of the world's diamond mines was a necessary but not
sufficient condition for perpetuating the price of diamonds.
If the public's appetite for diamonds decreased precipitously,
as it had in the Depression, or women's fashions suddenly
changed, as it had with coral and pearls, De Beers would
not be able for long to keep prices from collapsing,
no matter how ruthlessly it cut back on production from
the mines. To complete the diamond invention, De Beers
had to control demand as well as supply, and this required
some manipulation of the psyche of the diamond buyer.
What was necessary was the creation of a mass mentality
in which women would perceive diamonds, not as precious
stones that could be bought or sold according to economic
conditions or fashions, but as an inseparable part of
courtship and married life.
In September 1938,
Harry Oppenheimer journeyed to New York City to investigate
the possibilities of creating such a diamond mind. He
was met by Gerald M. Lauck, who was the president of
one of the leading advertising agencies in the United
States, N. W. Ayer. Lauck and N. W. Ayer had been recommended
to Oppenheimer by the Morgan Bank, which had helped
his father consolidate his financial empire. His bankers
were clearly concerned by the worldwide decline in the
price of diamonds.
In Europe, where diamond
prices had collapsed during the Depression, there seemed
little possibility of restoring public confidence. In
Germany, Austria, Italy and Spain, the notion of giving
diamond rings to commemorate an engagement had never
taken hold. In England and France, diamonds were still
presumed to be a jewel for aristocrats rather than the
masses. And in any case, Europe was on the verge of
war, and there seemed little possibility of expanding
diamond sales. This left the United States as the only
real market for De Beers' diamonds.
Even though the "tradition"
of giving diamond rings for engagements in America was
barely fifty years old, it had survived the Depression.
In fact, in 1938, some three quarters of all the cartel's
diamonds were sold for engagement rings in the United
States. Up until this point, however, American men tended
to buy the smaller and poorer quality diamonds, averaging
under $80 apiece, for their loved ones. Oppenheimer
and the bankers believed that Americans could be persuaded
to buy more expensive diamonds through an advertising
During their initial
meeting, Oppenheimer suggested to Lauck that his agency
prepare a plan for creating a new image for diamonds
among Americans. He assured him that De Beers had not
contacted any other American advertising agency with
this proposal, and if the N. W. Ayer plan met with his
father's approval, it would be the exclusive agents
for the placement of the newspaper and radio advertisements
in the United States. Moreover, Oppenheimer offered
to underwrite the costs of the research necessary for
developing the scheme. Lauck, envisioning a new and
potentially lucrative account, instantly accepted the
In their subsequent
investigation into the American diamond market, N. W.
Ayer's staff found that ever since the end of World
War I in 1919, there had been a consistent decline in
both the number and the quality of the diamonds sold
in America. During this nineteen-year period, the total
number of diamonds, measured in carats, had declined
by 50 percent; while the price of the diamonds, measured
in dollar value, had declined by nearly 100 percent.
This suggested that well before the Depression, Americans
had begun buying poorer quality and cheaper diamonds.
They concluded, according to an Ayer memo, that the
present depressed state of the market for diamonds was
"the result of the economy, changes in social attitudes
and the promotion of competitive luxuries."
Although it could do
little about the state of the economy, N. W. Ayer suggested
that through a well-orchestrated advertising and public
relations campaign, it could significantly alter the
"social attitudes" of the public at large and thereby
channel American spending toward larger and more expensive
diamonds instead of "competitive luxuries." Specifically,
the Ayer study stressed the need to vitalize the association
in the public's mind between diamonds and romance. Since
"young men buy over 90% of all engagement rings," it
would be crucial to inculcate in them the idea that
diamonds were a gift of love: the larger and finer the
diamond, the greater the expression of love. Similarly,
young women had to be encouraged to view diamonds as
an integral part of any romantic courtship. The study
found that there was already an increasing number of
marriages among middle-income wage-earners who were
"the backbone of the diamond market," and that, if properly
cultivated, this trend could provide fertile grounds
for diamond sales in the future.
