Presentation on theme: "Five Major Dimensions to Culture"— Presentation transcript:
1 Five Major Dimensions to Culture Power distance Extent to which individuals expect a hierarchical structure that emphasizes status differences between subordinates and superiors.Individualism Degree to which a society values personal goals, autonomy, and privacy over group loyalty, commitment to group norms, involvement in collective activities, social cohesiveness, and intense socialization.Uncertainty avoidance Extent to which a society places a high value on reducing risk and instability.Masculinity/femininity Degree to which a society views assertive or “masculine” behavior as important to success and encourages rigidly stereotyped gender roles.Long-term/short-term orientation Extent to which values are oriented toward to future (saving, persistence) as opposed to the past or present (respect for tradition, fulfilling social obligation).It may be obvious that culture is important to HRM practices, but the relevance of this may be lost in a country like the United States, where many of the best-known theories of management practice are firmly rooted in Western culture. Shown here are five dimensions of culture set forth by Geert Hofstede.
2 Organizational Theory TABLE Organizational RitesType of rite Example of rite Purpose of riteRite of passage Induction and Learn and internalize basic training norms and valuesRite of integration Office Christmas party Build common norms and valuesRite of enhancement Presentation of annual Motivate commitment to award norms and valuesRite of degradation Firing of top executive Change or reaffirm norms and valuesNote that “rite of degradation” not included in 4e/5e/6e
3 Organizational Theory Organizational culture develops from theinteraction of four factors:FIGURE 7-2Where an Organization’s Culture Comes FromOrganizational cultureCharacteristics of people within the organizationOrganizational structureProperty rights systemOrganizational ethics
4 Final Shuttle Report Cites ‘Broken Safety Culture’ at NASA Report indicated mngt techniques unknowingly imposed barriers that kept at bay both engineering concerns and dissenting viewsProgram mngrs required engineers to prove that debris strike created safety-of-flight issue – engineers had to produce evidence that system was unsafe, rather than prove it was safeReliance on past success as substitute for sound engineering practices (such as testing to understand why systems were not performing in accordance w/ requirements)Organizational barriers prevented effective communication of critical safety information and stifled professional differences of opinionLack of integrated mngt across program elementsEvolution of informal chain of command and decision-making processes that operated outside NASA’s rules
5 Final Shuttle Report Cites ‘Broken Safety Culture’ at NASA Ultimately helped create ‘blind spots’ that prevented NASA from seeing danger that foam strike posedReplacing managers would not solve problem unless NASA’s culture also changedIn addition to structural changes outlined previously, report called for organizational culture “that reflects the best characteristics of a learning organization”Source: New York Times, 8/26/03
6 “Secretive Culture Led Toyota Astray” Toyota had known about problem w/ gas pedals for more than a year before revealing issue in closed-door meeting in January 2010 w/ National Highway Traffic Safety AdministrationInstead of physically connecting to engine w/ mechanical cable, 2001 redesigned Camry pedal used electronic sensors to send signals to computer controlling engineGrowing rift btwn Co and NHTSAHeart of problem: secretive corporate culture in Japan clashed w/ U.S. requirements that auto makers disclose safety threatsNHTSA can do own testing, but generally relies on Cos to supply technical dataIn 2009 Toyota’s European unit found problem w/ plastic part in gas pedal mechanism also widely used in U.S., redesigned pedals for newly-assembled cars, but didn’t issue recall in Europe, notify U.S. regulators, or Toyota North AmericaToyota still very much run by Japanese HQ; top leadership doesn’t include U.S. executives, officials responsible for recall process are in JapanSource: WSJ, 2/10/10
7 Organizational Theory An organization with a narrow stance onsocial responsibility believes it is beingresponsible as long as it acts within thelaw and plays by the rules of the game.An organization with a broad stance onsocial responsibility views itself as amoral agent and examines every situationfrom a moral perspective.
8 Identifying Cultural Norms List classroom normsList three ‘rules’ that influence your decision to speak, or not to speak, in class discussionsHow are these norms formed?Situational forcesActions of key individualsCritical incidentsChanging unproductive norms
9 The Ethical Dimension #7 What steps can a company take to prevent this problem, to stop its values and norms from becoming so inwardly focused that managers and employees lose sight of their obligations to their stakeholders?