Restitution W.r.t. to Civil Procedure Code 1908
· The expression restitution has not been defined in the code, but it is “an act of restoring a thing to its proper owner.” Restitution means restoring of anything unjustly taken from another. It provides for putting a party in possession of land, tenement or property, who had been unlawfully dispossessed, deprived or disseised of it.
· In other words, restitution means restoring to a party the benefit which the other party has received under a decree subsequently held to be wrong. The word restitution in its etymological sense means restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree what has been lost to him execution of the decree or in direct consequence of the decree.
· Any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep.
· Restitution is an ancient institution which has had an established position in the history of law and justice. It has its historical origin in the middle Ages and can mainly be found in the Germanic Common laws. Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘restitution’ as “an act of restoring a thing to its proper owner”.
· The word in its etymological sense means ‘restoring to a party on the modification, variation or reversal of a decree or order, what has been lost to him in execution of decree or order of the court or in direct consequence of a decree or order’.
· To cite Black’s Law Dictionary, the term has been defined in three senses, viz. (1) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (2) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; (3) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another. As far as Indian Code of Civil procedure is concerned, though the term “restitution” has not been defined in the Code, it has got its statutory recognition in the section 144.
Scope of the Topic:
· Section 144 of the code embodying the doctrine of restitution does not confer any new substantive right to the party not available under the general law. The section merely regulates the power of the court in that behalf. It is the paramount duty of all courts to ensure that they do no injury to any litigant.
· The expression “ the act of the Court” does not mean merely the act of the primary or trial court or intermediate court of appeal but the act of the court as a whole from the lowest court which entertains the matter to the highest court which finally disposes the case.
· Moreover, the section is not exhaustive and, therefore, even if the case does not fall within the strict term of Section 144 of the Code, it is always at the discretion of the Court to grant relief of restitution.
· Further Since the object of the doctrine is to shorten litigation and to afford speedy relief to the party adversely .affected, and merely lays down a procedure, the provision should be construed liberally.
Study of Civil Provisions
The Expression restitution has not been defined in the Code of Civil Procedure, but it is an act of restoring a thing to its proper owner. In other words, restitution means restoring to a party the benefit which the other party has received under a decree subsequently held to be wrong. In law the term ‘restitution’ is used in three senses:
· return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status;
· compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another;
· Compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another.
Doctrine of Restitution
· In Halsbury’s Laws of England, it is stated, any civilized system of law is bound to provide remedies for cases of what has been called unjust enrichment or unjust benefit, that is, to prevent a man from retaining the money of, or some benefit derived from, another which it is against conscience that he should keep.
· The doctrine of restitution contemplates the case where property has been received by a decree-holder in execution of a decree, and the decree, or part thereof, is subsequently varied of reversed on appeal by the judgement-debtor, or even in a separate suit or otherwise, as for instance, on an application under the Bengal Money Lenders Act or Agriculturist Relief Act.
· The principle of restitution has been statutorily recognised in s 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It does not confer any new substantive right to the party not available under the general law, but merely regulates the power of the court in that behalf. It is the paramount duty of all court to ensure that they do no injury to any litigant.
Section 144: Application for restitution
1. Where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose, the Court which passed the decree or order shall, on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution or otherwise, cause such restitution to be made as will, so far as may be, place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for such decree or order or such part thereof as has been varied, reversed, set aside or modified; and, for this purpose, the Court may make any order, including orders for the refund of costs and for the payment of interest, damages, compensation and mesne profits, which are properly consequential on such variation, reversal, setting aside or modification of the decree or order.
A. For the purpose of sub-section (1) the expression “Court which passed the decree or order” shall be deemed to include,
B. Where the decree of order has been varied or reversed in exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction, the court of first instance;
C. Where the decree or order has been set aside by a separate suit, the court of first instance which passed such decree or order;
D. Where the court of first instance has ceased to exist or has ceased to have, jurisdiction to execute it, the court which, if the suit wherein the decree or order was passed were instituted at the time of making the application for restitution under this section, would have jurisdiction to try such suit.
3. No suit shall be instituted for the purpose of obtaining any restitution or other relief which could be obtained by application under sub-section (1).
· Section 144 enables the successful party to be placed in status quo ante and empowers the court to order restitution when a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding.