Since the Ayer plan
to romanticize diamonds required subtly altering the
public's picture of the way that a man courts a woman,
the advertising agency strongly suggested exploiting
the relatively new medium of motion pictures. "Motion
pictures seldom include scenes showing the selection
or purchase of an engagement ring to a girl," the Ayer
proposal noted. "It would be our plan to contact scenario
writers and directors and arrange for such scenes in
suitable productions." Since movie idols were then paragons
of romance for the mass audience, they would be given
diamonds to use as their symbols of indestructible love.
In addition, the proposal
suggested planting news stories and society photographs
in selected magazines and newspapers that would reinforce
the link between diamonds and romance. There would be
stories about the size of diamonds that celebrities
presented to their loved ones, and photographs that
conspicuously focused on the glittering stone on the
finger of a well-known woman. And there were to be radio
programs where fashion designers talked about the trend
The Ayer plan also
envisioned using the British royal family to help foster
the romantic allure of diamonds. It observed, "Since
Great Britain has such an important interest in the
diamond industry, the royal couple could be of tremendous
assistance to this British industry by wearing diamonds
rather than other jewels." Subsequently, Queen Elizabeth
did go on a well-publicized trip to the South African
diamond mines, and she accepted a diamond from Oppenheimer.
On April 6, 1939, H.
T. Dickinson, a director of De Beers responsible for
international diamond sales, arrived in New York on
board the Queen Mary. At 4 PM that afternoon, he was
in the offices of N. W. Ayer discussing the implementation
of the advertising campaign. Initially, he found it
difficult to believe that diamonds had steadily lost
ground to other luxury goods in America, but after reviewing
the data, he accepted the N. W. Ayer thesis: a new image
for diamonds was needed. Within two months, De Beers
authorized Ayer to begin its campaign.
The advertising agency
wasted little time in approaching the film studios in
Hollywood. In its 1940 report to De Beers, it noted,
"A long series of conferences with Paramount officials,
capped by your own efforts, succeeded in changing the
title [of a film] from 'Diamonds Are Dangerous' to 'Adventures
in Diamonds'." It then reported that in another film
called Skylark, it had succeeded in inserting a "long
scene" in dealing with the selection of a diamond clip
and bracelet for the star Claudette Colbert; and that
in the film, That Uncertain Feeling, Merle Oberon wore
$40,000 worth of diamond Jewelry. On the basis of these
initial results, N. W. Ayer strongly recommended that
continued efforts be made to manipulate Hollywood films.
It reasoned that Americans "have not been conditioned
by their environment to diamond purchases. Aside from
the engagement rings, they have no diamond tradition.
But they are going to be influenced by ... what they
see their favorite movie star wear."
To further advance
the romantic image of diamonds, N. W. Ayer placed a
series of lush four-colored advertisements about diamonds
in the New Yorker and other magazines presumed to mold
elite opinion. These advertisements featured reproductions
of famous paintings by such respected artists as Picasso,
Berman, Dali and Dufy, which were intended to convey
the idea that diamonds were also unique works of art.
When the Second World
War began in Europe, N. W. Ayer fed numerous stories
to the press suggesting that the diamond market would
not be adversely affected by these developments. Even
though the war, in fact, virtually ended the gem diamond
business, with mines being shut all over Africa and
cutting centers in Europe being abandoned, the planted
stories, which were widely circulated by the wire services,
carried such optimistic titles as "Diamond, King of
Gems, Reigns Supreme Despite War," "Diamond Supply Unhurt
by War," "War Gives Impetus to Diamond Cutting," "Marriage
Increases Indicated by Rise in Diamond Sales," and "How
Diamonds Spark the Wings of War and Peace."
By 1941 the advertising
agency reported to its client that it had already achieved
impressive results in its campaign to alter the American
public's perception of diamonds. Since its inception,
the sale of diamonds had soared 55 percent in the United
States, reversing the previous downward trend in retail
sales. N. W. Ayer stated in the accompanying memorandum
to De Beers "the entire structure of your diamond organization
for the duration of the war rests upon the ultimate
sale of diamonds to consumers in the United States.
