War is won by holding on or driving off, not by successful running away.—Mahan
Many changes have taken place since our existing battleships were designed. Not only have our pre-war ideas of the value of speed faced the test of actual battle, but we have had time to find and digest the facts concerning these engagements. The lessons to be drawn, although startling, lost most of their effect due to the slowness with which the truth appeared. Furthermore, the situation has been altered by the advent of new weapons and the improvement of old ones, by the Washington treaty, and by actually testing the protection of one of our latest ships, the incomplete Washington. It is only by a careful examination of the entire problem that one realizes how much it has been changed. This subject is again of interest since in less than three years, we resume the building of battleships. In the following Paragraphs, an earnest effort is made to avoid preconceived ideas and to view conditions as they actually exist today.
THE PRESENT VALUE OF SPEED
The battles of the World War are particularly instructive, because they were the first ones fought by modern armored vessels, manned by crews nearly enough equal ln training and morale for the engagements to be considered fair tests of the ships themselves. Still further interest is added by the fact that the opposing ships represented two equally antagonistic schools of thought. On the one hand, we had Fisher building ships with the dominant idea that “the first of all necessities is Speed, so as to be able to fight—When you like, Where you like, and How you like.” (Ch-I-146)* On the other hand, the German ships were the embodiment of Tirpitz’s dictum: “The supreme quality of a fighting ship is that it should remain afloat and by preserving its vertical position, continue to put up a fight. (T-I-173) While it is generally conceded that, on the whole, Fisher was wrong, it is important to determine, as accurately as possible, the extent to which the claims made for high speed are justified. We will therefore now examine, in the light of what actually happened in the war and of subsequent developments, each of the supposed advantages of superior mobility.
Fisher wrote: “It is admitted that strategically speed is of very great importance. It enables the fleet or fleets possessing it to concentrate at any desired spot as quickly as possible…” (F-II-110) Although he and Tirpitz had to consider distances of only a few hundred miles, it actually worked out that the strategic speeds of their fleets were decided, not by their battleships, but by the relatively low economical speed of their destroyers. While we may look for increases in the size and fuel capacity of future torpedo craft, this is more than offset by the vastly greater distances involved in American strategy. Furthermore, if fuel ships or other vessels of the train are in company, the fleet speed will be decided by the slowest of these auxiliaries. It is, therefore, manifest that battleship speeds will certainly not be so low as to reduce the strategic speed of our fleet.
Another advantage claimed for superior mobility was the power to force or refuse an action. Only twice in the late war was this claim realized, and then under most unusual circumstances. At the Falklands, Sturdee was able to bring on a battle principally because of his unusual luck in having Spee walk squarely into a trap, and partly because of higher speed. Again, at the Dogger Bank, Beatty engaged Hipper, due chiefly to remarkable advance information, and partly to his faster ships. It is noteworthy, however, that in neither case would superior speed have been of value unless accompanied by superior fighting power. This is an impossible combination, under the fixed maximum displacements of the Washington treaty, if we assume equality in numbers and skill. There is certainly no advantage in forcing an action with vessels of superior fighting power.
The occasions on which higher speed was useless for this purpose form an impressive list. The escape of the Goeben and Breslau was due, not to superior mobility, but to a series of tragic blunders with which we all are familiar. The Heligoland Bight affair was simply a case of light forces, surprised at short range, by raiders of overwhelming superiority. There was no question of escape. At Coronel, no effort was made on either side to avoid action. On December 16, 1914, Beatty was unable to bring Hipper to book, in spite of advance information which placed him between Hipper and Heligoland. At Jutland, Hipper made no effort to avoid battle with Beatty. Later on that same day, Scheer was drawn into action with Jellicoe because of lack of information. The ease, however, with which Scheer avoided battle on August 16, 1916, showed that, with adequate aerial reconnaissance, a skillful admiral can seldom be engaged against his will. The important point is that, in all of these cases, superiority in speed either did not figure or failed to bring on an action. If the likelihood of forcing a battle under the conditions of the late war was slight, it dwindles into insignificance for future wars, where aerial scouting may be taken for granted. If we also recall the impossibility of getting superior fighting power in the same hull with superior speed, on a fixed maximum displacement, this claim must be dismissed.
The question naturally arises, how can a weaker and unwilling fleet be compelled to fight? Tirpitz answers thus: “We may be forced to give battle under unfavorable circumstances, for the mere honor of our arms. The English need only to bombard Heligoland one morning from the north.” (T-II- 98) Scheer also wrote: “They had it in their power to compel us to meet them in the North Sea, immediately they made an attack upon our coast.” (S-20) If we accept these statements, we must conclude that the ability to force an action—in other words, to take the offensive with its attendant advantages—depends not upon superior speed, but upon the wide margin in striking and resisting power prerequisite to offering battle near the enemy base.