· There was however a conflict of judicial opinion as to whether the provision of S. 144 applied to cases also where a decree was set aside or modified otherwise than on an appeal. The amendment made in S. 144 clarifies the position that it is applicable to such cases also where a decree is set aside or modified otherwise than on an appeal.
· Under the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act 1956, the benefit of S. 144 has been enlarged so as to comprise within its orbit not only a decree but also an order, with the result that upon the ultimate reversal or variation of a judgment or order the section enjoins that the court of first instance shall on the application of the party concerned cause restitution to be made so as to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for the erroneous judgment or order.
· S.M. Deshmukh v. Ganesh Krishnaji Khare: The doctrine of restitution is based on the principle that the first and highest of the duties of all the Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury or wrong to the suitors. The duty or jurisdiction of the Court to grant restitution is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the courts to act fairly and rightly in the circumstances towards all parties involved
Requisite conditions for the applicability of restitution:
· The restitution sought must be in respect of that decree or order which had been varied or reversed;
· The applicant has lost, or been deprived of, something by reason of the decree or order which has been subsequently varied or reversed;
· The party applying for restitution must be entitled to a benefit under a reversing decree or order;
· The relief claimed must be properly consequential on such variation of the decree or order; and
· The applicant must be a party to the litigation which has terminated according to law.
· If the aforesaid conditions are satisfied, it gives no choice or discretion to the Court, and the only course it has to follow is to order restitution to the party which had suffered loss on account of the erroneous decree or order.
· Section 144, Civil Procedure Code, imposes no limitations on the rights of the judgment-debtor to get back the benefit, to which he is entitled under the appellate Court’s decree, which has reversed or varied the trial court’s decree. On a perusal of S. 144, it is obvious that the question whether the balance of convenience is in his favour or not, is irrelevant for the purpose of granting restitution.
· Section 144 obviously consists of two parts. The first part postulates the variation or reversal of a decree or an order in an appeal. The second part is more important. Restitution can be granted on the application of any party entitled to any benefit by way of restitution, and it has to be determined by the court granting restitution that the party who has given the application is entitled to the benefit of restitution.
· Such an inference cannot be drawn in favour of a person who is a mere trespasser. Where the lower appellate court as well as the High Court held that the sale deed in favour of the appellant was null and void and no rights were conferred on him by virtue of the same, the appellant was a mere trespasser and he did not fulfil the second condition of section 144, C.P.C.
· In S.N. Banerji v. Kuchwar Lime and Stone Co. Ltd., it was held that where the persons who have been dispossessed were found to be trespassers and persons in subsequent possession were lawfully in possession by virtue of a valid lease in their favour, it was not necessary for the ends of justice that the trespasser should be restored to possession though they might succeed in a suit for possession. That case was followed in Mahaden Prasad v. Calcutta Dyeing and Cleaning Co.
Section 151 Inherent Powers to Grant Restitution:
Sec 151. Saving of inherent powers of court.-
Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, or to prevent abuse of the process of the court
· it is a saving clause and only gives legislative recognition of an age-old and well established principle that every court has inherent power to do that real and substantial justice between the parties for the administration of’ which alone it exists. It does not confer any substantive right on parties but is meant to get over the difficulties arising from rules of procedure.
· Section 15l gives no right to a party to make an application. It gives power to the court to pass such orders as it thinks fit. Section 151 is really intended to prevent courts from being rendered impotent by any omission in the Code; but it is not intended to override the main enactment of the law.
· The court has inherent powers, in order to advance the cause of justice and not to allow justice to be defeated, to issue orders in the nature of even injunctions. Therefore, it cannot be said that the court has no power to issue stay of a suit under its inherent powers unless the case clearly falls within the four corners of Order XXXIX, Rules 1 and 2.
· The Code of Civil Procedure is not exhaustive and S. 151 does not confer any new powers but only makes statutory recognition of the inherent power of the court to do certain things ex debito justitiae (to act as justice demands). It is in the ends of justice to avoid needless expense and inconvenience to
· Parties. So the court will not refuse relief merely because the application there for is made under a wrong section or because there is some technical defect.
· The abuse of the process of the court may be the result of an act of $he court itself (default its officers) or may be done by the party (misrepresentation). In all such cases the court is empowered to remedy the wrong.
