Documents included below:
The point to note is that the League and Jinnah stated clearly that the Plan took them closer to their final goal of a sovereign Pakistan and that is why they accepted it. It was clearly stated that a united India was not their final goal, nor was it the reason for their acceptance. Any historian who asserts otherwise needs to explain why.
Statement by Mr. M. A. Jinnah on the Cabinet Mission Plan, 22 May 1946. (excerpts)
I regret that the Mission should have negatived the Muslim demand for the establishment of a complete sovereign state of Pakistan, which we still hold is the only solution of the constitutional problem of India and which alone can secure stable Governments and lead to the happiness and welfare not only of the two major communities, but of all the peoples of this sub-continent.
It is all the more regrettable that the Mission should have though fit to advance commonplace and exploded arguments against Pakistan and resorted to special pleadings couched in deplorable language which is calculated to hurt the feelings of Muslim India. It seems that this was done by the Mission simply to appease and placate the Congress, because when they come to face the realities, they themselves have made the following pronouncement embodied in paragraph 5 of the statement..
(1) They have divided Pakistan into two-what they call Section
the North-Western Zone) and Section C(for the North-Eastern Zone).
(2) Instead of two constitution-making bodies only one constitution-making body is devised with three Sections A, B and C.
(3) They lay down that : 'There should be a Union of India, embracing both British India and the States.... "
There is no indication at all that the Communications would be restricted to what is necessary for Defence nor is there any indication as to how this Union will be empowered to raise finances required for these three subjects, while our view was that finances should be raised only by contribution and not by taxation.
(4) It is laid down that : 'The Union should have an Executive
and a Legislature
While our view was:
This raises a very serious question indeed, for if it
is left to the Union Constituent Assembly to decide these matters by a
majority vote, whether any of the recommendations of the Advisory
Committee should be incorporated in the Union Constitution, then it
will open a door to more subjects being vested in the Union Government.
This will destroy the very basic principle that the Union is to be
strictly confined to three subjects.."
Speech at the Secret Session of the All India Muslim League Council,
New Delhi, June 6 1946 Speeches, 'Statements and Messages of the
Quaid-e-Azam', Vol IV, Khurshid Yusufi, Bazm-i-Iqbal, Lahore.
I advised you to reject the Cripps proposal, I advised you to reject the last Simla Conference formula. But I cannot advise you to reject the British Cabinet Mission's proposal. I advise you to accept it."..Mr Jinnah added "The Lahore resolution did not mean that when Muslims put forward their demand, it must be accepted at once. It is a big struggle and a continued struggle. The first struggle was to get the representative character of the League accepted. That fight they had started and they had won. Acceptance of the Mission's proposal was not the end of their struggle for Pakistan. They should continue their struggle till Pakistan was achieved."
Mr Jinnah said that they could create a deadlock in the Constituent Assembly if anything was done against their wishes. They would continue to fight in the Constituent Assembly for their objective. They would also fight for the right of the Units or Groups to rejoin the Group from which they seceded.
As regards groupings, Mr. Jinnah is reported to have expressed satisfaction and said : The Groups should have power on all subjects except defence, communications and foreign affairs. But so far as defence is concerned, it would remain in the hands of the British till the new constitution was enforced. So they need not worry about it now. They would fight in the Constituent Assembly to restrict "Communications" to what was absolutely necessary for defence only.
Resolution passed by the Council of the All-India Muslim League, 6 June 1946, (excerpts)
1. This meeting of the Council of the All-India Muslim League, after having carefully considered the statement issued by the Cabinet Mission and the Viceroy on 16th May 1946... places upon record the following views for the guidance of the nation and direction of the Working Committee.
2. That the references made, and the conclusions recorded in paras 6,7,8,9,10 and 11 of the statement concerning the Muslim demand for the establishment of a full sovereign Pakistan as the only solution of the Indian constitutional problem are unwarranted, unjustified and unconvincing, and should not therefore have found a place in a state document issued on behalf and with the authority of the British Government.
These paragraphs are couched in such
language, and contain such mutilations of the established facts, that
the Cabinet Mission have clearly been prompted to include them in their
statement solely with the object of appeasing the Hindus, in utter
disregard of Muslim sentiments.
In order that there may be no manner of doubt in any quarter, the Council of the All-India Muslim League reiterates that the attainment of the goal of a complete sovereign Pakistan still remains the unalterable objective of the Muslims in India for the achievement of which they will, if necessary, employ every means in their power, and consider no sacrifice or suffering too great.
3. That notwithstanding the affront offered
to Muslim sentiments by the choice of injudicious words in the preamble
to the statement of the Cabinet Mission, the Muslim League, having
regard to the grave issues involved, and prompted by its earnest desire
for a peaceful solution, if possible, of the Indian constitutional
problem, and inasmuch as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan are
inherent in the Mission's plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of
the six Muslim provinces in Sections B and C, is willing to co-operate
with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme outlined
by the Mission, in the hope that it would ultimately result in the
establishment of complete[ly] sovereign Pakistan, and in the
consummation of the goal of independence for the major nations, Muslims
and Hindus, and all the other people inhabiting the vast subcontinent.
League reserves the right to modify and revise the policy and attitude
set forth in this resolution at any time during the progress of the
deliberations of the constitution-making body, or the Constituent
Assembly, or thereafter if the course of events so require, bearing in
mind the fundamental principles and ideals herebefore adumbrated, to
which the Muslim League is irrevocably committed.
Hatim Alavi was a Sindh Muslim League leader, who was a former Mayor of Karachi. In his letter, he quotes Jinnah as saying 'we can work on the two decks, provincial and group, and blow up the topmast'. By the term 'topmast', Jinnah presumably meant the Union.