... Your problem is to cultivate the desire to purchase
diamonds for their own sake." The advertising agency
saw no reason to be overly modest in summarizing its
own contribution. It noted in the report that its campaign
required "the conception of a new form of advertising
which has been widely imitated ever since. There was
no direct sale to be made. There was no brand name to
be impressed on the public mind. There was simply an
idea-the eternal emotional value surrounding the diamond."
It further claimed that "a new type of art was devised
. . . and a new color, diamond blue, was created and
used in these campaigns. . . ."
As far as future campaigns
were concerned, N. W. Ayer pointed out that paid advertisements
themselves were not sufficient for solidifying the credibility
of the diamond. "It is the responsibility of the publicity
effort to gain access to the editorial and news columns
of magazines and newspapers, and thereby become part
of the publication itself," the report added. "In this
manner, it carries the authority of a disinterested
source and consequently creates interest among readers."
This technique of distributing
its message disguised as a news story proved especially
effective when it became necessary to foster the idea
that diamonds were contributing to the war effort and
buying gems amounted to an act of patriotism. During
the war De Beers also called on N. W. Ayer to defuse
the charge that it was an international cartel. A penciled
memorandum from De Beers in 1944 dealing with its public
relations notes: "Problem to convince American
public that the Diamond Industry, though an admitted
monopoly, operates fairly and in a manner that accords
with American interests. This must be done in a way
that will stand up under direct attack even from a government
source." It was not until after the war ended,
when millions of soldiers returned to civilian life,
that N. W. Ayer received an expanded budget from De
Beers to proceed with the next stage of its campaign
to make diamonds part of the romantic consciousness
of the American public. In Its 1947 strategy, the advertising
agency strongly emphasized a psychological approach.
"We are dealing with a problem in mass psychology. We
seek to . . . strengthen the tradition of the diamond
engagement ring-to make it a psychological necessity
capable of competing successfully at the retail level
with utility goods and services." It defined as
its target audience "some 70 million people 15 years
and over whose opinion we hope to influence in support
of our objectives." Since the point of the exercise
was to cultivate a sustainable image in the public mind,
rather than merely increase short-term sales, the advertising
agency cautioned that "the ordinary so-called 'hard-hitting'
techniques are not for you, for they are the very methods
that helped to cheapen the diamond in the opinion of
the public during the years before our association."
Instead, N. W. Ayer
outlined a far more subtle program which included arranging
for lecturers to visit high schools across the country."All
of these lectures revolve around the diamond engagement
ring, and are reaching thousands of girls in their assemblies,
classes and informal meetings in our leading educational
institutions," it explained in a memorandum to De Beers.
The advertising agency also organized in 1946 a weekly
service called "Hollywood Personalities," which provided
125 leading newspapers with descriptions of the diamonds
worn by "screen stars." And it continued its efforts
to focus news coverage on celebrities displaying their
diamond rings as a symbol of romantic involvement.
In 1947, the agency
even commissioned a series of portraits of "engaged
socialites." The idea was to create prestigious "role
models" for the poorer middle-class wage earners. The
advertising agency frankly explains in Its 1948 strategy
paper, "We spread the word of diamonds worn by stars
of screen and stage, by wives and daughters of political
leaders, by any woman who can make the grocer's wife
and the mechanic's sweetheart say 'I wish I had what
she has.' " Aside from the romantic connection, N. W.
Ayer also found that it could subtly exploit the premarital
insecurity women were found to have in their relations
with men. Even though the tradition of diamond engagement
rings was, at least in its popular form, mainly an invention
of the late nineteenth century, the advertising agency
decided to give it deep historical roots and establish
it in the public's mind as an inseparable part of the
marriage process. "We keep people thinking of the diamond
as the traditional symbol of the pledge to wed," it
explains in the 1948 memorandum. "The tradition itself
is kept before them its origin, its meaning, its history.
