THE EVENTS OF 1914
The substance of the facts referred
to in the foregoing chapter was tolerably well known to the German Government
before the present war, through certain unofficial channels which need not be
specified; though the documentary evidence of
Even if there had been no danger of such a crisis
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it would have been contrary to the dictates of
political wisdom for
These relations changed very rapidly, by force of circumstances.
Being compelled, by the
unwarranted general mobilization of
consisting of the
A most significant passage
of those plans reads: "The First Army unites with the English and Belgian
Armies, and, after passing through
Thus, the French plan of campaign contemplated, as though it were a matter of course (which, indeed, it was for the French headquarters), a concerted action of the Maubeuge Army with the Belgian forces and an English expeditionary army. However, concerning this proposed co-operation of an English force with the French Maubeuge Army, there was corroborating evidence in the hands of the German General Staff, the Anglo-French designs having been allowed to leak out on various occasions.1 Moreover, the attitude of the British
name "Maubeuge" in particular recalls the
following startling revelations of the widely circulated French newspaper, Gil
Blas, in its issue of
"A contemporary of
Government toward Germany's proposals, during the
critical days preceding the outbreak of hostilities, left no doubt that England
had fully made up her mind effectively to support the French attack against the
German frontier, by way of
If this French plan of campaign, the correctness of which has since been confirmed,1 was allowed to be carried out, Germany would have had to face an attack at her most vulnerable spot—the entirely unprotected Prusso-Belgian frontier, where a hostile invasion of the indicated enormous strength would have delivered to the enemy at least more than half of the Prussian Rhine Province, including Germany's most valuable coal and iron mines as well as a number of important centers of industry. It would have been a most dangerous, perhaps a disastrous, attack against the German flank—and a later stage of the war (the operations of the Kluck Army) has clearly shown what such flank attacks mean, in modern strategy.
Under these grave circumstances, the German headquarters had to act without delay. It was their imperative duty to strike at the French Maubeuge Army as soon as possible, in order to prevent it
French cannons. Therefore, both governments have agreed to lay in store, already in peace time, on French territory, such quantities of ammunition as will be necessary for the English artillery."
1 The official press-communique in the North German Gazette of
THE EVENTS OF 1914 95
from carrying out the task allotted to it in the
French plan of campaign. To this end, however, it was unavoidably necessary to
pass through Belgian territory. The German Government, therefore, requested the
Belgian Government to grant the German troops an unobstructed passage to
The legal aspect of this demand will be discussed in a later chapter. Here, I confine myself to the form in which those demands were made.
By instructions from the
German Chancellor, the Imperial Minister Plenipotentiary at
The Imperial Government is
in possession of trustworthy information as to the intended concentration (Aufmarsch) of French forces along the
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Government would greatly regret if
In order to preclude any misinterpretation, the Imperial Government declares the following:
Under the conditions
set forth above,
In the event of a friendly
THE EVENTS OF 1914 97
railways, roads, tunnels or other engineering works, then
When the above note was despatched
to the Belgian Government, the German authorities were fully advised that
French army aeroplanes, which committed hostile acts
The German Government
brought those facts to the knowledge of the Belgian Government, in an informal
manner, through the Imperial Minister at
1 Aktenstuecke zum Kriegsausbruch, compiled by the German Foreign Office, part 3, No. 27.
2 Belgian Gray Book, No. 21, which is, evidently, a somewhat "edited" protocol concerning the oral complaint of the German Minister to the Belgian Foreign Department. The objection of the Belgian official quoted therein, viz.: that, since the French hostile acts complained of had been committed on German soil, they did not concern Belgium, is quite irrelevant because it does not meet Germany's complaint that those hostile French acts had been committed under violation of Belgium's neutrality.
to the effect that large bodies of French troops were actually operating on
Belgian territory before the German army invaded
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There can be no doubt that
those violations of Belgium's neutrality by France, not opposed by the Belgian
authorities, would have fully justified Germany in making a formal categorical
demand at Brussels that the Belgian Government take speedy and effective
measures for maintaining its neutrality. More than that—she might have publicly
However, everything goes
to show that
lished by the Imperial Government. Three affidavits of French prisoners of war, containing detailed information to that effect, are included in the Appendix, pages 230-235.
