WASHINGTON'S INTENTIONS AND PLANS
During the period from February 10 to August 14, 1781, the Commander in Chief was engaged in formulating and executing strategical plans which resulted in the French and American Armies being brought together near Dobbs Ferry on the 6th of July, and later caused them to be transferred to Virginia. Washington's initial purpose was to invest New York, with the reservation that this would be impossible if the French admiral refused to take his ships inside of Sandy Hook. The alternative was to attempt the capture of Cornwallis's army in Virginia.
On the 14th day of August Washington learned that the Count de Grasse would operate in the Chesapeake, and this date marks the end of all his plans to recover New York. Throughout the period terminating August 14 Washington's mind had dwelt on the possibility, and even the probability, of Virginia becoming the eventual goal. The development of the thought was so persistent and cumulative as to considerably lessen in after years recollection of an original design to operate against New York. In the early part of the revolution the military quality of Washington's mind was exemplified in the remark to Lafayette that "I never judge of the propriety of measures by after events," but in later years there was one occasion when its corollary—not to confuse happenings with intentions—was overlooked.
On the 14th of July, 1788, Noah Webster, a young and ambitious student and lecturer, wrote to General Washington, then at Mount Vernon, that he was engaged in preparing a history of the late war and expressed himself as follows:
I take the liberty of making an enquiry respecting a fact which I am told is commonly misrepresented, & which perhaps no person but the Commander in
Chief of the late armies in America can set right. An opinion, Sir, is very general, that the junction of the French fleet & the American armies at York Town was the result of a preconcerted plan between Yourself & the Count de Grasse; & that the preparations made at the time for attacking New York were merely a feint. But the late Quarter Master General has assured me that a combined attack was intended to be made upon New York, & that the arrival of the French fleet in the Bay of Chesapeake was unexpected, & changed the plan of operations.
Webster said that his sole motive in disturbing Washington with this matter was that in writing history—
it is of infinite consequence to know the springs of action as well as the events; and a wish to discover & communicate truth.
Washington replied to this communication on the 31st of July, 1788, saying that he could only answer the question "briefly, and generally from memory." His letter contains the following statement:
The point of attack was not absolutely agreed upon, because it would be easy for the Count de Grasse in good time before his departure from the West Indies to give notice by express at what place he could most conveniently first touch to receive advices, because it could not be foreknown where the enemy would be mod susceptible of impression, and because we, (having command of the water, and with sufficient means of conveyance,) could transport ourselves to any spot with the greatest celerity: that it was determined by me, (nearly twelve months beforehand,) at all hazards to give out and cause it to be believed by the highest military as well as civil officers, that New York was the destined place of attack, for the important purpose of inducing the eastern & middle States to make greater exertions in furnishing specific supplies than they otherwise would have done, as well as for the interesting purpose of rendering the enemy less prepared elsewhere: that these means, and these alone, artillery, boats, stores, and provisions were in seasonable preparation to move with the utmost rapidity to any part of the continent; for the difficulty consisted more in providing, than knowing how to apply, the military apparatus: that before the arrival of the Count de Grasse, it was the fixed determination to strike the enemy in the most vulnerable quarter so as to ensure success with moral certainty, as our affairs were then in the most ruinous train imaginable: that New York was thought to be beyond our effort, and consequently the only hesitation that remained was between an attack upon the British army in Virginia or that in Charleston: and, finally * * * the hostile post in Virginia, from being a provisional and strongly expected, became the
definite and certain object of the campaign. I only add, that it never was in contemplation to attack New York, unless the garrison should first have been so far disgarnished to carry on the southern operations, as to render our success in the siege of that place as infallible as any future military event can ever be made.