Perhaps the greatest tactical advantage claimed for the faster squadron was that it could choose the range at which to fight. As Fisher stated it:
. . . . speed was armor when associated with big guns because the speed enabled you to put your ship at such a distance that she couldn’t be hit by the enemy, so it was the equivalent of impenetrable armor although you had none of it, and you hit the enemy every round for the simple reason that your guns reached him when his could not reach you. (F-I-100)
This was an attractive theory.
Sir Alfred Chatfield, who commanded the Lion in all her engagements, pointed out its weakness in these words:
Those who have been in action know perfectly well that in ninety cases out of a hundred, the factor which determines the range at which you will fight is the Clerk of the Weather. If you cannot see more than 10,000 yards, it is no good having speed which would enable you to keep 25,000 yards off. You have got to come in to the distance at which you can see the enemy, and when you come in to that range, then the man who has got plenty of speed but no protection, finds himself in a very awkward position. That is what has happened time and again.
He might have added that, if the slower ships have sufficient protection, they can compel the faster squadron to close the range, if the latter wish to make their fire effective.
Aside from further modification due to the use of smoke, the Washington treaty, which fixed the maximum caliber of guns, precluded any practicable application of this theory to future battleships. With superiority in range ruled out, all that the faster and more lightly armored ships can do is to select the distance at which they prefer to be sunk—and they will not have a wide selection.
We also used to hear that superior speed enabled one to choose the bearing on which to open fire, in order to take advantage of light or wind. However, in all the actions of the war, the bearing on which fire was opened depended on the relative positions of the opposing forces prior to contact. Subsequent courses were dictated by the desire of one or the other to fall back on its main body or base. Although it is theoretically possible for the faster fleet to gain this advantage, the situation has changed greatly since the war, as will be seen in the next two paragraphs.
The most favorable direction of the wind has become a complicated problem. Formerly, it was considered best to have it on the engaged beam to get the smoke from one's own guns and funnels out of the way as quickly as possible. Now, so far as the n. se of gas and smoke screens are concerned, it is best to have the wind on the unengaged beam. If a sea is running, spray interference will be reduced with the wind on the unengaged bow. The advent of carriers still further complicates things. It is advantageous to that fleet whose carriers have the least margin of superiority in speed to have the wind ahead, while the other side will want it astern. Finally, if a course and relative bearing be decided upon as most desirable in regard to wind, the visibility may be unfavorable. Thus, the many factors tend to cancel one another and the comparative value of any one of them is reduced.
Furthermore, the great increase in probable battle ranges means that a proportionally longer time is required to change the relative bearing; for example, it requires three hours to effect a change of bearing at 30,000 yards which would require only one hour at 10,000 yards. The probable employment of fleet submarines, motor torpedo boats, light mine layers, and torpedo planes increases the likelihood of reversals in course at short notice. Consequently, any maneuvers which require a long time for completion are of doubtful value. Even if the desired position is gained, the advantage may be reversed by shifting winds, or by sunset, as at Coronel; or it may be nullified by clouds, mist, smoke, a flat calm, a change in the strategic situation, or a dwindling fuel supply. Finally, a fleet can usually withdraw from a disadvantageous position. Since superior speed did not gain this possible advantage in any action of the late war, and seems still less likely to gain it in future battles, we may classify this claim as doubtful.
The ability of the faster fleet to form tactical concentrations on portions of the slower fleet was formerly much dwelt upon. Beatty, for example, concentrated on the Blucher and sank her at the Dogger Bank. This was due, however, not to Hipper’s lower speed, but to his faulty formation and the placing of his weakest ship in the most exposed position. Sixteen months later at Jutland, Jellicoe twice effected a concentration on the head of the German column. Superior speed did not figure in the first concentration because, at the time, Jellicoe was making only fourteen knots, to allow Beatty to draw ahead. The second concentration was due to Scheer’s flinging his leading ships headlong at the British column, either to effect a breakaway, or because of his mistaken idea as to the location of the Grand Fleet. Either concentration could have been avoided, had there been adequate aerial reconnaissance and, in both cases, the fleet unfavorably placed was able to withdraw. Since those days, the situation has been modified by an increase in gun ranges, a decrease in the number of battleships in the world’s fleets, by dependable aerial scouts, and by improved systems of communication. The short columns of today can be handled with parade-ground precision and any concentration due to superior speed easily avoided.