· The inherent powers exercised under S. 151, C.P.C. are discretionary. In considering the question of propriety in invoking the power, the court should take into account several matters, some of which are the complexity of the question involved, availability of a more complete and efficacious remedy by means of a suit and the apparent justice of the claim. These are not exhaustive but merely illustrative. They would vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case. No hard and fast rule can be laid down.
· Where the averments in the application did not make out a case as to how the exercise of the inherent power of the court was necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court and the applicant did not come to the court with clean hands and had suppressed the facts and the case involved complexity of facts and the justice of the claim was adverse to the applicant, it was held that there was no case for the exercise of inherent powers in favour of the applicant.
· Where the possession has been taken forcibly by a landlord/defendant during the pendency of the proceedings, i.e., when the application for temporary injunction restraining landlord/defendants from interfering with possession is dismissed by the trial court and before filing the appeal, even though S. 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure may not strictly apply, the court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under S. 151 can grant restitution. ‘By invoking the inherent jurisdiction the Court would be justified to do justice and put back the parties in the same position in which they were, but for the order of the trial court.
· The Court has power and jurisdiction under section 151 of the Code to grant police help to implement its order of injunction.
Illustrations of Inherent Powers:
The court has an inherent power under S. 151, C.P.C.:
· To consolidate suits and appeals including appeals to the Supreme Court;
· To postpone the hearing of suits pending the decision of a selected action or where some of the issues are common in another pending suit;
· To stay cross-suits on the ground of convenience;
· To allow a defence in forma pauperis,
· To grant restitution apart from the provisions of S. 144, C.P.C.; Where the court rectifies a mistake in a decree in the exercise of its inherent powers, it has jurisdiction to order restitution of any benefit which may have been received wrongly by the persons who were not entitled to such benefits but for the mistake in the decree;
· To add a party or to transpose parties, or where the appeal is filed against dead persons to allow the appellant to add legal representatives of the deceased as parties in a proper case;
· To entertain the application of a third person to be made a party;
· To punish summarily by imprisonment for contempt’s of court committed by the publication of a libel out of court;
· To stay the drawing up of the court’s own orders or to suspend their operation, if the necessities of justice so require;
· To stay the carrying out of a preliminary order pending appeal;
· To amend decrees by correcting errors in cases not covered by S. 152. The court has an inherent jurisdiction to rectify its own mistake and to do justice between the parties where injustice has been done to them due to the mistake of the court;
Gangadhar v. Raghubar Dayal:
· Broadly speaking, restitution is the right of a party to being placed in the same position which he occupied before the decree or order which has subsequently been varied or reversed was executed. Suppose a landlord files a suit for ejectment against his tenant. The suit is decreed ex parte and in execution of this ex parte decree the tenant is ejected and the landlord is put in possession.
· Subsequently, the ex parte decree is set aside. The tenant can certainly without waiting for the final decision in the suit apply for being put back in possession, i.e., being placed in the same position which he occupied before he was ejected in execution of the ex parte decree which has subsequently been set aside. It is so because the very setting aside of the ex parte decree entitled the tenant to be put back in possession.
The power of a court to grant restitution is not confined to the cases covered by the provisions of this section. It extends also to cases which do not come strictly within s 144. Under s 151 courts has inherent power to order restitution irrespective of s 144. Where the standard rent fixed by the Rent Controller under the West Bengal Premises Rent Control Act 1950, was reduced in appeal, it was held that a claim for restitution of the excess rent paid under the order of the controller was not maintainable under this section but it could be sustained on general principles of restitution. The principle of the restitution will be of no avail as against a party to the suit who get the property otherwise than under the decree or the order of the court. Hence, where the petitioner gets the possession of the property under executive order, its restitution cannot be ordered.
Role of Judiciary
· The Lordship of the Privy Council said: “It is the duty of the court under section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reserved. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved.”
· The Allahabad High Court has however taken the view that a case for restitution would fall within the terms of s 144, even when the decree is set aside in a separate suit, or where the court itself sets aside its own ex parte decree. This view has now been confirmed by the Amendment Act 1976 which declares in express terms, that the restitution is available in cases where a decree is set aside or modified in another subsequent suit filed in another court for that purpose.
· The High Courts of Madras, Madhya Pradesh, and Patna have also held that s 144 will apply when the decree or order is reversed, otherwise than in appeal as in an independent proceeding or by the legislation. When a sale was set aside on an application under O 21, r 90, the judgement-debtor was awarded mesne profits under s 151 from the decree-holder purchaser for the period he was in possession.
