The main objective of India’s nuclear policy has been and remains the nuclear disarmament world -wide. The impetus behind the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy is the concern for the safety of a world with many nuclear weapons. India had recognized that the cold war deterrent relationship between the United States and the erstwhile Soviet Union was fragile. Having more nuclear weapons would reduce security for all, multiplying the risks of miscalculation, accidents, unauthorized use of weapons, or from escalation in tensions leading to nuclear conflict. At the same time India recognizes that the nuclear technology is necessary for the welfare of the mankind and economic development and therefore should be made available to all with necessary checks.
In fact, India’s nuclear policy has the following five dimensions-
- The developing world has the right to nuclear energy. Advanced technology should be made available with reasonable safeguards.
- Nuclear energy should be used for economic development and welfare of mankind.
- Proliferation networks must be neutralized. Merely promising to move in this direction is not sufficient.
- Nuclear security is as important as safety of nuclear plants. India is deeply concerned about the dangers of nuclear explosives and fissile material as well as technical know-how falling into the hands of non- state actors and desires effective measures to be taken.
- In the long term, the world should be free from nuclear weapons.
India has been consistently trying to make the world free from nuclear weapons. It was India that first proposed an end to nuclear testing in 1954. Again in 1965, it was India that proposed the basic principles that, with minor American modifications, became the basis for the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT), though it was in no way responsible for the flawed structure that has come into being. India’s refusal to sign resulted from the recognition that the treaty only legitimized possession and multiplication of nuclear stockpiles by the few states that already possessed them instead of addressing universal and comprehensive non-proliferation. Once again, in 1982, it was India that proposed a convention to ban nuclear weapons, including a ban on the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons.
In 1988, it was also India that put forward a comprehensive action plan for a nuclear-free world within a specific time-frame at the third United Nations Special Session on Disarmament. In a speech before the United Nations, late Sri Rajiv Gandhi, then India’s prime minister, argued, “We cannot accept the logic that a few nations have the right to pursue their security by threatening the survival of mankind…nor is it acceptable that those who possess nuclear weapons are freed of all controls while those without nuclear weapons are policed against their production. History is full of such prejudices paraded as iron laws: That men are superior to women; that white races are superior to the coloured; that colonialism is a civilizing mission; (and) that those who possess nuclear weapons are responsible powers and those who do not are not.”
LACUNEA IN THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR GOVERNING REGIME
The main issue is the nature of the present global nuclear regime. An examination of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Zangger Committee, Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) etc. reveals that they are dominated by developed nations and therefore they work in their interest. The issues are decided by great or hegemonic powers. In the interest of mankind, it is necessary to make available nuclear technology and science to all for economic development and welfare. Unfortunately there are some western experts who hold the view that the developing world is not adequately prepared for the use of nuclear technology or for the safety and security of nuclear material. Obviously this flawed thinking is responsible for creating impediments in the acquisition of nuclear technology by the developing world.
While there are some genuine concerns regarding security and safety of nuclear material and technology, the dominant powers’ turning a blind eye to the clandestine network operating in India’s neighbourhood is certainly not understandable. This is happening when IAEA has formulated in clear terms a working definition for nuclear security. It includes “the penetration and detection of and response to theft, sabotage, unauthorized access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radio-active substances or their associated facilities”.
FLAWS IN THE NPT
While it is well known why India did not sign the NPT, briefly the reasons may be summarised. The then India’s External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee aptly pointed out during his visit to Tokyo in 2007: “If India did not sign the NPT, it is not because of its lack of commitment for non-proliferation, but because we consider NPT as a flawed treaty and it did not recognize the need for universal, non-discriminatory verification and treatment.”
Flaws in the NPT from the Indian perspective are responsible for dividing the nations into two camps- those who have been placed in the category of nuclear weapon states and those who are placed in the category of non-nuclear weapon states. First, the treaty was considered to be discriminatory. Second, the abolition of nuclear arms has not been specified in the treaty. The wording of the NPT’s Article VI arguably imposes only a vague obligation on all NPT signatories to move in the general direction of nuclear and total disarmament, saying, “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament.” Under this interpretation, Article VI does not strictly require all signatories to actually conclude a disarmament treaty. Rather, it only requires them “to negotiate in good faith.” Most of the States belonging to the Non-Aligned Movement consider the language of the Article VI as vague. The weaknesses in the NPT have allowed a situation to develop in which disarmament is unlikely to take place, while proliferation continues unabated.