Told in different forms, in articles, in short 'filler'
items, in pictures, this story goes from our desks to
appear in books, magazines and newspapers." As evidence
of the success of this campaign of surreptitious authoring
of news stories, it cited the fact that "newspapers
have carried our items about the engagement diamonds
of a list of women that range from Mrs. [Harry S.] Truman
to the 'glamour girls' of Hollywood." It suggested that
these carefully constructed news stories were especially
effective in planting ideas in the public mind, noting,
"Such items develop the feeling, more convincingly than
mere repetition of the statement could do, that the
diamond is in fact the only accepted symbol of engagement."
De Beers needed a slogan
for diamonds that expressed both the theme of romance
and of legitimacy. Then in 1948 a N. W. Ayer copywriter
came up with the caption "A Diamond Is Forever," which
was scrawled on the bottom of a picture of two young
lovers on a honeymoon. Even though diamonds can be in
fact shattered, chipped, discolored or incinerated to
an ash, the concept of eternity perfectly captured the
magical qualities that the advertising agency wanted
to impute to diamonds. Within a year, "A Diamond Is
Forever" became the official logo of Dc Beers.
In 1951, N. W. Ayer
found some resistance to its million dollar publicity
blitz. It noted in its annual strategy review: "The
millions of brides and brides-to-be are subjected to
at least two important pressures that work against the
diamond engagement ring. Among the more prosperous,
there is the sophisticated urge to be different as a
means of being smart.... The lower-income groups would
like to show more for the money than they can find in
the diamonds they can afford."
To remedy these problems,
the advertising agency argued that "it is essential
that these pressures be met by the constant publicity
to show that only the diamond is everywhere accepted
and recognized as the symbol of betrothal."
N. W. Ayer was constantly
searching for new ways to influence American public
opinion during this period. Not only did it organize
a service to "release to the women's pages [of daily
newspapers] all the fresh material that we can find
or create about the engagement ring," but it set about
exploiting the relatively new medium of television by
arranging for actresses and other celebrities to wear
diamonds when they appeared before the camera. It also
established a "Diamond Information Bureau," which placed
a quasi-official stamp of authority on the flood of
"historical" data and "news" it released. "We work hard
to keep ourselves known throughout the publishing world
as the source of information on diamonds," it commented
in a memorandum to De Beers, and added, "Because we
have done it successfully, we have opportunities to
help with articles originated by others." Among such
successes, for example, the agency pointed to an article
in the National Geographic exalting diamonds that it
had helped prepare.
When sociologists such
as Thorstein Veblen popularized in his book The Theory
of the Leisure Class the idea that Americans were motivated
in their purchases, not by utility, but by "conspicuous
consumption," N. W. Ayer proposed applying this sociological
insight to the diamond market. "The substantial diamond
gift can be made a more widely sought symbol of personal
and family success an expression of socio-economic achievement."
To exploit this psychological
need of Americans to conspicuously display symbols of
their wealth, N. W. Ayer specifically recommended: "Promote
the diamond as one material object which can reflect,
in a very personal way, a man's ... success in life."
Since this campaign would require advertisements addressed
to upwardly mobile men, the ad agency suggested that
ideally they "should have the aroma of tweed, old leather
and polished wood which is characteristic of a good
club." In other words they were to evoke in men the
sweet smell of success.
To further develop
the diamond mind in America, N. W. Ayer asked both psychologists
and sociologists to analyze "basic human wants," such
as "comfort," "freedom from fear," "longer life," "the
ability to attract the opposite sex," and "social approval."
It justified this psychological investigation to De
Beers in the following terms: "An advertiser who
can make a close and believable association between
one or more of the "basic human wants" and his product,
can rouse a more vigorous and more universal demand
for his product and in the process tend to separate
this demand from control by consumers' current economic
The point of this manipulation
was to create in consumers a desire for diamonds that
had been subliminally linked through advertising with
other "basic human wants." Dr. James Bossard, a professor
of sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, observed
in a report that he prepared for N. W. Ayer: ~ The engagement
ring . . . is a symbol of the ability to get your man
in the competitive race. . . . It has the further features
that it is not easily given (too expensive), it is visible
(it sparkles), it is permanent (other things wear out),
and it advertises the economic status of the giver.