Land Mark Cases
Cases on Section 144
Rodger v. Comptoir descompte de Paris:
“One of the first and highest duties of all courts is to take care that the act of the court does no injury to any of the suitors and when the expression, the act of the court is used, it does not mean merely the act of the primary court, or of any intermediate court of appeal, but the act of the court as a whole from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest court which finally disposes case.”
Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Maewari,
A sale in execution of a decree as set aside on the grounds that the sale certificate comprised property different from that which was attached. The property was purchased by a stranger to the decree, and the price paid by him in to court was applied towards satisfaction of the decree. The judgement-debtor applied for possession
Amba Lal v. Ramgopal,
A, in execution of a money decree, brought property to sale as of his judgement –debtor and purchased himself. B and C who held decrees against the same judgement-debtor, applied for rateable distribution. A, therefore, paid the sale proceeds into court and they were rateably distributed between A, B and C. Co-sharers of the judgement then obtained a decree exempting part of the property from the operation of the sale. The amount available for rateable distribution was, therefore, reduced and A was entitled to a proportionate refund from B and C.
S. Prabhavathi vs Rohini Kilaru and Anr.
The Supreme Court while observing that s 144 of CPC incorporates only a part of the general law of restitution and not exhaustive, laid down as under:
“The jurisdiction to make restitution is inherent in every court and will be exercised whenever the justice of the case demands. It will be exercised under inherent powers where the case did not strictly fall within the ambit of Section 144, Section 144 opens with the words "where and in so far as a decree or an order is varied or reversed in any appeal, revision or other proceeding or is set aside or modified in any suit instituted for the purpose...."
Jamaluddin v. Mirza Quader Baig,
It was held that for restoration of possession to the tenant, who was dispossessed by the landlord from the suit premises forcibly in violation of the orders of interim injunction, there is no necessity of filing a petition under Section 144 of CPC. The Court can restore possession in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 151 of CPC. Similarly,
In Sujit Pal v. Prabir Kumar Sun,
It was held that when the plaintiff in a suit for permanent injunction and declaration of tenancy was forcibly dispossessed in violation of the interim injunction, the civil Court can invoke its inherent power to grant temporary mandatory injunction by directing the police to restore possession. The inherent jurisdiction to pass an order in restitution can be exercised by a persona designate entrusted with functions of a court as for example by a district munsiff to whom the decree is transferred for execution under s 66 of the Madras Village Courts Act 1889.
Cases on Section 151:
Ghuznavi v. Allahabad Bank Ltd:
The exercise of such inherent power can only be invoked where the court is satisfied that the provisions of the Code are not sufficient to meet the exigencies of the case: Justice Asutosh Mookerjee in the case of Ghuznavi v. Allahabad Bank Ltd)
Hukam Chand v. Kamalanand Singh:
· Justice Woodroff in Hukum Chand v. Kamalanand Singh, observed with reference to the applicability of S. 151 of the Code:
· “I am not aware of any authority which has laid down that the Code of Civil Procedure is exhaustive. The essence of a Code no doubt is to be exhaustive on the matters in respect of which it declares the law, on any point specifically dealt with by it. In respect of such matters the court cannot disregard or go outside the letters of the enactment according to its true construction.
· The Code does not affect the power and duty of a court where no specific rule exists to act according to justice, equity and good conscience, though in exercise of such power it must be careful to see that its decision is based on the sound general principles and is not in conflict with them or the intention of the Legislature.
· “The court has, therefore, in many cases where the circumstances require it acted upon the assumption of the possession of an inherent power to act ex debito justitiae and to do that real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone it exists.”
· It has, therefore, to be noted that the Code is not exhaustive and in matters with which it does not deal the court will exercise an inherent jurisdiction to do justice between the parties as warranted under the circumstances and which the necessities of the case require.
Padam Sen V. The State of Uttar Pradesh:
· It has been held by their lordships of the Supreme Court in Padam Sen v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, that the inherent powers of the court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the court by the Code.
· They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the court is free to exercise them for the purposes mentioned in S. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature. It is also well recognised that the inherent power is not to be exercised in a manner which will be contrary to or different from the procedure expressly provided in the Code.
