Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the Arab world’s main centers of power were in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. Yet in recent years these countries’ governments have been bogged down with many internal crises, preventing them from playing major leadership roles in the broader Middle East and North Africa (MENA).
In the 21st century, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Qatar have been ambitiously filling power vacuums throughout the MENA region. In this new period defined by “Arab Gulf hegemony,” American influence has steadily declined while the oil-rich Gulf monarchies have ascended as powerful actors regionally and internationally.
Competing ideologies and divergent perspectives on political Islam and the “Arab Spring” revolts of 2011 have fueled deep polarization within the Gulf Cooperation Council.
Yet, competing ideologies and divergent perspectives on political Islam and the “Arab Spring” revolts of 2011 have fueled deep polarization within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The most significant example of these internal tensions is the blockade of Qatar, which has essentially left the GCC a toothless institution. Such divisions between Arab nations have also contributed to the growing irrelevance of the Arab League as an institution.
Consequently, there is a lack of unity when it comes to addressing challenges in the region. From Libya to Palestine, Syria to Yemen, and Iraq to Lebanon, political crises and violent conflicts continue with no end in sight. The region’s regimes seem unable to devise Arab solutions to Arab problems, which has led to a host of non-Arab states interfering in Arab countries’ internal affairs.
Algeria’s government views the lack of pan-Arab unity and the high-level of division among Arab states as problematic. With President Abdelmadjid Tebboune at the helm, Algeria is seeking to reassert its diplomatic influence in the MENA region. To do so, Algiers sees restoring the Arab League’s political relevance to the region as necessary.
Last month, Tebboune paid a visit to Saudi Arabia where he spoke about healing intra-Arab conflicts. One of the most sensitive issues he raised was the Syrian crisis. With Algeria set to lead the upcoming Arab League summit, the Algerian leader stressed how this event will not take place unless Syria, which was suspended from the organization in November 2011, rejoins.
Hoping to end a period of Arab Gulf hegemony in the MENA region, Algeria wants to restore its special regional diplomatic role.
Hoping to end a period of Arab Gulf hegemony in the MENA region, Algeria wants to restore its special regional diplomatic role, which became much weaker during the final years of President Abdulaziz Bouteflika’s time in power. As Tebboune sees it, bringing Damascus back from the cold and having the Syrian Arab Republic (SAR) rejoin the Arab League serves not only Algerian national interests, but also those of the wider Arab world.
Historical and Ideological Factors
Algeria’s support for Syria is not new. There is much to say about Algeria’s own national identity and its unique history under France’s colonial rule, which inform Algiers’ perspectives on the Syrian conflict.
During the 1950s and 1960s, when Gamal Abdel Nasser was Egypt’s president and the posterchild for Arab nationalist struggles, Syria and Algeria belonged to a set of states comprising “progressive socialist forces” that stood in opposition to the “attacks of colonialism and imperialism” in all corners of the developing world from Africa and Asia to the Middle East and Latin America.
As two states struggling against French colonial rule, there was a pan-Arab, anti-imperialist bond between Algeria and Syria that began decades before Bashar al-Assad ascended to power.
As two states struggling against French colonial rule, there was a pan-Arab, anti-imperialist bond between the two regimes that began decades before Bashar al-Assad ascended to power, but still lives on in the narratives of both the Algerian and Syrian regimes.
Furthermore, with its support for non-intervention in the internal affairs of countries, Algeria has consistently opposed NATO powers’ intervention in Syria and other Arab states too, which Algiers views as a violation of a fellow Arab country’s sovereign rights.
When the Syrian crisis was in its earliest stage and numerous Arab and Western states, along with Turkey, were seeking to topple Assad’s government, Algeria stood against such agendas. The Algerian leadership opposed all Arab League resolutions against Damascus, as well as decrees proposed before the UN, that would have violated Syrian sovereignty and independence from Algiers’ perspective.
In late 2015, Algeria’s ambassador in Damascus Saleh Bosha condemned Assad’s foreign enemies for pursuing plans to “weaken and discourage [Syria] from its national and pan-Arab stances.”
