With the Holocene Climate Optimum behind us, and the likelihood of a switch to a global cooling phase, the UNFCCC and IPCC’s Articles 1 and 2 focused on global warming represent the biggest unrecognized global food security risk by far (see Chapters 1, 2, and 7 of “Revolution: Ice Age Re-Entry”).
Our “business as usual” global economic model, based on growth and resource depletion with little regard for the environment, also poses major food supply risks. Under business as usual, it is expected there will be 9-plus billion people living in the world by 2050. Most of the population growth from current levels is expected to be in drought-prone, aquifer-depleted, rapidly urbanizing, and malnourished[iii] Asia and Africa,[iv],[v],[vi],[vii] which depend heavily on fossil fuel imports to achieve economic growth.
Under the business-as-usual scenario it is expected that global food supply will need to increase by between 60 and 100 percent by the mid-21st century.[viii],[ix] The downside of growing urbanization is that there are fewer food producers relative to the number of consumers,[x] something which increases vulnerability to food supply risks. In a food crisis, trade restrictions imposed by exporting nations will be the norm. Corporate food suppliers in nations that do not restrict trade in food will also likely divert food supplies for profit, causing local food price inflation. This will undermine access to food for people in urban areas—especially the poor and, more generally, those living in developing nations.
Today nearly one-quarter of global agricultural food production, or more than half a trillion dollars’ worth, is traded internationally.[xi],[xii] Eighty percent of people now live in countries that must import food, with 10 percent of the world’s population living in countries importing more than half of their food supply. This reliance on food imports is most notable in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, Central America, and Southern Europe.[xiii]
Twenty food-exporting nations account for the majority of global food trade. The leading agricultural food exporters include the European Union, the USA, Brazil, China, Canada, Argentina, Indonesia, Australia, Malaysia, India, Russia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan.[xiv],[xv],[xvi]
Three main crop types, wheat, maize and soybeans, account for half of exported food crops.[xvii] Five nations account for between two-thirds and 80 percent of wheat, maize, and rice exports.[xviii],[xix],[xx] This dependence on a small number of crop-exporting nations creates huge vulnerabilities in our global food security. When crop yields in the major food producing and exporting nations are adversely impacted by extreme weather, import-dependent nations will become vulnerable to trade restrictions imposed by exporting nations, and will therefore be exposed to massive food price inflation.
For example, the food supply crisis of 2008 was the result of a price spike that resulted from drought-related crop failures among major exporters in late 2006, along with other market factors. Prices of the main staples increased by more than 50 percent, and in the case of rice prices tripled. This resulted in food riots in some countries, following the imposition of trade restrictions by some exporting nations. Export disruptions necessitated the introduction of import subsidies by the governments of importing nations, for the purpose of quelling public unrest.[xxi],[xxii],[xxiii],[xxiv],[xxv]
All of the above demonstrates the high level of interdependence between nations when it comes to food, the vulnerability of the global food system to climate change, as well as its vulnerability to price inflation. This high level of interdependence makes global trade, government restrictions on trade, and global commodity markets important influences on global food security.
Given the fragility of our global food supply to climate disruption, and the high level of dependence of many nations on food imports, how do nations improve the resilience of their food supply?
The simple answer to this question is that each one of us is a part of the solution. A number of important levers are available to people, communities, cities, food importers, governments, and organizations involved in developing climate-adapted crops (see citation)[xxvi] to improve the resilience of our food supply, both globally and nationally.
The most obvious solution is for more nations, municipalities, and homes to become almost self-sufficient in food supply, so that we may provide for a higher percentage of our own food needs. This will make us less dependent on food imports and on food supplied by corporations. This self-sufficiency underpins decentralized sustainable development. Decentralized sustainable development can protect us against food trade restrictions by governments, the impact of large food suppliers diverting food for profit, and commodity market speculation, all of which hinder the supply of food and drive up prices in a food crisis.
For countries that rely on food imports, increasing the number of supplying countries, suppliers, and the number of crop varieties imported can help them diversify their food supply.[xxvii] Diversifying the number of countries from which food is imported, and whose weather is controlled by different air circulation and monsoon systems, will also protect against the impact of low solar activity and volcanism. Trade agreements can be implemented to ensure food supply in times of crisis, with corporate suppliers prioritizing trade agreements over general exports. In times of a food crisis or short supply, consumers can also diversify their palates and reduce their reliance on any one type of food, such as, for example, water-thirsty rice.
Governments hold grain reserves for emergencies or for stabilizing prices in a food supply crisis. For countries with food stockpiles, these can be used to make good any food supply deficits for a number of months while food is being grown. However, food stockpiles have declined in recent decades, for a number of reasons.[xxviii],[xxix] National food stockpiles should be reassessed in preparation for a climate switch and accompanying risks such as climate-forcing volcanism or a pandemic flu outbreak. Industrial-scale and automated greenhouses, high-tech indoor and vertical farming, as well as the large-scale manufacture of single cell proteins, are all proven climate- and sunlight-independent food production technologies (reviewed below). These food production systems could be used to provide emergency food supplies in a crisis.
In the event of a climate-induced food crisis, switching from non-food crops such as those grown for biofuels (e.g., woody crops), beverages (e.g., coffee, cocoa, tea), and fibers (e.g., cotton) to food crops is an option for increasing available food crop acreage.[xxx] Croplands changed from non-food crops, as well as livestock pasturelands, can be planted with short-cycle crops such as potatoes, sweet potatoes, millet, pulses, maize, wheat, barley, etc. Diverting grain from livestock production to human consumption will also help expand food supply.
[i] Michael J Puma et al., “Assessing the evolving fragility of the global food system.” Environment Research Letter 10 (2015) 024007 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/10/2/024007.
