Bosnian Crisis of 1908-1909, also known as the
Annexation crisis, erupted into public view when
on October 5, 1908,
Bulgaria declared its independence and on October 6, 1908, Austria-Hungary announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia, the
Ottoman Empire, Britain, Italy, Serbia, Montenegro, Germany and France took an
interest in these events.
In April 1909 the Treaty of Berlin
was amended to
accept the new status quo bringing the crisis to an end. The crisis
permanently damaged relations between Austria-Hungary on the one
hand and Russia and Serbia on the other. The annexation and
reactions to the annexation were contributing causes of World War I
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of
Under article 25 of the Treaty
, 1878 Austria-Hungary received special rights in the
Ottoman Empire's provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novibazar
. Article 25 stated:
"The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina shall be occupied and
administered by Austria-Hungary." and continued "...
Austria-Hungary reserves the right to maintain garrisons and to
have military and trading roads over the whole area of that
portion" (the Sanjak of Novibazar) "of the ancient Vilayet of
Bosnia." Austria-Hungary exercised its rights, taking firm control
of Bosnia-Herzegovina and jointly occupying the Sanjak of Novibazar
together with the Ottoman Empire. This state of affairs persisted
from 1878 until the outbreak of the crisis in 1908. The Treaty of
Berlin also stated that the Straits of Constantinople would be
closed to warships during time of war. This had the effect of
bottling up the Russian fleet in the Black Sea.
of Novibazar separated Montenegro from Serbia and
prevented the geographic and political union of these two states
which were often closely aligned. The Austrian
occupation of the Sanjak was also significant because it provided
Austria-Hungary with a staging area for possible future expansion
towards the Aegean port of Salonika in Ottoman controlled Macedonia.
Bosnia-Herzegovina was a multi-sectarian state composed mostly of
Bosnian Muslims, Croatian Catholics, and Serbian Orthodox, with the
largest single group being the Serbian Orthodox. In 1903, a coup in
Serbia, brought in a new dynasty and shifted political power to
more nationalistic elements. These nationalists saw the Sanjak of
Novibazar and Bosnia-Herzegovina as natural avenues for territorial
expansion. Relations between Serbia and Austria-Hungary gradually
deteriorated. By 1907, Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Alois Aehrenthal
a plan to solidify Austria-Hungary's position in Bosnia-Herzegovina
through annexation. His opportunity came in the form of a letter
from Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky
and their well-known
meeting at Buchlau castle
The Buchlau Bargain
An exchange of letters
July 2, 1908, Russian
Foreign Minister Alexander Izvolsky wrote to Austro-Hungarian
Foreign Minister Alois Aehrenthal and proposed a discussion of
reciprocal changes to the 1878 Treaty of Berlin in favor of the
Russian interest in the Straits of
Constantinople and Austro-Hungarian interests in the annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of
On July 14
responded with guarded acceptance of the proposed discussion. After
long and complex discussions within Austria-Hungary, Aehrenthal on
outlined a slightly
different bargain to Izvolsky. In exchange for a friendly Russian
attitude in the event Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Austria-Hungary would then withdraw its troops from the Sanjak. The
letter then went on to offer to discuss, as a separate matter, the
Straits question on a friendly basis.
The meeting at Buchlau
On September 16
, Izvolsky and
Aehrenthal met face-to-face at Buchlau
minutes were taken during these private meetings which lasted a
total of six hours. Izvolsky accepted the responsibility to write
up the conclusions of the meeting and forward them to Aehrenthal.
