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3 CHAPTER 1 Background Introduction mountable challenges due to terrain or environmental restric- tions such as wetlands. Landing and takeoff overruns, landing undershoots, and More recently, the introduction of Engineered Material Ar- landing and takeoff veer-offs account for most of the acci- resting Systems (EMASs) has provided an alternative to achieve dents that occur on or in the immediate vicinity of the run- safety levels similar to those provided by the standards, but way. Accident statistics show that, from 1959 to 2009, 55% using only 60% of the area. Another alternative that has been of the world's jet fatal aircraft accidents occurred during used worldwide is the use of declared distances. For either of landing and takeoff phases of the flight and accounted for these alternatives there were no tools to help assess the true 51% of all onboard fatalities (Boeing 2010). Although in many safety benefits associated with the solution selected. cases the causal factors involve some type of human error, The study presented in ACRP Report 3 introduced a method- the conditions at the airport may contribute significantly to ology for risk assessment of RSAs that has been used to evaluate the probability and severity of the accidents. RSA alternatives by the industry. However, the methodology The runway safety area (RSA) is a graded and obstacle-free cannot be used to evaluate the use of EMAS, declared distances, rectangular-shaped area surrounding the runway that "should or safety areas for veer-off incidents. Moreover, the analysis is be capable, under normal (dry) conditions, of supporting air- complex and only prototype software was developed under planes without causing structural damage to airplanes or that study. injury to their occupants" (AC 150/5300-13 1989). The RSA This report is organized into seven chapters. This first chap- improves the safety of airplanes that undershoot, overrun, or ter provides the background and the objectives of the study, veer off the runway and has helped turn potential accidents as well as the basic alternatives used by the industry to im- into minor incidents. prove RSAs. The second chapter describes the five major types The rectangular dimensions of the RSA have changed over of incidents included in the analysis with major causes and the years and depend on the category of aircraft using the contributing factors. Moreover the chapter presents the data runway. In the 1960s, in an attempt to mitigate the severity of used for the modeling process. aircraft accidents, the FAA revised the airport standards for Chapter three explains the three-part approach to model RSA. The FAA RSA standard for most runways serving 14 CFR each type of incident. Also it presents the probability and Part 121 air carrier operations is an area that is 500 feet wide location models developed in this study and incorporated in centered on the runway and extends 1000 feet beyond each the approach. The next chapter describes the consequence end of the runway. approach and how it was implemented. Because many airports were built before the 1960s, when The approach and the models developed in this study were RSA dimension standards were smaller, some airports were incorporated into RSA analysis software named Runway Safety not complying with the new dimensions. In 1999, the FAA Area Risk Analysis (RSARA). Chapter 5 describes the soft- released Order 5200-8 and embarked upon a major effort to ware, and the required input and output information. Both upgrade safety areas that do not meet the current standards. the software and the models were validated using a sample of The goal is to have all possible improvements for Part 139 air- airports and their historical records for accidents and incidents ports completed by 2015. However, it is not practical for to run the analysis and compare actual and predicted incident some airports to extend their current RSA dimensions to and accident rates. The results for validating the analysis are meet the standards because they are landlocked or face insur- presented in Chapter 6.