INDIA’S NUCLEAR OPTION
The India’s security environment projected the need for strong steps to protect its national security interests. China which joined NPT in 1992 continued to not only increase its nuclear arsenal but also continued to assist Pakistan for acquiring nuclear weapons and delivery systems. Pakistan’s proliferation network (generally called as AQ Khan’s proliferation network) continued to function. These factors compelled India to maintain “nuclear option”. In view of failure of global nuclear regime to engineer abolition of nuclear weapons world-wide, India preserved its legal freedom to develop a nuclear arsenal to have a deterrent of some kind in the future. In the security environment prevailing in 1998, India decided to go in for nuclear tests and thereby became a state with nuclear weapons.
INDIA’S POLICIES AFTER NUCLEAR TESTS
However even after these tests India has not abandoned the policy of global disarmament and denuclearization. Soon after May 1998 nuclear tests Government of India called on all nuclear weapon states ‘to join with it in opening early negotiations for a nuclear weapons convention so that these weapons can be dealt with in a global non-discriminatory framework.’ Till date, the parameters of India’s nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy have remained consistent. In June 2008, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh restated India’s policy as ‘fully committed to nuclear disarmament that is global, universal and non-discriminatory in nature and that for India, the only effective form of nuclear disarmament is global nuclear disarmament; nuclear disarmament cannot be regionalized.’ In accordance with its policy at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in February 2008, India formally proposed two multilateral agreements and two global conventions in a detailed framework for nuclear disarmament and laid the seven point agenda for:
- Reduction of the salience of nuclear weapons in security doctrines.
- Negotiation of an agreement on no-first use of nuclear weapons among nuclear weapons states.
- Negotiation of a universal and legally binding agreement on non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states.
- Negotiation of a convention on the complete prohibition of the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.
- Negotiation of a nuclear convention prohibiting development, stockpiling and production of nuclear weapons, moving towards a global, non-discriminatory and verifiable elimination of these weapons.
- Unequivocal commitment of all nuclear weapons states to reduce risks and dangers arising from the possibility of accidental use of these weapons.
- Adoption of additional measures by nuclear states to reduce accidental use.
In early May 2011, India’s Acting Permanent Representative to the CD in Geneva reiterated India’s strong support to the UNSC Resolution 1540 on preventing proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery. India is not yet a member of PSI as there are concerns about its consonance with international maritime law and the artificial distinction it makes with regard to rights and responsibilities of nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. However, India has indicated that it has no problems with the purpose and the strategy of the initiative. There is a growing belief that India should join the PSI and support its expanded mandate. This fits in very well with India’s own concern over clandestine proliferation, especially in its own neighbourhood, which could facilitate the acquisition of nuclear weapons or fissile material by terrorist or jihadi groups.
While India’s long term objective remains abolition of nuclear weapons, it realizes that pragmatism demands maintenance of nuclear deterrence. India’s nuclear doctrine is in fact geared to this objective and not to use these weapons in any war. A close look at the nuclear doctrine would establish this.
INDIA’S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE
As is well known that India’s nuclear doctrine was based on the ‘Draft Nuclear Doctrine’ prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) in 1999, it is desirable to examine the suggestions of the NSAB in the light of discussions held in the board and what the authors intended to convey. The 27 Member board included inter-alia well known nuclear or strategic experts like (Late) Sri K Subrahmanyam (Convenor), Air Cmde Jasjit Singh, Dr Raja Ramanna, (Late) Sri J N Dixit, Sri M K Narayanan, Dr Bharat Karnard, Sri Brahma Challney, Dr Raja Mohan, Dr Roddam Narsimha etc. It may be mentioned at the outset that the consensus was obtained after the original draft which was prepared by Subrahmanayam, was revised several times to accommodate the views of all members.
In essence, the draft doctrine was based on the following assumptions-
- Nuclear weapons are meant for deterrence. The basic thrust was to deter the use of nuclear weapons and not fight a nuclear war.
- Nuclear weapons are to be used only in retaliation of nuclear attack on India. Therefore the doctrine was purely defensive in nature.
