common enemy, the capitalists.
Dreadnought, 28 July 1923.
9. G. Aldred, Trade Unionism and the
Class War (London: Bakunin Press 1919). See Author's Note to 1919 edn.
and Section 11 (emphasis in original).
|A final significant criticism of trade unions
made by the Dreadnought group was that 'their branches are
constructed according to the district in which the worker resides, not
according to where he works'.  The
point of this particular criticism was that since the unions did not
organise workers where they were potentially most powerful -- that is, at
the point of production -- they did not measure up to the requirements of
the sort of revolutionary organisations sought by anti-parliamentarians.
Dreadnought, 4 February 1922.
|During 1917-20 the Dreadnought group
proposed certain measures to overcome the problems outlined above. First,
reactionary or reformist trade union officials should be replaced by
revolutionaries: ‘The first thing you must do, if you really want to
overthrow the capitalist system and to establish Communism, is to get rid
of your reformist and palliative-loving leaders.’ 
Dreadnought, 19 February 1921.
|Secondly, action should be taken to 'alter the
structure of the Unions so as to allow the Rank and File to have complete
control'.  Sylvia Pankhurst sought the
introduction of 'The Soviet system within the trade union movement'. 
Instead of each section of workers being represented by full-time paid
officials, all workers in each workplace would meet in general assemblies
to elect and mandate delegates who could be recalled and replaced at any
time. As the Dreadnought explained in 1923 :
from E. T. Whitehead, CP(BSTI) Secretary, to Party branches, 10 June 1920,
file 125, Pankhurst Papers.
13. Workers' Dreadnought, 12
the rank and file of a trade union cannot control its officials, cannot
even watch them efficiently. The trade union machinery does not allow of
it. The workers can only control an organisation which is a workshop
organisation, with, when necessary, delegates appointed for specific
work, instructed, subject to recall. remaining still as fellow-workers
in the shop . . . The work and power of the organisation must not pass
into the hands of even such delegates : it must be an organisation
operated by the workers in the shop. 
Dreadnought, 28 July 1923.
|Thirdly, a resolution drafted by Sylvia
Pankhurst for a Rank and File Convention in March 1920 proposed that 'an
industrial union shall be established which shall admit all workers in the
industry, regardless of sex, craft or grade'. 
Instead of being divided among several competing trade and craft unions,
all workers in each industry would belong to a single union. This was
intended to promote working-class unity.
Resolution XI, Rank and File Convention Draft Agenda, file 32e, Pankhurst
|The Dreadnought's view during 1917-20
was that these changes could be effected through building a rank and file
movement within the trade unions. The group's attitude at this stage was
essentially one of critical support for the existing unions, rather than
outright opposition and hostility. This was an approach which had been
summed up most succinctly by the Clyde Workers' Committee, when it had
declared at the time of its formation in l915 that it would 'support the
officials just so long as they rightly represent the workers, but . . .
act independently immediately they misrepresent them'. 
in J. Hinton, The First Shop Stewards Movement (London: Allen &
Unwin, 1973), p. 119.
|THE INFLUENCE OF THE ENGINEERING SHOP
STEWARDS' AND MINERS' RANK AND FILE MOVEMENTS
|The Dreadnought group was influenced
strongly in its attitude towards the trade unions by the shop stewards'
movement which emerged in Britain during the First World War. Not long
after the beginning of the war most trade unions had agreed to renounce
strike action for the duration, and to accept any changes in established
working practices and conditions needed to increase production.