. . . Large scale society makes for impersonal relations.
One result of this is to place marked emphasis upon
outward manifestations and visible evidence." He
concluded "Conspicuous consumption becomes more
impressive than quiet confidence. . . . Symbols are
indicators of status.... A formal and visible symbol
of approaching marriage becomes a vital necessity in
a large office, a big university, a large plant."
In its strategy plan,
N. W. Ayer strongly endorsed the professor's analysis.
It added also that in terms of fashion "women are conditioned
to want what is shown in the fashion news." It asserted
that through psychologically designed advertising and
public relations, women could be further conditioned
to think of diamonds as a necessity of life.
For some sixteen years,
N. W. Ayer carefully cultivated the romantic image in
the public's mind that a diamond was a unique manifestation
of nature and the rarest of all precious objects in
the world. Then, in 1955, the General Electric Company
announced with considerable fanfare that it had invented
a process for manufacturing diamonds from ordinary carbon,
which was the commonest element on earth. At the behest
of De Beers, the advertising agency immediately began
feeding stories to the press intended to dispel fears
that the mass production of cheap diamonds was imminent.
The crisis of synthetic
diamonds soon passed from public attention. N. W. Ayer
reported back to De Beers, "At the time of the [General
Electric] announcement there were, quite naturally,
some expressions of uneasiness in the gem trade . .
. but with each passing week the announcement is falling
into perspective." It added, "We have fortunately been
in a position to counsel trade organizations on communicating
a relaxed point of view to their members."
Toward the end of the
1950s, N. W. Ayer reviewed its achievements in fostering,
if not wholly inventing, the diamond engagement tradition.
It reported to its client in South Africa that twenty
years of subtle but well orchestrated advertisements
and publicity had had a pronounced effect on the American
psyche. "Since 1939 an entirely new generation of young
people has grown to marriageable age," it noted with
unmistakable pride of accomplishment. "To this new generation
a diamond ring is considered a necessity to engagement
to virtually everyone." The message had been so successfully
impressed on the minds of this generation that those
who could not afford to buy a diamond at the time of
their marriage "deferred the purchase" rather than for
going it. Not only had the twenty-year advertising campaign
helped De Beers "sell current production" from its diamond
mines, but, more importantly, it had elevated diamonds
in the American mind to "cherished possessions" which,
according to N. W. Ayer, helped "keep previous production
in the hands of the consumer . . . and off the retail
market." Even in a severe economic pinch, diamonds would
not be resold by consumers who had subsumed the advertising
pitch "A Diamond Is Forever."
N. W. Ayer proposed
that instant engagement traditions should be invented
for other countries. In its 1960 strategy plan it suggested,
"The idea of developing a public diamond engagement
tradition in countries where it does not exist . . .
has been volunteered by leading jewelers in those countries."
It noted that Germany and Sweden would be two outstanding
targets for such an invention. Specifically, it said
that an international engagement ring tradition would:
"enlarge the market for smaller diamonds . . . insure
regular growth by broadening the market base . . . [and]
help to keep diamonds in safe hands by making them cherished
possessions of more people throughout the world." To
this end, the foreign language editions of Reader's
Digest were recommended as a means of introducing the
diamond message abroad.
N. W. Ayer recognized
in its analysis that some countries already had "firmly
rooted" traditions of exchanging simple gold rings to
symbolize the engagement, and that in these countries
it would not be possible to uproot instantly the existing
tradition. Initially, it therefore suggested a campaign
to associate diamonds with a "gift of love."
The campaign to internationalize
the diamond mind began in earnest in the mid-1960s.
The prime targets were Japan, Germany and Brazil. Since
N. W. Ayer was primarily an American advertising agency,
De Beers brought in the J. Walter Thompson agency, which
had especially strong advertising subsidiaries in Japan,
Germany and Brazil, to place most of its international
advertising. Within ten years, De Beers succeeded even
beyond its most optimistic expectations in creating
a billion-dollar-a-year diamond tradition in Japan.
