Prospects of Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: South-East and Central Asia
Savita Pande,Research Fellow,IDSA
The idea of setting up a nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia was first enunciated at the Association of South-East Nations (ASEAN) Foreign Ministers meeting in Kuala Lumpur in November 1971.1 The ASEAN Foreign Ministers issued the Declaration on the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPAN), commonly referred to as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration. They noted the trend towards establishing nuclear-free zones and "agreed that neutralization of South-East Asia was a desirable objective" and expressed their determination to "secure the recognition of, and respect for, South-East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality".2 It was also agreed that the establishment of the South-East Asia Nuclear-Free Zone would be an essential component of ZOPFAN. However, no measurable progress was made during the years that followed. On February 24, 1976, the ASEAN members made a commitment to develop conflict-free relations among themselves.
By the late 1970s, ASEAN officials successfully produced the first and second drafts of the treaty. At that time, contacts were initiated with other countries in South-East Asia, in particular in Indochina, not part of ASEAN. In fact, in the Seventies and Eighties, Malaysia and Indonesia were the chief advocates inside ASEAN of a nuclear weapon-free zone. The Indonesian delegate presented a draft treaty during a summit of respective Presidents and heads of government in Manila. According to the draft, the possession, stationing and manufacture of nuclear weapons by the signatory states should be banned, whereas the question of transit should be ignored. There was also no mention of military bases of foreign countries. The Philippines which had adopted an anti-nuclear provision in the new Constitution, favoured regional denuclearisation. While the Indonesians and Malaysians wanted to minimise "nuclear confrontation and heteronomy" in South-East Asia as much as possible with the help of the treaty, the Philippines government "integrated the idea of a zone into talks on the future of US bases".3 The Philippines government also supported the treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia later on.
At the end of the Eighties, a more decisive dimension was added to calls for the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. Individual states began urging the early integration of Indochina in a zone arrangement. There was swift response to the offer by Indochina even before Vietnam was included in ASEAN; the government in Hanoi signalled its willingness to participate in the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone. Talks also began with Laos and Cambodia. The idea to include peripheral countries was to highlight the regional aspects and project common regional security concerns. On their part, the countries of Indochina used the zone to move closer to the region and drift away from a one-sided policy. Eventually, the accession to ASEAN by Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar contributed substantially to the treaty's swift ratification.
From 1979 to the early 1990s, the Cambodia problem prevented the conclusion of a treaty. Following the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991 and the United Nations-sponsored elections in Cambodia in 1993,things changed. The other factors responsible for giving tangible shape to the proposal include the outgoing East-West conflict, the withdrawal of US troops from the Philippines and of the former Soviet troops from Indochina, and the rising prominent role of China and growing cooperation.
In recent years, states of the region have revitalised the regional denuclearisation proposal.4 A working group established by ASEAN conducted preparatory work to implement the initiative. The work gained momentum after the United States closed its military bases in the Philippines and appeared to support the ASEAN project. During the 1995 NPT Extension Conference, the Philippines delegation emphatically called for the signing of the South-East Asia nuclear weapon-free zone treaty, in particular by the nuclear weapon states. The ASEAN Foreign Ministers in 1995 declared that conditions in South-East Asia approximated those envisaged in the Kuala Lumpur Declaration for the establishment of the nuclear weapon-free zone. Efforts culminated in the signing of the treaty on the South-East-nuclear weapon-free zone in Bangkok on December 16,1995. In addition to the seven members of ASEAN (Brunei, Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), the signatories included the three non-ASEAN countries, namely Cambodia, Laos People's Republic and Myanmar.
Nothing in the treaty prejudices the right of the state parties to use nuclear energy, in particular for their economic development and social purposes. However, prior to embarking on their peaceful nuclear energy programmes, state parties shall subject their programmes to rigorous nuclear safety assessments, conforming to guidelines and standards recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the protection of health and minimisation of danger to life and property in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 3 of the Statute of the IAEA(Article 4b)
The parties are, however, prohibited, both inside and outside the zone, from developing, testing, manufacturing or otherwise acquiring, possessing or having control over nuclear weapons. Unlike in the Treaty of Pelindaba, research on nuclear explosive devices is not expressly banned. Compared to other regional denuclearisation treaties, in this, a "nuclear weapon" is defined in what is considered as somewhat simpler terms. Accordingly, it is any explosive device that is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner. The terms of transport or delivery of such material are not included in this definition " if they are separable from and not an indivisible part thereof".5 Nuclear explosive devices in unassembled or partly assembled forms are not explicitly covered. Each state party also undertakes not to dump at sea or discharge into the atmosphere anywhere within the zone any radioactive material or wastes; or dispose of radioactive material or wastes on land in the territory or under the jurisdiction of other states. The parties also undertake not to allow any other state to violate all their agreed undertakings in their respective territories. Seeking or receiving assistance in the commission of such acts is equally prohibited (Articles 1 and 3).