Even if a case is not come under the section 14 of the CPC, s. 151 gives an inherent right to the courts to grant restitution in order to dispense justice to the parties. It is not necessary that if the case is not covered under the specified provision then no restitution can be granted it is inherent in the courts to grant restitution for meeting
· Section 144 is so framed as to enable the successful party to be placed in status quo ante As stated above, it enjoins that as far as possible the position which the judgment-debtor and the decree-hol4er would have occupied under the amended decree should be made available to them.
· If the possession of property by a party has been disturbed by an order or decree of the court which has been varied or reversed, it is unquestionable that the party is entitled to be put back to the same position as he had held previous to the disturbance of his possession.
· And the duty and the jurisdiction of the court in directing restitution is to place the parties in the position which they would have occupied but for the act of the court. It is the duty of the court to see that the act of the court—meaning thereby not only primary or any intermediate court of appeal but the act of court as a whole from the lowest court which entertains jurisdiction over the subject-matter to the highest court which finally disposes of the suit—does no injury to any of the suitors.
· The section should be liberally construed, the object being to shorten litigation and to afford a speedy and simple remedy. The principle of restitution is not restricted by the exact words of S. 144, C.P.C.
· The doctrine of restitution is that on the reversal of a judgment the law raises an obligation on the party to the record who received the benefit of the erroneous judgment to make restitution to the other party for what he had lost and it is the duty of the court to enforce that obligation unless it is shown that restitution would be clearly contrary to the real justice of the case.
· In proceedings for restitution the Court has to consider the equities arising in the case and the demand for justice that the rights of both the rival parties make, and to pass such an order as will do justice to both the parties.
· The status quo ante is not to be achieved blindly. Such relief has to be given as is properly consequential on the reversal or variation of the decree or order. To find the appropriate relief the court has to see that the party applying for restitution is entitled to a benefit under the reversing decree and that such benefit has not been extinguished or mitigated by reason of supervening events which have either changed the subject-matter of the benefit or its character and incident.
· The term ‘decree’ covers an order. The section in terms also does not state or require that the applicant must be a party to the proceeding which has resulted in the original decree being reversed or varied; nor does it require that the final decree should provide for a right in him to apply for restitution.
· The language of S. 144, C.P.C. does not expressly rule out the case of a decree which has been varied or reversed by the same court. The section seems to be couched in very general terms and there is nothing in it to rule out the case of such a decree from the purview of that section by necessary implantation.
· The court has jurisdiction to order restitution under S. 144 even if the decree is modified or reversed by a court of co-ordinate jurisdiction in a separate suit.
· The limitations of the inherent power may be noted, In the first place, the court has no inherent power to do what is prohibited by the Code so as to defeat a statutory provision of the law of the land. Section 151, C.P.C. does not invest the court with jurisdiction over matters which are excluded from its cognizance.
· Thus no appeal can be allowed from a non-appealable order. Similarly, when once a judgment is signed it cannot be altered or added to save as provided by S. 152 or on review. In the same way an ex parte decree cannot be set aside when no case has been made out within the meaning of Order IX, Rule 13 of the Code.
· The inherent power is not to be exercised where the applicant has remedy provided elsewhere in the Code but has neglected to avail himself of it.
· The inherent power must not be exercised so as to come in conflict with the general principles of law. The court cannot entertain a suit arising in a place where it has no jurisdiction, nor can it acting under S. 151 recall its own previous order or hear appeal from its own judgment except as provided in order to cure a legal defect.
· The inherent power vested in the court is discretionary. The mere fact that there is remedy will not attract the provisions of S. 151, C.P.C., unless it is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
· In exercising jurisdiction under its inherent powers, the court is influenced by the justice of the case in favour of the party who invokes its aid. Where the party has been guilty of laches or has been negligent in prosecuting his remedy, a court of law would be most reluctant to exercise its inherent powers in his favour. Equity aids the vigilant and not the indolent.
· If there be specific provision in the Code, which would meet the necessities of the case, inherent powers cannot be invoked.
· The court is not to invoke its inherent powers under S. 151 for the purpose of impleading the legal representatives of the deceased respondent if the suit had abated on account of the appellant not taking appropriate steps within time to bring the legal representatives of the deceased party on the record and when its application for setting aside the abatement is not allowed on account of its failure to satisfy the court that there was sufficient cause for not impleading the legal representatives of the deceased in time and for not applying for the setting aside of the abatement within time.
