- The demonstrative refers to the object to which the speaker intends to refer.
- The demonstrative refers to the object that various 'contextual cues'—including particularly the demonstration (e.g,. pointing) that typically accompanies an utterance of a demonstrative—would lead a "linguistically competent public observer" to pick out.
- The referent is primarily determined by 'contextual cues', but the speaker's intentions help "disambiguate" vague demonstrations.
In "Dthat", Kaplan endorses (3). In later writing, however—in particular, in "Afterthoughts" (see above)—he abandons that view in favor of (1).
Reimer here argues that Kaplan ought not to have changed his mind. More precisely, she wants to argue that the demonstrations that typically accompany utterances of demonstratives play at least some role in determining to what the uttered demonstrative refers. The discussion here is limited, as Reimer notes, to so-called "perceptual demonstratives", where the uttered demonstrative is supposed to pick out some object that both the speaker and her audience can perceive.
Reimer claims that there are three sorts of cases that pose a problem for (1):
- Cases in which the speaker clearly demonstrates some object other than the one to which they intend to refer.
- Cases in which there is a demonstration but there is no "directing intention".
- Cases in which there is a "directing intention" but there is no associated demonstration.
As Reimer notes, such cases are exactly the sorts of cases at which one needs to look to decide the dispute between the three views mentioned above: They are precisely cases in which the predictions made by those views come apart.
As sensible as this last suggestion may seem, one might for other reasons think it odd to build one's account of demonstrative reference around cases that are "unusual" or "atypical". This sort of issue arises several time throughout the paper. I'll not ask a question about this, as the question would be very vague and difficult. But if anyone wants to think about this....
The first sort of case Reimer considers involves her grabbing a set of keys and saying "These are mine", but just as she says this she mistakenly grabs a set of keys next to hers. Surely, Reimer says, in this case, her intention to refer to her own keys does not make it the case that she does so.
Reimer's discussion of this case is very brief. She seems to regard it as a straightforward refutation of view (1). Is it? What responses might be open to a defender of that view? (Is it true, in the example Reimer gives, that she does not intend to refer to the keys she picks up?)
The second sort of case Reimer considers is the Carnap–Agnew case that Kaplan introduced in "Dthat". Reimer claims that such cases pose a problem for view (1) for two reasons. First, there is no "directing intention", since Kaplan requires such an intention to be directed at a perceived object. So, second, since Kaplan's version of view (1) was only supposed to apply when there is a directing intention, we need some other account of what fixes the reference in this case. Presumably, it is the demonstration. But, as Reimer says, if the demonstration plays such a role when there isn't a directing intention, why shouldn't it also play a role when there is one?
As Reimer notes, Kaplan could respond to the first worry by broadening the notion of a "directing intention" so that it might be directed at unperceived objects. How plausible might that be? What are her worries about this move? (And is it true, in the example Kaplan gives, that he does not intend to refer to the picture behind him?)
If the response to the first worry just mentioned works, then the second worry evaporates. Why?
In the third sort of case Reimer considers, one makes a demonstrative utterance, such as "That dog is Fido", but makes no demonstration at all. Reimer takes it to be intuitive in this case that one does not manage to refer to any dog at all. She also gives a more theoretical argument in favor of this claim: that "that", as it functions in "that dog", is an adjective, playing the same sort of role as "spotted", so that "that dog" is co-referential with "the dog I am demonstrating".
Reimer's account seems to entail that "that F" can never appropriately be uttered without an accompanying demonstration. Is that true? Can you think of any counterexamples to this claim?
Note that answering this question seems to presuppose our getting somewhat clearer about what a "demonstration" is supposed to be. So what are demonstrations exactly?