The final tactical advantage claimed for superior mobility was that it rendered possible the overtaking and destruction of a beaten and retreating fleet. The prerequisite is, however, to beat the enemy and make him wish to retreat. This calls for superior fighting power. So long as the Washington treaty remains in force, this cannot be obtained in the same ship with superior speed. Since mobility is the most vulnerable of the qualities of a fighting ship, it seems likely that the defeated fleet will have lost any superiority in speed before it seeks to withdraw. Even so, an immediate direct pursuit can be prevented by a liberal use of smoke, mines, and torpedoes. We now have, however, increased facilities independent of battleship speeds, for harrying a retreating fleet. Fast cruisers, destroyers, motor torpedo boats, light mine layers, and torpedo and bombing planes afford effective means of delaying a demoralized enemy. Hence, our aim should be to produce battleships of the maximum fighting power and trust that the retreating fleet will have lost its superiority in speed, or that our light forces will be able to delay them sufficiently for our battleships to reopen fire.
Six advantages claimed for speed have been investigated. Five of these cannot be substantiated under existing conditions and the other must be classified as doubtful. While we should not go to the opposite extreme of assuming that speed is of no value, we cannot escape the conclusion that its importance has been greatly exaggerated.
A remarkable shift in authoritative opinion on this subject has taken place since the war. Jellicoe affords an interesting example of this. Here is a level-headed, conservative officer of wide experience, considered by many to have the keenest mind in the Royal Navy. Of him, Fisher wrote in 1912, to Churchill: “I yesterday had an illuminating letter from Jellicoe…He writes to me of new designs. His one, one, one cry, Speed!” (Ch-I-146) After the fiery blasts of war had blown away the clouds of theory, Jellicoe saw the rugged, unmistakable outlines of truth and wrote:
The loss of the Good Hope, Monmouth, Queen Mary, Indefatigable, Invincible, Defense, and Warrior, and the considerations to which these losses gave rise, convinced naval officers afloat, even if they did not convince others less intimately associated with the Fleet during the war, that ships with inadequate defensive qualities are no match for those which possess them to a considerably greater degree, even if the former are superior in gun power. (J-306).
His pre-war cry was speed; his post-war cry was protection.
If Jellicoe, with many of his contemporaries, could be led so far astray by peacetime theories, we should surely investigate the causes underlying these wide-spread delusions, in order that we may guard against future epidemics of unsound thinking. The following section is devoted to such an inquiry.
The Pre-War Speed Craze
The principal factor in producing this unfortunate trend was probably the influence of the Russo-Japanese War. The advocates of speed pointed out that the Japanese had the faster fleet, used their mobility to advantage, and won every engagement. The weak spot in this argument was that it ignored the human element. Any lessons drawn from this war regarding material, were of doubtful value, due to the great difference between the training, discipline, and morale of the opposing forces. As further examples, exaggerated ideas also developed as to the value of armored cruisers and the effectiveness of high-explosive shells against armored vessels, simply because the Japanese were successful with them. Instances from this war were continually cited by Fisher in support of his high-speed theories. The influence of this brilliant and powerful officer was so great that it deserves special consideration.
Fisher, like most geniuses, had a mental soft spot. His unfortunate aberration was speed. To make matters worse, there was no hope of reasoning with him, for he not only had implicit confidence in his own ideas, but was fiercely intolerant of criticism. First of all, this colorful admiral secured himself from outside interference by winning the support of the press and the politicians. He accomplished that feat partly by his remarkable personal prestige and partly by his ability to draw striking analogies and to coin pat phrases or slogans with which he “sold” his ideas. This born sales manager then proceeded to deal with rebels in the Navy, either blistering them with ridicule or eliminating them by the “ruthless, relentless, and remorseless” exercise of his power as first sea lord. The wonder is, not that Fisher had his way, but that anyone with contrary views dared to approach this smoldering volcano of derision, wrath, and vengeance.
Fisher’s ideas on speed spread to other navies. In those days, just as Savile Row dictated what the well-dressed man should wear, so Whitehall set the styles in fighting ships. Aside from this, there were minor naval powers obliged to adopt tactics of the “hit-and-run” variety in which speed was me prime requisite. Faster ships for the British obviously meant still faster ships for them.
The influence of the war colleges was also making itself felt. These valuable institutions held game-board maneuvers which had an inevitable weak spot in that speed was the one quality of a fighting ship that could actually be demonstrated on the board. Protection was assigned an arbitrary weight, hut here an element of artificiality was introduced, the full effect of which was not then appreciated. Not only did the actual Working out before one’s eyes of the value speed impress it on the mind, but its continual demonstration tended to magnify it out of all proportion. On the other hand, the absence of any way, short of actual battle, of illustrating the value of protection, tended to reduce steadily the estimated importance of this factor. Peace-time maneuvers of the fleets had the same weakness. The extent of this artificiality can be appreciated by recalling the pre-war estimate of the relative battle life of battleships and flimsily protected battle cruisers.
