Approximately twenty years after the publication of UNESCO’s Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generations towards Future Generations, the need to protect the earth for the future generations has finally received a significant consideration in the field of ethics. The key findings on climate change have claimed it to be the biggest peril to the present generation and the future generations with the last three decades being successively warmer at the Earth’s surface (IPCC “climate change 2014”). The substantial variability of climate change has contributed to detrimental effects in the economic, social, political and environmental sphere that will continue to persist long after we are gone. Therefore, it is essential to conceptualise whether the present generation has any moral obligations or responsibilities towards the future generation with respect to mitigation or adaptation to climate change. If they do then on what grounds can we derive and justify what obligations those in the present have to the future generations. Therefore, the aim of the paper is to advance the aforementioned issue by approaching it through principles that are grounded in theories: virtue ethics, deontology and care ethics. In addition to that, it will counter notions such as the non-identity problem, the non-reciprocity problem and the non-existence problem concerning future agents to substantiate its’ argument. The main body of the article entails of two aspects: concepts justifying the lack of moral obligation to the future generation and their counter-arguments.
As the intergenerational dimension and climate change have uncertainties involved, it is crucial to put forward some suppositions. The most basic and fundamental assumptions essential for the ethical inquiry of this issue is to consider that there is a future and, in addition to that, there will agents in the future who will exist (Sanklecha, 229-30). This is necessary to conceptualise the issue whether the present generation holds a responsibility towards the future generations to curb “climate change” or not.
2. The Challenge of Climate Change
It has been highlighted that any increase in the present-level global warming (1°C > pre-industrial periods) will likely be trailed by adverse consequences to food and water ecosystems, human security and peace, and economic well-being. It will result in an upsurge in morbidity and mortality rates with vulnerable sections of the society (children, elderly, women, indigenous communities) more exposed to the threat. Furthermore, the pervasive and irreversible impacts of climate change will produce inequitable conditions around the globe because of prevailing socio-economic dynamics (IPCC “synthesis report”). The evidence so far has suggested that climate change is a “collective action problem” because emissions by any agent at any scale (individual, community, company, country) affect other agents. Therefore, there is a growing consensus in the scientific community that adaptation and mitigation should promote sustainable development at all levels. There is also a recognition that present-day delay in action would put the responsibility on the future generations, who will face greater vulnerability and exposure due to reduction in the climate-resilient pathways that we still have a chance to avail (IPCC “climate change report”, 33).
3. Application of Ethics
There are three main problems- non-identity, non-existence and non-reciprocity- that challenge the claim that the present generation has a moral obligation towards the future individuals. Parfit (1984) believes that we do not have any obligation to future people because there is no definitive group of individuals to whom we owe this obligation. The argument is based on the understanding that we do not know who exactly will exist in the future. This main conception behind the ‘non-identity problem’ also has implications on preventive policies (mitigation or adaptation) as he states that if we come up with policies related to people we would change the course of time and action. Therefore, any changes caused due to the policies would set a chain of events which would alter the existence of individuals in the future. Hence, making our knowledge of who would exist in the future incomprehensible. However, this quandary has been argued on several grounds. If we invoke the harm principle which states that “we have a moral obligation not to perform an act that causes no harm to others” (Sinnott-Armstrong, p. 297), we can argue that we cannot preclude the present generation from taking action against climate change, which would surely make their lives less terrible than they already would be, simply because they would “not have been” at all (Nelson, 91). Despite the fact that the present literature does not have an acceptable reply to the non-identity problem, Parfit states that Rawls’ reflective disequilibrium legitimizes invoking the precautionary principle as it would avert conceivably greater harm to future generations (Davidson, 480, 482). Some have contended that though we cannot know the definite nature of the future agents, we do realise that some group of people will exist in the future and will have interests. DesJardins has articulated that perhaps our commitments lie with the interests, as opposed to the eventual fate of people themselves. To support that, Baier has argued that moral rights and obligations are not founded on the determinateness of future people as they are applied to individuals by description and not denotatively (Davidson, 480). In any case, the obligation to future agents stays valid (Cochrane). However, the question arises that how can then a person living in 2019 decide what is the idea of a “good life” or what is in best interests for people living in 2100? It has been articulated that a knowledge of ourselves, our world and our attitudes are all bound to change. Nevertheless, human beings are supposed to carry out things coherently and efficiently and hence require some basic resources- adequate standard of living, access to clean water and food and ability to practice their rights (autonomy). To make these things possible, we would have to make sure that our present interaction with the Earth continues to function healthily (Nelson, 90).