The essential points in this extract from Washington's letter are that the place of attack was not absolutely agreed upon at the Weathersfield conference of May 21, 1781; that nearly 12 months before the conference Washington had determined to give out that New York was the destined place of attack; that before the arrival of De Grasse the Commander in Chief had decided to attack in the most vulnerable quarter; and that finally Virginia became the definite object of the campaign. This part of Washington's letter can not be interpreted in any light other than that there was always the thought that New York might be the objective. Another paragraph of the letter reads:
That much trouble was taken and finesse used to misguide and bewilder Sir Henry Clinton in regard to the real object by fictitious communications as well as by making a deceptive provision of ovens, forage, and boats in his neighbor, hood, is certain. Nor were less pains taken to deceive our own army; for I had always conceived, when the imposition did not completely take place at home, it could never sufficiently succeed abroad.
This paragraph alone lends itself to several interpretations, the most extreme being that all of Washington's plans against New York were meant to deceive, misguide, and bewilder; all of which are permissible and effective stratagems.
The letter closes with the remark that while most of the official papers bearing on the campaign are preserved, "yet the knowledge of innumerable things of a more delicate and secret nature is confined to the perishable remembrance of some few of the present generation." The only individuals who shared the most secret thoughts of Washington during these six months of uncertainty were the several gentlemen who, at the time, constituted his official family.
Preliminary plans for the 1781 campaign had been made at the Hartford conference of September, 1780, between Washington and
Rochambeau. The agreement entered into at the time was that New York was to be invested with a combined army approximating 30,000 men, provided the allies had a naval superiority on the Atlantic coast during the critical part of the campaign. Should the British reduce their total strength in and around New York by detaching troops for service elsewhere, a force equal to double their remaining strength was viewed as sufficient for the operations. It was expected that additional troops would come from France as a result of the request made upon the ministry for 10,000 reenforcements.
The general idea of the plan of operations, if it were possible to procure the land force counted on, was to attack simultaneously at two places; the Americans against the works on York Island, and the French, in all probability, against the works at Brooklyn. In case the allies found themselves unable to undertake this capital, enterprise the reduction of Charleston would probably become the objective. If the investment of Charleston met with success, Savannah, Penobscot, and other places might be attempted. This detailed presentation of major and secondary objectives was furnished to General Knox, Chief of Artillery, in a letter from Washington dated the 10th of February, 1781. Knox was told to prepare for the siege of New York, being advised at the same time that any dispositions which might be made for the principal object would substantially comprehend the lesser.
Meanwhile the spring operations of the French Fleet, which have been previously described, got under way. M. de Tilly concluded three ships to the Chesapeake in February, and in the same month Washington dispatched Lafayette's corps to Virginia. Upon De Tilly's return to Rhode Island, Washington proceeded to Newport for another conference with Rochambeau and arrived at French headquarters on the 6th of March. Two days later the entire fleet set sail for the Chesapeake, carrying a detachment of 1,120 French soldiers under the command of Baron de Viomesnil. Admiral Destouches encountered the British Fleet under Arbuth-
not off the capes of Virginia on the 16th of the month. After an indecisive action the French Fleet returned to Newport.
* * * * * * *
Brief reference has been made to the instructions covering a variety of contingencies which had been prepared at Versailles for Rochambeau's guidance in the conduct of the 1781 campaign. Such action by the ministry was necessary in order that it might exercise some measure of control over the movements of this part of the French Army, and of the important fleet which was about to sail to cooperate with it. The instructions were not so restrictive, however, as to deprive either the general or the admiral of the power of initiative, nor to prevent them making alterations within certain bounds. Rochambeau was cautioned not to engage in any operations which would cause him to abandon Rhode Island at a time when the squadron under Destouches might find it hazardous to retire to Boston. A superior French naval force under command of Count de Grasse, lieutenant general of the marine, would arrive in July or August, at which time it would be joined by the squadron then at Newport.
The French Fleet set sail from Brest on the 22d of March, followed by the Concorde, a frigate bearing to the United States M. de Barras who was to take command of the squadron at Rhode Island, and Viscount de Rochambeau, son of the general. The Concorde reached Boston on the 6th of May, and on the 8th Rochambeau wrote to Washington from Newport requesting an early interview and asking him to fix upon the place for the meeting. Washington's reply designated the 21st of May as the date for the conference, and Weathersfield as the place. The Commander in Chief set out for Weathersfield on the 18th of the month accompanied by Generals Knox and Duportail. The day before Ins departure there was confirmation of rumors which had persisted for several days to the effect that a heavy detachment of British troops had sailed from New York for the South. This detachment was the one commanded by Leslie, which had left the harbor about the 11th of the month.
Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Chastellux arrived at Weathersfield on the 216t of May. The appearance of the British Fleet off Block Island prevented the attendance of Count de Barras. One of the first projects to which consideration was given was the proposition made by Washington that the squadron at Newport be employed at an early date to transport the French Army to the Chesapeake. It was agreed that this could not be done in view of the instructions from the ministry to take the squadron to Boston in case the army was removed from Newport. As any joint plan of campaign would necessitate the removal of the French troops from Newport, Rochambeau was very desirous that measures be taken to insure retention of the harbor, thereby offering a very essential refuge for the ships during the hurricane season. It was further agreed, in view of the probable inability of Clinton to detach any considerable body of troops to repossess the island, that 500 militia would be sufficient to guard the works. The heavy artillery and spare stores having already been removed to Providence, it was decided that they could be left there with safety under guard of 200 French troops, aided by militia if necessary.
These preliminary matters being disposed of, the major questions involved were then discussed. Rochambeau asked Washington what operations would be engaged in by the combined armies when the superior French Fleet appeared off the Atlantic coast. To this question Washington replied that as the British had consider, ably reduced their force at New York by sending numerous detachments to the South, he thought it advisable to form a junction of the French and American Armies on the North River, and be pre, pared to take advantage of any opportunity which the weakness of the enemy might afford. The great waste of men which had always occurred in long marches to the Southern States; the difficulties and expenses of land transportation thither, gave preference to an operation against New York rather than to an attempt to send a force to the South. The entry in Washington's diary for the 22d of May is as follows:
Fixed with Count de Rochambeau upon a plan of Campaign—in substance as follows.—That the French Land force (except 200 Men) should March so soon
as the Squadron could Sail for Boston—to the North River—& there, in conjunction with the American, to commence an operation against New York (which in the present reduced State of the Garrison it was thought would fall, unless relieved; the doing which wd. enfeeble their Southern operations, and in either case be productive of capital advantages) or to extend our views to the Southward as circumstances and a Naval superiority might render more necessary & eligable.—The aid which would be given to such an operation in this quarter—the tardiness with which the Regiments would be filled for any other.—the insurmountable difficulty and expence of Land Transportation—the waste of Men in long Marches (especially where there is a disinclination to the Service—objections to the climate &ca.) with other reasons too numerous to detail, induced to this opinion.—The heavy Stores & Baggage of the French Army were to be deposited at Providence under Guard of 200 Men (before mentioned) —& Newport Harbour & Works were to be secured by 500 Militia.—
Before leaving Weathersfield Washington dispatched letters from Rochambeau and himself to M. de la Luzerne, in which they give complete information of the plans just concluded. The minister was asked to inform Admiral de Grasse of the strength and situation of the British naval and land forces, and of the intention of the allied commanders after a junction of the armies had been made.
While affairs remain as they now are—
the West India fleet should run immediately to Sandy Hook if there are no concerted operations, where they may be met with all the information requisite, and where most likely it will shut in, or cut of Admiral Arbuthnot, and may be joined by the Count de Barras.
On the 24th of May Washington set out on the return journey to New Windsor, where he arrived the following evening. The next day a letter was received from Colonel Laurens giving information of the gift of 6,000,000 livres from the Kings and telling of the offer of mediation made by the Courts of Petersburg and Vienna.
The president of Congress was informed of the plans agreed upon at Weathersfield in a letter written by Washington on the 27th of May, wherein were presented the reasons that prompted the decisions. Washington said in this letter that—
the Continental battalions, from New Hampshire to New Jersey inclusive, (supposing them complete,) aided by four thousand French troops, and such a
reinforcement of militia as the operation after its commencement may seem to require, have been deemed adequate to the attempt upon New York with its present garrison.