Consequently a shop stewards' movement, based mainly in engineering, arose
to take over the defence of workers' basic interests. Many of the leading
shop stewards belonged to organisations such as the SLP and BSP, and they
regarded the shop stewards' movement as a form of organisation which would
not only be able to defend workers' interests within capitalism, but which
could also be used to overthrow capitalism and reorganise production on a
|The most cogent expression of the shop
stewards' movement's ideas was J. T. Murphy's pamphlet The Workers'
Committee (1917). This discussed most of the critical points which
would also be raised in the Dreadnought's articles about trade
unions: 'the conflict between the rank and file of the trade unions and
their officials'; the unions' 'constitutional procedure' which demanded
that 'the function of the rank and file shall be simply that of
obedience'; the absence of any 'direct relationship between the branch
group and the workshop group'; and the way in which the unions'
sectionalism divided workers 'by organising them on the basis of their
differences instead of their common interests'. In The Workers'
Committee Murphy also outlined an alternative structure intended to
bring about 'real democratic practice' in workers' industrial
organisations, so that every member could 'participate actively in the
conduct of the business of the society [union]'. Apathy towards union
affairs -- 'the members do not feel a personal interest in the branch
meetings' -- would be overcome by establishing a 'direct connection
between the workshop and the branch'. All power would reside at workshop
level : committees elected to represent the workers would exist merely to
'render service to the rank and file' and would 'not have any governing
power'. These changes would be carried out as far as possible within the
existing unions : Murphy emphasised that 'we are not antagonistic to the
trade union movement. We are not out to smash but to grow, to utilise
every available means whereby we can achieve a more efficient organisation
of the workers.' 
Murphy, The Workers Committee (London: Pluto Press, 1972).
|Besides the engineering shop stewards'
movement, the Dreadnought group's attitude towards trade unions was
also influenced by the miners' rank and file movements, particularly in
South Wales where the Dreadnought group had established close links
with radical workers.  Militants within
the South Wales Miners' Federation had addressed many of the problems of
trade unionism outlined above. The most widely-known expression of some of
their ideas on these issues was The Miners' Next Step, a pamphlet
published in 1912 by a small group of socialist miners calling themselves
the Unofficial Reform Committee. The Miners' Next Step criticised
the SWMF's 'conciliation policy', which 'gives the real power of the men
into the hands of a few leaders'. The more power was concentrated in the
hands of the officials, the less power the membership had in deciding
union affairs. (This was the argument that Guy Aldred had put forward a
year earlier in the first edition of his pamphlet, Trade Unionism and
the Class War). Rank and file control of the union was far too
indirect, while the 'social and economic prestige' of the leaders raised
them to a position where 'they have therefore in some things an antagonism
of interests with the rank and file'. Another criticism of the union was
that 'the sectional character of organisation in the mining industry
renders concerted action almost impossible'.
||18. See the
'Communist Party Notes' published in the Workers' Dreadnought from
July 1920 onwards.
|This critique was accompanied by constructive
proposals for reforming the union. The pamphlet proposed a single
organisation for all mine and quarry workers in Britain, which would
enable them to achieve 'a rapid and simultaneous stoppage of wheels
throughout the mining industry'. Proposals for democratisation of the
union were also outlined, so as to enable the rank and file to 'take
supreme control of their own organisation'. All policy initiative and
ratification was to rest with the lodges, and the union executive was to
become an unofficial, 'purely administrative body; composed of men
directly elected by the men for that purpose'. If these reforms were
carried out there would be a growing recognition that 'the lodge meetings
are the place where things are really done'; rank and file apathy would
disappear, and the lodges would become 'centres of keen and pulsating
life'. The long-term objective of these proposals was 'to build up an
organisation that will ultimately take over the mining industry, and carry
it on in the interests of the workers'. This aim also applied to all other
industries: the authors wanted to see every industry thoroughly organised,
in the first place, to fight, to gain control of, and then to administer,
that industry'. 
Wales Miners' Federation Unofficial Reform Committee, 1973.
|The strong influence of such ideas on the Dreadnought
group's attitude towards the trade unions, and in particular the
insistence of militant mining and engineering workers on the need to work
within the trade unions, shows that some accounts of the Dreadnought group's
attitude have been factually mistaken. For example, it is not correct to
suggest that 'Pankhurst's group . . . was unable to prevent the
Communist Party, formed in late 1920, from pledging to work within the
existing trade union structure',  since the fact is that the Dreadnought
group supported such a strategy. The CP(BSTI)'s programme
stated that the party should aim to 'stimulate the growth of rank and file
organisation' and 'undermine the influence of reactionary Trade Union
leaders over the rank and file' by forming a CP(BSTI) branch within every
local trade union branch and workplace. 
Peterson, 'The General Strike: Fifty Years On' in World Revolution,
no. 6 (March 1976), p. 26 (emphasis added).