On September 21
Aehrenthal wrote to
Izvolsky asking for this document to which Izvolsky replied two
days later that the document had been sent to the Czar for
approval. This document, if it ever existed, has never been
Aehrenthal’s version of the agreement
By Aehrenthal’s account given by Albertini, Izvolsky agreed that
Russia would maintain "a friendly and benevolent attitude" if
Austria-Hungary were to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. Reciprocally,
Austria-Hungary, should Russia move to open “the Straits to single
ships of war” would maintain a benevolent attitude. The two agreed
that a likely consequence of the annexation was Bulgaria would
declare its independence from the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary
would offer no territorial concessions to Serbia or Montenegro, but
if they supported the annexation then Austria-Hungary would not
oppose Serbian expansion in the Balkans, and support the Russian
demand to revise Article 29 of the Treaty of Berlin which
restricted Montenegrin sovereignty. The parties agreed "these
changes could receive sanction after negotiation with the Porte and
the Powers", but "there would be no more talk of
Bosnia-Herzegovina". Annexation would probably take place at the
beginning of October. The original of Aehrenthal’s account has not
been found and so historians have had to make do with an undated
office copy of the document.
On September 30
informed Izvolsky, who was in Paris at the time, that the
annexation would take place on October 7
On October 4
, Izvolsky prepared a report
at the request of the British Ambassador to France, Bertie.
Izvolsky stated that his position was that annexation was a matter
to be settled between the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin. With
the compensation of Austro-Hungarian withdrawal from the Sanjak of
Novibazar, Russia would not consider the annexation as reason to go
to war, but Russia and other governments would insist on changes to
the Treaty favorable to themselves, including opening the Straits,
Bulgarian independence, territorial concessions to Serbia, and
abolition of restrictions on Montenegrin sovereignty under article
29. Bertie told British Foreign Minister Grey that he felt Izvolsky
was not being completely honest.
On October 5
, Bulgaria declared its
independence from the Ottoman Empire. On October 6
, Emperor Franz Joseph announced to the
people of Bosnia-Herzegovina his intention to give them an
autonomous and constitutional regime and the provinces were
annexed. On October 7
announced its withdrawal from the Sanjak of Novibazar. Bulgarian
independence and the Bosnian annexation were not countenanced by
the Treaty of Berlin and set off a flurry of diplomatic protests
Protests and compensations
Serbia mobilized its army and on October 7 the Serbian Crown
Council demanded that the annexation be reversed or, failing that,
Serbia should receive compensation, which it defined on October 25
as a strip of land across the northern most portion of the Sanjak
of Novibazar. In the end these demands were rejected, although
Serbia later took control of the Sanjak.
The Ottoman Empire protested Bulgaria’s declaration of independence
with more vigor than the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina which it
had no practical prospects of governing. A boycott of
Austro-Hungarian goods however did occur, inflicting commercial
losses on Austria-Hungary. On February
, Austria-Hungary settled the matter and received Ottoman
acquiescence to the annexation in return for ₤2.2 million.
Bulgarian independence could not be reversed.
France, Britain, Russia and Italy
The annexation and Bulgarian declaration were viewed as violations
of the Treaty of Berlin. France, Britain, Russia and Italy
therefore were in favor of a conference to consider the matter.
German opposition and complex diplomatic maneuvering as to the
location, nature and preconditions of the conference delayed and
ultimately scuttled it. Instead, the Powers reached agreement on
amendments to the Treaty through consultations between
Russia and Serbia back down
British opposition to amending the Treaty of Berlin with respects
to the Straits left Russia with empty hands and therefore Izvolsky
and the Czar regarded the annexation and Aehrenthal's maneuvers as
made in bad faith. Cognizant of Aehrenthal's heritage, Izvolsky
exploded making the remark:
- "The dirty Jew has deceived me. He lied to me, he bamboozled
me, that frightful Jew."
To bring Izvolsky to heel, Austria-Hungary threatened to release
and then ultimately began leaking documents, in which, over the
course of the last 30 years, Russia had agreed that Austria-Hungary
had a free hand to do as it liked with Bosnia-Herzegovina and the
Sanjak of Novibazar. These documents were an embarrassment to
Russia, especially with regards to its relations with Serbia. Czar
Nicholas II wrote to Emperor Franz-Joseph and accused
Austria-Hungary of betraying a confidence and relations between the
two countries were permanently damaged. Under Germany’s advice,
Austria-Hungary kept in confidence the July 2
and September 23
Izvolsky to Aehrenthal and these were a continued threat to
Izvolsky’s position if Russia did not firmly and publicly accept
amendment of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin to accept the
annexation. On March 22
, Germany put Russia
on the spot, demanding that Russia give a clear and unequivocal
"yes" or "no" as to whether it committed to accept this amendment.