On the 28th of May the Commander in Chief called on the Chief of Artillery and the Chief of Engineers (Knox and Duportail) to prepare estimates of their wants for the intended operations against New York, and on the Quartermaster General (Pickering) to provide a large number of boats and other supplies. The entry in the diary for the 31st of the month shows a detailed statement compiled by two of Washington's spies in New York of the British regular forces in and around that city, estimated at somewhat more than 4,500 men, together with their distribution amongst the several posts.
Washington wrote to Gen. John Sullivan, in Congress, on the 29th of May to inform him of the objective for the armies in the approaching campaign, declaring that New York offered the fairest prospect of success, "unless the enemy should recall a considerable part of their force from the southward." Even if this were done, while it might produce disappointment in one quarter, it would certainly afford the greatest relief in another. This letter was intercepted by the British, as were several others of about the same date, including one written by Lafayette. It was from these intercepted letters that Clinton, as previously stated, had learned that New York was threatened with a siege, whereupon he dispatched a runner to Cornwallis on the 8th of June with the request that 2,000 men be sent to New York, "and the sooner they come the better." Another runner left with a dispatch dated the 11th of the month, in which Clinton asked for certain organizations, saying, "the sooner I concentrate my force the better." The effective British force in and around New York at this time was 10,931 men.
A change now occurred in some details of the plan agreed upon at the conference. The Count de Barras, after holding a council of war, decided to retain his ships at Newport upon the departure
of the Army from Rhode Island instead of proceeding to Boston. In this position the squadron would be in closer touch with De Grasse when he arrived in American waters; furthermore, the harbor of Boston was unfavorable during the summer months on account of the southwest winds that blow almost continually. Rochambeau wrote to Washington on the 31st of May that, in order to give the fleet protection at Newport, M. de Choisy, of the French Army, was to be left there with 400 men, and Washington was asked to provide 1,000 militia for station on the island. In replying to this letter the Commander in Chief expressed some views on naval strategy not in concurrence with those of the admiral and his council, adding:
I would not, however, set up my single judgment against that of so many gentlemen of experience, more especially as the matter partly depends upon a knowledge of marine affairs, of which I candidly confess my ignorance.
Washington was without a peer in America in knowledge of naval matters. The many references to naval strategy and international affairs to be found in his writings, indicate a profound knowledge of the effect of sea power upon land operations and national interests, far more extensive than that of any other American.
On the 5th of June Governor Rutledge of South Carolina came to the headquarters of the army for the purpose of representing the situation of affairs in the South. Washington told his visitor of the proposed plan of campaign and frankly exposed the state of affairs in regard to the allied armies and the French Fleet. Governor Rutledge appeared to be convinced that no relief could be expected from the northern army while the British controlled the sea, as it would be folly to attempt marching a detachment so great a distance.
It was particularly important, however, that something be done at this time to force the British to give up all or part of the southern territory now in their possession, as Washington suspected, "from the most recent European intelligence, they are endeavoring to make as large seeming conquests as possible, that they may urge the plea of uti possidetis in the proposed mediation." Having this
in mind, a campaign to drive the British from Virginia, North and south Carolina, and Georgia was of more importance than dispossessing them of the posts around New York Harbor. However, everything depended upon whether or not De Grasse would attempt to operate at New York. It did not seem probable that he would, for D'Estaing in 1778 had found that it was unsafe to take his larger ships across the bar of Sandy Hook, and De Grasse would likely be of the same opinion. At the time D'Estaing refused to enter New York Harbor, Washington said in a letter dated the 22d of July, 1778, addressed to the President of Congress:
Previous to my despatching Mr. Hamilton, from the information I received on my inquiries respecting the navigation at the Hook, I was led to suspect, however interesting and desirable the destruction or capture of the British fleet might be, that it was not sufficient to introduce the Count's ships.