· It is not permissible to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the court as defined by S. 151 in cases where the applicant has his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and has neglected to avail himself of it. So also the inherent jurisdiction vested in courts is to be exercised only to further the ends of justice and not to create complication in a cause by introducing matters, the adjudication of which may be impossible without reception of additional evidence.
· The inherent power of a court is in addition to and complementary to the powers expressly conferred under the Code. But that power will not be exercised if its existence is inconsistent with, or comes into conflict with, any of the powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred by the other provisions of the Code.
· Inherent jurisdiction of the court must be exercised subject to the rule that if the Code does contain specific provisions which would meet the necessities of the case such provisions should be followed and inherent jurisdiction should not be invoked.
· The Court cannot make use of the special provisions of S. 151 of the Code where a party had his remedy provided elsewhere in the Code and he neglects to avail himself of the same. Further, the power under S. 151 of the Code cannot be exercised as an appellate power.
· Where a compromise decree was challenged and S. 151, C.P.C. was invoked on the ground that the compromise decree was defective as the parties did not sign the compromise or that the terms of the compromise were vague or uncertain, it was held that the petition invoking inherent powers under S. 151 was not maintainable and the proper remedy is to prefer an appeal.
· Even where a superior court issues a stay order, if the decree is executed before the stay order of the superior court reaches the original court, the stay order becomes inoperative. The same principle will apply in respect of the order passed by the same court regarding stay where decree for delivery of the possession is clearly executed. In such a case no inherent jurisdiction is vested in the trial court to restore the possession of land already given to the decree-holder.
· It is true that there is no specific provision from which it can be gathered that compulsion can be exercised against a person to produce documents. Such power, however, cannot be said to be absent with the court. Section 151 is the reservoir of that power where under inherent powers can be exercised by the court to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the court.
· Obviously, in order to exercise inherent powers, facts and circumstances of each case would have to be seen by the court if it comes to the view that a person purposely, contumaciously and maliciously was withholding documents required to be produced by it. There is no reason why the civil court cannot in that situation to further the object of Ss. 30 and 32, Civil Procedure Code, exercise the inherent powers under S. 151, C.P.C.
· Such recourse can be taken only when it is found that the relief asked for cannot be granted under the provisions under which the jurisdiction of the Court or Tribunal is invoked, much less when the result would be to deprive the party of a right of appeal provided against the order passed under such a provision.
# Concise Oxford English Dictionary (2002) at p. 1220
# Per Subba Rao, J. in Mahijibhai Mohanbhai v. Patel Manibhai, AIR 1965 SC 1477 at p. 1482
# Black’s Law Dictionary, seventh end, p1315, as quoted in Southern Eastern Coalfields Ltd. V. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 2003 SC 4482
# Halsbury’s Law of England (4th Edn.) at p. 434.
# Jogendra Nath Singh v. Hira Shahu AIR 1948 All 252 (FB); Maqbool Alam v. Khodaija Begum AIR 1949
# Alpati Ankamma v. Pvulari Basava AIR 1945 Mad. 360.
# KN Krishnappa v. TR Gopal Krishna Setty AIR 1997 Kant 152; Kaku Singh v. Gobind Singh AIR 1959 Punj. 468
# Ram Prasad v. British Insulated Calenders Cables Ltd. AIR 1954 Cal 13
# Montharampallipadipura Attakoya v. Neelathupura Kunhiseethikoya Thangal AIR 1996 Ker 286
# Jogendra Nath Singh v. Hira Shahu AIR 1948 All 252 (FB); Maqbool Alam v. Khodaija Begum AIR 1949
# Allahabad Theartres Ltd. V. Ram Sjiwan Misra (1949) ILR All 313.
# Ankamma v. Basavapunniah AIR 1945 Mad
# Choudhry Hari Ram v. Pooran Singh AIR 1962 MP 295
# Harihar Sao v. Bhagwan Das AIR 1963 Pat 333
# Ram Rattan v. Banarsi Lal AIR 1930 Pat 280, Pat 280
# 1871) LR 3 PC 456.
# AIR 1992 PC 269, 49 IA 351
# AIR 1933 All 218
# AIR 2006 Andhra High Court
# Padma Gowda v. Yuvaraja Hedge AIR 1960 Mys 377