Besides this, the ‘non-existence problem’ has also impeded the chance to extend our moral obligations to future people. This argument has been responded by asserting the difference between specific future individuals and the human race collectively made up of indeterminate human beings. This argument therefore disregards the uncertainty we have regarding future agents (Nelson, p. 90). Another hurdle in the granting of moral standing to the future generations has been the ‘non-reciprocity problem’. According to some philosophers, we do not have a moral obligation to the future generations because they lie outside the moral community. In the present context it refers to the notion that even if we aid in mitigating climate change to reduce the harm to the future generation, the future agents would not be able to do anything in return for us. Thus, this lack of reciprocity denies the future individuals the moral status. However, Gewirth (2001) has specified that even though we cannot directly receive anything from the future generations, they can expand their moral obligations to the coming future generations, thus indicating the existence of a broader transgenerational reciprocity. This goes hand in hand with the principle of “fair reciprocity”, where we offer to reimburse the benefits we have received and profited. The principle is based on the obligations of correspondence and fairness where we give benefits to those who have faced penances for us and when we cannot reach the original beneficiaries we offer those benefits to certain third parties ( 563).
Although, there is enough scientific evidence for the need of a collaborated effort, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (2005) has argued that individuals do not have a moral obligation to limit their green-house gas (GHG) emissions. Though he accepts the duty that stems out of historical obligations, wherein States that have contributed to the issue of global warming invoke commitments to reduce their present-day emissions and compensate for their predecessors’ actions, he falls short of addressing individual commitments. His main argument is that an “individual action” of driving a car for instance, which has the intention of gaining pleasure behind it and does “no” worse than average harm is condemned then people would assume that they would still face denunciation even if they improve thus, making the task counterproductive (Sinnott-Armstrong,298). Likewise, he recognises that individual action is neither necessary nor sufficient for global warming and since it is rather a usual action (driving a car), the causal responsibility is undermined. He also says on-going that the ethics of individual emissions should be based on some moral principle, which his analysis has failed to establish.
However, to counter his argument, Almassi asserts that threshold-contribution principle gives moral guidance for acknowledging individual contribution (Almassi, 4-5). The probabilistic approach inspired by Singer indicates that the reason the present generation should opt for mitigation is because the evidence suggests that mitigation or adaptation measures at all levels (even individual) would improve the odds of a positive outcome- restriction of climate change (11-13). To be clear, the essential thought behind the moral principle of threshold-contribution is that an “act” is correct if it makes reaching the threshold more likely. Besides this, individual actions against climate change are necessary as they have both direct and indirect impacts, which can yield to cascading effects to prevent climate change. Also, individual actions would refrain from making the rational subjective probability worse-off (17).
Moving forward, Sinnott-Armstrong asserts in his notes that there is no moral obligation that we owe to the future agents because we do not share a special relationship with them (Sinnott-Armstrong,313). But, the care ethicists have a different outlook on this. Care-ethics underscores the moral noteworthiness of our relational interdependency in the arrangement and receipt of care. The main issues that have prevented the applicability of care ethics in the context of intergenerational ethics are the principles of non-reciprocity and non-existence. Though they have been critiqued above, it is essential to comprehend non-reciprocity in the light of this theory. A major facet of the non-reciprocity problem is the case that the present and the future generations do not overlap. However, it is conceivable to care for the future generation because generations do over-lap. Also, Virgina Held’s understanding of care is built on the acknowledgement of the social and political context in which caring relations are embedded (Randall, 4-5). Therefore, we should extend an obligation because of the “socio-political” setting in which climate change is embedded, which puts the future agents at a disadvantage.
However, Groves’s account offers an all-encompassing argument by drawing upon attachment theory. Attachment can take numerous forms- people and non-human things, for example, objects, places, and establishments (socio-political) that represent dispositional and behavioural models around which self can be integrated through its convictions and activities. As indicated by him, the present generation’s commitment to future generation comes from the possibility that we care about all relations as they are a type of attachment (Groves, 158). This contention can be reinforcedby stating that the present generation already directly cares about the future generation because it perceives its place in the world in part from the imaginal content of what will improve the lives of the future generations. Along these lines, the main reason the present generation esteemscustoms, cultures, and communities is because of the likelihood of future agents inheriting it. Similarly, the future generation is dependent on the present generation for the kind of world they will bestow upon them (Randall, 13-15). Throughthis claim, we can state that the interdependent intergenerational relation is the foundation to the moral obligation of the present generation to the future ones.
