Allied cross-border raids, August to September 1914.
In August 1914 the British possession of Nigeria shared a long land border with German Kamerun running from the Bight of Biafra 1,000 miles northeastwards to Lake Chad. At the Lake the German territory was only about 65 miles wide. To the east Kamerun shared an even longer border with French Equatorial Africa that ran southeastwards down to the Congo River. Marshes had formed adjacent to the Lake but to the south the Kamerun territory was open plain with some mountain features. The two main German garrison posts in the Lake Chad area were at Mora which lay 100 miles south of the Lake in the centre of German territory, and Kusseri on the eastern frontier. One German company was believed to garrison both posts. The company headquarters was at Mora where the Mora Mountain rose 1,600 feet above the plain.
Above: A company with their German officers in the prewar era
armed forces of Nigeria consisted of the Nigeria Regiment (two batteries each
of six 2.95 inch mountain guns, a mounted infantry battalion of three companies
with 4 machine guns, and four infantry battalions each up to 1,200 men strong
with 8 machine guns per battalion), an armed police force 2,100 men strong, and
a Marine Department over 1,000 strong with steamers launches and pinnaces for
use along the coast and on the rivers.
When war was
declared the Nigerian Regiment soldiers, the police and the Marine Department
were deployed according to the territory’s Defence Scheme. This envisaged defence against German
cross-border raiding parties.
columns of troops were positioned at tactical points along the Kamerun border
and the most northern column was at Maidugari where it could react to an enemy
raid coming from Mora. Captain R.W. Fox
commanding “A” Company 2nd Battalion Nigeria Regiment was ordered to
Maidugari where he was joined by “C” Company of the Mounted Infantry. Located in depth behind Fox were two infantry
companies at Nafada.
Governor-General of Nigeria, Sir Frederick Lugard, was on leave in Britain
in early August 1914 and Mr. A.G. Boyle was acting in his place. Colonel C.H.P. Carter was the Commandant of
the Nigeria Regiment and was in Nigeria
at his headquarters. He immediately advocated
offensive operations involving columns crossing the border to distract the
Germans whilst a main thrust seized Douala,
the principal Kamerun port and naval base.
Boyle obtained an instruction from London
forbidding offensive action and he tried to water down Carter’s Defence Scheme
deployments, fearing that the removal of troops from western and central Nigeria would
lead to internal disturbances. But
Carter had his Defence Scheme and he stuck to it, hoping to catch the Germans
off-balance in the northern half of Kamerun where enemy communications were
reliant on British and French assistance.
Boyle reported all Carter’s actions back to London but omitted Carter’s reasoning. The civil administration and the military in Nigeria were missing
the direction and unifying authority of the absent Governor-General Lugard.
Above: Northern Kamerun and the Lake Chad area
Now the French
from their regional headquarters at Dakar in Senegal agreed to co-operate in an attack on Douala on the Kamerun
coast and stated their intention of also attacking independently across
Kamerun’s eastern border. The French
agreed to the attack on Douala
being commanded by the Inspector General of the West African Frontier Force
(WAFF) Brigadier C.M Dobell.
not only contained the Nigeria Regiment but also a Gambian infantry company, a Sierra Leone
infantry battalion and a Gold Coast mountain artillery battery and infantry
General Dobell was in the UK organising the concentration of the WAFF and
Imperial units from Sierra Leone
that he needed, and planning the Allied operation against Douala in consultation with the Royal
Navy. Dobell did not want separate
operations elsewhere in Kamerun dissipating his forces. However both Carter and Boyle agreed that it
would be politically and militarily advantageous to have northern Kamerun under
Allied control before the move on Douala
deployed to Madugurai Fox had entrenched himself near the German border and collected
information on enemy movements and activities.
With Carter’s agreement the mounted infantry company had been
reconnoitering towards Mora.
commander at Mora was Captain von Raben who occupied a small brick-built fort with
his 3rd Company.
was located on the plain one mile east of Mora town. The German telegraphic links to Douala had been halted on
the borders by the British and French since 31st July, and although von
Raben did not know of the declaration of war French military movements made him
assume that it had happened.
He had with
him eight Germans and 60 local troops with two machine guns whilst at Kusseri Fort
he had Lieutenant Kallmeyer, one German and 35 local troops with another
machine gun. South of Mora at Marua was
a detachment of the 7th
Company that was headquartered at Garua, which lay 125 miles to the southwest
near the Nigerian border. Although they
were not his troops von Raben ordered the two Germans at Marua to report to
Mora with their 34 local troops and machine gun.