In Germany and Brazil, De Beers met with more moderate
In America, which still
remained the ultimate market for most of De Beers' diamonds,
N. W. Ayer developed a plan for insulating diamond sales
from the cyclical swings in the economy that affected
most luxury goods. In 1960, it suggested a series of
advertising messages which would gradually induce consumers
into perceiving diamonds in terms of sentiments, such
as love, instead of valuable gems which could be disposed
of in hard times. Specifically, the "engagement advertising
strategy" for the 1960s involved three steps:
1. To attach to the
diamond the meaning of the engagement period;
2. Conversely, to identify
with the engagement period the romance, beauty, uniqueness,
value and permanence of the diamond;
3. To express these
ideas frequently to a clear majority of the U.S. families
capable of responding.
N. W. Ayer then outlined
a "psychology" for sentimentalizing diamonds: "The
first time that a man spoke to a woman of his love,
devotion, and expressed the wish never to be parted
from her ... the symbol of the first milestone was a
diamond. The engagement diamond. This diamond ring ...
was a badge for the outside world to see. It gave the
woman her status as a woman, the prestige of a woman.
Nothing else could take the place of the diamond."
However, as the years go by, the woman needs further
reassurance that her husband still loves her, according
to this psychological profile. "Candies come, flowers
come, furs come," the study continues, but such ephemeral
gifts fall to satisfy the woman's psychological craving
for "a renewal of the romance." A diamond, however,
which originally symbolized the commitment of love,
could serve to fill this emotional "later-in-life" need.
The advertising agencies
therefore recommended that De Beers initiate a program
of advertisements which would instill in the public's
mind that the gift of a second diamond, in the later
years of marriage, would be accepted as a sign of "ever
growing love." It argued that the development of a new
"later-in-life" diamond market would be necessary to
absorb the increasing supply of diamonds from South
Africa, because the number of engagement diamonds was
more or less fixed by the number of marriages in America.
Specifically, it recommended a campaign to "reach deeper
into the population to sell gift (later-in-life) diamonds
in order to increase demand," and in 1962 it asked authorization
to "begin the long term process of setting the diamond
aside as the only appropriate gift for those later-in-life
occasions where sentiment is to be expressed."
De Beers immediately
approved the campaign since the diamond mind had to
be now expanded to accommodate the surfeit of Siberian
diamonds that De Beers undertook to market for the Russians.
Almost all of these diamonds were under one-half carat
in their uncut form, and there was no ready retail outlet
for millions of such tiny diamonds. When it made its
secret deal with the Soviet Union, De Beers had expected
the production from the Siberian mines to gradually
decrease. Instead, it accelerated at an incredible pace,
and De Beers was forced to restructure its sales strategy.
Up to. this point,
De Beers itself had been largely responsible for reducing
the market for small, under one-carat diamonds. Through
its twenty-year advertising campaign, it had encouraged
American women to think of the size of a diamond as
a status symbol or "badge": The larger the diamond,
the more status it represented. During this period,
N. W. Ayer had surreptitiously authored film scenario
and news stories which constantly depicted women as
measuring a man's commitment by the number of carats
in the diamond he gave her. The engagement reports on
celebrities that N. W. Ayer circulated also emphasized
"caratage," or size, rather than quality. Diamonds were
portrayed as "a girl's best friend" if they were conspicuously
large. Now, however, De Beers had N. W. Ayer to reverse
its theme: Women were no longer to be led to equate
the status and emotional commitment in an engagement
with the sheer size of the diamond. Instead, a "strategy
for small diamond sales" was outlined which involved
stressing the "importance of quality, color and cut"
over size, and in advertisement pictures substituting
"one-quarter carat" rings for "Up to 2 carat" rings.
Moreover, the advertising, agency began in its international
campaign to "illustrate gems -as small as one-tenth
of a carat and give them the same emotional importance
as larger stones." The symbolic content of the news
releases was also to be manipulated so that women would
be induced to think of diamonds, regardless of their
size, as objects of perfection: A small diamond could
be as perfect as a large diamond.