Still other elements of artificiality were me inability to reproduce either the mental hazards or the time element of actual battle. On the game board, ships are handled with a meticulous care that one cannot expect in the heat of an engagement. Certainly, it is difficult to believe that some of the moves at Jutland would have been made on the game hoard. Ships that are tough enough to stand a little rough handling will probably fare much better in an actual battle than they do in maneuvers. This must not be mistaken for an ill-judged condemnation of maneuvers, game board or otherwise. Their value is unquestioned, so long as these elements of artificiality are recognized and allowed for.
The war colleges also very properly stressed the value of the offensive. Unfortunately, at this time, high speed was popularly associated with a dashing offensive—high speed meant the offensive; the offensive meant victory; and, what was more, you could prove it by every engagement of the Russo-Japanese War. Here was apparently an iron-clad case. Yet it was dead wrong, because it ignored the most potent single factor in warfare, “the power that lies in the hearts of men.”
The speed bubble was still further inflated by a number of other subtle psychological factors. The appeal of a fast ship to the imagination, the undeniable fascination in handling high-powered vessels, the spirit of competition, and the inclination of engineers to think of ships too much in terms of their own specialty with resulting distorted ideas of progress—all tended to increase speed. Then, unfortunately, there was something suggestive of boldness and dash in calling for speed and decrying protection; while, still more unfortunately, there was something suggestive of timidity and passivity in holding out for the latter vital but unromantic quality. This period, moreover, marked the beginning of the present speed-mad age. It was only to be expected that this world-wide craze would be felt in navies. Finally, there was the missionary spirit. Men like to spread a new gospel. They advocated higher speed with the same fanatical fervor with which others since have preached air-mindedness. It is truly remarkable that so many insidious but potent influences should have united to augment this unfortunate trend. Thus it was, in the tranquil airs of peace, that a showy bubble grew and grew, only to be burst at the first contact with the grim realities of war.
This was no isolated instance of losing touch with actuality, never likely to be repeated. Contemporaneously with the growth of the speed craze afloat, the general staff of the French Army became so obsessed with offensive doctrine that they adopted their disastrous Plan XVII, without first assuring themselves that material conditions permitted an offensive and, worse still, without providing an alternative, in case their offensive broke down. Any officer who attempted to point out the impracticability of the plan merely jeopardized his own future. Here we have the artificial viewpoint and the assumption of infallibility, with the same severe repression of opposing views; the identical rock on which Fisher foundered.
In both cases, it is noteworthy that the individual or group at the head became infected with an erroneous idea, refused to consider the possibility that they might be wrong, and treated those with contrary opinions as public enemies. Listening to opposing views is something like taking a vaccine; it occasionally causes some temporary inconvenience, but it is an excellent safeguard against the contagion of unsound theories.
The obvious lessons are: the erroneous conclusions drawn when the human element is ignored in studying any war; the necessity for recognizing and guarding against the artificial viewpoint which tends to develop in peace time; and that the latter can best be done by open-mindedness, by invariably according a fair hearing to minority views and by never basing a decision on a theory if it is possible to base it on facts. As Mahan says: “Current opinion and plausible impressions should always be thoroughly tested; for if erroneous they work sure failure and perhaps disaster.”
So far, we have discussed the value of speed and the factors which produced the speed craze. It is necessary, however, to review the present situation in regard to armament, ammunition allowances, and protection; for, with a fixed maximum displacement, any increase in one of these requirements reacts on each of the others. The extent to which this is true can best be shown by a concrete example.
Many naval officers would probably assent to the proposal that we follow other powers by going to twenty-three knots for our next battleships. Suppose that, instead of increasing their speed by two knots, we decrease it by that same amount. We could get nineteen knots with approximately 45 per cent of the power required for twenty- three knots. If, for the higher speed, machinery requires 10 per cent of the displacement, we would save 5.5 per cent or 1,925 tons. Actually, the saving would be greater, because the lower speed permits a form of hull which weighs less and requires a smaller tonnage for equivalent protection. With perhaps 2,000 tons liberated for use elsewhere, we could make substantial additions to armament, ammunition, or protection. For example, if the latter is allotted 30 per cent of the displacement, and we use 1,400 tons for additional armor, we could make the vertical armor approximately two inches thicker and have proportional increases elsewhere. Bearing in mind this inseparable relation between the different characteristics of a battleship, let us examine each of the other factors.