CMP(1) - From Ayesha Jalal's 'The Sole Spokesman'
CMP(2) - Congress and Muslim League positions on 12 May 1946
CMP(3) - The Cabinet Mission Plan 16 May 1946
CMP(4) - Jinnah and ML responses to the CMP 22 May and June 6 1946
CMP(5) - Jinnah's meeting with Mission Delegation on 4 April 1946
CMP(6) - Jinnah's meeting with Missiion Delegation on 16 April 1946
CMP(7A) - Maulana Azad's meeting with Mission Delegation on 17 April 1946
CMP(7) - The Congress unease with parity 8-9 May 1946
CMP(7B) - Jinnah and Azad responses to preliminary proposals 8-9 May 1946
CMP(8A) - Simla Conference meetings on 5 May 1946 on the powers of the Union
CMP(8) - More exchanges on parity, Simla Conference meeting 11 May 1946
CMP(9) - Jinnah and Wyatt(1) on Pakistan and CMP, 8 Jan. and 25 May 1946
CMP(10) - Jinnah and Wyatt(2) on the interim government, 11 June 1946
CMP(11) - Congress opposition to grouping. Gandhi, Patel and Azad, May 1946
CMP(12) - Congress Working Committee resolutions, May-June 1946
CMP(12A) - Arguments over inclusion of a Congress Muslim, June 1946
CMP(12B) - Behind the scenes-Gandhi, June-July 1946
CMP(12C) - Behind the scenes-Jinnah, June-July 1946
CMP(13) - Jawaharlal Nehru's press conference on the Plan, 10 July 1946
CMP(14) - League rejected Plan, called Direct Action, July-August 1946
CMP(15) - Viceroy strong-arming Nehru, Gandhi on compulsory grouping, Pethick-Lawrence to Attlee, Aug -Sept 1946
CMP(16) - Intelligence assessment on Jinnah's options and threat of civil war, Sept. 1946
CMP(17) - League Boycott of the Constituent Assembly Dec. 1946
CMP(17A) - Congress "climbdown" on grouping and Jinnah's rejection, January 1947
CMP (A1) - Plain speaking from Sir Khizr Hayat, Abell on the Breakdown plan, Wavell
CMP(A2) - North West Frontier Province, Oct-Nov 1946 and Feb-March 1947
CMP(A3) - Bengal and Bihar, August - November 1946
CMP(A4) - Punjab, February - March 1947
CMP (18) - My take
CMP (19) - What did parity and communal veto mean in numbers?
CMP(20) - Another take -with links to reference material
CMP(21) - Mountbatten discussing CMP with Patel and Jinnah, 24-26 Apr 1947
CMP(22) - A reply on the Cabinet Mission Plan
Extra(1) - Jinnah's speech in March 1941 on independent sovereign Pakistan
Extra(1A) - Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1941-1942
Extra(1B) - Jinnah's Speeches and Statements from 1938-1940
Extra(1C) - Jinnah's speeches and Statements from 1943-45
Extra(2) - Gandhi-Jinnah talks in 1944 on defining Pakistan
Extra(3) - BR Ambedkar quoted from his book 'Pakistan or the Partition of India'
Extra(4) - Congress and Muslim parties' on the Communal question 1927-1931
Extra(4A) - Excerpts of Motilal Nehru Committee Report 1928
Extra(4B) - Nehru, Bose, Jinnah Correspondence 1937-38
Extra(5) - BR Ambedkar on Communal Representation 1909-1947
Extra(6) - Gandhiji's scheme of offering the Prime Ministership to Jinnah in 1947
Extra(6A) - Jinnah on Congress's offers of Prime Ministership 1940-43
Extra (6B) - Apr-Jul 1947 Negotiations on Pakistan between Mountbatten and Jinnah
Extra(7) - M.A.Jinnah and Maulana Azad on two nation theory
Extra(8) - On Separate electorates, Joint electorates and Reserved constituencies
Extra(9) - Links to cartoons on Indian constitutional parleys from the Daily Mail, UK, 1942 and 1946-1947, by L.G. Illingworth
Extra(10) -Nehru Report 1928 (10 MB pdf)
Extra(11) -Iqbal's letters to Jinnah, May-June 1937
Extra(12) -Jinnah, Linlithgow, Sikander Hayat, Pakistan rumblings 1942-43
Durga Das (1) 1919-1931, Jallianwala Bagh to Bhagat Singh
Durga Das (2) 1931-1936, Crescent Card: Jinnah in London to Fazli Husain in Punjab
Durga Das(3) 1937-1940, Provincial Autonomy to Jinnah gets the veto
Durga Das(4) 1940-1945, The War Years: India's War Effort-Pakistan on a platter
Durga Das(5) 1945-1947, The Cabinet Mission to Divide and Quit
1937-1940(2) Congress and Jinnah fall out in U.P., Jinnah's anti-Congress campaign and the Viceroy gives Jinnah a Veto: Ayesha Jalal, Sarvepalli Gopal and Stanley Wolpert
1937: Congress-Jinnah tussle over coalition government in U. P., M.J. Akbar
1937: Nehru, Jinnah and Coalition Governments, Bimal Prasad
1939-1940: India and the War, Anita Inder Singh
1945-1946: The Elections of 1945-46, Anita Inder Singh
1857-1938 Glimpses of British policy in Punjab: Ian Talbot and David Page
1930-1939 Congress Decline in Bengal, John Gallagher
Glendevon (1) 1937: Congress's Office Acceptance Saga over Governor's Powers
Glendevon (2) 1937-1940: Federation, Jinnah, Congress activism in Princely States
Glendevon (3) 1939-1942: Linlithgow, Congress, Jinnah,War-time Realignments
1939-1947: Jinnah and the Anglo-Muslim League Alliance, Narendra Singh Sarila
1899-1947: British Forward Policy(2)