The new campaign met
with considerable success. The average size of a diamond,
which was one carat in 1939, fell to none-quarter carat
by the late 1970s. This smaller size coincided almost
exactly with the average size of the Siberian diamonds
that De Beers. was now distributing. However, as American
consumers became gradually accustomed to the idea of
buying smaller diamonds, they began to perceive of the
larger diamonds as "flashy" and ostentatious. The advertising
success was beginning, however, to take on the aspects
of a financial disaster. In its 1978 strategy report,
N. W. Ayer notes "a supply problem has developed . .
. that has had a significant effect on diamond pricing."
It then explains that this problem proceeds from its
long-term campaign to stimulate the sale of small diamonds.
"Owing to successful pricing, distribution and advertising
policies over the last 15 years, demand for small diamonds
now appears to have significantly exceeded supply even
though supply, in absolute terms, has been increasing
steadily." But whereas there was not a sufficient supply
of small diamonds to meet the demands of consumers,
N. W. Ayer reported that "large stone sales [one carat
and up] ... have maintained the sluggish pace of the
last three years." Because of this, the memorandum continued,
"large stones are being . . . discounted by as much
as 20%." In other words, by heightening the appeal of
minute diamonds, the advertising campaign had inadvertently
diminished the salability of the larger diamonds. Since
the larger stones were far more profitable to sell than
the smaller ones, De Beers and its clients were being
deprived of potential profits.
Despite this embarrassing
"supply problem," N. W. Ayer argued that "small stone
jewelry advertising" should not be totally abandoned.
"Serious trade relationship problems would ensue if,
after 15 years of stressing 'affordable' small stone
jewelry, we were to drop all of these programs," it
pointed out. Instead, it suggested a subtle change in
"emphasis" in presenting diamonds to the American public.
In the advertisements, it planned such "adjustments"
as replacing smaller diamonds with one carat and over
stones, and resuming both an "informative advertising
campaign" and an "emotive program" which would serve
to "reorient consumer tastes and price perspectives
towards acceptance of solitaire [single stone] jewelry
rather than multi-stone pieces." Other "strategic refinements"
it recommended were designed to restore the large diamond
to being a visible symbol of conspicuous consumption.
"In fact, this [campaign] will be the exact opposite
of the small stone informative program that ran from
1965 to 1970 that popularized the 'beauty in miniature'
concept. . . ." With an advertising budget for America
of nearly ten million dollars, N. W. Ayer appeared confident
that it could bring about this "reorientation."
N. W. Ayer further
attempted to plumb the diamond mind in the mid-1970s
by retaining the firm of Daniel Yankelovich, Inc., to
poll a representative sample of the American public
on its attitude toward diamonds. The study was continued
over five years, and from this highly sophisticated
analysis of public opinion emerged a rather surprising
picture of a man, rather than a woman, as "the key figure
in the diamond jewelry acquisition process."
In the case of engagement
rings, men played a dominant role in 88 percent of the
purchases; indeed, in 46 percent of the purchases, the
man bought the ring without any participation whatsoever
from his fiancee. In purchasing other pieces of diamond
jewelry, the study found that women also only rarely
participated in the decision. "Not only is a woman unlikely
to buy diamond jewelry for herself," the study continued,
"she is also unlikely to buy diamonds for anyone else."
The essence of the diamond transaction was that it was
a gift from man to woman.
The gift, moreover,
contained an important element of surprise. "Approximately
half of all diamond jewelry that the men have given
and the women have received were given with zero participation
or knowledge on the part of the woman recipient," the
Yankelovich study pointed out. N. W. Ayer explored this
"surprise factor" in an analysis that observed: "Women
are in unanimous agreement that they want to be surprised
with gifts.... They want, of course, to be surprised
for the thrill of it. However, a deeper, more important
reason lies behind this desire . freedom from guilt."
Some women had pointed out that if their husbands enlisted
their help in purchasing a gift, like diamond jewelry,
their practical nature would come to the fore and they
would be compelled to object to the purchase.