The Armament Situation Today
One of the astonishing lessons to be learned from Jutland was the powerlessness of the secondary batteries of capital ships to break up even minor destroyer attacks. The first of these was launched almost simultaneously by Beatty’s and Hipper’s destroyers during the run southward. They met between the lines; two German destroyers were sunk and the remainder retreated. Part of them sought safety around the rear and part around the van of Hipper’s battle cruisers. These last Commander Bingham in the Nestor, followed by the Nicator, turned to chase at full speed. In Corbett’s words:
…he continued to chase till he had reached a good position for the Lutzow, when, turning to attack, he fired two torpedoes at 5,000 yards. But Admiral Hipper was ready for him with the same foiling manoeuvre as our own, and just as the Nestor fired the Germans suddenly turned away, and both torpedoes missed. The Nicator had no better luck. But Commander Bingham was not yet satisfied, and followed by the Nicator he turned eastward after his prey. Undeterred by a rain of shells from the secondary armament of the enemy, as well as from the Regensburg, they pressed on till they were abeam of their targets, and fired again at 3,500 yards. Again there was no hit, and miraculously dodging the enemy’s rapid salvos they turned back to escape…Commander Bingham in dodging back from his second gallant attack had had two boilers put out of action by the Regensburg. (Co-III-339)
The startling thing about this affair is that two destroyers, headed in the same general direction, but on converging courses with a powerful division of battle cruisers, could run from a position on the quarter of the latter up until abeam, closing the range from 5,000 to 3,500 yards; then deliver a second attack and turn away unscathed. The hits which disabled the Nestor were made by the Regensburg after they had turned away. In view of the proved excellence of German gunnery in other respects, we should hesitate to attribute this to culpable inefficiency. It is a very different matter to hit a target, towed on a straight course at low speed, from what it is to hit a destroyer zigzagging widely at thirty knots, partially obscured by smoke and the splashes of shells from other ships. While great improvement in fire-control instruments and methods have been made since Jutland, we must make due allowance for the mental hazards of battle.
Jellicoe reports a similar experience as follows:
…at 7:10 p.m. a flotilla of enemy destroyers, supported by a cruiser, was observed to be approaching… A heavy fire was opened on the destroyers at ranges between 10,000 and 6,500 yards. At the latter range the destroyers turned and passed towards the rear of the line in a heavy smoke screen. One destroyer was seen by several observers to sink from the effects of gun…The 4th Light Cruiser Squadron and the 4th and nth Flotillas had been delayed in reaching their action station at the van until about 7;10 p.m., owing to the turns to the westward blade by the Battle Fleet to close the enemy… [and were] not very well placed for the first attack for the reason given above…(J-358, 091)
At this time, the Grand Fleet was disposed roughly in a quadrant athwart the course of the attacking destroyers, so that the battleships were in an exceptionally favorable position to open an effective fire. Furthermore, those of them that had no other target turned their turret guns on the destroyers. They had everything in their favor, including light. Yet, of the attacking flotilla, only one boat, “the S-35 was sunk, struck amidships by a heavy projectile.” (W-II-158)
It is also noteworthy that the British light forces were not in good position for counterattacking. Although the factors which produced this situation may be guarded against in future, these vessels are now subject to many new hazards. Onslaughts by bombers, torpedo planes, or motor torpedo boats may drive them from position. Therefore, m future battles, there is at legist as much likelihood as there was at Jutland that light forces may not be in place for counterattacking. Under the circumstances, we are driven to conclude that more reliance must be placed on secondary batteries for repelling destroyer attacks; and that these batteries must be strengthened to meet this responsibility, for which they were so pathetically inadequate at Jutland.
The development of aircraft has further altered the situation as follows: antiaircraft batteries and ammunition must be provided; protection must be increased; planes, supplies, shops, catapults, and personnel must be added. All this means extra weight.
The importance of the main battery is clearly recognized. It should be strengthened, if possible, but we should not forget that it would be of no value at the bottom of the sea. The secondary and antiaircraft batteries must first be augmented sufficiently to provide reasonable insurance that the gun platform will be kept afloat to engage vessels of its own type.