Had Belgium accepted those terms, the bulk of her people would probably never have learnt the horrors of war, and Brussels, Louvain and Antwerp would not have seen a German soldier; for the German army, passing only through the districts south of the Meuse and the Sambre, would have been able to carry out its imperative measures against the French Maubeuge Army entirely, or almost entirely, on French soil.
To make the acceptance of those terms possible, the German note carefully avoided not only every reference to Belgium's connivance toward French military operations on her soil, but also every allusion as to the complicity of the Belgian Government in the British complot of which, as mentioned above, the Imperial Government had then already sufficient knowledge without holding in its hands documentary evidence to that effect.1
However, the Belgian
Government was too deeply entangled in the meshes of
The German demands were flatly refused by
following passage in the Chancellor's speech of
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always to have been faithful to her international obligations, she emphasized that the King of Prussia was one of the guarantors of her status as a neutralized country; protested against the threatened attempt against her independence (which, obviously, was not threatened in the least); and declared herself in honor bound to repulse any attack upon her rights.1
Even at that advanced
stage of the crisis
1 Belgian Gray Book, No. 22.
2 Ibid., No. 25.
3 British White Papers, No. 155.
THE EVENTS OF 1914 101
For the reasons briefly stated above and more
fully to be discussed in a later chapter,
Early on August 4th, a
second German note was delivered at
to its deepest regret, compelled to carry out—by force of arms, if necessary—the measures of security which have been set forth as indispensable in view of the French menace.1
On the same day, the German Chancellor, Dr. von Bethmann Hollweg, made his famous speech in the Reichstag, declaring that, in her state of legitimate defense, Germany was compelled to invade the territory of two friendly neighbor countries, which act was "contrary to the provisions of international law," and putting it on record that the "wrong" which Germany thereby committed she would try to make good as soon as her military aim should be attained.2
These words of the Imperial Chancellor, which are constantly cited by Germany's critics as an unqualified official admission of Germany's unqualified guilt toward Belgium, can be fully understood and appreciated only if due consideration is given to the
1 Belgian Gray Book, No. 27.
2 See Appendix, page 219.
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circumstances under which they were uttered and to the exceptional personality of the
speaker. Not much known in
THE EVENTS OF 1914 103
pledge that the temporary wrongs imposed upon them would be righted as soon as possible. That such was, indeed, the Chancellor's hope is quite clear from his speech at the Reichstag on December 2d, when he made the following statement:
When, on August 4th, I
referred to the wrong which we were doing in marching through
At a later hour of the same fateful day, German troops passed the Belgian frontier, near the little town Gemmingen, whereupon Belgium instantly severed her diplomatic relations with the German Empire.2 Simultaneously, she made an appeal to Great Britain, France and Russia—not to Austria, by the way—asking these countries "to co-operate as guarantors in the defense of her territory,"3 which Powers immediately gave full assurance to that effect.4
1 See Appendix, page 228.
2 Belgian Gray Book, Nos. 31-34.
3 Ibid., No. 40.
4 Ibid., Nos. 48, 49, and 52.
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During the four preceding
1 British White Papers, No. 114.
2 Ibid., No. 123.
THE EVENTS OF 1914 105
ment will maintain to the utmost of her power her
neutrality."1 Third, after
As mentioned above, the
invasion of German troops in
With characteristic honesty
and frankness, Dr. von Bethmann-Hollweg had outlined
to the British Ambassador
It depended upon the action of
1 Belgian Gray Book, No. 11, where the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs remarks very mysteriously that, on July 31, Sir F. Villiers transmitted to him that communication .from Sir Edward Grey "which he was desirous of being in a position to place before me since several days" (qu'il souhaitait titre a meme do m'exposer depuis plusieurs fours).