When the Syrian Arab Army (SAA) took back Aleppo from rebels in December 2016, Algeria’s rhetoric and positions vis-à-vis the Syrian crisis became more openly pro-Assad by calling the defeated forces in Aleppo “terrorists”. Such language underscored the extent to which the Algerian and Syrian governments had embraced the same narrative about the bloodshed in Aleppo and the wider Syrian crisis.
In 2017, Damascus’ Deputy Foreign and Expatriates Minister Fayssal Mikdad emphasized that Syria and Algeria had “brotherly relations” rooted in Algeria’s revolution which was a “revolution for all Arabs.”
“We are fighting the same occupation as ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra terrorist organizations are another form of colonialism,” Mikdad said.
Algeria suffered from its own “black decade” in the 1990s when scores of militant Islamists and government forces battled throughout the country, resulting in over 100,000 deaths. The Algerians see many regional crises in the current period through the lens of that trauma, which created a dark chapter in Algeria’s modern history.
For Algiers, ensuring that more states do not collapse and create dangerous power vacuums is a high priority.
For Algiers, ensuring that more states do not collapse and create dangerous power vacuums is a high priority. Bordering Libya, Mali, and the Western Sahara, Algeria is in close proximity to conflicts that directly threaten its own stability.
Clearly fears of radical Islam are factoring into the picture, with Algeria—along with other Arab states that support bringing Syria back to the Arab League—seeing Assad’s regime as a bulwark against forces such as ISIS, al-Qaeda, and other extremist threats.
At the end of the day, Algeria—along with a growing number of other Arab states such as Egypt and the UAE—has come to the conclusion that Assad’s government is the best option for Syria.
Returning Syria From the Cold
Without a doubt, there is a regionwide trend taking shape. More Arab states are advocating Syria’s return to the Middle East’s diplomatic fold. Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Oman, Tunisia, and the UAE have joined Algeria in pushing for a revitalization of Assad’s standing as a “legitimate” Arab head of state.
Yet there is still no consensus in the MENA region about how to deal with Assad. Whereas a growing number of Arab regimes have concluded that it is wisest to let “bygones be bygones,” many Arabs, including high-ranking elite figures and average citizens on the street, take offense at the idea. Among Arab states, Qatar opposes any effort to rehabilitate the Syrian government’s now stained legitimacy.
Political groups in various Arab countries believe that permitting Syria’s government to return to the Arab League would expose governments in the region as morally bankrupt.
Additionally, scores of political groups in various Arab countries, including Algeria, also believe that permitting Syria’s government to return to the Arab League would only expose governments in the region as morally bankrupt. Given the enormity of the atrocities perpetrated by the Assad regime and its allies since 2011, re-admitting Syria to the Arab League would almost inevitably trigger anger throughout the region.
Yet it would be naïve to conclude that Arab League members view Syria’s crisis with a human rights-driven foreign policy, especially considering most Arab governments’ own records of violating their own citizens’ rights, as well as the roles played by some of these Arab states in flagrant war crimes in Yemen. Ultimately, each Arab League member has its own geopolitical interests and unique history with Syria that shape its views about Damascus’ relationship with the Arab League.
Saudi Arabia restoring its relations with Syria would mark a watershed in Damascus’ return to the region’s diplomatic fold.
Saudi Arabia restoring its relations with the SAR would mark a watershed in Damascus’ return to the region’s diplomatic fold given the Kingdom’s geopolitical, economic, and religious influence over a host of countries in the Islamic world. It is a safe bet that Algeria will continue using its leverage to push Riyadh toward the renormalizing of ties with Syria’s embattled government in the interests of advancing the cause of pan-Arab unity as the government in Algiers sees it.
If Assad attends the upcoming Arab League summit in Algiers, the Syrian government will long remember Algeria for its role in helping Syria return to an institution that it was a founding member of in 1945. Such a return would mark a highly symbolic victory for Assad, as well as for his domestic and foreign backers. Algeria would see such a diplomatic development as the over-due reversal of an Arab League mistake which led to growing disunity in the Arab world.