Future Ammunition Allowances
One point clearly demonstrated in the war was the necessity for more armor-piercing shells. At Coronel, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau fired approximately half their 8- inch projectiles to sink two hopelessly inferior cruisers, which offered no effective resistance. (W-II-50, 55) “At the Falk- lands the two British battle cruisers used up nearly three-quarters of their ammunition to sink two weaker antagonists, using 12-inch guns against 8.2-inch.” (Ch-I-270) When Beatty withdrew at the Dogger Bank, “the Seydlitz had only two hundred rounds of ammunition for the guns.” (S-85) Scheer states that at the time of his final breakaway at Jutland, “the leading ships of Squadron III could not have fought for any length of time, owing to the reduction of their supply of ammunition by the long spell of firing.” (S-166) This is a particularly serious matter, for this expenditure took place almost entirely in the preliminary phase of the battle, and resulted in no serious damage to the target ships. After regaining his base, Scheer apparently realized that his allowance of projectiles and powder was hopelessly inadequate for a serious engagement with the Grand Fleet; for, in discussing possible operations the following winter, he wrote: “On the other hand, the short days had this advantage; that we could time a battle so that our munitions did not give out.” (S-166)
Not only must we provide more armor-piercing shells, but we must still carry some high-explosive shells for use against cruisers and destroyers. Should we not make the ammunition allowance for the main battery equal to the accuracy life of the guns and continue to experiment with a view to increasing that life?
We have the smaller guns still to consider. The additions to the secondary battery require corresponding increases in magazine capacity. Then we must provide some gas and star shells, besides quantities of antiaircraft ammunition, none of which figured in pre-Jutland designs.
If we carefully review all these requirements, it is clear that the tonnage devoted to ammunition in existing battleships must be approximately doubled.
Additional Protection Needed
According to unimpeachable authority, thicker horizontal armor must be fitted as protection against plunging fire and aerial bombs. The report of the naval board which tested the protection of the incomplete Washington, after describing certain experiments, stated that, “this danger to a battleship must be met by thicker decks.” Furthermore, the “Navy Special Board Bearing on Proposed Department of Aeronautics” reported: “By armoring the battleship’s deck with six or seven inches of armor, we at one and the same time effectively meet any practicable attack from the air and also the attack by gun projectiles fired at the greatest probable ranges.” This is approximately twice the thickness of the protective deck in our newest ships.
This increased demand for horizontal armor has not been offset by any reduction in the necessity for vertical armor. Visibility conditions may necessitate fighting at short ranges where the latter would be just as essential as ever. Obviously, our fleet cannot run for home every time the visibility drops.
We should not forget that there has been a great improvement in the effectiveness of armor-piercing shells since Jutland. Jellicoe has described (J-69) the defects in British projectiles at that time. This means that the largest properly designed shell which has been tested in battle is the German 12- inch. Even the gunnery tests against the incomplete Washington were conducted with 14-inch ammunition. It is unnecessary to dwell on the greater destructiveness of the 16-inch shell which is now standard.
Another post-Jutland development in gunnery has been the effort to eliminate dispersion. This brings up the possibility of two or more shells striking closely enough together to smash in an entire section of armor. We must not only have armor plates thick enough to resist holing, but the framing back of the armor must be heavy enough to withstand unprecedented blows. The British evidently appreciated this, for Jane mentions as one of the features of H.M.S. Hood, “strong framing.” We should note that the Lion did have a section of armor driven in at the Dogger Bank. (W-II-98)
The need for better protection of the forward end of the ship was clearly demonstrated at Jutland. The Lutzow was sunk, due entirely to lost buoyancy forward. The Seydlitz was brought in with her forecastle awash. She would have gone under, but for the calm sea and the short distance to port. Other vessels came in, dangerously down by the head. That the Germans appreciated the necessity for increased protection forward is indicated by the following:
“Another project that did not mature was the construction of Krupp’s dreadnought destroyer. This was to be a vessel larger than any warship hitherto built, with a low freeboard to minimize target area, plated from end to end with massive armor and mounting a number of 18- or 20-inch guns, whose enormous shells would have pulverized any battleship they hit. The idea was to build four of these mastodons, which would constitute an ‘iron division,’ superior in fighting power to eight or a dozen ordinary battleships and use them as the spearhead in a great attack on the British fleet.” (Hector C. By water, Baltimore Sun, October 25, 1923).
The significant words are “plated from end to end with massive armor.” Apparently they planned to run the armor belt the full length of the ship. This is a point of particular interest to a power which might be compelled to fight thousands of miles from any well-equipped base. It would also provide urgently needed additional space for magazines.
The necessity for better underwater protection is also clear. Although the incomplete Washington easily withstood the explosion of three 2,000-pound bombs at some distance from the hull and two 400-pound torpedo war heads in contact with the hull, we must allow for increased effectiveness of these weapons. Even as long ago as 1918, the Germans produced a torpedo whose “explosive charge .... was 250 kilos (550 pounds) of a material that had three times the explosive power of guncotton.” (S-341) We may reasonably expect to see more powerful war heads before our new ships have been long in commission. A gradual increase in the size of bombs which planes can lift from the deck of a carrier is also probable. Our new ships must, manifestly, meet the conditions, not of 1916, but of x936 and 1946.