Although there is no reference made to this difficulty of navigation in Washington's correspondence of 1781, it is certain that he had not forgotten D'Estaing's refusal to imperil his ships, and he was justified in presuming that De Grasse would be no more willing to place his fleet in jeopardy.
In the latter part of May Rochambeau received dispatches from De Grasse dated at sea, March 29, saying that he would be off the coast of North America about the 15th of July. He asked that everything be prepared for the ensuing campaign, as he could stay only a short time in those waters. He requested that skillful pilots be sent to join the fleet in the West Indies, reminding Rochambeau that the French ships had a larger draft of water than those of the British. Count de Rochambeau immediately dispatched a vessel for the West Indies with full intelligence concerning the proposed plans for the allied armies, giving the strength, situation, and apparent designs of the enemy. Rochambeau recommended that the fleet enter the Chesapeake on its way up the coast, where there might be an opportunity of striking an important blow, and then proceed to New York to cooperate in an attack upon that city. Request was made that five or six thousand land troops be brought from the West Indies to engage in the enterprise.
The substance of Rochambeau's recommendations to De Grasse was transmitted to Washington on the 9th and 10th of June. The Commander in Chief did not view with favor the proposition of Stopping at the Chesapeake, and in his reply, written on the 13th of the month, he asked Rochambeau, in case the frigate carrying dispatches to De Grasse had not yet sailed, to inform the admiral that it would be left entirely to his own judgment, based upon information he might receive of the situation of the British Fleet upon the coast, as to what would be the most advantageous quarter in which to appear. Washington reminded Rochambeau that in the letter written to Luzerne from Weathersfield—
Sandy Hook was mentioned as the most desirable point; because, by coming suddenly there, he would certainly block up any fleet, which might be within; and he would even have a very good chance of forcing the entrance, before dispositions could be made to oppose him.
No change was made in Rochambeau's dispatches, however, as the frigate carrying them was sent away before Washington's letter arrived.
One-half of Count de Rochambeau's army embarked for Providence on the 10th of June, followed soon after by the other half. The troops then marched from Providence by way of Windham to Hartford. The army was augmented by 400 recruits who had landed at Boston. In addition to this number there were 260 more who were unfit for duty on account of the scurvy. Two companies of artillery were left at Providence with the siege artillery, which was to be transported by ships as soon as De Barras determined that it would be safe to go to sea. Rochambeau arrived at Hartford on the 22d with the first regiment, and expected to set out from there three days later.
On the 18th of June Washington divided his army into three divisions and arranged for the first division to march on the 21st for the new camp at Peekskill, the second to march two days later, and the third division on the 24th of the month. On the 25th of June Washington left winter quarters at New Windsor and joined the Army at its encampment at Peekskill. That same day he re-
ceived a letter from Rochambeau containing information that the first French division would be at Newtown on the 28th, where Rochambeau, proposed to assemble his forces and march by brigades. The legion of the Duke de Lauzun would cover his left flank.
Washington now determined to begin minor operations against Clinton's army by exerting pressure upon the more distant posts at the north end of York Island. Combined with this purpose was an intention to cut of Delancey's provincial troops and other light corps near Kings Bridge. The movement was to take place the night of July 2d. General Lincoln would command the first detachment and Lauzun, still on the left flank of the French Army, the second detachment. Rochambeau was requested to file off from Ridgebury to Bedford and hasten the march so that his army would be close enough to support the attack in case the action reached unexpected proportions. In Washington's instruction to Lincoln on the 1st of July he said:
The success of your enterprize depending absolutely upon secrecy and surprise, it will be wrong to prosecute it a moment after you are discovered unless the discovery is made so near the works, that you may, by a rapid movement, gam, them before the enemy have time to recollect and put themselves in a posture of defence.
Lincoln's detachment embarked on the night of July 1st near Tellers Point to pass down the North River. At 3 o'clock the following morning the Continental Army marched to support the detached troops and to improve any advantage which might be gained by them. The army halted at New Bridge over the Croton, about 9 miles from Peekskill. Another halt was made at the church by Tarrytown, 9 miles from the Croton, and that night the march was continued to Valentines Hill, where the army arrived about sunrise the following morning.