Stationing—defined as deploying, emplacing, emplanting, installing, stockpiling, or storing nuclear weapons—in the South-East Asia zone is prohibited. However, each party, "on being notified " may decide for itself whether to allow visits by foreign ships and aircraft to its ports and airfields, transit of its airspace by foreign aircraft, navigation by foreign ships, through its territorial waters and overflight of foreign aircraft above those waters in a manner not governed by the rights of overflight passage, archipelagic sea lane passage or transit passage (Article 7). It is, however, doubtful if the presence of nuclear weapons or foreign ships or aircraft would ever be announced.
The purpose of the control system is to verify compliance of the state parties.6 It comprises the following measures: (a) the IAEA safeguards system as provided for in Article5;(b) reporting and exchanging of information as provided for in Article 11; (c)request for clarification as provided for in Article12;and (d) request and procedures for a fact-finding mission as provided for in Article 13 of the treaty.
In this regard, each state party which has not done so, shall conclude an agreement with the IAEA for the application of full-scope safeguards to its peaceful nuclear activities not later than 18 months after the entry into force for that state party to the treaty (Article 5). In addition, each state party which has not acceded to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident shall endeavour to do so.
A Commission for the South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, composed of all state parties, is to be established to oversee the implementation of the treaty and ensure compliance with its provisions. The Executive Committee, a subsidiary organ of the Commission—also composed of all parties—is to ensure the proper operation of verification measures, decide on requests for clarification and for a fact-finding mission, set up such a mission (which would consist of the inspectors from the IAEA who are neither nationals of the requesting state nor nationals of the receiving state), decide on its findings, and request the Commission to convene, if necessary. The decisions of the Executive Committee and those of the Commission are to be taken by consensus or failing which, by a two-third majority of members present and voting (Articles 8 and 9). In case of an established breach of the treaty, the Commission must decide on the measures to cope with the situation, including submission of the matter to the IAEA and—where the situation might endanger international peace and security—to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations (Article 14.3). Disputes arising from the interpretation of the treaty may be referred to arbitration or the International Court of Justice.
The South-East Asia zone comprises the territories of Brunei, Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, as well as their respective continental shelves and exclusive economic zones (EEZ)(Articles1a and2.1). The inclusion of continental shelves and EEZ is a novelty, but, according to the language of the treaty, the rights of the states with regard to the freedom of the high seas and innocent passage of ships and aircraft are not to be prejudiced.
Under the protocol annexed to the Treaty of Bangkok and open for signatures by China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, the signatories would assume the following obligations: to respect the treaty and not to contribute to any act that would constitute its violation, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty and, in general, within the zone. The protocol is of a permanent nature, but each party may withdraw from it, if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the protocol have jeopardised its supreme interests.
In the event of a breach of the protocol, the Executive Committee may convene a special meeting of the Commission to decide on appropriate measures to be taken. No other denuclearisation treaty provides for such action.
The United States expressed concerns (shared by some other nuclear powers) that because of the geographical extent of the zone—which it considers inconsistent with the Law of the Sea Convention—regular movement of naval vessels and aircraft through South-East Asia would be restricted and regional security arrangements disturbed. It is reluctant to provide what it deems are sweeping security assurances as demanded by South-East Asian zonal states. China made known its objections to the geographical scope of the treaty, specially to inclusion of parts of the South China Sea to which it and some ASEAN members have conflicting claims.7 It remains to be seen how far the signatories of the treaty will revise the language of the protocol to make it acceptable to the nuclear weapon states.
In his closing statement at the fifth ASEAN Summit, the Chairman, Prime Minister Banharn Silapa- Archa of Thailand, announced that the state parties would review the protocol to the treaty. The ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting Working Group on ZOPFAN and NWFZ was subsequently tasked to carry out the review and to undertake consultations with the nuclear weapon states. The first round of discussions to the effect were held in November 1996 between Malaysia as Chairman of the Working Group on ZOPFAN and South-East Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone and representatives of the nuclear weapon states.