Still further demands must be met. The need for larger conning towers, particularly on flagships, is too generally appreciated to require discussion. Defense against gas also requires additional weight. We must, moreover, provide some protection for personnel that have hitherto been left in the open, since the hazards to which they are exposed have multiplied.
The protection of fire-control tops demands attention. They must obviously be proof against falling shrapnel and the bullets from attack planes. This necessitates a substantial steel structure from which observation is exclusively by periscope. The bomb menace not only calls for reducing the horizontal target offered by the tops, but reinforces the existing necessity for better Protection of vital communication cables and a less vulnerable supporting framework.
It is proposed to meet these requirements by a hexagonal heptapodal mast, differing from that of the Mutsu in that its struts would be small cylinders with thick walls, instead of large cylinders with thin walls; m that the struts would approach but not meet at the top; and in that the mast would be entirely enclosed except for the levels devoted to navigating and signal bridges. These latter should project out from the mast in order to provide a clear view overhead, which has now become as important as a clear view around the horizon. Emergency cabins, chart house, etc., would be inside the mast. The feature of this mast is that the small thick-walled struts form an unusually rugged support for the top, as well as partially splinter-proof conduits for vital communication cables. These cables might be in duplicate or triplicate so that communication would be uninterrupted, even though more than one strut were shot or blown away.
It is also proposed to build a similar but shorter mainmast just abaft and slightly lower than the stack. This would eliminate smoke interference in the after top and permit a wider arc of antiaircraft fire for the after group of guns. A further advantage of this grouping is that it would give our ships a distinctive silhouette, instantly recognizable, day or night.
The greatly increased requirements for armament, ammunition, and protection on the one hand and the deflated value of speed on the other, suggest that we reduce speed to liberate the necessary tonnage. There are certain points in connection with such a step which have not yet been discussed. They will be taken up in the following section.
Further Aspects of Speed
The advent of fleet submarines and aircraft carriers bears on this question. Due to the relatively low surface speed of submarines, and the obvious desirability of having them able to change their position relative to the main body, it is obvious that the submarines accompanying the slower fleet will have an advantage in ability to regain position, after slight changes of front. If aircraft carriers are to be kept with the main body or are to maintain any definite relative position, it is clear that the slower our fleet is, the greater will be the margin of speed that the carriers have available for flying operations, and the greater will be the number of merchant vessels having the necessary margin of speed to be utilized as carriers.
No student of history can fail to be impressed with the extent to which chance intervenes in battles. The point here is that speed is the most vulnerable of the characteristics of a fighting ship. Hence, when chance intervenes, mobility is the most likely quality to be lost and the fleet which has pinned its faith on speed will probably find the “breaks” of the battle going against it.
Let us examine the hazards to which speed is exposed. First, there are many mechanical casualties which may render this dearly bought characteristic unavailable. If speed is available on the day of battle, the tactical situation may be such that it cannot be utilized. Next, the chance of sudden reversals in course is so increased as to reduce the likelihood of attaining the desired position. Further, the vulnerability of high-speed ships may result in loss of speed before this characteristic can be utilized. Even if the desired position is attained, the advantage may be nullified or reversed as explained in a previous section. Finally, if everything works out just as the most enthusiastic advocate of speed would wish, it is extremely doubtful if the advantage gained would offset the disadvantage incurred by sacrificing protection. Taken singly, these hazards do not appear serious; together they form a practically insurmountable combination.
On the other hand, protection is built right into the ship, does not get out of order, and is always there when wanted. If the battle is ever allowed to reach the crucial stage, it will be wanted and, other things being equal, will be decisive.
There are still other advantages of protection. Its first cost is less and the maintenance is negligible. No extra personnel is required for its upkeep or operation. This reduces congestion in living spaces. The consciousness of ample protection gives confidence and reduces the mental hazards in battle. Since the speed of other classes of ships is based more or less on that of our battleships, a cut in the speed of the latter makes for more robust qualities all along the line.
Perhaps the greatest advantage of cutting the speed is that it permits a short, beamy hull which is ideal for a fighting ship. The initial stability is increased; better underwater protection can be provided; the gun platform is improved; and the target exposed to gunfire, torpedoes, or bombs is reduced. The resulting smaller turning circle is of value for ramming and general handiness, particularly in avoiding both torpedoes and collisions. On a given weight of armor, this form of hull can be afforded better protection. Similarly, a greater proportion of the space below the protective deck can be devoted to magazines, which room is further augmented by the reduction in size of machinery spaces. Since future ships must carry greatly increased supplies of ammunition, this point is particularly important.