21. Workers' Dreadnought, 3 July
|A circular to CP(BSTI) branches stated that the
party's 'most urgent need' was 'the speedy addition to the ranks of the
party of genuine class fighters from the ranks of the proletariat,
especially of the organised industrial proletariat, so that the party may
exercise increasing control and influence inside the organised Unions of
Workers'.  A CP(BSTI) Industrial
Sub-Committee submitted a report suggesting how this might be achieved. It
stated : 'Branches should make the closest distinction between work
through the NON PARTY MASS ORGANISATIONS OF OUR CLASS, and through the
PARTY ORGANISATIONS.' CP(BSTI) members were to oppose 'Party
Organisations' such as the Labour Party, but try to exert every possible
influence within 'Non Party Mass Organisations' such as trade unions, shop
stewards' and rank and file movements, and unemployed workers'
organisations. In order to gain influence within such organisations party
members were instructed to 'accept delegation from branches of their
industrial organisations to all such bodies as Trade Union Congresses,
Trade Union Executives, or to any Trades and Labour Council or similar
body WHERE SUCH ACCEPTANCE OF DELEGATION DOES NOT NECESSITATE DENIAL OF
THEIR COMMUNIST PRINCIPLES'. Wherever possible, party members were to
'take full and active part in building up Shop Stewards' and Workers'
Committee Movements, and in all Rank and File Movements which weaken the
power of officials, and lead to Rank and File Control, Mass Action, and
the development of the Class Struggle'. Agitation within trade union
branches was also intended to spread communist ideas, attract militant
union members into the CP(BSTI), and expose the trade unions' inadequacies
as revolutionary organisations. 
Suggested Circular to Branches, Number Four, no date, file 125, Pankhurst
23. CP(BSTI) Report of Industrial
Sub-committee, Draft for Final Revision, no date, file 5a, Pankhurst
|All of which demonstrates the complete
inaccuracy of the claim that the Dreadnought group 'despised . . .
participation in the work of the trade unions'. 
Klugmann, History of the Communist Party of Great Britain, vol. I
(London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1968), pp. 20-1.
|GUY ALDRED AND THE SHOP STEWARDS' MOVEMENT
|One of the several significant differences
between the Dreadnought group and Guy Aldred concerned their
respective attitudes towards the shop stewards' movement. Aldred was
imprisoned repeatedly after the introduction of conscription in 1916,
because he refused to fight in an imperialist war from which only the
capitalist class would profit. His opposition to the war also led him to
oppose those workers who were not only churning out the munitions which
millions of workers in uniform were using to slaughter each other, but
were also seeking to profit from their strategically important position by
bargaining for wage rises, reductions in working hours and so on. In
Aldred's view the engineering shop stewards' movement's aims
contained no suggestion of not erecting capitalist
institutions, of not engaging in armament work, of asserting any
sort of class-consciousness against the war. Indeed, the workers'
committee flourished on war . . . The idea was merely that of improving
the worker's status in the commodity struggle and not to develop his
revolutionary opposition to capitalism. 
Aldred, At Grips With War (Glasgow: Bakunin Press, 1929), p. 83
(emphases in original).
|Aldred criticised those 'revolutionaries' who
separated their industrial agitation from their opposition to the war,
leaving their 'revolutionary' politics behind when they entered the
munitions factory. Aldred described Willie Gallacher, for example, as
someone who had 'made munitions during the war, and atoned for this
conduct by delivering Socialist lectures in the dinner hour'. 
|Aldred's attitude towards the shop stewards'
movement has led one critic to dismiss him as ‘a character marginal to
the organised labour movement on Clydeside' because 'he condemned the
munitions workers as "assassins of their own kindred" ’. 
But Aldred's attitude was shared by another figure less frequently
dismissed as 'marginal' -- John Maclean too was
Campbell, review of I.MacDougall (ed.), Essays in Scottish Labour
History in Society for the Study of Labour History Bulletin,
no. 39 (Autumn 1979), p. 87.
opposed to the way the Clyde Workers' Committee and the socialists on it
were behaving . . . Most of the shop stewards were socialists and
anti-war, but they had submerged their politics in workshop struggles
and were not even mentioning the war inside the factories . . . This
meant that no anti-war fight developed inside the factories; the men
were making guns, shells and all kinds of munitions, but the
all-important question was never raised. 