In the second round of consultations in June 1997, representatives from nuclear weapon states met with members of the ASEAN Working Group. While some nuclear weapon states have expressed appreciation for the effort of the working group in negotiating acceptable wording or amendments, they felt that it has not yet directly addressed their concerns. In the final communiqué of the conference of ASEAN Foreign Ministers on July 24 and 25,1997, the participants urged the nuclear weapon states to back their fundamental support of the nuclear weapon-free zones by acceding to the protocol of the South-East Asian nuclear weapon free zone treaty.8 The US, of course, took no notice of these appeals as was evident by the fact that US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright ignored the South-East Asia nuclear weapon-free zone issue on the occasion of meeting with her colleagues from the ASEAN states at the end of July 1997
Entry Into Force
The Treaty of Bangkok is to enter into force upon the deposit with the Government of Thailand of the seventh instrument of ratification (Article 16). The treaty entered into force on March 27,1997, following the deposition of the seventh instrument of ratification. Following the entry into force, Thailand, as the Depository State, submitted the treaty in June 1997 for registration with the United Nation in accordance with Article 102 of the United Nations Charter. Reservations are not permitted. The treaty is to remain in force indefinitely, but—like in the treaty of Rarotonga -each party will have the right to withdraw from it, at 12 months' notice, in the event of breach by any other party of a commitment that would be essential to the achievement of the objectives of the treaty (Article 22).
The operation of the treaty is to be reviewed 10 years after its entry into force at a meeting of the Commission specially convened for the purpose (Article 20). Amendments can be adopted only by consensus and decisions of the Commission (Article 19).
Assessment and Prospects
The United States as also other nuclear weapon powers continue to oppose the nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. The US stance on the South-East Asian nuclear weapon-free zone visibly demonstrates the shallowness of supporting all non-proliferation objectives. Thus, while it has removed its forces from the Philippines and the Soviet Union has removed its bases from Vietnam, nuclear weapons are no longer stored in the region. The USA has also recognised a similar zone in the South Pacific.
Further, in 1993,former Secretary of State Christopher stressed that his country was willing to accede to a treaty under certain conditions. During a meeting with the representatives of ASEAN, a few months later, Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbot reiterated the right of member states to conclude regional non-proliferation treaties.
President Clinton repeated the offer in February 1995 vis-à-vis Indonesia's President Suharto. Ten months later, however, the Government of the United States contended that the content of the treaty was not consistent with its fundamental interests.9And yet at the NPT Extension Conference, Lawrence Scheinman, the chief US delegate, while expressly praising the nuclear weapon-free zones in the South Pacific and Africa at the UN Security Council Preparatory session, made no mention of the efforts by ASEAN to set up a comparable zone.10
In a Press discussion, the Director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), John D. Holum, said that his country wanted to join the treaty and hoped that the South-East nations would allow for revision.11 The stated primary concern of the nuclear weapon states is the inclusion of the EEZ and continental shelves in the definition of the zone. The nuclear weapon states maintained that such inclusion raises the questions of consistency of the principles embodied in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, mainly those concerning the high seas. In addition, they maintain that the continental shelves have never been clearly delimited in the South China Sea which could create uncertainty over the scope of the treaty and protocol obligations and could be a source of conflict owing to the competing territorial claims in the region. There were reservations also on the interpretation of negative security guarantee and the obligation to provide notification on transportation of nuclear weapons.
The parties to the treaty, on the other hand, assert that the interests of the nuclear weapon states have been adequately addressed by the treaty, which provides for the exercise of the freedom of the high seas. The treaty, they feel, "is not inconsistent with the high seas freedom of navigation and overflight, in and over the zone". They maintain that the definition is "not only reasonable but also crucial for the preservation of the zone from nuclear holocaust." They also feel that the question of overlapping claims in the South China Sea "is wholly extraneous to the issue".12 In the case of the United States, for instance, the fear of it being dragged into a territorial dispute with China anyway remains valid even without the South-East Asian nuclear weapon-free zone coming into effect, since the US has concluded a number of support agreements with individual ASEAN states. Besides, as long as the presence of the US is desired by the member states of the treaty—the states of the region—a conflict situation is improbable.
The second concern of the nuclear weapon states deals with Article 2 of the protocol and the precise nature of the legally binding negative security assurances from the protocol parties. Under Article 2, each state party to the protocol (non-nuclear weapon states) undertakes not to use nuclear weapons against any state party to the treaty. It further undertakes "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone". The second part is of concern to the nuclear weapon states. Citing their policy of nuclear deterrence, they want the second sentence deleted. In their consultations with the nuclear weapon states, the state parties proposed certain amendments but nothing came of it.
