On Nov. 2, 2007, Venezuela’s National Assembly approved modifications to the 1999 constitution that would increase the power of the national executive and central government. One measure created new rules for declaring states of emergency and permitted security forces to disregard legal protections and round up citizens. The revised constitution also would allow for the indefinite reelection of the president and end the central bank’s autonomy. These changes conformed with suggestions to the National Assembly by the Commission for Constitutional Reform, which Pres. Hugo Chávez appointed shortly after being sworn in on January 10 to a third term as president. Allies of President Chávez controlled all 167 seats in the National Assembly, which overwhelmingly approved the reforms (160 lawmakers supported the changes, and 7 abstained). These changes were submitted to a national referendum on December 2, and though public opinion polls forecast that a majority of voters would vote to approve the reforms, the referendum was defeated by a narrow margin of 51–49%. The groups most opposed to the reforms included the Roman Catholic Church, the business community, professional associations, and leaders of the marginalized but vocal opposition political parties. In addition, many supporters of President Chávez in the urban shantytowns abstained, fearing that the reforms would eliminate private property.
During the second quarter of 2007, Venezuela’s GDP grew 8.9% over the same period in 2006, when the country registered a 9.4% growth rate. GDP in 2007 was expected for the first time to reach $200 billion. The nonpetroleum sector grew at a rate of 10.8% in the second quarter of 2007, although the petroleum sector contracted by 3.9%.
The annual accumulated inflation by November 2007 was 19%, one of the higher rates among less-developed economies. Investment banks believed that inflation for the entire year would settle at 16%, more than exceeding the government’s goal of 12%. On November 1 the collection of the new tax on financial transactions (known as ITF) took effect. This measure was the core of the government’s plan to close the financial gap resulting from its decision to cut value-added tax. Corporations had to pay the Integrated National Customs and Tax Administration Service 1.5% on movements in their bank accounts. Additionally, ITF would be levied on self-employed professionals, such as doctors, lawyers, and engineers.
Petroleum remained central to Venezuela’s economy. Over the past decade reserves of sweet crude had declined, and heavy-oil projects in the Orinoco Basin had become more important. In May President Chávez unilaterally modified the contracts under which foreign companies exploited four heavy-oil projects. Two companies that had developed these projects, ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips, refused to accept the terms that the government offered and were nationalized. Four other companies with significant investments in the heavy-oil projects (Chevron, BP, Total, and Statoil) agreed to remain as minority partners in joint ventures controlled by PDVSA (Petróleos de Venezuela), the state company. In October the National Assembly approved joint-venture contracts between PDVSA and Chevron, BP, Total, and Statoil.
Relations between Caracas and Washington remained frosty. The administration of U.S. Pres. George W. Bush was frustrated over the increasing volume of cocaine trafficked through Venezuela. In Moscow President Chávez proclaimed, “Either we break U.S. imperialism or U.S. imperialism will definitely break the world.” Relations with Brazil were outwardly cordial, but below the surface a potentially huge conflict persisted over the issue of Bolivian natural gas. In 2006 Bolivian Pres. Evo Morales had nationalized the gas reservoirs, and the Bolivian armed forces had taken control of facilities belonging to Petrobras (the Brazilian oil giant). According to agreements signed by Bolivia and Venezuela, Caracas would intervene in any conflict between Bolivia and another country.