Women were not totally
surprised by diamond gifts: Some 84 percent of the men
in the study "knew somehow" that the women wanted diamond
jewelry. The study suggested a two step "gift-process
continuum." First, "the man 'learns' diamonds are O.K."
from the woman; then, "at some later point in time,
he makes the diamond purchase decision" to surprise
Through a series of
"projective" psychological questions, meant "to draw
out a respondent's innermost feelings about diamond
jewelry," the study attempted to further examine
the curious semi-passive role played by women in the
diamond relationship. The man-woman roles seemed to
closely resemble the sex relations in a Victorian novel.
"Man plays the dominant, active role in the gift process.
Woman's role is more subtle, more oblique, more enigmatic.
. . ." Like Victorian sex, women seemed to believe there
was something improper about receiving a diamond gift.
They spoke about large diamonds as "flashy, gaudy, overdone
and otherwise inappropriate." Yet, through its
psychological probing of the female mind, the study
found, "Buried in the negative attitudes ... lies what
is probably the primary driving force for acquiring
them. Diamonds are a traditional and conspicuous signal
of achievement, status and success." It noted, for example,
"A woman can easily feel that diamonds are 'vulgar'
and still be highly enthusiastic about receiving diamond
jewelry." The element of "surprise, even if it is feigned,
plays the same role of accommodating dissonance in accepting
a diamond gift as it does in prim sexual seductions:
it permits the woman to pretend that she has not actively
participated in the decision. She thus retains both
her innocence and the diamond."
In projecting from
this data a strategy for De Beers for the future, N.
W. Ayer suggested that the objective of advertising
was "to perpetuate the positioning of diamond 'jewelry
as the most special of all gifts, so that men will continue
to 'know' and women continue to 'teach' that diamonds
are acceptable and wanted." While the advertising agency
candidly recognized that "available research has not
shed light on how the man learns that a diamond gift
would be acceptable to his wife," it nevertheless pressed
for a campaign of highly emotive advertising that would
reinforce this cryptic male "awareness" of female "receptivity."
Specifically, it suggested that the "tone of the copy"
should project "a strong sense of confidence in
the voice of the giver that the gift will be especially
well received." Ideally, the male reader should be enabled
"to project himself into the situation and . . . play
the role of the giver and anticipate the rewards associated
with a gift of diamonds." For example, an advertisement
might depict a beautiful woman, gushing with love and
admiration, as she is surprised by the diamond gift
while the male giver stands smugly by. No matter how
uninterested men might be in diamonds themselves, these
advertisements should convey "the extraordinary reaction
that can be expected from the gift." The artwork in
these advertisements should, N. W. Ayer further recommended,
play to "a known positive attitude in women that
a gift of this sort is preferred as a surprise."
Finally, "A significant
male appeal implicit in the surprise situation is the
strong implication that the gift will be a success."
N. W. Ayer concluded that such a campaign would provide
"an emotional appeal that is highly motivating to men."
For the continued shaping
of the diamond mind, the implications of this psychological
research were clear. To induce men to buy women diamonds,
advertising should focus not on the qualities and beauty
of the diamond itself, but on the emotional impact of
the "surprise" gift transaction. In the final analysis,
men were not moved to part with their earnings by the
value, aesthetics or tradition of diamonds, but by the
expectation that a "gift of love" would enhance their
standing in the eyes of their beloved. On the other
hand, women accepted the gift as a tangible symbol of
their status and achievement. Playing off the duality
of the male-female relationship, N. W. Ayer helped De
Beers expand its sales of diamonds in the United States
from a mere $23 million in 1939 to over $2 billion,
at the wholesale level by 1980. In two-score years,
the value of its sales had increased nearly a hundred-fold.
In comparison, the expenditure on advertisements, which
began at a level of only $200,000 a year and gradually
increased to $10 million, seemed a prudent investment
by De Beers. It had, after all, helped evolve an American
diamond mind capable of absorbing the abundance of diamonds
from both Africa and Siberia.