What is the definition of the term “interdiction” as applied to amphibious assault combat? It’s the act of preventing the movement of enemy troops to a point where they can mount a counterattack.
We recently discussed D-Day and noted that interdiction of German reinforcements and counterattacks was instrumental in the success of the assault. In WWII, the enemy had to be pretty much within visual range to mount any kind of effective counterattack because most weapons had only a line of sight effective range. Even artillery required that the enemy be within visual range to provide spotting. Thus, if we could keep the enemy beyond visual range, their counterattack would be negated. Further, counterattacks generally consisted of troops (in tanks or mounted, perhaps, but still troops). On a practical basis that meant that interdiction could occur within a few to several miles of our forces and be effective although, of course, it could also occur much farther away than that.
Now, let’s consider the modern assault battlefield and the range and composition of today’s counterattack.
Today, counterattacks do not have to consist of troops, at all, but can consist of cruise and ballistic missiles with ranges of hundreds or thousands of miles as well as artillery supported by UAVs in addition to conventional armored units and troops. Interdiction has become a much more difficult proposition. The enemy no longer has to move to within visual range. Thus, our interdiction efforts must be able to occur at much longer ranges. I’m not sure that “interdict” is even the right word anymore. Regardless, we need to be able to stop cruise and ballistic missile counterattacks which means either shooting them down in the air (the hard way to do it) or disrupting and preventing their launch at greatly extended ranges (theoretically, the easier and more efficient way to do it).
The point is that our interdiction efforts must range much further than in WWII. In fact, those ranges may take us within the heart of enemy defensive systems, further complicating the interdiction effort.
If you think about it, an opposed landing no longer needs to have enemy soldiers anywhere near the landing site to be considered “opposed”. Opposition in the form of cruise and ballistic missiles and long range rockets and artillery can constitute an effective opposing force with absolutely no enemy troops in the immediate vicinity of the assault force. This also casts doubt on the “land where they ain’t” concept.
So, as we contemplate amphibious assaults, we need to provide a means of interdicting enemy forces that may be hundreds of miles from the assault site and may have no need or desire to move closer. Again, the term interdiction is probably no longer even valid so don’t get hung up on the terminology.
Now, how can we do this? What forces can an amphibious assault group call on to accomplish this interdiction?
Naval Gunfire? It won’t be naval gunfire – that can’t even reach the beach!
Marine Artillery? It won’t be artillery since that doesn’t generally have the range and it won’t be available until later waves. Worse, the Marines are cutting back on artillery as they pursue “lightness” of force.
Helicopters? This is a viable option within relatively shorter ranges. Attack helos are effective. Unfortunately, amphibious assault groups don’t have sufficient numbers for effective long range interdiction of multiple targets. Worse, every helo sent on interdiction missions is a helo unavailable to provide the crucial, initial support for the landing itself. Still worse is the vulnerability of helos to modern shoulder launched surface to air missiles and gunfire (ZSU and the like). Compounding this vulnerability is the probable need to move deeper within the enemy’s air defense systems in order to reach the counterattacking units.
Cruise Missiles? Cruise missiles are viable and effective against fixed targets. Moving targets are relatively impervious to cruise missile attack. A further limitation is the limited inventory in an assault group. Cost is also a factor. At around $1.5M per missile, it’s an expensive way to provide explosions.
Fixed Wing Aviation? This is the most effective and flexible option though it comes with the attendant risk of pilot losses and difficult rescue operations. The problem is that the assault group will not likely have sufficient numbers of aircraft to handle the interdiction. This is where Air Force support will be required. Assuming there are bases close enough to the interdiction sites to allow a sufficient sortie rate, the Air Force can provide both the strike capability and the escort support needed to conduct successful interdiction. However, the assumption of adequate basing is highly suspect. Bases in likely regions of conflict are neither numerous nor secure from cruise and ballistic missile attack.
UAVs? While viable, this is not currently an effective option due to the lack of aggregate payload relative to the need. A handful of UAVs, each carrying a couple of Hellfires or bombs is just not sufficient for the task.
Of course, in the real world, we would use a combination of all of these assets.
The point is that we need to anticipate the requirement for very long range interdiction and build forces to address that need. We also need to consider the degree to which we can count on Air Force support. While viable and effective at the task, the Air Force suffers from lack of basing in likely regions of conflict and susceptibility of those bases to attack by ballistic and cruise missiles with the result being a potentially significantly impact on sortie rate. That being the case, we need to ask whether we need significantly more interdiction range firepower organic to the assault group. At first blush, the answer would seem to be, yes.
Possible options to enhance the assault group long range interdiction capability include the following.
- UAV carrier and a large, strike-oriented UAV air wing.
- Arsenal ship and/or SSGN to greatly increase the on-scene inventory of cruise missiles without consuming the AAW escort ship’s VLS cells which will be needed for surface to air missiles.
- Short range ballistic missiles
- Significantly larger carrier air wings so that more aircraft are available for interdiction
In short, if we are serious about amphibious assaults we need to begin developing the necessary doctrine and procuring the necessary tools for a viable assault capability.