Another fallout of the US non-signing of the protocols of the treaty is that Britain and France will probably follow its example. Because of the absence of security policy interests in South-East Asia, it was expected that the two would sign the protocol without much hitch. In fact, during the signing of the treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia there were reports that the two were ready to sign the protocol in 1996. That the two have not done so is indeed surprising.13 The reason then seems to be rooted in political considerations of mutual nature. The US acceded to the protocols to the treaty establishing nuclear weapon- free zones in the South Pacific following the discontinuation of French nuclear testing.
Although the Chinese are not strictly considered part of South-East Asian sub-systems, the Chinese government had called for setting up of a nuclear weapon-free zone.14 Beijing now rejects the nuclear weapon-free zone because of its reservations about including the EEZ and continental shelves.15 It says that signing the protocols would also indirectly mean a recognition of the controversial sovereign rights in the South China Sea between China, on the one hand, and Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei, on the other. It is believed that the scope of the treaty was structured the way it was in order to make it difficult for the Chinese military to station and store nuclear weapons in the maritime territory.16 This, of course is debatable.
The Chinese have, on the one hand, signed an agreement with ASEAN on the special mechanism of cooperation; on the other, they extended their claims to sovereignty in the South China Sea by 2.5 million km in 1995.17 Interestingly, the Chinese Ambassador to the UN was the only one of the five permanent Security Council members who voted in favour of the resolution on nuclear weapon-free zones in the Southern Hemisphere in the UN General Assembly, discussed later.
Russia has also not signed the protocol to the treaty establishing a nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia. This is intriguing because the nuclear weapon-free zone in South-East Asia does not restrict Russia's maritime possibilities. Also, Russia took on the obligations of the Soviet Union vis-à-vis other arrangements for nuclear weapon-free zones. At a bilateral discussion during the ASEAN Conference of Foreign Ministers in July 1997, the Vietnamese Foreign Minister, Nguyen Manh Cam, expressly urged Russian Foreign Minister Primakov, to sign the Bangkok Treaty. The latter subsequently disregarded this request. It has been argued that the Russian attitude is rooted in not doing anything that would upset the Chinese. This, again, is because of the Russian realisation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's (NATO) eastward expansion and that Beijing has become the most important trading partner and arms buyer in Asia.18
Central Asia, too, has been mentioned by the countries of the region as an area lending itself to denuclearisation. Numerous key steps have already taken place, including the tabling of several documents before the United Nations.19 Most significant among these developments has been the Almaty Declaration of February28, 1997, in which the Presidents of five states of the region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) expressed their joint support for the formation of a nuclear weapon-free zone. The five states created a working group and met in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, in September 1997 to draw up plans for a formal UN resolution announcing their plans and calling on other states for their support in the formation of the zone.20
The basic principles that emerged from the Tashkent meeting included:
— The zone must totally be free of nuclear weapons.
— Not only the participating states, but all interested countries, must make a commitment to its proper functioning.
— The agreement on the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone should include an effective control system to ensure that the agreed commitments are honoured.
— Such control should be implemented on the basis of IAEA safeguards and guarantees by the United Nations Security Council.21
The Uzbek Foreign Minister called for a need to develop a reliable system of collective efforts by the participating states, which would include:
* Effective measures ensuring the non-proliferation regime.
* A reliable system of arms control.
* Ensuring the ecological safety of hazardous production facilities linked to nuclear raw materials.
* Measures to prevent the diversion of nuclear technologies and materials.22
At the conference, Russia strongly supported the creation of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia. To quote its representative, "We support the desire of the states to promote the strengthening of nuclear non-proliferation regimes in their regions through additional measures that would reliably guarantee their truly nuclear-free status. We take the same approach to the idea of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia".23
The Chinese representative said that his country appreciates and supports the efforts of Central Asian states to establish a Central Asian nuclear weapon-free zone "with a view to promote regional peace and security". It stated various principles which it thought should be observed with regard to nuclear weapon-free zones. These included: consultations and voluntary agreement among countries concerned in the light of regional realities; they should be consistent with the principles of the UN Charter; the nuclear-free status should not be subject to influence by any other mechanism; it should have a clear-cut boundary (not include continental shelves, EEZs or disputed areas or areas with common maritime interests with neighbours); it should have an effective verification system; it should be conducive to cooperation on peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and the nuclear weapon states should promise not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against nuclear weapon-free zones.24
The statement seeking a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia issued at the end of the conference requested the United Nations specialised agencies to set up a group of experts of the United Nations with the participation of experts from the regional group to examine the form and elements for the preparation and implementation of a treaty on the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia.25
The resolution on establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia was passed in December 1997. While welcoming the offer of Kyrgyzstan to hold a consultative meeting of the experts on the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia, the resolution inter alia, requested the Secretary General to provide assistance (within existing resources) to the Central Asian countries in the preparation of the form and elements of an agreement for the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia."26
On the face of it, setting up a nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia appears to be a less complicated problem. Kazakhstan is the only country in the region to have had nuclear weapons on its territory, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Considerable speculation was aired about the future of these weapons, particularly after the initial declaration by President Nazarbayev that Kazakhstan would keep its nuclear weapons for another 15 years.27 At the same time, in Washington in May 1992, President Nazarbayev agreed to sign the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon power.28 It signed the treaty later in London. Kazakhstan also signed the Lisbon Protocol on May 23, 1992, and assumed all obligations of the former USSR under the START 1 Treaty. Kazakhstan ratified the START I Treaty on July 2, 1992,and deposited the instrument of accession to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on February 14, 1993.29
An even broader concept of establishing a "nuclear weapon-free Southern Hemisphere and adjacent areas" was launched at the 1996 UN General Assembly.30
1. Norachit Sinhaseni, "Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone: Looking Ahead; Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone: Next Steps," Disarmament, vol. XX, no. 1, 1997, p. 64.