2 British White Papers, No. 153.
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The war with France having become an accomplished fact in the meantime, the Imperial Government, on August 4th, instructed the German Ambassador in London to declare to the British Government that
the German army could not be exposed to French attack
and to repeat, at the same time most positively the formal assurance that
even in the case of armed conflict with
England, however, did not accept that assurance, but on the same day addressed an ultimatum to Berlin, to the effect that the German Government give a satisfactory reply to the British request, made the same morning, namely, that Germany give
1 British White Papers, No. 85.
2 Ibid., No. 157.
THE EVENTS OF 1914 107
an assurance that the demand made upon
This ultimatum concluded the following passage which
may be considered as
Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality
The time-limit having expired at of August 4th (corresponding to 11 p.m. of the same day, according to London time), without any answer forthcoming from the German Government, Germany and Great Britain were at war with each other from that time—ostensibly for the reason that Germany had violated Belgium's neutrality.3
It is beyond the scope of
this study to show in detail that
1 British White Papers, No. 159 and No. 153.
2 Ibid., No. 159.
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neutrality. "As a matter of history," says Professor A. Bushnell Hart of Harvard, "it seems now established beyond all cavil that the English practically decided to stand by France (which must infallibly lead to war) on August 2d; and would have continued in that mind even if the Germans had respected Belgium."1 Besides, quite a number of honest Britishers are on record who, like Mr. Trevelyan, a former member of the Cabinet, George B. Shaw, the noted playwright, and others, have publicly repudiated their Government's official justification of England's participation in the war—emphasizing that Germany's invasion of Belgium had nothing to do with it.2 It was, to use a phrase of Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the English Labor Party, "a pretty little game of hypocrisy"
of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honor which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind,—we are fighting to vindicate the principle that smaller nationalities are not to be crushed in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and over-mastering Power." (M. P. Price, The Diplomatic History of the War, Appendix, page 101.)
1 The essay, The Essential Points
of Belgian Neutrality, in the New York Times of
2 A number of interesting
verdicts of this kind are contained in the pamphlet
interviews with several prominent Englishmen, including G. B. Shaw, were
published in Collier's for
when Mr. Asquith and his colleagues tried to make the
world believe that
The fact is that
When, in the critical hour, the King of the Belgians, realizing the tremendous task imposed upon his country and, obviously, making a supreme effort for a peaceful solution, asked England for diplomatic support, London sent him a categorical command to charge the enemy, depriving thereby Belgium of the chance of avoiding a clash with Germany which had no designs on Belgium and offered liberal terms.
The same was, evidently, the
case when, on August 7th,
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The fortress of
1 Belgian Gray Book, No. 60.
THE EVENTS OF 1914 111
fused this last offer for a peaceful settlement. After having submitted the draft of her proposed reply to the diplomatic representatives of Great Britain, France and Russia1—a step which permits of more than one interpretation—she was duly authorized by Great Britain and France2 to despatch it to Germany, which she did, via the Hague, on August 12th.3
The frequent notes of
moral indignation, the constant references to the national honor and the
re-iterated assurances that Belgium had always lived up to her international
obligations, displayed in those official documents, fall flat now, after the
world has learned something about the Belgian Government's illicit ante-bellum
relations. It is obvious that its course of action could not have been
determined by any considerations of
Nevertheless, the question arises: what did the Belgian Government, in carrying out those obligations, expect? Could it reasonably hope and did it really expect successfully to stop the advance
Belgian Gray Book,
2 Ibid., Nos. 68 and 69.
3 Ibid., No. 71.
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of the German army, with the aid of its secret allies, and come out uppermost in the impending struggle?
An answer to this question may possibly be found
in a pamphlet of a well-known French military writer, Colonel Arthur Boucher,
which appeared early in 1913 under the title "La Belgique
a jamais independante"
"But, at that moment, the French and Belgian armies will not be the only ones which the North German contingent will have to face.
"May one not suppose that
"Above all, can one not be
1 Berger-Levrault Editeurs, Paris, 1913.
THE EVENTS OF 1914 113
gium, and that she, in possession of the liberty of the Sea and, probably, in
a position to enter the mouth of the
critical will then be the situation of all German troops engaged in
we must not forget that, thus forecasting the situation of our adversaries, we
have, on purpose, put all the trumps in the hands of the Germans. However, do
not the latter, after the trip of Mr. Poincare to
The firm expectation that
1 This forecast that England would "forestall a Belgian appeal for assistance" (ira au devant de l'appel de la Belgique) is, possibly, something more than a strange coincidence in thought with the bold assertion of Col. Bridges that England would have sent her troops to Belgium, even if the latter country should not have asked for them (page 87).