[ii] C. Sage, “The interconnected challenges for food security from a food regimes perspective: Energy, climate and malconsumption.” Journal of Rural Studies (2012), doi:10.1016/j.jrurstud.2012.02.005.
[iii] David Satterthwaite et al., “Review. Urbanization and its implications for food and farming.” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010) 365, 2809–2820. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0136.
[iv] Global Europe 2050. Directorate-General for Research and Innovation. 2012. Socio-economic Sciences and Humanities. EUR 25252.
[v] Conduct a Google search, “United Nations, World population, 2050, 2100.”
[vi] J. Cleland, “World Population Growth; Past, Present and Future.” Environ Resource Econ (2013) 55: 543. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9675-6.
[vii] P. Gerland et al., “World Population Stabilization Unlikely This Century.” Science (New York, NY). 2014;346(6206):234-237. doi:10.1126/science.1257469.
[viii] Tony Fischer et al., “Crop yields and global food security. Will yield increase continue to feed the world?” Australia Centre for International Agricultural Research. Grains Research and Development Corporation. https://www.aciar.gov.au/node/12101.
[ix] M.E. Brown et al., 2015, “Climate Change, Global Food Security, and the U.S. Food System.” http://www.usda.gov/oce/climate_change/FoodSecurity2015Assessment/FullAssessment.pdf.
[x] David Satterthwaite et al., Review. “Urbanization and its implications for food and farming.” Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B (2010) 365, 2809–2820. doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0136.
[xi] Philippe Marchand et al., 2016, “Reserves and trade jointly determine exposure to food supply shocks.” Environment Research Letter 11 095009. Environment Research Letter 11 (2016) 095009 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/9/095009.
[xii] Graham K. MacDonald et al., “West; Rethinking Agricultural Trade Relationships in an Era of Globalization.” BioScience, Volume 65, Issue 3, 1 March 2015, 275–289, https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biu225.
[xiii] M. Porkka et al., 2013, “From Food Insufficiency towards Trade Dependency: A Historical Analysis of Global Food Availability.” PLoS ONE 8(12): e82714. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0082714.
[xiv] European Commission. Agriculture and Rural Development. Agricultural trade in 2013: EU gains in commodity exports. Monitoring Agri-trade Policy. https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/trade-analysis/…/2014-1_en.pdf.
[xv] European Commission. Agricultural and food trade. https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/sites/agriculture/files/…/agricultural-food-trade.pdf.
[xvi] Graham K. MacDonald et al., “Rethinking Agricultural Trade Relationships in an Era of Globalization.” BioScience, Volume 65, Issue 3, 1 March 2015, 275–289, https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biu225.
[xvii] Graham K. MacDonald et al., “Rethinking Agricultural Trade Relationships in an Era of Globalization.” BioScience, Volume 65, Issue 3, 1 March 2015, 275–289, https://doi.org/10.1093/biosci/biu225. (See Figures 1-4 and 8 for food trade and country interdependencies by crop or food type, and by calories, value, irrigation water, and land area).
[xviii] Christopher Bren d’Amour et al., “Teleconnected food supply shocks.” Environment Research Letter 11 (2016) 035007 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/3/035007. (see table 1, page 2 for the list of countries for each main crop).
[xix] Bo Chen and Sayed H. Saghaian, 2016, “Market Integration and Price Transmission in the World Rice Export Markets.” Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics 41(3):444–457. https://uknowledge.uky.edu/agecon_facpub/8.
[xx] S. Muthayya et al., 2014, “An overview of global rice production, supply, trade, and consumption.” Ann. N.Y. Acad. Sci., 1324: 7-14. doi:10.1111/nyas.12540.
[xxi] M.E. Brown et al., 2015, “Climate Change, Global Food Security, and the U.S. Food System.” http://www.usda.gov/oce/climate_change/FoodSecurity2015Assessment/FullAssessment.pdf.
[xxii] Tony Fischer et al., “Crop yields and global food security. Will yield increase continue to feed the world?” Australia Centre for International Agricultural Research. Grains Research and Development Corporation. https://www.aciar.gov.au/node/12101.
[xxiii] Michael J Puma et al., “Assessing the evolving fragility of the global food system.” Environment Research Letter 10 (2015) 024007 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/10/2/024007.
[xxiv] Philippe Marchand et al., 2016, “Reserves and trade jointly determine exposure to food supply shocks.” Environment Research Letter 11 095009. Environment Research Letter 11 (2016) 095009 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/9/095009.
[xxv] Christopher Bren d’Amour et al., “Teleconnected food supply shocks.” Environment Research Letter 11 (2016) 035007 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/3/035007.
[xxvi] Crop Stakeholder Organizations: 1) International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center (CIMMYT), https://www.cimmyt.org/, 2) International Rice Research Institute (IRRI), http://irri.org/. 3) The Pan-African Bean Research Alliance (PABRA), http://www.pabra-africa.org/seeds-systems. 4) International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT), http://www.icrisat.org. 5) International Potato Centre, https://cipotato.org/.
[xxvii] Christopher Bren d’Amour et al., “Teleconnected food supply shocks.” Environment Research Letter 11 (2016) 035007 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/3/035007.
[xxviii] Christopher Bren d’Amour et al., “Teleconnected food supply shocks.” Environment Research Letter 11 (2016) 035007 doi:10.1088/1748-9326/11/3/035007.
[xxix] Alex Evans, “The Feeding of the Nine Billion Global Food Security for the 21st Century.” A Chatham House Report.
[xxx] M.M. Mekonnen and A. Y. Hoekstra, “The green, blue and grey water footprint of crops and derived crop products.” Hydrology and Earth System Sciences, 15, 1577-1600, https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-15-1577-2011, 2011.