As stated in the textbook, Think Critical Thinking and Logical Skills For Everyday Life by Judith A Boss, there are two primary forms of moral theories. The first of these two theories are “those that claim that morality is relative” and the second is “those that claim that morality is universal” (Boss, 279). Moral relativists states that there is no universal law or view on what is considered to be morally right and what is morally wrong (Boss 279). In contrast, a universal morality states that there are specific moral values or views that all should follow (Boss, 279). Both of these views are filled with flaws.
This theory opposes the belief in the objectivity of moral truth. Moreover, there is no universal truth in ethics, only various cultural codes instead. On the other point of view, it has been suggested that the world should derive an objective truth in every action. This essay will argue against the existence of objective truth in
Bernard Williams’ essay, A Critique of Utilitarianism, launches a rather scathing criticism of J. J. C. Smart’s, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian ethics. Even though Williams claims his essay is not a direct response to Smart’s paper, the manner in which he constantly refers to Smart’s work indicates that Smart’s version of Utilitarianism, referred to as act-Utilitarianism, is the main focus of Williams’ critique. Smart illustrates the distinction between act-Utilitarianism and rule-Utilitarianism early on in his work. He says that act-Utilitarianism is the idea that the rightness of an action depends on the total goodness of an action’s consequences. Smart also discusses how act-Utilitarianism is often associated with hedonism, and that
Morals may be an examination for ethical quality, originates from the out of date "ethos" significance custom or inclination. It might be an examination for speculations concerning the thing that may awesome and severe dislike on humankind's immediate. There is no particular arranged from guaranteeing laws portraying the thing that may moral and the thing that may be not, in perspective there may be no straight on the other hand terrible reaction. Those second feeling about morals talk of "codes of morals", which would an arrangement of principles serve as bearing with individuals, every now and again to fields from guaranteeing callings for instance, such that advantages of the business or remedial. Moral differentiations for untrustworthy
In Response to McGrath’s Dilemma Against Moral Inferentialism An influential argument for moral skepticism is the moral regress argument (Sayre-McCord 1996). Moral inferentialists, who think we do have genuine moral knowledge, argue against the moral regress argument by rejecting the picture of justification one finds in the moral regress argument. Sarah McGrath (2004), in order to make room for her non-inferential moral perception account of moral knowledge, presents a dilemma against moral inferentialism, the thesis that all of our moral knowledge of particular cases is inferential. In particular, she challenges the most compelling version of moral inferentialism, which I call moral bridge inferentialism. In this paper, I argue that both horns of McGrath’s apparent dilemma turn out to lack argumentative weight against the moral bridge inferentialist.
Kant argued that it was Hume's philosophy, flinched from the "dogmatism". However, in the changed context and something unlike Hume, Kant had just sense a source of moral norms. The changed context consisted in the fact that Kant does not ask how to justify all value judgments in the same way, rather than separately dealing with the so-called morality in the narrow sense, that is, the attitudes on which it is possible to agree all and make them subject to an obligation or duty and other value judgments in which it sets the request. This difference, which extends along ethic is well understood. You can consider that a good deal of long
Critique of the Epicurus’ theory of the most valuable pleasure The goal of this essay is to provide an argument against possibility of Epicurus’ attempt to determine the most valuable pleasures. Through the analysis of the key concepts and their relation in Epicurus’ theory I will try to show that his concept of pleasure does not take into account basic human psychology and that this oversight leads to faulty generalization about human nature. I will argue that it is not possible to identify the most valuable pleasure due to diversity of our personalities. In order to understand Epicurus’ pursuit for the most valuable pleasure it is necessary to explain the notions of pleasure and desires. Pleasure is defined negatively as absence of physical
Yet, the constructivist view of Kantian ethics may present a contradiction: if morality is entirely constructed by human rationality, then there should not be a universal principle which one would need “to receive” in order to regulate decisions. Thus, as Kant rejects authority and experience, through reason and textual analysis, drawing both from Kant’s writing and Augustine’s City of God, it is imperative to reconcile the conflict between the realist—that morality exists independent of rationality—and constructivist readings of Kant’s ethics. That “in practical common reason, when it cultivates itself, a dialectic inadvertently unfolds [...] and one is therefore [unable] to find rest anywhere but in a complete critique of our reason” lends credence a constructivist
According to John Rawls, his ‘A Theory of Justice’ is an attempt to offer a system of justice, which is a viable substitute to the prevalent practice of choosing a deviation of the principle of utilitarianism which is limited by the intuitionism of people (Rawls, viii). This, Rawls reasons, is because despite the sophistication of the various theories of Utilitarianism presented by philosophers like Bentham and Mill, it failed to work out a “systematic moral conception” leaving a difference between the principles of Utility and the moral sentiments of the people (ibid). The alternative system of justice provided by Rawls is an attempt to address this difference with rationality. The function of rationality here is to produce a theory that can consistently provide an explanation for human behaviour and motivation. This alternative system of justice is described as ‘justice as fairness’.
Copleston in one of his books, A History of Philosophy opines that, it is really difficult for one to totally reject all the old values or binding force of what is customarily called morality. This is because, one who attempts this, may degenerate himself as to destroy himself morally, since the traditional morality has put into cognizance, the values that enhance the dignity of the human person, morally and likewise. Then it becomes questionable, as to why Nietzsche calls the old morality the slave morality, even when he retains some of the values in his master morality. Nietzsche’s outright condemnation and rejection of conventional morality in favour of subjective morality, is for me not a true response to the reality of the human society. Owing to the fact that man lives in the society presupposes or demands