As Republicans court Latinos, they can learn from LBJ’s Great Society
Hoping to win the affections of Hispanic voters who scorned their presidential nominee in record numbers on November 6, some Republicans have embraced comprehensive immigration reform. But will the passing of one piece of legislation, however comprehensive, be enough to persuade significant numbers of Hispanics to begin voting Republican in 2014 and 2016?
History and recent opinion polls suggest not.
To understand why, look back to the 1950s and early 1960s, when both major parties were locked in intense struggles for black votes. That saga might offer some insight into the enormous challenges confronting Republicans.
For generations after the Civil War, most blacks considered themselves Republicans and were, until the 1930s, loyal to the party of Lincoln. But Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the 1930s upset that equation.
In his 1936 re-election campaign, FDR won huge majorities in black neighborhoods of northern cities, a result of direct appeals by Democratic Party leaders who cited New Deal programs and the ways they helped improve the lives of poor blacks. One DNC campaign pamphlet circulated among black voters in 1936 said: “He clothed us when we were naked, gave us drink when we thirsted, fed us when we were hungry and gave us shelter when we were out in the cold.”
The appeal worked. Although Democrats had not tried to pass civil rights laws, author Nancy J. Weiss wrote in her 1983 book, “Farewell to the Party of Lincoln,” that FDR “had managed to convey to [black voters] that they counted and belonged.”
FDR’s success started to break the Republicans’ hold on the black vote, but he did not secure their permanent loyalty. While 68 percent of blacks voted for him in the 1944 presidential elections, only 40 percent identified themselves as Democrats. Harry Truman’s 1948 campaign — following his party’s endorsement of civil rights and his desegregation of the military — earned Democrats a record 77 percent of black votes, but President Dwight Eisenhower fought back, appointing progressive judges, proposing a civil rights law and sending in federal troops to desegregate public schools in Little Rock. In 1956, blacks rewarded Eisenhower with the highest percentage of black votes for a Republican in a generation — 39 percent.
That prompted Democrats like Senate Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson to worry that Republicans might stage a comeback with black voters by pushing long-desired civil rights legislation. In 1957, in anticipation of the 1958 midterm elections, Eisenhower offered a mild civil rights bill that Johnson and the Senate’s Democrats amended and passed into law. But absent Johnson’s skillful maneuvering to head off a Southern filibuster, the bill would likely have failed. In the end, Johnson’s public embrace of the legislation, combined with his arm-twisting and deft management of the debate, earned him and his party the most credit for the bill’s passage.
By the early 1960s, Democrats were on their way to securing the black vote — 68 percent in 1960 and, because of Johnson’s strong support of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 91 percent in 1964. But even after Johnson’s signature on a major civil rights bill, blacks didn’t switch party registrations in large numbers. In the 1964 election, 52 percent of blacks still told pollsters they considered themselves Republican.
Civil rights and voting rights bills delivered the votes of black Americans in the mid-1960s to Democrats. But it was Johnson’s subsequent Great Society programs — Medicaid, Medicare, education and fair housing laws — that improved their lives in more tangible and profound ways and, in turn, secured their lasting affection.
As Republicans vie for Hispanic votes, they must consider that passing one law may not be sufficient — and, worse, as the 1957 Civil Rights Act demonstrated, they may get little credit for its passage. Even the Republicans’ high-profile, vital role in passing the 1964 Civil Rights Act earned them little lasting affection from blacks after the 1964 GOP nominee, Barry Goldwater, voted against the bill and his party opposed Johnson’s Great Society.
This long, contentious courtship of black voters suggests that a successful Republican effort to win over Hispanics might take many years, perhaps a decade or more. A quick-fix approach may yield little.
That’s not to say that immigration reform shouldn’t be the starting point. Support for such legislation could be worthwhile if Republicans start winning even a slightly larger share of the Hispanic vote in 2014. Nonetheless, immigration reform is not the top concern of most Hispanics. According to an impreMedia/Latino Decisions pre-election poll, 53 percent of Hispanic voters listed the economy and jobs as their top concern. Thirty-five percent were most concerned about immigration, but health care and education were also significant issues.
As Republicans work to win Hispanic voters, they would do well to view immigration reform as a kind of civil rights act, knowing, however, that Hispanics also want their own version of the Great Society. That means Republicans must be prepared to develop a deep, lasting commitment to a panoply of issues important to Hispanics.
That will be more difficult, especially if the party wants to maintain its conservative, anti-immigration base. But if winning Hispanic votes is the goal, this approach will likely be more productive. What the civil rights era demonstrates is that the lasting affection of a significant demographic cannot be bought with one bill. To alter the political landscape, Republicans must begin the long, hard work of establishing and nurturing a deeper, meaningful relationship with Hispanics.