The length of Duke de Lauzun's march and the fatigue of his corps prevented his coming to the point of action at the hour appointed. In the meantime Lincoln's party, which was ordered to prevent the retreat of Delancey's corps by the way of Kings
Bridge and to cut of reenforcements approaching by that route, was attacked by the Yagers and other troops. Upon the appearance of the American Army from Valentines Hill the enemy retired to York Island. That afternoon the Americans withdrew to Valentines Hill and lay upon their arms, while Washington spent a considerable part of the day reconnoitering the enemy's works. The next day, July 4, the march was continued to a position on the left of Dobbs Ferry where the army encamped. Washington marked a camp for the French Army to the eastward of the American camp.
Rochambeau, was now marching in two brigades, and on the 3d of July the first brigade reached North Castle. The second brigade, by a forced march, joined that afternoon. The next day Rochambeau wrote to Washington that his army was united and ready to execute any orders of the Commander in Chief. The letter was received within a few hours at headquarters, and a reply was immediately sent directing Rochambeau to march to the camp prepared for him about 4 miles southwest of White Plains.
On the 5th of July Washington visited the French Army at North Castle, where it was halting to recuperate. The following day Rochambeau led his troops to the camp designated for them, and the armies of France and America now rested side by side, with a valley between. The Orderly Book of July 6 contains the order published by the Commander in Chief in which he expresses his thanks to his excellency the Count de Rochambeau—
for the unremitting zeal with which he has prosecuted his march, in order to form the long wished-for junction between the French and American forces; an event, which must afford the highest degree of pleasure to every friend of his country, and from which the happiest consequences are to be expected.
Special praise is given to the regiment of Saintonge for the spirited manner "with which they continued and supported their march without one day's respite." The Abbé Robin says that the Viscount de Noailles performed the whole march from Providence to the North River on foot.
While in camp at Dobbs Ferry, Washington heard from Lafayette of the retirement of Cornwallis's army to Williamsburg. This most gratifying news added weight to the many impulses which were directing the mind of the Commander in Chief to the South. It is probable he now felt almost certain that the major objective of the ensuing campaign would be the British Army in Virginia. For the first time he put this thought on paper—in a letter to Lafayette dated the 13th of July.
I shall shortly have occasion to communicate matters of very great importance to you, so much so, that I shall send a confidential officer on purpose to you. * * * In the present situation of affairs, it is of the utmost importance that a communication by a chain of expresses should be opened between this army and that in Virginia. They are already established from hence to Philadelphia, and if there is none from you to Philadelphia, you will be pleased to take measures for having it done.
In order to determine the number, location, and strength of the British posts at the north end of York Island, Washington, accompanied by the Count de Rochambeau, General de Beville (quartermaster general of the French Army), and General Duportail, crossed the North River on the 18th of July to make a reconnaissance. Washington's diary for that day contains numerous and detailed entries as to posts, works, encampments, troops, and naval vessels pertaining to the British. Possible landing places are described and tentative approach roads on the east side of the river noted.
Washington is not yet sure that New York will not be the point of attack.
The diary for the 20th of July gives the information that Rochambeau, in the name of De Barras, called on Washington for a definite plan of campaign, which was to be communicated to the Count de Grasse.
I could not but acknowledge, that the uncertainties under which we labour—the few Men who have joined (either as Recruits for the Continental Battns. or Militia)—& the ignorance in which I am kept by some of the States on whom I mostly depended—especially Massachusetts from whose Govr. I have not received a line since I addressed him from Weathersfd. the 23d of May last.—rendered it impracticable for me to do more than to prepare, first, for the enter-
prize against New York as agreed to at Weathersfield—and secondly for the relief of the Southern States if after all my efforts, & earnest application to these States it should be found at the arrivl. of Count de Grasse that I had neither Men, nor means adequate to the first object—to give this opinion I was further induced from the uncertainty with respect to the time of the arrival of the arrival1 of the French Fleet & whether Land Troops would come in it or not as had been earnestly requested by me & inforced by the Minister of France.