McShane and J. Smith, Harry McShane: No Mean Fighter (London: Pluto
Press,1978), pp. 77-8.
|David Kirkwood, the shop stewards' leader at
Beardmore's Park-head Forge in Glasgow, was an outstanding example of the
type of stewards criticised by Aldred and Maclean. Although he claimed to
oppose the war, Kirkwood's own account of the war years scarcely mentions
him engaging in any sort of anti-war activity. He was a willing
collaborator in any scheme to increase munitions output, so long as it did
not adversely affect wages and conditions, and relished the quips that it
was really he (Kirkwood), and not the owner Sir William Beardmore, who was
actually in charge of running Parkhead Forge. 
The attitude of stewards such as Kirkwood led John Maclean, in his famous
May 1918 speech from the dock of the High Court, Edinburgh, to condemn not
only worldwide capitalism -- 'the most infamous, bloody and evil system
that mankind has ever witnessed' -- but also those workers who sought to
exploit their powerful bargaining position in the munitions industry :
||29. See D.
Kirkwood, My Life of Revolt (London: George Harrap, 1935), Chapters
David Kirkwood . . . said that the Parkhead Forge workers were then
prepared to give a greater output and accept dilution if they, the
workers, had some control over the conditions under which the greater
output would accrue . . . Since he has got into position he seems to
have boasted that he has got a record output. The question was put to me
: Was this consistent with the position and with the attitude of the
working class? I said it was not . . . that his business was to get back
right down to the normal, to 'ca'canny' so far as the general output was
|30. See G.
Aldred, John Maclean (Glasgow: Bakunin Press/StricklandPress,1940),
|When the war ended, however, there was no
longer any political reason for Aldred not to support the shop stewards'
movement. In August 1919 he expressed his approval of the forms of
organisation created during the war by the movement, writing of the need
to abandon 'the unwieldy, bureaucratic, highly centralised Industrial
Union idea of peace-time [class] war organisation' in favour of 'a living
unit of organisation in every workshop, and a federation of living units,
mobilising, according to necessity, the real red army. This will be
accomplished by developing our Workshop Committees.' 
Around the same time, the Communist League, in whose formation Aldred
participated, was arguing that communists should ‘enter the
workers' committees and councils and by their agitation and education
develop and extend the growing class consciousness’. In time the
workers' committees would overthrow the capitalist System and then
function as the administrative machinery of communist society. 
This was basically the same position which the CP(BSTI) put forward in
more detail in 1920.
2 August 1919.
32. Spur, March 1919.
|THE POST-WAR CLASS STRUGGLE
|So far this chapter has concentrated on the
anti-parliamentary communists' ideas up to 1920. During 1920-1 these ideas
began to change, mainly in response to fluctuations in the pattern of the
post-war class struggle. In Britain the shop stewards', workers' committee
and rank and file movements were largely the product of certain groups of
workers' militancy during the war and the short post-war boom. If the
level of class struggle declined these forms of organisation were likely
to disappear, along with the revolutionary expectations vested in them.
This is precisely what did happen in Britain after 1920.
|The high level of wartime demand for their
products kept unemployment among engineering, shipbuilding and metal union
workers below 1 per cent during 19l5-18. 
During the short-lived post-armistice boom (1919-20), the unemployment
rate among these workers was still only 3.2 per cent. In 1921, however,
unemployment shot up to 22.1 per cent, and then to 27 per cent the
following year. At the same time the wage gains which engineering workers
had made during the war began to be eroded. This was the background to a
decline in engineering workers' militancy, reflected in the downwards
trend in the statistics for strikes in the metal, engineering and
shipbuilding industries (see Table 4.1).
Statistics in this section are from the Board of Trade Statistical
Table 4.1 Disputes involving stoppages in the metal, engineering and
shipbuilding industries. 1919-24
||Working days 'lost'
Source: Board of Trade Statistical Department, 1926.
|The exceptional figures for 1922 were the
result of a three-month engineering workers' lock-out; Harry McShane
describes what happened :
the engineers were defeated . . . and they returned to much worse
working conditions. The union's defeat meant a reduction in wages, not
only for them but ultimately for all trades and labourers as well. After
the war I got £4 8s. a week as an engineer, but after the
lock-out engineers' wages went down to £2 13s. 