Failure to give a positive reply would cause Germany to withdraw
from the diplomatic discussions "and let things take their course".
Under such pressure, Izvolsky caved and advised the cabinet to
accept the amendment of Article 25 for fear that otherwise Austria
would be free to act against Serbia. The cabinet agreed. On
the Czar accepted the decision and
communicated the decision to German Ambassador to Russia Portales.
Britain however was not quite ready to acquiesce and stated that it
would do so only once “the Serbian question had been settled in a
pacific manner. France fell in line behind Britain.
On March 26
, Austria-Hungary provided
Britain with the negotiated text of Serbia’s March declaration
committing Serbia to accept the annexation. It ran:
- "Serbia recognizes that she has not been injured in her right
by the fait accompli created in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
that consequently she will conform to such decision as the Powers
shall take in regard to Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin.
Submitting to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes
already now to abandon the attitude of protest and opposition which
she has maintained in regard to the annexation since last autumn
and undertakes further to change the course of her present policy
towards Austria-Hungary to live henceforward with the latter on a
footing of good-neighborliness. Conformable to these declarations
and confident of the pacific intentions of Austria-Hungary, Serbia
will reduce her army to the position of spring 1908 as regards its
organization, its distribution and its effectives. She will disarm
and disband her volunteers and bands and will prevent the formation
of new units of irregulars on its territories."
The next day Austria-Hungary asked for Britain’s firm assurance
that once the negotiations with Serbia were complete, Britain would
accept the amendment of Article 25. Without such assurance
Austria-Hungary stated it would break off negotiations with Serbia.
Later that day Austria-Hungary decided to partially mobilize its
armed forces. On March 28
as requested. On March 31
Serbia made its
formal declaration of acceptance to Austria-Hungary representing a
complete Serbian climb down. The crisis was over. The Great Powers
signed the amendments to the Treaty of Berlin in the various
capitals from April 7
to April 19
A little over a year later, as a result of this diplomatic defeat,
Izvolsky was demoted and made ambassador to France. He was
permanently embittered against Aehrenthal and the Central Powers.
The Russian Diplomat and newspaperman de Schelking relates
Izvolsky's political downfall: "In the Salons of Petrograd he"
(Izvolsky) "was given the Sobriquet 'Prince of the Bosphorous'. In
his conceit Iswolsky could not see he was being mocked."
- Albertini (2005: 22-23).
- Albertini (2005: 195–6).
- Albertini (2005: 201-202).
- Albertini (2005: 207).
- Albertini (2005: 206-207).
- Albertini (2005: 208).
- Albertini (2005: 207-208).
- Albertini (2005: 218-219).
- Albertini (2005: 222-223).
- Albertini (2005: 277).
- Albertini (2005: 225-285).
- Joll & Martel (2007: 69).
- Albertini (2005: 285-286).
- Albertini (2005: 287).
- Albertini (2005: 291-292).
- Albertini (2005: 289).
- de Schelking (1918: 183).
- Albertini, Luigi. 2005.
Origins of the War of 1914 - Vol. 1, Enigma
Books, New York.
- Anderson, Frank Maloy and Amos
Shartle Hershey; Handbook for the Diplomatic History of
Europe, Asia, and Africa 1870-1914. Prepared for the
National Board for Historical Service; Government Printing
Office, Washington; 1918.
- Joll, James, & Martel, Gordon. 2007. The Origins of the
First World War. Pearson/Longman, London.
- Shelḱīng, Evgeniǐ Nīkolaevīch and Makovskī, L. W. 1918.
Recollections of a Russian Diplomat: The Suicide of
Monarchies. The Macmillan company, New York.