2. Ibid., p. 65.
3. Rolf Muetzenich, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Southeast Asia," Aussenpolitik, vol. IV, p. 395.
4. UN Document A/47/80.
5. Jozef Goldbat, "Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: A History and Assessment," The Nonproliferation Review, Spring/Summer 1997, p. 27.
6. ASEAN Update, vol. 1, 1996, January-February 1996, p. 13.
7. International Herald Tribune, December 9, 10, 11, 14 and 16-17, 1995.
8. Joint Communique of the Thirtieth ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Subang Jaya, Malaysia, July 1997, pp. 24-25.
9. Muetzenich, n. 3, p. 395.
10. US Statement of the Preparatory Committee Meeting, USIS, Washington File, April 11, 1995, pp. 3.
11. John D. Holum, Remarks to the Non-proliferation Breakfast National Press Club, Washington D.C., February 15, 1996, p. 2.
12. Arumugam Ganapathy, "The Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (The Bangkok Treaty)," in Pericles Gasparini Alves and Diana Belinda Cipollone eds., Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century, (New York and Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), 1997), p. 60.
13. Muetzenich, n. 3, p. 398.
14. Xuewu Gu, "China's Activities as a Stabilising Power in Asia," Aussenpolitik, no. 3, 1995, p. 316.
15. John Simpson, "The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime After the NPT Review and Extension Conference." SIPRI Yearbook: 1996, Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, (Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 575.
16. Ralph A. Cossa, "Southeast Asia Seeks Endorsement of 1st Nuclear-Free-Zone," International Herlad Tribune, July 23, 1996.
17. Muetzenich, n. 3, p. 399.
18. Ibid., p. 400.
19. UN General Assembly Document A/52/112 (March 18, 1997), Annex "Almaty Declaration Adopted by the Leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, on February 28, 1997," Also see UN General Assembly Document A/C/. 1/51 1/L.29, October 29, 1996, submitted to the First Committee, "Kyrgyzstan and Mongolia: Draft Resolution, Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in the Central Asian Region."
20. Goldblat, n. 5, p. 29.
21. Islam Karimov, "Building an Integral Part of the Global Nuclear Security System," address delivered at the opening meeting of the International Conference on a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, September 15-16, 1997. Tashkent, Uzbekistan, published in Disarmament, vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, p. 89.
22. Abdulaziz Kamilov, "A Step Towards Regional Peace and Development," statement at the opening meeting of the conference stated in n. 21, Disarmament, vol. xx, no. 1, 1997, p. 96.
23. Igor V. Ivanov, "Common Concerns, Common Interests: Building Regional Stability, Peace and Prosperity," (presentation made at the international conference, ref, n. 21), Ibid., p. 104.
24. Li Jinxian, "Principles for the Establishment of New Zones," based on the presentation made at the above stated international conference, n. 21, Disarmament, vol. XX, no. 1, 1997, p. 109.
25. A/52/390 annex, statement by Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Republics of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, signed at Tashkent, September 15, 1997.
26. Resolution 52/38S, adopted without a vote by the General Assembly, December 9, 1997.
27. FBIS-SOV-92-086-May 4, 1992, p. 47.
28. FBIS-SOV-92-098, May 20, 1992, p. 55.
29. "US will Triple Foreign Aid to Kazakhstan," New York Times, February 15, 1994, pA3.
30. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/51/45.