- Nuclear weapons would not be used to deter the threat or use of conventional weapons, biological or chemical weapons.
- Emphasis on ‘minimum credible deterrence’ would avoid any unnecessary arms race.
The draft doctrine was based on two elements. In the first place, it was intended to convey the message that India would not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances and therefore the concept of “No First Use”. And in the second place it was meant to convey that any nuclear attack on India or Indian forces anywhere would attract punitive retaliatory nuclear attack to cause unacceptable damage to the aggressor. At the time of preparation of the draft doctrine, it was made clear that this would be a draft paper meant for informed debates. It was also clarified that the doctrine contained only the broad principles and the nuclear strategy, policies and posture would flow from this doctrine (Para 1.6). The official announcement of India’s Nuclear Doctrine was made in January, 2003 after substantive discussions on various aspects pertaining to the posture, targeting strategies, deployment and development as also command and control system. The note released along with the doctrine suggested a slight change in the formulation of response. The note substituted the word “suitable” to “massive and designed” retaliation to nuclear strike “to inflict unacceptable damage”. In both the cases, the retaliation was linked to causing unacceptable damage to the aggressor. The Indian Nuclear Doctrine reiterated the NFU and a commitment not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states. The main thrust of India’s nuclear doctrine is that the nuclear weapons are meant for deterrence and not for use in the war. The current developments in Pakistan and China have generated a demand by experts that we should change our nuclear doctrine to drop the concept of ‘no first use’ for enhancing our deterrence. While this argument has weight, this could lead us to arms race. However, increasing our nuclear arsenal to enable us to cause unacceptable damage to the adversary in the event of nuclear attack is necessary. Our nuclear doctrine gives us this flexibility. However, more informed debates are necessary to consider any change in our nuclear doctrine.
INDIA’S ASSOCIATION WITH GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION EFFORTS
- While India has not signed the NPT, it has remained deeply involved with several efforts for non-proliferation. In this context the following merit attention.India maintains that IAEA is important as the central institution for nuclear energy. India contributes to its programmes such as innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles, nuclear technology etc. India has served on its board of governors in the past and is on the current board as well.
- India is actively involved with activities of the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), which works on nuclear safety issues.
- India is also actively involved with the functioning of CANDU Owners Group (COG). This organization is dedicated for providing programmes for cooperation, mutual assistance and exchange of information for the support, maintenance and economics of CANDU technologies.
- India is actively involved in the efforts of small countries towards nuclear security efforts. India participated in the Washington Nuclear Summit in April 2010 and is participating in the preparatory meetings of Seoul Nuclear Security Summit 2012. In the Washington meeting India announced the formation of India Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnerships. This institute would impart training to security forces on application of physical protection systems and response procedures, to enhance physical security of nuclear facilities by developing and deploying most modern technological tools including information security, and to provide facilities for test and evaluation of sensors and systems used for physical security (6).
- India is also harmonizing its export control system with the guidelines of the NSG and Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). After giving a commitment to do so on 18th July 2005, India took steps in this direction.
- India also supports all treaties, conventions and agreements on non-proliferation which are universal in nature. India is on the Committee established for implementing the UNSCR 1540.
Given its excellent track record on non-proliferation, the US entered into civil-nuclear agreement with India. Even Nuclear Supplier Group in 2008 gave approval to the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement and the US gave assurance for India’s entry in to NPT as well as in NSG. However, NSG in the June 2011 meeting laid conditions which would bar India’s entry in these groups. Dr Anil Kakodkar, who played an important role in the Indo-US civil agreement, has termed the latest decision of NSG as betrayal. This development certainly establishes that the global nuclear regime continues to remain discriminatory and encourages nuclear weapon states to increase their arsenal while not allowing the non-nuclear weapon states to take steps to protect their security interests. During the last four decades, the NPT has done little to achieve the objective of global disbarment.
This brings to the conclusion that current global nuclear regime needs drastic changes to do away with the system that only caters to the interests of the dominant powers. In addition, it would not be wrong to state that there is no global nuclear governance in the context of continuing and flourishing proliferation network which involves one of the nuclear weapon states. Drastic steps are required to restructure the present global nuclear governance system to ensure adequate attention is paid to the interests of developing nations. Countries like India which have impeccable track record for non-proliferation should not remain outside the global nuclear governance system.