A marked increase in beam has one disadvantage. Such ships could enter neither the existing locks at Panama, nor many of our present dry docks. It will be recalled, however, that a third set of locks at Panama has been under discussion for some time and will eventually have to be provided. If a decision were reached and work started immediately on these locks, they could probably be ready before the ships are. As for the dry docks, there are enough large ones on the East Coast to care for our reduced number of battleships when the fleet is in the Atlantic. On the West Coast, our base facilities are admittedly inadequate. When they are brought up to standard, wide docks will be just as easy to build as narrow ones. Thus the objections disappear, provided prompt action is taken. We should not forget Jellicoe’s regrets over having built ships to fit existing docks. (J-315)
The possible value of these ships in combined operations should not be overlooked. Their value in a decisive naval battle is paramount, but this must frequently be followed up by a landing. In a war with a weaker power, such operations might be the only way in which a battle fleet could be actively employed. In the World War, a smashing success at the Dardanelles would have yielded even greater results than a sweeping victory at Jutland. The point here is that, in combined operations, the value of speed is nil, since the ships must anchor for effective firing.
Mahan has expressed himself repeatedly and unmistakably on this issue of speed. Typical of his views is the following:
The great end of a war fleet, however, is not to chase, nor to fly, but to control the seas…When speed, not force, is the reliance, destruction may be postponed, but can be escaped only by remaining in port…Force does not exist for mobility but mobility for force…the time has come to say plainly that its [speed’s] value is being exaggerated…(M-82)
These words were written in 1898, when eighteen knots was a dizzy speed for battleships.
It would be interesting to know what would have been the German answer to the Rodney and Nelson, had they been allowed to build 35,000-ton battleships. The only clue that we have as to the type they would build is Mr. Bywater’s previously quoted report of Krupp’s proposed “dreadnought destroyer.” The powerful armament, low freeboard, and thick armor specified for these ships are all indicative of low speed. This is not proof; it is simply offered for what it is worth.
The strategic position of the United States, moreover, differs from that of any other nation. Our fleet might be compelled to fight thousands of miles from any well- quipped base. Seriously damaged ships would probably be lost on the long return trip. The best way to avoid having badly crippled vessels is to cut their speed and increase their armament and protection. Those ships still fit to carry on might have to wait some time before they could replenish their stocks of ammunition and stores. Consequently, generous supplies are of particular importance to us. On the other hand, no naval power has a fleet base within striking distance of our shores. We have, therefore, less to fear from “hit-and- run” raids than other powers and speed is of less value to us. Furthermore, thanks to the sound judgment of the General Board m years gone by, we have the slowest battleships of any of the leading powers and are consequently in the most favorable position to exploit the return swing of the speed pendulum.
Finally, it is in keeping with our naval traditions to strive for the maximum in hitting and resisting power. These traditions, moreover, have something besides sentiment behind them; their soundness has been proved in every test. Let us “hold fast to that which is good.”
We should first review the points previously brought out:
- The World War demonstrated that the value of speed had been greatly exaggerated and that the requirements for armament, ammunition, and protection have been increased.
- Post-Jutland developments have not only still further reduced the value of speed, but still further increased the demands for armament, ammunition, and protection.
- A cut in speed would be advantageous in the operation of fleet submarines and aircraft carriers; it would permit an improved form of hull which allows better protection, provides more space for magazines, increases stability, reduces tactical diameter, makes a better gun platform, and reduces the target exposed to gunfire, bombs or torpedoes; it would also be in accordance with the teachings of Mahan, with our unique strategical requirements and our sound naval traditions.
These points indicate that our problem consists, not in how much we dare increase the speed of battleships, but in how much we dare reduce it in order to meet the increased requirements for armament, ammunition, and protection, as well as to reap to the fullest extent possible the many advantages of such a step. It is, therefore, proposed that we ignore the tactical value of speed to the extent of making the battle speed of the fleet the same as its strategic speed and that for all future construction, this should be fifteen knots. If we go higher, fuel consumption runs up too rapidly; if we go lower, the submarine menace is increased and the strategic potentialities of the fleet are reduced. It is further proposed that the maximum speed of battleships should be only two knots above that of the fleet. The ratio 17:15 is nearly as great as 23:20. Increased battle ranges, moreover, have reduced the likelihood of sudden changes in the tactical situation calling for drastic alterations in formation. In other words, we maintain that the speed of our next battleships should be seventeen knots.
In conclusion, attention is called to the shifted burden of proof. This now rests with the advocates of higher speed, since their pet theories were either exploded in the war or rendered untenable by subsequent developments. If they still call for speed, they should demonstrate exactly what they propose to do with it that would justify the necessary sacrifices.