McShane and J. Smith, Harry McShane: No Mean Fighter (London: Pluto
Press,1978), p. 136.
|This was the general pattern throughout the
rest of British industry. Unemployment increased from 1.5 per cent
in the autumn of 1920 to 18 per cent by December 1921. Cuts in wages were
only partially offset by a fall in the cost of living. The number of
working days 'lost' in disputes involving stoppages in all industries
decreased, as did the number of workers involved (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2 Disputes involving stoppages (all industries), 1919~24
||Working days 'lost'
Source: Board of Trade Statistical Department, 1926.
|The sections of the working class which had
been at the forefront of the class struggle were the ones hit hardest by
the onset of the post-war depression. The national rate of unemployment in
August 1922 stood at 12.8 per cent -- compared with 27 per cent on
Clydeside and 32 per cent in Sheffield. Engineering and shipbuilding
workers accounted for 65 per cent of all unemployed workers on Clydeside,
while iron, steel and engineering workers made up 70 per cent of the total
in Sheffield. In Wales as a whole 44 per cent of unemployed workers were
miners -- a percentage which was obviously much higher in the coalmining
areas themselves.  In his Presidential
address to the South Wales Miners' Federation in July 1923, Vernon
Hartshorn remarked that 'he had never known a period when the workmen had
been more demoralised than they were during 1922 . . . Wages had been low,
unemployment had been extensive and the owners had taken advantage of the
general position to attack standard wages and customs which had been in
existence for many years'. 
and occupational figures from J. Astor et al., The Third Winter
of Unemployment (London: P.S. King, 1922).
36. Quoted in H. Francis and D. Smith, The
Fed: A History of the South Wales Miners (London: Lawrence &
Wishart, 1980), p. 32.
|During this period the generalised class
struggle of the years before 1920 gave way to defensive battles in which
sections of the working class were isolated and defeated one by one. The
year 1921 illustrates the change. In April the railway and transport
workers' union leaders withdrew their promise of support to the miners,
leaving their Triple Alliance partners to fight a three-month struggle
which ended in defeat. Of the 85 million working days 'lost' in 1921,
nearly 80 million were accounted for by locked-out miners. In 1921 almost
two and a half times more days were 'lost' in strikes as there had
been in 1919, but more than a third fewer workers were involved
(see Table 4.2).
|These circumstances saw a rapid decline in the
rank and file activity of the shop stewards' movement. As unemployment
rose known militants were frequently the first to lose their jobs through
victimisation by employers: ‘Soon it was a wry joke that the shop
steward leaders of 1918 had become the unemployed leaders of the 1920s’.
 The decline of rank and file activity
saw power within the trade unions shift back in favour of the full-time
officials, a trend consolidated by a number of major union amalgamations
(which on grounds of sheer size created conditions for greater
bureaucratisation) and by the spread of national collective bargaining. As
Sylvia Pankhurst observed in 1922 :
Hinton and R. Hyman, Trade Unions and Revolution (London: Pluto
Press, 1975), p. 14.
Undoubtedly a strong move is being made by the Union officials to secure
greater power in the Unions and to thrust the rank and file still
further into the background . . . the Unions become more and more
bureaucratic, more and more dominated by the capitalist influence upon
the Trade Union leaders, still further removed from rank and file
Dreadnought, 10 June 1922.
|The victimisation of shopfloor activists during
the 'employers' offensive' was complemented by state repression of
'subversives' : 'In 1921 over 100 "communists" were arrested and
jailed for variations on the theme of sedition.' 
A leaflet issued by the APCF in 1921, in connection with the prosecution
of the Glasgow Communist Group for publishing the 'seditious' Red
Commune, referred to the 'concerted effort on the part of the ruling
class . . . to suppress ruthlessly every serious advocate of social
transformation in order to preserve the present iniquitous and unjust
Quail, The Slow Burning Fuse (London: Paladin,1978), P. 303.
40. Leaflet issued by John McGovern,
Treasurer, APCF Defence and Maintenance Fund, Shettleston, 1921, bundle 2,
Chapter 4, part 2