Day after day passed, each hour spent in eager expectancy of more intelligence from De Grasse, until finally Washington realized that he could no longer delay his decision. It was to his friend and confidant, Lafayette, that he wrote of his intentions. In a letter dated July 30th he said:
I am convinced, that your desire to be with this army arises principally from a wish to be actively useful. You will not, therefore, regret your stay in Virginia until matters are reduced to a greater degree of certainty, than they are at present, especially when I tell you, that, from the change of circumstances with which the removal of part of the enemy's force from Virginia to New York will be attended, it is more than probable, that we shall also entirely change our plan of operations. I think we have already effected one part of the plan of the campaign settled at Weathersfield; that is, giving a substantial relief to the southern States, by obliging the enemy to recall a considerable part of their force from thence. Our views must now be turned towards endeavoring to expel them totally from those States, if we find ourselves incompetent to the siege of New York.
At an earlier hour the same day Washington had written a letter to Greene, praising him for the accomplishments of the southern army and declaring that he was "unable to conceive what more could have been done under your circumstances, than has been displayed by your little persevering and determined army." Commenting on the political effect of the withdrawal of troops from Virginia to New York, which Washington mistakenly believed to have occurred, he said:
This withdraw will probably disappoint their views of conquest in Virginia, and will exceeding embarrass the prospects of the British ministry in the proposed treaty opened at Vienna. This is a very great object, even should anything prevent our obtaining further success in our operations against New York.
1. Repetition occurs in original.
The letter continues with a request for the earliest and most minute information of every event occurring in the State of South Carolina, for "'a particular reason, which cannot at this time be communicated." The reason was communicated to Lafayette, however, and he was directed to inform Greene of that part of the letter winch related to Washington's—
expectation of being able to transport put of the army to the southward, should the operation against New York be declined.
This communication is the one Washington had expected to send to Lafayette by a confidential officer.
But I am really at a loss—
for want of knowing the officers better, to find one upon whose discretion I can depend. My own family, you know, are constantly and fully employed. however hope, that I have spoken plain enough to be understood by you.
The entry in the diary for the 1st of August furnishes additional evidence that at this tame the probability of investing New York was almost eliminated from Washington's mind. All small boats, heavy ordnance, and supplies were now in perfect readiness and he could commence operations if the States had furnished the quotas of men demanded of them. Of those called for in the first requisition not more than one-half had joined the Army, and only a handful of those asked for in the second requisition. Having little assurance of securing the additional men, Washington could see no ground upon which to continue his preparations against New York, especially as he believed that part of the British troops in Virginia had been recalled to reinforce the posts at New York. After commenting in Ins diary upon these conditions he continues:
I turned my views more seriously (than I had before done) to an operation to the Southward—and, in consequence, sent to make enquiry, indirectly, of the principal Merchants to the Eastward what number, & in what time, Transports could be provided to convey a force to the Southward if it should be found necessary to change our plan—& similar application was made in a direct way to Mr. Morris (Financier) to discover what number cd. be had by the 20th of this month at Philadelphia, or in Chesapeak bay. * * * Measures were also
taken to deposit the Salt provisions in such places as to be water born, mom than thew, while there remained a hope of Count de Grasse's bringing a land force with him, & that the States might yet put us in circumstances to prosecute the original plan could not be done without unfolding matters too plainly to the enemy & enabling them thereby to Counteract our Schemes.