Moving along, we can turn to Kant as he provides an extensive framework to support the claim that present generations have moral obligations to the future agents. To elaborate, in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, he articulates Categorical Imperative as “ So act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature” (Gregor and Korsgaard,31). An action is right on the chance that it very well may be universalised as a rule when everybody can pursue it without struggle and the action is wrong if it cannot be pursued without conflict. When this model is applied in the environmental framework, we can say that an activity is right if it is something that every other person in the world can do and still allow the sustenance of the Earth’s equilibrium (Rentmeester, 78-81). Consider that we (Indian nationals) are emitting GHG and do not have any regard for the future generation. This will have an inequitable effect on the present vulnerable and marginal societies and on the future ones too. Would wewill this simple act to become a universal rule? We will see that we could not will that everyone in the world act as we do because it will have a detrimental impact on the atmosphere. We will increase our proximity to the “tipping point” or in some cases will exceed it , which will eventually lead to the collapse of this civilisation. Additionally Kant has pronounced that reasonable moral agents are deeply committed to trying to live as they should, not just “as a rule” therefore they should acknowledge that sometimes they have to forego any desired goods or rise above self-interest, if the price is to abandon or violate their commitment to something obligatory (Gregor and Korsgaard, viii, ix).
Furthermore, the Categorical Imperative helps to approach anthropogenic climate change by determining universalizability through time- which represents the intergenerational aspect of it. Morality, in Kant’s humanistic model, concerns all people, in the present and future states. Kant reiterates that it is immoral to treat other humans, in this case, future agents (poor living conditions), as mere means to one’s ends (unsustainable utilisation of fossil fuels for economic gain). Therefore, it is wrong to act in one’s self-interest and engage in unsustainable activities that promote climate change. Rather, Kant believes that all rational creatures, whether they are born today or will be born in the future should be treated with respect, therefore highlighting that we cannot limit our focus to the present when making decisions regarding GHG emissions (Gregor and Korsgaard, p. xxii-xxiii; Rentmeester, 81-82). To him, the immediate interest of emitting emissions cannot be the universal maxim as the logical interest of the reason is never immediate and nor based on desires, but rather presumes determinations for its function (Gregor and Korsgaard, 63).
Last but not least, in the discipline of virtue ethics, character traits such as selfish, greedy or predatory cannot be regarded as virtues as they lack the commitment to ethical value. Julia Annas’s account very well puts forward that the motivation behind leading a virtuous life is not egoistic but rather living in a fair, generous and brave way which aims at the good of others as opposed to just her. However, the present generation would not be leading in a virtuous way if we act selfishly to further our goals and aspirations at the expense of the future generation. Hence, the disposition of being socially responsible cannot be switched off simply because one’s own interests are at the line ((Annas, 519, 522-523).
To conclude, the complexity of climate change has been referred to as the “perfect moral storm” that includes of three attributes – “Dispersion of Causes and Effects, Fragmentation of Agency and Institutional Inadequacy” (Gardiner; Dees). Though the paper has attempted to advocate on the second storm- Intergenerational Storm- and has made a case that the onus of addressing the climate problem lies on the present generation, we cannot disregard that it would not be possible to mitigate climate change if we are not able to tackle deficiencies such as moral corruption, selective attention and self-interest. There is ample support in moral theories to interpret the responsibilities of the current generation but how far that is applicable in real-life depends on what side we are willing to take.
The fundamental thought behind this probabilistic model is that how likely should we act sensibly given the proof that is accessible to us with respect to climate-changethat the threshold would be reached [p(t|i)] is or should be > than the likeliness of expecting that the limit would be reached (t).
It is understood as an ecological phenomenon wherein even small changes in the environmental conditions result in greater changes in the state of the system. This dramatic shift can lead to nonlinear loss in biodiversity and human-kind. In this case, the tipping point suggests that no anthropogenic intervention to mitigate or adapt to climate change would be applicable after we exceed this. Hence, putting the future generations at a disadvantage.
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