Objection 1: It would seem that the first man's soul had no passions. For by the passions of the soul |the flesh lusteth against the spirit| (Gal.5:7). But this did not happen in the state of innocence. Therefore in the state of innocence there were no passions of the soul.
Objection 2: Further, Adam's soul was nobler than his body. But his body was impassible. Therefore no passions were in his soul.
Objection 3: Further, the passions of the soul are restrained by the moral virtues. But in Adam the moral virtues were perfect. Therefore the passions were entirely excluded from him.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10) that |in our first parents there was undisturbed love of God,| and other passions of the soul.
I answer that, The passions of the soul are in the sensual appetite, the object of which is good and evil. Wherefore some passions of the soul are directed to what is good, as love and joy; others to what is evil, as fear and sorrow. And since in the primitive state, evil was neither present nor imminent, nor was any good wanting which a good-will could desire to have then, as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 10), therefore Adam had no passion with evil as its object; such as fear, sorrow, and the like; neither had he passions in respect of good not possessed, but to be possessed then, as burning concupiscence. But those passions which regard present good, as joy and love; or which regard future good to be had at the proper time, as desire and hope that casteth not down, existed in the state of innocence; otherwise, however, than as they exist in ourselves. For our sensual appetite, wherein the passions reside, is not entirely subject to reason; hence at times our passions forestall and hinder reason's judgment; at other times they follow reason's judgment, accordingly as the sensual appetite obeys reason to some extent. But in the state of innocence the inferior appetite was wholly subject to reason: so that in that state the passions of the soul existed only as consequent upon the judgment of reason.
Reply to Objection 1: The flesh lusts against the spirit by the rebellion of the passions against reason; which could not occur in the state of innocence.
Reply to Objection 2: The human body was impassible in the state of innocence as regards the passions which alter the disposition of nature, as will be explained later on (Q, A); likewise the soul was impassible as regards the passions which impede the free use of reason.
Reply to Objection 3: Perfection of moral virtue does not wholly take away the passions, but regulates them; for the temperate man desires as he ought to desire, and what he ought to desire, as stated in Ethic. iii, 11.