The culmination of the uncertain and vexatious situation came on the 14th of August, when Washington received dispatches from the Count de Barras announcing the intended departure of the Count de Grasse from Cape Francais, with between 25 and 29 sail of the line and 3,200 land troops. De Grasse was to sail on the 3d of the month for Chesapeake Bay, and wanted everything in complete readiness to commence operations the moment he arrived. Washington's diary of that date contains the following decision:
Matters having now come to a crisis. —and a decisive plan to be determined on—I was obliged, from the shortness of Count de Grasses promised stay on this Coast—the apparent disinclination in their Naval officers to force the harbour of New York—and the feeble compliance of the States to my requisitions for Men, hitherto, & little prospect of greater exertion in future, to give up all idea of attacking New York; & instead thereof to remove the French Troops & a detachment from the American Army to the Head of Elk to be transported to Virginia for the purpose of cooperating with the force from the West Indies against the Troops in that State:
The detachment from the American Amy which was to go South was composed of the light infantry under Colonel Scammell, two light companies of New York to be joined by a like number from the Connecticut line, part of the Jersey line, two regiments of New York, Hazen's regiment, the regiment of Rhode Island, and Lamb's regiment of artillery with cannon and ordnance for the field and siege. General Heath was left in command of all the troops remaining in the department, consisting of 2 New Hampshire regiments, 10 from Massachusetts, 5 from Connecticut, the corps of invalids, Sheldon's legion, the Third Regiment of Artillery, and the militia which had assembled. The security of West Point and the posts in the Highlands were to be considered the first object of his attention.
Washington's Diary, August 14, 1781
Hazen's regiment was thrown over the North River at Dobbs Ferry and ordered to march, together with the Jersey troops, and take post on the heights between Springfield and Chatham, in which position the detachment would cover a French bakery that had been set up at Chatham "to veil our real movements and create apprehensions for Staten Island." The remainder of the American Army marched to Kings Ferry on the 20th of August and crossed on that and the following day to Stony Point, where camp was made to protect the crossing of the French.
Rochambeau 's army began its march from the camp near White Plains on the 19th of August and passed by way of White Plains, North Castle, Pines Bridge, and Crompond to Kings Ferry. The crossing of the river by the troops, together with all their artillery, baggage, and supplies, was accomplished between the 22d and 25th of the month. While at Stony Point Washington mounted 30 flat boats, each with a capacity of about 40 men, upon carriages, "as well with a design to deceive the enemy as to our real movement, as to be useful to me in Virginia when I get there."
On August 25 the American Army resumed its march, proceeding in two columns, one by Paramus to Springfield, the other to Chatham by way of Pompton. On the following day the French Army arrived at Suffern's. The march of both armies progressed throughout the 28th and 29th, leaving only one more day's march during which the intentions of Washington could longer be concealed from the British. With the idea of further confusing Clinton, on the 30th the left of the three columns in which the allied troops were now marching was directed toward Sandy Hook by way of Brunswick, as though the intention were to cover the passage of the French Fleet within Sandy Hook. The middle column passed through Somerset; and the right column, composed of the entire French Army, marched byway of Morristown and Somerset Court House. The rendezvous of all three columns was to be at Trenton, where transports had been ordered to carry the troops down the Delaware River.
Washington went ahead of the armies to Philadelphia on the 31st of August for the purpose of hastening up to Trenton all the vessels that could be procured; but finding the number inadequate to transport both men and stores, after conferring with Rochambeau, he decided to let the troops march by land to Head of Elk and embark at that point. He remained in Philadelphia until the 5th of September, by which time the American Army had passed through the city, and the rear of the French Army had arrived within its confines. All the stores now being at hand and everything pertaining to both armies in a satisfactory condition, Washington left Philadelphia for the Head of Elk to hasten the embarkation at that place.
When passing through Chester Washington learned of the safe arrival of Count de Grasse in the Chesapeake with 28 sail of the line and 4 frigates, together with 3,200 land troops, who were to be immediately debarked at Jamestown to form a junction with the American Army under Lafayette. Judging it highly expedient to be with the army in Virginia as soon as possible, to make necessary arrangements for the siege and to get material prepared for it, Washington determined to set out for Lafayette's camp without loss of time. On the 8th of September, accompanied by the Count de Rochambeau and the Chevalier de Chastellux, the Commander in Chief departed from Head of Elk for the South.
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