Yugoslav-United States relations, 1946-1947, stemming from the shooting of U. S. planes over Yugoslavia, August 9 and 19, 1946
Wooldridge, Dorothy Elizabeth
Master of Arts
From 1945 to 1950, the era of the early cold war, most of the nations of the world were in one of two political groups: the pro-West headed by the United States, or the pro-East, headed by Soviet Union. One country which did not fall into this pattern, however, was Yugoslavia. She wanted to break completely with Moscow and to establish her own brand of national. Communism, thus enabling her leaders to steer an individualist course in world affairs. Yugoslavia sought not only to free herself from Soviet domination but also to show her total opposition to the Western Allies, especially the United States. The latter part of this objective became a unique area of conflict in the cold war. In 1945 Yugoslavia offered stiff opposition to Italian boundary settlements proposed by the Council of Foreign Ministers. Yugoslavia claimed the area of the Istrian peninsula, including the city of Trieste, as rightfully hers. While the diplomats discussed potential settlements, Yugoslav and Allied troops coexisted uneasily on the peninsula. Tension between the U.S. and Yugoslavia rapidly reached a breaking point. Early in 1946 disputes between the two countries became more bitter. Tito claimed that-scores of unauthorized Allied flights violated Yugoslav airspace daily. Although he protested, nothing was done. He retaliated by forcing the closing of commercial air service to American government representatives in Yugoslavia. In August, 1946, the crisis was reached. The Yugoslavs forced down two U.S. aircraft over Yugoslavia within a space of ten days. The passengers and crew of the first plane were secretly interned by the Yugoslav government. The second plane and its crew were a total loss. The U.S. was outraged and sent an ultimatum to the Yugoslav government, demanding the release of the Americans in custody, U.S. access to the downed planes, and full investigation of the incidents. Before the 48-hour deadline was reached, the Yugoslavs had fulfilled all the requests. Each country blamed the other for the incidents, and each had its own accounts of the action. From that time the U.S. and the Yugoslav governments were in opposition until 1949. Tito continued his anti-U.S. campaign, accusing U.S. Embassy employees of spying and then ordering the closing of the USIS reading room. The United States likewise continued on its anti-Yugoslav course, spurred along by the realization of the fact that the nation to which it contributed 75% of UNRRA aid had, for no apparent reason, shot down two American craft and killed American crewmen. After much arguing, the issue was finally terminated, neither side gaining a clear victory. The incidents were important for what each country had learned. Bipolarity, the Soviet-U.S. dominated framework for international relations, would have to be altered to accommodate third powers. This small incident in the cold war had brought three nations to the brink of hostilities and back to the reality that the uneasy peace, of the post war world had to be maintained regardless of wounded national pride and prestige.