Von Raben was
an enterprising commander and he engaged 60 recruits to augment his garrison
and then entrenched a new defensive position on a prominent ridge 1,300 feet up
the steep-sided Mora
Mountain. Reserves of food and ammunition were
stockpiled here and springs of water were adjacent.
On 19th August German sentries saw
British mounted troops approaching and von Raben led a detachment of his men
out and drove back the British mounted infantry patrol. However the appearance of the British caused
the local carriers employed by the Germans to desert. Von Raben now guessed that a British attack
was imminent so he partly demolished his fort on the plain and took all his men
up Mora Mountain to their trenches.
Right: A Nigeria Regiment soldier
August 1914 London gave Carter discretion to
deal with enemy posts near Lake Chad as he saw
fit. Carter immediately signaled Fox at
Madugurai instructing him to attack and capture Mora if he considered that his
force was adequate for the task. Fox
marched quickly and on 26th August occupied a position at Sava which was about 4,000 yards southeast of von Raben’s
position. Here the British were joined
by Captain Ferrandi and 15 Tirailleurs Senegalaise (French colonial infantry)
who had come to advise Fox that the French would be invading northern Kamerun
Fox immediately incorporated Ferrandi and his
men in the forthcoming British attack.
observed that he could climb higher up Mora
Mountain than the German trenches, and
so on 27th August he left a mounted infantry detachment with a
machine gun to guard his Sava position whilst
he and his other men and the French troops climbed the steep mountain. Two local men guided the Allies in darkness
to the very top of Mora
As dawn broke Fox saw the enemy trenches
below him and opened fire. However the
range was 1,500 yards and the one British machine gun was outclassed by the two
that von Raben’s men were firing back.
The No 1 on each of the enemy guns was a well-trained German European,
as was the German practice in Africa, and their skills ensured that the Allies
could not move down the open ridge line that separated the two parties. Fox realized that he could neither close with
the enemy nor sustain his men with ammunition and food whilst he was on top of
the mountain, so he decided to withdraw to Sava.
Then thick mist
descended causing confusion amongst three of the withdrawing Allied
groups. The machine gun crew under
Sergeant Studley, doubtless looking for a satisfactory way down the very steep
slopes, wandered too far north in the mist followed by the medical group under
Dr. T.P. Fraser and this was in turn followed by the reserve ammunition group
under Sergeant Taylor. As the mist
cleared these men saw troops in red fezes approaching them.
At first fire was opened but as the French
troops also wore red fezes the order was given to stop firing. This was a mistake as the soldiers were
German and had been dispatched by von Raben to counter-attack the Allied
position. This enemy party rushed the
British, capturing Studley’s machine gun before it could come into action and
killing Dr. Fraser, two soldiers and five gun carriers. Studley and some of the men escaped but
Taylor, a soldier, the gun and twelve boxes of ammunition were captured, along
with some stores. Von Raben, although
having 50 less men than the Allies and a large number of untrained recruits in
his less-elevated position, had exercised a tactical superiority over Fox.
Left: German mounted infantry in Kamerun
built a defensive position on a rocky hillock near Sava
and Fox requested that some artillery be sent to support him before he moved
against the enemy again. On 2nd
September Ferrandi and his Tirailleurs returned to French territory. Meanwhile von Raben now positioned a post on
the higher ground that the Allies had briefly occupied on Mora Mountain. In late August Lieutenant Kallmeyer and his
36 men inflicted heavy casualties on a French detachment from Fort Lamy
of 250 riflemen with one old gun that attacked the Kusseri Fort. Kallmeyer had surrounded the fort with a
thick abattis (deep fence obstacle) of thorn bushes, and skillful machine
gunnery prevented the French from penetrating this and rushing the fort. The old gun was soon put out of action and
after suffering 5 French and 18 Tirailleur casualties the French also withdrew
and requested reinforcements. These
arrived on 20th September but Kallmeyer fought a successful
withdrawal action to Mora, although he lost about half of his men. Fort
Foureau became the new
French name for the captured Kusseri Fort.
Von Raben held Mora until the bitter end, only surrendering on 18th
February 1916 when the remainder of the German forces in Kamerun had sought
refuge across the southwestern border in neutral Spanish Rio Muni.
What the early
Allied cross-border raids in northern Kamerun had shown was that whilst the
British and French were trained and equipped for actions against dissident tribesmen,
the Germans had equipped and prepared for more serious battlefields.
Official History, Military Operations, Togoland
& The Cameroons 1914 - 1916. by Brigadier General F.J. Moberley.
The Great War in West Africa
by Brigadier General E.
The Empire At War by Sir Charles Lucas KCB KCMG.
The History of The Royal West African Frontier
Force by Haywood and