The Civil Rights Act of 1991
On November 21, 1991, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1991. Congress acted to address a series of no fewer than seven
decisions by the Supreme Court, some of which were regarded as
changing the well-established landscape of discrimination law, and
calling into doubt existing precedent. Among the decisions that
Congress addressed were Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins (1989) and Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Court provided
that, even where a plaintiff demonstrates that an employer was
motivated by discrimination, the employer can still escape
liability by proving that it would have taken the same action based
upon lawful motives. Wards Cove reinterpreted the disparate impact
method of proof, and held that an employer can avoid liability
merely by showing a business justification for the practice causing
a disparate impact, and that the plaintiff has the burden of
proving a lack of a business justification. Both cases were seen as
having made it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail in
employment discrimination lawsuits.
The 1991 Act amended several of the statutes enforced by EEOC,
both substantively and procedurally. Previously, jury trials were
possible only in cases brought under the EPA or the ADEA. Under the
provisions of the 1991 Act, parties could now obtain jury trials,
and recover compensatory and punitive damages in Title VII and ADA
lawsuits involving intentional discrimination. The Act placed
statutory caps on the amount of damages that could be awarded for
future pecuniary losses, pain and suffering, and punitive damages,
based on employer size. The maximum award of compensatory and
punitive damages combined was set at $300,000 for the largest
employers (more than 500 employees).
In addition, the 1991 Act added a new subsection to Title VII,
codifying the disparate impact theory of discrimination,
essentially putting the law back as it had been prior to Wards
Cove. And in response to Price-Waterhouse, the Act provided that
where the plaintiff shows that discrimination was a motivating
factor for an employment decision, the employer is liable for
injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs (but not individual
monetary or affirmative relief) even though it proves it would have
made the same decision in the absence of a discriminatory motive.
The Act also provided employment discrimination protection to
employees of Congress and some high-level political appointees.
Lastly, Title VII and ADA coverage was extended to include American
and American-controlled employers operating abroad.
Next: Furthering the
Protections Against Discrimination and Harassment Based on Race,
Sex and National Origin